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Construction Histoy Vol.10.


The Failure of the Bouzey Dam in 1895

"TAank yo14 for the copy o/' "Cnsaiel-'' with you/- inreresting article un the Bouzey Darrr. It must huvc hern rm rrwfully jerry-built uffoir ~f the vertical hnnrl was so wholly uhsenr that it Iooked as if the mass filling the gup hud slid und $the mortar joints, incfudin,q the bond, wouldn'! *fund surh u paltry p l ~ I lUS 20 lhs. per sq. in. - uhmut twice rrs mrrch us u little boy's sucker!" (letter from Sir Benjamin Baker to Prof. W.C. Unwin in 1896)


The Boui-ey dam near Epioal in Easterr~France railed almost exactly 100 years ago, on Saturday 27th April 1895 at 5-45 in the rnurn~ng(Fig. 1). The ensuing flood-wave, pourlllg northwards along the valley of the Avitre (F1p. 7) to the Moselle, drowned 85 people and extensively damaged canal works, ralluay structures, bridges, villages and farms. fiy thc standards nf dam d~qasters ~t was a serious accidcnt although not so destructive of 11Fe ds the Dale Dyke darn failure' near Shcfheld In Mnrch 1864, which killed 244 people, and nothing like as terrible as the death-1011 of over 2200 in Jolinstown, Pennsylvania when the South Fork dam collapsed in M;ly 1889'. For comparison, 75 people were killed in the famous Tay Bridge rrililwi~ydisaster of 1878. There was another aspect of the gravity of the Bouzey frtil~tre,in tbe wider context ol' engineering safety and designer responsibility O F great qignilicance. The Bouzey darn, it was believed, had been desigrred rationally by the reasoned application of tnathematics to n

I! is assumed that masonry is 5/? times as: l~eiivyas water. 1 mention a11 of fhis to make the point.F.' /5b and in additinn. slices interact with each o t h e r a n d p r o v i d e additional resistance. they could still k designcd very well. Those engineers In France. P. w h i l c B. nt least briefly. What car1 be said is a that :I number of Frerlch canal darns o l the period . to which was added the requireinent that the rario of p r e s s u r e to w e i g h t m u s l not e x c e e d t h e cocl-Rcienl ni l'rictiun a p p r o p r i a t e to tllc masonry itself and the connection between he dam artd its lioundation.>mdnd 11. it i s neccssary to examine. m s .A.M. by referring to Fig. pal-tiuularly near hi abutments. the beginnings of a tradition carried on wcll into the nineleenth ccntury. Vioreau.rting the overturning rnonzerlt due to the water pressure. and that any one A B could be treated independently o f all the othcrs. to achieve a safety factor of 1. t o b e g i n w i t h Sazilly publ~sherihis pioneering st~tdyo r darn d c s i g n . A huge T P~NAL I Ii The Background M a s o n r y d .have been hullt f r o m e a r l y t ~ m c ? while the E u r o p e a n t r a d i l i o n ha5 c l e a r l y dcfined and well attested orrgms ~n Fig ? : Tlle Bourn D. H o w c v e r . in most cases. ignored piece AEYX could not overturn.L. less that1 b (Fig. By qu. Lnmpy un the Canal du Midi.'. Sergc ~cliilvsky'maintained that dams of the period were designed by Belidur's concepts. C. Brltain. to be deter~nined. in their essentials. and there are numerous exnrnpics of thoroughly successfu[ d i t n ~ sbuilt in Prance. the conlponent ul' water p ~ s r u r e i . Charles C a u l o ~ n bh i d applied l ~ i ~ n s c to l f the particular problem of retaining walls bearing earth pressitre. T h a t they w e r e a s t o u n d e d a n d alarmed when a darn of the new age went su badly wrong 100 years ago is hardly surprising. G e r m a n y and Central Europe t h r u i ~ g h o u tthe whule ol' the early modern period. he shows that y' has to be ?ti13 /lob. arched and buttressed . N a v i e r a n d I. Some Spanish dnms of the sixteenth :~ndseventeenth celituries are a particularly i~i~pressive lestimony to what could he achieved. Italy. albeit wilh the aid. B6laoger. have much twtter records. 3). It was a s ~ u m e d that a slraight gravity darn cuulrl be visi~alised as i l series of separiite sticcs o f unit thickness. Fig3: Bclidor'a pmblcm In 1 8 5 3 calnc a decisive s t e p . when resisting . De S a y i l l y s l a t e d i11 f u l l t h e t w o reclilirenients mentioned above: that it should be inlposr~blelor the section of darn above X Y to slide relative to the part below and that t h e line o f thrust representing W and P ~ h o u l dbe contained within XY so that the ~i~4: D~ ill^'^ ofequal rcsistimcem.e. Norman A..est in c:rlculatirrg tlre ability of a niasonry wall to resist overturning when loaded by some horizontal force. 49 . The old rnetllods (prc-1850) of proportioning dilrns. 4. There ale big dnms of the sixteenth cenluq and later which.I depth uf water n. to the Ruuzey d a ~ n ' s the backgrou~~d short life.5.g r a v ~ t y . of considerable repairs and recot~structions. T h e r e f o r e . It i s about design and cnns ~ r u c t i o nand why structures fail. D e SazillySs irleas can be Beliclur a d d r e s s e d t h e e s s e n c e of t h e darn p r o b l e m i n his consideriltion o f the behaviour of the walls of navigntion locks. and the restorir~g mument developed by the weight of the wall. ranging in date from the 1780s to the 1840s' .mith H o w f a r such rudimentary calculations were applied to practical darn-builcling in thc r: * Y latc eighteenth and early nineteenth ceniuries has so Ihr been impossible to esttlblish.T.have profiles liL which are cenainly not at oddh with the "nooverturning" rule hut that may be n o Inure than coincidental. T h i s is not to b e a " d i s a s t e r " paper. and cIyulzilly and Groshois w i o n the Canal de Bourgogne.5. "Sur un profile d'egale resistance proposC pour les murs de reservoirs d'e~iu".lr ns tror~ble-rl-ee service is concerned. so f:'.a r c h . J.' This long and complex paper was a further French contribution to t l ~ c study u F retaining walls generally and was based on previous w o r k in t h e strength or materials by.t was an emerging inte~. indeed enviable. W.' Relidor exanlines thc stability of a r e c i n n g ~ ~ l wall a r o f height h and width g. R o s m ~ l i a cand Glomel on the Canal de Nantes 5 h e s t . Germany and the United States who had pioneered this hrst era o r d a m design were c o n r t d e n t t h a t n e w s l n n d n r d s in saftty of perronnancc and economy of construction were now to hand. F.The Fatlure of the B o u ~ e ?Dam in 1895 structural problem. The height of a h dam vnfies across a valley and. . rvhich if space permitted would bear cnnsiderable el:~boratiun. whatevcr tl?ose mcthods crlnlpriscd. envlrt>n\ the R o ~ n i l n Some R o m a n dams are a1111 In use as iire Metltevnl structures. Bclidur shows that y' must be at least 11.tlrnt evcn in an era before clums cou[d bc designed rationally. were not unsaCe ever though thcy were undoubtediy uneconomic. t h e m o s t c r i t i c a l c a s e c a n be covered by annlysing the tallest slice and a s s u m i n g it to be u n s u p p o r t e d by its neighbours.H. Even in [he eighteenth uer~turyttje~. ror e x a m p l e . The Iin~itatior~s to these assumptior~s are considerable and ohvious.

