ORDINARY APPEAL RULE 40 MTC to RTC Republic v. Luriz G.R. No. 158992 January 26, 2007 FACTS: Sps.

Luriz filed an ejectment case against Claval at MeTC. According to Luriz they are the owners of the property at QC by virtue of TCT issued in the name of Urakami and 2 deeds of sale 1st deed from Urakami to Balingit then 2nd deed from Balingit to Luriz Clavel contended that the owner of the property was Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC) and has been in possession since 1953, and authorized its personnel to occupy the 4 cottages built therein. Moreover, said that cannot rely on the TCT because already burned during the fire in the office of the Register of Deeds, and therefore, must first be reconstituted MeTC ruled in favor Luriz and ordered Clavel to vacate premises and pay reasonable compensation for use and occupancy. MeTC granted motion for execution by Luriz. Clavel through OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. MeTC dismissed petitioners Notice of Appeal for failure to file required appeal fee and alos denied Motion to Fix Supersedeas Bond. Deputy Sheriff took possession of lots and ejected all POC personnel Clavel filed MR questioning dismissal of Notice of Appeal was denied again which prompted him to file with RTC a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition to annul the Order and Writ of Execution but was dismissed, so appealed the same with the CA. Republic of the Philippines filed for Motion for Intervention. CA affirmed decision of the RTC because filed appeal fees 3 days after reglementary period for filing an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to pay proper docket fees within the reglamentary period? NO paid fees within the reglamentary period HELD: Requirement in order to perfect an appeal: 1. Notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from the notice of final judgment or final order appealed from. 2. Notice of appeal must be filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order, and served upon the adverse party. 3. Within the same period, payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees to the clerk of the court to which rendered the judgment or final order. 4. Full payment of the appellate dockets fees within the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional.

Claimed good faith because it was Clavel who received the MeTC decision on October 10, and when forwarded the message to counsel of POC, also stated October 10 when in fact it was received only on October 13. Hornbook doctrine states that when a party is represented by counsel, notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law (remember that petitioner now is Republic and not Clavel). Even assuming that belatedly filed, Court recognizes liberal construction of the Rule on Non-payment of Docket fees in order to serve the demands of substantial justice. Mandatory character of filing of dockets fees must be qualified by the following: 1. Failure to pay appellate court docket fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the appeal. 2. Such power should be used in the exercise of the Courts sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering the attendant circumstances. On other issues: immediate execution of judgment not proper because writ of execution was issued even before the appeal was perfected, and before petitioners could have filed sufficient supersedeas bond. Mejillano v. Lucillo G.R. No. 154717 June 19, 2009 FACTS: Loterina died leaving 2 parcels of land with 6 children. 3 of whom from 1 st wife Lucinada namely Tranquilino (T), Antonia (A) and Cipriano (C), and the other 3 from the 2nd wife Monreal namely Julita (J), Felix (F) and Hospicio (H). Surviving children from 1st, T and A executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Cession(lot 9007) dividing equally between them but A ceded of her share to A. T executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Lorente, and amended the same including Lot 9014. But surviving children from 2nd, F and H claimed that lot 9014 was part of their inheritance thereby prompting Lorente to file an action for recovery of possession with the RTC of Legaspi City. RTC dismissed and declared that F and H as co-owners of lot 9014. F and H sold the their respective share in the Extrajudicial Settlement to Lucillo. Lucillo filed an action for recovery of possession of real property against Lorente after the occupant thereof, Mejillano refused to vacate the same. MTC ordered Mejillano to vacate the premises and to turn-over possession to Lucillo.

RTC dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner to file an appeal memorandum. Filed an MR, with a memo through new counsel, contending that failure to file memo was because of demise of counsel and under the belief that what was needed was merely a notice of appeal, but the same was also denied. Appeal with CA also dismissed petition for certiorari on the ground that respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion, MR was also denied hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether CA erred in not considering substantial compliance in filing his appeal memo with RTC in the interest of substantial justice despite the fact that belated filing was unintentional BEREFT OF MERIT HELD: Section 7 (b), Rule 40 is clear. It is obligatory on the part of the petitioner to file his memo on appeal within 15 days from receipt of the notice to file the same; otherwise, his appeal will be dismissed. The word shall in the statute expresses mandatory and compulsory Submission is not a matter of discretion, and failure to comply will compel RTC to dismiss his appeal. Why mandatory: in appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellants brief is mandatory since only errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the appeal memo will be considered in the decision on the merits. CA did not commit reversible error. Encarnacion v. Amigo G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Encarnacion is the registered owner of 2 lots totalling 707 sq. m located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. These originally formed part of the tract of land belonging to Valiente. TIME LINE: 1982: Valiente sold land toMallapitan. 1985:Mallapitan sold the land to Magpantay. Respondent Nieves entered into the possession of the land without the consent of then owner Magpantay. 1992: Magpantay died. 1995: Widow of Magpantayexecuted an Affidavit of Waiver, waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law Petitioner Encarnacion. 1996: Petitioner Encarnacioncaused the subdivision of the land into two lots and the issuance of titles in his name. February 1, 2001: Petitioner Encarnacionsent a letterdated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property.

