Fidelity and Insurance Co. vs Wilson Facts 1.

Wilson, is a disbursing officer in the Philippines, he took money, sureties, and funds, then fled to Canada. When he was caught, several lawsuits were filed against him intercorrelating each complaint. The merican Company of !ew "ork became sureties on the official bond of Wilson for the sum of #$% 1&,'''. Wilson defaulted #$% (,)*1.(', so the surety companies paid half from each of them to the +overnment. ,is funds were placed in a depositary named by the court to take care of the money. little earlier before the complaint was filled, Wilson transferred the funds to Terrell, in payment of his debt for the professional services already rendered. $ince the funds were under the possession of the Treasurer entrusted with the depository, the transfer could not have been made since, it would have been necessary that the delivery of the funds had been made directly Terrell, which fact has not been proved at any time. .ut Terrell never claimed that the delivery was ever made, he only claims that the ownership thereof should be derived to him, not thru the fact of delivery but thru the very fact of the transfer and of his subse/uent notification to Treasurer .aranagan, although, it is very clear that such notification does not constitute, in any manner, the fact of delivery as established by articles 1-02, 1-0*, and 1-0-of the Civil Code, all of which cover, in full this sub1ect2matter.

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transfer, does not produce the effect by the fact of the mere consent, but is ac/uired by tradition and in the due observance of general precepts.6 Therefore, by reason of the non2delivery Terrell did not ac/uire the ownership of the property transferred to him by Wilson. The court therefore finds that neither of the two creditors should en1oy preference with regard to the other. Preference is determined by the nature of the credit in some cases and by the priority of date in others. The first, when it deals with privileged credits, which different kinds of privileged credits are enumerated in articles 1)22, 1)2*, and 1)2- of the Civil Code; and the second, when such credits are without special privilege, but are set forth in a public document or a final 1udgment. 9Par. *, article 1)2-.: 7n neither of these two classes do we find the credit of the appellant or that of the appellee. The credit of the appellee is only shown in a private document, and the right, or credit, of the appellant is that derived by reason of the payment made by appellant to the +overnment as a surety on the bond of Wilson, and nothing more than this appears in the allegations and admissions of the parties during the trial of the case. 7t does not appear by the bill of e<ceptions in this case that any document was ever presented in 1ustification of such payment. !either does the decision refer to any document as showing, as proven, said payment. These two credits not coming under any of the articles herein cited, the same pertain to a general class, and therefore do not en1oy any preference, in accordance with provisions of article 1)2& of the Civil Code. This being so, the two creditors should be paid of pro rata from the funds in /uestion and without consideration of the dates. 9=ule *, of article 1)2).:

Issue 1. $hould Terrell and The 3idelity and %eposit Company of 4aryland, claim ownership of the funds in accordance to rt 0') of the Civil Code5

Ruling 1. 6 7n conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 0') of said code, that 6the ownership and other property rights are ac/uired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in conse/uence of certain contracts, by tradition.6 nd as the logical application of this disposition article 1')& prescribes the following8 6 creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. ,owever, he shall not ac/uire areal right.6 9and the ownership is surely such: 6until the property has been delivered to him.67n accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable re/uisite for the purpose of ac/uiring the ownership of the same by virtue for a contract. With this, it can therefore be concluded that8 6The transfer of the ownership in the contract of such

was no payment made by Cru>ado to .ustos, thus, rendering the contract not to be consummated. Cruzado vs Bustos Facts 2. 1. gapito Cru>ado was a poor man living in Pampanga, he had a 1ob in court but was still not enough to support his family. ,e aspired to hold the office of procurador in the C37 of Pampanga but he was unable to give the re/uired bond, an indispensable condition for his appointment. $ince Cru>ado was friends with .ustos, a rich woman in their place. ,e begged the latter to simulate a mortgage deed of a certain property and have it e<ecuted in court in his favor only to pose that he has real property to enable him to /ualify to such position of procurador. 7n truth, the said mortgage was a front and fraudulent but was effected by making a pretended contract which bore the appearance of truth. 7t is un/uestionable that the contract of sale was perfect and binding upon both contracting parties since their names both appear in that instrument to have agreed upon the thing sold. .ut it is also undeniable that the said contract was not consummated8 a. b. Cru>ado did not pay the purchase price of P2,2'' nd he never took possession of the land apparently sold in the said deed. ll that the vendee did was to pledge the land as a security for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office. rt 110- states that, a creditor has a right to the fruits of the time the obligation to deliver it arise. ,owever, he shall not ac/uire a property right thereto until it has been delivered to him.

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.esides the failure to pay the purchase price, neither the vendee nor his heirs, had at any time taken possession of the land. $even witnesses attest to the fact, .ustos and her husband while still living, continued to possess the said land supposedly sold to gapito Cru>ado and cultivated it, as she had done long before the sale of $eptember 1(A& to $eptember 1()1, the date of complaint by $antiago Cru>ado.

