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Contention One
U.S. thought concerning Latin America relegates the region to political irrelevance. Our hemispheric strategy is permeated with outright neglect towards a region that U.S. policymakers regard with ambivalence and disdain
Wiarda 99 (Howard J., United States Policy Toward Latin America: A New Era of Benign Neglect, in Neighborly Adversaries:
Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations, Ed Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, p.257-263) Like Falcoff, Howard Wiarda, a well-known Latin Americanist and foreign policy expert who has taught at National Defense University, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies and currently works at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, is doubtful that Washington will pay much attention to Latin America with the end of the Cold War. He suggests the historically low priority of Latin America within the U.S. foreign policy community would again be the case with the end of the Cold War. At best, we are entering an era of "benign neglect." Latin America would be left to solve its own problems with only scant encouragement from Washington, according to Wiarda. Public opinion polls in the United States have shown a low level of empathy for or patience with Latin America. Wiarda states that US. policy interests are "likely to be sporadic and episodic rather than sustained" and that relations will be driven by domestic political considerations. This last point, as it relates to issues such as immigration and drug trafficking, has proven prophetic. In hindsight, however, the level of engagement since 1990 has been much more intense than Wiarda suggested in 1990, particularly as it relates to trade, drug trafficking, and summitry. Interestingly, Wiarda states here that benign neglect, rather than sparking concern or criticism in Latin America, would be welcomed because of the absence of interventionism. Latin America's standing in Washington, D.C., among the U.S. foreign policy

community, and in terms of the rank ordering of foreign policy areas of priority, is precarious at best. Latin America has always been rather low on our priorities but now it runs the risk of slipping further stillalmost out of sight. Ignored and viewed as unimportant, Latin America is in
danger of falling to the level of sub-Saharan Africa as a region that some poor assistant secretary must be responsible for but that is

seen as hopeless and not worth paying serious attention to. Many in the general foreign policy community (as distinct from Latin Americanists) see Latin America as a "black hole" into which are sucked immense amounts of U.S. aid and effort, as well as hopes and dreams, but out of which comes nothing in return except despair and grief. It is not a great time in Washington, D.C., to be a Latin America specialist or one with hopes for U.S. policy for the area. Paradoxically, while the U.S. is devoting little serious attention to Latin America, U.S. relations with the
area are goodbetter than they have been in at least fifteen years. Moreover, it is precisely at this time of "benign neglect" on the part of the United States that the area is undergoing some of the most far-reaching cultural and structural changes ever in its history. These paradoxes need to be explored in further detail. Latin America's Isolation The reasons for Latin America's poor

standing in Washington and among the policy community are various, relating both to changes in the U.S. and in global power relations. One main reason is the winding down of the Cold War . As
citizens we may applaud the ending of the Cold War and as professional Latin Americanists we may lament the reasoning involved, but the undeniable fact is the Cold War was the main reason for U.S. interest in the region over the last

forty years. Without the Cold War the U.S. will be less interested in Latin America, less inclined to assist it (witness the difficulty of generating aid to Nicaragua now that the Sandanistas are out of power), and less interested in "bailing it out," with Marines or dollars, when Latin America gets in trouble. Nor, in the absence of any
credible Soviet or Cuban threat, will clever Latin American politicians be able to play off the superpowers against each other or run to Washington or the local U.S. embassy with stories of potential "Communist" takeovers unless we come to their assistance. The ending of the Cold War has changed all the "givens" of the last four decades. There will therefore be no Marshall Plan for Latin America, no Alliance for Progress, little foreign aid. In addition, as the world organizes into regional trading blocs (Europe, East Asia, North America), Latin America runs the risk of being completely left out of the possibilities for prosperity that will accrue to the countries within these blocs. When that prospect is added to Latin America's other economic problems of capital flight, lack of investment from virtually any source, debt, and actual disinvestment by foreign firms, the prospects look dismal indeed. Not only is the United States not very concerned with Latin America except sporadically and as U.S.

interests are directly affectedbut other possible sources of support are drying up as well. There will, given their own economic problems, clearly be no
or meager assistance from the Soviet Union, China, or Eastern Europe. Japan has been very selective in terms of its investments in Latin America, limiting most of its activities to parts of Brazil and Mexico along the border area. Europe is also preoccupied with its further integration in 1992; and its attention and assistance to, and investments in, Latin America have been declining in recent years. These trends imply that one of the more ambitious of the panaceas for Latin America in recent years, that of di versifying its dependence, will simply not work out because no one else is really interested. That means that Latin America has de facto been thrown back into the arms of the United States, whether we or the Latin Americans wish it or not. But not only in the wake of the Cold War is the United States not very committed at the policy level, but at the popular level Latin America has never had a worse reputation in the U.S. Latin America is broadly assumed to be, the opinion surveys tell us, an area of drugs and dictators. It is perceived as a region where U.S. tourists are preyed upon, where parents are reluctant to allow their children to go on exchange programs, of brutality, violence, and inefficiency. In addition, uncontrolled immigration from the area is widely seen as adding to U.S. crime problems and of putting inordinate burdens on school systems, social welfare programs, and law enforcement. Many of these characterizations are of course false and based on inaccurate stereotypes, but unfortunately that is how the public tends to view Latin America, a perception that is inevitably reflected also in congressional votes and Administration policy. Bush Administration Policy The Bush Administration coming into office in January, 1989, recognized full well the bad reputation and domestic political traps of dealing with Latin America. James Baker, Mr. Bush's campaign manager and then his secretary of state, was known to feel that Central America was a "can of worms." Mr. Baker determined that moving to the left on Central America would anger conservatives, President Reagan's constituency which Bush could ill afford to lose, while moving to the right would mean the Administration would "get it" from the religious and human rights lobbies. Far better, he reasoned, to get Latin America off the front burner, off the nation's front pages and television screens, indeed off the agenda of foreign policy issues altogether so that

it could do no political harm. These were of course all domestic political considerations, enabling the new Administration to finesse Latin America and concentrate on higher priority issues. In 1990 I published a book on U.S. foreign policy-making in which I estimated that 80 percent of U.S. policy considerations on Latin America derive from domestic political considerations rather than having much to do with Latin America per se; under Secretary Baker, who wants above all else to see his president be reelected in 1992, that figure should be closer to 90 percent. Virtually everything the Administration has done with regard to Latin America has had these domestic considerations as preeminent: get it off the agenda and defuse its potential to do political damage. The assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs was chosen not for his expertise on Latin America but because he was a Democrat who would thus be acceptable to the congressional leadership and because he had once writ-ten part of a speech favoring aid to the Contras, which made him accept-able to conservatives. A political compromise was then worked out with the congressional Democrats under which the Administration went along with some aspects of the Arias Plan, but in return got room for Mr. Bush to concentrate on the European summit and his meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which Secretary Baker considered far more important politically than anything that could possibly come out of Central America. The Brady Plan, which was really an extension of the Baker Plan de-vised when the secretary of state was secretary of treasury in the previous administration, helped defuse the Latin American debt issue and get it off the front pages without the expenditure of very many U.S. government dollars and without the taxpayers becoming aware that it was they who would eventually have to carry much of the burden. Strengthening the Organization of American States (OAS) was seen as a way of letting that agency handle (and thus receive attention for) inter-American disputes, rather than the blame for the area's problems always falling on the United States. The ouster of General Manuel Noriega by U.S. forces, which would most likely eventually have been carried out in the domestic Panamanian political process, was ordered only after Noriega had frustrated all earlier efforts and when he had become a political embarrassment to President Bush domestically. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is similarly a wonderful rhetorical gesture and it may even produce some results, but it carries almost no U.S. financial commitment and there is as yet precious little flesh on the bare bones of the policy. Quite a number of these programs merit our applause particularly given the fact that the political climate in Washington is not ripe for any vast new assistance programs and that the public attitudes are so poisonous. The debt issue has not gone away or been resolved but its dimensions have been reduced and it is less troublesome; the OAS needed to be strengthened; Noriega needed to go. In Central America diplomatic negotiations led to the holding of democratic and free elections in Nicaragua and serious peace talks are underway between the government and the rebels in El Salvador. Some economic assistance is flowing to the area and the democratic openings, while incomplete in many cases, are encouraging. The policy has been successful even while the motivesdomestic politicsremain suspect. In addition, the skill of the persons executing the policy has been impressive. As assistant secretary, Bernard Aronson has been indefatigable, careful, prudent, balanced, and patient. He has managed to eke out "some benefits for Latin America" even though the Washington climate is decidedly not propitious. And surely Secretary Baker's grand strategy of removing Central America from the headlines and reducing its potential for domestic damage and foreign policy divisivenesswhatever one thinks of the results and implications of the policy was very cleverly and skillfully carried out from a political and technical point of view. Latin America's standing in Washington and in the country at large may be terrible but the strategies carried out in the crevices have been quite skillful. It may be a policy of benign neglect but it is handled deftly.The New Issue Given the new, often disparaging, climate in Washington regarding Latin America, as well as the Bush Administration strategy of benign neglect, what can we expect in the way of policy regarding the major issues in the area? 1. Foreign aid. There will be no major assistance programs for Latin America. The money is unavailable and Congress is reluctant to spend the funds. If there is a modest "peace dividend" from the winding down of the Cold War and the reduction of the Defense Department budget, it will go chiefly to fund domestic social and economic programs, not foreign aid. Yet, Latin America will continue to receive some assistance. 2. Trade. Protectionist sentiment in the Congress is strong and rising. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative is useful but it carries little financial commitment. Latin America will have to reform its economies from within and stop blaming its problems on "dependence" because in the wake of the Cold War the United States will not come to its rescue anymore. 3. Immigration from Latin America will be a source of friction further souring relations; the U.S. will launch new but ineffective efforts to solve the problem at the sending country level. 4. Drugs. As the U.S. designs a more effective program to deal with drugs and as drug consumption in the U.S is increasingly viewed as an inner-city problem, less attention will be paid to the issue and to Latin America. 5. Debt. The debt issue has been politically "solved": the banks are now out from under and the U.S. government has figured out how to hide from taxpayers the fact that they will be paying most of the burden. So this issue will also command less attention. 6. The environment will receive some sporadic attention but since the sources of the problems are far away (the Brazilian Amazon) and responsibility murky, it will not receive sustained policy priority. 7. Democracy and human rights. The U.S. government will continue to support democracy and human rights on pragmatic (democracies do not muck around in their neighbors' internal affairs), political (democracies cause less grief in U.S. domestic politics), as well as moral grounds; but some of the steam has gone out of the earlier Reagan Administration campaign for democracy and we should not be surprised to see a reversion to authoritarianism in 3-4 countries. 8. Security. There are still problem areas (Peru, Cuba, Central America, the Caribbean); but with the Soviet presence diminishing and Cuba's revolution increasingly seen as a failure, U.S. security interests and involvement in the area will be occasional rather than constant. This is a too-brief discussion, but even in abbreviated form such a run-down of the main policy

U.S. policy interests in the area are likely to be sporadic and episodic rather than sustained; that U.S. interests in trade and other areas will be heavily driven by domestic political considerations; that such issues as immigration and drugs lead to more poisonous rather than better
issues in U.S.-Latin American relations is revealing. It suggests that

relations; and that Latin America is likely to be on its own more than at any time in the last thirty years. Overall what is striking is that there is no one issue, or combination of issues, that seems likely to achieve the sustained attention and funding from the U.S. Congress or the Administration that the Cold War did for the last forty years. Conclusion There is not only less U.S. official interest in Latin America now that the Cold War is fading but, the polls tell us, less public

patience and empathy as well. Latin America may have reached its nadir in terms of overall U.S. interest and inclination to assist the area. At high policy levels the main issues and policy debates are viewed as decided; what Latin America requires, the consensus says, is democracy, open markets, privatization, export promotion, a cleaning up of its own "act" (corruption, overbureaucratization, and the like). Since we now "know" the answers and there are no other viable alternatives, it is up to Latin America to solve its own problems. The end of the Cold War gives Latin America less room to maneuver
between the superpowers, and Europe's declining interest means Latin America has less opportunity to reduce or diversify its dependency. Hence Latin America is on its own as it has not been for the last thirty years; it can sink or swim, but Latin America must solve its own internal problems since, with the Cold War waning, no one else will do it for the area. Neither singularly nor collectively do any of the new issuesecology, drugs, debt, etc.promise to deliver as much for Latin America in terms of interest or Congressional budgetary support as did the Cold War for nearly half a century. The Brady Plan and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative are useful, but there is little substance as yet to these proposals. Hence the policy can be characterized as "benign neglect" with some occasional, more dramatic involvement (as in Panama) although from the point of view of U.S. policymakers, given the budgetary and other domes-tic constraints, they are doing about as much for Latin America in terms of attention and aid as it is possible to do in the present circumstances. The most interesting aspect is that Latin America's adept leaders understand all this and are already operating on the assumption that U.S. Latin America policy largely stops at the Mexican, or maybe El Salvadoran, border. From their point of view the absence of moralizing as under Carter or of sometimes heavyhandedness as under Reagan is to be welcomed. In their view "benign neglect" is comparable to the policy of the "Good Neighbor" because while it means little or no assistance, it also means little or no U.S. interference.