February 12, 2001: Demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent. Notwithstanding receipt of the same, respondent still refused to vacate the subject property. March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the MTC of Isabela. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities. 2001: the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the Petitioner Encarnacionordering the defendant to vacate the land. Respondent filed an appeal with the RTC Cauayan, Isabela. The RTC reversed the judgment and said that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals likewise ordered a remand of the case to the RTC because the case involved an accionpubliciana (RTC jurisdiction) and not an unlawful detainer (MTC jurisdiction). ISSUE: Is the case one for accionpubliciana or uinlawful detainer? ACCION PUBLICIANA. HENCE, CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN THE RTC FIRST AND NOT THE MTC. HELD: 1. The actions that may be brought to recover possession of property may be accioninterdictal or publiciana. Accioninterdictal, under which the case of unlawful detainer falls is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year. Accionpubliciana, on the other hand is an action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the proper RTC when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. 2. Based on the distinctions, the important element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of dispossession. 3. In the case at bar, Petitioner Encarnacion became the owner of the property in 1995. He filed the complaint for ejectment in 2001. Considering that the dispossession has lasted for more than one year, the proper action was an accionpubliciana. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case to the RTC of Isabela. 4. The RTC however should have not dismissed the case. Pursuant to Section 8, of Rule 40 the RTC still should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction over it. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Canlas v. Tubil G.R. No. 184285 September 25, 2009 FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent Tubil against petitioners Canlas before the MTC. Tubil alleged that the he was the owner of the property and petitioners Canlas built a house on the land owned by him and are currently occupying the same. Respondents sent a demand against the Petitioners ordering them to leave the premises on Jan. 2004, upon the petitioners failure to do so, respondent thus filed an action for unlawful detainer before the MTC on June of the same year. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the subject matter because the cause of action if one for accion publiciana which is beyond the MTCs jurisdiction.The y also avered that they have been open, continuous, adverse, public and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than 60 years, that respondents title which was issued pursuant to a Free Patent which was dubious, spurious and of unlawful character and nature. Siding with the allegations of the petitioners, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action being an accion publiciana was beyond its jurisdiction.The RTC also affirmed the judgment of the MTC. Respondent thus filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs Decision, and ordered the RTC to render a decision on the merits based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to par. 2 of Section 8 of Rule 40 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. Which court has jurisdiction? MTC 2. W/n Rule 40 is applicable in the case at bar? Since it is the MTC that has jurisdiction over the case, Section 8, Rule 40 does not apply. HELD: If the case is one for unlawful detainer, then the action was properly filed in the MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion publiciana, original jurisdiction is with the RTC, which is mandated not to dismiss the appeal but to decide the case on the merits pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction, one must look at the nature of the action and the allegations in the complaint. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.

On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. If at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. In the case at bar, the respondent alleged that she was the owner of the land in question and she tolerated the Petitioners use of the land because the petitioners were her relatives.She sent the demand letter on January 12, 2004, and filed the case on June 9, 2004, which is still within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was made. Therefore, the MTC had properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Thus, Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which orders the Regional Trial Court not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal trial court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case on the merits, finds no application here. Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc G.R. No. 143331 October 5, 2007 FACTS: 7 Siblings: Sheikding, Rufino, Felisa, Salvador, Jose and Roque Booc decided to buy LOT 69-A in Quezon Ave., Iligan City from Nicolas Abarca. Because they had unequal contribution to the purchase price, the siblings formed 5 Star Marketing. Their respective company shares reflected their contribution in the purchase price of the lot. 1982: When the original structure was razed by fire, the siblings built a 4 storey building. G/F and 4th floor occupied by Rufino, 2nd floor by the family matriarch, Ong Chuy Tiok, and the 3rd floor by Shiekding. All of them were RENT-FREE. Late 1980: the matriarch insisted that the PR, James Booc, and son of Sheikding to be allowed to use of the G/F for his business. Use was still RENT-FREE. 1993: 5 Star and James had a lease agreement, where the latter became the lessees of the spaces occupied by Rufino and that of de Leon Gun Store. Several years later: the BOD of 5 Star passed a resolution terminating all the rent-free arrangements in the building until March 31, 1999. Future occupants will pay the corresponding rentals and enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star. Despite notice and repeated demands, James did not negotiate and enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star, nor did he vacate the G/F door 2 (with 40K rental/mo. beginning Apr. 1 99).

