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Part 1 How to Challenge an Assignment of Mortgage By Glenn Augenstein Have you ever wondered what the phrase Borrower

r is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to mortgage under BORROWER COVENANTS meant? Glenn Augenstein, a seasoned researcher and expert witness in foreclosure fraud, has taken the time to research the ancient word seisin which gives us better insight into what the mortgage document was meant to convey. This two-part post is worth the read and education and may give you a new perspective on the intention of the documents and the necessity to defend the title at all costs.

Weve seen numerous times, in numerous cases, a Homeowner/borrower/defendant and plaintiff (Homeowner) precluded from raising any issues relating to a defective assignment of mortgage (AOM). This language, or similar, is frequently uttered by the court in a final order denying the Homeowner has standing to challenge an assignment of mortgage, and also usually granting summary judgment to plaintiff bank, Defendant is not a party to the contract, or a 3 rd party beneficiary, and therefore has no standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. One case frequently cited by banks to support such rulings in the past three (3) years is Livonia Property Holdings, L.L.C., v. Farmington Road Holdings, L.L.C., 717 F.Supp.2d 724 (E.D.Mich. 2010), stating Borrower disputes the validity of the assignment documents on several grounds outlined above. But, as a non-party to those documents, it lacks standing to attack them. It is significant that the same court held differently two (2) years later in another case. It is true that the Livonia Properties opinion contains the statement that there is ample authority to support the proposition that a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge that assignment, Livonia Properties, 399 F. Appx at 102 (quoting Livonia Properties Holdings, LLC v. 12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC, 717 F.Supp.2d 724, 736-37 (E.D. Mich. 2010)); but when read carefully the case does not stand for such a general and unqualified position. The Court believes, therefore, that Livonia Properties does not compel the conclusion that a foreclosure plaintiff can never attack the foreclosure by challenging the validity of an underlying assignment. Talton v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 839 F.Supp.2d 896 (E.D.Mich. 2012). Banks arent nearly as quick (heh, heh) to wrap their arms around this counter holding. Before making a mere laymans attempt at providing answer(s) to potential questions raised above Id first like to cover a bit of history in regard to conveyance of interests in, and ownership of, real estate generally. It is long standing, and well established, that someone ALWAYS owns land, and that such ownership be a matter of public knowledge, of the public record.

Conveyance Before Writing Livery of Seisin Before the Norman Conquest of 1066 writing in England was uncommon, and for several centuries after. Ownership of land, and changes in ownership, were memorialized in the publics knowledge via livery of seisin. Blacks Law Dictionary (8th Edition, 2004) offers the following: Livery of seisin. Hist. The ceremony by which a grantor conveyed land to a grantee. Livery of seisin involved either (1) going on the land and having the grantor symbolically deliver possession of the land to the grantee by handing over a twig, a clod of dirt, or a piece of turf (called livery in deed) or (2) going within sight of the land and having the grantor tell the grantee that possession was being given, followed by the grantees entering the land (called livery in law). See SEISIN. [Cases: Deeds 21.C.J.S. Deeds 1213.] [W]e may now pause to wonder how transfer of these potentially infinite in terests was accomplished. Without a modern system of land records, it would be desirable that the transfer be effected with sufficient ceremony not only to mark itself indelibly in the memories of the participants, but also to give notice to interested persons such as the mesne lord above the transferor. The central idea was to make ritual livery (meaning delivery, from the Old French livrer) of seisin (meaning, roughly, possession, from the Old French saisir or seisir). The transferor and transferee would go to the land to be transferred, and the transferor would then hand to the transferee a lump of soil or a twig from a tree all the while intoning the appropriate words of grant, together with the magical words and his heirs if the interest transferred was to be a potentially infinite one. Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 1011 (2d ed. 1984). The ceremony was usually attended by witnesses. I imagine the bigger the parcel of land the more witnesses were in attendance. In the absence of a writing it was the ceremony and witnesses that created the public knowledge, and thereby the public record. Though writing was rare a written charter of feoffment would occasionally be drafted. This might occur when the boundaries of a given parcel were particularly complex. Even when employed the charter would not by itself be the conveyance. The conveyance was the livery of seisin and without same the charter was of no effect. Language utilized in charters helps to illustrate this point. It wasnt By this charter I hereby give Rather it was Know ye that I have given Livery of seisin was the present tense ceremony of conveyance. A charter of feoffment was a past tense writing about an event that had already occurred. In the presence of a writing it was still the witnesses that created the public record. Who owns Blackacre? Jones owns Blackacre. How do we know Jones owns Blackacre? There were seventeen (17) witnesses in attendance at the livery of seisin in which Smith conveyed Blackacre to Jones.

