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Willemijn Westerlaken s0712019 elations
Student number: Track: Date: Supervisor:
!r" #" $" Erk aga((i
Second reader: !r" %" &" '" M" ord !ount:
)able of contents 1" Introd*ction++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++p" , 2" Macedonia as a negati-e case++++++++++++++++++++++++""p" . ," )heories on the rise and resol*tion of ethnic conflict/ the cases of 0oso-o and 1osnia+++++++++++++++++++++++++"p" 10 2" )he Macedonian 3ase++++++++++++++++++++++++++++""p" 21 ." )he 2001 conflict+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++p" ,4 4" 5hrid 6greement+++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++"p" 27 7" 3oncl*sion+++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++p" 7" 1ibliograph8++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++ ""p"
Introd*ction Macedonia has a tr*l8 *ni9*e histor8 within the 1alkans" It has been a m*ltiethnic and m*ltic*lt*ral co*ntr8 since its origin" )his composition has been created thro*gh time beca*se Macedonia has been part of the territor8 of man8 different states" Each state bro*ght its own *ses/ religions/ lang*ages and people/ creating an interesting mix which has res*lted in toda8:s Macedonia" 6ltho*gh *ni9*e/ Macedonia also has some resemblances with some of its neighboring co*ntries" It shares ethnic elements with $reece/ 0oso-o and 6lbania" 5ne common denominator is for instance the presence of an 6lbanian comm*nit8" 5ther minorities are ;lachs/ oma and 'erbs/ b*t the 6lbanian minorit8 is the biggest after the ethnic Macedonians" )he histor8 of the 1alkans has been a stor8 filled with conflict/ changing power blocks and traditions" 5ttomans/ 'erbs/ $reeks/ 1*lgarians and man8 other nations ha-e tried to gain more infl*ence in Macedonia at the expense of others" 3onflict in the 1alkans has been a catal8st for greater conflict in the region and therefore the international comm*nit8 has since long time been concerned with instabilit8 and *nrest in this part of the world" Engra-ed in the memor8 of man8 are the conflicts in 1osnia and 0oso-o in the 1990s 1*t also Macedonia has had its share of *nrest after the dissol*tion of <*gosla-ia" )he most recent conflict was a clash between 6lbanians and Macedonians in 2001" !*ring this conflict/ the 6lbanian minorit8 in Macedonia demanded more rights and -iolentl8 expressed their feeling of depri-ation" 6t that point in time/ man8 expected the conflict to escalate and spill o-er to the rest of the region/ creating new instabilit8 in the 1alkans" =e-ertheless/ this did not occ*r/ the conflict was resol-ed relati-el8 shortl8 after the start and Macedonia has not been in s*ch an instable sit*ation since 2001"
It is exactl8 the fact that large scale -iolent conflict has not occ*rred in Macedonia that poses a 9*estion/ namel8> What factors can explain the non-existence of large scale, violent ethnic conflict in 2001 in Macedonia? )his thesis tries to clarif8 what circ*mstances contrib*ted to the fact that the 2001 conflict did not escalate into a blood8 ethnic war s*ch as the wars in 0oso-o or 1osnia" In order to do this/ the thesis will be di-ided *p in fo*r parts" In the first part/ the *se of the methodolog8 of negati-e case method will be explained" 'econdl8/ theories on the rise and escalation of ethnic conflict will be disc*ssed" )his is necessar8 to identif8 the theoretical framework with which to anal8(e a case s*ch as Macedonia" )he theories show when a positi-e o*tcome is likel8 to be expected/ namel8 the occ*rrence of war" )o p*t them along the Macedonian case sho*ld make clear what factors/ disc*ssed in those theories/ are lacking in Macedonia" 6 central place in this thesis is dedicated to a disc*ssion of the Macedonian case" )herefore/ the third part will be *sed for a case st*d8 of Macedonia" )he foc*s of this case st*d8 will be to look at possible explanator8 factors and e-ents that ha-e pre-ented the conflict from escalating" 5nce a clear and detailed st*d8 of Macedonia has been established/ the fo*rth part will be *sed to point o*t the characteristics of the case that ha-e contrib*ted to a containment of aggression and the sol*tion of the conflict *sing the negati-e case method" It will also indicate in which aspects theories of ethnic conflict fail to explain a case s*ch as the Macedonian" )he goal of this thesis is therefore twofold/ it wants to explain the Macedonian case/ which/ beca*se of its *ni9*eness within the region/ can also
contrib*te to theories on ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict resol*tion b8 showing the gaps of some theories" 6 few factors can be expected to be decisi-e as an answer to the central 9*estion/ based on a literat*re and case st*d8/ those will be elaborated and explained thro*gho*t the thesis" %irst of all the role pla8ed b8 the international comm*nit8 can be regarded as ha-ing infl*ence on the process that took place in Macedonia" )he organi(ations and co*ntries in-ol-ed ha-e mediated d*ring the negotiations" More importantl8/ the fact that =6)5 and se-eral E? member states were alread8 present in Macedonia and the region has is of considerable importance" 'econdl8/ the attit*de of the parties in-ol-ed/ the Macedonian 6lbanians and ethnic Macedonians/ has contrib*ted to a s*ccessf*l resol*tion" @ad the political elites of both gro*ps not been as cooperati-e and willing to make concessions as was the case d*ring the 5hrid peace negotiations" 6 third explanation has to do with the regional context and recent histor8/ )his is intertwined with the former two b*t has to be mentioned separatel8" )he conflicts in other parts of the %ormer in the conflict" ep*blic of <*gosla-ia ha-e been a lesson to both the international actors and the parties in-ol-ed elated to this is the fear of a spill o-er effect" )his effect co*ld work in two directions" %irst/ the *nrest in 0oso-o/ with a big n*mber of 6lbanians/ has ca*sed fears among the ethnic Macedonians that the 0oso-ar Aiberation 6rm8 wo*ld contin*e its war for a $reater 6lbania in Macedonia" 'econd/ the infl*x of 0oso-ar 6lbanian ref*gees changed the demographical composition in Macedonia and created instabilit8" )he other direction of the effect wo*ld be the instabilit8 in Macedonia/ this co*ld spread to other/ *nstable co*ntries in the region s*ch as 'erbia/ 6lbania and 0oso-o" )his thesis therefore/ will tr8 to pro-ide the answers to a 9*estion that has not been asked before/ and sho*ld not onl8 clarif8
the 2001 conflict in Macedonia/ b*t also p*ts other similar conflicts in another context in order to be *nderstood better"
Macedonia as a negati-e case )his part of the thesis tries to explain wh8 the *se of negati-e case selection is the most effecti-e method to anal8(e the Macedonian case" 6 short o-er-iew of the rationale behind the method will be pro-ided and the *sef*lness for Macedonia will be indicated" )he conflict of 2001 in Macedonia re9*ires a method that is effecti-e in disco-ering the explanations for the BnonCescalation: of the conflict" 6 comparati-e method wo*ld probabl8 look for similarities in other cases/ which can be fo*nd in for instance 0oso-o/ b*t the chances of s*ch a method in o-erlooking important facts and e-ents are present" =egati-e case selection has been a relati-el8 *nderde-eloped method within comparati-e and international politics 1" It is interesting and worthwhile to appl8 this method to the Macedonian case for se-eral reasons" 5ne has to do with the specific geographical location of the co*ntr8" 1eca*se it has its place in the 1alkans/ it wo*ld ha-e been -er8 likel8 of conflict had escalated in 2001" 3lose to Macedonia/ a decade before/ intense conflicts er*pted after the dissol*tion of <*gosla-ia and spill o-er was -er8 likel8" 6lso/ 1alkan co*ntries are similar in their di-ersit8 of ethnic composition and the8 often share histor8" When in-estigating a complex case s*ch as the Macedonian/ necessar8 to make a comparison with cases that are similar beca*se this comparison can shed light on important explanator8 aspects of the conflict" 6s has been pointed o*t abo-e/ logical/ comparable cases can be fo*nd close to Macedonia" 6 comparati-e design on the basis of similarities or differences for instance co*ld be *sed" 1*t this method has some deficiencies for the Macedonian case" 5ne deficienc8 is that/ in a certain wa8/ the 2001 conflict of Macedonia is/ *ni9*e and cannot be ade9*atel8 compared to
Mahon8 #" and $oert(/ $" D2002E/ B)he &ossibilit8 &rinciple> 3hoosing =egati-e 3ases in 3omparati-e esearch:/ )he 6merican &olitical 'cience e-iew/ ;ol" 97/ =o" 2/ p" 4.,
other cases" )he most important/ ma8be e-en essential difference with other cases is the fact that it did not escalate into ci-il war among the 6lbanian and Macedonian ethnic gro*ps in contrast to other cases" )here are theories/ which wo*ld h8pothesi(e that it wo*ld be -er8 likel8 for conflict to arise in s*ch a context as the Macedonian one/ b*t those will be elaborated f*rther in the part on theories of ethnic conflict" 6t first instance/ it wo*ld seem impossible to in-estigate a case in which something did not happen" It is exactl8 this point which wo*ld be *sef*l in order to disco-er the reasons for the nonCexistence of the conflict:s escalation" )he negati-e case anal8sis of the 2001 conflict in Macedonia has se-eral ad-antages" %irst of all it gi-es an insight into the details that can explain which factors contrib*ted to the resol*tion of the conflict" 'econdl8/ it de-elops the negati-e case anal8sis method into a new direction" It is not a -er8 common method of comparati-e research b*t in specific cases/ s*ch as this/ it can contrib*te to the *nderstanding of this case specificall8 b*t also to other similar conflicts that are on the -erge of escalating" )he negati-e case method fills the gaps where theor8 cannot explain obser-ation/ beca*se no significant phenomena can be obser-ed" 1eca*se the case is obser-ed in detail/ factors can be disco-ered that might be o-erlooked in other comparati-e methods" It expands theories beca*se it to*ches *pon their bo*ndaries and it p*ts other theories in context" What is important to mention here is that the negati-e case method can onl8 be selected if the o*tcome can also be a positi-e one" In this case it wo*ld be the escalation of the Macedonian conflict2/ which/ as the theories will show/ was indeed likel8 to expect" 6ccording to ebecca Emigh/ negati-e case methodolog8 is especiall8 *sef*l when there are not eno*gh cases that can be
Mahone8 and $oert(/ p" 4.,
compared,/ the 2001 conflict in Macedonia is s*ch a case" Its exact constellation of minorities/ timing and geographical location makes it diffic*lt to find a case similar to Macedonia" 5f co*rse/ certain elements are comparable to cases s*ch as 0oso-o" 1*t whereas 0oso-o is the case that probabl8 comes closest / still/ the essential difference is the absence of escalation in Macedonia" &*t differentl8/ Macedonia is a de-iant case and exactl8 therefore interesting to in-estigate2" )he selection of a negati-e case co*ld ca*se some problems/ since some case ha-e o-erlap with positi-e cases" In order to j*dge whether a case is tr*l8 negati-e/ comparison co*ld be made with other/ Bpositi-e: cases/ s*ch as 0oso-o" )here sho*ld be some independent -ariables that will predict the positi-e occ*rrence of an e-ent." In her article/ #enne has applied the negati-e case method to conflict in the 1alkans" 'he has not looked at one specific conflict b*t has (oomed in to certain factors that sho*ld ha-e contrib*ted to conflict in <*gosla-ia/ b*t ha-e been absent" 'he stressed the importance of the in-ol-ement of a third part8 in negotiations on peace agreements4" =e-ertheless/ she has not looked at the Macedonian conflict/ b*t b*ilding on her work on other 1alkan conflicts/ this thesis co*ld contrib*te to the negati-e case method" =egati-e cases also ser-e as better historical reference points 7/ meaning that a negati-e case that is described can also be *sed to explain other/ similar historical e-ents" 'ince the 1alkans ha-e a histor8 of ethnic conflict/ *sing the negati-e case method to clarif8 e-ents in 2001 will certainl8 contrib*te to a better *nderstanding of other cases of ethnic conflict"
Emigh/ " #" D1997E/ B)he &ower of =egati-e )hinking> )he ?se of =egati-e 3ase Methodolog8 in the !e-elopment of 'ociological )heor8:/ )heor8 and 'ociet8/ ;ol" 24/ =o" ./ p 429C4.0
2 . 4 7
Mahon8 and $oert(/ p" 4.7 #enne/ p" 7,0 Emigh/ p 4.0
?sing a negati-e case sho*ld lead to the disco-er8 of -ariables that cannot be disco-ered *sing a normal comparati-e method since comparati-e methods look for e-ents that ha-e occ*rred" )he method can work in two wa8s/ since it contrib*tes to a better *nderstanding of the case specificall8 and beca*se it also shows the limits of existing theories that predict the opposite o*tcome/ specificall8 those that will be disc*ssed in the next part7" )hese limits wo*ld be the bo*ndaries of a theor8 that fails to explain wh8 conflict did not occ*r" In this case/ it wo*ld be theories on ethnic conflict/ and more precisel8/ theories on factors that contrib*te to the rise and escalation of s*ch conflicts" )aking this one step f*rther/ *sing the negati-e case method/ also gaps and limits in theories on conflict resol*tion might be disco-ered" 6n important side note to this howe-er is/ that not all single cases can be *sed/ this is also pointed o*t in the article of Mahone8 and $oert(" 3ases in which a positi-e o*tcome/ h8potheticall8 is not possible/ won:t be -al*able cases to examine" )his means that a case with a negati-e o*tcome/ needs to contain at least the h8pothetical possibilit8 of a positi-e o*tcome9" Macedonia therefore/ is an excellent case to examine beca*se/ as will be arg*ed in this thesis/ it contained the h8pothetical positi-e o*tcome/ the escalation of the conflict into ci-il war"
Emigh/ p" 4.2 Mahone8/ $oert(/ p" 4.,
)heories on the rise and resol*tion of ethnic conflict/ the cases of 0oso-o and 1osnia 1efore going to the Macedonian case/ it is *sef*l to look at what theorists ha-e alread8 said abo*t ethnic conflict and the resol*tion thereof" )his part of the thesis will be *sed for a literat*re re-iew of se-eral theories that pro-ide possible explanations for the rise and escalation of ethnic conflict as well as the wa8s in which those can be resol-ed" It is rele-ant to look at what theories indicate as -ariables that lead to the escalation of a conflict or e-ent" )his wa8/ it is possible to disco-er if s*ch -ariables were lacking in the Macedonian case and if those can be considered explanator8 factors that ha-e led to the s*ccessf*l resol*tion of the conflict before it escalated10" In addition to this/ attention will be paid to two positi-e cases/ 1osnia and 0oso-o" )hose cases are *sed beca*se of their similarit8 with the Macedonian case and the8 will strengthen the arg*ment that all factors pointed to a similar o*tcome in Macedonia" %irst of all it seems appropriate to clarif8 what is *nderstood as ethnic conflict" 6ltho*gh common sense might gi-e a first indication/ one co*ld sa8 that it is a sit*ation in which two ethnic gro*ps are in disagreement with each other and might e-en *se -iolence to gain power or sec*re the interests of their own gro*p" In their article on 1osnia/ 'lack and !o8on define ethnicit8 as> F+ the identification of a people b8 lang*age/ religion/ geographical location/ the sharing of common historical experience/+"11G
