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A "Statute" is the will of the Sovereign Legislature according to which the Governments function. The executive must act and the Judiciary in the course of Administration of Justice must apply the law as laid down by the said legislative will. ery often occasions will arise where the courts will be called upon to interpret the words! phrases and expressions used in the statute. "n the course of such "nterpretation! the #ourts have! over the centuries! laid down certain guidelines which have come to be $nown as "%ules of "nterpretation of Statutes" .&ore often than not the Statutes contain "Statement of 'b(ects and %easons" and also a ")reamble" both of which provide guidelines for "nterpreting the true meaning of the words and expressions used in the Statute. Judges have to interpret statutes and apply them. The (udges fre*uently use this phrase true meaning or literal or plain meaning. Literal "nterpretation of a statute is finding out the true sense by ma$ing the statute its own expositor. "f the true sense can thus be discovered. There is no resort to construction. "t is beyond *uestion! the duty of courts! in construing statutes! to give effect to the intent of law ma$ing power! and see$ for that intent in every legitimate way! but first of all the words and language employed. Statutes are embodiments of authoritative formulae and the very words which are used constitute part of law.The interpretation or construction means the process by which the #ourts see$ to ascertain the intent of the Legislature through the medium of the authoritative form in which it is expressed. +The law is deemed to be what the #ourt interprets it to be. The very concept of ,interpretation- connotes the introduction of elements which are necessarily extrinsic to the words in the statute. Though the words ,interpretation- and -construction- are used interchangeably! the idea is somewhat different.

"nterpretation of statutes is of two types .they can de distinguished as "literal" and "functional". The #ourts have laid down that the "nterpretation of the statutes must be in accordance with the literal meaning of the words and expressions read in the light of the "Statement of 'b(ects and %easons and the )reamble" of the Act". The )rimary %ule of "nterpretation of Statutes is called "Literal "nterpretation" or "Literal #onstruction". "t is also $nown as ")lain %ule of interpretation". "n this form of interpretation the "words" used in the statute are construed according to their "literal" meaning or according to the popular and dictionary meaning of the term! in other words its plain sense. #hief Justice Jervis in Abley v Gale has explained the expression -literal meaning-. /e points out that "if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous! in our (udgment we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense even though it too leads in our view of the case to an absurdity or manifest in(ustice. The words of a statute are to be first understood in their natural! ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning! unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context! or in the ob(ect of the statute to suggest the contrary. The tendency is that by doing so! the courts give effect to the intention of the )arliament and the presumption is that the words themselves do! in such a case it is best to declare the intention of the law giver. "t is a rule of construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the word is to be adhered to. The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. 0here the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt! that construction ought to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. "n other words the best possible interpretation of a statute would be to give its plain meaning. 0hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it is not necessary to loo$ into the legislative intent or ob(ect of the Act. "t is when the language is vague that the legislative-s intention is to be ta$en into consideration. There is no room for

construction if there isn-t any ambiguity. "f! applying this rule! a clear meaning appears! then this must be applied! and the courts will not in*uire whether what the statute says represents the intention of the legislature. "t doesn-t loo$ beyond the written words.The #ourts have to follow this principle even if it results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to the policy or intention of legislature. 0hen the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning the tas$ of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. "f the . "t is also $nown as "Grammatical "nterpretation" . A restrictive and exhaustive definition should be expanded or made extensive to embrace things which are strictly not within the meaning of the word as defined. The duty of the court of law is simply to ta$e the statute as it stands! and to construe its words according to their natural significance. "f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the court must give effect to it and it has no right to extend its operation in order to carry out the real or supposed intention of the legislature. "n order to determine the literal meaning of a statute the courts have to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word in a statute by referring to a dictionary or scientific or any other technical wor$s where the words have been used. "t (ust loo$s at what law says. "f the words of the statute are in themselves precise and lucid! then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. 0ords and phrases are to be construed by the courts in their ordinary sense! and the ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation have to be applied. "t doesn-t loo$ beyond the litera legis which means letter of legislation. "f the words given in the statute are lucid and explicit! it is not for the (udges to go beyond that language or words to try and establish what the legislative might have meant by using that word. This rule is also widely followed in "ndia. Thus! generally spea$ing! words and expressions would be given their plain and ordinary meaning which cannot be cut down or curtailed unless they in themselves are clearly restrictive. "t is an elementary principle of the construction of statutes that the words have to be read in their literal sense.