Livery of seisin was not abolished in England until 1925 with the passage of The Law of Property Act. The Statute of Frauds In the latter part of the seventeenth (17th) century a new method of conveyance and recordation was, out of necessity, developed; In the aftermath of the English Civil War in 1642-1651, a midst some confusion, there were efforts to game the existing system of livery of seisin, and to acquire some ill booten gotty, er.., um ill gotten booty. The method employed was to hire a couple of contract perjurers to act as false witnesses, usually locals in good standing in the community, to come into court and offer perjured statements in regard to a land transaction . Yes, I saw Jones sell Blackacre to Johnson for 10 sterling, on a handshake. You can imagine Jones was rather upset by this. The party employing the more upstanding community member would usually win these disputes. Enter the profession of the contract perjurer. [Some things never change. DC Ed] After several years it became quite clear what was occurring crooked folks were hiring the best, most well thought of contract perjures they could find, and stealing properties across the countryside and how the courts had become complicit, unwittingly or otherwise, in the fraudulent takings. Enter the English Statute of Frauds of 1677. The important parts are relatively short. The emphasis is mine. For prevention of many fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury: Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majestie by and with the advice and conse nt of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and the Commons in this present Parlyament assembled and by the authoritie of the same That from and after the fower and twentyeth day of June which shall be in the yeare of our Lord one thousand six hundred seaventy and seaven All Leases Estates Interests of Freehold or Termes of yeares or any uncertaine Interest of in to or out of any Messuages Mannours Lands Tenements or Hereditaments made or created by Livery and Seisin onely or by Parole and not putt in Writeing and signed by the parties soe making or creating the same or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized by Writeing, shall have the force and effect of Leases or Estates at Will onely and shall not either in Law or Equity be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect, Any consideration for makeing any such Parole Leases or Estates or any former Law or Usage to the contrary notwithstanding. The original V is the portion relating to conveyances and sales of real estate. V. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the 4 and twentieth day of June, all devises and bequests of any lands, or tenements, devisable either by force of the

statute of wills, or by this statute, or by force of the custom of Kent, or the custom of any borough, or any other particular custom, shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express directions, by three or four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect. [Research source] Between the writing and the three or four credible witnesses this resolved the problems of the contract perjurer. Now it becomes the writing that effectuates the conveyance. The Statute of Frauds brought back some stability and reliability to land ownership, and private property rights. It was utilized in America before independence. Recording statutes also grew up around the Statute of Frauds. After independence the same Statute of Frauds was retained by the founders, and the land recording systems and statutes as well. Every state has adopted a similar version of the original English Statute of Frauds into its own statutes. For centuries this system worked quite well. Until the last decade or so. But now those with bad intentions have discovered ways around the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Perjured testimony in court as the only proof doesnt cut it any more. What is required is an executed writing that also lies. Were now dealing with rampant contract perjury, and contract forgery. It is utterly insane. The astute recorders, of which there arent many (John OBrien, Kelley Monahan, Curtis Hertel, Jeff Thigpen, Phil Ting [forgive me if I've left any out]), liken their recorders offices, and records, to being a crime scene, and that seems to be accurate. Part 2 - How to Challenge an Assignment of Mortgage by Glenn Augenstein Glenn Augenstein, a seasoned researcher and expert witness in foreclosure fraud, has taken the time to research the ancient word seisin which gives us better insight into what the mortgage document was meant to convey. Recent Case Law Wells Fargo v Erobobo On this I must first comment that standing, or lack thereof, is considered differently in some jurisdictions than it is others. Some treat it as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded timely or it is considered waived. Because the issue of standing is distinct from the issue of subjectmatter jurisdiction and, thus, can be waived, we hold that an appellate court cannot, on its own motion, resolve an appeal based upon a lack of standing before the trial court. Harrison v. Leach, 323S.W.3d 702 (Ky. 2010). Others treat it as a brother to jurisdiction, which cannot be waived, and consider being so closely related that standing, or a lack thereof, cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal.

