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Chapter 8: The Legislative Department

A. Organization and Membership; Composition/Apportionment

MACIAS VS COMELEC GR. L-18684 (Sept. 14, 1961) (Constitutional Law Apportionment, Proportional Representation)

MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211) FACTS: 1.Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.2.GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code .b.Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.c. Section 52:i.Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title iii.The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution the population of Makati is 450,0003.GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as a fore stated. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional. HELD: Yes. Petitions dismissed. RATIO: a.D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act 3040) that apportions representative districts in this country on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in representation is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality.

D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issues. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has

increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since It has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994 As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional. As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners additional argument that the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering, which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners; Computation

B. Election, term and contests-qualifications; residence

residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or

even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional HELD: NO to both issues. RATIO : Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people

AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10months) Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification. COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration. On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910votes. COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.

C. Compensation and privileges-freedom from arrest; privilege of speech and debate

PHILCONSA v. Gimenez G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994 Regala, J. Facts: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue: whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows: The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. Held: Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments.

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 87) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS:

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863) FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months. ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political buildup of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court dismissed this complaint.

RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress? HELD:

2.)Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous? HELD: No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesnt fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasnt performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee. No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogatory to the petitioners to entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested. No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. Instant motion is denied. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was reelected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress.

D. Disqualifications and Disabilities- Incompatible vs Forbidden Offices; duty to disclose in conflicts of interests; sec 12 and 13 Art VI, sec 14 Art VI

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, may intervene in the SEC Case without violating the Constitution. HELD: The Order granting Fernandez to intervene in SEC Case is reversed and set aside. RATIO:

PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31) FACTS: On May 14, 1979, an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation was held. Petitioner Puyat was among those elected. On May 25, 1979, the other group of directors, led by Acero, instituted a proceeding questioning the said election on the ground that the votes were not properly counted. Thereafter, Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of Interim Batasang Pambansa,entered his appearance as counsel for Acero to which Puyat objected due to Constitutional Gorunds which provides that: SEC 11. ART VIII No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel . or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly, or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called on account of his office. Assemblyman Esatnislao Fernandez did not continue his appearance as counsel but instead filed a Motion for Intervention. SEC granted the motion on account that Fernandez had 10 shares on the corporation. Thereafter, the Court en banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining SEC from allowing the participation as intervener of Assemblyman Fernandez. Solicitor General supported the allowing of the intervention. Hence this petition. Fernandez acquired a mere 10 shares out of 262, 843 shares. He acquired said shares after the institution of the contested election, after the suit has been filed and a day before he filed a motion to intervene. Realizing that the objection of petitioner Puyat as valid, Fernadez decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court found that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before and administrative body and it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. A ruling upholding the intervention would make the Constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need to do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done in indirection which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the Court held that the intervention of Assemblyman in SEC case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11.Art. VIII of the Constitution.

Adaza vs Pacana Villegas vs Legaspi Political Law Appearance in Court by a Congressman FACTS: On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, an assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding Judge however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not CFIs are appellate courts resolving this is essential in determining if Legaspi indeed violated a constitutional provision? HELD: CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the case at bar, CFI Cebu acted as a court of general original jurisdiction since the case filed by Villegas was not elevated from any lower court. It is then clearly resolved that this CFI in the case at bar is a court without appellate jurisdiction. Legaspi then has violated a constitutional provision and is hereby barred to appear as counsel before the said court of first instance. Singularity of Office/Position FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . . The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13*2+ of which specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

E. Internal Government- officers; quorum; sessions; discipline of members; journal

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268) FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmien to was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (DeputySpeaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.(Gavel)MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.(It was 3:01 p.m.)(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House. HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.

Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.

designated to chair the session. Tanada was finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidads resolution no. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to senate president pro-tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced resolution no. 67 entitled Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and designating the honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate. Resolution no. 67 was approved. ISSUES: Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were resolutions nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? DECISION: Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. RATIO: The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the senate session hall and not in the supreme court. Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO (83. PHIL. 17) FACTS: Petition of quo warran to. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus Cuenco. Feb 18, 1949; the request of senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on Feb 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges against the then senate president Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not immediately openthe session, and read slowly the resolution of senator Sanidad and Tanada. When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but senator Tirona, Avelinos follower, opposed the motion because of the plan of Avelinos group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct broke out in the senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelinos follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to prevent Tanadas privilege speech. Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandonedthe chair, and walked out of the session hall followed by senator Francisco, Torres, Magalona,Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was

OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL. 863) Mabanag vs Lopez Vito FACTS: In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the Garcia administration. House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months. ISSUES: WON his suspension was constitutional HELD: Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed RATIO: Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. The question of whether Osmenas speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because n opreliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order. Political Law Amendment to the Constitution FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts. *this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to

amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification. On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Philippine Judges Association Versus Prado Direct Filing Facts: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law. Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional. - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." - Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. - Violative of the Equal protection clause Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

F. Electoral tribunals and the Commision on Appintments

[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957] TAADA vs. CUENCO FACTS: Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators." RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an

act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said

members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.). It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful? Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of

the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents. Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7),

instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as

members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes.

Cunanan vs Tan CARLOS CUNANAN vs. JORGE TAN, JR. Facts: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.

Justices of the Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)senators. On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect, would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari. ARGUMENTS: Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play and due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure permitting the contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and unconstitutionally unobjectable solution. ISSUE: Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3) Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution HELD: NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.

Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same. Issue: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid. Ruling: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

REASONS: Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the SET is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651) FACTS: Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

spirit and intent of the Constitution. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of senators. The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence. Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recues himself from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of Senators or Justices.

ARGUMENTS: In moving to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground that it was filed late, petitioner cited Sec.250 of the Omnibus Election Code: A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa...shall be filed...within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election . Using the above rule, Petitioner argued that respondent had only until February 6 to file a protest. Since the protest was filed on February 8, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it. However, the HRET argued that petitioner was able to file the protest on time, citing Sec. 9 of the HRET rules: Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed... within fifteen (15)days from the effectivity of these rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15)days from the date of proclamation. Using the above rule, the HRET argued that respondent has up February 11 to file a protest. Since it was filed on February 8, the HRET ruled it was within the prescribed period and thus, had jurisdiction over the matter. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may conduct a Judicial Review of decisions/final resolutions of the HRET HELD: 1. YES. The HRET has jurisdiction over the protest, as it was filed within the period prescribed by Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. 2. NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary jurisdiction.

LAZATIN VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391) FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga in the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of the votes, respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns and brought the case to the COMELEC. On May 19, The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, yet on May 27, petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Respondent filed two petitions: a) to nullify the proclamation and b) prevent petitioner from taking office. However, the COMELEC did not act on the petitions. On June 30, petitioner assumed office. On September 15, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. The Supreme Court set aside the revocation on January 25, 1988.On January 28, Respondent received a copy of the Courts decision and consequently filed an election protest with the HRET on February 8.

REASONS: Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar: Under the 1973Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official. Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the Batasang Pambansa ha salready been abolished and legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective Electoral Tribunals. Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power:

Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.

Daza versus Singson Tribunal and its Composition The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests. A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution, this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and nonpartisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose. Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The 1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives. FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

Coseteng Versus Mitra Facts:

parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/ Held:

Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation Issue: 1. WON the question raised is political. 2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political

1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna VeranoYap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective

political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable. Section 21&22

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senatorsmembers in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales HRETs Composition Rounding Off FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) FACTS: Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision has been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. Thereexamination resulted in increase of Bondocs lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated. A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc seeking the following reliefs:1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to the HRET.;2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place of Camasura from assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;3.)writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that nominates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political parties materially changed.