Absoluta sentantia expositore non indigent1 plain words need no exposition. Such language best declares! without more! the intention of the law1 giver! and is decisive of it.words of the statute are clear and unambiguous! it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in provision. All that we have to see at the very outset is what that provision says. 0hen the meaning of the words is plain! it is not the duty of #ourts to busy themselves with supposed intentions ."t! therefore! appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or accused. "f the provision is unambiguous! and if from that provision! the legislative intent is clear! there is no need to call into aid other rules of construction of statutes. "n constructing a statutory provision! the first and the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. .

"t must be possible to spell the meaning contended for! out of the words actually used6 +4 7nless the words are without meaning or absurd! it would be safe to give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention+ and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to conse*uences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or (ustice entertained by the #ourt. 34 The law goes so far as to re*uire the courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words! if by doing so absurdity arid inconsistency can be avoided4 54 The #ourt should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is! on the face of it! reasonably plain. 'f course! this does not mean that an Act or any part of it! can be recast. Bachittar Singh' clearly underscore the desirability of the above indicated course of action in the given situation of textual inade*uacy of a given provision 81 ""t is argued that if the language of the enactment is interpreted in its literal . A #ourt has the power to depart from the grammatical construction! if it finds that strict adherence to the grammatical construction will defeat the ob(ect the Legislature had "n view. /owever! if the language so permits! it is open to the #ourt to give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the legislation.GOLDEN RULE: Argument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in interpreting a statute. 2o doubt! grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate. The following observations in this regard of en$ataram a Ayyar! " in Tirath Singh v.

in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contraction of the apparent purpose of the enactment! or to some inconvenience or absurdity! hardship or in(ustice! presumably not intended! a construction may be put upon which modifies the meaning of the words! and even the structure of the sentence. As (udge Learned /and said! -we must not ma$e a fortress out of the dictionary but remember that statutes must have some purpose or ob(ect! whose imaginative discovery is (udicial craftsmanship-. 0e need not always cling to literalness and should see$ to endeavour to avoid an un(ust and absurd result.and grammatical sense! there could be no escape from the conclusion that parties to the petition are also entitled to the notice under the proviso.% Ltd AIR 3=DB S# 3=>+! the Supreme #ourt observed as under 8 "The courts must always see$ to find out the intention of the achieve the obvious intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction 1 Ajit Investment #o. To ma$e sense out of an unhappily worded provision! where the purpose is .: "t is also well1recognised principle of construction that while construing a statute! the courts have to so read the provision of the Act as to steer clear of the vice of unconstitutionality . Kodaikanal Motor "nion #$. K. Ltd v. Malvandkar <3=>?@ =A "T% A?B C9orn. "n State of Tamil ad!v.G. 0e should not ma$e a moc$ery of legislation.4. 9ut it is a rule of interpretation well1established that where the language of a statute. As Lord Eenning said! -it would he ideal to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity-. Violence to the lan ua e use! The court! if necessary! does some -violence to the words.. Though the courts must find out the intention of the statute from the language used! but language more often than not is an imperfect instru1 ment of expression! of human thought.