Emigh/ p 429 'lack/ 6" and !o8on/ " D2001E/ B&op*lation !8namics and '*sceptibilit8 for Ethnic 3onflict> )he 3ase of 1osnia and @erxego-ina:/ Journal of Peace Research/ ;ol" ,7/ =o" 2/ p" 120
6 first theor8 that pro-ides a basis for the explanation of ethnic conflict is pro-ided b8 'tano-HiI" @e addresses the problems that can come *p in a societ8 with -ario*s different ethnicities" %i-e factors that can lead *p to ethnic tension are identified> firstl8 the formal ethnic str*ct*re of the co*ntr8/ secondl8 the pattern of change in this str*ct*re/ thirdl8 the degree of territorial concentration of the ethnic gro*ps12" )o this third factor/ an addition needs to be made" 1eside the wa8 gro*ps are distrib*ted/ it is important to look at the degree in which the minorities li-e together in mixed constellation/ meaning that a geographical concentration/ within a state/ of an ethnic minorit8 also matters" 6 fo*rth factor is the degree in which an ethnic gro*p is aware of its stat*s as an ethnicit8" 6nd the fifth and last factor according to 'tano-HiI is the conflicts of interests between the gro*ps" @e notes that hostile images often occ*r with gro*ps who are -er8 similar in ethnic make*p/ c*lt*re and lang*age1," )he change in the pattern of str*ct*res in m*lti ethnic societies is infl*enced for a great degree b8 demograph8" If one ethnicit8 grows faster/ this might pose a threat or at least change the balance of power within a state beca*se of the changed demographic composition" )here is a greater possibilit8 for tension if an ethnic minorit8 is dispersed aro*nd -ario*s nation states" Interests o-er which ethnic conflict arises are connected with the ethnic identit8 and the will to express this identit8" )his can be c*lt*ral aspects like traditions/ flags and clothing b*t also ed*cation" 6nother point where interests ma8 clash is the participation in power b8 the minorit8" In politics/ a minorit8 can feel excl*ded or disad-antaged/ b*t also sociall8 and economicall8" )his position is alwa8s compared to that of the majorit8 and therefore/ relati-e/ it does not necessaril8 sa8 an8thing abo*t the absol*te economic sit*ation of the minorit8"
'tano-HiI/ ;" D1992E/ B&roblems and 5ptions in Instit*tionali(ing Ethnic International Political cience Revie!/ ;ol" 1,/ =o" 2/ p" ,40 1, 'tano-HiI/ p" ,41
)o resol-e s*ch tensions or pre-ent the rise of those/ 'tano-HiI proposes three sol*tions" @e seeks an instit*tional sol*tion to the problem of ethnic tension" If the formal instit*tions of a state can g*arantee indi-id*al rights instead of minorit8 rights/ this sho*ld pre-ent a feeling of depri-ation among minorities beca*se certain rights are not granted on basis of ethnicit8" )his wa8/ there will be no sentiments of ine9*alit8 between the ethnic gro*ps within the state" 6nother instit*tional sol*tion can be ethnic federalism or consociationalism as wa8s to go-ern ethnicall8 di-erse societies12" In an ethnic federal s8stem/ there is a clear di-ision of regions according to ethnicit8/ incorporated in a federal s8stem" In a consociational s8stem/ a clear power sharing agreement among se-eral ethnic gro*ps creates order in s*ch a di-ided societ8" 6n article that has been mentioned before disc*ssing the negati-e case method is that b8 Erin #enne" 1*t the article is also rele-ant in this part of the thesis" %or one reason beca*se she has written on the conflict in 0oso-o/ which is 9*ite similar to the Macedonian conflict" )he similarities will come *p later in this thesis/ for now to state that beca*se of its geographical location/ histor8 and origins of the 0oso-o conflict/ both cases co*ld be compared" 1*t also beca*se she has de-eloped a new part of theories on ethnic conflict/ namel8 a theor8 on ethnic bargaining" )herefore/ #enne:s theor8 co*ld/ at least partiall8 be -al*able to appl8 to the Macedonia conflict of 2001" 'he proposes that when an ethnic minorit8 can be Bresc*ed: b8 their homeland/ the incenti-es for a minorit8 to secede from their host state are higher" In this case/ the homeland wo*ld be the state in which the majorit8 of the ethnic gro*p li-es" esc*e wo*ld mean that the minorit8 knows that the8 will be s*pported b8 this homeland when the8 demand independence" 'he also mentions instit*tions of
'tano-HiI/ p" ,41C,4,
a*tonom8 that might create or foster claims for more independence or a*tonom81." When the central a*thorities weaken/ ethnic minorities will demand more rights beca*se the8 see a bigger chance of being granted those rights" 'he also classifies certain demands that minorities can ha-e in order secede or separate" )hose can be demands for c*lt*re or ling*istic a*tonom8/ for regional a*tonom8 or demands for complete secession" E-ent*all8/ #enne de-elops a s8stem that classifies ethnic conflicts" 'he makes a distinction between a majorit8 that can s*ppress a minorit8 or not and also sees the presence or absence of the infl*ence of a lobb8 or home state as an important dichotom8" )his classification sho*ld lead to a prediction of the possibilit8 of conflict er*pting" )he classification which probabl8 comes closest to Macedonia is something in between a stadi*m with a nonCrepressi-e majorit8 and nonCs*pporti-e lobb8 state and a repressi-e majorit8 and a nonC s*pporti-e lobb8 state" )he first of which leads to a 'tate of &eace and the second to a 'tate of ;*lnerabilit8/ which poses a diffic*lt 9*estion to answer since both seem -er8 distant" In the first state/ a minorit8 within a societ8 fees respected and e9*al to the majorit8" )herefore/ there is no incenti-e to secede or exert press*re on the majorit8 or centre" 6lso/ there is no strong home state that can protect the minorit8 or form a ref*ge" )he costs of radicali(ation are too high and the minorit8 will gain more b8 accommodating the majorit8" In the other 'tate/ one of -*lnerabilit8/ there is no home state that pro-ides a sec*rit8 g*arantee to the minorit8 and the ethnic majorit8 has a repressi-e polic8" )his creates a sit*ation in which the minorit8 has a -er8 weak position14" 6lso in this state of the world/ costs of war are too expensi-e and it is better for the minorit8 to accommodate the majorit8" It seems that a great deal of weight to be assigned to the
#enne/ p" 7,1 #enne/ p" 7,2C7,4
existence of a s*pporti-e home state" #enne also calls s*ch a state a lobb8 state/ which implies that it does not necessaril8 need to be a state which is the home state of the ethnic minorit8" 6nother example co*ld be a state that s*pports the minorit8:s goals witho*t being ethnicall8 linked" )he same/ howe-er/ goes for the majorit8" 6 decisi-e factor for a majorit8 in deciding to accommodate the minorit8 or to repress co*ld also be a state which s*pports the goals of the majorit817" 3owan does not explicitl8 *se a clear theoretical framework in her book on Macedonia/ b*t does pose an interesting h8pothesis" If a region is characteri(ed b8 heterogeneit8 of ethnicit8/ this means that it is -er8 hard to establish a central power that can coordinate and control all ethnicities in one coherent wa8" 6 region/ therefore/ can onl8 be administered b8 inter-ention of external agencies17" )hose co*ld be international organi(ations s*ch as the ?= b*t also neighboring sates" It might be interesting to appl8 this statement to the Macedonian case/ since the co*ntr8 has been s*bject to s*ch Bexternal agencies: like the 5ttomans and <*gosla-ia" 3owan also states that the organi(ational principle of a m*lti ethnic societ8 matters/ one needs to think abo*t the stratification of s*ch a societ8" )his is a 9*estion of what is considered the first determinant of identit8J class/ ethnicit8 or religion for example" 6 possible scenario wo*ld be a class societ8 in which ethnic gro*ps are di-ided along class lines" What matters in s*ch a societ8 is whether ethnic gro*ps can be sociall8 mobile" )he degree in which minorities can mo-e on the social ladder is also connected with how well local elites are connected with the centre/ how well a minorit8 is being
#enne p" 7,7 3owan/ #" 0"/ Macedonia/ the &olitics of Identit8 and !ifference/ Aondon> &l*to &ress/ 2000/ p" 9
represented at the national le-el19" )his might ha-e conse9*ences for the degree to which a minorit8 feels represented in societ8" !issatisfaction might gi-e ca*se for *nrest and this might lead to conflict sit*ations" !a-id 3arment has emphasi(ed the infl*ence of the international dimension on ethnic conflict within one state" @e states that ethnic conflict has a national/ internal dimension/ b*t also that ethnic conflicts can spill o-er to neighboring states" 6 reasonable proposition made b8 3arment is that it is more likel8 to expect higher le-els of -iolence in ethnic conflicts than in conflicts that do not ha-e an ethnical dimension20" 'omething else that is h8pothesi(ed b8 3arment is that in-ol-ement of a new/ or third/ state will increase the le-el of -iolence in an ethnic conflict21" Whereas the possible origins of ethnic conflict ha-e been laid o*t in the former part/ the step that follows after conflict has started/ resol*tion/ also needs to recei-e attention" 3oakle8 proposes that the resol*tion of ethnic conflict has fo*r dimensions" )he first is a ph8sical one where a minorit8 fights for ph8sical s*r-i-al/ a territorial one/ in which there is a conflict between the state bo*ndaries and the territor8 of the minorit8" More o-er there is a c*lt*ral dimension that shows a conflict between the state c*lt*re and that of the minorit8 and the political dimension in which the interests of the minorit8 and the majorit8 di-erge" In each dimension/ or t8pe of conflict/ a different strateg8 of resol*tion needs to be applied22" In order to create stable conditions and find a sol*tion to ethnic conflict/ one first needs to establish the conditions for reaching a peace
3owan/ p" 20 3arment/ !" D199,E/ B)he International !imensions of Ethnic 3onflict> 3oncepts/ Indicators/ and )heor8:/ #o*rnal of &eace esearch/ ;ol" ,0/ =o" 2/ p" 1,9C120 21 3arment/ p" 12, 22 3oakle8/ #" D1992E/ B)he esol*tion of Ethnic 3onflict> )owards a )8polog8:/ International &olitical 'cience e-iew/ ;ol" 1,/ =o" 2/ p" ,2.C,27
oss has de-eloped a t8polog8 or ro*te that co*ld lead to
s*ccessf*l conflict management and resol*tion" )wo steps need to be taken/ the first one being preconditions that will con-ince both parties that change can be achie-ed and str*ct*ral peace can be established" )he next step wo*ld be for both parties to incorporate the interests of both parties in an arrangement" 6n essential condition for this is to start on a 9*ite small scale with local gro*ps/ the changes achie-ed there can spill o-er to the rest of the gro*p2," )he term opted b8 oss is that of Bcomm*nit8 relations: which is a concept that emphasi(es on change at a local le-el22" 3omm*nication and tolerance need to be increased among ethnic minorities" 6 second method that separate the persons from the interest in order to increase *nderstanding on the other part8" Emotional attachment needs to be diminished/ and an emphasis needs to be placed on m*t*al gains2." When taking a closer look at the conflict that took place in 2001 in Macedonia/ it sho*ld become clear whether s*ch patterns can be fo*nd" In the cases of 1osnia and 0oso-o/ the res*lt of ethnic tensions were blood8 ci-il wars among ethnic minorities" In the case of 1osnia/ the 'erbs and M*slim 1osniaks and in the case of 0oso-o/ the 0oso-ar 6lbanians and 'erbs" It is *sef*l to look at those cases in short before t*rning to the Macedonian conflict of 2001 beca*se 1osnia and 0oso-o ill*strate how ethnic tension can lead to war and that it was likel8 to see the same occ*r in Macedonia" )he conflict in 0oso-o between the 'erbs and 0oso-ar 6lbanians in the 1990s has had an impact on Macedonia beca*se the 6lbanians
considers is that of Bprincipled negotiation:" )his method tries to
oss/ M" @ D2000E/ B3reating the 3onditions for &eacemaking> )heories of &ractice in Ethnic 3onflict esol*tion:/ Ethnic and acial 't*dies/ ;ol" 2,/ =o" 4/ p" 1002C100, 22 M" @" oss/ p" 1009 2. M" @" oss/ p" 1012
in Macedonia are ethnicall8 connected with the 0oso-ar 6lbanians24" )his is also the main similarit8 between 0oso-o and Macedonia 27" In 0oso-o/ the biggest gro*p were the 0oso-ar 6lbanians" )he8 alread8 felt depri-ed of their rights as e9*al citi(ins within <*gosla-ia27" )he 'erbs/ b8 the time of 1997/ wanted to end the claims of the 0oso-ar 6lbanians for an independent 0oso-o" )hose claims had been s*ppressed/ b*t this s*ppression had also ca*sed the rise of the 0oso-o Aiberation 6rm8 D0A6E and the creation of parallel/ *ndergro*nd instit*tions in 0oso-o" )he 0oso-ar 6lbanians had organi(ed *ndergro*nd elections and had a 0oso-ar go-ernment29" 5ne can see the armed response of 'erbian militar8 forces to the 0A6 as the start of the conflict" )he militar8 campaign cond*cted b8 the can be seen as a coordinated attempt to Bcleanse: 0oso-o from the 0oso-ar 6lbanians,0" With the war in 0oso-o/ man8 6lbanians fled to the other side of the border/ which meant a s*dden and big infl*x of ref*gees in Macedonian territor8" 6ttempts were made to resol-e the conflict b8 bringing the parties to the negotiations table/ b*t both the 'erbians and 0oso-ar 6lbanians did not agree with the propositions made in the ambo*illet 6greement,1" Milose-ic did not adhere to the agreements and started to send reinforcements to 0oso-o,2")he fighting intensified and/ despite efforts made b8 the international comm*nit8/ the onl8 sol*tion b8 =6)5 seemed to be the bombing campaign 5peration 6llied %orces in 1997" )his onl8 happened after the massacre at a -illage called
acak/ which raised international
3lKment/ '" D1997E/ B3onflict &re-ention in the 1alkans/ 3ase 't*dies of 0oso-o and the %< of Macedonia:/ Institute for ecurit" tudies-#haillot Papers/ =o" ,0/ p" 7 27 I3$/ p" 12 27 %reedman/ A" D2000E/ B;ictims and -ictors> reflections on the 0oso-o War:/ Revie! of International tudies/ ;ol" 24/ p" ,27 29 3lKment/ '"/ p 2, ,0 Malcolm/ ="/ B)he War o-er 0oso-oL/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 1.2 ,1 &osen/ 1" D2000E/ B)he War for 0oso-o/ 'erbia:s &oliticalCMilitar8 'trateg8:/ International ecurit"/ ;ol" 22/ =o" 2/ p" 22 ,2 %reedman/ A"/ p ,.0