The recent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo of Supreme Court Kings County NY engaged in a brief discussion in re standing, and how it related to the instant case. Many decisions treat the question of whether the Plaintiff in a foreclosure action owns the note and mortgage as if it were a question of standing and governed by CPLR 3211(e). Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Randolph Bowling, 25 Misc 3d 1244(A), 906 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty 2009); Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Youkelsone, 303 AD2d 546, 546547 (2d Dept 2003); Natl Mtge. Consultants v. Elizaitis, 23 AD3d 630, 631 (2d Dept 2005); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 2009 NY Slip Op 7624, (2d Dept 2009). However, Plaintiffs ownership of the note is not an issue of standing but an element of its cause of action which it must plead and prove. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, 042913 NYMISC, 2013-50675. Not to be deterred plaintiff had attempted a bit of misdirection to shift the argument to one of standing. Plaintiff argues that Defendants claim that Plaintiff does not own the n ote and mortgage amounts to a standing argument, and because Defendant failed to raise standing in his answer as an affirmative defense or pre answer motion, he cannot do so now. ibid. This was a well-played burden of proof tactic, as the Erobobo general denial was considered sufficient to place the burden on Wells Fargo. The Erobobo Court went on to offer an excellent analysis of the relevant Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) that alleged to own/hold the Erobobo note and mortgage. Section 2.01, subsection 1 of the PSA requires that transfer and assignment of mortgages must be effected by hand delivery, for deposit with the Trustee with the original note endorsed in blank. Section 2.05 of the PSA requires that the Depositor transfer all righ t, title, interest in the mortgages to the Trustee, on behalf of the trust, as of the Closing Date. The Closing Date as provided in the PSA is November 14, 2006. Option One assigned Defendants mortgage loan to the Plaintiff, as the Trustee, on July 15, 2008, approximately eighteen months after the trust had closed. ibid . Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trust on contravention of the trust is void. EPTL 7-2.4. Therefore, the acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed, would be void. ibid Defendant Erobobo argued that in addition to timely conveyance, pursuant to the strict and regimented requirements in Section 2.01 and 2.05, conveyance to the trust must be by a specific party, the Depositor. In Erobobo the The assignment of the note and mortgage from Option One rather than from the Depositor ABFC violates section 2.01 of the PSA which requires that the Depositor deliver to and deposit the original note, mortgage and assignments to the Trustee.

The assignment of the Defendants note and mortgage, having not been assigned from the Depositor to the Trust, is therefore void as in being in contravention of the PSA .The evidence submitted by Defendant that the note was acquired after the closing date and that assignment was not made by the Depositor, is sufficient to raise questions of fact as to whether the Plaintiff owns the note and mortgage, and precludes granting Plaintiff summary judgment. ibid Standing to challenge an assignment of mortgage was not a central issue in Well Fargo v Erobobo. However, the court made a very significant ruling in respect of the requirements of the PSA, and the application of NY EPTL 7-2.4 It is important to note the ruling in Erobobo is merely interlocutory. At some point there may be further deliberations. Until a final order is issued the case remains on the Supreme Court of Kings County NY active docket. No appeal can be taken from an interlocutory order. The entire interlocutory order is available here. In re Saldivar Approximately 5.5 weeks after the Erobobo interlocutory order a Texas Bankruptcy Case, In re Saldivar, cited to the case. As a threshold matter, the court must first address Chase and Deutsche Banks assertion that the Saldivars lack standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of mortgage to the Trust. In re Saldivar, Case No: 11-10689. The Saldivar court begins its discussion on Saldivars standing to challenge the validity of the assignment stating A third party generally lacks standing to challenge the validity of an assignment. Bank of American Natl Assoc. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., et al., 981 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). ibid It then considers whether the Trustees acts in contravention to the PSA, and NY EPTL 7-2.4, are ultra vires, and merely voidable, but not void ab initio. Finally the Saldivar Court states, Based on the Erobobo decision and the plain language of N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law 7-2.4, the Court finds that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars Note after the start up day is void ab initio. As such, none of the Saldivars claims will be dismissed for lack of standing. In Re Saldivar, Case No: 11-10689. There are likely to be further deliberations in In Re Saldivar. The entire In Re Saldivar opinion in is available here: GLASKI v BofA (PUBLISHED Version) This case seems to be a shot heard round world based on the amount of attention it has received since issue, and subsequent publication. There are a number of nuggets.