apparent to the (udicial eye! -some. The Legislature could not be presumed to have intended an absurd or anomalous result! if literal construction suggests any. BF? to BFBG A"% 3=D3 S# 3=55 at p. in Artemion v.violence to language is permissible." 0here to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" "we must do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction Cper Lord %eid in L!ke v.$. The meaning of the same words in a statute may he amended! enlarged or restricted in order to harmonise them with the legislative intention of the entire statute. AA>! he also observed 8"t his is not a new problem! though our standard of drafting is such that it may emerge4. $roco1io! <3=BB@ 3 H9 D>D C#A4 CDDD4! "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. A? "T% BD5 C/L4. The spirit of the statute should prevail over the literal meaning #(/. #See K.-. M()*+.S. The intention of the Legislature must be discovered from the words employed in the statute and the provision should be interpreted in a manner to further the intent and ob(ect." 0herever strict interpretation of the statute gives rise to un(ust situation or results! the (udges can ensure their good sense to remedy it by reading words in! if necessary! so as to do what )arliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result!" said Ean$werts L. "n the course of vitalising the intent or purpose! the omissions or gaps can be bridged and extended meaning can he given and details can be appended within the contours facilitating full1fledged sway of the provision. I2() 3=B?@ A? "T% B=5G C3=B+4 A# AA> where at p. S!0hash (handra Bose A"% 3==5 S# A>+4.(. "n certain situations the modification of the language! or . 3=5> and 3=5D! and L!ke v. Omissions an! a"s su""lie! "n the realm of (udicial interpretation! the departure from normal maxim of literal interpretation can be made to effectuate the intention and purpose of the enactment.J. Ltd v. IT' <3=D3@ 3+3 "T% A=> at pp. &arghese v.

4 &eanin of the 'or! ma( )e e*ten!e! "n '5iltshire v.enlarged interpretation to highlight the meaning implicit in the provision is nut eluded to s*uare with the intention and advance the purpose."t is often said that the function of the #ourts is only to expound and not to legislate! a theory which has in the recent past invited dissent in the sense! gaps in the legislation may call for (udicial filling up with a view to dealing with situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute! not within the imagination of the Legislature! when its application may be called for 1 Shirish 3inance and Investment $. Sreenivas!l! 2edd4 <5FF5@ 3F= #omp. "n "nited Slates v. Barret ) 3=BB@ $ H9 +35 the expression "a person committing an offence" was interpreted as a person believed to have committed offence by ma$ing arrest and it was held that instead of merely a "person committing an offence"! the extension or addition to the same -believed to have committed." The #ourt while construing a provision should not easily read into it words . #$% C9orn. v. 5illiam 3reeman8 C3D?+1 ?B4 ?? 7S ?A+8 + /ow AAB! the Supreme #ourt in the context of giving an interpretation to an extended meaning held as follows 81 "The meaning of the Legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law! from the reasons or motive upon which the Legislature proceeded! from the end in view! or the purpose which was designedG the limitation of the rule being! that to extend the meaning to any case! not included within the words! the case must be shown to come within the same reason upon which the law ma$er proceeded and not a li$e reason.#as. 7ester 3=>+ A# 5=B the words "some other material evidence" were read as "material evidence admissible" and the /ouse of Lords while interpreting to that effect held that the extension is implicit in the words employed by the statute. appropriate in the context. Ltd. "n 6irector of $!0lic $rosec!tions v.

. "t is for such reason that whenever it becomes absolutely necessary! and without doing violence to the expressed words of the statute! a creative and innovative approach is to be adopted.: Ltd. Arm chair rule + .in the construction of wills! Judges can more fran$ly step into the shoes of Legislature where an enactment leaves its own intentions in much too nebulous or uncertain State. "n Bangalore 5ater S!11l4 9 Sewerage Board v. 2aja11a A"% 3=>D S# A?D! #hief Justice 9eg dealing with necessity of such exercise by #ourt observed 8 )erhaps! with the passage of time! what may be described as an extension of a method resembling the "arm chair rule.u! es ste""in into shoes of le islatures "n the modern trend of interpretation of statutes the archaic concepts of interpretation adhering to strict rules of grammar are not absolute and what has become firmly anchored as a proper manner of interpretation is the contextual one! so that the attempt is made to discover elusive words necessary to materialise the purpose of the rule.which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the ob(ect of the statute in which the provision is enacted! the #ourt should construe it in a harmonious way to ma$e it meaningful.0henever strict interpretation gives rise to un(ust situation or results! the Judges ensure their good sense to remedy it by reading words if necessary! so as to do what )arliament would have done had they had the situation in mind #(/S. The mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of steps with the modern positive approach. (handra Bose A"% 3==5 S# A>+4. S!0l. A. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction! that is! to effectuate the ob(ect and purpose of the Act #Administrator< M!nici1al (or1oration v. 6attatra4a 6ahankar A*2 3==5 S# 3D?B4 Calready discussed4.