attention" 18 then the =6)5 considered the acts b8 the 'erbs to be aggressi-e and expected their goal was to exp*lse the 0oso-ar 6lbanians o*t of 0oso-o" )he Western co*ntries expected the 'erbs to s*rrender/ since the8 did not ha-e the same capacit8 as the militar8 alliance,," 1*t the campaign had the opposite effect/ and the 'erbs decided to speed *p their campaign to o*st the 0oso-ar 6lbanians o*t of 0oso-o,2" )he 0oso-o conflict in the late 1990s has been an important catal8st for e-ents in Macedonia" %or one reason beca*se there was a great infl*x of 0oso-ar 6lbanians into the co*ntr8 closest to the 0oso-ar border/ Macedonia,." isks of conflict in Macedonia ha-e been related to spillo-er effects from the 0oso-o conflict ,4" 3losel8 related to the war in 0oso-o is a conflict that preceded it in 1992/ 1osnia" 1*t besides the similarities with the 0oso-ar case Da s*ppressed minorit8/ ethnic cleansing campaign cond*cted b8 'erbs/ no peacef*l end of the conflictE/ there also are some similarities with Macedonia" )he8 ha-e the same <*gosla- legac8 and ha-e been s*bjected to territorial claims of other co*ntries as well as some similarities in demograph8" Economicall8 seen/ the8 ha-e ne-er been of major significance in the 1alkan region" 1*t for both co*ntries/ their geographical location has been an important asset" In 1osnia/ the location at the 6driatic see is of importance and Macedonia is the passage from )*rke8 and $reece to the rest of the 1alkans" )he8 both ha-e alwa8s needed external powers to g*arantee the internal between the minorities s*ch as the 5ttomans and <*gosla-ia,7" It is interesting to see that/ in an article written in 199./ $lenn8 foresees the same sit*ation occ*rring in Macedonia as did occ*r in 1992 in
&osen 1"/ p" .9 Malcolm ="/ p" ,. 3ameron in 1lit(/ p" 99 ,4 3ameron in 1lit(/ p" 10. ,7 $lenn8/ M" D199.E/ B@eading 5ff War in the 'o*thern 1alkans:/ $oreign %ffairs/ ;ol" 72/ =o" ,/ p" 97C99
1osnia beca*se of the instabilit8 ca*sed b8 disagreements between minorities" @e implicitl8 ass*mes that once the backing of a greater state is absent/ small states which contain se-eral minorities will be s*bject to instabilit8 beca*se minorities might demand more rights in a militar8 wa8" 1osnia had also been part of the rep*blic of <*gosla-ia and when this state dissol-ed/ the ethnicities started to find a new balance of power" Aike Macedonia/ the 1osnian territor8 contains a m*ltiplicit8 of minorities" In 1osnia/ three main ethnicities are presentJ 1osniaks Dwho are M*slimsE/ 3roats and 'erbs" @owe-er/ the 1osnian M*slims ne-er had claims for self determination that were as strong as those of the 3roats or 'erbs,7" )he 1osnian territor8 was di-ided among those three ethnical gro*ps in the hope that this wo*ld appease them" )he effect was the opposite/ the separation of the three ethnic gro*ps was complete and hostile images arose and were fed b8 distr*st abo*t the intentions of the other gro*ps,9" %ighting started and the 'erbs and 3roats started to Bcleanse: their parts of 1osnia from the 1osniak pop*lation" )he international comm*nit8 tried to resol-e this conflict and the res*lt of their diplomac8 were the !a8ton 6greements which separated the minorities/ b*t failed to sol-e the bigger problem/ instabilit8 in former <*gosla-ia20" 1*t this agreement pro-ed problematic beca*se it legitimi(ed the actions of the two agressors/ 3roats and 'erbs21" )he ca*se for the war in 1osnia was an *ns*re political sit*ation in which ethnic nationalism became powerf*l" )his nationalism fostered demands for self determination and demands on
'lack/ 6" M !o8on/ "/ p" 121 0*rspahic/ 0"/ B%rom 1osnia to 0oso-o and be8ond> mistakes and lessons:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 74 20 0*rspahic/ 0"/ p" 72 21 1anac/ I"/ B)he &olitics of =ational @omogeneit8:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 20
territorial control22" )he 3roat and 'erb minorities also enjo8ed strong moral s*pport from there Bhomestates: 3roatia and 'erbia" 6ccording to 'lack and !o8on/ the most important factor that led to the escalation of the 1osnian conflict was the demographic shift ca*sed b8 the Bnew: ethnic bo*ndaries" 3onflict will arise for reso*rces and territor8 an if this is f*eled b8 ethnic nationalism/ conflict is likel8 to arise2," 1ased on the cases of 1osnia and 0oso-o and on the theories disc*ssed/ some expectations abo*t what wo*ld be likel8 to ha-e occ*rred in Macedonia in 2001 can be form*lated" )he similarit8 of the cases shows/ as was also arg*ed b8 $lenn8/ that the same scenario co*ld be expected in Macedonia" )he combination of ethnicities and attit*de of the go-ernment" 6lso the histor8 of all three co*ntries is similar/ all three states ha-e been dependent on other states for their safet8 and internal stabilit8" %irst of all/ the Macedonian 6lbanians in Macedonia were territoriall8 concentrated j*st like the 1osniaks and the 0oso-ar 6lbanians" )he fact that the 6lbanian minorit8 was spread across se-eral states increases the chances of conflict arising beca*se the minorit8 might feel depri-ed of its right to self determination beca*se it is separated22" )his wo*ld be e-en more likel8 if this minorit8 wo*ld be s*pported b8 a home state/ which/ in the case of the Macedonian 6lbanians/ wo*ld be 6lbania" 6lso/ the fact that the 6lbanian minorit8 is distrib*ted o-er different states gi-es the conflict an international dimension2." It is therefore likel8 that the conflict in 0oso-o between the 'erbs and 0oso-ar 6lbanians has had infl*ence on the Macedonian conflict" )he instit*tional str*ct*re also seems to matter/ which is connected with claims of more a*tonom8 or self
22 2, 22 2.
'lack/ 6" M !o8on/ "/ p" 120 'lack/ 6" M !o8on/ " p" 12,C 12. 'tano-HiI/ p" ,41C,4, 3arment/ p" 12,
determination of the minorit8" If the Macedonian 6lbanians wo*ld feel *nder represented in the Macedonian s8stem/ this co*ld be a ca*se for the conflict" 3onflict wo*ld be more likel8 to arise if those claims of the minorities are in conflict with the interests of the state24" What does matter in s*ch a case is the attit*de and action that the go-ernment of this state attaches to this conflict of interests" If a state wo*ld react with s*ppressi-e polic8/ it is more likel8 that conflict will er*pt than if a go-ernment wo*ld accommodate the minorit827" )his wo*ld mean that if the demands b8 the 6lbanians in Macedonia wo*ld be in conflict with the interest of the Macedonian state/ conflict wo*ld ha-e escalated" 'ocial mobilit8/ and connected with that/ the economic position of the minorit8 can also be of infl*ence on the decision of the minorit8 to start a conflict or not" If it is possible for members of an ethnic minorit8 to reach higher positions in a societ8/ the8 will be less likel8 to feel depri-ed27" %or a conflict to be resol-ed/ it is necessar8 that both parties are con-inced that the8 will gain from a possible peace agreement" )his means that a mediator has to p*rs*e both parties to join the negotiations in the first place and that the demands of both parties ha-e to be reflected in the final agreement to make s*re both li-e *p to their obligations29" What the cases of 1osnia an 0oso-o show is that the infl*ence of a mediator does not necessaril8 mean that an agreement is s*ccessf*l" '*ccess in the resol*tion of a conflict wo*ld mean that both parties agree to stop fighting" &ossibl8/ the presence of an external actor s*ch as =6)5 or a co*ntr8 s*ch as the ?'/ with an extensi-e diplomatic network/ can contrib*te to the earl8 and s*ccessf*l resol*tion of a conflict.0" )he Macedonian case co*ld gi-e
24 27 27 29 .0
#enne/ p" 7,1 #enne/ p" 7,2C7,4 3owan/ p" 20 M" @" oss/ p" 1009 $lenn8/ M" p" 10,
more insights into what creates a sit*ation in which parties can s*ccessf*ll8 compl8 with the agreement"
)he Macedonian 3ase )he central 9*estion of this thesis is wh8/ altho*gh e-er8thing pointed towards the escalation of the tensions in 2001/ this did not happen in Macedonia" In order to find the factors or aspects from the Macedonian case that can explain this/ this part of the thesis is *sed to" %irst of all/ the historical/ regional context will be shortl8 described" 6fter that/ the thesis will (oom in to the Macedonian case and will describe what the origins of the Macedonian nation state are" )his is rele-ant beca*se here/ the ca*ses for the conflict are ill*strated" )hen/ before t*rning to the act*al conflict/ attention will be paid to some *nderl8ing ca*ses of the tensions that arose in 2001" 6fterwards/ the conflict itself and its resol*tion/ the 5hrid 6greement will be described" &istorical introduction, the 'al(an context )he histor8 and recent e-ents in Macedonia therefore cannot be *nderstood witho*t some *nderstanding of the entire 1alkans" In order to ha-e a better *nderstanding of the Macedonian case/ the historical and regional context also has to recei-e some attention/ since Macedonia:s histor8 is closel8 connected with that of the other co*ntries in the 1alkan like 0oso-o" )his part of the thesis tries to highlight some rele-ant e-ents and de-elopments in the 1alkans" 5ne important de-elopment has been that of the rise of nationalism in the region/ paralleled with the Bfall: of comm*nism in former <*gosla-ia" When talking abo*t a concept as nationalism this concept can also be *nderstood as the rise of ethnoCconscio*sness.1" Instead of thinking abo*t the extreme -iolence that can be an effect of nationalism/ one can also think of an ethnic minorit8 that de-elops
1lit(/ 1" 0"/ BWar and 3hange:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 2
conscio*sness abo*t its identit8 as a minorit8 is also part of this concept" In some cases/ nationalism res*lted in -iolence in the 1alkans/ in other cases/ it merel8 created this awareness among ethnic gro*ps" It was with the dissol*tion of <*gosla-ia that new states were established within the 1alkans" )he new constit*tions often instit*tionali(ed those ethnic tensions.2/ not p*rportedl8 b*t to meet the demands of the ethnic minorities within their bo*ndaries" &art of this problem la8 in the instit*tional str*ct*re of former <*gosla-ia" )he polic8 *sed in <*gosla-ia towards ethnic minorities had two opposite effects" 5ne effect was that/ being *sed as a tool to create coherence and order/ it pro-ided the central go-ernment had a clear o-er-iew of which minorities had which place within the rep*blic" )his was necessar8 beca*se the comm*nists needed to find an effecti-e de-ice to manage their m*ltiethnic rep*blic" )o pro-ide an extra tie/ )ito:s comm*nism was the ideolog8 *sed to connect the -ario*s pop*lations/ b*t also the leadership of )ito himself pro-ed to be an important binding factor., 1*t another effect was that mis*nderstandings arose between the -ario*s nations that were part of <*gosla-ia abo*t their own position and their relation to others within the rep*blic.2" 6 problem for man8 former <*gosla- states/ after the fall of the Iron 3*rtain/ was the absence of a strong ci-il societ8 and a stable political c*lt*re" '*ch a societ8 and c*lt*re are needed if a new state needs to be b*ild.." 6lso/ after the dissol*tion new bo*ndaries were created/ and some ethnicities became part of a nation with whom the8 did not alwa8s share a common histor8 or c*lt*re" )he res*lt was a fragile beginning for man8 new states and soon the *nstable sit*ation ca*sed
1lit(/ p" , 'lack/ 6" and !o8on/ "/ p" 122 .2 'chNpflin/ $"/ B<*gosla-ia> 'tate 3onstr*ction and 'tate %ail*re:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 1.C17 .. 'chNpflin in 1lit(/ p" 19
tensions among se-eral ethnicities" )he conflicts that er*pted in the 90s in former <*gosla-ia ha-e had a certain amo*nt of infl*ence on the 2001 Macedonian conflict" 1osnia can be seen as a good example here/ when the international comm*nit8 became in-ol-ed/ this t*rned o*t to be a fail*re since ci-ilians co*ld not be protected against 'erb aggressors b8 ?= troops" 6lso/ the !a8ton agreements in 199./ did sol-e the 1osnian war/ b*t did not address the seeds that ca*sed a following war in 0oso-o" 3oncessions made to the 1osniaks/ 3roats and 'erbs in the !a8ton agreements ca*sed grie-ance *nder the 6lbanians.4/ those concessions mainl8 concerned the geographical separation of the -ario*s ethnicities within 1osnia" )his res*lted in the territorial separation of the 1osnian M*slims/ with whom the 6lbanians felt connected beca*se the8 had also been s*ppressed minorit8" )he8 therefore felt disad-antaged and it was the 0oso-o conflict in the late 1990s that has been an important catal8st for e-ents in Macedonia" %irstl8/ beca*se there was a great infl*x of 0oso-ar 6lbanians into the co*ntr8 closest to the 0oso-ar border/ Macedonia.7" 6nd secondl8 beca*se of the n*mber of 6lbanians that were alread8 present in Macedonia at the time the conflict in 0oso-o broke o*t" )his shows how closel8 linked Macedonia:s past and present are with the region" Macedonia)s path to!ards *eco+ing the $,-,R,.,M )o p*t the conflict in 2001 in its proper context/ it is important to show how the co*ntr8 that is internationall8 known as the %ormer <*goslaep*blic 5f Macedonia D%< 5ME has de-eloped thro*gh histor8" &arts of this national histor8 might be explanations for the fact that tensions
0*rspahic/ 0"/ B%rom 1osnia to 0oso-o and 1e8ond> Mistakes and Aessons: in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 77 .7 3ameron/ %"/ B)he E*ropean ?nion:s role in the 1alkans: in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 99
arose in 2001 and ma8be also for the resol*tion of those tensions" $oal of this part of the thesis is to sketch a detailed -iew of the Macedonian sit*ation" In order to do this/ a historical o-er-iew will be gi-en/ ending with a description of the 2001 conflict" )his conflict has been the most recent er*ption of ethnic *nrest" It cannot be seen as a s*dden and *nexpected er*ption of ethnic -iolence and therefore needs to be placed in its historical context" )he historical o-er-iew sho*ld clarif8 how Macedonia de-eloped from being a loose collection of ethnicities into a nation state with a certain amo*nt of homogeneit8 or at least a stable n*mber of ethnicities within its borders" 6 distinction sho*ld be made here between Macedonia as a nation and Macedonia as a state" )he fact that the co*ntr8 now has established borders/ a b*rea*crac8/ part8 s8stem and a stable n*mber of minorities does not mean that Macedonia is a *nited nation as well" 6s the following part of the thesis will show/ not all minorities identif8 themsel-es as being primaril8 Macedonian" 5ne central 9*estion thro*gho*t histor8 therefore probabl8 is whether Macedonia is a tr*e nation state" )he c*rrent borders were established with the independence of Macedonia in 1991" 1efore that/ Macedonia has existed in -ario*s compositions" 'ince the independence of 1991/ b*t also before this/ there has been no big interCethnic conflict that can be compared to a ci-il ethnic war.7" )he minorities ha-e co existed for 9*ite a while" )his seems to indicate that minorities in Macedonia had de-eloped a wa8 to coexist" In a wa8/ the *nrest in 2001/ was 9*ite remarkable beca*se no internal *prising had occ*rred before" Macedonians ha-e re-olted against/ for instance their 5ttoman r*lers/ b*t this was no internal conflict b*t acts against an external aggressor"
5rtako-ski/ p" 2.