5 Star filed Unlawful Detainer case against James in the MTCC. During the proceedings, PR and his counsel filed a MOTION TO RESET the preliminary conference because PRs counsel had an unpostponable personal engagement. MTCC denied the motion to reset. PR failed to appear in the preliminary conference and pursuant to the summary procedure in Unlawful Detainer, Petitioners was entitled to judgment. MTCC favored Petitioners and the PR was ordered to vacate and pay rental until possession is restored to petitioners. PR filed an MR, but was denied. PR filed an appeal via Rule 40 to the RTC. RTC: remanded the case to the MTCC claiming that procedure should be relaxed in the interest of justice, because PR was effectively denied of his day in court when MTCC rendered judgment solely based on the complaint of the plaintiff. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied, hence this Petition for Review under Rule 45 to the SC. ISSUES: W/N the RTC properly remanded the case to the MTCC or should it have decided the case based on the record, pleading, memoranda? HELD: RTC should have decided the case based on the record, pleading, memoranda. Before explaining the ratio: the Court held that this case should have been filed in the CA with due regard for the hierarchy of courts. On this score, the SC couldve outrightly dismissed the case, but in the interest of justice, in view of the clear mistake of the RTCs decision, the SC took cognizance of the case. The avowed objective of actions for FEUD, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide peace, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor for a long time, thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community, otherwise the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. The Court on occasion grants the relaxation of procedural rules when the appellant substantially complied with the formal requirements. In this case, the reason for the counsels absence did not warrant an excuse. Further, the PRs absence during the preliminary conference was not explained at all. MTCC correctly decided the decision on the basis of the complaint pursuant to the summary rules of procedure in FEUD actions. On the REMAND: The Court notes that the decision and order of the RTC are for remanding the case to the MTCC on the mistaken conclusion that there was

denial of due process for failure of the respondent to present his evidence. As discussed above, the decision of the MTCC on the basis of petitioner's complaint is fully warranted. Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the MTCC. It must be emphasized that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, no hearing is conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit their respective position papers. On appeal to the RTC, the parties are required to submit their memoranda. The RTC should have decided the appeal on the basis of the records elevated by the MTCC, as well as the memoranda of the parties. To remand it is a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of the case. Finally, had the RTC decided the case in the manner required, the result could only have been to affirm the MTCC decision, since respondent did not contest it on the merits. All told, therefore, the decision and order of the RTC must be set aside and the decision of the MTCC must stand, there being no contrary evidence presented by respondent, and the fact of ownership by petitioner of the building being undisputed. Banares v. Balising 328 SCRA 36 (2000) FACTS: Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty, they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground tha t they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases. Municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. More than two months later, private respondents filed a Motion to Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with. Petitioners filed a Comment and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995

dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive MTC granted the Motion to Revive. Petitioners questioned the order, claiming that the prior dismissal had already become final and executory. ISSUE: Whether the said order became final and executory -YES HELD: An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the decision or order to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the courts power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. This rule applies to both civil and crim cases. RULE 41 RTC to CA Silverio, Jr. v. CA G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009 FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006,

private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. ISSUE: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41. HELD: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed. The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead. A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC. Mangaliag v. Pastoral G.R. No. 143951 October 25, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees. Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc. The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of jurisdiction has

already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. ISSUE: Whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of the RTC is proper? HELD: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance. (Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)

Manila Memorial Park v. CA 344 SCRA 769 (2001) FACTS: On 04 June 1975, respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., and its co-defendants United Housing Corporation, etc. This was dismissed on 17 June 1983. Respondents received the decision on 4 July 1983. Then on 19 July 1983, the last day of the prescribed fifteen-day period for appeal, the private respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or consideration, which was denied by the TC on 3 October 1989. The copy of the said order was received on 28 November 1989. Respondents filed a notice of appeal on 7 December 1989. TC gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The records of the case, however, were not transmitted to the CA due to missing transcript of steno notes. Almost a year had lapsed but the missing steno notes were still not submitted to the TC. On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a motion for a new trial for the retaking and presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that the reconstitution of the missing steno notes was no longer possible considering that the court stenographers then already retired from the service. On 22 April 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new trial filed by respondents contending that the appeal was filed out of time and that the remedy for new trial could not be availed of since it was filed long after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed. TC did not grant petitioners motion after having waited for eight years before raising the issue. The CA rendered its now assailed decision, dismissing the petition on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the notice of appeal which had meanwhile been given due course by the trial court. ISSUE: W/N CA erred in disregarding the well-entrenched rule in the SCs jurisdiction that the perfection of an appeal within the time prescribed by law is jurisdictional and as such it can be assailed at anytime. HELD: Yes. Compliance with the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional, and it is thus never too late to assail the timeliness of an appeal. Respondents received on 4 July 1983 a copy of the decision of the TC, dated 17 June 1983, dismissing the complaint. Conformably with Sec 39 of BP 129, like Sec 19(a) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, respondents had up to 19 July 1983 within which to file an appeal. On said date, respondents, instead of filing

their notice of appeal, moved for the reconsideration of the decision. The MR was denied by the TC in its order of 3 October 1989, and a copy of the order was received by respondents on 28 November 1989. Respondents failed to file a notice of appeal until 7 December 1989, which was much too late for by then, the judgment had already become final and executory. It was ruled in Lacsamana v IAC that in an ordinary appeal form the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or MTC to the RTC, and from the RTC to the CA in actions or proceedings originally filed in the RTC, the 15-day period for appeal is interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial, or reconsideration duly filed. If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period. Neypes v. CA 469 SCRA 633 (2005) FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. ISSUE: Whether petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time. HELD:

YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. Puertollano v. CA 156 SCRA 188 (1987)

FACTS: Jan 30, 1985, Juan Puertollano filed an ejectment case with damages against Delavin, Dableo, Damian and Alberto Escorel, and Almodal. Puertollano alleged that these people entered portions of his grazing land in Masbate and constructed nipa huts and cultivated some portions without his permission. He claimed that he got the help of the Brgy. Capt to have the people vacate his land to no avail. Feb 15, 1985, the defendants in the case filed a motion to refer the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. They are claiming that they are bona fide tenants of Puertollano. Feb 18, 1985, the RTC issued an order REFERRING the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, pursuant to PD 31 and 1038. Puertollano filed an opposition to the motion for referral before he got notice of the decision, and another MR when he received the order. On April 2, 1985, he also filed a notice of appeal of the order and the case was elevated to the IAC. In Jan 28, 1986, IAC rendered a decision on the appeal of the order of referral, dismissing it. ISSUE: W/N the appeal to the IAC is premature because there was still an unresolved MR. HELD: No. The appeal was considered premature as there was still a motion for reconsideration pending before the trial court which had yet to be resolved. However, considering that thereafter a notice of appeal from the order was filed by petitioners, the legal effect thereof is that petitioners abandoned their motion for reconsideration and opted for the remedy of appeal. The appeal, therefore, is not premature. ISSUE: W/N the order was an interlocutory order that may not be appealed. HELD/RATIO: No. It was considered by the SC as final order. The order sought to be appealed is interlocutory and not final in character for it only seeks a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The issue of whether an order is a final order is its effect on the rights of the parties. A final judgment, order or decree is one that finally disposes of, adjudicates or determines he rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. No doubt said order settles definitely the issue of whether the case should be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038

so that no further questions can come on the issue before the trial court except the execution of the order. Said order concludes the right of private respondent to such referral until it is reversed or set aside. It is thus a final order that is appealable. Side note: However, the court held that the law invoked mandates the court to refer this type of case to the Sec of Agrarian Reform and a mere ejectment cannot and should not defeat the rights of the tenants. Samala v. CA 363 SCRA 535 (2001) FACTS: In Oct 1990, a Super Saint bus sideswept a Yamaha motorcycle along Panamitan Highway in Cavite. Romulo Ocampo was riding at the back of the motorcycle driver. As a result of the impact, he was thrown several meters away and sustained serious physical injuries on his neck and left leg. The culprit bus, after hitting the motorcycle, sped away. The driver, Babista, did not even lend assistance to the victim. (Hit and run!!) Ocampo was confined and had to receive treatment for months. So in Dec 1990, Ocampo filed with RTC Naic, Cavite a complaint for damages against the driver and the owner of the bus, Ildefonso SAMALA. On May 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Ocampo, awarding to him actual, consequential, moral, exemplary and other kinds of damages and fees. On Oct 16, 1995, petitioners SAMALA and Babista filed a notice of appeal, which was denied by the trial court the next day because the 15-day period to appeal had elapsed. On Nov 24, 1995, petitioners filed with the TC a petition for relief from order denying appeal, reasoning that they failed to file on time because the notice was entrusted to Jose Samala, Jr. but he suffered from diarrhea on Oct. 11-12 and could not leave the house and nobody could attend to the filing of the notice. He filed it on Oct. 16 thinking that the period had not yet lapsed. The TC denied the petition for relief because the reason was not compelling enough. So the petitioners filed a notice of appeal to with respect to the 2 orders (Oct 17 and the one denying relief from judgment). Thereafter, Ocampos motion for writ of execution was granted while the petitioners filed a MR, in which they prayed for denial of the writ of execution and elevation of the records of the case to the CA for review. MR denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA denied this. MR was also denied. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in refusing to grant petitioners relief from order that denied their appeal from the judgment of the TC. (whether the failure to file the notice of appeal was excusable negligence in the first place) HELD/RATIO:

Yes. There was excusable negligence. TC ordered to elevate records to the CA for review. Relief from judgment is a remedy provided to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts. In this case, the last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on a Friday, October 13, 1995. Petitioners entrusted the filing of the notice of appeal to Jose Samala on October 11, 1995. However, he suffered from stomach pains which lasted until the following days. Jose Samala filed the notice immediately on the next business day, Monday, October 16, 1995. He believed in good faith that he could still file it on Monday. Delay in filing the notice of appeal was actually for one (1) day. Saturday and Sunday are excluded. Considering the facts of the case, this was excusable negligence. The real purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their appeals denial. Trans International v. CA 285 SCRA 49 (1998) Facts: Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent National Power Corporation arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles. The trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner corporation. A copy of the aforesaid decision was received by respondents on June 6, l996. On June 19, l996, respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to NAPOCORs office on August 23, 1996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk. Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table. However, on August 26 and 27, l996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and that same day, respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal (should have been filed August 26). The trial court issued an order denying