. The #ourt should construe the words of the statute in a reasonable way having regard to the context and not to embar$ upon any legislative action #See 7ameedia 7ardware Stores &s.J. A (udge should as$ himself the *uestion how! if the ma$ers of the Act had themselves come across this ruc$ in the texture of it! they should have straightened it out6 /e must then do as they would have done. 9ut that is a $ind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the ob(ect of the legislation and to promote the goals of society or to put it negatively! to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society. and then he must supplement the written word so as to give -force and life. /e must set. in Bangalore 5ater S!11l4 and Sewerage Board v. . So long as #ourts $eep themselves tethered to the ethos of the society and do not travel off its course! so long as they attempt to furnish the felt necessities of the time and do not refurbish them! their role in this respect has to . Asher <3=?=@ 5 All I% 3AA at p. 2. "t is! therefore! not only necessary but obligatory on the #ourts to step in to fill the lacuna.J. to wor$ on the constructive tas$ of finding the intention of )arliament. 0hen #ourts perform this function! undoubtedly! they legislate (udicially. $en tiah the intention of the Legislature.u!icial le islation The Legislature often fails to $eep pace with the changing needs and values! nor is it realistic to expect that it will have provided to all contingencies and eventualities.. Mohan Lal Swocar AI2 3 = D D S # 3 F B F 4 . A (udge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can and should iron out the creases. 3B?! Lord Eenning L." This rule of construction is *uoted with approval by the Supreme #ourt M. 2aja11a Al2 3=>D S# A?D."n Seaford (o!rt /states Ltd v. said 8 -0hen a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. 333A and it is also referred to by 9eg! #. M!ddala &eeramalla11a AI2 3=B3 S# 33F> at p.

"s law static or moderately progressive6 The controversy is discussed in the following paragraph8 (o!rt's com1etence in s!11l4ing omissions > According to the former view! the court is not competent to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mista$e. Such importation would be not to construe! but to amend! the statute. Askar awa. 7ndisputably! the court cannot usurp the power of legislation in the guise of finding defects in draftsmanship and incorporate its go by letter or to give effect to legislative intent. The #ourt must proceed on the footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. 9ut! is there a total prohibition to supply essentials which have been inadvertently omitted so as to ma$e the Act effective and meaningful or whether the #ourt can add or supplant this omission6 /ere comes the crux. "t is well1recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity! hardship or in(ustice! presumably not intended! a construction may be put . Iven where there is casus omiss!s8 it is for the courts to remedy the defect4 Addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissibleJ There is no scope for importing into the statute! words which are not there. A cas!s orniss!s can in no case be supplied by a #ourt of law for that would be to ma$e welcomed #2attan (hand 7ira (hand v. E/en if there be cas!s omiss!s8 the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by (udicial interpretation. =!ng AIR $##$ S#0 ?=B4. There is a clash of (udicial debate on this aspect 1 one view is that court cannot usurp the powers of Legislature and other is that it is permissible under certain circumstances to read into the Act something which is not there so as to ma$e it effective and meaningful. The other view is that the general rule that addition to or modification of words should not be made can be departed from by the court to avoid a patent absurdity. Iven if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the court cannot aid the Legislature-s defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or! by construction ma$e up the deficiencies which are left in the Act.

