Experimental Economics Fall 2013 Alex Imas aimas@andrew.cmu.edu https://sites.google.

com/site/alexoimas/teaching/experimental-economics 319A Porter Hall Office Hours: By Appointment Course Description: This course will focus on the experimental literature studying decisionmaking and strategic interactions. We will explore both seminal and ongoing experimental work on risk, time and social preferences. We will then do an overview of how experiments have been used to test theory of strategic interactions, learning and market behavior. The last sections of the class will briefly review experimental work on incentives, behavioral finance and emotions. The class is meant to be interactive, and students will have many opportunities to critically discuss existing experimental research as well as to present their own research ideas. Text: There is no text requirement for the course. Required and optional reading will be posted to blackboard and the course website. The following text is encouraged: Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., and Rabin, M. Advances in Behavioral Economics, New York, Princeton University Press, 2004. Format: The course will be taught in a seminar format. Students are expected to interact, comment and challenge the presenter. We will spend between one and three classes on each of the topics below. We will first introduce the seminal papers in the literature and then explore recent developments on the topic. There will be weekly assignments of either a referee report or an idea brief. Students will have an opportunity to present their own ideas and existing working papers of others throughout the semester. In addition, a final paper will be due at the end of the semester. Course Requirements: Participation (40%): Given the seminar format of this course, students are expected to play an active role in class discussions. Each student should plan on preparing 2-3 questions on each paper to be discussed. In addition, a student will be assigned to present a working or recently published paper from the reading list on each topic. The presentations should be between 40 minutes to an hour, and designed to facilitate discussion. The presenter is encouraged to incorporate their own thoughts and opinions about the paper. Idea Brief (20%): For each topic covered, students will write a short idea brief (1-2 pages) focusing on a research idea related to the topic. The idea briefs should focus on the big picture questions that the research aims to answer, with a focus on the motivation and the experimental design used to explore it. Students will give a short (5-10 minute) presentation of their idea brief on the day that they are due.

(1999). V. Current Directions in Psychological Science. M. . discussion and conclusion. and Smith. (1991). G. Guidance on how these improvements can be made should be included here. and Norton. 28.Referee Report (20%): Students will be assigned a recent working or recently published paper on each topic to evaluate in a referee report. D. literature review. results. 4) Binmore. 2) Ariely.A succinct summary of the paper (1-2 paragraphs) . Journal of Political Economy. with an introduction. 24. 2) Smith. V. The paper should be structured as a standard scientific article.Criticism and discussion of issues that the paper either failed to address or should improve on.Final impression and recommendation (1 paragraph) Final Project (20%): The final project is a paper (10-20 pages) on an original research topic of the student’s choice. (2007). . 16. Each student or group will make a brief presentation (20 minutes) of their final project. Economic Man—or Straw Man? The Behavioral and Brain Science. . 877-897. Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 383-403. D. Psychology and Experimental Economics: A Gap in Abstraction. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. 3) Kahneman. Reports should not be longer than 2 pages singlespaced. Students can work together. Actual data is not required. Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioral Economics. Economic Journal. Methods of Experimental Economics 1) Hertwig. Foundations of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. Ken.Overall impression of the paper. Each issue should be organized by either using separate paragraphs or bullet points. procedures. The reports should be structured as follows: . (2002). the results section should contain a detailed plan on how such data would be analyzed. Course Outline Required readings are in bold Introduction (8/28) Assignments Due: Required readings Behavioral and Experimental Economics 1) Loewenstein. A. (2001). 99. and are HIGHLY encouraged to make an appointment to discuss the final project with me. 109. and Ortmann. R. 815-818. 25-34. Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology. If no data was collected. What it does right and what it does wrong (1-2 paragraphs). 336-339. (2005).