I n o t h e r words. at one and [he same time chilling and portentous. The next i~npol-t. f o l l o w i n the earlicr worka or Nnvier. D c Sazilly's proposit~or~s genen~Hyreckoned to be Ihe first "n~odem"dam. If thc s a m e maximum compressive vertical stress is developed at Y. reversed.e. Kiinkine.The Failure of the Rouzey Dam i n 1895 advance was de Sazilly's consideration of stresse5.esr of a dam. and at the poinl Y reservoir full. will obtain. :)I-e mirror images o f each other. neitl~er de Sazilly nor h ~ disciples s positively spcll out the need to avoid tension. Elnile Delocrc. Rankine knew better. which began in 1876.lrily that oi a langenr lo that face. It is elclrlentary to eslablish a number of properties of this par1icul.J. up to and ahove maximum watcr level.mside~. pass through the two mid-third points.un near St. to thnr extent. tlie "no-tension" condition is. wcre npplied immediately. N m m A. Etienr~e. F. the I-esultiunt of P nrtd W. Hcnce the [ern1 "profile of equal resir. 11 is defined by the reliltionship hl=b2w. The Ful-ens d. Thus we have here rlre mosl straightforward 51 .i. its magnitude must excccd that o f the associ:~ted verticnl srress.lnis came frurn Prolessor W. the r n a x i ~ n u n con~pressivr ~ stress that tlie material could withstand sl~ouldbe I-enlised. perfectly s t r d l g h ~ f o r w n r d a n d In o r d e r to Fig 5: The Fulcn. by prnfile is exerletl amongst the particlcs close to either face of thc masonry is nrcess. And so it was that he brought into gravity dam design a new imperative: that there must be a strict observmncc o l the socalled "middle-third rule". respectively.. stresses decrease progressively so that de Sazilly's theoretical profile is. reservo~r F~III. in his c l i s c u s s ~ o of ~~ dam ~ design follows de Sazilly cxactly and their concepts were ndopted in~medintclyas the hnsis of European and American prnclice Ibr half a century. where w is the spcciiic gravity o r the masoi-lry. the co~npressive strcss diagram is itself triangular.P. and quite correclly sensed here i s that ~ n a x i m u r n171-inril~ul stresses occur in directions parallel to those of zero shear. and. This will be true at every level. rither at thc air-Lice. The calculation of t h e s e states o f stress was. It is essential to re-e~nphasischere that i11 de Sazilly's protile of equal resislance. nevcr ro tensiun: tlie shape of the prohle and de Sazilly's conditions see lo that. Approaching the c~. but r a t h e r t h a t i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n lo struciural strength should simply hr discounlcd. In de Snzilly's paper thtre is a remark. a nunrber oYcon1ributor. the profile of equal resistance because the r n t l x i n ~ ~ ~ working tn stress of the masonry cannot be realiscd ot every level. is not subject to any shearing stress and therefore the muxin~iirndirer! stress at the race of a dam must he on a plane at right-angles to that face. 5). unattainable. if the Corcc R.~nr advance in the thcory of d. for the in ~ Figure of the Inst and one OF the best u T his pl~blications". However. Tor d e Sazilly. was designcd and buill hetwecn 1858 and I Sfib (Fig. In I870 he was consulted over rhr desien of thc Tansa d. began to be assessed. the vertical pressure Found by means of the ordinary formula i s not the whole pressure. knew fl11l well that according to their theories. to its demise 20 ycars later. F. apropos tensile stresses. the triangular one showri in Fig: 6 .ln~in India. With the d a m loaded the m a x l m ~ r mstress will occur at the nirrace sincc the i ~ n p o s i ~ i o of n P induces bcnding stresseq across XY to i ~ ~ 10 ld the direct stress d u e to W. oi course. the line of thrust moves fro111 l e h lo right as P increases. that it is allownhle to neglect "the force of cohesion i n the mortar. we can simplify the essential design concepts prevailing by considering the most b a s i c of all dam profiles. anrl this is crucial.he fou~tdin Favour oi the basic de Sazillion ideas h u ~ added new ancl crucial cr. unless the FACEis vertical. or dcvintion of the h c e from the verticnl"." True. il can be shown that on the typical section XY. The other of Rankine's observations c h a I l e n ~ e d t h e a s s u m p l i o n that ~naximum stresses did. 4 every horizontal section is subjected only to compression." As background to the Bouzey dam's design. 11s designer. il is not. then the saiile triangular stress distribution. rull and empty. When thc reservoir is empty the mE'iAES self-weight W I S taken to i n d u c e a I trapezoidal compressive slress diagram is at the water50 XYqp whose mi~xirr>um race. the greater the "batter". at every level. as shuwn. but only its vertical componeni: and the whole pressure exceeds the ve~tictllpressure in a ratin which becomes the greater.lngul. style of cross-sectinn s l ~ o w t Iiowever. the d c SazillyDelocrc view of tension in a masonry d m was not that ir should be avoided. in f a c ~ .ntions. The race of a form or profile." T h e o p i n i o n i s r e p e a l e d v e r b a t i m by Delocre.met. acted with an eccentricity of greater than XYl6 -then tension was inevitable.reservoir elnpty. including the role of shear. at the poinl X reservoir empty. cut the section XY outside the "middlc-third" . occur on horizontul planes.tnnce" used in his title.X. hlCry and BClanger. rcscrvoir full and reservoir empty. in fact. or :1l Ihe watcr-face. Following Rankine's paper. 1x66 maxinlise the r n a s o n ~ y ' sperformance and economise on conslruclion costs he set a cot~dition. They recognised that it could occtlr and indeed. Twu werc par-titularly crilical and for bi-evity we will contine ourselves tn t h a n here. Rnnkine puts it thus: -b"Thc direction in which the pressure Fig C: The haw rri. that the two compressive stress diagrams. Moreover.M. Smith which slates.s to [he theory ofdarns introduced variations on his criteria and by degrees the complexities of stress within n dam. reservoir elnpty. and in a sense what we linve here is a profile of equal resista~~ce. Durn. which is u n f a v o u r a b l e to resistance". O n the other hnnrl. and cannot he. when the rcservuir is full. In effect he was extending t h e ideas o f N a v i e r and Betanger to dams hy treating each slice as a heavy vertical cantilever and assuming a linear distribution of stress on any horizontal w z r a 8 sm m section. In short. Rrinkine stated tirnlly that nowhere on any horizontal section of a dam sl~ouldtensioil be allowed to dcvetop. It means.H e specified that tl~roughoutthe darn o n every section. For example. It also incans thal in Fig. In a iarnouq paper of I872 . the triangular protile automatically meet* Rankine's middle-third condition because the lines o f pressure.