.A Judge must not alter the material of the texture of which the Act is woven! but he can and should iron out the creases if he come across the ruc$ in the texture. There need be no mee$ or mute submis 1 sions to the plainness of the language.. %igid legal thin$ing 1 a temporary aberration of the &iddle Ages 1 seems to be ma$ing a come bac$ in spite of e*uity! Lord &ansfield and all others made efforts to humanise The court must! therefore! strive to interpret the statute as to promoteKadvance the ob(ect and purpose of the enactment.2o doubt it is the duty of the #ourt to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature but it is certainly not the duty of the #ourt to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in the a"s or omissions in the provisions of an Act. The cold! logical and soulless approach defeats not only (ustice but also the intention of )arliament. "n the past! the Judges and the lawyers spo$e of the -literal rule.has now been discarded. To avoid patent in(ustice! anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law! the #ourt would be well (ustified in departing from the so1called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the ob(ect and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written word if necessary.. Lor this purpose! where necessary! the court may even depart from the rule that /ain words should be interpreted according to their plain which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They too$ the grammatical and literal meaning unmindful of the conse*uences.To ma$e sense out of an unhappily worded provision! where the purpose is apparent to the (udicial eye! "some" violence to the language is permissible! the courts need not cling to literalness but should see$ to endeavour to avoid un(ust and absurd result! and not to ma$e a moc$ery of legislation.upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence.The -literal rule.. lie must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the Legislature. Iven if .

Euring the last several years! the -literal rule. The whole situation and not (ust one1to1one relation is loo$ed at.has been given a good1bye.such a meaning gave rise to un(ust results which Legislature never intended! the grammatical meaning alone was $ept to prevail. They said that it would be for the Legislature to amend the Act and not for the court to intervene by its innovation. 9ut it does not imply power to #ourt to substitute its own notions of legislative intention. 2ot any provision but the framewor$ of the whole statute is considered. Ivery word! section and provision is examined. )rovisions are considered in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. The necessity which gave rise to the Act is examined. 9ut! if words are ambiguous! uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed! the court puts upon the language of the Legislature! rational meaning. 2ow the opinion has swept in favour of construction of a statute so as to promote "general legislative purpose" instead of adhering to "literal rule" of interpreting a statute according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the words. The mischief which the Legislature intended to redress is loo$ed at. "f the words are precise and cover the situation in hand! there is no need to go further. The preponderance of opinion is in favour of construction so as to achieve the legislative intendment. The #ourt expounds those words. "t implies only a power of choice where differing constructions arc possible and different meanings are available. . They are considered to ensure coherence and #onsistency within the law as a whole and to avoid unavoidable circumstances. The Act is examined as a whole. )rovisions are not viewed as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. Such adventure! no doubt! enlarges #ourt-s discretion as to interpretation. The words of the statute are first examined. The intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the statute is loo$ed for.

?B. Liberal 3 5 &athur! E. The general rule of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. )robodh #handra Ghosh C3==F4 3D? "T% BF? C#al4 + #"T vs.INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION "2T%'E7#T"'2 Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority.+ M"t is true that an exemption provision should be liberally construed! but this does not mean that such liberal construction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning of such exemption provision. 2. "f the words are clear! free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. Eungarmal Tainwala C3==34 3=3 "T% ??A C )atna4 .! "nterpretation of Statutes! 3st Idn. "2TI%2AL A"ES Lon title A long title of a Legislation may not control! circumscribe or widen the scope of the legislation! if the provisions thereof are otherwise clear and unambiguous! but if the terms of the legislation are capable of both a wider and a narrower construction! that construction which would be in tune with the avowed ob(ect manifested in the preamble or declared in the long title! ought to be accepted.5 E*em"tions An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be! as far as possible! liberally construed and in favour of the assessee! provided no violence is done to the language used.3 9ut if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation. 7rmila 9ala Easi vs.! 5FFB! #entral Law )ublications! Allahabad )g.