respondents notice of appeal and granting the motion for execution filed by petitioner. Respondent Court of Appeals reversed and granted the appeal. ISSUE: W/N CA erred in granting the appeal despite being filed out of time? HELD: No. We find for the respondent in this case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz. More important, the decision sought to be appealed from awarded an enormous sum in the amount of P37,554,414.99, by way of damages. The court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one-day delay. St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City G.R. No. 174290 January 20, 2009 FACTS: The private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Sales and Cancellation of TCTS registered in the name of Oro Development Corporation (ODC) and SMWSI. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that Tomas Soriano and Josefina Soriano, parents of the private respondent, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Sorianos subscription of stocks in the said corporation. Tomas Q. Soriano then diedintestate.By virtue of the said Deed of Assignment, the ownership and title over the subject properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter, ODC executed in favor of petitioner SMWSI a Deed of Saleover one of the subject property. Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Sorianos death, he discovered that the latters signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery.A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on TCTs of the property owned by ODC and SMWSI. Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.RTC issued an Order dismissing the private respondents Complaint. Aggrieved by the RTC Order, private respondent moved for its reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same.Petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendensannotated on the titles, which Motion was opposed by the private respondent. Private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal stating his intention to elevate the RTC Orders to the Court of Appeals. RTC issued its Ordergranting the Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendens. The private respondent, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order.RTC denied for lack of merit private respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

Private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Reannotate Notice of LisPendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been duly appealed. Petitioners opposed the aforesaid Motion of private respondent.Petitionersfiled a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on the ground that the issues in the appeal are and can only be questions of law, the appellate jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, thus the dismissal of private respondents appeal is mandatory pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 and Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure.The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of LisPendens. The Court of Appeals also issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Appeal of private respondent. According to the appellate court, private respondent raised both questions of fact and law in his appeal. The petitioners instituted two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. In G.R. No. 174290, the petitioner, seek to annul and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which granted herein private respondent Hilario P. Sorianos Motion to Reinstate/Re -annotate the Notice of LisPendens over TCT. In G.R. No. 176116, the petitioner also seek to annul and set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the three Resolutions similarly rendered by the Court of Appeals to wit: (1) Resolutiodenying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Appeal of herein private respondent Hilario P. Soriano; (2) Resolutiondenying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and (3) Resolution requiring the Register of Deeds of Makati City to submit to the appellate court the original copies of the documents involvedso that they can be presented to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for comparative analysis of the signatures of Tomas Q. Soriano. G.R. No. 174290 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may file the instant Petition without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed resolution. RULING: No. A Motion for Reconsideration of the order or resolution is a condition precedent for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari challenging the issuance of the same.The general rule that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. This rule, however, is

subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the order or a resolution, is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower court; (3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for Reconsideration would be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings were ex parte or were such that the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Petitioners averment of sense of urgency in that private respondent was already taking steps and other measures to have the Notice of LisPendens reannotated by presenting the Resolution of the Court of Appeals to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City deserves scant consideration. Petitioners never described with particularity, much less, presented proof of the steps purportedly taken by the private respondent that would justify their immediate resort to this Court on certiorari without seeking reconsideration of the Resolution in question from the Court of Appeals. Petitioners simply made a sweeping allegation that absolutely has no basis. The records themselves are bare of any proof that would convince this Court that the private respondent indeed, took steps to have the challenged Resolution implemented. In fact, petitioners themselves, in their letterdated 8 September 2006 addressed to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, pointed out that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals did not yet order the said Office to reannotate the Notice of LisPendens. More importantly, petitioners explicitly revealed in their letter that they intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, as its Resolution dated 18 August 2006 had not yet acquired finality. Why then did petitioners not proceed with filing their motion for reconsideration, and opted to immediately file the present Petition for Certiorari?Similarly baseless is petitioners bare assertion, without even an attempt at explaining, that the issues subject of the Petition at bar involve public interest sufficient to excuse them from filing a Motion for Reconsideration. G.R. No. 176116 ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves purely questions of law, in which case, the proper mode of appeal would be a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; or questions of fact or mixed questions

of fact and law, in which case, the proper mode would be by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41? RULING: Rule 41. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or questions both of law and of fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals. Among the grounds raised by petitioners in seeking the dismissal by the RTC of private respondents Complaint are: (1) the Complaint stated no cause of action;(2) the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; and (3) a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. In a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts, simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." It must be remembered, however, that the basis of the RTC Order dismissing private respondents Complaint was not only its failure to state a cause of action, but also the fact that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, and that the condition precedent for filing a claim had not been complied with. According to the RTC, the Complaint was dismissible on the ground that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. Private respondent, in accepting a certain parcel of land as his share in the estate of his late father Tomas Q. Soriano, was now deemed to have been paid or compensated because his share in the estate of the deceased had been delivered to him. In arriving at such a finding, the RTC necessarily made a preliminary determination of the facts in order to verify that, indeed, private respondents claim or demand had been paid. When the private respondent assigned as error in his appeal such finding of the RTC, he raised not only a question of law, but also a question of fact. It must be stressed that in its 17 January 2005 Order, the trial court expressed a finding that in the beholder of untrained eyes, the signatures in the Deed of Assignment and in the Second Amendment of Credit Agreement are the same. Considering that the trial court made a finding of fact as regards the issue of forgery and such issue was properly raised in the private respondents appeal with the appellate court, it certainly behooves the appellate court to review the