were as I-evealingof rainfall strttistics and catchment area r~rnofr So it is not difflcutt to nppreciate that Inany a spillway was scriously under designed. is the znasonry's compressive s t ~ n g t h b . and thus the more FnnliIiar shape of a high dam begins to emcrge. To have a higher dain not stressed. over the nruat wtdcn 10 w%trict ~i~S: ~~l~~ XY the ~ t r ICVCII e ~ ~ yeilrq. i l is fig 9: Dam with widened c r c ~ ciificr~ltto build. it could he as hiph as 2. 8. Inevitably designers and users alikc aosurne that a reservt. fronl of back. A dam with a pointed crest is not a very practical proposirion.5 or a shade more: the masonry uf Lhe Vyrnwy dam iri Wnlcs was particularly dense at 2. forluitoilsly. X Y say? ~ h i r lthe line of thrust jbrward and violale the middle-third rule on rhe air-ftrcr. such as Auguste Grneff.Consider a width of road addcd to the top of a triangular profile as in Fig. applied their nnalysec ro historic Spanish d. the lower linlits were chosen. Now this basic shape. However. traffic across the structure. overflowed. In other words. can produce an overload. :I ZrianguIar profile is not rerluiwd to change all [ha! much. likcly to be met. the ratcs a t which reservoirs 611ed. It reaches ils limits according to the range of numbers given iri the Table in Fig. beyond the prescribed limits requires a base OF increasing width. a potential dnngcr for any dam is that i n s u h i e n t spillway capacity. remember. As soon as the crest of gravity dam has some useful width.F. Fi~." T h e unswers were prwtty ~nixeri. very relevntlt to B~ouxeyas we shitll see shonly. Interestrngly enough. There was a horzus to this cautious approach to rnnxinlun~stresses.~rns a n d d e t e r m i n e d t h e prev:iiling maxlmurn stresses. t e n s i o n .and Bouzey was a tragictllly outstnnding example . thc cenlroid of the profile is in any casc rnuch nearer the air-face. It was a dangc~. and its behaviour when loaded. as in Fig. Smith increasingly slender profiles. the line of thrust. Secondly. In the old days it was two easy to.The latter was il mill enough approach. and hence o n e s w l ~ i c hmade m o r c e c o n o m i c u s e o f m a t e r i a l .T h Failure of th Bourey Dam in 1895 N m n A. between these cxtremes of cletlsity. and that a dam which wxq already stressed lo the limit near its cresl at normal maximum level. the not unnatural assumplion being that dams are vulnerable only in the depths where pressures are high.cns dam is s t ~ r s s e dto h. e it measured or estin~ated. as problemaiicnl as dam behaviour. This is very unlikely to be n problem but it is a fact. vulnerable in use. On the othcr hand. and as vice versa. whicb in some quarters there wns a willingness to discount.5 57. is greiilly increased when the reservoir i s Full. To get stiirted on designs French engineers. Because ir lends to a relatively w i d e d n n ~ x profile .5kg/c!n2 lu a s hlph as 14. maximum principal stresses are easily calculated as heing equal lo psec20whcre p is the rnaxi~nulnvertical cornprcssjve stress nnd 9 the angle o f the race. in t l ~ c i rdeterminillion to build more highly stressed dams. and lo be safe. lines of thrust move and middle-third requirements arc offec~ed. below n certain level. R. all or whlch can have a txming on the desigrl process and n dam's safe operation. at a point such as m.1 Fig 7: Llrniri~~g lheifhts 01 trrangubr dam5 Ibr v. or exceptionally n p i d reservoir filling.5kplcln'.ti.ous silualiun all too readily compounded by the fuurth factor w e are considcring. to allow h i g h c ~ co~npressivestresses in hy . and in any c a s e tails to provide a roadway T o r maintenance. as w e l l a s s a t i s f y i n g a c c r t a i n ambition to achieve "proper" desirn. will. So it emerges that an urlexpccted properly of a prartrcnf profile is that it is particularly s~lsceplibleto unfavournble stress distributions tical. Ceneridly it was not usual to use a stone whuse spccilic gravily w a lcss ~ than 2. or both. the density of masonry is a variable. In lhe early days. Thescfore the possibility of generatir~g tension at the rvnter-bce. For a number of nineteenth century gravity dams . 7.stly. It is evidcnt that when the rcscrvoir is empty the mass o f the piece ABCYX. 9. It was e s ~ c i a l l y true u century or so ago.7 61. Hence the risk or t e n s i o n w a s i n c r e a s e d . are s~rsceptibleto variations in ur least four parameters. This need to modify the basic triangular protile is c o m p o u n d e d b y a n o t h e r requirement. r r o n ~as l u w as 6.~kg/cm'.~ h d top. on the section mn. is torced to the right by the addition of ABC. in its way. while i r ~ thc case or a reaIly h e ~ v y ~ptcimen. and much Inore signilicant. T h e maximum stresses allowed hnve n marked el'fecl on a dam's profile and Ibe height to which it can retain the simplified triangular shape we I ~ a v ebeen visualising. ~ l dl d tFrrrn! rnruilnlln~principhl strcsws profile fur a graviry's maximum water-level is known. Indeed. access 01.6. predictable and controllable. The fact thal the top of the dam now has width means tltnt above a section such as mn. However. only from ahour 32 to 35 in the anglc of the dam. European engineers generally were inclined.00 66.rul(y a*iolutedu n h ricar rhr is elementary to show (hat the middletllir-(1 rule was near[y or ac.and not a parliculilrly econo~nicone the middle-third rule is. the Fur. be unaware or Ibis. a very rcal issue arises when the reservuir i s full. Sgecific Gravity of Masonry PrincipaP Stress kg/cm2 H E I G H T - metres 20. For the air-face. Reservoir bchaviour was.rriouu rpzc~ficprdvities .