And This form of benign neglect manifests itself through selective intervention. The United States picks-and-chooses when and how to engage Latin America, doing so only with a self-serving concern for our own security and economic interests. This ideology dictates our thinking; we only care about Latin America when its useful for us to do so
Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 5 (Craig, David, Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of
Change, p.219-221) Policy Implications Knowing

when and why foreign forces matter to the conduct of events in Latin America takes on policy salience as well. As Latin America moves into the twenty-first century, it faces problems of
considerable gravity: democracies that are weakly institutionalized, governments that perform poorly or not at all militaries that are asked to fill functional gaps, crime and insecurity that sweep through once relatively safe and secure communities, courts that fail to bring perpetrators to justice, poverty that reaches up and grabs vast portions of an erst-while middle class, double-digit unemployment rates, and indigenous populations at the very bottom who will not wait any longer for a slice of the pie. The political life spans of Latin America's leaders have grown progressively shorter as they either cannot or will not remedy these ills; worse still, they are sometimes part of the problem. It is always at times of great frustration and great need when the question is asked: what will the wealthier industrialized countries offer this beleaguered region? And specifically, what will the United States offer? The answer is not comforting, but it is at least more comprehensible once viewed through the lens of our framework. The United States is not likely to invest any significant resources or effort in a campaign of direct economic or social assistance targeted at in-need populations. This is not a bold prediction course; the foreign aid spigot was more or less turned off years ago and remains closed. Naturally there have been both ideological and fiscal changes in the United States in recent decades that can account for the diminished importance of foreign aid. But the problem goes beyond the

hegemony of fiscal conservatism to one of general hegemonic attention and motivation. U.S. governments-whether Democratic or Republican controlledhave very little interest in any of the aforementioned problems, and less interest still in doing anything about them. Their lack of interest derives from a perception that the burdens of the region's poor, its workers, its unemployed, its peasants, its pensioners indeed its average citizens, generate no imminent threats to U.S. national interests , and efforts to assist them generate no tangible benefits in return. These are low politics difficulties that do not reach out and grab the attention of powerful executives or lawmakers from the North. This view is not just a kind of bias toward the impoverished masses. The U.S. government demonstrates an equally indifferent attitude toward the elites. It refuses to commit significant attention, expertise, or sums of money to strengthen and reform Latin America's courts,
legislatures, police units, defense ministries, and other institutions of the democratic state. Elites desperately need stronger institutions if they are to govern effectively. But however vital democratic deepening may be to Latin America's future, it just does not appear on Washington's radar screen because it too resides in the realm of low politics, meaning the stakes are appreciably lower for foreign states. Scholars can wax eloquent about how the afflictions of poverty, unemployment, crime, the environment, institutional decay, and human rights left unattended now will fester and create crises that will eventually harm U.S. interests. But the arguments fall on deaf ears to policy makers who view the long term as very long indeed and

who are eager to discount the future costs to their current inaction. Unless Latin America's low politics problems can cause considerable and immediate angst at a national level within the United States, they will not become a political agenda item in Washington. Washington's attention deficit is selective, and issue sensitive. Within the high politics realm of economics, the U nited States is willing (with some misgivings) to work toward the creation of a free trade zone with its Latin American partners. It is ideologically predisposed to do so, and it envisions a short- to medium-term gain in the form of new, expanded, and unrestricted markets for U.S. exporters and investors. But it is much less willing to associate free trade with low politics reforms within Latin American states that would humanize the workplace, boost wages, or create jobs. In the longer term, assisting Latin American workers and unemployed
should, in theory, rebound to the benefit of the United States by bolstering disposable incomes, which in turn would mean greater consumption of very competitive U.S. goods. Even though there is a logical linkage between these sets of issues, it is still

perceived as an indirect and less urgent connection and one that Washington policy makers seldom make. They would rather place their bets on a free trade deal alone that quickly solidifies their nation's export earnings and profit remittances. Similar issue splits are visible elsewhere. The United States
wants Latin American armed forces to leap into wars against guerrillas and terrorists but shows little concern that military immersion in these campaigns might have negative consequences for professionalism, democratic society, and civilian control in those countries. It devotes scant resources to help fully professionalize those forces and less still to equip civilians with the tools they need to institutionalize control over their soldiers. It wants its Southern neighbors to fight hard against transnational crime but will not help finance judicial reform that would allow Latin American courts to process their criminal caseloads more efficiently and prosecute more frequently, or help fund police reform to reduce the rampant corruption of those units. The United States visualizes the struggle against left-wing insurgents, terrorists, and their criminal associates as high-stakes contests of high politics that must be won to enhance its own national security and that of its allies in those struggles; it does not visualize improvements in Latin American civil-military relations or judicial and police systems in quite the same way. In not addressing the latter issues, the United

States may be cutting off its nose to spite its face. Without low politics reforms to assist Latin American judges, police, investigators, soldiers, and their civilian managers, those groups will be less equipped to lend a hand in transnational struggles deemed vital by Washington. But so it goes. The hegemon's indifference to these groups and their problems persists, and

the balance of influence remains tilted in the direction of domestic politics and away from the foreign. On these issues, Latin America is left to fend for itself, and only time will tell whether its independence proves to be a
blessing or a curse.

And Even when the U.S. does choose to engage, we do so in a manner that disregards the interests of the people of Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and of every other country in the region. U.S. neoliberal interventions may have secured our narrow, strategic interests but they have resulted in ongoing violence against the people of Latin America
Hattingh 8 (Shawn, International Labour Research and Information Group, ALBA: Creating a Regional Alt ernative to
Neoliberalism?, Monthly Review,, 7/2/8) ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-liberalism? by Shawn Hattingh Latin America was

the first place where the US imposed the most callous economic system ever seen: neo-liberal capitalism. Starting in Chile in 1973, the US used its power, along with its control over the IMF and the World Bank, to force governments across Latin America to adopt neo-liberal economic policies. This has seen Latin American countries embrace trade liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, and labor market flexibility. Of course, US multinationals benefited from this. They have snapped up ex-state owned assets throughout Latin America at bargain basement prices. With the reduction of tariffs and the advent of "free" trade, US multinationals have also flooded Latin America with cheap exports. This has seen US multinationals making massive profits. The people of Latin America have paid for this . Since the advent of neo-liberalism, inequality in Latin America has grown, and millions of people have lost their jobs along with their access to healthcare and education.1

And U.S. selective engagement is based on the same violent ideology that drove European exploitation of Latin America in the nineteenth century neoliberalism is simply the new face of mercantilist subjugation
Grosfoguel 2k (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, Developmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the independence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies . White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom . This is what An bal Quijano (1993) calls coloniality of power. During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spains backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism and Great Britains advanced, civilized and modern nation. Leopoldo ea, paraphrasing Jos Enrique Rod , called this the new northernmania (nordoman a), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new models in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 1617). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as feudal or in a backward stage served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call feudalmania, which would continue throughout the twentieth century. Feudalmania was a device of temporal distancing (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The

denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibil- ity in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other regions. Second, living different temporalities, where Europe was

said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority. Thus Europe was the model to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to catch up. This is expressed in the dichotomy civilization/barbarism seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina. The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the
arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentis- tas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Argentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the C mara de Diputados, Vicente F. L pez. L pezs group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial cap- italists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentinas major export item at the time. Thus L pez promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a tran- sitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports. However, the group of deputies led by L pez developed neomer- cantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school and by some of the dependentistas. Influenced by the late 183 s Argen- tinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevar- ria), L pez defended a historicist idiographic approach against the univer- salism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 12829, 13334). According to L pez, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each coun- try. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and eco- nomic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. L pez, said in 1873, It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations (Chiaramonte 1971, 12930). This critique of the nomothetic universalist approach of core state intellec- tuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. L pezs disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the Eu- ropean Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical condi- tions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smiths beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confronta- tion. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments. The originality of their arguments was to artic ulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentinas underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. L pez and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 19293). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-dependentista positions one hundred years later: It is very speak of free trade...this word freedom . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom. For the English who favor free

trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By free trade I understand an exchange of finished goods
for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for Englands iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a fin - ished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Eu- rope and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, lets follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countr ies, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 18283) In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the C mara de Diputados in 1875; 189) It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self- sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts. (Speech by Vicente F. L pez at the C mara de Diputados in 1875; 27) It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile

independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192) (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185) Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of tra- ditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They defended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full im- plementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the Ger- man political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary develop- mental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellec- tual tradition (13435). In sum,

they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie. Other countries in Latin America, such as Mexico (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) had similar debates during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist
debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the L pez family was destroyed by a military inter- vention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which provided the ideological justification

for both the economic subordination to the empire of free trade and the political domination of the dictatorships of order and progress. Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comtes positivist and Herbert Spencers evolution- ary doctrines. They were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against backwardness and feudalism. Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new hegemon in the region, the United States of America.

And Its not simply about political economics, rather, this ideology is rooted in a racialized contempt towards difference that marginalizes those who dont fit neatly into our black-white dichotomy of race relations
Martinez 94 (Elizabeth, Chicana activist, author, and educator, March, Seeing More Than Black & White: Latinos, racism, and
the cultural divides http: blackwht.htm) A certain relish seems irresistible to this Latina as the mass media has been compelled to sit up, look south of the border, and take notice. Probably the Chiapas uprising and Mexico's recent political turmoil have won us no more than a brief day in the sun. Or even less: liberal Ted Koppel still hadn't noticed the historic assassination of presidential candidate Colosio three days afterward. But it's been sweet, anyway. When Kissinger said years ago "nothing important ever happens in the south," he

articulated a contemptuous indifference toward Latin America, its people and their culture which has long dominated U.S. institutions and attitudes . Mexico may be great for a vacation and some people like burritos
but the

usual image of Latin America combines incompetence with absurdity in loud colors. My parents,

both Spanish teachers, endured decades of being told kids were better off learning French. U.S. political culture is not only Anglo-dominated but also embraces an exceptionally stubborn national self-centeredness, with no

global vision other than relations of domination. The U.S. refuses to see itself as one nation sitting on a continent with 20 others all speaking languages other than English and having the right not to be
dominated. Such arrogant indifference extends to Latinos within the U.S. The mass media complain, "people can't relate to Hispanics" - or Asians, they say. Such

arrogant indifference has played an important role in invisibilizing

La Raza (except where we become a serious nuisance or a handy scapegoat). It is one reason the U.S. harbors an exclusively white-on-Black concept of racism. It is one barrier to new thinking about racism which is crucial today. There are others. Good-bye White Majority In a society as thoroughly and violently racialized as the United
States, white-Black relations have defined racism for centuries. Today the composition and culture of the U.S. are changing rapidly. We need to consider seriously whether we can afford to maintain an exclusively white/Black model of racism when the population will be 32 percent Latino, Asian/Pacific American and Native American - in short, neither Black nor white - by the year 2050. We are

challenged to recognize that multi-colored racism is mushrooming, and then strategize how to resist it. We are challenged to move beyond a dualism comprised of two white supremacist inventions: Blackness and Whiteness. At stake in those challenges is building a united anti-racist force strong enough to resist contemporary racist strategies of divide-and- conquer. Strong enough, in the long run, to help defeat racism itself. Doesn't an exclusively Black/white model of racism discourage the perception of common interests among people of color and thus impede a solidarity that can challenge white supremacy? Doesn't it encourage the isolation of African Americans from potential allies? Doesn't it advise all people of color to spend too much energy understanding our lives in relation to Whiteness, and thus freeze us in a defensive, often self- destructive mode?

And This makes extermination of the Latin American other an imperative

Lander, 2000 (Edgardo, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, Eurocentrism and Colonialism
in Latin American Social Thought, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 3, p. 519-532)

Political and social thought regarding Latin America has been historically characterized by a tension between the search for its specific attributes and an external view that has seen these lands from the narrow perspective of European experience . There has also been an opposition between the
challenge of the rich potentialities of this New World and distress over its difference, which stands in contrast with the ideal represented by European culture and racial composition. Nonetheless,

external colonial views and regrets because

of the difference have been widely hegemonic . A brief revision of the texts of the first republican constitutions is enough to illustrate how liberals, in their attempt to transplant and install a replica of their understanding of the European or North American experience, almost completely ignore the specific cultural and historical conditions of the societies about which they legislate . When these conditions are considered, it is
with the express purpose of doing away with them. The affliction because of the differencethe awkwardness of living in a continent that is not white, urban, cosmopolitan, and civilized finds its best expression in positivism. Sharing the main assumptions and prejudices of nineteenth-century European thought (scientific racism, patriarchy, the idea of progress), positivism reaffirms the colonial discourse. The continent is imagined from a single voice, with a single subject: white,

masculine, urban, cosmopolitan. The rest, the majority, is the other, barbarian, primitiv e, black, Indian, who has nothing to contribute to the future of these societies. It would be imperative to whiten, westernize, or exterminate that majority.

And Specifically, the combination of racial stigmatization and economic nationalist ideology guarantees unimaginably heinous violence
Radcliffe, 2007 (Sarah A., Senior Lecturer in Latin American Geography at the University of Cambridge, Forum: Latin
American Indigenous Geographies of Fear: Living in the Shadow of Racism, Lack of Development, and Antiterror Measures Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 97, No. 2, Jun., 2007, Project Muse) Currently, neoliberalism is the hegemonic development model in Latin America such that the majority of regional development priorities and projects have been shaped by the theory, interpretation, and implementation of neoliberalism. As such, the region offers an ideal location in which to evaluate this development model in terms of its ability to address indigenous concerns. Over the past thirty years, neoliberalism and its adjunct of democracy promotion have been applied, albeit unevenly and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, resulting in privatization of assets and resources, opening up of trade barriers, legislative reforms to facilitate labor flexibility, and the selective rolling backward and forward of the state in social reproduction. Far from being monolithic, neoliberalism is characterized by variation, hybridity with existing policies, and multiple and contradictory aspects regarding neoliberalizing spaces, subjects, and states (Perreault and Martin 2005). As an agenda for development hope, neoliberalism is premised on the notion of a self-adjusting market in which free market capitalism can "construct some sort of space within which it can function" (Harvey 2000, 176-77) and where the role of the state is ostensibly reduced.


difference can be interpreted as a block on the free working of the market . In the current neoliberal
and geopolitical context, according to one businessman, ethnic mobilization "could jeopardize the exploitation of natural resources-gas, oil, gold ... in territories with a significant indigenous population" (Gonzalez Manrique 2005, 1). For

Latin American Indian populations, neoliberalism is directly linked to the nonfunctioning of market economies, and the restructuring of economic rights vis- a-vis nation-states in ways that undercut indigenous security and livelihoods. This is in large part due to the restless

spatialization of capital as it negotiates with "the geography of place" (Harvey 2000, 179). The geographies of market capitalism are frequently destructive of local and national forms of economy, just as they "creatively" expand the opportunities for minority wealth creation. Although neoliberal capital compromises with its very spatialization, these apparent flexibilities serve to deepen uneven development as they permit greater exploitation of particular juxtapositions of landscape, people, and resources (Massey 2005). Latin American neoliberalisms work against a politics of redistribution by exacerbating inequality and pushing indigenous people into poverty. Privatization of land markets, combined with the emphasis on individual responsibility, has compounded indigenous loss of voice (e.g., Sanabria 1999). Neoliberalism's support for entrepreneurialism pushes Indians into market-oriented production and restrictive forms of political participation (Radcliffe and Laurie 2006a, 2006b; Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe, forthcoming). Large numbers of Indians remain impoverished under neoliberalism, trapped by segregated labor markets, limited product outlets, insecure land tenure, and weak social welfare. The economic story of neoliberalism's failure represents only part of the picture, however; neoliberalism has also entailed the restructuring of the cultural terms of (indigenous) citizenship and the sociopolitical pact through which rights are extended and realized. The neoliberal dismantling of corporatist state systems, which granted Indians some recognition and representation in decisions over rights, has contributed to widespread ethnic protest. Neoliberal restructuring breaks previous forms of rule (1930-1970s) that granted Indians access to resources and political representation (Yashar 1999). This Indian-state pact was broken, reworked, and re- formed during the debt crisis, democratic transitions, and neoliberalism in a contested and tense process (Assies, van der Haar, and Hoekema 2001), such that although civil and political rights are now formally established on paper, social and economic rights are more insecure in practice, and the political and cultural bases for state-indigenous negotiations have been trans- formed. Formal democracy, with regular elections and civilian representatives, now exists, yet slow economic growth, inequalities, and ineffective judiciaries and social services provision combine to undermine citizens' confidence in elective democracies (UNDP 2004). On the one hand administrative decentralization and formal channels of citizen participation deepen democracy, even as macroeconomic decision making remains with technocrat elites, and social welfare comes through unaccountable NGOs (Radcliffe 2001). Policy shifts to multiculturalism entail specific politico-cultural consequences for Indians and shape their political and social rights. Under neoliberal multiculturalism, the new "indigenous slot" offered to ethnic citizens has tended to give limited (and conditional) resources to Indians and to police their expression of identity (Hale 2002; Paley 2002). Multiculturalism represents both "opportunity and peril" for Indians (Hale 2002, 487), the peril resting in its tendency to listen only to certain voices. On these grounds, neoliberal development prompts indigenous groups to mobilize to demand recognition (as racially discriminated groups whose ethnic recognition under corporatism was removed) and redistribution (a voice in macroeconomic and national decision making). Ecuador illustrates the groundedness and contingent nature of interconnections between political economy, political culture, ethnic identity, and institutionalized social difference in neoliberal development. Ecuadorian neoliberalism over twenty years has openly favored economic elites and systematically harmed low-income sectors (Divalos 2004).12 In this context it is not surprising that Ecuador's indigenous campaigns hold governments accountable for overeager endorsement of neoliberalism (Collins 2001; Zamosc 2004) and stand at the forefront of peaceful protest alongside poor urban and rural dwellers, women, and informal workers. For example, they protest the neoliberal Ecuador-U.S. Free Trade Treaty negotiations with "days of struggle" and demands for transparent talks. Indian agendas highlight the need for capitalist development, but question the context of closed decision-making, U.S. geopolitics, and neoliberal models of poverty alleviation. According to CONAIE leader Leonidas Iza, We don't have food to feed our children. Our markets are flooded with cheap imports. Imported milk is dumped on Ecuador for half what it costs to produce, but TNCs sell it back to us at $1.80 a liter. We have no way to live, and the FTAA will only make it worse. When we complain, the US government calls us terrorists. We are not threatening anything but we are hungry and tired and things have to change. -(Quoted in CONAIE 2006) Protest against neoliberalism