ISSUE: Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant party, change the partys representation in the House Representatives Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein. DECISION: SC ruled in favor of Bondoc. RATIO: (Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in matter pertaining to contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a body separate from and independent from the legislature. Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET. The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET as a mere tool for the advancement of a party in power. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from political party to which they belong. In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Such resolution is therefore null and void. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec 2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from political party which he represents, formal affiliation with another political party, and removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other

Angara versus Electoral Commission FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The

purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power

to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

appoint the Chairman of the CHR, without the confirmation of the CA, pursuant to the abovementioned constitutional provision. Calderon vs. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 Fast facts

President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public workers and employers sectors. It was stated that the appointees may qualify and assume the duties and responsibilities of their appointed seats. RA 6715 Section 13 Provides that the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC shall be appointed by the President upon the confirmation of CA.

Concepcion-Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989) FACTS:

Doctrines from jurisprudence (Mison, Quintos-Deles, and Concepcion-Bautista)

1. Confirmation from CA is only required when the appointee involved in the first group, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Bautista was appointed by President Aquino, from an ad interim appointment, as constitution itself in the President (i.e. sectoral reps to Congress and members of the Chairperson of the CHR. She took her oath and assumed the duties and the CSC, etc.) responsibilities of the position. Her appointment was questioned by the CA because she was appointed without having the CA confirm her nomination. 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers Contention c/o Bautista whom he may be authorized by law to appoint CA does not have the jurisdiction to question her appointment. Held & Ratio

3. Confirmation is not required in the appointment of those from inferior offices, The position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not amongbecause it shall be construed as those officers whose appointments are not the positions mentioned in the first group of presidential appointees, asotherwise provided for by law enumerated in Article 7, Section 16, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CA. The appointment of the Chairman of the CHR is not specifically provided in the constitution itself, unlike the Chairpersons and members of the COMELEC, CSC, and COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the constitution in the President, with the consent of the CA. The President shall validly

Issue: WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in Article 7, Section 16 fo the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation from the CA Contention c/o pet Section 13 of RA 6715 must mandatorily be complied with. Held & Ratio: As to the constitutionality of the appointments. The President is within her authority to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC without the prior confirmation of the CA. The aforementioned officials are not included in the first group of appointees, as clearly explained in Mison. As to the constitutionality of RA 6715. Unconstitutional. It amends legislation by adding to the first group provided in Article 7, Section 16, additional officers which it requires to be appointed by the President upon the confirmation of the CA. It appears that the legislature is not happy with the lessened role of the CA in the appointment process, as compared to the 1935 Constitution.

G. Powers and Functions: 3.Constituent powers: Legislatice inquiries(sec. 21); appropriation

claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case. 2. WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legislative purpose. 3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into. 4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. HELD: 1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers. 2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution. 3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

Bengzon Versus Blue Ribbon Committee Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Granted. FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner

4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.

Whether or not the Judiciary may encroach with the exercise of functions of the legislative and executive departments. HELD: (1)The first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may bylaw be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Section 16 authorizes the President to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices; however, first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Indeed, such provision in question is null and void. (2)The law provides the doctrine of Separation of Powers as well as Checks and Balances to ensure that no abuse of power shall take place. Therefore, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void

DEMETRIA VS. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) FACTS: Petitioners, who filed petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction questioning the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 as concerned citizens of the Philippines, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interest may be affected. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and general agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Petitioners claim that it is in violation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUES: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is in violation of Section16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 FACTS: This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."