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Conse/uently, at the death of gapito, he could not have transmitted to the $antiago as his successor any greater right than a personal right to e<act fulfillment of a contract, as plaintiff was not the owner of the said land, he could not validly register it. This fulfillment of a right has already prescribed since, under the law, prescription towards real property shall be *'years. 7n the case at bar, the action to recover took *- years to bring it to court, thus has already prescribed.

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$antiago Cru>ado, the son, brought an action for recovery of possession, founded on the right transmitted to him by his father at his death ? a right arising from the said simulated deed of sale of the land in /uestion. Petition is denied.

Issue 1. W@! the said deed of sale was simulated, not with the intent to defraud * rd persons, but for the sole purpose of making it appear that gapito Cru>ado has real property5 W@! rights of transmission ac/uired by $antiago Cru>ado from the death of his father, pertaining to the said land in contest is valid and without defect5

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Ruling 1. #nder the law, the contract of purchase and sale, as consensual, is perfected by consent as to the price and the thing and is consummated by the reciprocal delivery of the one and the other. 3ull ownership of the thing sold being conveyed to the vendee, from which moment the right of action derived from this right may be e<ercised. ? the record discloses that there

Pornellosa vs Land Tenure Administration Facts 1. The lot in controversy is a part of the $anta Clara Bstate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. 7n 4ay 1)-1, the said Bstate was ac/uired by the +overnment C was entrusted to an office known as the =ural Progress dmin., which was later abolished C its functions was transferred to the .ureau of Dands. =ecently, such duties was given to the Dand Tenure dministration. The plaintiff ac/uired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in /uestion from Eicente $an Fose, predecessor2in2interest. fter the purchase of the $anta Clara Bstate by the +overnment, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two hundred 92'': s/.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two 92: smaller lots, !o. -- and A(. Dot !o. -- had been sold to ,ermino +u>man. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the %irector of Dands to e<ecute a %eed of $ale in their favor C declare null and void the %eed of $ale of Dot !o. --, e<ecuted in favor of respondent ,emino. The trial court rendered 1udgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of ppeals, dismissing the petitionerGs complaint. ,ence, this petition.

of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. cts and contracts which have for their sub1ect the creation, transmission, modification or e<tinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.

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Caleon vs Agus Development Corporation Facts 1. gus %evelopment Corporation leased to =ita Caleon its lot for P1('.''Hmonth. Caleon built a -2door apartment and sub2leased it at P*&'.''HdoorHmonth without gusG consent. gusG filed an e1ectment suit under .atas Pambansa 9..P.: .lg. 2& after Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that ..P. .lg. 2& cannot be applied because there is a perfected contract of lease without any e<press prohibition on subleasing. The 4TC ruled in favor of gus. 7t was appealed to the =TC but was dismissed outright. ,ence this petition for review.

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Issue 1. Whether or not ..P. .lg. 2& is unconstitutional for being violative of Inon2 impairment clauseJ on the ground that it impaired the lease contract.

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Ruling (. 1. !o. ..P. .lg. 2& is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the police power of the state. Petition is denied. ..P. .lg. 2& is derived from P.%. !o. 2' which has been declared by the $upreme Court as police power legislation so that the applicability thereof to e<isting contracts cannot be denied. The constitutional guaranty of non2 impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and sub1ect to the e<ercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. 7n spite of the constitutional prohibition, the $tate continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Degislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.

Issue 1. Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the +overnment the lot, allegedly includes 2'' s/.m.

Ruling 1. The 1udgment under review was affirmed. The lot on which $an FoseGs house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. $ignificantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the =ural Progress dmin., has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 2'' s/.m. party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. ,e must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent. 4oreover the %eed of $ale allegedly e<ecuted by Eicente $an Fose in favor