makes Indians vulnerable to state and extra-state violence, echoing

earlier histories of anti-Indian violence . In March 2006, the Ecuadorian president accused Indian movements of destabilizing the country with four days of roadblocks and protests; the government declared a state of emergency in five highland, largely Indian, provinces in an effort to prevent indigenous strategy meetings (BBC News 2006a). Public meetings were banned and a curfew was imposed, troops reinforced security along major roads into the capital (Comercio 2006; Andrade 2006). Despite these actions, CONAIE continued to engage a public debate around the institutional and political terms of free-trade decision making. Why, it asked, did the government make negotiations confidential? Why appoint an export agro-industry representative as Minister of Economy (CONAIE 2006)? In short, Ecuador exemplifies the recent "politicization of ethnic cleavages" (Yashar 1999, 87) by which worsening indigenous disadvantage together with reorganization of decisionmaking structures generates Indian protest. Neoliberal economic and political restructurings are experienced as threats to Andean ethnic security, with Indians "fear[ing free trade] will damage their livelihoods and their way of life" (Andrade 2006). Yet it is not merely a question of different priorities-an indigenous alternative to a neoliberal agenda. Rather "attempts to establish a neoliberal order can act as factors of political destabilization" (Zamosc 2004, 132). In other words, the seeds of political instability, now of such concern to Washington, lie precisely with the political agendas and consequences embedded in neoliberal macroeconomic development.

And Unless we challenge the ideology underpinning current engagement towards Latin America, global slaughter becomes inevitable
Robinson, 2008 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Latin America and
Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective pg. xii-xiii)

The truth, as Hegel said, is in the whole. That said, if there is any one caveat to highlight here, it is that in a slim volume such as this simplification is unavoidable. I can only shine a spotlight on a select few of the trees that make up the forest and must inevitably omit entirely a look at other trees, no matter how much they may be integral to the forest. In the end, any intellectual endeavor is openended: a work in progress. My approachto look at Latin America as a wholeinevitably understates complexity and divergence and overstates the extent to which general statements can be made. There is no single, homogenous Latin America. Nonetheless, the exercise remains validindeed, useful and vitalinsofar as there are underlying structural shifts that have produced clear region-wide patterns of change. There is a general pattern across all of Latin America of transition to global capitalism, even if each country and region has experienced this transition on the basis of its own particular constellation of social forces, historical circumstances, and contingent variables. I am concerned in the present study with identifying this underlying unity among varied patterns of change, with extrapolating from divergent experiences to uncover these general patterns and categories of eventssuch as the spread of nontraditional exports, the rise of transnational capitalists from among the region's dominant groups, the debt crisis and the preponderance of global financial markets, and the upsurge of new resistance movements across the region. These general patterns point to underlying causal processes of capitalist globalization. Returning to the dual themes of crisis and critical globalization studies, there can be little doubt that we are living in troubling times in the "global village." The system of

global capitalism that now engulfs the entire planet is in crisis . There is consensus among scientists that we are on the precipice of ecological holocaust , including the mass extinction of species; the impending collapse of agriculture in major producing areas; the meltdown of polar ice caps; the phenomenon of global warming; and the contamination of the oceans, food stock, water supply, and air. Social inequalities have spiraled out of control, and the gap between the global rich and the global poor has never been as acute as it is in the early twenty-first century. While absolute levels of poverty and misery expand around the world under a
new global-social apartheid, the richest 20 percent of humanity received in 2000 more than 85 percent of the world's wealth while the remaining 80 percent of humanity had to make do with less than 15 percent of the wealth, according to the United Nation's oftcited annual Human Development Report (UNDP, 2000). Driven by the imperatives of over accumulation and transnational

social control, global elites have increasingly turned to authoritarianism, militarization, and war to sustain the system . Many political economists concur that a global economic collapse is possible, even probable. In times such as these intellectuals are called upon to engage in a critical analytical and theoretical understanding of global society: to contribute to an understanding of history and social change that may elucidate the inner workings of the prevailing order and the causal processes at work in that order that generate crisis. They are also called upon to expose the vested interests bound up with the global social order, the discourses through
which those interests are articulated, and the distinct alternatives to the extant order that counterhegemonic agents put forward. Intellectual production is always a collective process. Let us not lose sight of the social and historical character of intellectual labor. All those scholars who engage in such labor or make knowledge claims are organic intellectuals in the sense that studying the world is itself a social act, committed by agents with a definite relationship to the social order. Intellectual labor is social labor; its practitioners are social actors; and the products of its labor are not neutral or disinterested. In recent years I have proposed a rationale and minimal guidelines for critical globalization studies and have called on intellectuals to "exercise a preferential option for the majority in global society" (Robinson, 2006c). Globalization is not a neutral process. It involves winners and losers and new relations of power and domination. We need organic intellectuals capable of theorizing the changes that have taken place in the system of capitalism, in this epoch of globalization, and of providing to popular majorities these theoretical insights as inputs for their real-world struggles to develop alternative social relationships and an alternative social logicthe logic of majoritiesto that of the market and of transnational capital. In other words, critical globalization studies has to be capable of inspiring emancipatory action, of bringing together multiple publics in

developing programs that integrate theory and practice .

Contention Two
Our thoughts and ideas that inform our understanding of Latin America matter problematizing the way we think about Latin America in academic debate is critical to challenge the current ideology and change political thought about the region
Bertucci 13 (Mariano, Political Science and International Relations Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern California,
Latin America Has Moved On: U.S. Scholarship Hasnt, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 2, Spring)

The bias in U.S. research on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America not only skews analysis and understanding of the region, it also sidesteps today's greatest challenges. The study of what scholars focus on and debate helps to shape how policy is understood and discussed in the public realm and, sometimes, even made. However, a close look at the past three decades of scholarly publications
on U.S.-Latin American relations, covering 174 peer-reviewed articles and 167 non-edited books, reveals a disconnect with many of the themes and realities in the region today. International relations or other fields of inquiry related to global studies, such as international political economy or security, are severely underrepresented in scholarship on the Western Hemisphere. Instead, most of the research in the field is based on the study of foreign policy. Over 94 percent of the scholarly publications noted above that are dedicated to the region could be qualified as foreign policy analyses rather than the more current or trendy themes of international relations theory or international political economy. And within foreign policy studies, it is essentially the study of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Virtually all (89 percent) scholarly works offering foreign policy analyses of U.S.-

Latin American relations make U.S. foreign policy a central focus in their understanding of U.S.Latin American affairs. Roughly half of the articles and books (51 percent) focus on foreign policy initiatives and reactions
of the U.S. and Latin American countries toward one another; and almost 40 percent of published works only analyze U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. As a direct consequence of this approach, there is almost no attention paid to international political economy or security. And that, in turn, has led to a neglect of some of the most central and challenging issues in today's policy agenda: narcotics trafficking, migration, the environment, and energy cooperation. Alongside the


understanding of Latin America , there are relatively few policy articles and books on foreign policies of Caribbean As a result, there are serious gaps in our understanding of how much latitude nation-states in the Americas have to set their own policy, especially in a region in which U.S. influence is becoming more diffuse. Other
countries, on South American countries-including, most notably, Brazil- and even on Mexico's policies toward the United States. gaps concern the migration, drug-related, and energy security issues and threats faced by the United States. These problems are likely to be solved only through sustained cooperative efforts with countries such as Mexico and Brazil. But these countries' foreign policies toward the U.S. are under studied. Only 12.9 percent of all articles and books focus on U.S.-Mexico relations and less than 3 percent focus on Mexico's foreign policy toward the United States. Similarly, less than 5 percent of articles and books analyze U.S.-Brazil relations and no more than 2 percent examine Brazil's foreign policy toward the "Colossus of the North." These are

critical gaps. Any informed foreign policy must be based on an understanding of both sides. Differences in Understanding The deficiencies-even biases-of current research on U.S.-Latin American relations become even more apparent when peer-reviewed publications of U.S.-based scholars are compared to those
of scholars based in Latin America. U.S.- based scholars address the foreign policies of Latin American countries in just 3.1 percent of their publications, but 87 percent of their works put the U.S. at the center of the analysis. Meanwhile, U.S.-Latin American foreign policy interactions are addressed in only one-third of their publications. The implication of this pattern is clear: the literature

leaves one with the impression that "U.S.-Latin American relations" is synonymous with "U.S. policy." This distortion in research and the literature can have practical and policy impacts. Most significantly, it has contributed to the conventional wisdom that the best way to make sense of U.S.Latin American relations is to understand, first and foremost, the U.S. foreign policy- making process. That, however, only delivers truncated pictures of the factors shaping the hemisphere
historically and, especially, today. To be sure, policy doesn't automatically follow from scholarly publications. Still, research-based ideas do trickle down through the work of think tanks, op-eds, policy journals, and other venues. Scholars do participate in government-either as consultants or as appointees- and policymakers have been exposed to research at some point in their professional development. Almost three decades of a U.S.-centered perspective on Latin America is

likely to shape a very particular worldview on the policy issues at hand. From there, it's a short step to hegemonic conceptions of U.S.-Latin American relations, particularly when combined with the predominance in policy circles of an untested theoretical model in which the U.S. is the actor and Latin American countries the dependent and defenseless objects. Research by scholars based in Latin America appears somewhat more balanced but no less parochial than that of their U.S. colleagues. In their studies of U.S.-

Latin American relations, Latin American scholars put their own countries' foreign policies center stage in 71 percent of publications. They address U.S.-Latin American foreign interactions in roughly half of their work, but consider U.S. foreign policy toward the region to be the more salient focus of their analyses in 16 percent of their articles. Similar patterns appear when you compare scholarship in the U.S. to scholarship from Latin America in matters of international political economy. Economic integration and regionalism are only addressed in less than 10 percent of journal publications by U.S.-based scholars; however, these same issues are the focus of almost 40 percent of the journal articles published by Latin American scholars. As a result, integration efforts (e.g. ,the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Mercosur, ftaa- Mercosur interactions, and nafta) that have been front and center in shaping Latin American policy are given short shriftin U.S.-based research and scholarship. The difference-and its implications for how scholars and policymakers on both sides of the Rio Grande view the world and the region-will only become more stark as the trend toward sub-regional integration through institutions like celac and unasur increases. Moreover, where much of the Latin American policy debates since the early 1990s focused on convergence, typical international relations (IR) specialists would have tended to look at individual interests of countries and the trend toward divergence unless there were common interests at stake. Even though developments in migration, energy security and drug-related violence confirm the intermestic nature (i.e., the interplay of international and domestic politics) of the current U.S.-Latin American relationship, research patterns show that the stock of

knowledge available to policymakers working on any such issues is marginal. Only 16 percent of articles and
books on U.S.-Latin American relations focus on the environment, migration and narcotics. Furthermore, some intermestic issues, such as remittances, energy supply and public health, are almost completely ignored. A similar pattern is evident in relation to exploring the role of non-state actors in U.S.-Latin American relations. Multinational enterprises, religious and guerrilla organizations, among others, have all presumably had a significant impact on hemispheric affairs. Yet only 6 percent of the scholarly work published on U.S.- Latin American relations over the past quarter century has paid attention to such non-state actors, rendering their role in hemispheric affairs a matter of speculation. Moreover, the recent literature almost completely disregards more traditional security issues, such as deterrence of extra-hemispheric powers and risks of nuclear proliferation and war. Getting Over Our Yanqui Foreign Policy Obsession Apart from the regional differences in terms of research perspectives, research patterns in U.S.-Latin American affairs more generally diverge from trends in the broader field of international relations, in which foreign policy analysis is marginal compared to the attention devoted to international political economy, security issues and international relations theory. The differences demonstrate that little intellectual dialogue and sharing is taking place among international relations scholars and U.S.-Latin American relations specialists. Rectifying this situation would require IR scholars to explain, test and, when necessary, develop new theories on the causes and interests surrounding the pressing policy issues in the hemisphere. Many of these issues also lend themselves to quantitative analyses now dominant in IR. Statistical measures can help assess levels, degrees and dimensions of asymmetries between countries on both sides of the Rio Grande. Game theory can specify the terms, conditions and extent of compliance with (or defection from) multilateral schemes. And Bayesian algebra can help identify the conditions promoting cooperation or defection. But all this is easier said than done. As of 2013, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA)-the largest professional association for individuals and institutions studying Latin America-does not have a section on international relations (although, as of 2011, it does offer an award for the best book published on the region's foreign policy and international affairs). Funding opportunities for researching the hemisphere's international politics are relatively scarce, particularly for young IR scholars. Also, the current reputational pecking order in the field of international relations hardly rewards regional expertise. This is particularly true in the U.S. and increasingly so in other countries. Even if some scholars are willing to do some soulsearching of their own and embrace the mindset, tools and research goals of IR in their analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations, such efforts are not likely to be enough to systematically yield more balanced, practical and IR-minded approaches to inter-American affairs. Governments, think tanks, university-based research centers, and foundations throughout the hemisphere also need to be involved by helping to redefine and build new institutional supports for producing research that is both peer-reviewed and policy-relevant. More foundations, think tanks and research grants need to also place a higher priority on producing peerreviewed IR research on the pressing issues in the hemisphere. As the leading professional association, LASA needs to encourage and support the creation of a section on international relations that could bring together the work of both senior and young IR scholars around a U.S.-Latin American relations policy-driven research agenda. Governments should also help fund training and research on those same policy issues in top IR research programs. The creation of a peer-reviewed outlet with the mission of publishing theory-based and methodologically rigorous research on the intermestic dimensions of narcotrafficking, energy security and organized crime, to name just a few hot policy examples, would be an important addition to the relatively limited number of outlets available to publish research on inter-American politics and economics.


from such platforms can innovative new research contribute sustainably to the shaping of common solutions to the shared problems in the hemisphere.