4 > (IT vs. A proviso should receive strict construction. There is! in the eye of law! only one enactment! of which both the section or sub1section and the Ixplanation are two inseparable parts.?+ )& B #"T vs. Such an Ixplanation becomes an integral part of the main enactment. #9ET C3=D=4 3>A "T% A5+ CS#4 "nterpretation of the Statutes! will be made wherever it is possible to be made without impairing the legislative re*uirement and the spirit of the provision. 'rdinarily! a proviso is intended to be part of the section and not an addendum to the main provisions. #$% Ltd. "t cannot! normally! be so interpreted as to set at naught the real ob(ect of the main enactment. vs.pdf! accessed on 5AK3FK5F3+ on A.A MThe main function of a proviso is to carve out an exception to the main enactment.:? Pro/iso A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself.% .:B E*"lanation Sometimes an Ixplanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words appearing in the section. The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope. 3=D "T% 33F C'ri. "n the absence of anything repugnant in the sub(ect or context! the words and expressions used in the Ixplanation are to be given the same meaning as given to them in the main provision itself.:> ? A )etron Ingineering #onstruction )vt.inKarticlesKart53. 2e!nion /ngineering (o.IT2 ?@A #Bom. A proviso is a subsidiary to the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself.i(tr. #*++-% ?:. An Ixplanation appended to a section or a sub1section becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. MAn Ixplanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main provision to which it is added as an Ixplanation. Ltd. )yarilal Nasam &an(i O #o.nic.

An Ixplanation is *uite different in nature from a provisoG the latter excludes! excepts and restricts while the former explains! clarifies or subtracts or includes something by introducing a legal fiction. Lakshamma AI2 *+.The purpose of an Ixplanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. . = (IT vs.IT2 @@ #Kar% 33 $aras!ramaiah vs. There is no presumption that an Ixplanation which is inserted subse*uently introduces something new which was not present in the section before.B A$ ??:.:=. &oltas Ltd. 'rdinarily! an Ixplanation is inserted to clear up any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to harmonise it with the section and to clear up any ambiguity in the main section.+ #Bom% 3F (IT vs. #*++A% ?:B IT2 B.:3F Non+o)stante clauses MA non1obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that the provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non1obstante clause. "n case there is any inconsistency or a departure between the non1obstante clause and another provision! one of the ob(ects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non1obstante clause which would prevail over the other clause.:33 D Singh! Avtar! "ntroduction to "nterpretation of Statutes! 5nd Idition %eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and #ompany! 2agpur.D MAn Ixplanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning of the words used in the section. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi 5orks *+. MThe normal principle in construing an Ixplanation is to understand it as explaining the meaning of the provision to which it is addedG the Ixplanation does not enlarge or limit the provision! unless the Ixplanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clauseG if the intention of the Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the scope of a provision! the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provisionG such an Ixplanation has to be given effect to! as pointing out the real meaning of the provision all along.

(IT #*+CC% *@? IT2 -@. "t cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section! particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but! being part of the statute! it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous act. Therefore! punctuation is put as grammatically re*uired. The main ob(ective and purpose of the Act are found in the )reamble of the Statute. ?D.3? "n Kashi $rasad v State*B! the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute! it can be treated as a $ey for the interpretation of the statute. 35 3+ K.$.! 5FFB! #entral Law )ublications! Allahabad. 3A 3=DF 99 #J B35 .:35.: 3+ Pream)le The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. M&arginal notes are not decisive in interpreting a substantive provision of law! but! in case of doubt! they can be relied upon as one of the aids for construction.! "nterpretation of Statutes! 3st Idn. )g. "t is a preparatory statement. A comma is! therefore! legitimately and as per the rules of grammar! re*uired after the first activity to separate it from the second activity of manufacture. Shreeram 2eligio!s 9 (harita0le Tr!st vs. M)reamble is the Act in a nutshell.B. IT' *-* IT2 B+@ #S(% 2. 2.&ar inal notes an! hea!in s MThe marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show what the section is dealing with. Punctuation MThere are three activities serially set out in that sub1clause! namely! construction! manufacture or production. "f the language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. "t contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. &arghese vs.#Bom% 3? &athur! E. Since the second activity is followed by the word Mor:! no comma is re*uired after the second activity to separate it from the third activity.