Quarterly Journal of Economics. 183-206. Risk Preferences and Mental Accounting: Foundations 1 (9/4) Assignments Due: Required readings. L. 6) Jamison. A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. 17. 5) Bonetti. The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. 68. Risk Preferences and Mental Accounting: Foundations 2 (9/11) Assignments Due: Required readings . Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics. 11-46. 39-60. Idea brief Expected Utility and Prospect Theory 1) Kahneman. Mental Accounting Maters. 3) Prelec. 47. Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. J. 19. M. Journal of Economic Literature. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. (1999). 4. 2) Thaler. B. G. D.. V. 121. A. (2008). Quarterly Journal of Economics. (1998). Psychology and Economics. Experimental Economics and Deception.. 1. (2005). 4-28. and Thaler. 19. 2) Thaler. and Rabin. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. G. C. and Kahneman. Economic Theory and Experimental Economics 1) Samuelson. 4) Camerer. R. 1133-1165. 477-488. (2006). Economic Theory and Experimental Economics. M.3) Camerer. R. C. 199-214. (1998). Mental Accounting 1) Thaler. J. Econometrica. and Tversky. D. Marketing Science. 377-395. (1985). To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior in Future Laboratory Experiments. and Walker. and Loewenstein. (1992). 5. Karlan. 4) Smith. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. (1979). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 7-42. 3) Tversky. Economic Inquiry. The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt. Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time. 407441. 112. Marketing Science. R. (1997). R. and Hogarth. Loewenstein. 245-261. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2) Koszegi. (1980). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 263-292. (1999). 21. Babcock. L. R. 297-323. 1. 3) Rabin. D. L. 12. and Schechter. (1989). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. 65-107. 43. D.. A. S. Journal of Economic Literature.

Reconsidering the Effect of Market Experience on the ‘Endowment Effect. R. (1991). Journal of Marketing Research. forthcoming. 2) Ellsberg. 75. R. 4) Thaler. 2. C. 2005-2019. A. (2005). 4) Halevy. 2) Weber. 5. 643-660. N. R. Experimental Methods: Eliciting Risk Preferences. 2) List. G. 101. (1992). L. Ambiguity. 323-370. and Johnson. C. and Imas. 503536. Planned Versus Actual Betting in Sequential Betting. American Economic Review. 173-196. 110. Save More Tomorrow ™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Savings. History-Dependent Risk Preferences 1) Thaler. Knetsch. (2004). . D. and Huffman. Quarterly Journal of Economics 3) Camerer. Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice. A. and Status Quo Bias. Risk Preferences and Mental Accounting: Advances (9/18) Assignments Due: Required readings. and Tversky. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 372-383..’ Econometrica. (1990). and Thaler. 112. Journal of Economic Perspectives. U. Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 3) Engelmann. 585-603.. Loss Aversion. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Anomalies: The Endowment Effect. E. 27. (2009). 46. Journal of Political Economy. (2013). (2007). 193-2006. Ambiguity Aversion 1) Fox. Falk. and Guillaume. S164S187. and Benartzi. J. Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study. D. Econometrica.Endowment Effect 1) Kahneman. Thirty Years of Prospect Theory: A Review and Assessment. Risk. M. 118. Referee report 1) Barberis. B. Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 3) Andrade. and Weber. 36. Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity. Y. 30-43. and the Savage Axioms. Management Science. (2011). and Zuchel.. (1995). Gneezy. E. 2) Abeler. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 470-492. (2013). Reference Points and Effort Provision. 10. How Do Prior Outcomes Affect Risky Choice? Further Evidence on the House-Money Effect and Escalation of Commitment. Decision Analysis. M. J. 3) Charness. D. 41-71. A. 5. D. and Iyer. H. (1961). H. G.. Gotte. (2010). J. (2003).