And Vote Affirmative to endorse a substantial increase in radical forms of engagement and openness. This is the only way to ensure institutional receptiveness to difference
Walls, 2006 (Laura Dassow, John H. Bennett Jr. Chair of Southern Letters at the University of South Carolina and William P. and
Hazel B. W hite Professor of English at the University of Notre Dame, The Search for Humboldt, Geographical Review, Vol. 96 No. 3, p. 473-477) Sachs's Humboldt

is above all a risk taker who dares to open himself to challenge by the Other--both natural and cultural. The virtue of such a challenge is, first of all, personal, for only through radical openness can one loosen the hold of cherished convictions, unsettle oneself, and learn both respect for human limitation in the face of natural forces and receptiveness to the deep differences of marginalized, non-European peoples. At their most Humboldtian, Sachs's explorers are not conquerors but survivors, marked for life with a tragic sense of human vulnerability and the limits of European power. The importance of this key lesson extends far beyond the personal, however. Humboldt's core value is diversity, in landscapes, plants, nations, languages, for diversity is "that unfailing source of life and motion in the intellectual world" (Humboldt 1814-1825, 2: 219). His complementary value is unity, which nets all together in a common fate. As Emerson put it in one of his more Humboldtian moments, "All are needed by each one; / Nothing is fair or good alone" ([18471 1994, 9). In Humboldt's global ecological interrelatedness, "human" means not just universalized,

white Europeans but peoples of all colors, for every race and nation tells some necessary part of the human story. True openness to the Other, then, requires the daring to see the world through the eyes of another and the courage to denounce injustice wherever one finds it, from colonial exploitation and slavery to the Catholic mission system that crushed free Indians into sullen conformity. As Sachs shows,

Humboldt's fierce social radicalism, the human side of his natural social ecology, was more difficult for his explorer-followers to sustain, although all four at least occasionally showed an empathy for nonwhite peoples that resisted the century's rising tide of racism. According to Sachs, what, then, are the characteristics of "Humboldtian" scientific exploration? First, that willingness to risk estranging encounters with wild nature and unsettling experiences with non-European

peoples, leading to an open- minded acknowledgment of the limits of (white, European, civilized) knowledge and power. From this comes, second, a Humboldtian "social ecology" (Sachs in- vokes the work of Murray
Bookchin) that grounds true environmental radicalism. This means not the escapist crusade to set aside a few pure and treasured wild places (that came, partly through Muir's campaigns, to dominate in the United States) but the activism that burrows to the roots of social and environmental injustice to denounce its social, political, and economic causes. In Humboldt's case, this meant not only a sustained critique of European colonialism and the slave system but also a lifelong commitment to study, publicize, and celebrate the diversity of non-European cultures and languages, a commitment neglected by U.S. environmentalism but built into the foundation of modern American anthropology by the Humboldtian Franz Boas. Combining the natural and social halves of this proto-ecological view yields an ethic of sustainable resource use. It was Hum- boldt, for example, who first called to widespread public attention the social and environmental destruction wrought by deforestation.

And Aligning yourself with the Aff is critical to reorder the geopolitics of knowledge that structures our thinking about Latin America
Castillo, 2001 (Debra A., Professor at Cornell University, Seduced, Betrayed, CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 1 No.1,
Spring, p. 283-296) A number of Latin

Americanists have in recent years turned our attention to the historical legacy of the long European colonial experience in the Americas, and to the Eurocentric tinge that remains part and parcel of the postcolonial theorizing that frequentlyalthough not exclusively circulates through and from First World academic locations. Scholars like Walter Mignolo have commented on the enthusiastic reception of
token Third World intellectuals in First World theoretical circles, and on the some- what belated, often hedged, interest in the lessacademic practice of other Third World actors (underclass writers and indigenous activists, for exam- ple). The multiple ironies of this interest on the part of both First World and Third World theorists are patent. Thus, Mignolo calls for the

reorder ing of the

geopolitics of knowledge, such that it is not so much the historical postcolonial condition that should retain our attention, but rather the post- colonial loci of enunciation as an emerging discursive formation, and as a form of articulation of subaltern rationality ( , ). Mignolos call to
action echoes and is echoed by an enormous range of other scholars in U.S., Latin American, and to some extentEuropean intellectual circles, and has served as the organizing theme for a growing number of monographs and anthologies, as well as academic journals. It is also a fundamental grounding discourse in the work of the two very distinguished scholars under review in this essay. At the heart of these often abstract, academic exchanges about people from an underclass and non-Eurocentric background are questions about them and us, agency and/versus representation:

questions of how to define their agency when they inevitably come to us represented through the framing discourse of our academic texts. The problem remains of how to reread the paradigm of modernity from the perspective of a locus of enunciation outside that of the Western subject.
Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro G mez comments that the herencia colonial sigue reproduci ndose en el modo como la discursividad de las ciencias sociales y humanas se vincula a la producci n de im genes sobre . . . Latinoam rica, administradas desde la racionalidad burocr tica de las universidades often, he suggests, in U.S. uni-versities with agendas and


that enter into direct conflict with Latin American interests . Even when these U.S. interests are discounted, Castro G mez continues: las narrativas anticolonialistas jam s se pregun - taron por el status epistemol gico de su propio discurso ( ),

creating a blind spot by which the non-European other is inevitably framed and for a more careful and thorough analysis of the relations between imperial

analyzed through the filter of Eurocentric discourse . Not only, then, are scholars like Mignolo and
Castro G mez calling

history and knowledge construction; they also call for the recognition of alternative theoretical knowledge from Latin America about Latin America . Even more radically, in relation to Western institutional identify the need for an outside critique of Eurocentric knowledge systems, a paradigm shift that will allow for a distanced observation beyond that obtaining when Europeans observe them- selves
settings, they (observing the other).


Internal U.S. Approach to LA = Neglect

The U.S. neglects Latin America
Hillman, 2011 (Richard S., Professor of political science at St. John Fisher College, Understanding Contemporary Latin
America, Fourth Edition, available online @ https: uploads 4e cdf8aa74d7.pdf) Notwithstanding the potential for renewed respect for US values that has been stimulated by President Obamas message of change, as well as many Latin Americans identification with a US leader of African American descent, the love-hate relationship between Latin America and the Colossus of the North persists. As observers throughout the world perceive the enormity of the issues plaguing the Obama administration, the less sanguine they become that US

policies of benign neglect will be overcome in the short term. Although the United States has been a leader in providing disaster relief to Caribbean countries devastated by earthquakes and hurricanes and providing upward mobility for multitudes of immigrants from the region, resentment and defiance continue to affect hemispheric relations.

Internal U.S. Approach to LA = Hegemonic Neoliberalism

The United States only cares about Latin America as a subject to receive its hegemonic application of neoliberal economics
Phillips, 2005 (Nicola, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Sheffield, U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic
Governance in the Americas, Latin American Politics & Society, Volume 47, Number 4, Winter 2 5, pp. 1 -25, Project Muse)

The central concern of this article is to address the question of what sort of approach to economic governance is emerging in the region, and what its implications are for the shape of the economic regime itself and the broader regional political economy. This essay argues that by far the dominant approach is based on the assertion of U.S. power in the region, and has taken a form peculiarly in line with the distinctively U.S. interests served by that exercise of power. The political and economic projects associated with the hemispheric agenda must be recognized, in this respect, as being fundamentally of an ideological nature, and part and parcel of the neoliberal project that underpins the global hegemonic project of the United States. That is to say, the political and economic objectives encapsulated in the regional project are intrinsically informed and molded by the broader ideologicalneoliberalfoundation of U.S. hegemony and the world order associated with it. The ideological dimensions of the regional project are often overlooked in a
focus on the technical details of trade negotiations and the political bargaining processes under way in the region, but they are crucial to an understanding of the nature and the politics of the emerging regional economic regime. More specifically, this article argues that the U.S.-led approach to governance in the Americas has been fostered by the

systematic orientation of U.S. trade strategies to the construction of a distinctly hub and spoke set of regionalist arrangements, as a key means by which to capture control of the governance agenda and to ensure
that the regional economic regime takes a form consistent with U.S. interests and preferences. The growing prioritization of bilateralism has become the predominant strategy to this end . The leverage afforded to the United States by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence over the shape of the rules that constitute the regime, and the primary functions associated with the task of its governance, firmly in the agencies of the U.S. state.

Internal U.S. Approach to LA = Civility/Barbarism

Our thinking about Latin America is based on a dangerous dichotomy between what the civilized and the barbaric
Pike, 1992 (Frederick, Latin American history scholar, author of several books on Latin America, The United States and Latin
America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature Google Books, pg. 347-8)

The tone of U.S. media coverage sometimes emerges out of, while simultaneously reinforcing, conventional American stereotypes of the Latin Other. Often enough, though, news coverage emerges out of
reality. Furthermore, Americans do not have to rely on the national media for evidence of disintegration to the south. They can turn also to the sentiments of despair that abound in the refrains of many Latin American contemporary songs, some of which become popular north of the border, and also in the mass-market English translations of Latin fiction. More likely than not, this fiction tells of societies red of tooth and claw ; beset by wile, cunning, duplicity, treachery, and depravity of surrealistic proportions; and wracked by cultural, political, ethnic, and class warfare . Colombian novelist Gabriel Garca M rquez maintains that Latin Americas novels and also its best films tend to depict human beings struggling to find their place in societies where any venture, from love to politics, is likely to end badly. Ignoring the provocation afforded by violence-prone revolutionaries, American leftists still bewail the savagery of repressive military governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile (the southern cone, predominantly white countries in which Americans once placed high hopes) that, during the 197 s, tortured and disappeared countless thousands of citizens. Meanwhile conservative Americans bemoan the continuing cruelty of Fidel and Ral Castro and their henchmen in Cuba, as well as the bloodthirstiness of the Marxist rebels who function in so many republics, most notoriously in Peru where the sendero luminoso (shining path) movement has descended to new lows in Western Hemisphere barbarism. Whether radical or conservative, Americans readily enough find ample indications of Latin barbarism. Americans do not have to look south of the border to find signs that make them wonder about the civilizability of Latinos . They can read about the high dropout rates and the gang violence of Hispanic immigrants living in American cities, overlooking all the worthwhile contributions of the lawabiding, upstanding Latino or Chicano majority to the social and economic fabric of American life just as they overlook the abundance of positive factors in the republics to the south. Americans inclined to give up on primitive Others can also look to New Mexico, where in the early twentieth century some of their forebears saw the cradle of a new civilization, arising from an amalgam of Indian, Hispanic, and Anglo sources. If todays American tourists visit Taos, they may initially be overwhelmed by the sight of fast-food establishments, Wal-Marts and shopping malls, glitzy motels, and sleazy novelty shops. The splendor of the natural setting is certainly still there, and so is much of the traditional charm of Taos; but to find that charm the tourist must dig beneath the surface. A real stretch of the imagination is necessary in order to appreciate that this onetime frontier outpost still seemed in the early twentieth century to promise something more than another abject surrender to consumerism.

Internal Current Thinking/Understanding Results in Bad Engagement

Current engagement is based on economically exploitative strategy which promotes violence in the region
Harnecke, 2010 (Marta, sociologist and political scientist, I. Latin America, Monthly Review, August 2 1 , The Empire Strikes Back: Recolonization and Discipline Although there has been some marked change in the balance of forces favoring left-wing and progressive governments, this doesnt mean the United States is a paper tiger. The loss of ideological and political influence, plus a reduction of its economic power in the region, has been made up for with increased influence on the media and growing military power. Today there are twenty-three U.S. military bases across our subcontinent, and multilateral military exercises are still held every year for the purpose of training troops in the region.21 The Fourth Fleet [operating in the Caribbean and Central and South America] has been reactivated, and U.S. intelligence networks have been extended in an effort to keep watch on and control the dynamics of popular movements in the region.22 The empire is trying to prevent the emergence of national forces that could clash with U.S. policies of domination and imposed servitude. There has been, therefore, a huge increase in military aid to Colombia, its faithful ally and beach-head in the region. And, to weaken any government that it does not directly control, the United States has supported separatist movements in Bolivia (in the resourcerich eastern Half Moon states), Ecuador, and Venezuela (in the oil-rich state of Zulia).23 Faced with the unstoppable advance of left forces in Latin America, especially in the last two years, the Pentagon has decided to implement a

plan to recolonize and discipline the whole continent.24 It aims to stop and , as far as possible, reverse the process of building a free and sovereign Latin America , set in motion by Chvez. The Empire cannot accept thatin spite of the enormous economic, political, military, and media power deployed in the regionLatin American countries are forging their own independent agenda that runs counter to its designs. Attack on Ecuador Launches New Cycle: According to Ana Esther Cecea, a Mexican researcher, the March 2008 attack on Sucumbos province in Ecuador was the start of a new cycle in US strategy to control its living space: the American continent. The attack was the first step in an imperial policy that has not changed with Obama taking office, although it adapted to the new continental situation by putting the brakes on its escalation, after Ecuadorwith the backing of most of the regions countriescomplained.25 The U.S. military actionwhich had the support of the Pentagon but was denounced by the OAS as a violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty triggered a break in Bogot-Quito diplomatic relations. Attempted Civilian-Prefectural Coup in Bolivia: As a response to Bolivias first indigenous president Evo Moraless overwhelming victory in the July 2008 recall referendum, the oligarchic right, entrenched in the Half Moon in eastern Bolivia, tried to mount what Morales called a civilian-prefectural coup. Using its control over the prefectures of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija and its support by civic committees in that region, which were dominated by local elites, the right employed violence to take control of state institutions. Paramilitaries soon appeared on the street, the idea being to create a situation that would force the government either to resign or to bring out its own troops. This scenario could have resulted in death and chaos, creating a situation that would have justified foreign military intervention, in the interests of restoring peace. As there was plenty of evidence that this plot had been prepared with the direct support of the U.S. embassy in Bolivia, the Bolivian government decided on
September 9 to expel the U.S. ambassador. On the same date, Chvez also decided to expel the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. Meanwhile, Bolivian social movements marched to Santa Cruz to confront the coup supporters. Then came the massacre in Pando, where dozens of peasants were murdered. This event was so strongly condemned throughout Bolivia that the government, joined by social movements, decided to declare a state of emergency in Pando and sent in the armed forces to restore order. The coup was finally defeated, thanks to social movement members encircling Santa Cruz and to the unequivocal statement from UNASUR that member countries would only recognize the legitimate government of Evo Morales. Institutional Coup in Honduras: On June 28, 2009, fifteen months after the attack on Ecuador and six months into the Obama presidency, the Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was kidnapped and thrown out of the country. Zelaya was a liberal political leader who, radicalized during his time in office, joined ALBA and proposed holding a constituent assembly. The military operation that ousted him was ordered by the National Assembly. This coup was almost unanimously denounced. According to Brazilian researcher Theotonio dos Santos, this was the first time in history that the United States added its voice to the condemnation of a coup d tat in Latin America.26 But what does this condemnation mean? Can we say that a

change has occurred in U.S. imperial policy toward our subcontinent? Unfortunately, the answer to