)here is a reason for Macedonia to be called the 6pple of !iscord of the 1alkans.9" Man8 states ha-e had Macedonia within their borders at one point in time" Man8 bo*ndaries di-ide the co*ntr8/ starting with more or less geographical ones/ depending on what c*lt*ral or ethnic perspecti-e one *ses" %or example/ one co*ld sa8 Macedonia as a geographical part of the 1alkans can be di-ided into three partsJ 6egan Macedonia/ ;ardar Macedonia and &irin Macedonia" )hose three terms refer to the $reek/ 'erbian and 1*lgarian -iew of what constit*tes Macedonia40" )he oldest inhabitants of the Macedonian territor8 are part of what one now calls $reeks/ ;lachs and 6lbanians41 1esides territorial bo*ndaries/ another bo*ndar8 that can be drawn is that of religion/ since there are m*ltiple religions within Macedonia" )he 192, )reat8 of Aa*sanne established religio*s affiliation as the prime determinant for nationalit842" 1*t also before this )reat8/ religion in the 5ttoman Empire was an important factor" 'ince Macedonia was part of the 5ttoman Empire/ the8 were also s*bjected to their polic8/ in which religion took a central place" Initiall8/ the 5ttomans were s*ccessf*l in integrating and assimilating ethnic minorities4," 1*t the disintegration of the 5ttoman Empire/ which alread8 started at the end of the 19th cent*r842/ la8 the roots for the *nrest in the 1alkans in the 1990s" )he disp*tes that ha-e been going on since the 19th cent*r8 ha-e their basis in the rise of nationalism in that period4." 1eca*se parallel to the fall of the 5ttoman Empire / nationalist feelings arose in the se-eral co*ntries that belonged to the empire" 6ccording to the 5ttoman s8stem/ M*slims were considered first rank citi(ens/ and 3hristians second rank" )he8 also performed
&o*lton/ @"/ Who are the MacedoniansO/ 1loomington> Indiana ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 199./ p" 4 40 3owan/ p" xiii 41 &o*lton/ p" 2 42 3owan/ p" 11 4, &o*lton/ p" 7 42 3owan/ p" 1 4. 3owan/ p" 1
different d*ties within the empire and had an official different stat*s" Each religio*s comm*nit8 formed its own +illet/ or *nit/ which f*nctioned as an important organi(ational tool for the 5ttoman r*lers" It are those +illets that ha-e left an important imprint on the c*rrent Macedonian societ8" 1eca*se this wa8/ religion has/ thro*gho*t histor8/ been an important determinant of ethnicit8 or identit8 and this is also the case in Macedonia" It is a strange contradiction that exactl8 those +illets/ intended to peacef*ll8 incorporate and accommodate the different gro*ps/ did create the opport*nities for nationalism to de-elop among the -ario*s ethnicities" =ationalism co*ld spread thro*gh ed*cation/ since each religio*s entit8 or +illet co*ld retain its own ed*cation/ and beca*se religion was often linked with a certain ethnicit844" =ationalit8/ or better said/ nationalism has had its infl*ence in shaping Macedonia" With nationalism here/ it is pres*med that it means that members recogni(e themsel-es as being part of a nation and want to organi(e this nation into a nation state" 6lso/ the interests of their own nation is gi-en preference o-er those of others 47" %or a long time there has not been one homogeno*s Macedonian identit8 b*t fo*r ethnicities or nationalities ha-e had their place within Macedonia/ being $reek/ Macedonian/ 1*lgarian and 6lbanian47" )hese fo*r nation each ha-e distinct claims on Macedonia as their territor8" %or the 'erbs it is the related c*lt*re/ since the ethnic Macedonians are considers to be 'la-" %or the $reek it is the histor8 of 6lexander the $reat that is also part of their national heritage" )he 1*lgarians ha-e claims similar to the 'erbs sa8ing Macedonians are ph8siologicall8 closer related to them49"
44 47 47 49
&o*lton/ p" ,7 'lack/ 6" M !o8on/ 3owan/ p" 1, &hilips/ p" 22
"/ p" 120C121
=ationalism also rose in Macedonia thro*gh the establishment of the Macedonian nationalist organi(ation ;M 5 in 179,/ based in 1*lgaria70" 6fter 1777/ with the )reat8 of 'aint 'tefano/ a lot of ethnic Macedonians had fled to the 1*lgarian capital and started to de-elop a resistance mo-ement" 1*t soon this organi(ation was split into a moderate and radical part and became partl8 a militar8 organi(ation 71" In the )reat8 the *ssians decided to Bgi-e: the 'la- part of Macedonia to 1*lgaria based on the common denominator of the 5rthodox 3h*rch72" )he 8ear of 1777 was also a decisi-e 8ear beca*se in addition to the treat8 of 't" 'tefano/ at the 3ongress of 1erlin/ E*ropean leaders decided not to create a $reater 1*lgaria and therefore created Macedonia as a b*ffer state7," 6n important moment for the ethnic Macedonians is the Ilinden *prising in 190, on 't" Elijah:s !a8" It was a re-olt organi(ed b8 ;M 5 against the 5ttoman r*lers and the intensit8 s*rprised both the $reat &owers and 1*lgaria" )he goal of this *prising was to pro-oke $reat &ower action against the 5ttomans/ b*t no one s*pported the Macedonian re-olt72" )he rebels declared the independent rep*blic of 0r*Pe-o" 1*t the *prising failed *nfort*natel8 and *nrest seemed to ha-e been s*ppressed b8 the 5ttomans for a while" )he reperc*ssions were se-ere and the rebels partl8 s*cceeded in gaining the attention of the $reat &owers since the8 mediated in the conflict:s resol*tion 7." 6fter this/ Macedonia remained part of the 5ttoman Empire *ntil its dissol*tion after the %irst World War" 1*t before WWI/ with the first 1alkan war in 1912/ a coalition of forces tried to force the )*rks o*t of Macedonia74" 6t the end of the first 1alkan war in 1912/ Macedonia gained a*tonomo*s stat*s for the first time/ b*t did not ha-e the
70 71 72 7, 72 7. 74
&o*lton/ p" ., &o*lton/ p" .. &hilips/ p" 2. &hilips/ p" 21 &o*lton/ p" .4 &hilips/ p" 27 &hilips/ p" 24C 29
shape and bo*ndaries it has toda877/ in addition to this/ after the 'econd 1alkan War/ parts of the co*ntr8 were di-ided between $reece and 'erbia" )his war took place in 191,/ j*st before the first World War started77" )he 1alkan Wars ha-e left a great deal of resentment and disappointment in the part of the 1alkans where Macedonia is located" 1*lgaria saw itself as the big loser of the 1alkan Wars" 6nd 'erbia Dand later on to a lesser extent also <*gosla-iaE was also treated with mistr*st b8 Macedonians beca*se of their end*ring claims on the territor879" 'ince then and *ntil the 1990s/ Macedonia has been part of the ep*blic of <*gosla-ia" )his part of Macedonian histor8 has alread8 shortl8 been introd*ced b*t it is worthwhile to repeat it here shortl8" )ito wanted Macedonia to be part of <*gosla-ia as a r*mp state of ;ardar Macedonia/ the 'erbian part of the territor8 70" Macedonia chose to be part of the rep*blic of <*gosla-ia beca*se it wanted to be safeg*arded against $reece/ and also against co*ntries within <*gosla-ia" It pro-ided them with a safe balance of power71" !*ring the 'econd World War/ in 192,/ Macedonia was granted official stat*s as a state b8 )ito" 6ltho*gh 'erbia did not agree with this/ since the8 considered Macedonia to be part of their territor872" Macedonian c*lt*re became instit*tionali(ed" Aang*age and territor8 and the Macedonian 5rthodox 3h*rch were granted official stat*s7,"1eca*se of this/ ethnic Macedonians became a majorit8 within their own state" 6ltho*gh alread8 then/ the 6lbanians were the biggest minorit8 within
&o*lton/ p" 7, &hilips/ p" ,0 79 &o*lton/ p" 70 70 ;eremis/ )/ B6fter the 'torm> $reece:s ole in econstr*ction: in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 177 71 ossos/ 6"/ B)he !isintegration of <*gosla-ia/ Macedonia:s Independence and 'tabilit8 in the 1alkans:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 111 72 &hilips/ p" ,2 7, &o*lton/ p" 114
Macedonian borders72" )he balance of power changed after <*gosla-ia broke *p in 1990/ and Macedonia needed to find a new position within the 1alkans and a few sol*tions were proposed" 5ne of those was the incorporation of Macedonia in what was left of <*gosla-ia to pro-ide a balance against the 'erbs/ b*t this was not preferred b8 the Macedonians" 6nother proposal was to partition Macedonia *nder 1*lgaria/ $reece/ 'erbia and 6lbania" Initiall8/ $reece opposed the dissol*tion of <*gosla-ia beca*se the8 foresaw instabilit8 close to their borders7." 1*t the probabilities of this sol*tion ca*sing e-en more disagreement were too high" )herefore/ the Macedonians opted for a third sol*tion/ declaration of complete independence and so-ereignt8" )he8 did this thro*gh a referend*m in 1991/ which was bo8cotted b8 the 6lbanian minorit8" =e-ertheless the !eclaration of Independence was accepted74" 1*t the fact that the Macedonian 6lbanians did not recogni(e the legitimac8 of this declaration alread8 can be considered as a -ag*e sign of dissatisfaction" )he greatest problem of Macedonia therefore was alread8 -isible at the start/ namel8/ inter ethnic tensions/ the 1991 declaration of independence from the <*goslaep*blic has been a ke8 moment77" 1*t not e-en in name has Macedonia been a stable state since then/ beca*se from the o*tside and inside/ this new state was contested from the beginning" %or example/ the name iss*e in which Macedonia became immediatel8 in-ol-ed with $reece" $reece considers Macedonia to be part of its national histor8 since 6lexander the $reat had his roots in Macedonia b*t is a $reek national hero" 6lso/ Macedonia is the name of a pro-ince/ located within $reece" )he name of Macedonia is contested b8 $reece e-er since the independence of 1991 77" )his disp*te seems
72 7. 74 77 77
&o*lton/ p" 124 ;eremis in 1lit(/ p" 177 &hilips/ p" 27 3owan/ p" 2 3owan/ p" .