(Emphasis supplied.) They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e., Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.) Whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation; otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. 12 RULING: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. The Court, therefore, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO (87 SCRA 29) FACTS: Buenavista Estate Original owner: San Juan de Dios Hospital Jan 1, 1939 to Jan 1, 1964Philippine Govt has the option to purchase this property for Php3,000,000 within this period if the Philippine Govt will not purchase this property, it will be disposed in court on June 21,1944But if Philippine Govt will opt to purchase the said property, they'll pay the owner the sum of Php3,000,000June 29, 1946San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the property to Ernest Burt for Php 5,000,000 who made adown payment of Php 10,000 and agreed to pay Php 500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of Php 500,000 each Failure to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of Php10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Latter part of October, 1949Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Buenavista Estate for Php 4,500,000. Php 1,000,000 was paid to Burt through his attorney- in- fact in the Philippines, the Assoc. Estates Inc. represented by Jean L. Arnault for BUENAVISTAESTATE Tambobong Estate Original owner: Philippine Trust Company May 14, 1946Philippine Trust Company sold this to Burt for Php 1,200,000, who paid Php 10,000 and promised to pay Php 90,000 within 9 months and the balance of Php 1,100,000 in 10successive annual installments of Php 110,000 each Feb. 14, 19479 month period expired without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards Sept. 4, 1947Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the estate to RURAL PROGRESSADMINISTRATION by an absolute dead of sale in consideration of the sum of Php 750,000February 5, 1948Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Bert for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of Php 90,000 within the period of 9 months CFI of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burts certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration. Latter part of October, 1949the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought Tambobong Estate for the sum of Php 500,000, which was all paid to Burt through his other attorney- in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault for the TAMBOBONG ESTATE.

October 29, 1949: 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating Php 1,500,000 were delivered to Arnault. That same day, Arnault opened a new account in Burts name with the Philippine National Bank where he deposited the two checks aggregating Php 1,500,000 On the same occasion, he drew on the same account 2 checks One check for Php 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc. Another check for Php440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the Senate to determine the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000 Feb 27, 1950, Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estate Deals. A special committee was created by the said resolution to work on the investigation Arnault refused/ dont want to mention who was the ultimate recipient of the sum of Php440,000 because His answer might be used against him. Also, he said that it is his constitutional right torefuse to incriminate himself. According to him, such question violates his right as a citizen to have privacy in his dealings with other people. I dont remember the name; he was a representative of Burt I am not sure; I dont remember the name Without securing a receipt, he turned over the Php440, 000 to a certain person, are presentative of Burt, in compliance with Burts verbal instruction made in 1946;that, as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the money on Oct. 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him

again 2 or 3 items. The last time being in Dec,1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39-40 years old, bet. 52- 56.Senate deliberated and hereby committed the petitioner to the custody of the Sergeant- atArmsand imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000. ISSUES: 1.The Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php 440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.2.Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 19503.Petitioner invokes the privilege against self- incrimination. HELD: The petition must be denied. RATIO:[for issue #1] Subject of the inquiry was the questionable expenditure of the Government of Php 5,000,000 of public funds. Thus, its been decided that its within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry/ investigation Once an inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self- incrimination. Also, once the jurisdiction is conceded, the SC cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion Inquiry should be within the jurisdiction, material/ necessary for the exercise of a power vested by the Congress and every question which the

investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry The ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be correct. The investigation had not been completed, because due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution no. 8 The bills recommended by this committee had not been approved by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation. Those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished This atmosphere of suspicion must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person [for issue #2] Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. Exercising the power to punish for contempt is enables the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committee charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would

be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senateof its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. This power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. Also, its an absurd, unnecessary and vexatious procedure if we are to hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed. [for issue # 3] The ground upon which the witness claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Its also unbelievable that he gave Php440,000 to a person unknown to him Since according to the witness himself, the transaction was legal, and that he gave the Php440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, court cant find a basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might in criminate him.

Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.

It is the witnesss clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere and truthful testimony before acompetent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizens obligation; consistent of course with isright under the Constitution

