You are on page 1of 8


, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila 243 SCRA 32 2. VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC.vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION 274 SCRA 642 3. PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO 253 SCRA 10 4. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS 251 SCRA 42 5. Philippine national bank V. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 134 6. ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR 414 SCRA 288 7. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 537 SCRA 373 8. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR 492 SCRA 1 9. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 422 SCRA 376 10. Veronico Tenebro vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals 423 SCRA 472 Quita vs Court of Appeals December 22, 1998 Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas m arriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their country s national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo. SAN LUIS vs SAN LUIS FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.Felicisimo San Luis was married to Vriginia Sulit. This relationship bore six children.Virginia Sulit died in 1963. With this Felicisimo was able to marry Merry Lee Crown whichmarriage bore a son. Five years into the marriage, Merry filed for divorce in Hawaii which wasgranted by the court. Felicisimo eventually married herein repsondent Felicidad San Luis withwhom he had no children. When Felicisimo died in 1992, Felicidad filed for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and estate settlement stating the legal heirs of Felicisimo was her as thelegal wife, the six children from the first marriage and the son from the second marriage. The sonof Merry contested this saying that she was not the legal wife hence not a legal heir becauseFelicisimo was still married to Merry. He justified this by saying that the divorce decree acquiredin Hawaii is not recognized in the Philippines of whom Felicisimo was a citizen. The court sidedwith the son and declared Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo as null and void ab intio. The Courtof Appeal however, reversed this decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree granted to Merry Lee Crown is recognized in thePhilippines RULING:The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that the Philippines recognizes divorce decrees acquired by the alien spouse in another country provided that it is valid according to their national law. In the present case, Merry LeeCrowns divorce decree is considered valid. This provision permits the Filipino form a mixedmarriage to enter into another marriage because the law does not wish to keep the personattached while the alien spouse is free to marry and is considered single. REPUBLIC vs IYOY FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.Crasus Iyoy was married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to fivechildren. Fely Iyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent Crasus documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasuseventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship hasconceived of a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Felys subsequent marriage.The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely. ISSUE: Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is validand recognized in the Philippines RULING:The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Courts decision. Basingfrom the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marryingMicklus a year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such away that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and thereforeshe does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as subsisting. TheCivil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the Philippines. RP V. IYOY 21 Sept. 2005 FACTS:After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, tothe care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasusreceived a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded thesaid request. Sometime in

1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely totheir children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel inCebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for thebrain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued tolive with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Suchincapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines .ISSUE:Should the divorce obtained abroad by the Filipino wife be recognized as valid? RULING:Article 26 of the Family Code provides:"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force inthe country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in thiscountry, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38."WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLYCELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THEALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALLLIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurdand unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although thelatter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorceabroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbandscitizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art.26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embracesanother citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still beconsidered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants tothe former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does notexist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential maritalcovenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrentand will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couplegetting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the caseof respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. Inthe same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time shefiled for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. REPUBLIC vs ORBECIDO III FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court.Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in Ozamis City in the year 1941.This relationship gave birth two a son and daughter. Said son was with Lady when she left for the States in 1986. Cipriano knew eventually that his wife has become a naturalized citizen of theStates and learned that she has married another man after acquiring a divorce decree. Ciprianoasked the declaration of the court permitting him to remarry. The Solicitor General asrepresentative for the State contends that he cannot be granted permission to remarry becauseLady was not a foreign citizen specifically when he married her and the law only recognizesdivorce acquired by the alien spouse. Petition was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Code permits Cipriano to remarry after a divorce was acquired by Lady RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative, however, it denied Cipriano permission to remarry.The court in answering in the affirmative on the issue based their decision on paragraph 2of Section 26 of the Family Code which provides for the recognition of a divorce decree validlyacquired by the alien spouse in another country. This is to permit the Filipino spouse to remarryas a matter of fairness because the foreign spouse ceased to be attached to the Filipino. What isrelevant here is that Lady was no longer a citizen of the Philippines when she acquired thedivorce bringing her within the purview of Section 26. She is considered an alien who obtained adivorce decree. This then capacitates Cipriano to remarry. Unfortunately, for his petition to begranted, he has to prove to the court that a divorce decree has been validly acquired by his wife.However, he failed to do so, hence, the court cannot permit him to remarry. REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA (G.R NO. 108763) This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molinas marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the

trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recours e. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more o f a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no w ise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESGR No. 174689October 22, 2007 CORONA, J.:When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.(Genesis 5:12)Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming frominside the bamboo. Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!, the voices said. She peckedthe reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came twohuman beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man Malakas(Strong) and the woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize thechanges made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person s sex?May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificateto reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? FACTS:On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the changeof his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, alleging that he isa male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that hehad always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, heconsulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a womanculminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. Hethen sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,and his sex from male to female.On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting thepetition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with his sexualre-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possessesthe physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his owndoing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm,injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On thecontrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of thepetitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams.On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries inthe birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appealsrendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court. Hence,this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioners name and sex in his birth certificate is allowedunder Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA9048. HELD:A PERSONS FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name arecontrolled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person canchange his name or surname without judicial authority.This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1of RA 9048 provides:SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can becorrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general inaccordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertainpetitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul generalconcerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is nowprimarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law isto exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unlessan administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewiselays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and theproceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of firstname or nickname may

be allowed in any of the following cases:(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion.Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment . Heintended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself intothrough surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may onlycreate grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable causeor any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will beprejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first namewas not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy becausethe proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed inthe wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where hisbirth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and officialname does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctlydismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. Garcia Vda. De Chua vs. CA March 5, 1998 FACTS:Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sonswith her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianshipand administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for itsdismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and thatthe decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the saidcourt was not the proper forum to settle said matters.The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences thatshe used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; ResidenceCertificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and wasborn in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where thestatus of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he wasmarried and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish thevalidity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court,but it decided in favor of herein respondents. ISSUE:Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua .RULING:The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding thatpetitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of thedecedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce.Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documentscannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from theLocal Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which shepresented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner shouldhave presented. Failure to present it as an evidence would make the marriage dubious. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent March 29, 1995 FACTS:Respondent Judge Francisco R. Brillantes, Jr. is charged by complainant with gross immortalityand ignorance of impropriety for having been cohabiting with and subsequently married YolandaDe Castro, complainants live -in partner and of whom he has two children, despite of him beingmarried twice with Ongkiko which alleges to be invalid for having been celebrated without amarriage license. His subsequent marriage with De Castro was celebrated without havingobtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Ongkiko. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent judge is legally capacitated to contact a subsequent marriage withouthaving secured a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage. RULING:Under Article 40 of the Family Code of the Philippines, there must be a judicial declaration of thenullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Thus,respondent judge is not legally capacitated to contract his subsequent marriage with De Castro,his first marriage with Ongkiko not having been judicially declared null and void for lack of a marriage license. LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent March 29, 1995 FACTS:This is a complaint for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against the judge-respondent. The respondent was co-habiting with the complainants live-in partner (Yolanda De Castro), which the respondent claims to have married in Los Angeles on December 4, 1991.When respondent married De Castro, he believed that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent denies having been married to Zenaida Ongkiko (first wife), although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of Ongkikos parents, they were again married inJune of the same year and neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko allegedly abandoned him 17 years ago and left their children in his care. ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage entered into by the respondent and Zenaida Ongkiko was void abinitio