said findings. Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals has the power to inquire into the allegations of forgery made in the private respondents Complaint, it can validly require the submission of the original copies of the documents involved to enable the NBI to perform a comparative analysis of Tomas Q. Sorianos signatures therein. Kho v. Camacho 204 SCRA 150 (1991) FACTS: In payment of atty's fees resolved against him, petitioner Kho, a businessman, issued in favor of respondent Atty. Camacho 6 postdated Manila Bank checks in the total sum of P57,349.00. One of the checks, in the amount of P10K was lost by Atty. Camacho who promptly notified Kho. When the other 5 checks were negotiated by Camacho, the same were returned uncleared because Manila Bank had been ordered closed by the Central Bank. Petitioner refused to replace the said checks or pay his obligation. Camacho instituted an action for a sum of money against Kho before trial court. Kho alleged that he was under no obligation to replace the lost check for P10K, arguing that Camacho should have executed a sworn statement that he lost the check instead of merely informing petitioner. He also refused to issue new checks alleging that the closure of Manila Bank was beyond his control. Contending that Kho's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Judge Leviste directed Kho to pay the debt minus the P10K pertaining to the lost check. Kho seasonably filed a notice of appeal which respondent Judge duly approved. Camacho made no move to contest the award. Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation praying that Kho's notice of appeal be stricken off the record as a mere scrap of paper. The Judge issued the assailed order setting aside the previously approved notice of appeal and adopting Camacho's view that the proper remedy from a judgment on the pleadings was a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/n the lower court committed GAD in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it involved only questions of law. - Yes HELD: In E Razon, Inc. vs. Judge Moya, the court held: Issues that involve pure questions of law are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the Trial Court to disallow an appeal on the ground that there is no question of fact, but only a question of law, involved. The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it declared in the subsequent case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr:

We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law or both questions of fact and law, this question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the court which rendered the subject decision appealed from. Respondent Judge erred in dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same involves only a question of law and based on this reasoning, disallowed petitioner's appeal because it was not made to the SC By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was misdirected because the case was resolved by it on a pure question of law, the trial court committed a grave error. Respondent Judge should have allowed the IAC to decide whether or not the petitioner's appeal involves only a question of law and not arrogate unto himself the determination of this question. His error in dismissing petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is specifically provided that "where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the CA, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." Thus, following the above pronouncements, what respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the CA to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court. Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed, to require the judge to give due course to the appeal and then elevate the records to the Appellate Court will serve no useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of an otherwise open-and-shut case. The records before us are sufficient to enable us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings and to terminate this case once and for all. The judgment on the pleadings was proper. In that pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where he had deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what petitioner was saying was that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a sufficient controversion of the material allegations in the complaint. Finding no reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings rendered by respondent Judge Leviste, the Court considers the same as the final adjudication on the respective rights of the parties. Indiana Aerospace University v. CHED 356 SCRA 367 (2001) FACTS: CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional Regulatory Commission inquiring whether Indiana Aerospace already acquired university status in view of its advertisement as such in Manila Bulletin. Upon

investigation, it was verified from SEC that Indiana School of Aeronautics failed to amend its articles of Incorporation to change its name to Indiana Aerospace University. Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term University. Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand filed a motion to Dismiss. The lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and Granted Indianas prayer for Preliminary Injunction. Likewise, Indiana Aerospace filed before the lower court a Motion to declare CHED in Default. CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File its Answer. The lower court ruled on Indianas motion to declare CHED in Default and directed it to present evidence ex parte. CHED filed with CA a petitioner for certiorari arguing that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss and in declaring it in default despite its filing an Answer. CA ruled that Indiana had no cause of action against CHE since it failed to show that it had been granted university status by CHED, and ruled that CHED should not have been declared in default since its Answer had long been filed before the lower court ruled upon Indianas Motion to declare it in default. Indiana claims that the Petition for Certiorari of CHED should have been dismissed by CA because it was filed out of time and was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the RTC. ISSUE: Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed? HELD: CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered is the date when the respondent received the Order declaring it in default. In the case at bar, CHED was able to comply with the 60-day reglamentary period to file its Petition for Certiorari. As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should precede the petition for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct itself and thus a motion for reconsideration should precede a petitioner for certiorari. However, exception to such are: a) when issues are purely legal; b) public interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d) special circumstances so warrant. In the case at bar, regulation of educational institutions is invested with public interest; thus there is not need to resort first to a motion for reconsideration. Lastly, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory; the proper remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, it is resorted only to correct grave abuse of discretion In the case at bar, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss since the acts of CHED such as declaring in a newspaper that Indiana was ordered closed for illegal advertisement,

