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Pilapil vs.

Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS 345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000) FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank. On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse. In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administratix of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente. HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determinging the validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased. WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC,

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Branch 149, respondents. G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country. Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared

as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spou se capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

BAYOT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008 Facts: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on,

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Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. RTC ruled against Vicente. CA ruled in favor of Rebecca stating that the marriage between the spouses was already dissolved upon the grant of divorce since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for such decree. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Guam was sufficient to dissolve the marriage bond between them. Thus, the application for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC was no longer needed. Arguments: Petitioner: On March 21, 2001, Rebecca sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. Respondent: On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Supreme Court Ruling: There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during

her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente. Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. Republic vs Dayot Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

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FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time. Santos vs. Ca Case Digest Santos vs. Ca G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO GR. No. 184063 [January 24, 2011] FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the respondent husband had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children and that respondent husband just ate and slept all day and would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that respondent husband would venture into several businesses but all of these failed. Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent husband started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the

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conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitio ners relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he gambled. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City. He also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that petitioner wifes evidence failed to support her argument that respondent husband was indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. Thus: The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family. The court recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures. RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband.

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code. Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that: Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law. The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability. It rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It sai d that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an emotional immaturity and not psychological incapacity. Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable. ISSUE: WON the totality of petitioner wifes evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?

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HELD: No. RATIONALE: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting problems, and such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity. Lester Halili vs Chona Halili (G.R. No. 165424) FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 60010. Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake. Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage. Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

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ISSUE: Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of marriage. Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated. HELD: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-tocase basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as: a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection. In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED. MARCOS V. MARCOS Facts Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. Issues Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. Held Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,

however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina. REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425 FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting

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evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice? HELD: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was

not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

G.R. 166738 August 14, 2009 Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua, petitioner vs Edward Rumbaua- respondent Facts: The petitioner, petition to declare for the nullification of marriage against the respondent for the ground of psychological incapacitated to exercise essential obligations as shown by the following circumstances, the respondent was reneged on the promise to live in one roof after finding a job, failed to extend financial support to the petitioner, blaming the petitioner for the death of the mothers respondent, and presented himself single for all his transaction and pretended working in Davao although he was cohabiting with other woman in Novaliches City. Issue: Whether or not the psychological incapacity as basis for the declaration of nullification of marriage? Ruling: Article 36 of of its celebration the Family Code which provides tha t a marriage contracted by any party who at the time of its celebration, was psychological incapacitated to comply with the essential marital Obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even is such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Wherefore, in view of the considerations, we deny the petition and affirm the decision and resolution of the court of appeals. Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA 266 SCRA 324 FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever

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made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ?[i] HELD: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non -fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. Antonio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 Facts: Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that

petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void. Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the patho logic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Choa vs. Choa GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

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FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. David Dedel vs Court of Appeals & Sharon Corpuz-Dedel On November 20, 2010 Art 46 compared with PI (Psychological Incapacity) In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically

incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of AntiSocial Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven. HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage. Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No. 161793) FACTS: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trials court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the

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information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void? HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. SIAYNGCO V. SIAYNGCO The facts

He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; and that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement. [3] Manuel further alleged that Juanitas psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years. [4] In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint. [5] The Family Court denied Manuels petition declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juanita. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and granted Manuels petition. The Supreme Court however reversed the CA and held that: We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. The Supreme Court ruling (excerpts) [1] From the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been

of

the

case

[1] Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. [2] On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.

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allowed a window into the Siayngcos life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [2] Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. [3] The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. [4] The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the trial courts decision. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

Facts: Bonas illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup detat. He heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin. He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose. Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage. Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bonas mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history. On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bonas illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability. OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial court decision.

Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Ochosa vs Alano and Republic, G.R. 167459 Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondents G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011

Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Bonas alleged psychological incapacity

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did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence. Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor cant it be traced to the inception of their marriage. The psychiatrists conclusion about Bonas HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity. Dr. Rondains conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in 1980 and 1986, respectively. Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Mallion v. Alcantara GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006 Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? Held: Res judicata1 applies. Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the absence of a marriage license. Res judicata a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZMONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents. [G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996, PUNO, J.:] FACTS: 1. Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs a. Edmond Ruiz only son b. Maria Pilar Ruiz adopted daughter c. Maria Cathryn, Candice

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Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz 2. Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. 3. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz and respondents. 4. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father's holographic will. 5. 4 years after Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the deceaseds will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz a. Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. 6. The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. 7. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. 8. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. a. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00 9. Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will a. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 10. Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds a. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court b. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3 granddaughters c. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to Edmonds lack of opposition d. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance 11. CA sustained probate courts order. ISSUE: W/N the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: 1. to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren - NO 2. to order the release of the titles to certain heirs 3. to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. HELD: 1. grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. a. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity b. Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. 2. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or

b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations 3. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors a. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. b. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. 4. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law a. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. 5. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed . An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration. a. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited i. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favour ii. petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. iii. As executor, he is a mere

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trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992 DOCTRINE: Adopted child/ children has no right of representation FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of practically the same evidence. The Lower Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. HELD: A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro. the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. . The lower court agrees with private respondent that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required

before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. FACTS: Private respondent filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank. acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in its ruling. the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper and stranger may not invoke Art. that his wife. Subsequently. it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family. only she may invoke said Art. who were the ones that benefited from the loan. but that the same have failed. the spouses Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner. (petitioner). may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code. the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad. not being a member of the same family as respondent.HIYAS SAVINGS vs. Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family. Additionally. made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage. his wife Remedios. 154132 August 31. the Supreme Court. HELD: In applying the case of Magbaleta vs. 151. Inc. taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in its report. Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner. 151 of the Family Code. ruled that: once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family. Gonong. 2004 DOCTRINE: when a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family. 151 of the Civil Code. being a member of the same family as that of plaintiff. ACU A GR No. nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor. petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. SAYSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992 DOCTRINE: Adopted child/ children has no right of representation FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the

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intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. Both cases filed on the Lower Court were decided in favor Delia, et al. on the basis of practically the same evidence. The Lower Court declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. The appellate court affirmed that Delia, et al. are entitled to the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. However, Delia and Edmundo are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding that Delia and Edmundo are disqualified to inherit from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson. HELD: A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro. the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. . The lower court agrees with private respondent that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. FACTS: Private respondent filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank. acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in its ruling. the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper and stranger may not invoke Art. that his wife. Subsequently. it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family. only she may invoke said Art. who were the ones that benefited from the loan. but that the same have failed. the spouses Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner. (petitioner). may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family

Code. the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad. not being a member of the same family as respondent.HIYAS SAVINGS vs. Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family. Additionally. made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage. his wife Remedios. 154132 August 31. the Supreme Court. HELD: In applying the case of Magbaleta vs. 151. Inc. taking into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in its report. Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner. 151 of the Family Code. ruled that: once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family. Gonong. 2004 DOCTRINE: when a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family. 151 of the Civil Code. being a member of the same family as that of plaintiff. ACU A GR No. nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor. petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made.

Facts:On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law. Issue:Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt Held:Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

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(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-countryadoption as may be provided by law. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of theUnited States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenshipwhen she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Teotico vs. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 Facts: Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her

properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. Issue: Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding. Ruling: Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Santos Jr. v Republic G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967 PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This is as appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa Y Mendoza. The

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trial court held that the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor, a legitimate brother of the petitioner wife will also be her son. The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but were denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS: The above named spouses filed petition before the JDRC for the adoption of Edwin Villa Y Mendoza, 4 years old. The spouses do not have a child of their own blood. Edwin was a sickly child since birth and due to his impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who had reared and brought him up for the years thereafter. The natural parents have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners. ISSUE: ANSWER: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother. Yes, an elder sister is allowed to adopt a younger brother.

Martin Guerrero. Teodora Guerrero died without any ascendant or descendant. When she died, the petitioners sought to inherit the parcel of land from Teodora by right of representation. Martin, however, sold the land to private respondents Teodora Domingo. Just the same, the petitioners sought reconveyance, saying that they are entitled to inherit of the property in question by right of representation. In this regard, private respondent Domingo maintains that the petitioners failed to establish their legitimate filiation. ISSUE: Whether or not the legitimacy of petitioners may be properly challenged in the present action for reconveyance HELD: No. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved, the burden of proof rests not on the petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on the private respondent who is disputing the same. Jao vs Court of Appeals (G.R. NO. 128314) JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002. Facts: Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased Spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989. Private respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of Quezon City over the estate of his parents. Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not reside in Quezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary evidence showing that his deceased parents were residents of Angeles City, Pampanga. Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided in petitioners house as shown in the death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City. Held: Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