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have been a decision olengincers. It muxt retlecl the Canal de I'Cst's paritmount need lor water to s u u ~ i n traffic.was to d e m o l i s h l h ~ s illstarred structure and start again. t4. o s h i sand Ch. Fissured ant1 perlnenble bed$ reaching well into the reservoir nrsa had not beell sealcd Fig 13: The wture nf the frecture by the cul-ufi wnll. and the f o r m a t i o ~ ~ under s rhe dam were dislocated ant1 sntilrilted to a depth of 2-31n. The u r g e to u s e t h e navigation and make it pay musl have \ beell powerful. proround economic problems. The bure-hule user1 to investigate cwnditio~ison ihc lowel side of thc original dam was retained as a hasis for monitoring water-pressures beneath the modihed structure. that is to say about two-thirds thc inaxrmum. the leaks hacl grown only a I l ~ c t i o n to 70 l/scc.. although h a t factor W~LF not fully debated until a later date. Tl~codolite n>easur~n~cnts"' along the d a ~ n indicated a mnxilnum deflection of ljmnl: leakage was o f lhe order of 70 lhcc. the piezonietric levels were about lorn above foundation level.6n1 deep. as the years went by. the 0 k o n e thing which was never agreed s u r p r i s i n g l y g i v e n h o w m u c h trnlc e l a p s e d . In {his c o n d i t i o ~ ~ for . Something which all Ihe plonetr allalysts of d i ~ m s hat1 thoughl about but never really believed c o ~ ~ happen.51~1 above datum o r 2 1 . On 15th May r l achieved a depth nf 2I. On the 18th Novcmber 1889 the Bouzey reservoir began lo refill. Drains were installed at thc base of the d m to take away any wwar percolating unrle~.4m. The level passed 19. t h e w h o l e repair being generously covercd wirh puddled-clay. The rebuill croscsection is shown in Fig. There WCIY coriflicting opi~lions as to whar had happened and what to do next. F o r lhe downstream s i d e there were s c v e r a l proposnls.5.. o n the 14th of Mxrch. Oddly. totally ~rnsrttisfactorily. 13). The dam retained a hip11 to full water level without mishap. The m o s t e x t r a ordinary w a s lo construct an earthen Pi8 IS: Tile Bouzey D.6m arid 22. reports were prepared ant1 discussed in 1887 and 1889.lm rebuilt Ithc old darn 1s hhuwn by thc b u l k to the full height of d ~ e dam.6111 of depth. It was a post-war period and t h e C a n a l de I'Esl was n e w and e x p e n s i v e . over I 8 months. One detects here. Several Feirrilres of the 1884 accident and its aftermath are intripuirlg. The intention was to prevent turther sliding. The level rose a lurtI1e1-80cn1. Explorarion of the foundations occupied the yea[-$ 1885 and 188h.tension cracks in a broken "horizontal beam". Uy March 1884 rhc reservoir was 18. a crack width of as much as 7m1n bcing lrcorded.neath. progress was very leisurely. [he Bouzey dam corltinuetl in use with watcr pouring through cracks at the rnte o r 232 l/sec. and at this moment the water-supply to the reservoir was augmented very substantially by the completion of a 43km-long aqlteduct bringing Moselle water from Remiremont.The verticnl cracks were filled with cement mortar or grout. Therefore the Bouzey darn was repaired. Come December 1883 I I/ I 1 1 /L Fig 12: Pbn and eleuor~on of llte f ~ l l o r ruf : I384 (not lo scale) the reservoir level had reached 15.'' And yet once the reservoir was drained. 1 1 1 1 above the l'ounda~on level. In [he event. were rhc result of bending frnctt~res. O n the upslream s i d e at t h e base m a s o n r y w a s used to s c a l t h e g a p belween the body O F the dam and the cut-aff wall.4nd then. RUI nu strengthening was provided Tor the upper half of the dain and (ha1 was where the ultimate disaster was lurking. ld in fact had. Underneath the dam it was Found thul the cut-OFF wall had no nleans protected the poor rock i~nrnediatelyunder the structure.If' By any reckoning this was a serious sir~lation and yet the asrotlishing thing is that not only were n o precautions taken.~zilIy.The Failure of the Bouzey Durn i n I895 Nmman A. i A February 1890 and suhsequentiy the water level was relenllessly increased.- I \ . l m. Thc piezorneter proved itself very easily damaged by ice so that after the Eavage wlnter of 1894-5 it was removed. The deflection measurement& were given up ill 1893 and replaced. to 19. Tlrat the broken dam was e x p c t e d to cuiry on for 18 months cannot. .F. A da111 had slid on i ~ foundations. They. by visually sighting pegs. . Smith Top water level was at 37 1. the depth at which the accidenl of 1884 occurred.~ntlyopened vertical fissures in the dam xs the wall contracted. I n hubsequent years the ~ n a x i r n ~ level l ~ n was always achieved. The reservoir was drainer1 in the autumn o r 188. the broken Ime) best was Ibr n series uf la11 buttresses in n the dams of G ~ . jusl SOcm short of the mnximurn. 12. quite evidently. These various observations were not.'"In view of what the manner of the measures laken i was to happen in 1895 the decision 11ut to build "contreforts" was another chance missetl. maintained.5m. though METRFS t h e issue is n c v e r bronclled In l h e relevant literature. the reservoir level was actually allowed to rise n filrtller 20c1n. The ii~aximumdispl~cclncntwas 35cm and the hrenk occurred at Fo~lndatinn level (Fig. the chosen solutiwn was a massive buttress "toothed" into the original masonry and h a r i n g against a deep lcvel nburment." The best chance to ensure the dnm's rulure 0 2 4 4 s t n was signilicant hut nut enceplional. This same fearsome winter is supposed to have signilic. 1351n of the dam slippcd forward into the V-formation indicated in Fig. surely. For 53 days in 1893 and for [ 67 in 1894 the water level fluct~lnted between 21. su ~ h dam c begall to leak: even at waler depth of less than 15m the leakage was up to 65 l/sec In D e c e m b e r o f 1882 t w o l i ~ s u r e smnterialised to add to the leakage They were put d o w n t o l o n g i t u d i n a l corltraction of rhe structure in cold weather. s an effecl probably cxacerbntcd by a considel-able uplift presslrlt under the dam. As the ~cservorr Ibe~an to till. especially by Bouzey standards. For the first hair n T t l ~ e1890s il must have seemed that rill wils well. just before noon. Not surprisingly eroups of vertical cracks wei-e round at each end of the displi~cedsection and at its ceIltrc.