(1999). M. The Realization Effect: Risk-Taking after Realized versus Paper Losses. Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices. (1997). Referee report 1) Benhabib. American Economic Review. American Economic Review. 8. G. (2013). mimeo. . Journal of Economic Literature. J. and Bickel. 2) Read. Mimeo. 121. 4) Prelec. Time Discounting and Time Preferences: A Critical Review.. 5) Kirby. Bisin. 2) O’Donoghue. The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect is Valued Less than its Worst Possible Outcome. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 3) Eil. Frederick. G. and Rabin. C. 78-87. J. Is the Endowment Effect an Expectations Effect? Mimeo. (1987). Present-Bias. (2009). 6) Sprenger. 69. and O’Donoghue. (2012)... 1508-1543. (2013). Marketing Letters. Management Science. and Rahman. 3) Loewenstein. Quarterly Journal of Economics. and Schotter. and Fuster. 51. M. 126. 1326-1335. Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption. Petry. Doing it Now or Doing it Later. G. 351-401. Four Score and Seven Years from Now: The Date/Delay Effect in Temporal Discounting. Heroin Addicts Have Higher Discount Rates for Delayed Rewards than Non-Drug-Using Controls. mimeo. T. A. Orsel. J. OR Heffetz. Time Preferences: Foundations (9/25) Assignments Due: Required readings. Hypobolic Discounting and Willingness-to-Wait.4) Gneezy.. and Weizsacker. U. K. D. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. B. T. 205-223. 5) Rabin. and Fixed Costs. Time Preferences: Advances (10/2) Assignments Due: Required readings. 40. (2010). W. (2002). Games and Economic Behavior. 1283-1309. (2012). and List. 103-124. An Endowment Effect for Risk: Experimental Tests of Stochastic Reference Points. Economic Journal. 1879-1907. Idea brief 1) Frederick. 99. Loewenstein. (2011). A. K. G. Beyond Time Discounting. A. (2005). (2006). 7) Imas. Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting. 89. J. O. 97. 128. Referee Report and Presentation Ericson.. A. G. N. M. 666-684.. S. S. and Loewenstein. and Wu. Expectations as Endowments: Evidence on ReferenceDependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation Experiments. (1999). D. D. 97-108. List.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. (2008). S. Referee Report and Presentation Andreoni.. C. and Rutstrom. J. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. J. A. Anomalies: Cooperation. Journal of Political Economy. (1976). Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2) Andreoni. American Economic Review. . Reciprocity and Fairness 1) Fehr. Dictators and Manners. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests. G. E. 5) Becker. S. M. 5) Rabin. A Theory of Fairness. J. G. 464-477. 817-868. 117. J.. Journal of Economic Perspectives. and Gachter. E. and Miller. Thompson. Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences. and Bazerman. Journal of Labor Economics. (1995). 4) Fehr. and Gachter. G. 3) Dawes. 100. (1998) When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets. 187-197. Econometrica. Anomalies: Ultimatums. 83. Economic Journal. Quarterly Journal of Economics. J. 1063-1093. (1988). Harrison. E. 57. (1989). K. (2012). 76. R. 14. 2) Fehr. 9. forthcoming. American Economic Review. Social Preferences: Foundations (10/9) Assignments Due: Required readings. Idea brief Social Preferences (Global) 1) Charness. 4) Loewenstein. 324-351. 82. (1999). 2) Camerer. (1993). 83. Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts. (2002). Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the consistency of Preferences for Altruism. A. Competition and Cooperation. R. E. and Rabin. L. 1281-1302. 583-618. Lau. Warm Glow 1) Andreoni. and Schmidt. Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving. Kirchler. 114.. American Economic Review. and Thaler. 2. 817-869. M.. (1993). (1990). and Sprenger. 3) Andreoni. 426-441. 1317-1327. (2002).. S. 16. 159-181. R. M. and Thaler. M. C. 209-219. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets. Weichbold. A Theory of Social Interactions. G. An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics. M.4) Anderson.

R. D. Mimeo. A. J. 77. V. Loewenstein. (1989). L. Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism. E. Conscience Accounting: Emotional Dynamics in Social Behavior. Empathy and Charitable Giving. (2013). 2) Dellavigna.. L. G. Referee report 1) Dana. K. V. (2006). H. 113-131. V. Palfrey. 67-80. M. Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market. R. B. Econometrica. R. 74. U. J. Referee Report and Presentation Andreoni. J. and Dawes. M. R. 70. Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary? Journal of the European Economic Association. and Bernheim. U. 4) Gneezy. X. and Malmendier. A. and Weber. Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving.. 151-169. 8. 7) Gneezy. J. 537-567. and Kuang.. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. L.. Rao. and List. T. A. List. (1982). 3.. Economic Theory.Social Preferences: Advances (10/16) Assignments Due: Required readings. and Weber. (2007). 3) Dana. The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis. and Madarasz. 1-56. (2009). 97. Idea brief Markets 1) Smith. Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12321254. forthcoming. Journal of Political Economy. Economics in the Laboratory. (2012). 2) Smith. (1994). Mimeo. 4) Camerer. 3) Smith.. U. 111-137. Econometrica. J. (1989). 193-201. . Quarterly Journal of Economics. 127. Econometrica. 5) Forsythe. 33. 16071636. Strategic Interactions and Markets: Foundations (10/23) Assignments Due: Required readings. Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects. 5) Andreoni. 100. Theory. Journal of Political Economy. (2013). D. Cain. (2006). Experiments and Economics. S. and Trachtman. C. J. 6) Krupka. An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior. 50. and Plott. Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets using Field Experiments. J. J. Imas. What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Me: Costly (but Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games. C. Weber. (2012). Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1364-1384.. (1962).

