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People vs PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463 FACTS:In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil.

, 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. Inthis Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over thePhilippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, thedefendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: “Act No. 292 of thePhilippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.” ISSUES:Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,is in force. HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government. Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982 (En Banc), J. Makasiar

Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated. Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in

business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"? Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its

incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary Facts: In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.] Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the

or cars or other commodities. As in the United States during the second period.reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof? Held: Yes. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States. they pay the corresponding duties. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated. And on incomes other than their judicial salary. when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation. No. taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. and second. assessments are levied.R. These pay taxes. Case DigestPASTOR M. Owning real property. we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. to wit: First. which must be deemed to have been transplanted here . when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913. 1953 . they pay taxes thereon. Upon buying gasoline. SATURNINO DAVIDG. Gore). It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. L-6355-56August 31. the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.

590. and soordered the refund of said taxes. Issue(s) Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. or actdeclaratory of what the law was before its passage. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof bythe Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of theJudiciary. the court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of themeaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act. referring to the salaries of judicial officers. 13. Article VIII of the Constitution.” According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellantCollector of Internal Revenue. in a rather exhaustive and wellconsidered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Congress enacted Republic Act No. Alegislative definition of a . 590. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salariesof Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines.” found insection 9. so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s andJustice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. was not receivedfavorably by Congress.Facts: Saturnino David. 590 constitutional? Ratio Decidendi On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges. the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussionin the Lower House of House Bill No. 590 isconstitutional. To bring home his point.Meer. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensationfixed by the Constitution or by law. 85 Phil 552. the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. No salarywherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exemptfrom the income tax. because immediately after its promulgation.590. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicialofficer is not a decrease of compensation. By legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13. supra. then Collector of Internal Revenue. 1127 which became Republic Act No. Republic Act No. Meer.

Further. to the effect that the collection of income taxon the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. the Legislaturemay not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition. the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. supra. and that in enacting a law. dissentingopinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to the Income TaxLaw prevailing.that Section 13. In this sense. was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges’salaries Nitafan vs. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries. court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. 23 July 1987] Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and . especiallywhen the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretationalready given in a case by the highest court of the land. CIR [GR L-78780. thecourt holds that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within theexclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed. Theascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute.word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere. interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provisionin question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. the court is of theopinion that said section is null and void. The court reiterates thedoctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered “not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law”.Hence. it being a transgression of the fundamental principles underlyingthe separation of powers. Meer.otherwise. The debates.constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. in adopting it.

The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10. including constitutional officers. 1987 (infra. 19 and 53. With the filing of the petition. . Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee. including constitutional officers. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of Judiciary The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. all with stations in Manila. pp. from payment of income tax. Meer and Endencia vs. National Capital Judicial Region. Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court. from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. respectively. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February. their salary shall not be decreased). David. 7-8). shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6. Held: NO. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement. During their continuance in office. The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee. Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.other members of the judiciary. even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court. Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. of the RTC.

In the case at bar. David is understood not to apply anymore. Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. Section 10. . the doctrine in Perfecto vs. The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. With the period. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. or if lower. The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Meer and Endencia vs.) after “decreased” was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax.negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision. it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.

It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. In the main. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS. 10. which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15. the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. a Filipino corporation. or P2. which bid for the same number of shares at P44.MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. matched the bid price of P44. 50 dated 8 December 1986.000 shares at P41. petitioner invokes Sec.42 more than the bid of petitioner. with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts. GSIS Case Digest Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). a government-owned and controlled corporation. To all intents and purposes. On 17 October 1995. a Malaysian firm. Art. second par.00 per share. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation. petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.. XII. of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.58 per share.300. it has become a part of the national patrimony. . pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. and Renong Berhad. perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad.

Held: The Manila Hotel or. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. for that matter. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. as mandated by the provision in question. And this Court. will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44. not . 51% of the MHC. at the same time. and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation. therefore. In his dissenting opinion. Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision. According to Justice Bellosillo.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. second paragraph. is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. ponente of the case at bar. Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners. Section 10.

Hence. insurrection or rebellion. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law. too. Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on November 17. In the case at bar. HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion. privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. therefore. when public safety requires it. or imminent danger against the state.anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights. . the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared. there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified. pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. 2010 Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense).

fair and honest. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office. so long as the election is clean. rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign. and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the . BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional.” The unified opposition. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7. Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. 1986 FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7. 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.Philippine Bar Association vs.

since there is no issue more political than the election. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. 1986. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The events that have transpired since December 3. Aquino G.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.election on February 7. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot. The Court further held that: . 1986." Issue: whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate Held: Yes. 1986 Facts: On February 25. On March 25. have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 73748 May 22. 1986. proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.R. No.as the Court did not issue any restraining order.

