You are on page 1of 18

RAYRAY V. CHAE KYUNG LEE (1966) [ G. R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966 ] LAZARO B. RAYRAY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS.

CHAE KYUNG LEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

RULING:

Yes. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in

FACTS:

actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res. The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of

Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan, Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a night club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him. Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's

plaintiff's

marriage

to the

defendant,

which

is

within

the

jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,[2] and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.[3] The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.[4] Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.[5] This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.[6] Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.[7] plaintiff herein is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and - under plaintiff's theory -still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein. WONG WOO YIU V VIVO

whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea.

26FEB G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO Doctrine:

Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad

when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912. Issue:

Facts: 1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the Board of Commissioners. 2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to be excluded from the country. 3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She then filed the instant petition as

W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be admitted as non-quota immigrant in the country

Held: No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband in the investigations

conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support of petitioners claim that she is Blas wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husbandwife relationship. Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.

for mandamus with

preliminary

injunction

(considered

certiorari) before the Manila CFI. 4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts, the court a quo declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the present appeal. 5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set of Board of Commissioners found that petitioners claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioners marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati no

Decision appealed from reversed.

PHILSEC VS CA FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or factIn the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance

YAO KEE VS. GONZALES167 SCRA 736 FACTS: 1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he was then residing leaving behind real and personalproperties here in the Philippines.2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for the grant of letters or administration alleging thatthey were the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego.3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,) alleging that they were the legitimate family.4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimatechildren.5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with AsuncionGillego.6. On appeal,

the lower courts decision was set aside declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of SyKiat and Asuncion Gillego.7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the deceased since the legality of the allegedmarriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China. ISSUE: Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom? HELD: Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,legally binding and obligatory. The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidencelike any other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must beproven, namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and 2) the alleged foreign marriage byconvincing evidence.In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China onmarriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of Chinas law or customon marriage not only because they are self serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they arecompetent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, thevalidity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot berecognized in this jurisdiction.However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, theycannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. petitioners arenatural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by anyimpediment to marry one another. [See Art. 269, Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceasedbecause of Sy Kiats recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood.Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceaseds acknowledged natural children with AsuncionGillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their fathers acknowledgment, evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents andapproved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewisemade provisions for their support and future inheritance.

provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. Garcia-Recio vs. Recio TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437 FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson. ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy. HELD: The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

Domingo vs CA Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572

FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to

(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy. Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;

(2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

HELD:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is

February 2, 2001

sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes

FACTS:

other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married

respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies

pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.

It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage;

Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

Van Dorn vs Romillo, Jr. over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own 9MAY countrys Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own 139 SCRA 139 FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership. Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wifes obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Quita vs Court of Appeals December 22, 1998 Fact of the Case: Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

ISSUE: Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property. HELD: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to use in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control

the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial

reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court. Issue: (1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo. Held: No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo

alleging that,while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscalapproved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery againstpetitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer herarraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merelyreset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner movedfor the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge deniedthe motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitionerrefused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against thepetitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filingof charges. HELD: The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage theperson who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. Thefact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitionerand respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being nolonger married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restrainingorder issued in this case was made permanent Case for Article 15 of the Civil CodeArticle 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition andlegal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even thoughliving abroad. G.R No. 80116.June 30, 1989Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653[Put put the name of the ponente here] FACTS BACKGROUNDER. On September 7, 1979 Imelda P i l a p i l ( p e t i t i o n e r ) g o t married to Erich Ekkehord Geiling (private respondent), a German national, att h e F e d e r a l Republic of Germany and gave birth to a child, I s a b e l l a P i l a p i l Geiling. F I R S T S T A G E : A f t e r t h r e e a n d a h a l f y e a r s o f m a r r i a g e , t h e p r i v a t e respondent filed a divorce at the Scho n e b e r g L o c a l C o u r t i n G e r m a n y claiming failure in marriage. The local court granted the d i v o r c e o n J a n u a r y 15, 1986, and custody of the child was given to the petitioner. SECOND STAGE: Five (5) months after the divorce was granted, the privaterepondent filed two (2) complaints for adultery claiming that the petitioner hada n affair with a certain James Chua (1st complaint under Judge Cruz) andWillian Chia (second complaint precided by r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e I b a y - S o m e r a ) The complaints were raffled at the RTC in Manila. o On March 14, 1987, the petitioner prayed to the Secretary of Justice toorder the RTC to dismiss the cases or complaints filed against her. The proceedings were deferred and the records were elavated and reviewed by the Department of Justice. o The first complaint under Judge Cruz was s u s p e n d e d a n d t h e o t h e r case under respondent judge was moved for reset of proceedings. o The petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arrai gnment and for the suspension of proceedings for the second complaint until a f t e r t h e pending resolution of the petition for review before the Secretary of Justice and also filed a motion to quash the same

PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174 SCRA 653FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and therespondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support andseparation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery

case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, the lower court (under respondent judgewhich the complaint was not suspended) denied her motion. o when the responded refused to be arraigned, the respondent judgeconsidered it as a direct contempt and ordered the petitioner t o b e detained until submit herself for arraignment. FINAL STAGE. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed a Special Civil Actionfor Certiorari, a temporary restraining order and for the annulment of order byt h e l o w e r c o u r t ( b y respondent judge) denying her motion to quash. t h e petition was anchored on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction "tot r y a n d decide the charge of adultery which is a private offense that cannot b e prosecuted de officio, since purported complaint, a foreigner does not qualifya s an offended spouse havingc obtained a final divorce d e c r e e u n d e r h i s national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint of adultery". o October 21, 1987 this court issued a temporary restraining order for thei m p l e m e n t a t i o n c r i m i n a l c a s e o f a d u l t e r y u n d e r the respondent judge and secretary of justice acted on the r e s o l u t i o n w h i c h h e i s s u e d a resolution directing the respondent judge to move for dismissof t h e complaints against the petitioner. ISSUE Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery? RULING No. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of ad ulteryc a n n o t be prosecuted except when filed with a written complaint o f t h e offended spouse. However, the private respondent does not qu a l i f y a s a n o f f e n d e d s p o u s e because when he filed th e criminal complaint of adultery, the marriage witht h e p e t i t i o ner had already been voided as they had been divorc ed under Germany law. The latter is recognized in the Philippines in so far as t h e private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civill a w o n t h e m a t t e r o f t h e status of a person. [NB: there is no divorce i n t h e Philippines] Moreover, under the American Jurisprudence on the cases involving thestatutes in that jurisdiction which are pari materia [on the s a m e s u b j e c t o r matter which should be construed with reference to each other] in ours, yieldst h e r u l e t h a t a f t e r a di vorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the s t a t u t e provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusiv e right to institute a prosecution for adultery as cited in the Loftus case in Iowa [understood as it ist h e s a m e r u l i n g g i v e n i n this case]. The court also cited the case of Van D o r n vs. Romillo Jr., et al where the court ruled that after the divorce has been made between the Filipina (petitioner) and American private respo ndent, the latter could no longer sue the petitioner, as her husband, in any state of union. Wherefore, the questioned order denying petitioner's m o t i o n t o q u a s h i s s e t aside and another one entered dismissing the complaint Criminal Case no. 8752435 (2nd complaint above) for lack o f j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h e t e m p o r a r y restrainin

g order issued in this case on October 21, 1 9 8 7 i s h e r e b y m a d e permanent. This case is under art 15, which in the matter relating to the status of t h e petitioner and her then husband, the divorce decreed obtain ed abroad wash o n o r e d legally by our constitution [although we do not have divorce here] a n d t h e l a w relating to filing a criminal case like a d u l t e r y i s n o t b i n d i n g anymore for the reason that they have already voided their marriage. RECTO V. HARDEN (1959) Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them. Court ruled for Recto Facts: Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US. Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation TC: for Mrs. Harden CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, and claims to the conjugal partnership -Recto filed motion contesting agreement -defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES *CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY 1. The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit -NOT to secure divorce to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce 2. Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage) Llorente vs CA on November 5, 2010

345 scra 592 Nationality Principle

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo

was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente? HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Tenchavez vs Escano TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano CITATION: 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZG.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999FACTS:ISSUE: Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article. 36. HELD. Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on January 1, 1981 and they begot three (3) children. On July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTCof Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 alleging that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform hisobligation to support the family, devoting most of this time drinking, had affairs with many women and cohabiting with another women with whomhe had an illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family.No. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring amarriage void based on psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these facts are manifestations of a discolored personality which makeprivate respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youthand self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.Expert

testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of the psychological incapacity to show that it existed at the time of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus,any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage QUERUBIN vs. QUERUBIN FACTS (In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 'They had a daughter, Querubina. Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were restrained from taking Querubina out of California without the permission of the Court. On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living w th another man. Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father. Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child tc be raised in a better environment. In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina urlder the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the Philippines.] RULING "The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles. Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties. In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of other states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child. In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can send by mail.

Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs of the child."

PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996) Facts: Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile. Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare. Issue: Who should have rightful custody of a child? Held: Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (Italics supplied) The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother

10

unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother. Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his child. Macadangdang vs. CA108 SCRA 314 Facts:Responde nt Eli zabeth Me jias is a marrie d w oman, he r husband b e i n g C r i s p i n A n a h a w . S h e a l l e g e d l y h a d i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h p e t i t i o n e r Antoni o Macadangdang someti me in March, 1967. She also alle ges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birthto a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.Re spondent, the n plainti ff, file d a complai nt for recogniti on and support against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, nowpetitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim andpraying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pretrial Orderformali zing certai n sti pul ati ons, admissi ons and factual issue s on w hichboth parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, anamende d complaint was file d by plainti ff. In i ts decisi on rendere d, the l o w e r c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t . T h e d e c i s i o n i n v o k e d p o s i t i v e provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.Issue:W h e t h e r o r n o t the wife may institute an action t h a t w o u l d bastardize he r chil d without gi ving he r husband, the le gall y presumedfather, an opportunity to be heard.Ruling:SC find no me rit in peti ti oners submi ssi on that the que sti one d decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly andc l e a r l y p r o v i d e s f o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n a n d l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e c o n j u g a l partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.It al so appe ars that he r cl aim against peti ti oner i s a disguise datte mpt to e vade the responsi bility and conse quence of her reckle ss behavior at the expense of