R. S. 79. Camerer.. R. 3) Costa-Gomes. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games. Econometrica. and Broseta. Psychological Review. and Weigelt.. American Economic Review. (1998). 101. The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence. Econometrica. 95. Mimeo. M. M. A. Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study. (1979). 76. 574-594. 411-429. S. T. and Oprea. Game Theory 1) Roth.” American Economic Review. D. American Economic Review.. Mimeo 6) Bernard. M. 2) McKelvey. B. and Chong. 3) Dufwenberg. 85. (1992). Knetsch. American Economic Review. Behavioral Game Theory 1) Nagel. (1986). J. Referee Report and Presentation . 60. (2005).. The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study. Referee report 1) Dal Bo. C. C. (2004). M. An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game. 102. American Economic Review. 4) Oprea. (2012). A. G. Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining. J. and Thaler. K. 5) Bernard. (2013). 803-836.. The Benefits of Being Able to Fire (and Replace) People.. Mimeo. 7) Palfrey. and Yuksel. J. Ho. 3) Roth. Econometrica. 86. S. 947969. Crawford. A. American Economic Review. Fanning. R. (2011).6) Kahneman. 2) Friedman. Strategic Interactions and Markets: Advances (10/30) Assignments Due: Required readings. (2013). and Frechette. (2013). 50. V. Fanning. and Moore. Quarterly Journal of Economics. American Economic Review. R. 119. T. Econometrica. A Continuous Dilemma. (1982). and Palfrey. Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows. 88. E. J. Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study. J. and Yuksel. K. (1995). 355-384. Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental “p-Beauty Contests. 728-741. 69. J. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market. T. P. R. (1989). The Benefits of Being Able to Fire (and Replace) People. (2012). 337-363. and Roth. Survival Versus Profit Maximization in a Dynamic Stochastic Experiment. and Malouf. Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment. 1313-1326. M. (2001). forthcoming. 1193-1235.. T. An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining. and Murnighan. 1731-1737. 1123-1142. and Wang. Lindqvist. 4) Ochs. T. 861-898. 4) Camerer. 2) Ho. D.

Two Experiments to Test a Model of Herd Behavior. and Limited War. When Does Communication Improve Coordination? American Economic Review. (1957). (2010). American Economic Review. 19-36. S. Economic Theory. and Yuksel. 2) Schelling. 94. Conflict Resolution. Learning and Persuasion: Foundations (11/6) Assignments Due: Required readings. 2) Charness. and Xiao. G. 1695-1724. C. Referee report 1) Gneezy. D. Communication. (2012). Classification of Natural Language Messages Using a Coordination Game. and Dufwenberg. and Gneezy. J. U. 4) Houser. 100. and Holt. 1579-1601. Mimeo 6) Ellingsen. Referee Report and Presentation . Idea brief Cheap Talk 1) Crawford. (2000). 121-136. T. (2005). Herding and Information Cascades 1) Anderson. 847-862. Information Cascades in the Laboratory. 22. (2003). and Wilson. and Kariv. (2010). Learning and Persuasion: Advances (11/13) Assignments Due: Required readings. T. 3) Plott. Promises and Partnerships. Econometrica. (1998). G. American Economic Review. and Ostling. 58. C. Infinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory: Four Perspectives on Discounting and Random Termination. and Yang. 2) Allsopp. (2012). B. 14. V. 1-14. M. L. Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory. 87. Journal of Economic Theory. U. Wit. and Hey. A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk. (1997). Experimental Economics. 3) Erat. A. E. 484-498. Deception: The Role of Consequences.. S. 78. (2006). Experimental Economics. Communication with Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment.Frechette. J. 7) Celen. R. 1. 286-298. 5) Vespa. 384-394. (2004). 3. S. Bargaining. L. American Economic Review. 74. Management Science. W. E. (2013). Mimeo. 723-733. 311-351. Parimutuel Betting Markets as Information Aggregation Devices: Experimental Results. 95. White Lies.