whole cost of the labor and material and not 1ust the value of the missing part based on rticle 110A8 C avez vs !onzales Facts 1. 7n the early part of Fuly 1)0*, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, who is a typewriter repairer, a portable typewriter for routine cleaning and servicing. The defendant was not able to finish the 1ob after some time despite repeated reminders made by the plaintiff. The defendant merely gave assurances, but failed to comply with the same. 7n @ctober, 1)0*, the defendant asked from the plaintiff the sum of P0.'' for the purchase of spare parts, which amount the plaintiff gave to the defendant. @n @ctober 20, 1)0*, after getting e<asperated with the delay of the repair of the typewriter, the plaintiff went to the house of the defendant and asked for the return of the typewriter. The defendant delivered the typewriter in a wrapped package. @n reaching home, the plaintiff e<amined the typewriter returned to him by the defendant and found out that the same was in shambles, with the interior cover and some parts and screws missing. @n @ctober 2), 1)0*, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant formally demanding the return missing parts, the interior cover and the sum of P0.'' 9B<hibit %:. The following day, the defendant returned to the plaintiff some of the missing parts, the interior cover and the P0.''. @n ugust 2), 1)0-, the plaintiff had his typewriter repaired by 3rei<as .usiness 4achines, and the repair 1ob cost him a total of P().(&, including labor and materials 9B<hibit C:.6 @n ugust 2*, 1)0&, the plaintiff commenced this action before the City Court of 4anila, demanding from the defendant the payment of P)'.'' as actual and compensatory damages, P1''.'' for temperate damages, P&''.'' for moral damages, and P&''.'' as attorneyKs fees.6 7n his answer as well as in his testimony given before this court, the defendant made no denials of the facts narrated above, e<cept the claim of the plaintiff that the typewriter was delivered to the defendant through a certain Fulio .ocalin, which the defendant denied allegedly because the typewriter was delivered to him personally by the plaintiff. 6 rt. 110A. 7f a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be e<ecuted at his cost.6This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. 3urthermore, it may be decreed thatwhat has been poorly done be undone.6 12. %efendant posits that his contract with plaintiff2appellant did not contain a period, so that plaintiff appellant did not contain a period, so that plaintiff2 appellant should have first filed a petition for the court to fi< the period, under rticle 11)Aof the Civil Code, within which the defendant2appellee could be held liable for breach of contract. Issue 1. Ruling 1. The inferences derivable from these findings of fact are that the appellant and the appellee had a perfected contract for cleaning and servicing a typewriter; that, they intended that the defendant was to finish it at some future time, although such time was not specified; and that such time had, passed without the work having been accomplished, for the defendant returned the typewriter cannibali>ed and unrepaired, which in itself is a breach of his obligation, without demanding that he should be given more time to finish the 1ob, or compensation for the work he had already done. W@! the defendant is liable for the whole costs

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The time for compliance having evidently e<pired, and there being a breach of contract by non2performance, it was academic for the plaintiff to have first petitioned the court to fi< a period for the performance of the contract before filing his complaint in this case.

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%efendant cannot invoke rticle 11)A of the Civil Code for he virtually admitted nonperformance by returning the typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a non2working condition, with essential parts missing. The fi<ing of a period would thus be a mere formality and would serve no purpose that to delay.

1'. Trial court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P*1.1' as the value of the missing parts and the costs of the suit 11. Plaintiff appealed to $C contending that the award should have been for the

7t is clear that the defendant2appellee contravened the tenor of his obligation because he not only did not repair the typewriter but returned it 6in shambles,6 according to the appealed decision. 3or such contravention, as appellant contends, he is liable under rticle 110A of the Civil Code, 1am /uot, for the cost of e<ecuting the obligation in a proper manner.

The cost of the e<ecution of the obligation in this case should be the cost of the labor or service e<pended in the repair of the typewriter, which is in the amount of P&(.A&, because the obligation or contract was to repair it.

7n addition, the defendant2appellee is likewise liable, under rticle 11A' of the Code , for the cost of the missing parts, in the amount P*1.1', for in his obligation to repair the typewriter he was bound, but failed or neglected, to return it in the same condition it was when he received it.

3ortuitous Bvents Tanguilig vs CA Facts 1. ,erce contracted Tanguilig to construct a windmill system for him, for consideration of 0','''.''. Pursuant to the agreement ,erce paid the downpayment of *','''.'' and installment of 1&,'''.'' leaving a 1&,'''.'' balance. ,erce refused to pay the balance because he had already paid this amount to $P+47 which constructed a deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected since the deepwell, and assuming that he owed the 1&,'''.'' this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after strong winds hit their place. ccording to Tanguilig, the 0','''.'' consideration is only for the construction of the windmill and the construction of the deepwell was not part of it. The collapse of the windmill cannot be attributed to him as well, since he delivered it in good and working condition and ,erce accepted it without protest. ,erce contested that the collapse is attributable to a typhoon, a force ma1eure that relieved him of liability. The =TC ruled in favor of Tanguilig, but this decision was overturned by the Court of ppeals which ruled in favor of ,erce 2 =efers to an occurrence or happening which could not be foreseen, or even if foreseen, is inevitable. 7t is necessary that the obligor is free from negligence. 3ortuitous events may be produced by two 92: general causes8 91: by !ature, such as but not limited to, earth/uakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, and 92: by the act of man, such as but not limited to, armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, provided that they have the force of an imposition which the contractor or supplier could not have resisted.

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Issue 1. W@! the collapse of the windmill can be attributed to force ma1eure thus, e<tinguishing the liability of Tanguilig5

Ruling 1. "es, in order for a party to claim e<emption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under rt 11A- of the Civil Code the event should be the sole and pro<imate cause of the loss or destruction of the ob1ect of the contract. 7n !akpil vs. Court of ppeals, the $.C. held that - re/uisites must concur that there must be a 9a: the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of debtor 9b: the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; 9c: the event be such to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and 9d: the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the in1ury to the creditor. Tanguilig merely stated that there was a strong wind, and a strong wind in this case is not fortuitous, it was not unforeseeable nor unavoidable, places with strong winds are the perfect locations to put up a windmill, since it needs strong winds for it to work.