REASONING: The court held that there is no provision of law which states that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged incongruity that will result to a dual relationship of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter will also be her son by adoption. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt and it has been shown that the petitioners are not among these prohibited from adopting. Art 339 also enumerates those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is in consideration is not one of those excluded by law. Article 338 of the same code allows adoption of a natural child by the natural father and mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother. This article has remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. It is not the policy of the law not to allow adoption when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. HOLDING: The petition for the adoption of the minor is granted and the decision appealed is set aside. Tison vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997 FACTS: The case involves an action for reconveyance filed by petitioners Corazon and Rene against private respondent Teodora Domingo. The petitioners herein are the niece and nephew of spouses Teodora Guerrero and

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As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence or domicile. In the case of Garcia-Fule vs CA, it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time is required; however, the residence must me more than temporary. In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents have been living in Quezon City at the time of their death and some time prior thereto, and as was also shown in the death certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City. Uy vs. CA Case Digest Uy vs. CA G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000 Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization.

Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property. Ruling: The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Philippine National Bank vs CA, Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug G.R. No. L-57757 Aug 31, 1987 Procedural History: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-GR No. 60903 which is an action for reconveyance and damages. Originally, a petition was filed by Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug for partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance in Pampanga. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals and decision of the lower court was Reversed and set aside and in accordance with the tenor of the prayer of appellants complaint with the modification that the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels be considered valid with respect to the thereof. No costs Facts: Clodualdo Vitug during his lifetime married two times. His first wife was Gervacio Flores whom he had 3 children. The second wife, Donata Montemayor had 8 children. That Clodualdo Vitug died intestate where is estate was settled and distributed in a Special Proceeding whereby the assigned administrator was Donata Montemayor. Properties of Donata Montemayor TCTs 2289 2887, and 2888 were mortgaged in favor of PNB as guarantee on loans granted in the amounts of P 40,900 and P 35,200. For failure to pay the loan, PNB foreclosed the mortgaged properties and were eventually sold at public auction. The PNB was the highest bidder. Sons of Donata Montemayor, Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug, filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages against the administrator of Donata Monte mayors estate, other heirs of Montemayor and PNB. Subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal property of spouses Donata and Clodualdo of which they claim a share of 2/11 of thereof assailing that the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. Issue: Whether the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided in Art 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow.

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Answer: No, the presumption under Art. 160 of the civil code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Reasoning: The presumption of Art 160 (All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife) of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Although actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. When subject properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. Holding: The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The decision of the lower court is affirmed by the Supreme Court. VICENTE G. VILLARANDA, petitioner, vs. Spouses HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA Y. VILLARANDA; and COLORHOUSE LABORATORIES, INC., respondents FACTS A 471-square-meter parcel of land located at Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro City, was left to the two brothers and their eight other siblings by their parents. Estate Administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 square meters of the property to Honorio starting on May 1, 1976, until May 31, 1986. Vicente, on the other hand, inherited 64.22 square meters of the property that had not been leased to Honorio On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22square-meter portion to Honorio, in exchange for a 500-square-meter property in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the 64.22square-meter lot and constructed a building thereon. Years later, on April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan for Lot 448-B was completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T-65893 for the 64.22 squaremeter share of Vicente was issued in his name and designated as Lot 448-B-7. The other heirs were issued their own TCTs for their respective shares. Honorio and his wife, Respondent Ana Maria Y. Villaranda, then brought an action for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange. The spouses alleged that they could not fully use or dispose of their Macasandig property, because Vicente had yet to identify and delineate his undivided 500- square-

meter portion of the property. They asked the court to compel him to do so, as well as to convey to them the 64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance with his obligations under the Deed. During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. which, by virtue thereof, intervened in the civil case. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent spouses. On appeal, the CA held that the provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to the case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been [4][17] entered into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the absence of the wifes signature on the Deed made it only [5][18] voidable, not void. The CA further found that Ana was aware of the execution of the [6][19] Deed, and yet she brought no action for its annulment within ten (10) years from its execution. Her omission or refusal to rescind it, as well as her act of joining her husband in filing the case for specific performance, points to the conclusion that she assented to the Deed. Hence this petition ISSUE: Whether there was a perfected and consummated deed of exchange HELD: The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are applicable to the present case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Anas conjugal properties. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code on the disposition of real properties of the conjugal partnership are the following: Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. x x x Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband. According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. The latter