this question is no. Nothing fundamental seems to have changed. Despite Obamas formal condemnation, there is clear evidence of the Pentagons hand in preparations for this coup. This is not surprising, since
Honduras had been the U.S. regional operations center for fighting Sandinista-ruled Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas in the 1980s. According to Costa Rican analyst lvaro Montero, the Honduran army was used by Reagan and Bush to support the Contra military bases in Honduras and in the north of Nicaragua. [The army collaborated with the CIA to transport and sell drugs to finance the dirty war against the Sandinistas. It is said that if even a sheet of paper rustles in the Honduran army, U.S. intelli gence officers know about it.27 The big question is, How committed to this coup was President Obama? Opinions are divided on this matter. There are those who wonder if this was a coup against Obama, too.28 According to Jos Vicente Rangel, a Venezuelan journalist and former Deputy President, there were two levels of U.S. government policy operating in Honduras. One was the White House and the other was the machinery left in place by the Bush administration, still operating from the U.S. military base in the Honduran town of Palmarola.29 It is clear that the coup was of vital importance to the Empire of the North to stop the

advance toward integration of the South, an advance initiated by Chvez and made more concrete in ALBA, which had been gaining more and more supporters. So the Pentagon decided to attack the efforts to integrate at their weakest link, Honduras, promoting a military coup with a legal face that was more in step with the new era. According to Ana Esther Cecea, this would be the first operation to relaunch the escalation of recolonization.3 It was then followed by the decision to install new military bases in Colombia with the concomitant immunity given to U.S. troops on Colombian soil. At present, the big winner is the Pentagon. Still, the abrupt interruption of that popular democratic process has sown seeds that, sooner or later, will lead the Honduran people to reclaim democracy and take steps toward building a fairer society, based on the principle of solidarity. Honduras today is not the same as yesterday. Never before in its history have the popular sectors been so united;
the struggle to hold a constituent assembly, instead of tapering off, is stronger than ever. One day the Honduran people will give thanks for this momentary setback. New Military Bases in Colombia: The U.S. alternative to Ecuadors Manta base was to transfer ships, arms, and high-technology spying devices to Colombian bases per agreements signed in early March 2009 by the Colombian Ministry of Defense, the head of the Pentagon, and the CIA. These agreements

increase U.S. military presence there and turn Colombia into a U.S. aircraft carrier in the heart of the region.31 It is an interesting coincidence that the bases receiving most of this military equipment are very close to Colombias borders with Ecuador and Venezuela. Colombias decision to allow the United States to station soldiers and civilian personnel in five places in Colombia has created a domestic uproar that has extended to its
neighbors, especially Venezuela and Ecuador, and has unleashed general criticism on an international level.32 The negotiations took place in secret in the United States. The accord, titled the Complementary Agreement for Defense and Security Coopera tion and Technical Assistance, was signed on October 3 , 2 9, by the Colombian foreign minister Jaime Bermdez and the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, William Brownfield.33 According to a State Department internal document dated August 18, this Defense Cooperation Agreement is designed to facilitate bilateral cooperation in matters concerning Colombian security. Instead of creating U.S. bases, the agreement allows U.S. personnel access to seven Colombian military installations, two naval bases, and three air force bases located in Palanquero, Ap a, and Malambo. According to the agreement: All of these installations are, and will r emain under, Colombian control, and all of the activities performed by U.S. personnel from these installations can only be carried out with the express, prior approval of the Colombian government. Moreover, the agreement does not signal, anticipate, or authorize an increase in the presence of U.S. military or civilian personnel in Colombia. lvaro Uribes government will receive up to $40 million in additional aid for having signed this military pact. According to Christopher McMullen, the State Departments Deputy Assi stant Secretary for Western Hemispheric Affairs, this agreement formalizes access that weve had on an ad hoc b asis the whole time of Plan Colombia.34 The Deputy Assistant Secretary navely believes that his declarations will calm Latin American governments. Colombia, the black sheep of South America, is, like Mexico, an occupied country. It can be said of both countries that they have suffered a comprehensive occupationto use Pablo Gonz lez Casanovas term

involving occupation of the social, economic, administrative, cultural, media, territorial and strategic spheres. Pentagon strategists call this phenomenon full spectrum dominance. The coup
in Honduras and subsequent developments in that countrythe increase in the number of military bases in Colombia, the continuing economic blockade of Cuba, and keeping the base in Guantnamo openhave deeply disappointed those who hoped for consistency between Obamas discourse and his actions. There is no longer even the slightest doubt that the aims pursued by the imperial apparatus are still the same. Previously, its gaze was fixed on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but now the Pentagon is paying more attention to Latin America.

The way we currently approach Latin America cements ideological dogmatism that manifests itself in a violent way of thinking about and acting within the region
Hillman, 2011 (Richard S., Professor of political science at St. John Fisher College, Understanding Contemporary Latin
America, Fourth Edition, available online @ https: uploads 4e cdf8aa74d7.pdf) The story of Latin Americas indigenous origins, conquest by European powers, struggles for independence, and ongoing search for political and economic stability is an action-filled drama, revealing protagonists whose cultural differences have brought about

Latin Americas increasingly important yet, at times, neglected role in world politics makes essential a comprehensive understanding of how its history is rooted in a complex and turbulent past. Popular discussions of Latin America and inter-American affairs, however, are generally charged with high levels of passion and scanty knowledge, resulting all too often in mutual misunderstanding due to unfortunate stereotypes on both sides. For example, some North Americans argue vehemently about their need to protect themselves against violent Latin American revolutionaries who threaten political stability in their backyard, illegal immigrants who steal jobs from US workers, and narcotraffickers who poison US youth. And some Latin Americans fear the
conflicts as well as coalitions. Contemporary malevolent intentions of the Colossus of the North that has seemed to intervene continuously in their domestic affairs.3 They exhibit a strong tendency to resent US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and blame the violence occasioned by drug cartels on the demands of the US market. Yet, many Latin Americans seek upward mobility by emigrating to the United States, thereby causing their love-hate relationship to confound many observers. During the Cold War, many US citizens excitedly propounded the merits of military incursions or covert operations in places like Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. When asked to locate these countries on a map, name their major cities, account for their economic status, or place them in historical context, however, they were clueless. Far too many North Americans are apt to locate Cuba in Central America or Argentina in the Caribbean and to assume Brazilians speak Spanish. Moreover, public opinion on many issues in both the United States and Latin America has become profoundly divided in the postCold War era. The plight of Cuba is a case in point. To many observers, the US economic embargo and diplomatic isolation of Cuba have constituted a misuse of power to the extreme detriment of masses of Cubans who, as a result, must endure suffering and hardship.4 Many others believe Cubas development problems should be attributed solely to Fidel Castros adoption of the socialist model. In either case, ideological dogmatism has been reinforced by insufficient understanding and vilification of US foreign policy on the one hand or of Castroism on the other. Could it be that this is not a mutually exclusive proposition and that, in fact, both sides have contributed to the dilemma?

American historical amnesia has led to the neglect of the Latina Other this guarantees only exploitative forms of engagement
Behdad, 2008 (Ali, , Department Chair of Comparative Literature at UCLA, Critical Historicism American Literary History,
Volume 20, Number 1-2, Spring/Summer 2008, pp. 286-299, Project Muse) That even a scholar as radical and sophisticated as Cole would overlook, for example, the mistreatment and disciplining of Iranian students in his detailed historical review of the way aliens have been treated in the US attests, I think, to the profound amnesia undergirding American political consciousness. The US, as I have shown elsewhere,3 is a forgetful nation that continuously disavows not only its violent beginningsi.e., the conquest of Native Americans, the brutal exploitation of enslaved Africans, the colonialist annexation of Mexican territories, and a heavy reliance on indentured laborbut also the recurring and powerful strand of xenophobia that has most often been accompanied by disciplinary regulations directed at new immigrants and foreigners. Put otherwise, the narrative of immigrant America disregards a long history in which cultural and ethnic differences have produced a differential mode of national identification that includes the political rationale for regulating the foreigners practices of everyday life. American national identity is often articulated through the figure of the immigrant alien, who by being treated as a threat to the democratic nation enables the construction of a normalized notion of citizen as white, Englishspeaking, law-abiding, hard-working, and heteronormal. Although often cast as a threat to national culture, the immigrant is an essential contributor to its formation. In addition, while immigration laws in the US seem to strive for total solutions, the failures of these policies have turned out to be productive as well, insuring a steady supply of exploitable labor while keeping disempowered groups in the US divided against themselves on the basis of citizenship status. The benign neglect of illegal immigration, especially in the post-bracero era, has been vitally

important in maintaining a docile and cheap supply of labor from Mexico and Latin America for the agricultural sector, as well as for urban employers such as restaurants, construction companies, and domestic

Our view of Latin America as a backward region filled with pathological problems lays the groundwork for genocidal violence
Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, Developmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374) The second problem with the dependentista underestimation of cul- tural and ideological dynamics is that it impoverished their own political- economy approach. Ideological/symbolic strategies, as well as Eurocentric forms of knowledge, are constitutive of the political economy of the capital- ist world-system. Global symbolic/ideological strategies are an important structuring logic of the core-periphery relationships in the capitalist world- system. For instance, core states develop ideological/symbolic strategies by

fostering occidentalist (Mignolo 1995) forms of knowledge that privileged the West over the rest. This is clearly seen in developmentalist discourses, which became a scientific form of knowledge in the last fifty years. This knowledge privileged the West as the model of development. Develop- mentalist discourse offers a recipe about how to become like the West. Although the dependentistas struggled against these universalist/ Occidentalist forms of knowledge, they perceived this knowledge as a superstructure or an epiphenomenon of some economic infrastructure. Depen- dentistas never perceived this knowledge as constitutive of Latin Americas political economy. Constructing peripheral zones such as Africa and Latin America

as regions with problems about their stages of development concealed European and Euro American responsibility in the exploitation of these continents. The construction of pathological regions in the periphery, as opposed to the normal development patterns of the West, justified an even more intense political and economic intervention from imperial powers. By treating the other as underdeveloped and backward, metropolitan exploitation and domination were justified in the name of the civilizing mission.

Establishing Latin America as barbaric relegates the region to the periphery and by doing so dismisses the livelihoods of entire populations
Long, 2005 (Ryan Fred, Narrative, Criticism, and Politics: Negotiating Latin American Transition, Latin American Research
Review, Vol. 40 No. 2, p. 268-280) Muozs observations on Vargas Llosas relationship to the market help him contextualize the novelists life and work within a broader discussion of Peruvian and Latin American identity. As his texts full title makes clear, Muoz frames this analytic al operation by relying upon the long-standing dichotomy of civilization and barbarism. His use of this paradigm assumes and sustains its validity, often blurring the line between his take on Vargas Llosa whom he accurately defines as some- one who wishes us to acknowledge that he belongs squarely in the Western tradition (ix)and his own position. Vargas Llosa, according to Muoz, incorporates the market into his notion of the western tradi- tion. Muoz wants his readers to identify him, in contrast to Vargas Llosa, as someone who sustains an earlier tradition of western moder- nity. This tradition embodies civilization. Evidence of Muozs moti- vations is how he contrasts the modernist tradition (Muoz refers often to Kant, Marx, and Durkheim, for example) to contemporary postmodernism, a term whose notoriously ambiguous meaning is not clarified here,8 and whose alleged pervasiveness Muoz relates to market hegemony (2223). Mu ozs use of the civilization barbarism

paradigm clarifies very little, and at times it slips into dangerous stereotypes. It does not ap- pear that he is being ironic or indirectly adopting Vargas Llosas per- spective when, for example, Mu oz calls Latin America one of the not-quite-mature areas of the world (26), or when he asserts that the end of the millennium is a time when the impertinent Many are turn- ing politics into a mundane, murky, carnivalesque affair (65), and that Peru is backward and barbarous (67). Thus Mu ozs essay tends to reproduce one of the most troubling aspects of the western tradition as it is still commonly sustained: its adherents define and equate terms like civilized and western by dismissing and excluding populations that allegedly lie beyond modernitys purview. Furthermore, an acritical appeal to the west tends to deny this act of
exclusion, as if the west- ern tradition could be identified unquestionably as existing prior to its originary violence.9

Internal AT: Perea

Perea is wrong the black/white paradigm segments our understanding of race and perpetuates ongoing structural violence against the non-white, non-black other
Kim, 1999 (Janine Young Kim, Associate Professor Of Law at Marquette University Law School , June, Are Asians Black?: The
Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 108, No. 8, Symposium: Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism (Jun., 1999), pp. 2385-2412, JSTOR) Juan Perea's The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought21 can be seen as an extension of the discussion Professors Omi and Winant began in Racial Formation. Professor Perea attempts to prove the existence of the black/white paradigm by applying Thomas Kuhn's study of paradigms to race discourse.22 Professor Perea finds that even as paradigms help us to frame knowledge, they also exclude and distort by defining, and thus limiting, relevancy.23 Accordingly, he defines the black/white paradigm as "the conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or primarily, of only two constituent racial groups, the Black and the White." 24 Professor Perea then documents the ways in which the black/white binary paradigm has excluded the experiences and struggles of Latinos and other non-Black, nonWhite groups by examining textbooks and history books that purport to deal with the race problem in general but focus primarily on the struggles of the African-American population.25 Professor Perea focuses largely on the effect of the black/white paradigm on scholarship and "normal research" on race.26 I emphatically agree with Professor Perea that the absence or marginalization in scholarship of other racialized groups such as Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans is harmful not only to these groups, but to the richness of race discourse in general. But I disagree with his suggestion that the black/white

paradigm has an unimportant role in forming or understanding the racial identities and positions of non-White, non-Black groups and individuals27 because, as I attempt to demonstrate in Part IV, the black/white paradigm is more sophisticated than Professor Perea's narrow, race-specific definition of it. Moreover, the ultimate purpose of Professor Perea's discussion remains somewhat confusing. He states that he opposes the use of paradigms and instead advocates the development of an inclusive and particularized understanding of race.28 Although he denies that his "new understanding " of race is another paradigm, it is not clear how or why it manages not to be one.

Impact Neoliberalism Bad in LA

Neoliberalism has normalized violence in the lived experiences of Latin America populations
Sanchez, 2006 (Magaly Sanchez R., Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science: Volume 606: pages 178-195,
The social

expression of violence in Latin America occurred in three historical moments , each came structural violence, the rampant economic inequality, social exclusion, and persistent poverty arising from the imposition of neoliberal economic policies. In response came two other kinds of collective violence, one political and the other criminal. As the urgency of circumstances facing middle-and working-class people increased, many turned to radical violence, leading to successive waves of strikes, demonstrations, and insurrections throughout the region. At the same time, the situation of the poor and the young deteriorated, and many of them turned to criminal violence in the form of youth gangs, criminal mafias, and drug cartels . If
characterized by its own form of violence. First "unstable social equilibrium" refers to the tenuous stability under which the powerful negotiate political compromises with diverse interests to maintain social control, then rising violence and growing insecurity suggest a new "social disequilibrium" and a progressive loss of control throughout Latin America. In the region's largest cities, disorder

and violence become part of daily life. This situation has created a self-feeding cycle whereby neoliberal policies generate high rates of inequality, exclusion, poverty, and alienation, which yield a rising tide of both radical and criminal violence, which triggers more state coercion, which, in turn, encourages more violent resistance from below. The end result is a militarized elite facing a mobilized and hostile population made up not just of the urban poor and unemployed but also disaffected technical, managerial, and professional classes
who have found their living standards eroded by the devaluation of wages and the accompanying decrease in purchasing power. Under these conditions of generalized discontent and instability, the institutions

of democracy lose flexibility, and the paternalistic state of old reemerges to offer models of authoritarian repression and militarized violence to establish order.