We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trusts chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trusts closing date. Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement. Glaski v. Bank of America, National Association, F064556. I am particularly fond of footnote 6 in which the court states, Because the trial court took judicial notice of the existence and recordation of the assignment earlier in the litigation, we too will consider the assignment, but will not presume the matters stated therein are true. (See pt. IV.B, post.) For instance, we will not assume that JP Morgan actually held any interests that it could assign to LaSalle Bank. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [taking judicial notice of a recorded assignment does not establish assignee's ownership of deed of trust].) ibid Here the Glaski court is unwilling to extend a presumption of good faith in respect of the validity or veracity of the recorded document. This seems something of a sea change. By refusing to presume good faith the court is unwilling to merely accept as true whatever documents BANA may wave under the Courts nose. It appears the veracity can be challenged, and must needs be proven. Another good nugget, Despite the foregoing cases, we will join those courts that have read the New York statute literally. We recognize that a literal reading and application of the statute may not always be appropriate because, in some contexts, a literal reading might defeat the statutory purpose by harming, rather than protecting, the beneficiaries of the trust. In this case, however, we believe applying the statute to void the attempted transfer is justified because it protects the beneficiaries of the WaMu Securitized Trust from the potential adverse tax consequence of the trust losing its status as a REMIC trust under the Internal Revenue Code. Because the literal interpretation furthers the statutory purpose, we join the position stated by a New York court approximately two months ago: Under New York Trust Law, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust is void. EPTL 7-2.4. Therefore, the acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed, would be void. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo (Apr. 29, 2013) 39 Misc.3d 1220(A), 2013 WL 1831799, slip opn. p. 8; see Levitin & Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, supra, 28 Yale J. on Reg. at p. 14, fn. 35 [under New York law, any transfer to the trust in contravention of the trust documents is void].) id The above section seems to have as its intent protection of the bond or certificate holders, the beneficiaries, from adverse tax consequences that could result from the trustee violating the governing trust documents and losing REMIC tax status. This position is significantly different from the oft repeated lines put forward by bank PR firms of The homeowner just wants a free house. There may be further deliberations on Glaski.

The entire Glaski v. Bank of America, National Association opinion, post publication, is available here. Choice of Law Provision Upon satisfying the court one has standing to challenge the invalidity of an assignment, or substitution of trustee, or conveyance, where do you go next? The above cases of Erobobo, In re Saldivar, and Glaski all tie in New York Estate Powers and Trust Law (NY EPTL). Several sections, but particularly 7-2.4. If youre in Ohio, or Nebraska, gaining that standing may not help in having the court apply NY EPTL. Enter the choice of law provision (CLP). If your battling a party different than the originating lender it is likely your loan has been securitized into a mortgage backed security trust. The PSA is the document that expresses the duties, authorities, and limits and disabilities of the trustee. In almost all the PSAs Ive reviewed there is a section, usually in Article 11.04 titled Governing Law; Jurisdiction. The language in the first sentence or two usually reads something like: This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, and the obligations, rights and remedies of the parties hereunder shall be determined in accordance with such laws. It appears the Ohio court is going to be entirely reticent at now having to become knowledgeable in regard to New York law, and particularly NY EPTL. But a lifesaver has been thrown out to us on the frigid, choppy waters. One of the cases referenced and cited to above, Bank of American Natl Assoc. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., has some very beneficial language in respect of a CLP. We are cognizant that we have already concluded that defendants are not entitled to rely on the PSAs choice-of-law provision; however, we do not view the application of New York law under these circumstances as an invocation by defendants. Quite simply, plaintiff was a party to a transaction that took place under and contained a choice-of-law provision expressly contemplating the application of New York law. Continuing, In any event, by participating in transactions under the PSA, it is plaintiffs actions, rather than defendants, that make New York law applicable to this issue. Bank of American Natl Assoc. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., et al. 981 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). If you scour some legal databases for cases in your jurisdiction it is likely youll find some beneficial appellate level case law in respect of CLP. While CLP isnt frequently discussed it is not a new, unproven legal theory. It has substantial history. With such you should be able to move your court to rule in accordance with New York law. Bassman continues with this other nugget relating more directly to standing to challenge an assignment, Therefore, a borrower generally lacks standing to challenge the assignment. Id. at 736. However, a borrower may raise a defense to an assignment that would render it