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states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husbands alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable. Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless annulled. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan Posted: November 10, 2011 in Case Digest Tags: Civpro 0 Facts: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with the land. The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include restrain defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell. Held: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended complaint prayed among others to restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of the property. This in effect brings the Loring property under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of the legal separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the

order. The administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute. It was subject to a condition. The CFI Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case is finally terminated. PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING September 26, 2012 Leave a Comment PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING December 18, 1992 (216 SCRA 692) FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her. ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property. HELD: The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together because that was our agreement. It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together because that was our agreement. It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse.

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Under the Art. 128 of Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. PISUENA vs. HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999 Facts: Petra Unating inherited Lot No. 1201 from her mother. During her marriage to Aquilino Villar, she registered the lot in her name. They had two children Felix and Catalina. In 1948, Petra died. In 1949, Felix and Catalina sold the entire lot to Agustin Navarra but repossessed the same upon the latters death in 1958. Meanwhile Aquilino died in 1953. In 1982, defendant Jessie Pisuena, son-in-law of Agustin wrested possession of the property from the heirs of Felix and Catalina. The latter filed a complaint for its recovery, assailing the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Agustin. Issue: Did the Deed of Sale in 1949 transfer the whole lot in favor of Agustin despite the fact that Aquilino did not consent to the sale of his share? Held: No. In 1949, Felix and Catalinas interest in the share of their father is still inchoate. They cannot dispose such share without the consent of their father. At most they conveyed only their 2/3 share over the lost. However, when Aquilino died in 1953 without disposing of his1/3 share, Felix and Catalinas interest on it was

actualized because succession vested in them the title to their fathers share and consequently, the entire lot. Thus, the title passed to Agustin pursuant to Art. 1434 of the present Civil Code, which provides: When a person who is not the owner of the thing sells or alienates or delivers it, and later, the seller of grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. Mathews vs Taylor Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, a nd Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn w ithout his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wifebought during their marriage? Held: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their fathers estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of

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another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Wong vs. IAC Case Digest Wong vs. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina.

That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties. Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico. Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. Munoz Jr. v Ramirez G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010 Procedural History: This is a case of a present petition for a review on certiorari field by petitioner Fransisco Munoz Jr. to challenge the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals that the paraphernal property of the respondent became conjugal when it was used as collateral for a housing loan. The Court of Appeals set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court Branch 116 of Pasig City which fully states that the subject property is clearly paraphernal since respondent inherited the property from her father. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration hence this petition of certiorari was filed. Statement of Facts: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot to the GSIS to secure a 200-thousand loan which they used to construct a residential house on the said lot. It was alleged that petitioner granted the spouses a 600-thousand loan which they used to pay off their debts to GSIS. The balance of the loan which is 400 thousand will be given by Munoz upon the surrender of the title of the property and the affidavit of their waiver of their rights over the said property to be executed by the husband. Consequently, Munoz refused to give the 400 thousand balance of the loan since the spouses were to turn-over the title but no affidavit was signed to waive their rights over the property. Since the spouses could not anymore return the 200-thousand loan because they already paid it to GSIS, Munoz kept the title

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over the property and subsequently cause the issuance of a new one in his own name. The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale. The RTC ruled that the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property and as such, the sale is valid even without the husbands consent. The Court of Appeals reversed the and ruled that while the property was paraphernal, it became conjugal when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void. Issues: 1. 2. Is the property conjugal or paraphernal? Was the transaction a sale or equitable mortgage?