to recei-ed less attention/ beca*se of the o*tbreak of war in 0oso-o a t that same time/ b*t has been an obstacle for Macedonia to join the E? and =6)5 *nder its official name" Macedonia has therefore presented itself on the international le-el as the %< 5M D%ormer <*goslaep*blic of MacedoniaE" )he economic sit*ation at the time of earl8 independence in Macedonia was not -er8 promising" 1*t conditions ha-e deteriorated since then/ beca*se <*gosla-ia did not lea-e the economic or political str*ct*res that were needed to impro-e the sit*ation79" With high *nemplo8ment and a s8stem filled with corr*ption/ rapid change is not to be expected" )he Macedonians also consider the go-ernment that was in power in 2001 to ha-e stopped all impro-ement and deteriorate the sit*ation e-en more90" 6lso/ in the 90s the $reek blockade constrained economic de-elopment and this has had an effect into the next millenni*m/ and 1elgrade had c*t off free trade agreements with Macedonia" 'till trade within the region is tro*bled at times which has not been in fa-or of the de-elopment Macedonian econom8" )he corr*ption has created a political and economic s8stem based on clientelism" 6nother conse9*ence of the fragile s8stem and instit*tions has been that the political elites ha-e not been able to create the prere9*isites for a stable ci-il societ8 to de-elop" )he res*lt of all these factors was a co*ntr8 in 2001 that still needed to de-elop in man8 areas" In 1999 Macedonia was enrolled in the 'tabilit8 &act for 'o*th Eastern E*rope" )his ga-e Macedonia the opport*nit8 to de-elop infrastr*ct*re and finance other projects" 6ltho*gh the mone8 was di-ided selecti-el8 o-er the co*ntr8/ which ca*sed some regions to be ad-antaged compared to others91" 6fter its independence in 1991/ Macedonia has recei-ed financial aid from the E? to de-elop both
?'I& eport/ B)he %*t*re of Macedonia> 6 1alkan '*r-i-or =ow =eeds March 2001/ ?nited Instit*te of &eace/ p" 2 90 ?'I& eport 2001/ p" 2 91 ?'I& eport 2001/ p" 4C7
economicall8/ politicall8 and c*lt*rall8" 5ne important goal of this help was the e9*al position of minorities/ the de-elopment or recognition of minorities" )he E?/ in a wa8/ th*s stim*lated the de-elopment of a strong sense of 6lbanians as a minorit8 within Macedonia" In 2001/ Macedonia has become a stratified societ8 in which the ethnicities li-ed parallel li-es92" It was therefore/ onl8 in the 1990s/ that the 6lbanians became aware of their identit8 as an ethnic minorit8 9,/ b*t this will be elaborated later on" )he e-ents in 2001 ha-e been preceded b8 earlier *nrest/ which pro-ided the c*lmination of distr*st and aggression" 5ne of those moments is a confrontation in 1997 in #*l8/ in the town of $osti-ar" )his was a clash between 6lbanian demonstrators and Macedonian police forces" )hree persons were killed and abo*t 200 inj*red" 3a*se for the reaction of the Macedonian police was the displa8 of an 6lbanian flag o*tside a town hall92" )hose e-ents ha-e torn the both gro*ps more apart since the protest ga-e 6lbanians the opport*nit8 to express their fr*stration and confirmed Macedonians in their image of 6lbanian aggression9." Macedonians started to mo-e o*t of mixed neighborhoods since the8 wanted to li-e in Bethnicall8 p*re: ones" 1oth in Macedonian and 6lbanian press/ the protests were co-ered with another narrati-e94" %l*anian nationalis+ )he fact that both parties in the end reached an agreement in the end with the concl*sion of the 5hrid 6greement shows that the political elites of both ethnic gro*ps were willing to make concessions and compromise" =e-ertheless/ the *nderl8ing sentiments do deser-e
3owan/ p" 12 3owan/ p" 127 92 3owan/ p" 1,1 9. International 3risis $ro*p D1997E/ B)he 6lbanian Q*estion in Macedonia> Implications of the 0oso-o 3onflict for InterCEthnic elations in Macedonia:/ I3$ 1alkans eport =o" ,7/ p" 7 94 I3$ eport/ p" 9
some attention beca*se the presence of nationalism and the stereot8pes existing among the Macedonians and Macedonian 6lbanians ha-e greatl8 infl*enced the ca*ses of the conflict" &a8ing attention to these attit*des explains the *nderl8ing sentiments that were ca*se for the tensions to arise" )he 6lbanian minorit8 in Macedonia Bbecame: a minorit8 in the 90s/ shortl8 after the dissol*tion of <*gosla-ia d*e to E*ropean polic8 and the *nrest in other parts of the 1alkans" It became a minorit8 partl8 beca*se the moment*m ga-e the opport*nit8 for ethnic gro*ps to express their identit8/ s*pported b8 policies from the E? and also beca*se of the new geographical constellation of the 1alkans" In Macedonia/ the 6lbanian pop*lation is located in the west and northC west of Macedonia and holds the majorit8 of inhabitants in the cities )eto-o/ $osti-ar/ 0iHe-o and !ebar97" )he 6lbanians ha-e been dispersed o-er the 1alkans/ b*t ha-e remained *nified partl8 thro*gh religion/ beca*se most 6lbanians con-erted to Islam d*ring the 5ttoman r*le97" It might be beca*se of the con-ersion/ b*t the 5ttoman r*lers ha-e held a bene-olent attit*de towards the 6lbanians/ granting them independence" It was this promise that formed the basis for later demands for a B$reater 6lbania:99" 6t the end of the 19th cent*r8/ M*slims had become concentrated in Macedonia and in 1777J a big re-olt took place against 5ttoman r*le100" It was also in 1777 that a first sign of organi(ed 6lbanian nationalism became manifested thro*gh the Aeag*e of &ri(ren" 6n organi(ation with the aim of raising 6lbanian conscio*sness101" 6ltho*gh this leag*e was not -er8 s*ccessf*l/ it was a first sign of a call for more c*lt*ral recognition of 6lbanians in the 1alkans" 6fter this/ 6lbanians ha-e t*rned to more g*erilla like mo-ements/ *sing g*erilla tactics to enforce this
&hilips/ p" 22 &o*lton/ p" 29 99 &hilips/ p" 20 100 &o*lton/ p" 2. 101 &o*lton/ p" 4.
recognition" )he 6lbanian 6lbanian wars"
e-ol*tionar8 3ommittees were the
predecessors of the 0A6 and =A6/ protagonists of the 0oso-ar and emarkabl8 eno*gh/ the 6lbanian nationalists ha-e not alwa8s been hostile to Macedonians" Within the <*gosla- rep*blic/ 6lbanians obtained a secondar8 position in comparison to other ethnicities" )he8 also had a minor disad-antage since their motherland/ 6lbania/ was not part of <*gosla-ia" )he polic8 of the 'erbs towards 6lbanians co*ld be labeled as hostile" 'erbs wanted to contain 6lbanian nationalism b*t achie-ed the opposite" )he Macedonian ;M 5 and 6lbanians made a pact to free Macedonia 102" 6lread8 with the 1997 election it became clear that the two ethnic gro*ps had become separated/ political parties had become segregated/ no -oters from the other ethnic gro*p wo*ld -ote for the other10," 5*t of their sense of relati-e depri-ation and ine9*alit8 certain demands originated" )he Macedonian 6lbanians wanted official recognition and better representation at the national le-el102/ altho*gh some extremist 6lbanians also demanded secession10." 1*t the mainstream demands of the 6lbanians concerned mainl8 fi-e points" %irst of all/ the8 want a different constit*tional stat*s/ more e9*al to that of the Macedonian majorit8" 6lso/ demands for more ling*istic rights and rights to higher ed*cation in the 6lbanian lang*age are important demands" %o*rth and fifth are greater representation of 6lbanians in the p*blic sector and greater a*tonom8 for the regional forces104" 1*t the demands b8 the 6lbanians do need to be p*t in perspecti-e" )heir perception was that the8 were treated as second rank citi(ens in a s8stem that looked like the apartheid s8stem in 'o*th
102 10, 102 10. 104
&o*lton/ p" 92 I3$/ p" 10 &hilips/ p" 70 &hilips/ p" 47 5rtako-sk8/ p" ,2
6frica107" )he demands that were stated b8 the =A6 were the same as ad-ocated b8 the 6lbanian political parties107" )he histor8 of 6lbanians nationalism/ and their claims can be seen as important contrib*tions to the rise of the tension before 2001/ b*t also the attit*de of the ethnic Macedonians deser-es some attention"
Parallel societies, +utuall" reinforcing stereot"pes 1oth the Macedonian and 6lbanian nationalist sentiments ha-e helped the conflict in 2001 to start" )he ?nited 'tates &eace Instit*te has cond*cted an interesting research into what -iews both gro*ps held towards each other" )o know those attit*des might also explain better wh8 the conflict started and lasted for a few months" What needs to be mentioned here are the di-erse -iews held b8 both ethnic gro*ps/ 6lbanians and Macedonians109" Macedonians do*bted the lo8alt8 of 6lbanians towards the Macedonian state beca*se of the displa8ed 6lbanian nationalism" 6lso/ the 6lbanian minorit8 was de-eloping m*ch faster demographicall8/ which seemed a threat to Macedonians beca*se the8 co*ld be o*tn*mbered110" 5n the other side/ the 6lbanian perception was that of discrimination" In addition to this/ the8 felt -ictims of social excl*sion beca*se of limited ed*cation possibilities in the 6lbanian lang*age and limited job perspecti-es within the state apparat*s" 3owan described the Macedonian societ8 at that time as a (eroCs*m game" 'he *ses this term to explain that both parties tho*ght the8 co*ld onl8 gain at the expense of the other part8" )hose perception onl8 reinforced the
&hilips/ p" 1, &hilips/ p" 120 109 &etroskaC1eska/ ;" and =ajce-ska/ M" D2002E/ BMacedonia/ ?nderstanding @istor8/ &re-enting %*t*re 3onflict:/ 'pecial eport =o" 11./ ?nited 'tates Instit*te of &eace/ p" 2 110 &etroska p" ,
negati-e images both parties had abo*t each other and deepened the di-ide111" 1oth the Macedonian and 6lbanian nationalist attit*des are m*t*all8 enforcing112/ if both wo*ld keep their stands/ perceptions of the other gro*p will probabl8 get more extreme" 5ne of the factors contrib*ting to this -iew is the fact that both ethnicities enjo8 ed*cation in parallel s8stems11," )he effect has been that both gro*ps onl8 gained information abo*t each other indirectl8/ and did not see falsification of this in real life" 'hortl8 before the conflict broke o*t/ se-eral programs had been initiated to diminish the gap between 6lbanian and Macedonian st*dents112" )he Macedonian perception of what lead to the escalation of the conflict la8 mainl8 in the economic sit*ation at that time and the instabilit8 in 0oso-o" )he8 blamed the 6lbanians for seeking affiliation with a greater 6lbania" )he8 also claim 6lbanians are not being discriminated" )he8 portra8 themsel-es as -ictims of the conflict/ especiall8 Macedonians who ha-e li-ed in the -illages attacked b8 6lbanians" )he role of the international comm*nit8 is also not percei-ed in a positi-e wa8/ since the international sec*rit8 forces are being Bacc*sed: of s*pporting the 6lbanians11." )he 6lbanians howe-er/ ha-e a slightl8 different perception of the e-ents" )he8 stressed the effects of go-ernment polic8 on the 6lbanian comm*nit8" )he8 also e9*ated their position with the one of 0oso-o/ which meant that the8 also felt that the8 were repressed b8 the Macedonian a*thorities 114" )he8 appro-ed of the attacks of the =A6 and regarded the Macedonian go-ernment as not willing to meet the 6lbanian demands" )he 6lbanians also tho*ght that the s*pport of the international comm*nit8 was welcome and s*ccessf*l in managing the conflict 117" 1oth parties
111 112 11, 112 11. 114 117
&etroska/ I3$/ p" 7 &etroska/ &etroska/ &etroska/ &etroska/ &etroska/
p" 2 p" p" p" p" p" , 2 7 7 7
howe-er regard the ethnic Macedonians as being the losers of the conflict" eason for this is that the8 ha-e to make concessions in the 5hrid 6greement117" 6lread8 in the 1970s/ Macedonian a*thorities had fears of the 6lbanian pop*lation o*tgrowing the ethnic Macedonian one beca*se of the demographic changes within the 6lbanian part of the pop*lation119" )he8 therefore cond*cted a polic8 to diminish the strength of 6lbanian nationalism mainl8 directed to 6lbanianClang*age schools and the c*rric*l*m at those schools120" )he relationship between the Macedonians and 6lbanians has been central to man8 of the existing tensions in Macedonia" !espite their participation in the political scene/ the 6lbanians do not see themsel-es as f*ll worth8 citi(ens of Macedonia" )here also is a gap between the political realit8 and the social realit8" 5n go-ernmental le-el/ parties/ and ethnicities cooperate/ on social le-el howe-er/ there is not a lot of interCgro*p contact121" 6lso/ d*ring the 2001 conflict/ 6lbanians claimed to be portra8ed wrongl8 in the media/ both in Macedonia and internationall8" 3ertainl8/ different narrati-es were *sed to describe the e-ents in proC6lbanian and proCMacedonian media122" 6fter the conflict/ with the 5hrid 6greement/ the perceptions of both gro*ps did not change on a da8" )here was a general lack of confidence in the intentions of both gro*ps12," )he nationalist feelings seem to ha-e contrib*ted to the *nrest that er*pted in 2001/ and it is therefore necessar8 to dedicate part of the thesis to this" 6n important characteristic of the 6lbanian nationalism in Macedonia was the =A6 D=ational Aiberation 6rm8E
117 119 120 121 122 12,
&etroska/ p" 9 &hilips/ p" 2. &hilips/ p" 2. ?'I& eport 2001/ p" , &hilips/ p" 79 &hilips/ p" 179
which is an offspring of and related to the 0A6 D0oso-o Aiberation 6rm8E in 0oso-o122" Initiall8 6lbanians demanded that the northC western part of Macedonia/ which is mainl8 inhabited b8 6lbanians wo*ld be added to 0oso-o in order to create a bigger 6lbanian territor812." Macedonians ha-e regarded those de-elopments with s*spicion/ since the8 saw a threat in the 6lbanian nationalism" )he8 also hold the attit*de that 6lbanian leaders do not cond*ct attempts to diminish the 6lbanian nationalism/ at a point at which the8 consider themsel-es to ha-e diminished the Macedonian e9*i-alent124"
122 12. 124
;eremis in 1lit(/ p" 179 &o*lton/ p" 124 ?'I& eport 2001/ p" 2
)he 2001 conflict E-ent*all8/ all preceding e-ents and *nderl8ing sentiments ha-e led to the er*ption of interethnic -iolence in 2001" 6n o-er-iew of what took place in those months is gi-en and factors that were of importance in the ca*sation and resol*tion of the conflict are highlighted" )his sho*ld also indicate the possible explanations for the fact that the tensions did not escalate into war" %irst of all/ a chronological o-er-iew of e-ents is gi-en" )hen/ some more *nderl8ing topics will be disc*ssed s*ch as nationalism and the attit*des of the gro*ps engaged in the conflict" 6lso/ the e-ent*al 5hrid agreement recei-es attention beca*se the content can pro-ide explanations for the earl8 resol*tion of the conflict" )here are a few general factors of importance in the r*n *p to the Macedonian conflict127" )he ine9*alit8 as percei-ed b8 the 6lbanians was a catal8st for the conflict" 6lso/ the fact that the econom8 in Macedonia at the time of the conflict was weak created a -*lnerable sit*ation in which both gro*ps felt threatened b8 demands of the other gro*p127" )he weak econom8 also res*lted in a mistr*st against the go-ernment/ which was also f*elled b8 the widespread corr*ption among politicians mentioned earlier" 6lso/ parallel societies existed within Macedonia" 6lbanians and Macedonians did not interact -er8 often" )his res*lted/ in stereot8pes that were f*elled when the *nrest started to mo*nt129" )he soil of the conflict has been identit8/ for both 6lbanians and Macedonians/ their national identit8 and demand for recognition of it has been the stake in the conflict" )he 6lbanian nationalism f*eled the