n ' w h o l e s e r i e s of e f f e c t s occur in q u i c k s u c c e s s i o n .T l l c m a s s filling t h e gap nppe'ared r a t h e r to h a v e s l i d o r over1~rned. redress and the riamcs of those responsible. Kenctinns ro the disastcr came at several levels. Naturally there was a readiness to msockitc thc final collapse with the a c c ~ d e ~ of~ t 1884 ant1 the repairs of 1888-9.Thc third eyewitness was the innkeeper M. conducted by French enpineers. Hc was able to provide a ~tsefula c c o ~ i n lof the failure sequence which compriscd two phases: an initial bl'enk near the cresl ir! thc middle vl" [he structure over a length or ?Om."24 T h e cross-section of the failed d a m i s instructive (Figs 15-1 7 ) ..\ C~~>V-IIII % I ~ W III~ b~mk I ~ I L ~ I . Thiriat tlarl to j u ~ n povel. the rrcpped l ~ n c shows. The verricil scile i s 5 x the l~orizontal." In a sense they were probably correct. ZvI. 15. Smirh Fig IS: Ttle hilure of IRY5. Early that n ~ o l n i n g a workman callcd Thiriat was crnssing the dam and he stopped. ns pointed out at the b e g ~ n n ~ n o g f thrs account. The mason he had bee11 chatting with w. The failcrl dam is shown diagrnm~ni~ticiilly in Fig. ~ '. agreed conc l u s ~ o n swere paramount ' ... without any obvious cracking or splintering of rhe stones along the down-stream edge of t h e f r a c t ~ r r e . a l il~rtividualsclaimed that towards rhe end a pronounced downstream curve o f the dam developed which could be detected by the naked eye.l'~' One s c h o o l of though1 w a s q u i t e convinced of ii shear failure.. IF such coilld strike passe~. As they talked the dam began lo break up. A t Pig 17: Tht 1ypic.Th F~tilure of the Bouny V~tm in 1895 11 had bad f o u n d a l ~ o n s . O f the three expcns appoirlted to the tribunal of enquiry. the fi~sures u T 1884.Grcnt Britain and the United States.l hope :~nd puritlon n l the hlled sectior! Bouzey the final stngc very likely was a shear . U n w ~ n ) the placc to begin a briel account of what happened. But it was nut and the Bouzcy diun failed. Gihiri who was watering his horse in the village 01. As Unwln pi11i t . designer of the Vyrnwy dam in Wales. The Failure There were three witnesses to the collapse on the 27111 April 1895. It certairlly was nor enough to observe rhat thc dcsign uT the d i m was had and thnt 14: it. I11 add~tion. And in m y case the h i l u r e o i I R95 did uccur cniirelq.[hc bul~oln of the cut-off wall T o what extent accurite and frequent measurement m i g h ~ have predicted the final collapse wiIl never be known. S e v e ~ . Louis Geislcr was quickly into print with his "15 V r ~ e sPt~otogioplliquesde In Vallte dc I'Aviere ap&s la Catastrophe de Bouzey". it was v ~ t n lto comprehend how and fur wl~atreasnnq Nmman A. 160m short uT Ihc spillway at the eastern enrl. In reality no such connection could usefullq be made. 300m downstream.I I~ IIIIUIO~~~IIIII 1.) The failed don1 itself is Prolchs~r~n W. the extremcs of the F<~il~tre of 1895 did not colncide with the vertical cracks at the lirnjts ot the movement of 1884 while the cenlral group of fisscu. Both Thiriat and Gihin cnmrncntcd 011 the nvise. B u u z e y w a s '7 s u p p o s e d t o have b e e n d r s 1 . Jarncs Mudd. q ~ e d And ~f dam des~gn was to be trusted.C. Moreover.: . a photographic collec~ior!in the style of the cvcn better one covering the ruins of the Dale Dyke dam put togcther by the Manchestcr photographer. On behalf or ari outraged public the pop ill:^ press clamuured for explanation.a l0cm crack io his dash lu safety. Unwit~was struck by the fact that there was no evidence of failure by crushrng.L. Deacon.F. two advanced this view and they were s u p p o r t e d by t h e e x p e r t w i t n e s s o f t h e eminent M. The lattcrs' observations are among the most useful and objective ccrtninly in Er~glish. T h e great nbittment hat1 not yielded and appemed to havc prevented a11 fu~ther movement oi the bnse or the dam. that the historian can consult.?' Of course there was an official enquiry. r ~ c w c llrurn l opsrreom.s-byit surely would have registered officinlly had it been measul-ed in the earlier acc~deni were conta~nedcompletely by thc final the first victim of the rlisa~ler." Not the l e a s l interesting feature aT the deliberations which took placc is the degree or disagreement as to what exactly had happenerl and how to explain it. Unwin of Imperial College and Dr.followed by the main ct>llapseof 180m of the darn to a depth of ahout 10m.Bouzcy. rather than to d c p n d on. "The fractrne of 1895 seemed to avoid. Naurice Ltvy. 2nd tours of inspection by other experls two 01. because. appmx~mntdy.F. and the o n e which starts the chain is no1 necessarily the one associated w i t h t h e Final m o m e n t s o f c o l l a p s e . There was huge international coverage i r ~ thc engineering preqs in Prancc. aho~*c the level of the remedrrtl works of six years before. that "The mnqs war torn uut along a nearly level plane of fracture . the right bonk.G.whom were Prolessor W . Gcrmar~y. to talk to a mas011 working below. The break runs horirontally through about half the section and then drops nwny. The mechanism or a d a m ' s failure is a very c o m p l e x nffair.

''We need not in t h i ~ case consider eorthen dams which nre of very doubtful qecurrly at il heiglrt of 20 metres. 5 : ! 1 I The Puzxle The queslion has not been answered. Huwever. And yet.3m length of thc section and. givc11 that its profile w a so ~ poor that tension did occur. He says "No observntiuns have come to light on the subject of upstrcam tension. Fig 1 % System of lorcer.4 kgcm' was relieved by cracking. by the method of M. By conlrast the situation at the water-face. t l ~ c cor~esponding principal slress parallel t the ahr-face being ! of the order 6 kglcm'. (he darll's designer was already complacent and ir. 111 (Fig 18).rvntcr we can now construct a [ h i d strcss diagram." The explanation has a on e number of elernenis Although the b a s ~ ctheory treals n Jam ah J.uction of IXSX-9. Auguste G r ~ e f f apropos the 50-m Furens dam. overturning about thc downstrea~nedge would rnost likely give way. His procedure was much in vogue ot the end o r the nineteenth century and in a French ministei-iai circular a f 1897 wah even qpectfied as rnnndntory. ActuaLly t h e compressive slresses induced at the air-face 5. one wonders not so much why it failed but how C --!