Neoliberalism breeds structural poverty and inequality in Latin America

Huber and Solt, 2004 (Evelyn and Frederick, professors of political science at UNC Chapel Hill and Iowa respectively,
Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism, Latin American Research Review, 2 4, Higher levels of liberalization and more radical processes of liberalization are associated with higher levels of inequality and poverty. The changes in inequality are impressive: The countries with the more liberalized economies as of 1995 started out around 1982 with lower levels of inequality than the countries with the less liberalized economies as of 1995, but the two sets of countries switched position, with the more liberalized economies ending up with higher levels of inequality around 1995 than the less liberalized economies. Looking at the process of reform, we see that the more radical reformers started out and ended up with lower levels of inequality than the more moderate reformers, as both sets of countries saw an increase in inequality. However, the gap between the two sets of countries narrowed considerably, as the more radical reformers increased their Gini index twice as much as the more moderate reformers. The greatest costs in terms of inequality were incurred by drastic reform episodes; countries that had more drastic reform episodes increased their Gini index nine times more than countries that avoided them. There is no doubt, then,

that higher levels of neoliberalism and more aggressive tactics of liberalization are associated with rising inequality. The picture on poverty is equally consistent. More liberalized economies and more radical reform approaches are associated with higher levels of poverty. Since we do not have comparable data for the period before the onset of reforms, proponents of neoliberalism will argue that this must be a result of initially higher levels of poverty in the radical reformers. However, we need to remember that the more liberalized economies started out with a higher level of GDP per capita in 1982, had higher economic growth in the period between 1982 and 1998, and ended up with a level of GDP per capita in 1998 roughly a third higher than the less liberalized economies. So, the very least we can say is that economic growth certainly did not trickle down and did nothing to relieve the higher levels of poverty in the more liberalized economies. If we consider the poverty data in conjunction with the inequality data, this seems to be a great understatement.

Neoliberalism segregates the poor, who consequently rely on violence to survive in places like Mexico and Venezuela
Sanchez, 2006 (Magaly Sanchez R., Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science: Volume 606: pages 178-195, The nations of Latin

America and the Caribbean exhibit some of the highest rates of socioeconomic inequality in the world (Hoffman and Centeno 2003). Highly unequal with respect to income, nations throughout the region are also characterized by divided access to education, health, clean water, safe food, and by poverty and exclusion leads increasingly to urgent basic public services such as electricity and sewers, yielding
huge disparities in assets, opportunities, and voice. In the region today, the richest one-tenth of families earns 48 percent of total income, whereas the poorest one-tenth earns just 1.6 percent (de Ferranti et al. 2003). Statistics and experience coincide in revealing that poverty and inequality are more serious problems today than when the foreign debt crisis first broke out in 1982 (Pedrazzini and Sanchez 1998). Current expressions of violence are properly understood in the context of structural adjustment policies and their consequences. I argue that violence in Latin America follows directly from underlying

inequalities brought about by the imposition of neoliberal policies. The proliferation of street children and youth gangs in Latin American cities are but one expression of structural exclusion, and if it continues new and more dramatic forms of violence can be expected to arise and spread, touching the lives of millions more. It is not that people are violent because they are poor. Rather, the long-term segregation of people within neighborhoods of concentrated poverty produces, across the generations, ways of life and household strategies that necessarily adapt to conditions of deprivation. They come to rely on violence as a basic tool for survival. The emerging space of violence was taken up first by radicalized and disenfranchised young people but has since spread to other sectors of society in the form of arms trading, drug trafficking, and kidnapping rings, which now abound in countries such as Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil. These activities together constitute a growing criminal economy (Castells 1998; Rementeria 2003). Rather than viewing violence as a personal deviation from societal norms, it is more appropriate to consider it a product of structural inequalities, a social phenomenon in which multiple actors resort to the use of violence under similar social circumstances and in mutually reinforcing ways, not as isolated individuals. The expansion of the criminal economy
occurred within a context where urban residents had already lived for generations under "illegal" circumstances, having acquired their dwellings through informal processes of squatting and land invasion. Urban slums were always considered violations of the legal norms of private property, title, and ownership. Despite their widespread de facto existence through out Latin America, poor slum dwellers have often been repressed through forced removals and state-led redevelopment programs. Nonetheless, after decades of economic crisis slums have become so common and so endemic to the structure and organization of the Latin American metropolis that it is presently impossible to consider them as a violation; they are the norm.

Neoliberalism has socialized and normalized violence throughout Latin America

Sanchez, 2006 (Magaly Sanchez R., Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science: Volume 606: pages 178-195, The new

spaces that have been created in Latin American cities not only constitute economic niches but also operate as socialization systems. Socialization into the beliefs, practices, and values of surrounding people and groups is inherent to the human condition. When the surrounding social environment is violent, there fore, those coming of age within it will themselves be violent, often more so. Children born into popular urban barrios typically lack birth certificates, making them technically "undocumented " in their own land. Without identification documents, they cannot receive state services, notably health care and education, and are thus relegated to learning on streets where they come to be identified as "predators" because they do not fit within the "established order" of the state, which has no way of taking them into account (Pedrazzini and Sanchez 1992/1998). Under conditions of prolonged informality and illegality, and without official documentation, the structural violence of neoliberalism produced new expressions of violence. Street boys point to their lack
of legal documents as the "reason" they "violate the law" and live as "dirty and uneducated" on the streets rather than attending school. Among teenagers and adults, the combination of no documents and concentrated poverty explains

the rise of more advanced and radicalized forms of violence (Sanchez 2002). The spiral of violence is well indicated by the homicide rate. In recent years, it has risen dramatically .The regional average is now twenty murders for every hundred thousand people, making Latin America one of the most violent regions in the
world (Portes and Hoffman 2003). By 1998, violence had become the leading cause of death for those aged fourteen to forty-four in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Health Organization 1999; Huggins 2000; Briceno-Le6n and Zubillaga 2002).

The introduction of neoliberalism to Latin America has hallowed regional institutions and paved the way for corporate exploitation and savagery
Galeano, 1971 (Eduardo Galeano, Uruguayan journalist, writer, and poet, Open Veins of Latin America) Some innocents still believe that all countries end at their borders. They say that the United States has little or nothing to do with Latin American integration, for the simple reason that the United States is not a member of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), or of the Central American Common Market.
Integration, they say, is as the liberator Simn Bolivar wanted it: it goes no further than the border separating Mexico from its powerful northern neighbor. Those who sustain this seraphic notion suffer from a form of amnesia which may not be wholly disinterested. They forget that a legion of pirates, merchants, bankers. Marines,

technocrats, Green Berets, ambassadors, and captains of industry have, in a long black page of history, taken over the life and destiny of most of the peoples of the south, and that at this moment Latin Americas industry lies at the bottom of the lmperium's digestive apparatus. Our union makes "their" strength to the extent that our countries, not having broken from the molds of underdevelopment and dependence, integrate their own respective serfdoms. Official LAFTA documents exalt the role of private capital in the
development of integration-and we have seen in previous chapters in whose hands that private capital lies. In mid-April 5369, the Consultative Council on Business Affairs met in Asuncin. Among other things, it reaffirmed "the orientation of the Latin American economy, in the sense that economic integration of the zone must be achieved fundamentally on the basis of the development of private enterprise." It recommended that the governments introduce common legislation for the formation of "multinational enterprises, made up predominantly [sic] of capital and entrepreneurs from the member states" All the keys were handed over to the thief. Back in April l967, in the final declaration of the Punta del Este conference-on which Lyndon Johnson himself plated his golden seal-the creation of a common market of shares was even proposed, a kind of integration of stock exchanges, so that enterprises located anywhere in Latin America could be purchased anywhere in Latin America. Official documents went so far as to recommend openly the denationalization of public enterprises. The first gathering of the meat industry within LAFTA, in Montevideo in April 1969, resolved "to request the governments . . . to study suitable methods to achieve progressive transference of state meatpacking plants to the private sector," At the same time, the Uruguayan government, one of whose members chaired the meeting, pursued an all-out policy of sabotage of the state-owned Frigorfico Nacional packing plant in favor of those privately owned by foreigners. Tariff disarmament, which is gradually freeing the circulation of merchandise within the LAFTA area, is intended to reorganize

the distribution of Latin American production centers and markets for the benefit of the great multinational corporations, The "escalation economy" now prevails: the first phase, carried out these re- cent years, has seen the consolidation of foreign power over the launching platforms-the industrialized cities-from which the regional market as a whole is to be dominated. The enterprises in Brazil with the greatest interest in Latin American integration are precisely the foreign ones and, above all, the most powerful ones." Of the multinational corporations-mostly United States-owned-replying to an all-Latin American questionnaire sent out by the IDB, more than half were planning or proposing that their activities in the second half of the 1960s be in the extended LAFTA market, creating or strengthening regional departments." In September l969, Henry
Ford ll announced at a Rio de Janeiro press conference that he wanted to join in the Brazilian economic process "because the situation is very good. Our initial participation consisted of purchasing Willys Overland do Brazil." He said he would be exporting Brazilian vehicles to several Latin American countries. Caterpillar Tractors, a firm that has always treated the world as one sin gle market," according to Business International -took advantage of the tariff reductions as soon as they were negotiated, and in 1965 was already supplying various South American countries with bulldozers and tractor spare parts from its plant in Sao Paulo. With equal speed, Union Carbide began showering electrotechnical products on Latin American countries from its Mexican factory, availing itself of customs, tax, and advance-deposit exemptions in the LAFTA area. The Latin American countriesimpoverished, incommunicado, decapitalized, and facing serious structural problems within their

own frontiers progressively dismantle their economic, financial, and fiscal barriers in the monopolies' favor. The result is that the monopolies, which are still strangling each country separately, can move outward and consolidate a new division of labor on a regional scale by specializing their activities by countries and sphere of activity, fixing optimum sizes for their affiliated enterprises, reducing costs, eliminating competitors outside the area, and stabilizing markets. The affiliates of the multinational corporations can point to the conquest of the Latin American market in certain spheres
and under certain conditions not affecting the global policies of their head offices. As we saw in an earlier chapter, the international division of labor continues functioning as it always did for Latin America: the changes are only within the region. The presidents declared at Punta del Este that "foreign private initiative will be able to perform an important function to assure achievement of the

objectives of integration," and they agreed that the IDB should increase "the sums avail- able for export credits in intra-Latin American trade." Fortune in l967 assessed the "enticing new opportunities" which the Latin American Common Market opens to northern business: "In many a boardroom, the common market is becoming a serious element in planning for the future. Ford Motor do Brasil, which makes Galaxies, thinks it could mesh nicely with Ford of Argentina, which makes Falcons, thus deriving economies of scale by producing both cars for larger markets. Kodak, which now makes photographic paper in Brazil, would like to make exportable film in Mexico and cameras and projectors in Argentina,"" The magazine cited other examples of "rationalizing" or "expanding" operations by corporations such as ITT, General Electric, Remington Rand, Otis Elevator, Worthington, Firestone, Deere, Westinghouse, Air Brake and American Machine and Foundry. Nine years ago Raul Prebisch, a vigorous advocate of LAFTA, wrote: "Another argument I often hear, from Mexico to Buenos Aires, passing through Sao Paulo and Santiago, is that the

Common Market will offer foreign industry opportunities for expansion that it does not now have in our limited markets It is feared that the benefits offered by the Common Market will be taken advantage of principally by foreign industry, and not by national industries I shared and share this fear,
not only in imagination but because l have verified the reality of that fact in practice." This verification did not prevent Prebisch from later signing a document concerning integration in progress in which it is stated that "foreign capital undoubtedly has an important role in the development of our economies," and proposing that mixed companies be founded in which "the Latin American entrepreneur may participate efficiently and equitably." Equitably? Yes, "equality of opportunity" must of course be preserved. Anatole Hanes aptly said that the law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor from sleeping under bridges, begging in the street, and stealing bread. But it hap pens that on this planet and in this epoch one enterprise alone, General Motors, employs as many workers throughout the world as the entire active population of Uruguay, and earns in a single year four times as much money as the whole Cross National Product of Bolivia. The corporations know, from the experience of previous integrations, the advantages of acting as "insiders" in the capitalist development of other areas. The fact that the total sales of worldwide U.S. affiliates are six times the value of U,S. exports tells its own story." In Latin America as elsewhere, the United States' inconvenient antitrust laws do not apply. Here, with full impunity, countries become pseudonyms for the foreign concerns that dominate them. The first LAFTA implementation agreement was signed in August 1962 by

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, but in fact it was an agreement between IBM, IBM, IBM, and IBM. It eliminated import duties in the four countries on computers and their components, while raising duties on these machines
imported from outside the area: IBM "suggested to the governments that if they eliminated duties on trade between themselves, it would build plants in Brazil and Argentina . . ."" Mexico added its signature on the second agreement: this time it was RCA and Phillips (Dutch) which promoted the ex- emption for radio and TV equipment. And so on. The ninth agreement, in the spring of 1969, divided the Latin American market in electrical generating, transmission, and distribution equipment between Union Carbide, General Electric, and Siemens (German). The Central American Common Market, an effort to join the rachitic and deformed economies of live countries, has served to blow down with one puff the feeble national producers

of cloth, paint, medicines, cosmetics, and biscuits, and to expand the profits and trading orbit of General Tire and Rubber, Procter & Gamble, Grace, Colgate-Palmolive, Sterling Products, and National Biscuit. In Central America, liberation from customs duties has also gone hand in hand with raising the barriers
against external foreign" competition (as it might be called) so that "internal foreign" firms may sell at higher prices and greater profits: "The subsidy received through tariff protection exceeds the total value added by the domestic production process." No one has a better sense of proportion than these foreign enterprises: their own and other enterprises' proportions. What, for example, would he the point of installing a big auto plant, steel blast furnaces, or an Important chemical factory in Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, or Ecuador, with their miniscule markets? The spring-board sites are chosen elsewhere on the basis of the size and growth potential of the internal markets. FUNSA, the Uruguayan tin plant, depends substantially on Firestone but it is Firestone`s affiliates in Brazil and Argentina that expand with a view to integration. The growth of the Uruguayan plant is braked, applying the same criterion that determines that Olivetti, the Italian firm invaded by General Electric, will make its typewriters in Brazil and its calculating machines in Argentina. "The efficient assignment of resources requires an unequal development of the different parts of a country or region," says Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and an Integrated Latin America will also have its Northeasts and its poles of development." Weighing the eight years of life of the Montevideo Treaty which sparked LAFTA, the Uruguayan delegate said that "differences in degrees of development" between the various countries "tend to sharpen, for the mere increase of trade in an interchange of reciprocal concessions can only augment the previously existing inequality between privileged poles and submerged areas. The Paraguayan ambassador made a similar complaint: absurdly, he said, the weak countries were subsidizing the industrial development of the free trade zone's most advanced countries, absorbing their high internal costs through customs exemptions. He added that the deterioration of the terms of trade punished his country as severely within LAFTA as outside it: " For every ton of products Imported from the zone, Paraguay pays with two." The reality, said the spokesman for Ecuador,