undermined the public's confidence in Indiana as an educational institution. This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action. Custodio v. CA 253 SCRA 483 (1996) FACTS: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. As an access to P. Burgos Street from Santos property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distance from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos street. Such path passes through Custodio & Santos properties. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos street. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed. When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who wereacknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. Because the tenants were denied of a way through P. Burgos street, due to the fencing of the petitioner neighbors, they asked for a right of way to be given to their lot. The trial court ordered spouses Custodio and Santoses to grant the spouses Mabasa the right of way provided they pay proper indemnification. On appeal, spouses Mabasa were given indemnity for damages which they incurred. Custodio & Santos appeal to the SC, questioning the grant of RoW to Mabasa and the award of damages. ISSUE: Can Custodio & Santos still question grant of RoW? HELD: Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way. For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. Citytrust Banking Corp. v. CA 196 SCRA 553 (1991) FACTS: December 10, 1980: Private respondent Samara purchased a $40,000 draft from Citytrust, the payee being Thai International Airways. The drawee was Marine Midland Bank in the US.

December 23, 1980: Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the order through telex. Citytrust transmitted the message to Marine Midland the next day and followed it up with a cable, which the latter bank acknowledged to have received on January 14, 1981 stating in its receipt that it has noted the stop-payment order and has not paid the bank draft. Citytrust credited back Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00 due to the non-payment. July 3, 1981: Citytrust re-debited Samara's account for $40,000 upon discovering that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust's own account for the same amount allegedly on December 22, 1980, Despite the alleged discovery, however, there is evidence to show that Marine Midland informed Citytrust through a letter of the non-payment or non-encashment of the bank draft as of August 4, 1981. It is also shown that Marine Midland even confirmed in a telex letter dated August 31, 1981 that the bank draft had not been paid as of that date. Samara sued Citytrust & Marine Midland to recover the $40,000 debited from his account. Marine Midland contended that it had already paid the bank draft on December 22, before it received the stop payment order. The court ruled against it, however, holding that it was bound by its letters admitting knowledge of the stop payment order and compliance with it. The trial court ordered Citytrust & Marine Midland to pay Samara jointly and severally the sum of $40,000 plus 12% interest and other interests and damages. Marine Midland, the proximate cause of the damages, would then pay Citytrust whatever amount the latter would have to pay Samara. Citytrust and Marine Midland appealed the decision separately. Marine Midland successfully petitioned the CA to reduce the award (as far as Marine Midland was concerned) to $40,000 plus 6% interest. Citytrust, on the other hand, appealed all the way to the Supreme Court but was unsuccessful. The original (12% interest) award becoming final and executory, the trial court ordered the judgment executed against Citytrust. Citytrust appealed, arguing that its liability should be the modified one (obtained by Marine Midland). The CA denied the appeal. ISSUE: W/N Citytrust can claim that as it was adjudged to be jointly and severally liable with Marine Midland, the reduced liability the latter obtained inured to its benefit as well. HELD: REDUCED LIABILITY FOR MARINE MIDLAND ONLY, BUT SMALLER LIABILITY WILL BE ENFORCED IN THE END. It must be noted that two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust, filed cross claims against each other in their answer. Citytrust alleged that the proximate cause of the injury should be attributed to co-defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly inform Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust issued was really paid by Marine Midland on December 22, 1980. For its part,

Marine Midland alleged that Citytrust did not properly advise it of the actual circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft and of the receipt by the latter of the stop-payment instructions. The rights and liabilities of both parties concerned are not so interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar and that a reversal of the judgment as to one should operate as a reversal to the other. The fact that the petitioner previously filed a cross-claim against Marine Midland does not make the former a party in the latter's appeal where all reliefs granted to the plaintiff and/or to the petitioner who was a co-defendant are up for review. The rights and liabilities of Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged that the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already been litigated before the trial court which ordered full reimbursement in favor of Citytrust. Until petitioner Citytrust appeals for the review of the trial court decision either in part or in toto, its rights and obligations as pre-determined cannot generally be affected by an appeal of a co-defendant. There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic claim of Mr. Samara. The obligations arising from the same stop payment order on the same U.S. $40,000.00 bank draft are sought to be enforced by the two conflicting final and executor judgments (the 12 % interest one against Citytrust, the 6% one against Marine Midland). Since Samara effectively has the right to choose which defendant to hold liable (solidary liability), it would amount to enforcement one judgment while a violation of the other. This cannot be allowed. It is also unfair for Marine Midland, the source of the damages, to be allowed to pay a smaller amount. Therefore, the modified (smaller) liability should be executed. Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. CA 349 SCRA 321 (2001) FACTS: Private Respondents Marawi-Marantao General Hospital, Inc. and Atty. Macapanton K. Mangondato filed complaint against the petitioner Social Security System, with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, for specific performance with damages. The respondents allege that the parties executed a deed of conditional sale where petitioner transferred and conveyed unto private respondent Mangondato, the disputed property, covered by a TCT under the name of respondent hospital, but that respondent Mangondatos repurchase thereof having been consummated, the petitioner refused to execute a deed of absolute sale. Later on, petitioner declared the said deed of conditional sale a nullity. Private respondents then prayed for the execution of an absolute deed of sale. The Court ordered for the execution of an absolute deed of sale. Private respondents filed a motion for partial execution, serving a copy of said motion on petitioner. However, petitioner failed to appear, considering that as of said date, he had not as yet been served with a copy of the Decision and a copy of

