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Consti 1

Reviewer on Article VI June 24, 2013

Legislative Department
SECTION 1 THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.

Plenary legislative power of Congress -provided that substantive and procedural limitations found in the constitution are observed, the Congress may legislate on any subject matter -Congress may not pass irrepealable laws -Power of any legislature may only be limited by the Constitution

2. Initiative and Referendum


-elaborated on Section 32 -power of the people directly to propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body -people have, in addition to their constituent powers, have ordinary legislative power -institutionalize people power by providing an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people
Garcia v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994 Facts Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong Bataan Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 Agreed to the inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (RA No. 7227) Petitioners Filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 Municipality of Morong did not take action within 30 days of submission Resorted to power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Sec. 122 of RA No. 7610) Solicited signatures to repeal the resolution June 11, 1993: Unknown to petitioners, Vice Mayor Edilberto M. De Leon write a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting denial of the petition for local initiative/ referendum July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc denied the petition for local initiative as subject is a resolution and not an ordinance Issue Whether or not the petition for local initiative is constitutional? Held Yes, the petition for local initiative is constitutional. Case of first impression The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses of government. Peoples initiative installed in our fundamental law COMELEC- empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.

1. Legislative Power
1987 Constitution: Bicameralism Advantages 1) Allows for a body with a national perspective to check the parochial tendency of representatives elected by district; 2) Allows for more careful study of legislation; 3) Makes the legislature less susceptible to the control of the executive; 4) Serves as a training ground for national leaders. Unicameralism Advantages 1) simplicity in organization resulting in economy and efficiency 2) facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation 3) avoidance of duplication 2 kinds of legislative power in republican systems 1) Original legislative power -possessed by the sovereign people 2) Deriviative legislative power -delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people -Congress 2 classifications of legislative power 1) constituent -power to amend or revise the constitution -ex. amendatory process 2) ordinary -power to pass ordinary loss -ex. initiative and referendum 2 kinds of limits on legislative power 1) substantive -curtails the contents of the law -ex. no law may be passed which impairs freedom of speech 2) procedural -curtials the manner of passing laws -ex. process of passing a bill

R.A. No. 6735 An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor -borrowed from American laws -requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum, conduct of national initiative and referendum, procedure of local initiative and referendum and their limitations. Section 3(a) 3 types of initiatives 1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution 2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation 3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance Section 16 -any provision on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as here-in provided shall not be repealed, modified, or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within 6 months from the date therefrom R.A. No. 7610 Local Government Code of 1991 -Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I Conduct of initiative and referendum -Section 124 Limitations on Local Initiatives a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. Section 32, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution -any act (Black Law Dictionary) Expression of will or purpose, denote something done COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiatives and Referendum, on National and Local Laws -Section 5, Article I: Scope of power of initiative the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance

1) a non legislative body may be authorized to fill up the details of a statute

2) Congress may pass contingent legislation-l -leaves to another body the business of ascertaining the facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation admininistrative agency: not law-making but lawexecution

Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 166 SCRA 533 (1988) Facts Private respondent is awarded Php 192,000(180,000 as death benefits and 12,000 for burial expenses) by the POEA for the death of her husband Decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker Vitalino Saco-Chief Officer of M/V Eastern Polaris, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan His widow sued for damages under EO No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA Petitoner argued that complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund POE assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant Issue Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA us violative of the principle of non-delegation of power Held Petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner. There was a valid delegation of powers. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 -prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. -administrative regulation -POEA power is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standing guiding the exercise of said authority Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797 x x x The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). -discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be 2 Tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: 1) completeness test -law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it

3. Non-delegability of legislative power


Corwin -commentary on the US Constitution 3 Principles that legislative power cannot be delegated 1) doctrine of separation of powers 2) concept of due process of law 3) Delegata potestas non potest delegari - no delegated powers can be further delegated

2 Theories by Chief Justice Marshall (1825)

sufficient standard test -there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative principle if non-delegation of powers -applicable to all the three major powers of the Government -especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted administrative bodies -national legislature found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute power if subordinate legislation

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power. Facts On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor (Ople) for unfair labor practices and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Respondent, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondents establishment. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory arbitration pursuant to the provisions on strikes of the Labor Code this is to avoid adverse effects to the national interest. Issue Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power. Held FTWU failed to make out a case of undue delegation. The President shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: The President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Secretary Drilon 176 SCRA 24 (1989) Facts COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (C.B.A): - Negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 (1987) Facts -Petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 dated 23 August 1985 from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT: 1) as condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission 2) from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT 3) from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 offend against the due delegation of legislative power Held: Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. The government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. Medical Act of 1959 Section 1 -the standardization and regulation of medical education

Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 108 SCRA 757 (1981) Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, empowering the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest to and therafter decide it or certify them same to the National Labor Comission is not on its face unconstitutional for being violate of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative

Republic Act No. 6640 - Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage rates of workers and employees in the private sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, shall be increased by ten pesos (P10.00) per day, except non-agricultural workers and employees outside Metro Manila who shall receive an increase of eleven pesos (P11.00) per day: Provided, that those already receiving above the minimum wage up to one hundred pesos (Pl 00.00 shall receive an increase of ten pesos (Pl 0.00) per day. Excepted from the provisions of this Act are domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another. As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. Issue Whether or not an implementing order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement Held The petition is GRANTED. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Courts forthright resolution. It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 Facts The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitled the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Issues (1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy (2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law (3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution (4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power (5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition Held

Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution, which cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. As the dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. People v. Dacuycuy 173 SCRA 90 (1989) Facts Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) Imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) Constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. Issue W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid. Held NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of judicial powers not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

Employees Confederation v. National Wages Commission G.R. No. 96169, September 24, 1991 Facts On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed. On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No. NCR-01. It provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's grant of an "acrossthe-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings. On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case via petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR01-A providing for new wage rates, as well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum wage rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid. Held The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied the petition of ECOP. The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act sought a

"thinking" group of men and women bound by statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-theboard hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.

be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Issue Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators. Held Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

SECTION 2 THE SENATE SHALL BE COMPOSED IOF TWENTY-FOUR SENATORS WHO SHALL BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE PHILIPPINES AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. SECTION 3 NO PERSON SHALL BE A SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, A REGISTERED VOTER AND A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. No. 161658, November 3 2008 NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs DDB and PDEA (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658) Facts In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and

SECTION 4 THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE SENATORS SHALL BE SIX YEARS AND SHALL COMMENCE, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO SENATOR SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

SECTION 5 (1) THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN TWO

HUNDRED AND FIFTY MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A PARTYLIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. (2) THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST. FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONEHALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. (3) EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT, AND ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE. (4) WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION.

1. Sectoral representation and party representation


Sectoral representations -Commissioner Villacorta: extending protection to the interests of these groups which are not adequately attended to in normal legislative deliberations -chances of the marginalized sector -apprehension that Upper House might be monopolized by the moneyed sector and might protect vested property interests Party-list representations -Commissioner Monsod: main sponsor -not synonymous with sectoral representation

2. Cases on Party List


Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000 Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 147589, June 25, 2003 Banat v. COMELEC G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009

3. Apportionment
Apportionment -concept of equality of representation -1 vote is equal to 1 vote -each province, irrespective of population, is entitled to one representative -each city with a population of at least 250,000 is entitled to at least one representative Gerrymandering -formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party is not allowed -each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory
Tobias v. Abalos G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994 Facts Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by

involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. (2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. (3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. (4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section Issue Whether or not the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional. Held The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 Facts Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the

population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Issue Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional Held Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. Montejo v. Comission on Elections G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995 Facts The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte. Issue Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district

Held The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the

Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a subprovince to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte. Bagabuyo v. Comelec G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008 Facts In 2006, Rep. Jaraula of Cagayan de Oro sponsored a bill increasing the citys legislative district from one to two. It eventually became a law causing COMELEC to promulgate a resolution that for the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. Bagabuyo filed a petition and argued that COMELEC cannot implement the act without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. Issue Whether or not a plebiscite is required in the case at bar Held No. The Court upheld COMELECs arguments that the law merely increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and that the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay. In this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place. Further, the law did not bring about any change in CDOs territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

-personal presence in the place coupled with conduct and indicative of such intention -not necessarily lost even through prolonged absence -requirement for suffrage -1971 ConCon: rejected a proposal to make actual physical residence a requirement Domicile by choice 1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality 2) an intention to remain there 3) intention to abandon the old domicile animus non revertendi and animus manendi

SECTION 6 NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND, EXCEPT THE PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES, A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.

6. Qualifications of Party-list Representatives


Party-list representatives -must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors -nominees who do not have this ideological quality are not qualified to be part-list representatives in the HoR 1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines 2. a registered voter 3. a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election 4. able to read or write 5. a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of election 6. at least 25 years of age on the day of the election Youth sector nominee -at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election -if turns more than 30 during his term, he shall be allowed to finish his term

1. Qualifications of a District Representative


District representative 1. a natural born citizen of the Philippines 2. a registered voter 3. a resident of that district for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election 4. able to read and write 5. at least 25 years old was lowered to 21 on October 12, 1972, only to be raised later to 25 same as the age qualification for representatives under the 1935 Constitution and for Batasan members under the 1973 Constitution Natural-born citizens -citizens of the Philippines from birth without having too perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship -citizens by election: deemed to be natural-born Residence -synonymous with domicile

7. Residence qualifications
Gallego v. Verra G.R. No. L-48641, November 24, 1941 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 Aquino v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Domino v. Comission on Elections G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

8. Citizenship Qualification Cases


Co v. House Electoral Tribunal G.R. Nos. 921-92, July 30, 1991 Bengzon v. Cruz

G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

SECTION 7 THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

1. Term and tenure


Dimamporo v. Mitra, Jr. G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991 Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003