” “The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May. 2011 Political Law – De Jure vs De Facto Government Bermudez as a lawyer. 5. hereby extended to noon of June 30. 1992. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous. quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. ” ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. and provides for the . The six-year term of the incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the February 7. 1986 election is. and to no other persons. and the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government In Re: Saturnino Bermudez on November 9. .” Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers. he then asks the Court “to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who. . Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. for purposes of synchronization of elections. 1992. which provides in full as follows: “Sec. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to. HELD: No. it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and VicePresident Laurel. . among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country.

14.extension of their term to noon of June 30. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. a member of the Court of Appeals (CA). the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no." He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno Facts: Petitioner Assoc. as an exercise of her legislative power. the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. A Screening Committee was created. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. 129. 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 26. "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20. Justice Puno. wrote a letter dated Nov. When Pres. And the people have made the judgment. However. Moreover. 11. justice of the NEW CA. In previous cases. 33. Aquino. Hence. A motion for consideration was later . 29. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. 11 from being the assoc. 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. he now ranked as no. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May. the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 1982.

Held: The present CA is a new entity. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment. for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. 146738 Estrada vs. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US. and others. Issue: Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office. Japan. it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Aquino.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. In the new government under Pres. Therefore. Germany. Arroyo G. 2001 FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office. Desierto March 2. G. usually effected with violence. different and distinct from the CA or the IAC.filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President. until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.R. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden. No. Great Britain. and fundamental change in the government or political system. it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking. 33.” HELD: . only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. radical.

I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. the bureaucracy. Pagod na ako sa red tape. but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.) “I just want to clear my name. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. EDSA II involves legal questions. “Pagod na pagod na ako. a. as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. “If the envelope is opened. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. .” The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. Madison. the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . he says. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. I’m tired of the red tape.” The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. intriga. he will leave by Monday. . SECOND: Using the totality test. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review. on Monday. b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes. the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution. (I am very tired. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation. notably section 1 of Article II. . EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. the intrigue. and section 8 of Article VII. “The President says. EDSA I presented political question. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. bureaucracy. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. then I will go.

The House of Representative passed on January 24. His presidency is now in the past tense. he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President. d.c. In the press release containing his final statement. the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. . (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Without doubt. the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 2001 House Resolution No. Certainly. and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory. THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears. During the negotiations. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. his final act of farewell. Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up. the seat of the presidency. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. if granted. FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency. The plea. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Also. GUINGONA. JR. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President. would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign. the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. On February 7. still. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. . The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. 2001. petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio. he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.TEOFISTO T. it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.

GOVERNOR BENJAMIN ESGUERRA G." or up to June 7. Alfredo M.Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. 222). as Barangay Captain of Dolores Rizal with other baranggay councilmen for the memorandum ordered by Governer Benjamin Esguerra in replacing the petitioners. respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. DE LEON VS. 1988.R. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. The Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 1986 designating new officers barangay captain and barangay councilmen by authority of the Minister of Local Government granted by the 1986 provisional constitution. NO. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. 78059 AUGUST 31. the respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the following provision: . On February 9. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-today. However. De Leon received a memorandum antedated December 1. 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. DE LEON vs ESGUERRA Case Digest ALFREDO M. their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7. 1987 FACTS: An original action of prohibition was instituted by Alfredo M. 1987. De Leon. In the case at bar. HON.

. we hold that February 8. and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforementioned provision of the Provisional Constitution. the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25. 1986 to which it was antedated. the aforementioned provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27.” . 1987.“All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors. 1986. 1987. its announcement? HELD: The court held that since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution. and not because their term of six years had not yet expired. 1987. 1977. in keeping with the dictates of justice. the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. ISSUES: Whether or not the 1986 provisional constitution may be validly recognized? Whether or not the 1987 constitution was already in effect on February 2. But while February 8. if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. 27. Thus. there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor. respondent OIC . should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1. By that date. 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: "Sec.. therefore. Having become inoperative. 1987 the day of the actual plebiscite or February 8.

1987. an alien woman marrying a Filipino.Governor could no longer rely on Section 2. . because record shows that the same does not posses all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473). Further. the record of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission further shows the clear. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant. native-born or naturalized. claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. CA 473). becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. HELD: Yes. 1987. a temporary alien visitor. MOY YA LIM YAO VS. unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the of facial confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. a Filipino citizen. whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire. even if she has proven that she does not suffer any disqualification there under. thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. 15 and 4. the 1987 Constitution is deemed ratified on February 2. Article III. the announcement of the resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized. the actual date of the voting and not February 8." Therefor.