RULING: Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriagebefore a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. The Family Code applies in the case although the respondent argues that his first marriage was made prior to the Codes effectivity.Moreover, the retroactive application of the Code doesnt impair any vest ed right of therespondent.Following the rule that all marriages are valid unless annulled by a competent court, the marriagebetween respond and Ongkiko is valid although they dont have a marriage license. Furthermore,the respondent cant invoke that their marriage was void ab initio because they have, in fact, beenmarried twice. And without any a judicial decision annulling their marriage, it remains valid. Therespondent is dismissed from the service. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebrationof their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to thepresent time. The petition alleged the noncomplied marital obligations: During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from arich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house o r would play tennis the whole day When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner wascompelled to leave their conjugal dwelling The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to complywith the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationshipbetween the petitioner and the respondent -Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is nocause for action .ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana HELD: YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission as seenin factsFAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESSSec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage petition does not need to show (NOT) root causesince only experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. SIMPLIFICATION DIANA contends that the 2nd petition of his husband is defective because it fails to allege the rootcause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require thepetition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no need toallege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine theroot cause and at times they couldnt determine it). What the new Rules require the petition to allegeare physical manifes tations indicative of psychological incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo complieswith this requirement. (he has stated in his petition facts to support his claim stated in the FACTS) TONGOL vs. TONGOL Facts: On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando Tongol alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. Inher Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlandos insufficiency to fulfil hisobligation as married man. Both paties underwent a psychological exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.Does the psychological problem of of Mrs. Filipina Tongol enough to compel the court to nullify their marriage?No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must exist during the ceremony of the marriage, the psychological incapacity must be apparent as to the extent that the other party is uncapable the significance of their marriage andlastly, the malady must be incurable. The definition ormanifestation of marriage must within the scope of article 36of the Family Code. As in the present case, the psychological is sufficiency of Mrs tongol is not severe that would render her incapable of recognize the sanctity of her marital contractwith her husband, second, Dr. vellegas failed to prove the that the ailment is incurable. As to the facts of thepsychological examination report say: the emotional malady iscused merely by rejection of Mrs. Tongol by her mother when she was yong. Further, the facts of the case did not show thatMrs. Tongol did not care about the welfare of their children.And the financial issue as being cited in the facts, the courtdeemed that such phenomena is natural in evry marriage andcan be settled easily. Hence the court dismissed the petitionof the nullity of marriage. Digest on ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR.(Voidable Marriage) FACTS:Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He purchased a house in BelAir,Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever hes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Francisco Brillantes sleepingon his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes.Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with him.He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage was void.ISSUE: WON Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity?

HELD: No. Dismissed from service. RATIO:1. FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code.2. Bad faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary. VALDEZ vs. FINANCIERA MANILAG.R. No. 183387, September 29, 2009 Facts:Petitioner and his wife, Lydia D. Valdez, among others, filed a Complaint for asum of money against respondent Financiera Manila, Inc. Thereafter, the RTC rendered its Decision finding respondent Financiera liable to plaintiffs. An appeal was then filed with the CA, which affirmed the award of actual damages and remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the award for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. Subsequently, Compromise Agreements were entered into among the parties. The said Compromise Agreements were approved. A writ of execution was issued. The plaintiffs however filed a motion for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement on the ground that no payment was expected from respondent Financiera. The motion was denied by the court. Respondent Financiera filed an Urgent Motion for Execution dated November 13, 2006 of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-98-35546.Petitioner Valdez, on the other hand, filed a motion for the execution. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227 denied respondent Financiera's urgent motion and granted petitioner Valdez's motion for execution. Thereafter, respondent Financiera filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was eventually denied, prompting it to file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Valdez; hence, the latter now resorts to the present petition and ascribes to the CA. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals has no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. Ruling: Considering that an appeal was still available as a remedy for the assailed Orders of the RTC, the filing of the petition for certiorari was an attempted substitute for an appeal. Necessarily, it must be noted that the petition for certiorari was filed on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality. The Order became final when respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007 denying the formers motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007.Instead of filing a notice of appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July14, 2007, respondent filed a petition for certiorari, way beyond the reglementary period.. Hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to decide the said petition for certiorari. RULE 44 (Ordinary Appealed Cases) Marceliano Monato III SPS. JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO, vs. LEONARDO YAMANE FACTS:The RTC rendered a decision adverse to the respondent. Respondentreceived a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998. He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998, within which to file an appeal. Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new counsel be allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30,1998. It was eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was denied.Respondent subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1998 before the Court of Appeals. By this time, the original period to appeal had expired. However, CA gave due course to the appeal and reversed the RTC's Decision. ISSUE:WON the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period. HELD: The CA is correct in giving due course to the appeal despite failure to file it within the reglementary period.Section 3, Rule 41 provides:Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to altera final judgment. There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the presence of any justifying circumstance recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In other instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a)matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the failure to show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced."In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to preventa gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee. The Supreme Court believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly warranted in the present controversy. The Court carefully studied the merits of the case and noted that the review being sought has not been shown to be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has come to the conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, must be set aside. It would be far better and more prudent to attain the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice in the process. Thus, we would rather excuse a technical lapse and afford respondent a review of the case on appeal. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDS SURNAME ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005 Facts: Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to the name of the said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to all childs mothe r, Armi