Abra Valley College Versus Aquino Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948. On 6 July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the petitioner a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on public auction involving the sale of the college lot and building. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him. The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of

perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the director). Issue: Should there be tax exemption? Interpretation of the phrase used exclusively for educational purposes Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. This constitution is relative to Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act 470 as amended by RA 409 (Assessment Law). An institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation; notwithstanding that it keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members (YMCA case). A lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use in religious functions (Bishop of Nueva Segovia case). Exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not limited to property actually indispensable there for but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes (Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals). While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educational purposes, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of

the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

H. The legislative process- title of the bill; origination; procedure for enactment; approval of bills; constitution rules on general appropriations sec 25, ART VI
Lidasan v Comelec G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967 Sanchez, J.: Facts: 1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title HELD: YES. RA 4790 is null and void 1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. 2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. 3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." 4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which

subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. 4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. 5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6; 4. There is undue delegation of power and authority; 5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and 6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not. We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim. 1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5 Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia: Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrued to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L75697; 18 Jun 1987] Facts: Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds: 1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission. xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11 It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. 13 At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature. 3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land." In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised at the proper time. 4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of

authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law. 5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that: All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition. raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law. The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta

vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience". Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character. 6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being overregulated and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern. Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18 In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

3. 4.



Chiongbian v Orbos (Executive Secretary) 1995, J. Mendoza This suit challenges the validity of: - Sec. 13, Art. 29 of RA No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) - Executive Order No. 429 (Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao Facts: 1. Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734 2. RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the following provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur; and

7. 8.

the following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and Zamboanga Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi The cities and provinces not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region were under Art XIX, Sec. 13 of the RA 6734: That only provinces and cities voting favorably in plebiscites shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429, Providing for theReorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners, members of the Congress, wrote to Corazon Aquino, contending that theres: o No law authorizing the President to pick certain provinces and cities to be restructured to new administrative regions o Some of the provinces and cities in the regions did not even take part in the plebiscite o The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing governmental units or reorganization. The authority to merge doesnt include the authority to reorganize. The inauguration of the New Administrative Region IX went ahead. Congress brought the suit for prohibition and certiorari; petitioner Jaldon brough a suit as resident of Zamboanga City, taxpayer and citizen of the Republic.

Petitioners: 1. Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge existing region and provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated; and,

2. The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. Respondent Solicitor General: 1. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the President (Abbas v Comelec) and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Art X, Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17 of Constitution) 2. There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the details of the legislation, bec Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. 3. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is fairly embraced in the title of the RA No. 6734, because it is germane to it. Power extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region. 4. PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the President shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government, guided by the framework of more effective planning implementation, greater decentralization, etc. The President may create abolish, consolidate units of the National Government. Issues: 1. WON the power to merge administrative regions is legislative or executive in character (and whether Sec. 23 of Art. 29 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion) 2. WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute 3. WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions and provinces that did not take part in the plebiscite 4. WON the power granted includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region XI from Zamboanga to Pagadian Held: 1. Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their creations:

RA 5435 authorizing the President, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, etc. o Reorganization Commission submitted an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the country into 11 regions (1969) o PD No. 1 the Reorganization Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land (1972) o PD No. 773 divided Region IX into two grpups o PD No. 1555 transfer of regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to the authority granted to him b the law. The choice of President is logical because the division intended to facilitate the administration of executive departments and local governments. It has been traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the President the power to merge exising regions, Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. Sufficient standard by which President is to be guided in the exercise of power o Standard can be gathered or implied o Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department: to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development. 2. The constitutional requirement that every bill shall be passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical

rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to the subject, such as the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions. 3. There is a qualification in Sec 13, Art XIX, which states that the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions. While non-assenting provinces are to remain in their regions, they may nevertheless be regrouped into contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of the administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper and is no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of LGUs and insuring efficient delivery of services. There is no transfer of local governments. It is not even analogous to redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments. 4. The reorganization of administrative regions is based on relevant criteria (EO 429): o Contiguity of graphical features o Transportation and communication facilities o Cultural and language groupings o Land area and population o Existing regional centers o Socio-economic development programs o Number of provinces and cities The change of regional center from Pampanga to Pagadian is based on the power of the President (by virtue of the Executive Order) . The transfer is addressed to the wisdom, not the legality of the President. The Court cannot interfere.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution FACTS: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of

amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and

papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one man Marcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership"; WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.