@islope/ " D200,E/ B1etween a 1ad &eace and a $ood War> Insights and Aessons from the 6lmostCwar in Macedonia:/ Ethnic and acial 't*dies/ ;ol" 24/ =o" 1/ p" 1,1 127 @islope/ p" 1,7 129 &etroska/ p" 2
action *ndertaken b8 the =A6 D=ational Aiberation 6rm8E/ and created s*pport among the 6lbanian minorit8" )his is similar to the 0oso-o case since the 0A6 D0oso-o Aiberation 6rm8E was a nationalist mo-ement" 6lbanian nationalism in Macedonia has been infl*enced b8 the ideas and action of the 0A61,0" )he spillo-er effect from 0oso-o can be named as one of the factors contrib*ting to the start of the conflict" %or one reason beca*se the infl*x of ref*gees from 0oso-o destabili(ed Macedonian societ81,1" %or another reason beca*se of the close ties between the 0A6 and =A6" 6fter the war had ended in 0oso-o/ the 0A6 fo*nd a new goal in s*pporting the =A6 in its battle1,2" 6t the time of 2001/ the 6lbanian minorit8 made *p for 2, percent of the pop*lation1,,/ which makes it the biggest minorit8 in Macedonia" )he political scene at that time contained two important 6lbanian parties were the &!& D&art8 of !emocratic &rosperit8E and the !&6 D!emocratic &art8 of 6lbaniansE" )he first was in opposition/ b*t held a more moderate position on the 9*estion of the 6lbanian minorit8 rights" )his part8 also gained political control o-er the western part of Macedonia1,2" )he second part8 was in go-ernment and had separated from the &!& recentl8" )he most important Macedonian part8 was the ;M 5C!&M=E D!emocratic &art8 of Macedonian =ational ?nit8E/ which was in go-ernment with the !&61,." )his was 9*ite a *ni9*e sit*ation beca*se since the 1991 independence/ 6lbanians had not been in go-ernment" It seemed as if a period of more m*t*al respect and tolerance had beg*n" &artl8 beca*se of this coalition between an ethnic Macedonian and a Macedonian 6lbanian part8/ partl8 beca*se
@islope/ p" 121 I3$ eport/ p" 12 1,2 @islope/ p" 121 1,, I3$ eport/ p" 2 1,2 &earson/ 1" D2002E/ B&*tting &eace into &ractice/ 3an Macedonia:s =ew $o-ernment Meet the 3hallenge:/ 'pecial eport 94/ ?nited 'tates Instit*te of &eace/ p" , 1,. 3owan/ p" 1,2
some inter ethnic projects had started/ like the prod*ction of an 6lbanianCMacedonian series1,4" 1eca*se of the coalition/ a goal of both the &!& and the !&6 was closer in their reach/ namel8 the amendment of the constit*tion in order to e9*ate the stat*s of the 6lbanians with the Macedonians1,7" )he first president of an officiall8 independent Macedonia in 1991 was 0rste $ligoro-/ an ethnic Macedonian politician from the comm*nist part81,7" 6ltho*gh he was Macedonian/ he managed to appeal to the 6lbanians as well" It is beca*se of this appeal that se-eral times at instable occasions/ he s*cceeded in mediating between the two gro*ps and pre-ented escalation of those conflicts" =e-ertheless/ he also had to take into acco*nt other interests that were present among the ethnic Macedonians" %or the Macedonians/ their aim was to maintain territorial and political control also o-er the parts that were dominated b8 6lbanians" Initiall8/ the8 did not want to grant e9*al stat*s in the constit*tion" 1*t an important press*re on the change of the position of minorities in Macedonia/ was the possible accession to =6)5 and the E? beca*se this wo*ld impro-e li-ing conditions in Macedonia" )he demands of those two organi(ations wo*ld be important incenti-es for the Macedonians to alter their position1,9" 3oncerning the polic8 towards minorities in general in Macedonia/ the constit*tion needs to be taken as a starting point" )he Macedonian constit*tion officiall8 pro-ides protection of minorities" 6 few articles acknowledge the existence of minorities within Macedonia and also their religio*s freedom is g*aranteed120" It m*st be mentioned that the article that pro-ides for the e9*alit8 of citi(ens/ also is the article that is being contested b8 6lbanians" )he8
1,4 1,7 1,7 1,9 120
3owan/ p" 1,. I3$/ p" 4 &hilips/ p" 27 &hilips/ p" 79 I3$ eport/ p" 22
see this recognition of indi-id*al rights 6lbanians explicitl8 in the constit*tion as being e9*al to the Macedonian ethnic gro*p" )he Macedonian polic8 towards the 6lbanian minorit8 was designed o*t of fears for the pres*med -ario*s threats the Macedonian 6lbanians posed to the *nit8 of the Macedonian nation state" )he Macedonian polic8 therefore/ was aimed at controlling the 6lbanian minorit8" )he8 did this thro*gh control on the ed*cation/ the banning of 6lbanian names/ demographic meas*res against large families and an explicit aim to diminish signs of 6lbanian c*lt*re121/ and this ca*sed resentment *nder the 6lbanians" In reaction to this/ ;M 5C!&M=E also radicali(ed and became more nationalist" )his does not coincide with what has been claimed b8 ethnic Macedonians/ namel8 that the Macedonian nationalism was not existent an8more" &art of the reason for the &!& to be in go-ernment was to contain the Macedonian nationalist parties122" 6lbanians contin*ed to feel disad-antaged" %or instance/ in 1992/ a citi(enship law was adopted that said that to become a citi(en of Macedonia/ the re9*irement was that one needed to ha-e li-ed in Macedonia for 1. 8ears" )his meant for a lot of Macedonian 6lbanians that the8 were denied Macedonian citi(enship12," 6lbanians also felt depri-ed since man8 Macedonians who li-e abroad hold a passport/ b*t ha-e ne-er li-ed in Macedonia122" 6nother example refers to the case of ed*cation" It was one of the major points that ca*sed dissatisfaction among the 6lbanian part of the pop*lation" In 1992/ at the ?ni-ersit8 of )eto-o was established/ which was a *ni-ersit8 in which 6lbanian was the lang*age of ed*cation" )he Macedonian a*thorities were not pleased with this and did not recogni(e the *ni-ersit812." Which in t*rn *pset the Macedonian 6lbanians" )he
121 122 12, 122 12.
&o*lton/ p" 127 I3$/ p" 4 I3$/ p" 2 ?'I& eport 2001/ p" 2 5rtako-ski/ p" ,7
go-ernment also claims to ha-e cond*cted an acti-e polic8 in creating greater opport*nit8 for minorities to participate/ the 9*estion remains howe-er/ how the minorities concerned percei-e this" It seems likel8 that it were those conflicting interests on c*lt*ral iss*es and iss*es abo*t the minorit8 identities/ that ca*sed ethnic tensions" 6lso/ the fact that the 6lbanians were territoriall8 concentrated s*pports the expectations that it was likel8 that the dissatisfaction among the Macedonian 6lbanians wo*ld lead to -iolent conflict124" )he polic8 of the Macedonian go-ernment onl8 created extra awareness on the 6lbanian identit8/ which was the exact opposite of what the go-ernment was aiming at" In 2001/ the =A6/ the Macedonian 6lbanian:s armed resistance gro*p/ la*nched attacks in the northCwest of Macedonia/ )he Macedonian go-ernment responded with -iolence/ b*t was warned b8 the international comm*nit8 not to *se -iolence against the =A6127" 'ignificant was the occ*pation of a -illage called )an*se-ci b8 a gro*p of extremist 6lbanian nationalists127" In the spring of 2001/ there was an *prising" 6 tele-ision crew that was at location to report the *nrest got kidnapped" )he broadcasting compan8 claimed that the kidnap was cond*cted b8 6lbanians" )he crew was released safel8 b*t the Macedonian a*thorities responded b8 attacking the -illage )an*se-ci in order to find the kidnappers" )his res*lted in a clash between the Macedonian arm8 and the =A6 in which two Macedonian soldiers were killed" When the a*thorities tried to mediate in the conflict and tried to start con-ersation with the =A6/ the official send b8 'kopje were attacked b8 the =A6129" International aid arri-ed -er8 9*ickl8/ from -ario*s parties/ the armed response of the Macedonian militar8 for instance was s*pplied b8 ?kraine1.0" 6lso/ the ?' f*nded the
124 127 127 129 1.0
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Macedonian arm8/ this was part of longer term aid/ b*t d*ring the conflict/ this aid persisted" )he =A6 was s*pported b8 the 0oso-ar 6lbanians from the 0A6 who had crossed the border1.1" With the s*pport from those states/ and the 0A6 from 0oso-o/ it seemed likel8 that Macedonia fo*nd itself in a state of conflict" )he s*pporti-e lobb8 states and the polic8 of the Macedonian go-ernment towards the Macedonian 6lbanians co*ld ha-e ca*sed the last gro*p to opt for a radicali(ation of demands and means to achie-e those1.2" )he attacks described abo-e indicate that the =A6 indeed opted for this strateg8" )his in contradiction to the attit*de of the political parties of the Macedonian 6lbanians/ as will be elaborated later on" 1*t the 6lbanians are not the onl8 ones to be blamed for starting the *nrest in 2001" 6t a certain moment/ the =A6 felt strong eno*gh to propose an *ltimat*m to the Macedonian go-ernment to meet their demands" 5ne of those demands was that the Macedonian rep*blic wo*ld become a confederation1.," 1*t the Macedonians responded with declaring a tr*ce" )he goals was to make the =A6 withdraw from )eto-o so that peace negotiations co*ld start1.2" )he =A6 in t*rn made clear that their goals was not secession or the creation of a greater 6lbania1.." 'ince the end of the war in 0oso-o/ Macedonian troops did not ha-e to be alarmed abo*t a possible threat from the north" )he militar8 therefore/ needed another foc*s" 'kopje initiall8 wanted a militar8 sol*tion to the problem1.4" 6nd not onl8 the militar8 engaged in the conflict" 'ome paramilitar8 gro*ps were trained in order to force the =A6 o*t of the territor81.7" 6ltho*gh this was the goal of the paramilitaries in the beginning/ when the conflict contin*ed/ the
1.1 1.2 1., 1.2 1.. 1.4 1.7
&hilips/ p" 90 #enne/ E"/ p" 7,. &hilips/ p" 172 &hilips/ p" 92 &hilips/ p" 9. &hilips/ p" 12 &hilips/ p" 9
f*nction changed" &aramilitar8 troops also started attacking 6lbanian citi(ens/ committing ex j*diciar8 exec*tions" )heir moti-ation was that the8 helped the arm8 in p*nishing terrorists" 1*t se-eral monitoring organi(ations like the 5'3E had expressed their worries abo*t the crimes committed b8 those gro*ps" )he mission deplo8ed b8 the 5'3E to monitor the sit*ation was the biggest and most longstanding mission cond*cted b8 the organi(ation1.7" E-en after the 5hrid agreement was reached/ the foreign infl*ence remained strong on Macedonian politics1.9" ossos states in 1lit(:s book that the Macedonian conflict had the potential for an international war140" 6ccording to ossos/ there were too man8 nations in-ol-ed/ altho*gh some indirectl8" %irst of all/ the 1alkan states were often connected with Macedonia thro*gh ethnic ties and the8 were concerned for a repetition of e-ents in 1osnia and 0oso-o" 'econdl8/ $reece and )*rke8/ as =6)5 members/ also wanted to pre-ent instabilit8 in a region close to their borders141" )he 'erbs s*pported the ethnic Macedonians in their attit*de142" )his was for two reasons/ firstl8 beca*se the 'erbs felt ethnicall8 related to the Macedonians since the8 considered them both to be 'la-" )he fact that the orthodox Macedonians and 'erb orthodox ch*rch were related pro-ided another tie" 1*t the 'erbs had also dealt with the 6lbanians demands for secession or a*tonom8 in 0oso-o and the8 feared that the demands of the Macedonian 6lbanians wo*ld gi-e ca*se for renewed *nrest in 0oso-o" Where the 'erbs s*pported the ethnic Macedonians/ the 6lbanians and 0oso-ar 6lbanians s*pported the Macedonian 6lbanians beca*se of ethnic ties" )here was howe-er also reason for 6lbania to s*pport Macedonia in order to keep the Macedonian state
1.7 1.9 140 141 142
&hilips/ p" 121 &hilips/ p" 117 ossos in 1lit(/ p" 110 ossos in 1lit(/ p" 110 &hilips/ p" 71
*nified" 6lbania was happ8 to ha-e Macedonia in the region beca*se it pro-ided a co*nter weight against 'erbia14," )he8 were therefore rel*ctant to become closel8 in-ol-ed altho*gh that wo*ld make sense considering the ties with the 6lbanian comm*nit8" )his is contradictor8 to the ass*mption that the Macedonians had the backing of a s*pporti-e lobb8 state/ possibl8 an important reason for the fact that the Macedonian 6lbanians did not choose to contin*e fighting" 6lread8 in 1997/ the International 3risis $ro*p reported on the potentiall8 risk8 sit*ation in Macedonia and warned that> F+ relations between comm*nities within Macedonia are deteriorating alarmingl8142"G )he report also stated that altho*gh it -al*ed the presence of the international comm*nit8 in the area/ possible militar8 action wo*ld onl8 inflame tensions in Macedonia14." It also saw a ca*sal relation between the war in 0oso-o and the 6lbanian minorit8 and foresaw that spill o-er was possible144" )he se-erit8 of the conflict is shown in the case against the Macedonian Interior Minister Aj*be 1osko-ski/ a claim has been bro*ght to the I33 in )he @ag*e for being in-ol-ed in ethnic cleansing operations" )his was a claim for the possibilit8 of crimes committed in Aj*bance on the 9th of 6*g*st" )his s*pposedl8 was an operation cond*cted *nder close s*per-ision of 1osko-ski tr8ing to Bclean: the -illage from 6lbanian inhabitants147" E-ent*all8/ in 2007/ the I33/ j*dged on a case relating to e-ents two da8s later in Aj*boten" E-ent*all8/ 1osko-ski was fo*nd not g*ilt8/ b*t when reading the report of the e-ents/ it seems *nlikel8 to s*ppose that/ as an Interior
14, 142 14. 144 147
&hilips/ p" 72 I3$/ p" i I3$/ p" ii I3$/ p" 1 &hilips/ p" 1,9
Minister/ he was not aware of what happened in Aj*boten" )his is e-en more so since he was present at the time of the killings" )his s*pposes also some in-ol-ement in the planning of the operation147" )he reason for the dela8ed r*ling was the fragile balance and le-el of tr*st at that time" =6)5/ b*t also the ?' and the E? enjo8ed little s*pport among the Macedonian pop*lation" If a member of the go-ernment wo*ld ha-e been s*mmoned to the I33 at that moment/ it wo*ld ha-e meant a blow to the tr*st and s*pport that the go-ernment of Macedonia had in the international comm*nit8149" 1*t it pro-es that there were se-eral ethnic cleansing operation cond*cted/ p*rportedl8 and on the initiati-e of Macedonian go-ernment officials" )he effect of those operations were that the 6lbanian pop*lation no longer felt sec*re and fled to 'erbia/ e-en tho*gh/ a few 8ears before/ ref*gees flows had gone the other direction" Interference of the international co++unit" )he role of the international comm*nit8 cannot be o-erlooked in this conflict" 6lmost since the beginning of the Macedonian rep*blic/ an international pre-ention force was located in the northern 1alkans to monitor the sit*ations170" )he international comm*nit8 was aware of the potential of escalation in Macedonia" 6 ?= mission was alread8 present in the 1alkansJ ?=& E!E&" With this mission/ the ?= tried to stabili(e the region thro*gh pre-enti-e diplomac8" 1*t/ the international comm*nit8 has/ j*st as the Macedonian a*thorities ha-e been/ not alwa8s consistent in their s*pport or appro-al of cond*cted policies towards the 6lbanians" With the 1997 *nrest in $osti-ar for example/ the ?' and se-eral international organi(ations s*pported the 6lbanians b*t %rance and the ?0 on the
147 149 170
I33 *ling 1oko-skiC)arc*lo-ski/ p" 227 &hilips/ p" 120 I3$/ p" 1.