----.AIso. F. A1 n depth of 10 m 01. he was prepared.lra of strrsPtin kElcm') taken thesc stresses ever) thougl~ gootl design . the ones that were available l o the engineers of (he day. would then opply. allows an even l a g e r uplift Force and leaves a decreased length of section intact. we]-e ton readily regnrrled as ordinary.that very reason. and one that allowed so much tension'? ATler dl. That lie could produce a profile which sinlply looks so appallingly inadequate is interesting in itself.iin. elenlentnry to design and posing no significant risk in practice.Boitvier. the slices interact one beside the and so a crack has to other i n resisting deforn~ation extend t o a considerable depth beforc all t h e r e s i s t a n c e i s finally o v e r c o m e . l conhiclers the rest~ltantof P and W. be quite out of the rluestioi~. . The maxirnunl vertical stress was about 5 kdcm'. i v ~ t h uplift - described earlier. 3 nrr the dam. Why did the Bouzey dam have such inadequate shapt. in addition. it i s easily shown bow completely the middle\ rhird rule was violated in the upper part of ! . Presumably.9 were not destructive. all the esseiitial elcments of the theory were in place including the middle-third rule.1. the force R. series of thin vert~cal"slices".+ was tatal. the percolating water was inhibiled at intervals and sufficiently to prevent uplift pressures cqual to the full head of water. to shear fracture. it 3.'"t was quite incapable of resisting the tension which developed with a rull reservoir and so the Bouzey dnm cracketl. A similar surface of failul-e harl bee11observed in the Habra.. like dc SaziIly and Delucre. But the key question remeins: what B y initiated apply~ the ng t Failure h e analytical in the first techniques place'? N m m A. 1 . if it is retieved by cracking. Rcfen-ing to the stress diagram I In Fig 18 we can show that if the tension o f 1. as Fig 18.8 kg/cm? at miximum . Delocre and their foIIowers were willing to allow. And then again the reservoir was not always FulI. ns soon as water pressure penetri~tedthe tensiun crack a new vcrticnl force cnmc into play. Such then is [tie explanation as to why the Bouzey dam failcd. Such curnpiesslons were well w ~ t h ~ the n strength of the nlitsonry used and relalively low compared w ~ t h many other dams.The Failure of the Bou~eyDam it1 1895 failure on a surface sloping down towards the air-face. then l3ouzey's design is explained.4 kdcin'. Consider Flg 20 Boilvler. of corlrse. .. Smith i l i t h it lasted so long. Conceivably Bolrzey's proportions. apparently. cri~cketlirl tlmt case by n chronic hydraulic overload. at a depth of loin 8. The uplill U within the cracked Buuzcy dam significantly increased thc overturning moment and the magnitude ut the effect is readily calculr~ted (Fig 19). fol. But Bouzey w m nnt a high durn and therehre if. l t includes ."" Always OF concern was this question o r height.which. its face wns [rt~rntime to time treated to a waterproof coating. The reason why French engineers pursued the dcsign and construction of masonry dam s o tlssiduously was because. or course. But In wality Bouvier's method was ncvcr more than a device and its use nr Ro~rzeymay explain a good deal.~cmh\ thc crilical secrion should not have required then1 Lo. A canal rvhich was busy in t h e s u m m e r p r e s u ~ n n b l ya l l o w e d tlie datn s o m e s e a s o n a l respite. when the project was begun.9 kdcm'. The cr~lciaidefect was lhat thc bond between the masonry and mortar was very poor and should not have k e n relied upon in any casc. Such a Fracture would be along a surFace that Falls i~wily tuwards the air-hce. There is ii telling paragraph in tanglois rclating to the "calculs des inginieurs de 1876". a rnerre hrgher ~t was still 1. the minimum stress nuw becoming zero and tllc new milximum being a cornpresaian of 5.ccerr. rescwoir full. The p o i n t i s emphasisecl by the great length which gave wny at Bol~zey. dam. if that is the phrase. enactly as de Sitzilly.viving o l tension . not very high. because Bouzey was n "leaker". the basic n~echnnicsol' clam design are slraightlbrwar~land by 1876.was assumed permissible to settle for a crncked srctiun.I new element applies tc the su~."" There is OIIC o t l ~ e rreature o f Bouzey's ill-judged design to consider. to allow tensile stresses and then discount them. at 50 metres they would. to quote M. Lherefare. T h e clam was proporticnerl. Here the venical tensrle stress was about 1. It is hai-(irlly necessary to ernphasise the progressive nature of the filiturc now urtderwny. as indeed thc ruins of rhe d a n ~ confirmed (Fig 17).ul r.'' It seems very probable that Ernckjnp hot11 the masonry and the mortar could have Fig lH: S. . and that rhe greaiesi deviation was at the level of the Fracture. u T which there is no consideration."' Earlier I noticerl that it wns c & \ y to overlook the vulnerability of the glnvity dam near its crest when l o n hut ~ the reservoir is fill1 or. Su far the darn is still not ovcr-stressetl.3. + 5 . the tlplift force we were considering in the case o f Ihe Habril dam. except to point out again that at the final stage. in practice it is not. particularly since neither was of first class quality. eilher because he believer1 the n~aterial co~tldwithstand them or becausc it . the crack would penetrate 2m and the next stress diagr. 11. In a11 effort to allow that maximun~ stresres are not v e n ~ c a ones. as Hnbra was. T o my knnwledge tlie designer of the Rouzey dam is never named.1 kglc~n?. ntither in the calculations of 1876 nor in those which p~rceded the reconstl. overfull.