)unctuation! in any case! is a minor element in the construction of a statute. Balkrishna Malhotra #*+@*% C* IT2 @B+ #S(% 3= Singh! Avtar! "ntroduction to "nterpretation of Statutes! 5nd Idition %eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and #ompany! 2agpur.3= "n order to attract the principle of e(usdem generis! it is essential that a distinct genus or category must be discernible in the words under examination. 3B 3> 7ind!stan (onstr!ction vs.: 3B Definition clause an! un!efine! 'or!s 0a) Judicially defined words M"t has long been a well1established principle to be applied in the construction of an Act of )arliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear (udicial interpretation! the subse*uent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context! must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously been assigned to it. They ta$e their colour from each other that is! the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. "t is well recognised rule of construction that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis! they are understood to be used in their cognate sense.:3> M"nterpretation of a provision in a taxing statute rendered years bac$ and accepted and acted upon by the department should not be easily departed from. A0erdeen Steam Trawling and 3ishing (o. (IT #*++A% ?:C IT2 ?+* #Bom% Barras vs. Ltd.:3D (b) Rule of Ejusdem generis The maxim e(usdem generis serves to restrict the meaning of a general word to things or matters of the same genus as the preceding particular words. #*+--% A( A:? #7L% 3D (IT vs."t does not disclose any intention of providing for a separate $ind of business altogether. 'nly when a statute is carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. . "t cannot! however! be regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.

Similarly! the words Mother stationary plant: must be construed e(usdem generis with switchgears and transformers.0here the statute imposes restriction on advertisement! publicity and sales promotion! the expression Msales promotion: cannot include selling expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business 5F. #*++-% ?:? IT2 *:A #(al. Statesman Ltd.$. They are generally added to avoid encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details! guidelines to wor$ out the policy of the statute! transitory provisions! rules and forms which need fre*uent amendment and the li$e.B .53 The rule of e(usdem generis is to be applied Mwith caution: and Mnot pushed too far:. Anglo India =!te Mills (o.% 55 ". Ltd. 7ari Shanker =ain AI2 *+@+ #S(% .55 1che!ule The Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. INDE2 INTRODUCTION33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333$ LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333334 5F 53 (IT vs. State /lectricit4 Board vs. "t may not be interpreted too narrowly and unnecessarily if broad based genus could be found so as to avoid cutting down words to dwarf siPe.% )(IT vs. #*++?% *+C IT2 BC? # (al . &uch importance is not given to the forms unless they contain re*uirements of a mandatory nature.

.....................................................................................................................................................................................B 'missions and gaps supplied....................................GOLDEN RULE:3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333335 iolence to the language used....................................................................................................................................................3> )reamble..................................3> Eefinition clause and undefined words.....................................................................................................................................3D Cb4 %ule of I(usdem generis...........................................................................D Arm chair rule 1 (udges stepping into shoes of legislatures.........................................................................................................3= Ac7no'le! ment ......................3B &arginal notes and headings................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3F INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333$6 Long title........................................3A Ixplanation....................................................................................................................................3D Ca4 Judicially defined words..........................................................= Judicial legislation.............................................................3? Ixemptions................3? )roviso.........> &eaning of the word may be extended........................................................................................3> )unctuation..............................................3D Schedule.....................................................................3A 2on1obstante clauses...........................

" would li$e to express my gratitude towards my parents for their $ind co1 operation and encouragement which help me in completion of this pro(ect. 2ancy &aQam for their guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the pro(ect O also for their support in completing the pro(ect. 8I8LIOGRAP9:. . &y than$s and appreciations also go to my friends and seniors in developing the pro(ect and people who have willingly helped me out with their abilities." have ta$en efforts in this pro(ect. " would li$e to extend my sincere than$s to all of them. " am highly indebted to &s. /owever! it would not have been possible without the $ind support and help of many individuals.

• Singh! Avtar! Introd!ction to Inter1retation of Stat!tes! 5nd Idition %eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and #ompany! 2agpur.! Inter1retation of Stat!tes8 3st Idn.! 5FFB! #entral Law )ublications! Allahabad. 2.• &athur! E. .