1979. On May 17. 1982. The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and . In 1981. together with Marina Cabael. arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. Thus this petition for certiorari Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings Held : Yes. On March 25. 1974. On April 14. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. since she was an Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. 1979. 1982. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence. the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. 1974. the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. Banez' eldest son. Leonardo." petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Banez. When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13. filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940. met them. petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.As "guests. On January 13. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. petitioner and her two children with Banez. On the basis of the said letter. Not accepting the set-back.Djumantan vs. Domingo On April 3. he embraced and was converted to Islam.

.. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country.enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. filedan application to take the ’98 Bar Examinations. We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez. Ching has residedin the Phils July 1998: Ching. and Prescila Dulay. when Leonardo C. Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19. FACTS: April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching. the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. 1990. if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally. under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation. Chinesecitizen. Bar Matter No. Louis University in Baguio City. . Filipina. However. more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27. after graduating from St. In re Ching. 1980. 914 Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar. Since birth. unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises". in La Union. The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected .

it would already be beyondthe reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence. controlling statues and jurisprudencecompel the Court in its . from the Velayocase. July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenshipand his Oath of Allegiance. Voter Cert fromCOMELEC. from the Cuenco caseISSUES:1)WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time2)If affirmative. Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG):1 st – the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen2 nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means areasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs.HELD: Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar (ouch!) RATIO:1& 2) No. by any reasonable yardstick.Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submitproof of his Phil citizenship Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship. WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar. Ching’s election was clearly beyond. he wasalready 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C. Being born in April 1964.Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight.A. He wasfurther required to submit more proof of citizenship. theallowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philcitizenship.He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority. No 625 in June ’99. LaUnion also from COMELEC. April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and aFilipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen andcontinued to be so. and may be extended up to 7 yrs. and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao.

is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong.On the issue of residence. Samar. Northern Samar for voting purposes. Jose Ong. Jr. the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process CO vs. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. HRET Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong. Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. the private respondent’s grandfather. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the petitioners. For the elections of 1984 and1986. Ong Te. and voted there during those elections. Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent. Ching has offered no reason why he delayedhis election of Phil citizenship.decision. Held: Yes. Jr. The father of the private respondent. arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang.Under the 1973 Constitution. Jose Ong. Besides. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang. privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Jr. Jr. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be . In the year 1895. he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Jr.In 1984. He has established his life here in thePhilippines. Also. registered himself as a voter of Laoang. Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong. those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. is a citizen of the Philippines.

1985. Tarlac.tantamountto a property qualification. however. of Filipino parents. repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. section 1(4). As a Consequence. "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. votingand residence requirements. Bengzon Vs. 2001 Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. On the other hand. 1994. respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. took an oath of allegiance to the United States. 63. citizenship.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. who was then running for reelection. On March 17. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age. 142840 May 7. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. on April 27. R. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen. 1998 elections.” Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III. 1960. HRET 357 SCRA 545 G. a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization. if he was . On November 5. He was born in San Clemente. No. among other. he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.

) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections. Comelec dismissed the petition. Ruling: 1. of the 1987 Constitution. contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII. returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President". Section 4. Tecson vs Comelec Facts: Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen. Issue: Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec. as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. refers to “contests” relating to the election. his grandfather Lorenzo. The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship. holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth. of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4." Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage. paragraph 7. he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. 2. of the 1987 Constitution. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that . paragraph 7.

COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen. Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son. the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78. Being so. Allan--respondent’s father. Mercado Vs. pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual . Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. thus. having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie. the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented. Respondent.having died in 1954 at the age of 84. was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. In the absence of any other evidence. 1998 elections. in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. 135083 May 26. though an American citizen. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.R. 1999 Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 G. such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. No. Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child.

by some positive act. as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual allegiance. is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. The former arises when. the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. The filing of such certificate of . For instance. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco. While dual citizenship is involuntary. it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli. (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. IV) of our Constitution. refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes. on the other hand. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part. unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Such a person. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC. (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens. loyalty to two or more states. dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. USA.citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

No. received his education. petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of th Philippines.the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. dela Rosa Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February.A. 5440 andSection 25 of the Interim Rules. No. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. that it shall bedone on January instead of having it on March. Republic vs. on February 27.On September 20. On the other hand.A. 1992. private respondent has. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27. No. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule.A. 1991. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine. Branch 28. practiced his profession as an artist. when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. respondent Judge rendered the . that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. and directed the publication of the saidorder and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of theRegional Trial Court.Six days later. Manila. for three consecutive weeks. The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16. " where he manifested his intention to run for public office inthe May 1992 elections. and taken part in past elections in this country. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. 1992. 473).On January 14. 1992.candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship. 63 as amended by C. which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under theRevised Naturalization Law (C.