3..F. Close scrutiny of the failure disposed of il number of erroneocrs ur ulr~. pp.fill construction. Marlow.s (Rotterdam.5 as acting on the plune ZY rather than XY. e. tli~ N. That is For the thin arch where one finds Ihe very big dams. confirin the dirttc~ion of f u t ~ ~work.g.ey darn's use l'or a canal was actually rilthcr old fashioned).it all. the point Z being in effect nowhere. essential to obherve. R ~ .relit reduction in cilpncity all the snlne. s u c l ~ rather unsuitahle rnalerinls a s plasticine.M.77-83. Most branches of civil engineering have rheit land-marks: For dam-building the Bouzey failitre was tru[y n key one?' Let m e quickly tinish Ilie story of the dam itself."34 In shor~ a designer relying o n Uouvicr's nretliod will almost cerlninly design nn adequate air-Pace at the same time >is he ignores the water-face completely. It o c c u p i e s exactly the site o f its ill-fated predecessor ul' which the only surviving part is the spillway. "The Cause of the Johnstown Flood". c ~ 2 Pike Close. trend in twentieth century darn de~ign. As Langlois compl. The Bouzey T~ilure not only summed up the essenlial dcvzlop~nents st) Ihr. It also helped rt. 27rn high and 5 0 4 m long.Binnie. for public waler-supply. snrnething about which the Bo~rzey failure had heen instrumental in promoting discussion. Wegmann. kluch. U o r ~ ~ c . Nevertheless.'~' The failure of tlie Rnuzey dam. Leliavsky. Arid this rcmember was in a pericd when dams were h i t l .63-66. but a . S o m e attention had already been given to uplift pressures in the design of such d a m s a s Vyrnwy." And then. stands at a cross-roads where the lirst phase of rittior~aldnnr design endccl. pp. ~ But w h n ~ is crucial is that whereas Bouvicr's inethorl gives an augrnentcd c o m p r c s ~ i v estress value for the air-k~cepoint Y. The need to Ful[y understand the events at Bourey was the~rforeof zre.~ of Don1.i ~ n / rrrtd i o n Hydr-u~flic U P .e H y d r a ~ r l i q uVol. I ~ . Inattcr of uplift and the difficulty of comprehending its There was. Smith . They also drew atlention In the need to determine maxinium compressive stresses o n oblique joints. T h e stress distribution on %Y./ .Ihe masonry.A.F. T w o general hislories of dams are: N.eliableprupositions anrl and its rull cliscussio~~ e s ~ a b l i s h c dpositively that for safe d a m design ( a ) the no-tension c o n d i t i o ~ jwas a n imperative.The Failure of the I3ouzey Drtm it1 189.'~ For nearly I~nlf-a-ccntury there h d ttveloped a growing confidence.F.C. Aswan. for exnmplc . and this i?. and lhe emerging E:~sl~iun dams. A popular account is G. and to investigate the mngnitude and danger of shear stresses. Souzey was central to the developing interest in the stress analysis of dams beyond the elemenlary concepis o i de Sazilly and Rankine. 58 (May I9X8). Arr.A.I ~n:~kesliift a f h i r of 1901-2. In France.5 million m' userul to the Canal de I 'Est no doubt. higher than those obtained by considering W acling on X Y . Bucks SL7 2AX References 1.~incd of Bouvier's neth hod . ss usu. firat o f all in controversy but then in clarification. 2. it was the start of a very significant.~li m p r t a n u e and the nudielice awaiting enlight~i~ent was liirgc and tnternational. 3 (London 1960). Tecllnical details are in G. B. r. India. Civil Engineering. 'She method is intrinsically a lechnique for dctcrmiiiing n peak stress at a point. (b) thc middle-third rule was a correct concept.all the crudeness of the techniques. Fig Ill: Bwvrcr'c nlc~hud The Aftertnath Uouzey failed at a crucial time and strange though it may seem to say so. and orten the mosl signilici~nt. 1t1e United Stares and Attstralia. what assuniptions could and shotrld bc made. ~ . is assumed linear. The Dcsi. dmnb~rilding was by no iileans the monopoly of European counlnes." this Led tu dams h e ~ n g profiled so that the conlpressive stress at tlie water-face was grcater than the water pressure. In. in A l ~ a c e . in dam dcsign but considerable variations in how to d o it. when all is said clnd done.~I.p. s l ~ o r:~Dr.Smith.the point. built in increasing ~ulmhers world-wide. in the early experiments.375-78. it gives no strcss value Tur the water-face . The first recot~structionwas . gelatine and India-ruhher. . F. The C o l l q ~ s ofthe e Duke Dykr Durn 18h4 (1974). Thus. ~~~~ Smith. the belief being ~ll:~ the t infiltration of cracks then became impossible. Amey. According to Eellet'" it was only 6. It was rebuilt twice more. pp. in California and New South Wales. (c) a r n a x i ~ n t ~compressive m stress must nut bc exceedetl ant1 (d) n dam must nut be able to slide. and what criteria lo apply. and AIEeld. irrigation and rhe newly devclopi~lgapp1ic:~hon to I~ydro-electric power (the Liouz.Unwin. e. it was not iiltogtt>cr a bad thing: much good came out of this catastropt~e.hitrc. re New design problems and attitudes 10 them.eovcr. "it does not dekrrni~ieanything about what happens on the air-face. pp.rril. fullowing a much misundel-stor>dFrenctr rninislerial circular of 1897. 1994).ecolrr. but the calculated stresses art. A I-lrslor. Maurice LCvy was prorninen~ in pursing these increasingly sophisticated c o n c e p t s w h i l e in E n g l a n d an e q u i ~ l l y mathematical approach succeeded in triggering a firs! class controversy in which tI~cmain protagunisla were ProCes. in Wales.was happening in Nol-tli Africa.4111 in 11eipl1t Sorrning a reservtrir or 1. 4. J. A recent accrrunl is W. were given [rest1 illumination and a rnuctj sharper focus. Thc plrsent dam dates from 1939 and is of rock. ' ~ Avoiding uplift altogether was oric possibility and in some quarters.qn nnd . Frank.soru Karl Pearson anrl W. Lar(v Vicroriun Water Eti:rrairreeta ( I98 I ) . as we have seen.263277. 1. A Hisral:~of Dnms (1971) and N. Moi. dc Relidor. in effect maximum principill stresses. Tv1. not a stress distribution belween two points. One result was w m e very broad profiles indeed. Norman A . It is a device which is pttlusible but w i t h n ~ r rationale. ant1 at tinies a was rr~adelo ~riudelsutilising. for e x a ~ n p l e the bchaviotrr in various circumstances. Part 2 (Paris 17501. S. 5. Schnittcr. at right angles to R. 'These and other early French canal darns arc cavered in E. alrcady it is true under consideratio11 anyway. as intended. Not Far behililt came some instr~rctivelessons to do with construction techniclues and the quality of malerinls. T ~ Vol. In fact the 1897 instructions were inrelrded to allow for uplift by redrlcing the effective densily 0 1 . 6. in attempt to throw light on these intractable problems.