her husband, her illicit lover and above all herown son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardizationo f r e s p o n d e n t ' s s o n w o u l d g i v e r i s e t o s e r i o u s a n d f a r - r e a c h i n g conse que nces on society. This Court will not tolerate sche ming marrie dw ome n who would indul ge in illi cit affai rs with marrie d me n and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them tocollect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wreckingthe stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality Macadangdang vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-49542) FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. 2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: 1. Yes, the child Rolando is presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. The fact that the child was born a mere seven months after the initial sexual contact between the petitioner and the respondent is proof that the said child was not the petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby. Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the respondent and her husband. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption. (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311) 2. No, the wife may not institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after the respondents' reckless and immoral pursuits after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish motives would not be thwarted. Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. Flint vs Pierce, 136 N.Y.S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77). In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of infidelity or adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the husbands' impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa-Craven vs Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36). The Court says, and as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity of the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former, hence, the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy

WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

11

FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court. 2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded? RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.

Emilio Tuasons claim that he was deprived of due process is correct.1.) Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses or evidences that would prove his innocence that led to the courts decision todeclare their marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code based on the evidences presented by Maria Tuason.2.) No because his failure to inform or to notify the court about his confinement and medical treatment therefrom is negligencewhich is not excusable that led the court to deny his petition.

G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994 JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents. Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner. Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselitas psychological incapacity. The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition. The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that . . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioners counsel and not an averment of ultimate facts, as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the

TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996ISSUES:HELD:FACTS: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria L. Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, branch 149 of Makati a petition forannulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason. In her complaint Maria alleged that she and Emiliowere married on June 3, 1972 and as a result begot two children and at the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was alreadyPsychologically Incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligation which became manifest afterward and resulted in violentfights between them. Maria also alleged that Emilio is a drug user and a womanizer that in 1984 he left the conjugal home andcohabitated with three women in succession. After he left the conjugal dwelling he gave minimal support to the family and evenrefused to pay for the tuition of his children compelling Maria to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends. Emiliolikewise become spendrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership.1.) whether or not Marias claim that Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage and becomesmanifest only after their marriage is a valid ground for the nullity of their marriage.2.) whether or not

12

trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading. Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition thus In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salitas alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . . In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a plaintiffs cause of action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salitas particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court (Rules 24 to 28). Whether Espinosas averments in his bill of particulars constitute psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to her petition. Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husbands cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition. Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as . . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7 Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated." 8 In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. 11A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means. 12 We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondents cause of action against her thus . . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine upon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14 We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we said

13

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nations wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins. Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate resumption of the annulment proceeding which have already been delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code, explains The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17 WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Leouel Santos vs CA Leouel Santos vs. CA GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

LEOUEL SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS & JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS (G.R. NO. 112019) FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

14

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, J. PanganibanFACTS OF THE CASE:On April 14, 1985,plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred tospend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife inregard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.ISSUE:Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity?RULING:There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of adifficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and dutiesas married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.The evidence merely adduce that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had beenno showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecendence nor its incurability.The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article

36 of the Family Code of thePhilippines are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolvedin favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged inthe complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of theFamily Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestationsand/or symptoms may be physical.3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurabilitymay be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse not necessarily absolutely against everyoneof the same sex.5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disablity of the party to assume the essential obligationsof marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code asregards the husbad and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents adn their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence andincluded in the text of the decision.7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Churh in thePhilippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,which became effective in 1983.8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel of thestate. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quotedin the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition Republic vs CA and Molina Republic vs. CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

15

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined marriage such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the

causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

REPUBLIC VS DAGDAG On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. ISSUE:Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice? HELD

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the

16

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered

o f psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects werea l r e a d y p r e s e n t a t t h e i n c e p t i o n o f t h e marriage or that they are incurable. Article 3 6 o f t h e Family Code is not to be confused with a di vorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time t h e causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a partye v e n b e f o r e t h e celebration of the marriage. It is a malady s o g r a v e a n d s o p e r m a n e n t a s t o deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is aboutto assume. POLICY: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may beestablished by the totality of evi dence presented. There is no r e q u i r e m e n t , h o w e v e r t h a t t h e respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

pro BRENDA MARCOS VS WILSON MARCOS (G.R. NO. 136490) FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and hadfive children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the respondents failure to engage in any gainful employment, theyw o u l d o f t e n q u a r r e l a n d t h e respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailingA r t . 3 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e . T h e c o u r t a quo found the respondent to be p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d t o p e r f o r m h i s m a r i ta l obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed t h e decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos failure to find work to support his familya n d h i s v i o l e n t a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s P e t i t i o ner Brenda Marcos and their children constit u t e d psychological incapacity. HELD: The court ruled the negative. RATIONALE: T h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s d o e s n o t l e a d t o a c o n c l u s i o n

BRENDA MARCOS VS WILSON MARCOS (G.R. NO. 136490) FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even left the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined inMolina. ven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered

17

18