(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition. thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.thereby vesiting upon him. Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not “impressed with voluntariness. without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing. is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization. Frivaldo vs COMELEC [174 SCRA 245] Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22. On October 27.assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G.Held:No. all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18.Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino. and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.” His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. He isordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. the Solicitor General interposed a timely appealdirectly with the Supreme Court. 1988. 1988. The proceedingsof the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of thescheduled date of hearing. FRIVALDO. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. (3) petitioner wasallowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment. his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US. and the petitionitself. 1988. respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioner’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines andtherefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. 1992. Additionally. No pronouncement as to costs. .

The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate could not amend the Constitution. First. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. Once any of the required qualifications is lost. As an alien. his title may be seasonably challenged LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo. Labo is still an Australian citizen. Held: No. elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. is not a sufficient act of repatriation. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office. the Local Government Code and the Omnibus Election Code. According to Australian records. he was disqualified for public office in the Philippines. Held: The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such . There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Second.The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen. qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Third.

Yu vs Defensor-Santiago Doctrine: Reacquisition of citizenship FACTS: Petitioner Yu. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Petitioner. the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. while still a citizen of the Philippines who hadrenounced. SaidConsular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. originally a Portuguese national. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly andexplicitly and not left to inference or implication. However. It does not appear in the record. renouncing all other allegiance. nor does the petitioner claim. and legal capacity. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime inApril 1980. state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines." he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents hesigned. petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed PortuguesePassport No. was naturalized as a Philippine citizen on 10February 1978. Petitioner. in turn. 35/81 serial N.through a formal and positive process. with full knowledge. As a condition for such naturalization. Philippine citizenship. on 21 July 1981. specifically.after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine . he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance. simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. filed a petition forhabeas corpus. "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreignprince. potentate. upon his naturalization. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship. it must be stressed. is not a commodity or were to be displayed whenrequired and suppressed when convenient. The petitioner.The CID detained the petitioner pending his deportation case. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship HELD: Yes.

The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. represented by Executive Treasurer Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila FACTS: On June 3. potentate. upon his naturalization. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with hismaintenance of Philippine citizenship. premises considered. 1863. Respondent refuse to provide the money. In June 1983. equivalent to the same amount. hence. for the benefit of those persons and their heirs.citizen resumed orreacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen. a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place.000 deposited from before. the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80. applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippinecitizen. the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd.WHEREFORE. The government used the money as such but $80." he declared his nationality asPortuguese in commercial documents he signed. petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced. "absolutely andforever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince. .000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank.000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The Spanish dominions provided $400. This Decision is immediatelyexecutory. the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80. specifically. Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands. state or sovereignty" and pledged to"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.000 together with interest. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. On account of various petitions of the persons. which was in turn invested as jewelries. this appeal.

The defendant appealed for the case. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature. Appellate court decision was affirmed. MELCHORA CABANAS. as the beneficiary and authorized his brother. FRANCISCO PILAPIL. Millian Pilapil. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Francisco Pilapil. left an insurance having his child. deceased. the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the child’s welfare. Melchora Cabanas.ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil. plaintiff-appellee vs. it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. where no other person is entrusted with it. July 25. Petition was thereby GRANTED. HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. Issue: . by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso. defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94. to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority.

” With the added condition that the child stays with the mother. and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State. Article 320 states that “the father. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary. or in his absence the mother. is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. not the uncle. and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives." If. still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos. it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened. Francisco Pilapil." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle. as the Constitution so wisely dictates.Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. belongs to the child in ownership. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis. the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. without any evidence of lack of maternal care." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry. or by any lucrative title. as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae. the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. .

or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . THE ISSUE . 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5.S. and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. importation and exportation of equipment. Proc.The trust. insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law. THE FACTS The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Sp. Petitioners argued. inter alia.S. materials and supplies. .” II.000. Zamora. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction. the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings. and further defines the rights of the U. which provides that “foreign military bases. G. troops. 2000 DECISION (En Banc) BUENA. J. . Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. October 10. The VFA defines the treatment of U. 138570. No. No.: I. The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. Millian Pilapil.00." Bayan v.R. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. movement of vessel and aircraft. that the VFA violates §25. however. is pro tanto null and void. In order. to protect the rights of the minor. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits.

is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum. when so required by congress. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. the VFA is not unconstitutional. and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. unless the following conditions are sufficiently met. held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion. the provision in [in §25. troops. to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution. Section 25. and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. To require the other contracting state. (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and. the United States of America in this case. . THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. viz: (a) it must be under a treaty.] NO. in which case the significance thus .Was the VFA unconstitutional? III. Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases. or facilities in the country. . xxx xxx xxx This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