Answers: 1. It is paraphernal. It is clear in the case that the wife inherited the lot from her father and has clear evidence that sufficiently rebutted the presumption of conjugal ownership. 2. Yes. Basing on the facts of the case, it presents the conditions of an equitable mortgage and the spouses intended the same and not a contract of sale. Reasoning: 1. According to Article 120 of the Family Code, when the cost of improvement and any resulting increase in the value is more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement, otherwise the property shall be retained by the ownerspouse. In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan approximately 60 thousand pesos. Thus it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property is a paraphernal property of the wife and the written consent of the husband is not necessary at the time she contracted with Munoz. 2. Considering that the spouses remain in possession of the property and Munoz retained a portion of the purchase price (200 thousand), it was also the spouses who paid the real property taxes on the property and it was the wife who secured the payment of the principal debt with the subject property, the parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale. (Conditions are based on Art. 1602 of the Civil Code) Holding:

The Court denied the present petition and affirmed the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals with modifications: The deed of absolute sale will be declared equitable mortgage and petitioner will reconvey the property of the respondents upon payment of 200 thousand pesos with 12% legal interest from April 30, 1992 by respondents within 90 days from the finality of the decision. Del val v. Del Val Facts: Plaintiffs and defendant are brothers and sisters and only heirs to Gregorio Nacianceno del Val who died August 4, 1910. During his lifetime he took out insurance on his life for P40,000 payable to defendant as solebeneficiary. Defendant collected face of the policy and used P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate through his attorney in the name of plaintiff and defendant. Defendant declares redemption under name of plaintiff was without his knowledge or consent. Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurancepolicy belonged to the estate and not to defendant personally therefore they are entitled to partition thereof. Issue: Did the trial court err in declaring that the proceeds of policy belong exclusively to defendant? Held: No. The proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured. Neither can they be considered donations or gifts and therefore determined by Civil Code provisions relating to donations. The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. As regards the property repurchased, the property does not belong to the heirs in common unless it is established by evidence that it was the intention of the defendant that the other heirs enjoy with him ownership of the state. Limbona v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Noralainie Limbona, her husband Mohammad and respondent Malik Alingan were mayorality candidates in Panar, Lanao del Norte during 2007 National and Local Elections. After filing their Certificates of Candidacy, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad and Norlainie for failure to comply with the residency requirement. Norlainie filed an Affidvit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy and

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then motion to dismiss the petition for disqualification. COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition filed by Malik disqualifying Mohammad from running as mayor for he did not meet the requirements; one year residency and being a registered voter of the said place. As a substitute for her husband, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy which was approved. Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie. After election, Norlainie won, took her oath and assumed office. However, the COMELEC disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement, not being a registered voter of the municipality and nullity of her certificate of candidacy. Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition moot and for reconsideration arguing that the COMELEC approved the withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and was given due course. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the petition despite the approval of pertitioners withdrawal of certificate of candidacy. Held: The COMELEC did not err when it continued the trial and hearing of the petition for disqualification. The Commissions act of giving due course to her second certificate of candidacy constitutes a assertion that she is not disqualified. It correctly found that Norlainie failed to satisfy the oneyear requirement. Her domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte and her domicile by operation of law is Rapasun, Marawi City. Her hsband Mohamad effected the change of his domicile in Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. It is presumed that the husband and wife live together on one legal residence provided in Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code, then it follows that Norlainie effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. The petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband. Therefore, the petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Panar, Lanao del Norte for failure to comply with the residency requirement.

diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy and was discovered to have small ovaries. Her ovarian structures had minimized, she stopped growing, has no breast and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interest, appearances, mind and emotion, she has become male person. She prayed to change her gender from female to male and name from Jennifer to Jeff which was granted by the RTC. But the OSG seek a reversal of the said decision. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the correcting of her name and gender in the birth certificate. Held: In deciding this case, the Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. If determined that the respondent is female, then there is no basis for a change of gender in her birth certificate but if male based on medical testimony and scientific development, then the change is in order. The Court is of the view that the determining factor of gender of a person biologically or naturally intersex is what he or she thinks of his or her sex, having reached the age of majority. In this case, the respondent thinks of himself as a male. Petition denied.

Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol Facts: Star Paper Corporation is a corporation is engaged in trading paper products. Petitioners Jose Ongsitco is its Manager of Personnel and Administration Department and Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. Petitioners allege that respondents Ronaldo Simbol, Wilfreda Comia and Lorna Estrella were all regular employees of the company. Simbol met Alma in the company, whom he married. Prior to marriage they were advised by Ongsitco should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy. Simbol resigned. Same situation happened to Comia when she married Howard, a co-employee. Estrella met Luisito, also a co-worker and is a married man. He got Estrella pregnant and Estrellas services were terminated due to immorality but she opted to resign. On the other hand, respondents offer a different version of their dismissal, that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign because of an illegal company policy. Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,

Republic of the Philippines v. Cagandahan Facts: The respondent was born on january 18, 1981 and was registered as a female in her birth certificate but while growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She was also

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separation pay and attorneys fees and claimed that the companys policy is illegal. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and then denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals that reversed and set aside the NLRCs decision. Petioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred in their decision. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the subject of 1995 policy is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees. Held: Even true that the policy of the petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy, there is no reasonable business necessity to disqualify from work two or more employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity. The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination cannot benefit the petitioners.