absolutely invalid, that is, void. Id. at 735-36; Tri-Cities Construction, Inc. v. American National Insurance Co., 523 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (The law is settled that the obligors of a claim may defend the suit brought thereon on any ground which renders the assignment void, but may not defend on any ground which renders the assignment voidable only, because the only interest or right which an obligor of a claim has in the instrument of assignment is to insure himself that he will not have to pay the same claim twice.); See also: Greene v. Reed, 486 P.2d 222, 224 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1971); cf. Young v. Chicago Federal Savings & Loan Assn, 180 Ill.App.3d 280, 284 (1989) (If a valid assignment is effected, the assignee acquires all of the interest of the assignor in the property that is transferred. (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); ONeill v. De Laney, 92 Ill.App.3d 292, 297 (1980) (holding that third party could challenge validity of a contract where she established a significant and direct interest in its validity) [emphasis added]. Ibid Back Dating an AOM, or Substitution of Trustee With livery of seisin it was the ceremony (and witnesses) that created the conveyance. With the Statute of Frauds it was the writing (and witnesses) that created the conveyance. These were both present tense transactions. Why have we seen so many back dated, past tense, writings in the past several years? Can a present tense transaction be converted to one that is past tense? The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals in Juarez v Select Portfolio, No. 11-2431, February 12, 2013, handed down what many believed to be a new holding in saying In this case, even a perfunctory scrutiny of the Corporate Assignment of Mortgage attached by Jurez to her amended complaint reveals that we are before a document that was executed after the foreclosure and that it purports to reference, by virtue of its heading, a pre-foreclosure assignment. Specifically, the heading reads Date of Assignment: June 13, 2007, and it states that the document was executed [o]n October 16, 2008. However, nothing in the document indicates that it is confirmatory of an assignment. This section above, and surrounding, was interpreted as meaning back dating of an Assignment of Mortgage was impermissible, and that this was a new holding. I respectfully beg to differ. Doing some random research in late 2012 I came across a nice 6th Circuit case from 1962. It seems our jurists at that time had more awareness in respect of the history of conveyance of ownership and interests in real property. They werent ambiguous about it. While it appears more recently to have been forgotten, it is long standing and well established that conveyances of interests in, or ownership of, land and real estate are present tense transactions only. Land cannot be transferred except by writing and necessarily is in the present tense. The writing itself is the transfer when executed [emphasis added]. Belcher v Elliot, 312 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1962).

Consider in the alternative an analysis by an attorney with whom I consult: Here, the purported assignment would need to be recorded on or about February 2, 2010, but the actual assignment had not yet occurred, making the task a legal impossibility. The soonest the June 11, 2010 assignment could have been recorded would be June 11, 2010 the day it allegedly occurred. Thus, the recording could never be timely completed to effectuate a February 2, 2010 transfer date. KRS 382.360(3), supra. (The backdating of a transfer of interest in real property raises other issues as well. For example, if A owns Blackacre on June 1, 2010 when B is seriously injured on the land due to a latent defect, but A transfers his interest in Blackacre on June 11, 2010, backdating the transfer to be effective as of February 2, 2010, does A escape liability for the injuries incurred by B? In the case sub judice, the purported assignment executed June 11, 2010 is a ruse designed solely to hoodwink the Court and party-litigants. The backdated mortgage assignment was executed several months after this lawsuit was filed; however, it unlawfully purports to be effective at some date in the past. This kind of assignment, if considered lawful, would wreak havoc on real property law, paving the way for fraudulent takings, the dismantling of recording statutes, and a breach of the publics trust that matters of public record can be relied upon as what is of public record on February 2, 2010, for example more than thirty days after Plaintiff allegedly obtained an interest in the mortgage. For example, a person examining the public records on February 2, 2010 simply would not know that the future June 11, 2010 back dated assignment existed. Why? Because June 11, 2010 had not yet happened, as had not the back dated assignment. The record would be silent about any alleged ownership interest, even though the purported assignment would have to have been filed by February 2, 2010. On February 2, 2010, the purported assignment did not exist and it certainly does not now exist as of February 2, 2010 just because Plaintiff says so. Why You Might Want to Pass in Asserting Standing to Raise Challenges to an AOM, or a Substitution of Trustee, or Conveyance Bassman (previously referenced) informs us of some of the additional difficulties of asserting, and proving, standing to challenge an assignment. To have standing, a party must have suffered an injury to a legally cognizable interest. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Espinoza, 293 Ill.App.3d 923, 929 (1997). Bank of American Natl Assoc. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., et al. 981 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Similar is expressed in many state constitutions that have an open courts doctrine. The concept of standing is implicit in the Kentucky Constitution, Bill of Rights 14 which states, in relevant part: All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay [emphasis added].