Cassicr's Mrr:a.Gruner.70-78.37-9.. (1964)p.56.Dav~dson.Philip A. pp.. These developrncnts are reviewed by E.1950).npl~y of the hilure there is ICOLD. Bellct.A. . pp.Lelinvsky. E I I .". Eng.may be And1. "Expefimental Investigalions of the Stresscs in Masonry Dnms subjected to Water-Pressure". 'The Vyrnwy Works Cur the Water-Supply of Liverpool". 24. - 8. R~tptltreLIU B U I . "The Functions of Engineering Research in the University".3 1-2. 19 1-222. EII. Fuil1r1-os rrj~rl /tr~chidc.F. U Inrrn~ ~ I Irrtirlc~trs(Paris. or tl~ereahuuts.Rcllel. No.455 makes much of the usc of lime rather than cernerit rrlurtar Phil~p A. 30.Unwin. Serge Lelinvsky once refelred to the rnatly &I-titles written as being -'comparable to il sea o l ink": see his d~scussion to E. Lllrl$t in Gruvit?. Frilnce" Co.E .T. r ~ ~ i r .J. Juur-. (19 13). kI. yet it only parlially Fdils.Deacon .the basis for appreciating a well proportioned dtlni was limited to only a decade or so's experience.T. The foundation is bad.Lr G611ieCivil. .Langlvis.S. And interestingty enough.Rellet. ( 1 Xhbj. The Et~~~inr 33 r r(Jnnuliry. Inst. Buvrcr. R L I ~ ~ Idu I I ~. Le G{trie Civil. . For Alfeld see S.. 20. Su lar as I can determine (he Bouzey dilln ih the earliest to be instrumented in this way. "Design and Constructio~r of Masonry Darns". T ~ EP ~r~ince 4~Dccember -.Mnrley Parker puts i t in an interesting way when he says: "Neverlheless. 19681.i~.C.s Punts e l Chiru.rsies. Bul-t.J. Ohserrurior~s. 25. W.XVII1. p. pp. 2 (1853).p. p.453 notes [his oversight but does no1 rellect on the practicality of rebuilding.1. pp. pp. O h s r l ~ ~ ~ u r is~rtu t ~ lu s C r r f r r ~ ~ . A.umen Sociery.Civ. pp. Analyses of the accident nre replete with discussions about the strength of the rnateri:ils wed: see tanglois. Saziily.C. In 1876. ( 1566). 1872). 2e sem. Barrages en Muqonnel-ie er Mrrr:s h Rhervairs (Paris 1907). F.A. T/1r E t ~ < y i r l4 ~~ Uece~nber ~-.C. 35.u r ~ ~ ~ pp.~ussCeu. A. in particular. circa 18'36).Pippard.rle U ~B ~n. "Calculs de rCsistance des grnnds barrages err rnaionncric". p.4679 1. 59 ( I 987-88). Annoles des I'ot~ts P I Chausstes. and Ihe first was that there was no powder". . Civ. 29. And i~ can bc calculated that a zone of tension covered a hcigl~tof &out 6 mts above nnd berow lhe facture. L.rirr'sMtr..~~.qn und Constt.93-7 ant1 then to Sir John Ottley and A.85-6.. Thal was something like the mayor of town in France who had seventeen reason5 (or nut firing a royal salute.54-6.Gruner. M.46-9.C.Uouvicr. Altnrrles dcs Putlt~ef Chuusskrs. pr&s de Fcrri~nux".50. the Bouzey dam itself was ireated 10 an experimental investigation long after the events described. as of confidence in a well. p. 7.yr. pp. p.93-4 deals with c.19. Them is a copy irl t l ~ clibrary of the Instilutinn of Civil Engineers. "Report on the Design nnd Conslruction of Masonry Darns". ~ BIII-I. I 1. W I. Bellc~.fion nj'Darns Chaps. Inst. 2 ( 1875). J.196. 27. "Faiture o f the Bouzey Dam".239-40. de Belaevsky. 39.265-284.R/lermel. sir Ic Furens.denoted by "A. Delocrc.pp. 34.? barrages cn maiionnerie des ltservoirs". S.s. CXXVI (1895-6). 1-2. P ~ a rItrsr. 26.Guenot. 40. 36.7-22. not destroyed. 4 December 1942.s rt1 Mul-ul~n~v. 14.57.~ Id~ I <Rorr~cy ~P (Pnris 1898).293-302. "Wi~ter Supply". 31. The author of "Historic Accidents and Disasters".. Chnps. these facts create a feeling not so much of astonishment at the dismter. W.212-272.Graeff.P de Bouzey. p.9. pp. C ~ I . 17. pp. X X V (1895-6). ~ i ~ ullrl l f Consrrwrtion uf D U ~ pp. pp. C U J J ~ PMaguzine. Proc. D e .~ 33. p.68. The pint is noticed in "Historic Accjdents and Disaslers: No. Wegrnann.qes err M ( ~ ~ . pp. Graeff.C.4 (19491.Unwin. H. Bellet. 23.Binnie. 17 Jnnuluy IS96.inals' water requircmcnts in Maurice Lkvy.362-3.W. Observntions. "Sur un type de pruRl d'egale resistance pruposC pour les murs de reservoirs d'eau". 1941.1909) and the Vyrnwy Wurks".s der Ponts cr Chnlrsskes.O. Babb and T. 38. rie.pp. p. pp. The G ~ . R ~ r ( ) t i i ldl< .29 ant1 A. . 1 1 .~nalconsurr~ptionand there is LI lengthy co~npar:~tive sludy OF c.i~rr. Dc. 18. "Note sur la rupture du barrage du Bouzey". Drgirreer. The Cut~trul Wurrr. .de Sazilly "Sur un lype de prolil d'ignle resistance proposC pour Ics murs de r6servoirs J'eau". though il was no1 wid in whal respect.pp. designed dam. Tlws s:une report appears to he the basis of "t7nil~rl-e o f Ihe Great Dam nt Bouzcy".. LXXXVl (March 1925). "Sur lii f o m e du prolil h adoptcr pour les grand. Prm. (bt'ashillgton D. Rupture du Barrage de bouxey. 12.Beller. Burrrr.45?.Bellet. H. "Dam Disasters". 18..W. 15.362." . pp. and the dam is not carried of down Tar enough. Enfi. 37. Smith meetings of the Civils.Q<~C. 1-2. L.qu:irrc. 11-IV and H.ur. Barrages en Maqonnerie. "CircuL~ire du Ministtre de I'Agriculture du 15 Juin 1897" is reproduced in H. "La Rupture du Barraze de I'Habl-a. p. RUI-1-osrsr11 M o r . and also lhat i t had a bad foundation.(( I. 1973). Unwin is worth quoting on this: "It had k e n said that the design of the dam was bad. pp. Fur Vyrnwy see I.l_nngluis and the report of a special cn~nrnission of the Corps des Ponts ct Challssies which was pilblishcd in 1895. Civ. Rankine. J.Bellel.M. CLXXII (1907-8). ( 19581.tion uf Dums ( N e w York 1907) and H.683. o s b o i s d a n ~i \ the subject of M.e drr R < I I . u r n ~p. .283-5: the author . M. 2 r sein. 12. The tnost conlplcte general account of the Eouzey dam is Leon La~~glois.461466. Vol. A11nu1e. p.C."Sur la Forme el le mode de construction du barrage du gouffre d'Enfer.V. 1942. "Thc Failulv of the Masol~i-y Dam at Bouzey.I . 2 t. 10-23.. and Livy. Ucrrrcrges err Mn~unt~erie. pp.pp. XC11 (1928). p. We hnve a dam viulattng in every possible manner all the presentday principtes of sound construction. A. The Bouzey Dain". Langlois. Proc I t ~ s t . 32. I . 19. 10. 193. Idr too 1nuc11to record here. See also E.70. XI ( 1896-7).W. Inst.93. 28. The bibliography or the B o u ~ e yfablure is enormous.403. Barrages en Maconnerie..The Failure of the Buuzey Dam in 1895 Colrsrrur. "La StabilirC rles Digues du Reservoir el du Contre-Riscrvoir de Grosbois ali~nentanl te C:lnal dc Bourgugne". . Ci].u. PI-ofessorW.!(IIII [ 3th I~(. These and other d e t n ~ [ 01s the Bouzcy dam's career are tnkcn from. ~ 27 .94-8 S and 1-1. Although one must be wary or ljinds~ghthere.l c e y . (Feb.393. Wegman. I-'s pp. Antroles r/r. 22. 9. No.V-V1. For :In ii~troductiontu the bihl~ng~. p. (!his n. 173-205. E. G. pp.s.Unwin discklssion to Deacon.rl.Brightmore..o /dr ?Ii~ R(JII:P..Langlois. ~ I xC .Knnkine. W. L~ssorrs F ) . o ." . 18. Eb. "Dam Disasters".IS May 1964.~es eft Maqonneric.u ile ~ ~ Bulazey. I . This i~ the theme of "Lessons Learnt froni Daln Disasters". Thlr E ~ r q ~ ~ I o p!~?d I i. pp. See. and Lkvy. 7'rrr)lsat~1iurts oj'rhr Ncwr. Edition.Lelinvsky. It wils i~hslracterlby A. see V.F. discussion to E. The dam bad alter all only been dihplaced. et des grmds barrages en geniral".C. Durns.pp. W.rr/. Ann:iles des Ponts et Ch.Deacon."George Deacon (1543. W. p. pp. his discussion to G. 13. "Sur la Folme ct Ic mode de construction .28. En~irleering.Unwin. pp..qof' Durtr Disnsrrls.Morley 3'11~ En<yirlrr~. Rrrprrrt. pp. 33. Rouvier's rnethotl i s assessed by H.207-2 1 1.6 Coyne.I .. L.Unwirl frequently raked the Bouzey dniir issue at Nmman A. for examplc. 41. C'rrtu/u.256-9.