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. Facts: Petitioner Pedro Tecson is a medical representative of Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. He signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others that that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo also provides that he same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months. Tecson was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and had a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender, still marriage between them took place. After the marriage, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of interest, they reminded him that either he or Betsy should resign from their respective positions. Tecson asked for time to comply with the

condition of the policy company. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the ButuanSurigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. He sought Galxoss reconsideration regarding his transfer but was denied. He also brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. They submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid. Issue: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid. Held: The prohibition upon Glaxo's employees against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that character might compromise the interests of the company. Glaxo has the right to protect its economic interest; right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors.

Wiegel v. Sempio Dy Facts: Karl Wiegel married Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Karl asked for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that Lilia was married to one Eduardo Maxion on June 1972. Lilia said that the first marriage was void because the marriage was vitiated by force. Lilia asked to present evidence but the respondent judge ruled against it. Issue: Whether or not the first marriage is void or merely voidable. Held: Assuming that the petitioner proved that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment, it is clear that when she married Karl she was still validly married to her first husband Eduardo. Therefore, marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

Atienza v. Brilliantes

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Facts: Petitioner alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro living together in Makati, in a house he purchased. Petitioner stays there also whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, he was surprised to see Judge Francisco Brilliantes sleeping on his bed. The houseboy confirmed that the respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Thereafter, Brilliantes prevented him from visiting his children. Petitioner claimed that respondent was married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. The respondent denied that he was married to Ongkiko but admitted that they have five children. Respondent claimed that his marriage with Ongkiko is not valid because it was solemnized without license and that Ongkiko abandoned him 17 years ago. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Brilliantes. Issue: Whether or not respondent can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity. Held: NO. Under the Family Code, Article 40, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party can enter into a second marriage. This is applicable to Brilliantes even he got married under Civil Code because this has retroactive effect. Respondent is dismissed from the service because he acted in bad faith and is evident the he failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.

Cesar should acknowledge the son as his natural child and give maintenance and support. Geluz v. CA Facts: Respondent Oscar Lazos wife Nita Villanueva came to know petitioner Antonio Geluz, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. Desiring to conceal it from her parents and due to the advice of her aunt, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 for she found it inconvenient as she was employed at Commission on Elections. Less than two years, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida to meet Geluz. Nita again aborted the foetus. Oscar was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board at this time. He does not have any idea nor given his consent to the abortion. Issue: Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. Held: No. The minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. It is incapable of having rights and obligations.

De Jesus v. Syquia Facts: Cesar Syquia got Antonia De Jesus pregnant who is unmarried, 20 years old and working as a ca shier in the defendants brother in law barber shop. He promised to marry her. Before leaving for China, Cesar wrote a letter to a priest confirming that the child is his and that he wanted it to be named after him. Cesar wrote letters to Antonia telling her to take care of the baby, junior. After the baby was born, Cesar provided them a home. He got Antonia pregnant the second time but left her and married another. Issue: Whether or not De Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry. Held: No, she cannot claim damages for breach of promise to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law. But

People. V. Tirol Facts: Kosain Manibpol weas sleeping with his family, he was awakened by the dogs bark. When he went to investigate, 2 persons have already come up to their house; Beatingco, Jr and Julian Casian, they said they want to borrow his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas Bati arrived, flashed the flashlight in his face and boxed him. When he fell, the assailants companions more than 10 armed men came in hacked or boloed him and his wife and 7 children. His wife and 6 kids died. He and one of his daughters survived although wounded. 14 persons were charged with multiple murder and double frustrated murder. Of 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol.

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After they were found guilty of the crime of murder, they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died. Issue: Whether or not Baldesco will be liable for civil damages. Held: The courts dismissed the case insofar as the criminal liability of Baldesco is concerned. the appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is liable. Art 42 states that criminal liability is extinguished in death. The effect of death upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Civil liability is not extinguished.

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