115. D. S. Y. PNAS. (2013). U. Gneezy.. 112. A. G. K. and Zimmermann. Tversky. and Thaler. S. 7) Ariely.. and Nelson. Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All. U. U. Working for the ‘Warm Glow’: On the Benefits and Limits of Prosocial Incentives. Loewenstein. 647-661. 2) Benartzi. (2012). 3) Gneezy. and Neckermann. and Gneezy. Gneezy. Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. 109. U. (2010). Levitt. Mimeo. and Self-Signaling in Markets. and Rustichini. Large Stakes and Big Mistakes. Identity. Presentation Sadoff. L. S. Incentives (11/20) Assignments Due: Required readings.. 77. 76. R.. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Thanksgiving (11/27) No Class! Behavioral Finance and Emotions (12/04) Assignments Due: Required readings Myopic Loss Aversion 1) Gneezy. (1997). When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior. A.Enke. Mimeo. Idea brief 1) Gneezy. L. The Behavioralist Goes to School: Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Improve Educational Performance. Annals of Internal Medicine.. An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods. Journal of Economic Perspectives. U. (2009). J. and Potters. 8) Charness.. 4) Kullgren. Mimeo. L. J. Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation. U.. 73-92. R. F.. 158.. 631-645. and Mazar. J. Asch. A. R. Tao. Incentives to Exercise.. Science. (2012). L. . Review of Economic Studies. G. N. 5) Imas. (2008). (2013). 6) Gneezy. 25. (2000). Norton. 2) Gneezy. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Gneezy. G. J. D. Wesby. Fryer. B. Mimeo. 191-210. 110. A. List. P. 325-327.. 329. 909-931. Volpp. S.. and Kahneman. S.. and Rey-Biel. 451-469.. and List. U. (2012). Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives Through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment. G. Individual Versus Group Based Financial Incentives for Weight Loss: A Randomized. 9) Sadoff. Quarterly Journal of Economics.. S. Meier. 7236-7240. A. Econometrica. J. 505-514. Quarterly Journal of Economics. (2011). (2013). S.. (1997) The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test. Levitt. Controlled Trial. Reinder.. Loewenstein. Troxel. Shared Social Responsibility: A Field Experiment in Pay-What-You-Want Pricing and Charitable Giving.. (1995). 3) Thaler. A. Nelson. 791-810.. D. 112.. Pay-What-You-Want. Zhu. and Brown. A.

E. D. Emotions and Empathy Gaps 1) Loewenstein. A. (2011). (2001). Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility. (1985). Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior. Krawczyk. A. O’Donoghue. and Keltner. 16. Journal of Finance. M. 777-790. The Materazzi Effect: On the Strategic Use of Anger. M. 127. Risk as Feelings. Psychological Bulletin. 7398-7401. and Houser. G. 40. Using Neural Data to Test a Theory of Investor Behavior: An Application to Realization Utility. Barberis. Demasio. 267-286.. Fear.. (2013). Resolution of Risk and the Role of Affect. H. 102. H. 146-159. C. N. 65. 167184. Journal of Finance. A. Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior. Finals Week (12/11) Presentations . 2) Loewenstein. and Demasio. 81.. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 33. (2012). 272-292. (2001). Bechara. C. (2005). and Camerer. F. 918-939. 3) Lerner. 118. M. U. 2) Van Winden. 3) Xiao. N. Investment. Journal of Economic Psychology. Quarterly Journal of Economics. (1998). G. 4) Gneezy.. Mimeo. 4) Shiv. Loewenstein. and Statman. and Camerer. C. and Welch.. G. Risk and Affect 1) Loewenstein. D. 1209-1248. Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion. and Imas. The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. Hsee. J.. M. and Rabin. and Hopfensitz. B. E. PNAS. (2005). Presentation Frydman.. (2003). 2) Shefrin. The Disposition Effect in Securities Trading: An Experimental Analysis. forthcoming. C. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.. T. 32.Disposition Effect 1) Weber. (1996). Weber. G. Anger and Risk. A. Psychological Science. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 435-439.

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