other hand were in fa-or of the Macedonians171" 6lso/ there was a difference between the =6)5 troops that controlled the borders of Macedonia and 0oso-oC'erbia and the diplomats in 'kopje" )he8 both approached the conflict differentl8/ =6)5 percei-ing the problem as an 6lbanian Q*estion/ the diplomatic corps in terms of interethnic conflict172" )he8 therefore co*ld not agree on a consistent strateg8/ as has been the case on se-eral other occasions in Macedonia" 5f co*rse/ lessons learned from the earlier/ and -er8 recent conflict in the 1alkans pla8ed a role in the decision making of the international comm*nit8" Inter-ention wo*ld possibl8 gi-e ca*se for disappro-al of other co*ntries/ especiall8 those who felt the8 had a stake in Macedonia/ s*ch as *ssia/ 1*lgaria and $reece" 1*t the choice not to inter-ene co*ld res*lt in ethnic cleansing/ as had occ*rred in 1osnia and 0oso-o" )he renewed infl*x of ref*gees in other 1alkan co*ntries from Macedonia wo*ld destabili(e the region" )he first strateg8 deplo8ed b8 the West was to constrain the militar8 operation of the Macedonians" 1*t this res*lted in a weak arm8 and ca*sed for an increase in -iolence on the 6lbanian side17," 6 lesson learned was that of pre-ention and earl8 detection of possible conflict prone sit*ations172" )he shelling of 6lbanian -illages and the increase in the ref*gee flow were therefore the direct moti-ation for the international comm*nit8 to become militaril8 engaged" )his ca*sed for an increased in-ol-ement of =6)5 troops since the flow of ref*gees also effected the sit*ation in 0oso-o" =6)5 decided to deplo8 2000 men in Macedonia/ a mission led b8 1ritain" )he operation was named BEssential @ar-est: and had as its main goal to disarm both factions" )he disarmament also was part of the 5hrid 6greement and the =6)5 troops sec*red the compliance of both parties to this part of the
171 172 17, 172
&hilips/ p" 71 &earson/ p" . &earson/ p" . 0*rspahic in 1lit(/ p" 7.
agreement" )his mission ended at the 24th of 'eptember 2001/ b*t 1000 men remained17." )his was done beca*se both sides still recei-ed new weapons" ?kraine and done beca*se *ssia s*pplied the Macedonians" )his was *ssia was not pleased with the fact that it had not been
in-ited to act as a mediator" )he co*ntr8 still wanted to ha-e some amo*nt of infl*ence in the region and s*pported the Macedonians" )he =A6 was pro-ided with weapons b8 sm*ggling arms/ from 6lbania and 0oso-o/ b*t were also trained b8 the ?'174" 6lso/ the paramilitar8 gro*ps were not disarmed b8 =6)5177" )he conflict res*lted in 200 cas*alties and more than 170"000 persons internall8 displaced" 'ome parts were *nder the control of the =A6 and the Macedonian a*thorities spread weapons among ethnic Macedonian paramilitar8 troops177" 1*t still/ the operation BEssential @ar-est: can be considered a ke8 moment for the peace talks/ that had started/ to s*cceed" )he troops deplo8ed/ who had to make s*re the conflict did not escalate started transporting =A6 troops o*t of the cit8 of 6racino-o" )his town/ the closest the =A6 came to 'kopje/ had been occ*pied b8 the Macedonian 6lbanians" 1*t the =A6 agreed to be mo-ed o*t of this -illage" It was a sign for both parties that at least the extreme wing of the 6lbanian minorit8 was willing to make concessions" It made s*re a tr*ce was p*t in place/ altho*gh this was broken again later on beca*se Macedonians and 6lbanians did not stop planning and exec*ting attacks" )his shows that the international comm*nit8 had become deepl8 in-ol-ed in the conflict" &ossibl8/ the presence of an external actor s*ch as =6)5 or a co*ntr8 s*ch as the ?'/ with an extensi-e
17. 174 177 177
&hilips/ p" 122 &hilips/ p" 122 &hilips/ p" 144 &earson/ p" 2
diplomatic network/ has contrib*ted to the earl8 and s*ccessf*l resol*tion of the conflict179" #a-ier 'olana/ as E? representati-e/ mediated between the 6lbanians and Macedonians and bro*ght together a go-ernment of *nit8 in Ma8 2001170" 1oth the ?' and E? e-ent*all8 reali(ed that another ci-il war wo*ld disr*pt the recent stabilit8 in the region and therefore forced both parties to enter peace talks171" In this case/ the expectation of 3arment that in-ol-ement of a third part8 in an ethnic conflict will likel8 ca*se the le-el of -iolence is pro-en wrong" 'ince the mediation of the international comm*nit8 in the conflict/ the *se of -iolence had been contained" %or the E?/ Macedonia became an important case" )he E? replaced the =6)5 mission in 200, and remains present in the co*ntr8 to monitor the c*rrent sit*ation172" )he8 incl*ded Macedonia in the 'tabili(ation and 6ssociation &rocess D'6&E which ga-e 1alkan co*ntries the prospect of joining the E?" #a-ier 'olana was a relati-el8 s*ccessf*l attempt in bringing the parties together/ as preparation for reaching a peace agreement" )he =A6 howe-er/ was not in-ited to the table b*t the 6lbanian parties who were also part of the go-ernment of national *nit8" 1*t neither of the parties was/ at that point willing to make concession17, " 6t the end of the offensi-e in March/ positions of both parties had become polari(ed/ also in politics" )he 6lbanian &!& had withdrawn from parliament" )he !&/ the 6lbanian part8 in go-ernment howe-er did not withdraw172" )he president in power at that time/ 1oris )rajko-ski/ laid down the stepping stones for a peace agreement" It was this basis that was *sed b8 the mediating parties to gather the
$lenn8/ M" p" 10, &hilips/ p" 117 171 &earson/ p" 2 172 3ameron in 1lit(/ p" 101 17, &opetre-ski/ ;" M Aatifi/ ;" D2002E/ B)he 5hrid %ramework 6greement =egotiations:/ #onflict tudies Research #entre/ #*ne 2002/ p" 29 172 &hilips/ p" 97
6lbanians and Macedonians together and come to consens*s17." 1*t the president did not enjo8 s*pport among the Macedonian part of the pop*lation" )he8 wanted the militar8 to end the -iolence/ the prime minister/ $eorgie-ski was a proponent of this tactic/ which shows that the president also faced resistance in his go-ernment" 18 the time the talks started/ -iolence was still contin*ing" &artl8 beca*se the Macedonian nationalists were not -er8 eager to cooperate" With their paramilitar8 gro*ps/ the8 contin*ed attacks on 6lbanian -illages" 6lso/ the arm8 felt the s*pport of s*ch parties and did not feel the need to stop fighting174" )he troops that were organi(ed were called the ed 1erets and the )igers/ both gro*ps were disbanded in 2002" )he fighting ended officiall8 in 6*g*st 2001/ when both parties reached an agreement in 5hrid177/ altho*gh the *nrest contin*ed in some parts of Macedonia" 6fter the conflict was settled with the 5hrid 6greement on the 1,th of 6*g*st 2001/ the sit*ation in Macedonia sho*ld ha-e stabili(ed" )his can be said/ partl8/ for Macedonian politics/ b*t some remarks need to be made" )he implementation of the 6greement has not been easil8 accepted b8 Macedonians" 6ltho*gh the8 claimed to be -ictors in the conflict/ the8 are generall8 seen as being the losers" )he Macedonians still see the 6lbanians as aggressors and do not want to reward s*ch beha-ior" )he8 also fear that ha-ing granted the changes in the 6greement/ the 6lbanians later on will demand more once the8 gain more power177"
17. 174 177 177
&hilips/ p" 120 &hilips/ p" 127 &etroska/ p" 2 &earson/ p" ,
5hrid 6greement )he 5hrid 6greement probabl8 is the most important aspect of the Macedonian case beca*se it has been the ke8 to the resol*tion of the conflict" It shows that in Macedonia/ ethnic gro*ps/ with contrasting interests were able to find a compromise that was workable for both gro*ps" )h*s/ when looking at this agreement/ and especiall8 the process d*ring which it has been created in the wider context of the 1alkan conflicts/ it can be seen as one of the biggest explanator8 aspects of the Macedonian case" 6ltho*gh it has been mentioned se-eral times as being the end of the conflict/ it is *sef*l to disc*ss its content and the wa8 it was achie-ed more elaboratel8" )he parties/ bro*ght together at 5hrid were the representati-es of the gro*ps in-ol-ed in the conflict/ the Macedonians and Macedonian 6lbanians" )he !&6 and &!& represented the 6lbanian part and the ;M 5C!&M=E and '!'M the Macedonians" )he =A6 was not represented at the negotiation table/ b*t the Macedonian 6lbanian leaders were in contact with the =A6 leaders d*ring the negotiations 179" )his is clearl8 a different setting than that of 0oso-o" In that case/ the 0oso-ar 6lbanians were not represented in go-ernment/ nor were parties in-ited to the table for peace talks190" )he international mediators that led the peace talks were #ames &ardew who represented the ?' and %rancois Aeotard who was a %rench diplomat b*t who represented the E?" When/ in a later phase/ the negotiations seemed to ha-e entered a dead lock/ #a-ier 'olana/ at that moment the E? @igh epresentati-e for %oreign and 'ec*rit8 &olic8/ also made an important contrib*tion" @e con-inced the Macedonian 6lbanians to gi-e *p their demand for local police control" )his was a big blockade for negotiations to proceed" 6nother reason for this extra international
&opetre-ski/ ; M Aatifi/ ;"/ p" ,1 Malcolm/ p" 127
press*re was the -iolence that intensified/ 'olana e-en *sed the words Bethnic cleansing: to describe the actions *ndertaken b8 the Macedonian militar8191" 'olana was helped b8 a ?kranian diplomat/ 6natol8 Rlenko192" )he help of ?kraine can be explained b8 the fact that it had been in-ol-ed 9*ite earl8 in the conflict beca*se of its militar8 s*pport to the Macedonian forces" )he agreement was based on a few principles that both parties needed to compl8 with in order to implement the rest of the agreement s*ccessf*ll8" )he *se of -iolence was o*t of option in an8 case and the territorial integrit8 and so-ereignt8 needed to be respected at an8 time" !emocrac8 was emphasi(ed in the agreement and also the need to de-elop strong local go-ernment19," 5b-io*sl8/ a peace agreement cannot become effecti-e if parties are still fighting/ which explains the first principle" 6 peace agreement implies a tr*ce" )he fact that the territorial and so-ereign integrit8 of the nation needs to be respected192 is a call to the Macedonian 6lbanians not to demand secession or call for parts of Macedonia to be added to 6lbania or 0oso-o to create a B$reater 6lbania:" )he call for democrac8 and stronger local go-ernment are the pillars on which the other parts of the agreement are b*ild" )he demand for stronger and more a*tonomo*s local go-ernment19. was a demand expressed b8 both the 6lbanian political parties and the =A6" More competencies sho*ld be delegated to m*nicipalities on matters relating to p*blic ser-ices/ c*lt*re and ed*cation" )his meant an important concession to the 6lbanians since some -illages are pop*lated entirel8 b8 the 6lbanian minorit8" )o ha-e a sa8 abo*t their c*lt*re and ed*cation polic8 means that the8 wo*ld be able to express their identit8 witho*t being
191 192 19, 192 19.
Idem note 172/ p" ,2 Idem note 172 5hrid 6greement/ 1,"07"2001/ p" 1 5hrid 6greement/ art" 1"2/ p" 1 Idem note 127/ art" ,",/ p" 1
restrained b8 law" )his also was a point at which both parties stood at opposite ends" )here was a fear among the Macedonian negotiators that granting to m*ch a*tonom8 to local branches of go-ernment wo*ld weaken national *nit8194 6nother important article in the agreement is on e9*itable representation197" 6 big complaint or a big part of the fr*stration within the 6lbanian comm*nit8 was based on the fact that in the j*diciar8/ the police and in ministries/ deplo8ment of 6lbanians was still low compared to the n*mber of Macedonians" )he a*thorities therefore were obliged b8 the agreement to work on a more e9*itable representation of minorities in the branches of go-ernment and central and local p*blic bodies197" It has been mentioned that the *se and recognition of the 6lbanian lang*age was an obstacle d*ring the peace talks towards progress on other s*bjects" 6 separate part of the agreement is therefore dedicated to ed*cation and lang*age" In which it is stated that the 6lbanian lang*age will be recogni(ed in the constit*tion as one of the official lang*ages of Macedonia" 6lso/ if more than 20 percent of the pop*lation in a m*nicipalit8 speaks 6lbanians/ the8 are permitted to *se 6lbanian in official doc*ments199" 1*t still/ Macedonian will be the official lang*age in international relations200" It was a compromise which the mediators had to find beca*se initiall8/ the Macedonians ref*sed to recogni(e this demand of the Macedonian 6lbanians201" )he percentage re9*irement is connected with demographic changes and pro-ided the Macedonians with the g*arantee that the concession to the Macedonian 6lbanians wo*ld not be irre-ersible" 6lso/ strict g*idelines and timetables were established and incorporated in the agreement" 5ne point that has been a reason
194 197 197 199 200 201
&opetre-ski/ ;" M Aatifi/ ;"/ p" ,0 Idem note 127/ ch" 2/ p" 2 5hrid agreement/ art" 4"2 p" 2 Idem 1.0/ art" 4"./ p" , &hilips/ p" 2C, &opetre-ski/ ;" M Aatifi/ ;"/ p" ,2
for dissatisfaction among 6lbanians was that it was diffic*lt for them to obtain a Macedonian passport and ac9*ire f*ll nationalit8" )he agreement does not specif8 an8 meas*res of impro-ement on this howe-er" 6 breakthro*gh in the peace talks was the agreement reached on the *se and recognition of 6lbanian lang*age in Macedonia" )his seemed to be the main blockade towards agreement on other/ less sensiti-e s*bjects202" )he final 5hrid agreement was a res*lt that both parties did not see as completel8 satisf8ing/ b*t both regarded it as the most workable sol*tion for that time20," It therefore did not mean an end of the war" )he more extreme wings within both factions tried to make the agreement a dead letter b8 contin*ing with the *se of -iolence" )he 6greement was officiall8 signed on the 1,th of 6*g*st/ b*t three da8s before the signing/ Macedonian soldiers were killed and the Macedonian arm8 responded to this b8 reprisals in the -illage of Aj*boten202" )he international mediators present knew to con-ince both parties that total withdrawal from the agreement wo*ld mean an escalation" It can be ass*med that if the Macedonians and Macedonian 6lbanians had decided not to sign the agreement/ the conflict wo*ld ha-e escalated into a war that can be compared to that of 1osnia and 0oso-o" )he agreement was officiall8 ratified on the 14th of =o-ember 2001 b8 the Macedonian parliament20." %or a conflict to be resol-ed/ it is necessar8 that both parties are con-inced that the8 will gain from a possible peace agreement" )his means that a mediator has to p*rs*e them to join the negotiations and that the demands of both parties ha-e to be reflected in the final
202 20, 202 20.