Implicit in the open courts provision of Kentuckys Constitution is a restraint upon the courts to the adjudication of actual justiciable controversies. Our Kentucky state Constitution reinforces this restraint within 112(5), which states, in relevant part: The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court [emphasis added]. These provisions limit access to the courts to real parties in interest suffering an injury. The open courts provision expresses that courts are to be open for justiciable causes. A justiciable cause has been defined by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as a controversy in which a present and fixed claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Ky. [1994]). The Kentucky Constitution places substantial restrictions on the power of judicial intervention by limiting its availability to those real parties in interest who have suffered an injury and pled a justiciable controversy. The limitation placed upon the power of judicial authority via Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution is a limitation upon the courts subject-matter jurisdiction, and as such, it cannot be waived. Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. [1993]). When presenting a challenge to a void AOM or conveyance are these the kinds of arguments you want to force yourself to make, and win? Right from the get go? There is an easier way. The Contractual Obligation to Defend Generally the Title, or Keep It Simple Silly The simpler we make this for our courts the more likely well obtain our desired result; a fair proceeding, equal and fair application of the rules of procedure, the rules of evidence, terminating in justice. Now, pull out, or up, your mortgage or deed of trust. Find the following language: BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to mortgage, grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. Over several years Ive looked at more mortgages than I care to admit. Given a choice between knowing any of this stuff and having a lit cigar stuck up my nose Id opt for the latter. I used to get paid to start fires without matches. Id rather be doing that still. The last five (5) years are not what I had planned. Yet I am here. You dont need to assert standing to challenge the validity of an assignment after all. Did you see the part that contractually obligates the borrower to defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands? To this layman it looks to be Contract Law 101. And even better it is found in a seminal document; the mortgage or DOT.

Since reading my own again several months ago (you cant EVER read your own documents, your own pleadings, motions and other papers, the pleadings, motions and other papers of adverse party, or the rules [Read the Rules. Read the Rules. Read the Rules] too many times), and noticing that language, Ive reviewed several hundred more mortgages and DOTs. Thus far Ive found the language in every one Ive reviewed. I hesitate to say it is universal, but Im hopeful. Every example Ive seen has always started with BORROWER COVENANTS in all caps (that makes it a bit easier to find). Ive seen it in different places, on different pages, but thus far it has been in every one Ive reviewed. Imagine this conversation. Homeowner: Your Honor, I dispute the validity of the assignment. Court: Youre a non-party to the assignment. You dont have standing to challenge it. Homeowner: Im not asserting standing to challenge the assignment, Your Honor. Im contractually obligated to defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands. Court: Are you trying to get a free house? Homeowner: No, Your Honor. My contractual obligation, expressed in the mortgage on page X, par. Y, is to protect the interests of the holder/owner/investor/real party in interest. It appears that is not the party before this court. Court: Well, I dont think that is what it means. Homeowner: It looks pretty unambiguous to me, Your Honor. Even if it is ambiguous, Your Honor, the doctrine of contra proferentem is applicable; ambiguities are to be construed unfavorably to the drafter. I didnt draft the mortgage From this point, fulfilling a contractual obligation to protect the interests of the proper party, connecting the dots that lead to the PSA, a CLP, and NY EPTL may become considerably easier.