was that of "eleven countries in different degrees of development, which means greater or lesser capacities to take advantage of the free trade area and leads to polarization of the benefits and handicaps." The Columbian ambassador drew "just one conclusion: the program of liberation benefits the three big countries in conspicuous disproportion. As integration proceeds, the small countries will be renouncing
their customs income-which in Paraguay finances nearly half of the national budget - in exchange for the doubtful advantage of receiving, for example, cars from Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, or Mexico made by the same firms that sell them in Detroit, Wolfsburg, or Milan at half the price." This is the solid fact beneath the frictions increasingly provoked by the integration process. The

successful emergence of the Andean Pact, bringing together the Pacific nations, is one result of the three big countries` visible hegemony in the broader framework of LAFTA: the small countries propose to
unite separately. But despite all the problems, thorny as they may appear, the markets expand as the satellites keep bringing new satellites into their orbit of dependent power. Under the Castelo Bronco dictatorship, Brazil signed an agreement guaranteeing foreign investments which saddles the state with the risks and handicaps of each business deal. Significantly, the official who arranged the agreement defended its humiliating conditions before Congress with the statement that "in the near future Brazil will be investing capital in Bolivia, Paraguay, or Chile and will then need agreements of this type." In the Brazilian governments following the coup d tat of 1964, a tendency has in fact developed to assign to Brazil a "sub-imperialist" function vis-vis its neighbors. A

very influential military clique pictures the country as the great administrator of U.S. interests in the region, and calls on Brazil to become the same sort of boss over the south as the United States is over Brazil itself. In this connection, General Golbery do Couto e Silva has invoked a new "manifest destiny": "All the more so," wrote this ideologue of "sub imperialism" in 1952, "when our manifest destiny does not conflict in the Caribbean with that of our northern elder brothers" The General is now chairman of Dow Chemical in Brazil. Certainly the desired sub dominion structure has plentiful historical antecedents, from the annihilation of Paraguay on behalf of British bankers after the war of 1865 to the sending of Brazilian troops, just a century later, to head the solidarity operation when U.S. Marines invaded Santo Domingo. Recent years have seen a revival of the competition between the agents for imperialist interests installed in the Brazilian and Argentine governments on the troublesome question of continental leadership. Everything suggests that Argentina is in no condition to resist the powerful Brazilian challenge; Brazil
has double the land area and four times the population, produces nearly three times as much steel, double the cement, more than double the electric energy, and renews its merchant fleet fifteen times as fast. Furthermore, in the put two decades, its rate of economic growth has been considerably greater than Argentina`s. Until recently Argentina produced more cars and trucks than Brazil, but at the present rate Brazils auto industry will be three times larger than Argentina's by 1975 and its fleet - equal to Argentinas in 1966 - will be as big as that of all Latin America put together. Brazil offers foreign investors its far-flung potential market, its fabulous natural wealth, the strategic importance of its territory - sharing boundaries as it does with all the South American countries except Ecuador and Chile - and all the conditions for U.S. enterprises on its soil to advance with seven league boots. It has cheaper and more abundant labor than its rival: the average wage level is three times lower than In Argentina and the unemployed run into the millions. It is no accident that one-third of the processed and semi processed products sold within the LAFTA zone come from Brazil. This is the country called upon to become the axis of all Latin Americas liberation or servitude. Perhaps Senator Fulbright was not aware of the full significance of his words when in public statements in l965, he attributed to Brazil the mission of directing the Common Market of Latin America.

Neoliberalism in Latin America has paved the way for corporate exploitation and has exacerbated poverty and inequality
Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, Developmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374) By contrast to the cepalistas, the dependentistas criticized the import substitution industrialization model and the role of the national bourgeoisie. Prior to 195 , Latin American anti-imperialist movements struggled for the industrialization of the region as a so-called solution to the subordination to the capitalist centers. The imperialist alliance between foreign capital and the local landed oligarchy was an obstacle to the industri- alization of Latin America. The peripheral role assigned to Latin America in the international division of labor was to export primary products to the centers. However, as of 1950, with the proliferation of multinationals and a new international division of labor, industrialization to produce goods for the internal markets of La tin America was not in contradiction with the interest of international capital. The protectionist tariffs of the import substitution industrialization strategy and the search for cheaper labor costs increased foreign industrial investments in the Latin American periphery. Thus the nature of dependency was not any longer an industrial dependency, but a technological dependency. The problems with the balance of payments that the import substitution industrialization attempted to solve were dramatically aggravated due to the technological dependence on the centers. Rather than importing consumer goods, Latin Americans were

forced to import machinery, new technologies, patents, and licenses for which they needed to pay still more. The national bourgeoisie became associated with multinat ional corporations. They were dependent on foreign capitalists for technology, machinery, and finance. Thus, according to the dependentistas, the national bourgeoisie did not represent a progressive or reliable ally to dismantle the structures of the world capitalist system that reproduce underdevelopment in the periphery.

Neoliberal ideology establishes structural vulnerabilities in Latin America that create the foundation for gender violence
Morales and Bejarano, 2009 (Maria Cristina Morales, Associate Professor of Sociology at The University of Texas at El
Paso and Cynthia Bejarano, Associate Professor from the Department of Criminal Justice at New Mexico State University, Transnational sexual and gendered violence: an application of border sexual conquest at a MexicoUS border, Global Networks: Volume 9: Issue 3: July 2009, In summary, the Ju rez feminicides are more than forms of structural violence; they are examples of border sexual conquest. First, at the centre of border sexual conquest are sexual and gender aspects of violence. Rape, murder, attacks on feminine body parts, and theories surrounding their deaths that characterize the victims as socially insignificant or even deserving of the violence, all sexualize the violence that girls and women experience. Second, a national history of sexual exploitation as a

colonizing tool that surfaces today through the expansion of neoliberalism has an impact on the feminicides. In particular, neoliberalism has encouraged the collapse of the infrastructure that accompanied accelerated population growth and heightened global and local inequalities, both of which increase violence. Third, the depiction of this border as a region in which anything goes made it an ideal site for transnational corporations to experiment with globalization and not be accountable for the structural vulnerabilities that subjected women to sexual violence . Cynthia Morales, former programme director of the
Center against Family Violence, states that male partners forcibly transport women from El Paso to Ju rez with the intention of killing them. Sexual and gender violence is then rooted in the different structural factors applying to women residing in local places perceived to be marginal, which their counterparts in other places do not face. Fourth, women confront conquest through protests, civil disobedience and outreach to international governmental and non-governmental organizations. As such, although conquest is ongoing, womens resilience and resistance continues in part because conquest is constantly at work, aiming to strip this transnational community of its social, economic and political resources.

Neoliberalism creates inequality which spurs violent forms of sexual hatred

Morales and Bejarano, 2009 (Maria Cristina Morales, Associate Professor of Sociology at The University of Texas at El
Paso and Cynthia Bejarano, Associate Professor from the Department of Criminal Justice at New Mexico State University, Transnational sexual and gendered violence: an application of border sexual conquest at a Mexico US border, Global Networks: Volume 9: Issue 3: July 2009, The most brutal and obvious form of border sexual conquest is feminicide. It is not viable to discuss violence on this border without acknowledging that the feminicides continue. Although sexual violence has always existed,

systemic patterns of sexual violence have moved to the forefront in u rez since the early 1990s, after BIP and during NAFTA. Below, we discuss how the feminicides are an example of border sexual conquest. The violence against women in this place is sexual and gendered. In 2 8, violence in Ju rez escalated to approximately 16
murders; 86 of which were women. While male homicide rates are about 16 times higher than female ones (Mart nez Canizales and Howard 2006), girls and women are subjected to sexualized violence through rape and/or the dismemberment of their feminine body parts. In December 2 8, the body of a 31-year-old woman found on the streets of Ju rez had two messages inscribed on it. One written on her abdomen stated the devil is on the loose in Ju rez. Dont go out sexy or alone. We will continue to inform. The authorities did not disclose the content of the second message on her breast. Despite the sexual normative messages written on her body, the authorities ascribed her death to alcohol poisoning. The sexualized aspects of the feminicides are also evident in the popular theories suggesting that the victims were leading double lives as prostitutes. The police frequently drive the moth ers of those who have gone missing around the red light district in search of their daughters, even if they had disappeared elsewhere and in broad daylight. In such an environment, politicians tend to blame the victim if there is any suggestion that she may have overstepped sexual norms (Staudt and Campbell 2008) and their disposability becomes integrated into the social fabric. This form of violence is an expression of sexual politics and power by which oppression takes the sexual form of dead nude or semi -nude female bodies (Mon rrez Fragoso, 2 5; Segato 2 6). When the feminicides were first documented, some of the victims were en route to or from their work at mostly American-owned maquiladoras. Consequently, inter- national coverage and activists made the connection between the feminicides and transnational corporations (Arriola 2 7; Fregoso 2 3; Wright 2 1). However, Mon rr ez Fragoso (2005) found that, between 1993 and 2003, only 20.8 per cent of the women killed worked at a maquiladora or had previously worked at one.Regardless of the number of victims associated with maquiladoras , the adverse effects of neoliberalism created a climate of violence. This politico-economic trans- formation has

lured thousands of young women, mostly from southern Mexico and Central America, to this border (Salzinger 2 3), along with men and women who migrate to Ju rez with intentions of crossing into the USA. The social and physical infrastructure of u rez could not sustain such excessive urban growth, which created a climate of a city spinning out of control (Portillo 2002). The UN Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) strengthens this argument by stating that neoliberalism intensifies insecurity (Kirby 2006). In other words, neo- liberalism exacerbates inequality, which in turn perpetuates violence (Briceo Le n and Zubillaga 2002; Moser and Mcilwaine 2006; Sanchez 2006), including sexual violence (Adomako Ampofo et al. 2004; Hawthorne 2004). Furthermore, the differential positioning of women, through the global connection

between cheap labour and cheap products, devalues women from the poorer areas of the world
(Bhattacharyya et al. 2 2). Along with this devaluation of women in Ju rez are daily confrontations with threats of and act ual encounters with sexual aggression.

Impact Invisible Violence

This way of thinking perpetuates invisible forms of violence that subjugate Latin American populations
Martinez, 1994 (Elizabeth, Chicana activist, author, and educator, March, Seeing More Than Black & White (Latinos, racism,
and the cultural divides) http: blackwht.htm)

Latino invisibility - like that of Native Americans and Asian/Pacific Americans - has been close to absolute in U.S. seats of power, major institutions, and the non-Latino public mind. Having lived on
Until very recently, both the East and West Coasts for long periods, I feel qualified to pronounce: an especially myopic view of Latinos prevails in the East. This, despite such data as a 24.4 percent Latino population of New York City alone in 1991, or the fact that in 1990 more Puerto Ricans were killed by New York police under suspicious circumstances than any other ethnic group. Latino populations are growing rapidly in many eastern cities and the rural South, yet remain invisibile or stigmatized - usually both. Eastern blinders persist. I've even heard that the need for a new racial paradigm is dismissed in New York as a California hangup. A black Puerto Rican friend in New York, when we talked about experiences of racism common to Black and brown, said "People here don't see Border Patrol brutality against Mexicans as a form of police repression," despite the fact that the Border Patrol is the largest and most uncontrolled police force in the U.S. It would seem that an old ignorance has combined with new immigrant bashing to sustain divisions today.

Impact Racism
Racism is the root cause of genocidal violence and war
Martin, 1990 (Brian, associate professor in Science, Technology, and Society at the University of Wollongong, Uprooting War,

Racism has been a major factor in many wars, and also has motivated a great deal of exploitation and genocide. Racism is tied up with unequal social and power relations: genetic, cultural or other real or attributed differences are used to mobilise one group of people against another. One driving force behind racism is the advantage to the dominant group of exploiting the subordinate group. Racism also strengthens the positions of certain elites within each ethnic group, even when no ethnic group dominates: hierarchy and elitism are allegedly justified by the need to confront the ethnic enemy (rather than inequalities within one's own ethnic group) Racial violence of course occurs in 'peacetime' as well as war. The key link between racism and war is the link between the power hierarchies which derive strength from racial dominance and the power hierarchies of the war system. Racism also serves to dehumanise people. In many wars the enemy has been characterised as racially inferior or sub-human. This process of turning the enemy into a different type of person, an 'other,' is used to mobilise people around one state against another. Racial
antagonism can become extremely deep-rooted in societies, and the passions aroused have been rivalled perhaps only by religious intolerance. As in the case of patriarchy, the elite mobilisation of ethnic hatred for state purposes may play a reduced role as war becomes increasingly bureaucratic and technological. Like feminism, anti-racism can play a significant role in a struggle to remove the sources of war, to the extent that the aim is not simply to obtain racial integration within existing hierarchies or to set up alternative hierarchies, but rather to reorganise social life in an egalitarian way.

Racism is the current manifestation of biopower. Our enemies are no longer identified in political terms, but rather ethnic enemies. Racism is the societal justification for state violence the murderous function of the biopolitical state can only be assured by racism which is indispensable to it
Mendieta 2 (Eduardo. Professor at Stony Brook University, To Make Live and Let Die Foucalt on Racism, APA Central
Division Meeting, April 25, This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal meurtri re function of the state,

to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism (Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture The Political Technology of Individuals which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures the power of the state after the 18 th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics. is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a
(Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power,

biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body . Racism makes the

killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society
as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.


Solvency Challenging Thinking/Understanding Key

Challenging the way we currently think about and understand Latin America is necessary to imagine new possibilities
Besse 4 (Susan K. Besse, Associate Professor of History at City College and the Graduat e Center, CUNY, Placing Latin America
in Modern World History Textbooks Hispanic American Historical Review 84.3 (2 4) 411-422, Project Muse) Recent world history textbooks have been beefed up with additional pages about peripheral regions in general, and Latin America in particular, but this has not automatically rescued these areas from irrelevance. Even Peter Stearns, who includes a lengthy chapter on twentieth-century Latin America in his 2002 edition of World History in Brief, concludes that the region has always occupied a somewhat ambiguous place in world history. First, it does not fit neatly into either Western or non -Western societies, but is better seen as a syncretic civilization. Second, although Stearns judges that continuing dependency makes Latin America a full participant in the world economy, it participates not always influentially. Latin Americans have generated neither dramatic cultural forms nor catastrophic military upheavals of international impact. Nationalism and literary preoccupation with issues of Latin American identity follows from a sense of being ignored and misunderstood in the wider world.2 Somewhat apologetically, Stearns predicts that the region will have an increasing international impact in the twenty-first century thanks to its growing population, economic advances, and new cultural selfconsciousness. Indeed, in the United States (where the Hispanic population has recently surpassed the African American population and continues to grow rapidly), it is easy to make a case for expanded coverage of Latin America in world history textbooks on the grounds of academic inclusion. Increasing numbers of Hispanic students will demand to learn more about their heritage, and other citizens of the United States will benefit from an awareness of the culture of minority populations with whom they live and work. These are important, but insufficient, reasons for increased coverage of the region in world history courses. New chapters that make up for past omissionscompensatory history will accomplish little. Such additions are unlikely to convince either skeptical instructors or overburdened students that the new material is significant and thus worthy of much (or any) attention in a crowded seme ster. Like new sections about women pasted into old androcentric textbooks, such additions do not provoke a reconceptualization of the story; thus, they do nothing to overcome the marginalization of the history of Latin America in the field of world history. Latin America will only be featured more prominently as globalization changes not only our present lives but also the ways in which we question the past. As Michael Geyer and Charles Bright have argued, neither triumphal narratives of the rise of Europe, nor a string of regional histories, can account for a global present that they define as being marked simultaneously by accelerating integration and proliferating difference. Rather, an intellectually compelling and relevan t history requires attention to the multiple and competing pasts of the many actors who are currently debating the terms of global integration. 3

By combining structuralist and postcolonial approaches, it is becoming possible to

imagine new narratives that integrate macroanalysis of global systems with serious attention to the everyday lived experiences, ideas, and values of diverse peoples drawn together in relationships of
conflict and collaboration.