&hilips/ p" 1,2 &hilips/ p" 1,4 &opetre-ski/ ;" M Aatifi/ ;"/ p" ,. &hilips/ p" 1.4
agreement to make s*re both li-e *p to their obligations204" )he 5hrid 6greement can be seen as an excellent example of this" 6ltho*gh *ntil the last moment/ both parties still considered -iolence to be an option if the peace agreement wo*ld not ha-e a satisfactor8 o*tcome" It is the credit of the international comm*nit8:s mediators that both parties were con-inced to sign the agreement in the end" 1*t also/ when looking at the content of the 6greement/ it shows that both parties were met in some of their demands" %or the ethnic Macedonians/ one of their most important demands/ the *nit8 of the Macedonian state was retained b8 the importance that was gi-en to territorial integrit8 in the agreement" %or the Macedonian 6lbanians/ the two most important iss*es were sol-ed namel8 the recognition of 6lbanian as an official lang*age and an increase in a*tonom8 in the local branches of go-ernment" )he contrast with the cases of 1osnia an 0oso-o and the wa8 the agreements were achie-ed and their s*ccess is clear for se-eral reasons" %irstl8/ both in 1osnia and in 0oso-o/ the mediators enco*ntered great diffic*lt8 in getting the gro*ps in conflict at the negotiation table" With the talks at ambo*illet/ Milose-ic onl8 agreed to be present when he recei-ed a g*arantee that there wo*ld be no mention of the I3)< DInternational 3riminal )rib*nal for the former <*gosla-iaE in the final agreement beca*se he feared prosec*tion 207" 6lso/ both agreements were not satifactor8 for the gro*ps engaged in the conflicts" )he 1osniaks lost at the expense of the 3orats and 'erbs and in the case of 0oso-/ the 'erbs -iolated the agreement b8 contin*ing their Bethnic cleansing: campaigns directed against the 0oso-ar 6lbanians"
M" @" oss/ p" 1009 't*ebner/ W" 6/ B6merican cooperation with the I3)<:/ 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ p" 90
In both cases/ the international comm*nit8 was responsible for mediating between the parties/ 1osnia and 0oso-o show that the infl*ence of a mediator does not necessaril8 mean that an agreement is s*ccessf*l" '*ccess in the resol*tion of a conflict wo*ld mean that both parties agree to stop fighting"
3oncl*sion With the 5hrid 6greement as the clos*re of the conflict in 2001/ some concl*sions can be drawn" Initiall8/ when looking at the stage at which the conflict took place/ e-er8thing pointed to a repetition of the wars that had taken place in the 1alkansJ 0oso-o and 1osnia" )he ethnic composition and the tensions that had preceded the o*tb*rst in 2001 were similar to that of Macedonia" )he attit*de of the Macedonian go-ernment towards the Macedonian 6lbanians ca*sed dissatisfaction among this gro*p" 6lso/ beca*se both minorities li-ed in separatel8 organi(ed societies/ negati-e stereot8pes fed the tensions/ similar to what happened in 1osnia" )he ethnic Macedonians and Macedonian 6lbanians had a conflict of interests namel8 that the Macedonian 6lbanians wanted a stronger position as minorit8 in Macedonia" )he ethnic Macedonians howe-er/ saw threats in the demands for more c*lt*ral an political a*tonom8" When the *nrest started with attacks b8 the =A6/ the response of the Macedonian go-ernment and the wa8 the conflict de-eloped seemed to indicate the same scenario as that of 0oso-o" @owe-er/ this did not happen" )he central 9*estion of this thesis was what possible explanations for this co*ld be" )hree factors emerge o*t of the case st*d8 as being capable of explaining wh8 the conflict did not escalate into war" %irst/ the infl*ence of the international comm*nit8" )he fact that from an earl8 stage of the conflict/ =6)5 and the E? tried to mediate shows that the8 were aware of the possible instabilit8 in Macedonia" It has been d*e to the efforts of the mediators at the 5hrid negotiations that e-ent*all8 an agreement was reached" )he compliance of both parties has been sec*red b8 the =6)5 operation Essential @ar-est" )here is a clear difference with interference of the international comm*nit8 in Macedonia and that in 0oso-o and 1osnia" &ossibl8/ the =6)5 and E? were aware of the possible risk their interference posed to a possible
escalation of the conflict" 6lso/ the fact that the8 had learned from earlier conflicts is of infl*ence/ which is connected with the third explanator8 factor" 6 second factor is the attit*de of the political elites of both gro*ps" In order to reach a peace agreement/ both parties need to be willing to gi-e *p fighting and therefore/ the agreement needs to be satisfactor8 for both" )his was the case with the 5hrid 6greement beca*se both the ethnic Macedonians and Macedonian 6lbanians were willing to make important concessions" )he fact that the most important 6lbanian parties/ the &!& and !&6 were incl*ded in the peace negotiations/ and the fact that the8 were in to*ch with the =A6 has contrib*ted to the s*ccessf*l resol*tion of the conflict" 6nd a third/ more *nderl8ing factor is the regional context that was a moti-ation for both the mediators and the gro*ps in conflict" )he conflict in 0oso-o had onl8 recentl8 ended and the infl*x of ref*gees into Macedonia had been of infl*ence on the attit*des of both gro*ps" )he ethnic Macedonians were afraid that the demographic changes wo*ld affect the position of the Macedonian 6lbanians and this gro*p on their t*rn radicali(ed their demands/ res*lting in the attacks from the =A6" )he international comm*nit8 had learned from the conflicts in 1osnia and 0oso-o and recogni(ed the possible dangers that the Macedonian tensions inhibited" )his is likel8 to ha-e infl*enced the wa8 in which the8 mediated between the two gro*ps" 6lso/ it is likel8 that the international comm*nit8 expected that a war in Macedonia wo*ld renew tensions in 0oso-o/ this wo*ld mean a new instable sit*ation in the 1alkans" )he wa8 in which the conflict in 2001 was sol-ed in Macedonia co*ld be *sed as an exemplar8 case in other research on ethnic conflict resol*tion" It m*st be mentioned howe-er that Macedonia can be considered a *ni9*e case and therefore does not represent a form*la
that can be applied to an8 case" 'ome general lesson can be drawn howe-er" %irst of all/ the presence of external actors is of importance" 1oth in the phase of earl8 monitoring as at the point at which resol*tion of the conflict needs mediation" )he fact that the =6)5 and E? were alread8 present in the 1alkans and aware of the possible risk of escalation of the tensions in Macedonia" 6lso/ the fact that the 5hrid 6greement ended the conflict in 2001 does not mean that all tensions among ethnic minorities ha-e been resol-ed" %*rther research sho*ld indicate how the agreement has affected the Macedonian societ8 and also the risks of new conflict" In other words/ *ntil now the 6greement has ser-ed as an effecti-e means to manage inter ethnic relations"
1ibliograph8 1anac/ I"/ B)he &olitics of =ational @omogeneit8:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" ,0C2," 1lit(/ 1" 0"/ BWar and 3hange:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 1C12" 3arment/ !" D199,E/ B)he International !imensions of Ethnic 3onflict> 3oncepts/ Indicators/ and )heor8:/ Journal of Peace Research/ ;ol" ,0/ =o" 2/ pp" 1,7C1.0" 3ameron/ %"/ B)he E*ropean ?nion:s role in the 1alkans: in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 99C109" 3lKment/ '" D1997E/ B3onflict &re-ention in the 1alkans/ 3ase 't*dies of 0oso-o and the %< of Macedonia:/ Instit*te for 'ec*rit8 't*diesC 3haillot &apers/ =o" ,0 3oakle8/ #" D1992E/ B)he ,2,C,.7" 3owan/ #" 0"/ Macedonia, the Politics of Identit" and 0ifference/ Aondon> &l*to &ress/ 2000" esol*tion of Ethnic 3onflict> )owards a
)8polog8:/ International Political cience Revie!/ ;ol" 1,/ =o" 2/ pp"
" #" D1997E/ B)he &ower of =egati-e )hinking> )he ?se of
=egati-e 3ase Methodolog8 in the !e-elopment of 'ociological )heor8:/ 1heor" and ociet"/ ;ol" 24/ =o" ./ pp" 429C472" %reedman/ A" D2000E/ B;ictims and -ictors> reflections on the 0oso-o War:/ e-iew of International 't*dies/ ;ol" 24/ pp" ,,.C,.7"
$lenn8/ M" D199.E/ B@eading 5ff War in the 'o*thern 1alkans:/ %oreign 6ffairs/ ;ol" 72/ =o" ,/ pp" 97C107" @islope/ " D200,E/ B1etween a 1ad &eace and a $ood War> Insights and
Aessons from the 6lmostCwar in Macedonia:/ 2thnic and Racial tudies/ ;ol" 24/ =o" 1/ pp" 129C1.1" International 3risis $ro*p D1997E/ B)he 6lbanian Q*estion in Macedonia> Implications of the 0oso-o 3onflict for InterCEthnic elations in Macedonia:/ I3$ 1alkans eport =o" ,7"
International 3riminal 3o*rt/ International )rib*nal for the &rosec*tion of &ersons since 1991/ esponsible for 'erio*s ;iolations of International *ling in case no" I)C02C72C)/ 10 #*l8 2007" @*manitarian Aaw 3ommitted in the )erritor8 of the %ormer <*gosla-ia
#enne/ E" D2002E/ B6 1argaining )heor8 of Minorit8 !emands> Explaining the !og that !id not 1ite in 1990s in <*gosla-ia:/ International tudies 3uarterl"/ ;ol" 27/ pp" 729C7.2" 0*rspahic/ 0"/ B%rom 1osnia to 0oso-o and 1e8ond> Mistakes and Aessons: in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 74C74"
Mahon8 #" and $oert(/ $" D2002E/ B)he &ossibilit8 &rinciple> 3hoosing =egati-e 3ases in 3omparati-e esearch:/ 1he %+erican Political cience Revie!/ ;ol" 97/ =o" 2/ pp" 4.,C449" Malcolm/ ="/ B)he War o-er 0oso-oL/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 12,C1.." 5hrid 6greement/ 1,"07"2001" 5rtako-ski/ ;" )" D2001E/ BInterethnic 22C2." &earson/ 1" D2002E/ B&*tting &eace into &ractice/ 3an Macedonia:s =ew $o-ernment Meet the 3hallenge:/ 'pecial Instit*te of &eace" &etroskaC1eska/ ;" and =ajce-ska/ M" D2002E/ BMacedonia/ ?nderstanding @istor8/ &re-enting %*t*re 3onflict:/ 'pecial 11./ ?nited 'tates Instit*te of &eace" &hilips/ #"/ Macedonia, Warlords and Re*els in the 'al(ans/ =ew <ork> I" 1" )a*ris/ 2002" &opetre-ski/ ;" M Aatifi/ ;" D2002E/ B)he 5hrid %ramework 6greement =egotiations:/ 3onflict 't*dies esearch 3entre/ #*ne 2002/ pp" 29C,4" eport =o" eport 94/ ?nited 'tates elations and Minorities in the
ep*blic of Macedonia:/ outheast 2uropean Politics/ ;ol" 2/ =o" 1/ pp"
&osen/ 1" D2000E/ B)he War for 0oso-o/ 'erbia:s &oliticalCMilitar8 'trateg8:/ International 'ec*rit8/ ;ol" 22/ =o" 2/ pp" ,9C72"
&o*lton/ @"/ Who are the Macedonians?/ 1loomington> Indiana ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 199." oss/ M" @ D2000E/ B3reating the 3onditions for &eacemaking> )heories of &ractice in Ethnic 3onflict 2,/ =o" 4/ pp" 1002C10,2" ossos/ 6"/ B)he !isintegration of <*gosla-ia/ Macedonia:s Independence and 'tabilit8 in the 1alkans:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 110C117" 'chNpflin/ $"/ B<*gosla-ia> 'tate 3onstr*ction and 'tate %ail*re:/ in 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and #hange in the 'al(ans, /ationalis+, #onflict and #ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 1,C 29" 'lack/ 6" and !o8on/ #o*rnal of &eace " D2001E/ B&op*lation !8namics and esol*tion:/ 2thnic and Racial tudies/ ;ol"
'*sceptibilit8 for Ethnic 3onflict> )he 3ase of 1osnia and @erxego-ina:/ esearch/ ;ol" ,7/ =o" 2/ pp" 1,9C141"
'tano-HiI/ ;" D1992E/ B&roblems and 5ptions in Instit*tionali(ing Ethnic elations:/ International Political cience Revie!/ ;ol" 1,/ =o" 2/ pp" ,.9C,79" 't*ebner/ W" 6/ B6merican cooperation with the I3)<:/ 1it(/ 1" 0"/ War and 3hange in the 1alkans/ =ationalism/ 3onflict and 3ooperation/ 3amebridge> 3ambridge ?ni-ersit8 &ress/ 2004/ pp" 77C97"
eport/ B)he %*t*re of Macedonia> 6 1alkan '*r-i-or =ow =eeds
eform:/ March 2001/ ?nited Instit*te of &eace"
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