On January 29. the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. 2001 nationwide. has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. 8189. it was the consensus. as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law.R.attached to them prevails. and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty. xxx xxx xxx The records reveal that the United States Government.A. COMELEC Case Digest AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty. it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because. COMELEC G. 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001 Facts: Petitoners. March 26. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Comelec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request. to be set on February 17 and 18. Moreover. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus. 147066. there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission under R.A. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before the December 27. No. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said . representing the youth sector. 8 of R. Hubbard. 2001-027 requesting for a two-day additional registration of new voters. Aggrieved by the denial. under international law. Subsequently. through Ambassador Thomas C. 2001 General Elections of new voters. seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration before the May 14. which seeks to nullify respondent Comelec’s resolution and / or to declare Sec. AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure.

Macalintal vs COMELEC [G. wherein the commission shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law. July 10. and therefore Section 8 of R. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the “operational impossibility” of holding the additional two-day registration. provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. 2001 as it denies petitioners’ right to vote. as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not otherwise. 157013. 8436. 2003] Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal. 8189. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. cannot be applied in this case. 8436. No. No. Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No.A. 8189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. No. 8436 may not apply.R. Section 8 of R. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it .A.provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. The so-called “stand-by powers” or “residual” powers of the Comelec.A. a memer of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R. 8. 3584 dated Feb.A.A. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R. Held: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners’ request. Section 28 of R.

V.A. 1 of the Constitution. Whether or not Section 25 of R. violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. revise. entitled. IX-A. 4 of the Constitution. Sec 5(d) is valid. “An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad. V. violates the residency requirement in Art. and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate. petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer. Sec. VII. No. 9189 violates Art. Sec.5 of R. Whether or not Section 18.A. allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review. 2. 9189 violates Art. 9189 allowing the registration of voters. VII. amend. including the President and the Vice-President. No.A. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention: · That Section 5(d) of R. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R. 1 of the Constitution. No. Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress. R. 9189 violates Art.A. Sec. No. 9189.A. No. IX-A. 1 of the Constitution Ruling: 1. and · That Section 25 of the same law. 1 of the Constitution.” appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. violates the constitutional mandate under Art.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives. No.that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated. by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines. Sec. Issue: 1. Appropriating Funds Therefor. · That Section 18. Sec. who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee . and for Other Purposes. 3.

No.5 is unconstitutional. Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. was deliberated upon on the Senate floor.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.A. it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency. Section 18.voting and absentee voter qualification. Yes. .5 of R. 2104. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines. Yes.A. Section 18. further weakening petitioner’s claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. 9189. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or. 2. In the discharge of its functions. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. Art.A. V of the Constitution. Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President. granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” 3. which reads: “Sec. which later became R. 2. as aptly stated by petitioner. 2. No. which is in the Philippines. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. 9189. No. in connection with Sec. and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

. Atty.” that is.A. Jesus S. the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. its contacts with political strategists. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.) That R. among others: 1. to review its decisions. orders and rulings.A. 1996. unlike in the other modes of initiative. filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution. by People's Initiative" citing Section 2. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties. because of its fact-finding facilities. is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments. Article XVII of the Constitution. On December 18. Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In the same vein. Alexander Padilla. 1996. and 2. Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago. Acting on the petition. and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies. In line with this. this Court holds that Section 25 of R. founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative. Santiago vs comelec FACTS: On December 6. to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body “except those specifically granted by the Constitution. to which no such law has yet been passed. it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws. the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress. Delfin.The Commission on Elections.

it could have provided for a subtitle therefor. WHEREFORE.A. If R.A. Also. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative? HELD: NO.A. No. while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum. No. approve. the primacy of interest. approved or rejected. or reject.A. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. or hierarchy of values. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. ordinances. No. petition is GRANTED. While R. enact. Under the said law. amended or repealed" denotes that R. . 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted. in whole or in part. No. the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. or resolutions. R.ISSUE: Is R. it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. considering that in the order of things. initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.A. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.

Tolentino vs COMELEC Facts The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8. Issue Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s? Decision The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose . 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution. 1971. hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. Republic Act 6132. 1969 respectively." at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be. Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof. 1967 and June 17. and the subsequent implementing resolutions. by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No.

". 1971. The respondents Comelec. Disbursing Officer. insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8. as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention. Organic Resolution No. . and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. the Court declares this decision immediately executory.amendments to this Constitution. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. The petition herein is granted.