A. Alba He averred that such challenged entries are false. Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from NSO and Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong.The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the hearing was set. On the scheduled hearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition, Armi was not present. The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending that she came to know of the decision of the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioners surname from Herrera to Alba. Armi contended that she and private respondent cohabited and after their separation, he continued to give support to their son.Private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with Armi. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother. Held: Under Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, w/c took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother , unless their father recognizes their filiation, in w/c case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang vs. Cebu Civil Registrar it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiations is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status us an acknowledged illegitimate held. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO RECOVER PROPERTY OBTAINED BY FRAUD GIVING RISE TO AN IMPLIED TRUST; PROBATE FOR WILL SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL AND CONSOLACION SISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REMEDIOS EGUENIO-GINO G.R. No. 115925. August 15, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Sison and respondent Eugenio-Gino are the niece and grandaughter , respectively of the late Canuto Sison. Canuto and 11 other individuals including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano were co-owners of a property known as Lot 2 covered by an original certificate of title. On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan under which, Canuto sold his share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion. On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto, namely Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion, which the latter registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On February 4, 1988, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse, Ricardo Pascual for annulment of transfer of certificate of title because the former claimed that she is the owner of the lots since Catalina devised the land to her in Catalinas last will. Remedies also added that the lots were obtained through fraudulent means since the area covered by the TCT is twice the size of Canuto.Petitioner sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claim that the basis of the action is fraud and the action should have been filed within four years from the registration of Consolacions title on October 28, 196 8 and not some 19 years later on February 4, 1988.The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the presentation of the parties evidence du ring the trial. Issue: Whether or not the action for annulment or cancellation of transfer of certificate of title by Remedios has prescribed. Held: The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the time of the discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is ten years pursuant to Article 1144. this ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. Remedies filed her complaint on February 4, 1988 or more than 19 years after Consolacion registered her title over the lot on October 28, 1968. Unquestionably, Remedios filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. Remedies anchors her right in filing the suit on her being a devisee of Catalinas last will. However, since the probate cour t has not admitted Catalinas last will, Remedios has not acquired any right under the last will. Remedies is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot 2 or to enforce an implied trust over these lots. It was inappropriate to order the reconveyance of the subject lots to Remedios in her capacity as executrix of Catalinas last will because she sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots. Case: Republic vs. CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila Son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse. In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of

the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture." Issue:Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological incapacity? Ruling: No. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to the SC to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability Guidelines on Psychological Incapacity 1.The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.2.The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a .Medically or clinically identified .Alleged in the complaint. Sufficiently proven by experts. Clearly explained in the decision3.The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of themarriage4.Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent orincurable5.Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage6.The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by: Articles 68-71, 220,221and 225 of FC7.Interpretations of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, must be given great respect by thecourts8.The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Generalto appear as a counsel of the State