private respondents motion. Nevertheless, the court issued an order granting the motion for execution. A writ of execution was issued, and a notice of garnishment served. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration and immediate stay of execution, which was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, however failing to indicate when it received a copy of the decision of the court. It also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which court also nullified the order and writ of execution issued by the lower court. Petitioner thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal, quoting only the first item in the decision of the lower court, placing ellipses in lieu of the other items. A manifestation was filed to the effect that the petitioner, having perfected its appeal from the decision of the lower court, the latter had no more jurisdiction to grant relief to the private respondent on their motion for execution. It subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Also, Private Respondents contend that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable requirement before a petition for certiorari of an order of a regional trial court may be filed with the Court of appeals. Considering that the SSS did not file a motion for reconsideration with the RTC before it filed a petition for certiorari, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright. ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court has JD to order the partial execution of its judgment insofar as the second, third, fourth and fifth subparagraphs thereof are concerned. 2) Whether a Motion for Reconsideration is required before certiorari with the CA. HELD: 1) In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of other parties. In such case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, the court may only issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. Considering that SSS had appealed the entirety of the decision to the CA and that the period of appeal had already expired, the RTC has already lost jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when it issued the dispute orders. SSS did not file a motion for reconsideration with the RTC before it filed its petition for certiorari with the CA. Generally, the special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy ad

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration, so as to allow the lower court to correct the alleged error. However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for action for certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely: 1) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court has no jurisdiction; 2) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; 3) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable 4) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; 5) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; 6) Where, in a criminal case, relief form an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; 7) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; 8) Where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and 9) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. In the present case, considering that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders, the first exception is applicable. Consequently, the CA cannot be faulted to fiving due course to the petition for certiorari filed by the SSS despite its failure to file a motion for reconsideration. CA decision is affirmed and the petition is denied. Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc. v. Metrobank 463 SCRA 222 (2005) FACTS: Petitioner Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc., obtained a loan of P25 million from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company to be used for the construction of its hospital. To secure this loan, the petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land owned by Dr. Rene Sison and Rory P. Roque, President and Administrator, respectively, of the petitioner. Upon petitioner's default in the payment of the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged lots were sold in a public auction to respondent bank, being the sole and highest bidder. The petitioner failed to redeem the properties within the period of redemption. Forthwith, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the properties and was issued new certificates of title on 1 October 2001.

Petitioner expressed its desire to continue staying in the subject premises so that the operation of the hospital erected thereon would not be disrupted. For that purpose, the petitioner proposed to pay rent in the amount of P100,000 per month for a period of, but not limited to, three years. The terms finally agreed upon by the parties, as culled from respondent's letter to the petitioner of 30 May 2002, were (1) a monthly rental of P150,000, and (2) the effectivity of the lease contract in November 2001. However, approximately a year and eight months after the agreed effectivity date of the lease contract, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the leased premises within fifteen days. The petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement. The respondent filed with the RTC an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. The trial court issued an order granting respondent's ex parte motion for a writ of possession. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in the Order of 23 January 2004, the petitioner filed on 29 January 2004 (the day it received the denial order) a Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing to the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and law. Before its Notice of Appeal could be acted upon by the trial court, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that due to the nature of the appeal that it intended to file, it was withdrawing the Notice of Appeal. On the last day within which to appeal the 29 January 2004 Order, it filed with us a motion for extension of thirty days from the expiration of the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari. Said motion was granted. Petitioner instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent opposed such petition claiming that by filing an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner had already waived its right to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, since the two modes of appeal are mutually exclusive and governed by different rules. ISSUE: Is petitioner barred from filing a petition for review on certiorari? HELD: No. Petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived its right to file this petition. Realizing that the remaining issue was a pure question of law, it withdrew its Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing the 28 January 2002 Order on both questions of law and fact. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that prior to the transmittal of the original record, the court may allow withdrawal of the appeal. Nothing in the Rules prevents a party from filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court after seasonably withdrawing the Notice of Appeal as long as it is done within the reglementary period and the issue involved is purely one of law. In this case it was before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal that the petitioner withdrew its Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals and filed with us a motion for extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court. And the petition was filed within the extended period we granted, raising only one question of law.