We must call into question the assumptions and ideology that underpin U.S. selective engagement this is the only strategy that has any hope of altering the coordinates of our thinking
Brohman 95 (John Brohman, Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From Modernisation to
Neoliberalism, Third World Quarterly: Volume 16: Issue 1,

At a methodological level, a theory is largely determined by its underlying framework or presuppositions, and thus there exists a close connection between the framework, the theory and the subject and methods of
research. It is a common observation of the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science that a theory allows researchers to study only the subject matter to which the theory directs them. A theory is determined by its own framework and, in turn, the theory interprets its subjects in accordance with its own logic. Alternatively, a different underlying framework will yield a different theory that will address different subjects using different methods . Accordingly, if the frameworks and theories that are commonly employed in development studies omit important elements of Third World development, we need to

rethink our key concepts and theoretical discourses and engage in a process of theoretical renewal. In a recent review of contending theories of development,6 Davis asserts that the development field currently faces three broad challenges: first, to identify untenable concepts, categories,and theoretical propositions about Third World development; second, to trace the historical and ideological origins of these concepts and theoretical propositions; and, third, to 'unlearn' our preconceived notions and prevailing discourses that prevent us from

understanding the complexities of development in various Third World areas. Our approach to development needs to foster a sensitivity to the local context rather than indiscriminately replicating ideas and models generated out of context. Development principles should not be formed via the direct transplanting of preconceived approaches; instead, they should be reconsidered in terms of particular sociocultural, political, economic and environmental conditions.

Our openness to new forms of understanding and knowledge is an effective form of resistance
Davis 99 (Diane E. Davis, Professor of Political Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Power of Distance: Re Theorizing Social Movements in Latin America, Theory and Society, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Aug., 1999), pp. 585-638, JSTOR) Most scholars who work on Latin American social movements borrow frameworks developed by those who study Europe and North America. Little effort has been made to formulate alternative models deliberately sensitive to the unique political, social, cultural, and economic developments in Latin America. Furthermore, the two models most frequently utilized, mainly the political opportunity structure (POS) and new social movement (NSM) approaches, are limited in their explanatory potential and scope because they are built on "western" assumptions about state formation and state-society relations that do not hold in the Latin American context. In what follows, I offer a new and more historically specific framework for the study of social movements, built around a phenomenological understanding of space conceived as both a material and a social construct. By encouraging a sensitivity to space and how it articulates with historically given patterns of state formation, class formation, and citizenship, as well as racial, ethnic, and gender-specific identity politics, my larger aim is to provide a new way of understanding and theorizing the origins, nature, and consequences of social movements in different comparative and historical contexts. I argue that once we more conscientiously develop what Anthony Giddens, Doreen Massey, and Alan Pred, among others, call the"space/time" dimension of our theorizing, we can better understand social movements in Latin America and elsewhere, not just who joins them and the role that meaning and stragegy play in these decisions, but also their larger implications for political and social change.

We must be willing to re-build our understanding of Latin America to create new possibilities for celebrating difference through an ethic of care
Kraniauskas 2k (John, Professor of Latin American Cultural History at Birckbeck College, University of London, Hybridity in a
Transnational Frame: Latin-Americanist and Postcolonial Perspectives on Cultural Studies, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 1, p. 111-137) From the point of view of this tradition of political and cultural interpretation in Latin America, it is thus not surprising that Culturas h bridas should suggest a modernizing politics of its own that, with the help of recent postmodern critiques of modernist grand narratives of progress, attempts to overcome this opposition between modernization and traditions that persist (Garc a Can clini 1989, 331). Perhaps the central theme of cultural politics today, says Garc a Canclini, is how to build

societies on the basis of democratic projects that are shared by all without equalizing them, where disaggregation becomes diversity, and where inequalities (between classes, ethnic or social groups) are transformed into difference (148). Garc a Can- clini recognizes that one cannot just enter and leave modernity, that it is a
condition that contains us, in cities and in the countryside, in the metropoli and the underdeveloped countries. Here, however, he does not follow An- derson and advocate political rupture with modernity. He rather suggests that the only answer may be to radicalize the project of modernity . . . to renovate . . . to create new possibilities so that modernity can be something else and something more (333). In Garc a Canclinis (323) view, such a politics would be new and arise from the contemporary cultural reorganization of power . . . of the

political consequences of passing from a vertical and bipolar conception of sociopolitical relations to a decentered, multi-determined onein other words, I assume, the replacement of class politics by the
disenchanted politics of social movements. What emerges, however, is a cultural politics in which a self-styled modernity identifies its own opposites, that is, those traditions it must overcome. Culturas h bridas may thus itself also be read politically and obliquel y as providing intellectual resources for such a democratic social and cultural projectfor, in other words, taking charge of the more recent configurations of modernity in Latin America.

Solvency Radical Openness Key

Changing our understanding about Latin America through radical openness is key
Martinez 94 (Elizabeth, Chicana activist, author, and educator, March, Seeing More Than Black & White: Latinos, racism, and
the cultural divides http: blackwht.htm)

For a Latina to talk about recognizing the multi-colored varieties of racism is not, and should not be, yet another round in the Oppression Olympics. We don't need more competition among different social groupings for that
"Most Oppressed" gold. We don't need more comparisons of suffering between women and Blacks, the disabled and the gay, Latino teenagers and white seniors, or whatever. We don't need more surveys like the recent much publicized Harris Poll showing that different peoples of color are prejudiced toward each other - a poll patently designed to demonstrate that us coloreds are no better than white folk. (The survey never asked people about positive attitudes.) Rather,

we need greater knowledge,

understanding, and openness to learning about each other's histories and present needs as a basis for working together. Nothing could seem more urgent in an era when increasing impoverishment encourages a self-imposed separatism among people of color as a desperate attempt at community survival. Nothing could seem more important as we search for new social change strategies in a time of ideological confusion. My call to rethink concepts of racism in the U.S. today is being sounded elsewhere. Among academics, liberal foundation administrators, and activist-intellectuals, you can hear talk of the need for a new "racial paradigm" or model. But new thinking seems to proceed in fits and starts, as if dogged by a fear of stepping on toes, of feeling
threatened, or of losing one's base. With a few notable exceptions, even our progressive scholars of color do not make the leap from perfunctorily saluting a vague multi-culturalism to serious analysis. We seem to have made little progress, if any, since Bob Blauner's 1972 book "Racial Oppression in America". Recognizing the limits of the white-Black axis, Blauner critiqued White America's ignorance of and indifference to the Chicano/a experience with racism. Real opposition to new paradigms also exists. There are academics scrambling for one flavor of ethnic studies funds versus another. There are politicians who cultivate distrust of others to keep their own communities loyal. When we hear, for example, of Black/Latino friction, dismay should be quickly followed by investigation. In cities like Los Angeles and New York, it may turn out that political figures scrapping for patronage and payola have played a narrow nationalist game, whipping up economic anxiety and generating resentment that sets communities against each other.\\

Solvency Bottom-Up Key

Aligning ourselves with popular movements spurs indigenous widespread social change
Robinson, 2008 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Latin America and
Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective pg. xii-xiii) Neither Horizontalism nor Verticalism The claim that social relations can be transformed from civil society alone appears as the inverse of the old vanguardist model in which social and political forces mobilize through political organizations in order to overthrow the existing state, take power, and from the state transform society. That verticalist model-; pursued by much of the Latin American Left in the 1960s and 19705, often through armed struggles, has been recognized by most as a failure and as a dead end in the new century. As we saw, the indigenous and other social movements in Latin America, in distinction to the old vertical models, have spearheaded a new model of horizontal networking and organizational relations in a grassroots democratic processes from the bottom up. But at some point popular movements must work out how

the vertical and horizontal intersect. A long march through civil society may be essential to transform social relations, construct counter-hegemony from the ground up and assure popular control from below. Yet no emancipation is possible without an alternative project, and no such project is possible without
addressing the matter of the power of dominant groups, the organization of that power in the state (including coercive power), and the concomitant need to disempower dominant groups by seizing the state from them, dismantling it, and constructing alternative institutions. The current round of social and political struggle in Latin America high- lights the changing relation between social movements of the Left, political parties, the state, and global capitalism. This in turn raises the issue of political organizations that can mediate vertical links between political and civil society, that is, interface between the popular forces on the one hand and state structures on the other. How can internally democratic political instruments be developed to operate at the level of political society and dispute state power without diluting the autonomous mobilization of social movements? The potential for transformation will depend on the combination of independent pressure of mass social movements from below on the state and also on the representatives and allies of those movements taking over the state. The issue is how' to assure that political organizations are internally democratic. How can they serve as instruments of social movements and popular class mobilization and not the reverse?

Solvency AT: Neoliberalism in LA Inevitable

Neoliberalism in Latin America can be challenged it is not inevitable or pre-determined
Goldfrank, 2009 (Benjamin, Associate Professor and Chair, School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall
University, Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads pg. 45 -6) Weyland is correct that neoliberalism poses challenges to the left, especially in terms of implementing national-level economic alternatives. However, neoliberalism has not yet sounded the death knell for the left, and can be seen, rather, as having had at least three positive effects on the left. First, in their drive to reduce the weight of the central state and debt burdens, neoliberal reformers called for decentralization, which opened local spaces for the left and made municipal governments more relevant as potential showcases. Mayoral elections in major Latin American cities returned with democratization (Brazil, Uruguay, Peril) in the early 198 s or debuted for the rst time at the end of the decade (Venez uela) or in the late 1990s (Mexico City, as well as Buenos Aires and Santiago). While revenue transfers and taxation powers granted by national governments were not typically generous, the decentralizing trends at the end of the twentieth century did begin to reverse decades of centralized control. Second, the failure of neoliberal reforms to go beyond reducing ination to either produce strong economic growth or decrease poverty and inequality has lowered public support for such reforms and for the politicians associated with them (296, 306), thus opening the way for left candidates for higher office. Neoliberalism has also frequently been associated with politicians widely despised for some combination of authoritarianism, corruption, and mendacity. Obvious examples include Chiles Augusto Pinochet, Mexicos Carlos Salinas, Brazils Fernando Collor de Mello, Venezuelas Carlos Andr s P rez, Perus Alberto Fujimori, and Argentinas Carlos Menern. In Neoliberalism by Surprise (2001), the latter three exemplifiedin Susan Stokes polite phrasepolicy switchers, or politicians who promised not to implement drastic market reforms and proceeded to betray their mandates. Furthermore, Collor and Prez were impeached on corruption charges, Pinochet faced charges of corruption and human rights abuses, and Fujimori, Menem, and Salinas fled their countries to avoid trials and/or public contempt. Third, neoliberalism provided the left with a common enemy, facilitating alliances across parties, between parties and social movements, and across countries. Left parties always held divergent-views on capitalism and' the role and size of the market. Antineoliberalism helped as a rallying cry because it allowed different ideological tendencies to downplay disagreements, especially over eventual economic models. This rallying cry worked better before the recent rise of the left to national power in several countries; with the move from opposition to government, disputes over economic models have come to the fore (see later). Many scholars use anti-neoliberalism as the dening characteristic of the left (Harnecker 1995; Sader 2005). Because neoliberal economic policies are connected in many ways to- undemocratic or weakly democratic politics, as well as to the United States, the banner of anti-neoliberalism imparts two other important (noneconomic) meanings for the left: deepening democracy and anti-imperialism. In the absence of concrete economic alternatives, these symbols here become signicant markers of what left means. The left label is now associated not only with (perhaps vague) ideas of wealth redistribution and a strong state but also general ideas about participatory democracy and Latin American unity rather than submission to U.S. 'interests.' These symbols of deepening democracy and anti-imperialism contribute to the lefts appeal in a region where dissatisfaction with how democracy works is high (Lora and Panizza 2003: 124) and where public opinion of the United States is worsening, especially since 2000 (The Economist, October 30, 2003: 33-4).

Solvency AT: Practical/Pragmatic/Policy Action Key

Their focus on top-down political change destroys indigenous, popular movements and guarantees reactionary oppression
Robinson 8 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Latin America and Global
Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective pg. xii-xiii)

The challenge, hence, is how to convert a reactive global resistance into a proactive global program.
For poor majorities a resolution to the crisis requires a radical redistribution of wealth and power, predicated on the construction of more authentic democratic structures that allow for popular control over local and TNS institutions. The transformative possibilities that have opened up in Latin America cannot be realized without an organized Left and a democratic socialist program. Yet such possibilities will only end up frustrated by the old vanguardist model of top-down change by command and the military fetishism of the 1960s and 1970s that converted armed struggle from the means to an end into an end itself. Nowhere is this more evident than in the military hypertrophy" of the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC), which sees independent political mobilization as a threat to its own efforts to hegemonize resistance (Hylton, 2006). The transformative moment of the early twenty-rst century in Latin America will depend on the Lefts ability to learn the lessons of the previous era of revolution, especially the need to relinquish vanguardism of party and state and to encourage, respect, and subordinate itself to the autonomous mobilization from below of the popular classes and subordinate sectors. Popular and progressive resistance competes with the spread of reactionary resistance to global capitalism, ranging from religious fundamentalisms to racist and xenophobic right-wing populisms, which may well gain inuence if a popular project is unable to cohere . Moreover, we must not conate neoliberalism with global capitalism. Precisely because the neoliberal phase of global capitalism is coming to a clos e, resistance must move beyond the critique of neoliberalism. The problem of the particular neoliberal model is in the end symptomatic of the systemic problem of global capitalism. If it can be said that the Washington consensus" had cracked by the turn -of-century then what may replace neoliberalism in Latin America and in global society depends not only on

the struggle to oppose the neoliberal order but also on the struggle to develop a viable alternative
and to impose that alternative.

Theory-versus-action is a false dichotomy our approach is to create social justice synergies by tying theory to action in the form of praxis
Valdes, 2001 (Francisco, Professor of Law at the University of Miami, Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic and Caribbean
Legal Studies, B.A. from UC Berkeley, La Raza Law Journal, 12 La Raza L.J. 137, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Educat ion: Making Do While Making Waves, lexis)

Of course, I recognize that "theory' can become a substitute for action . I understand that theory can
become pedantic, obtuse, self-indulgent, effete. It can become an end unto itself, rather than a means toward an end. And for these reasons, I understand how and why some folks, maybe some of you here today, might disdain or fear theory, might view anything labeled as "theory' with suspicion grounded in experience. These dangers are real, and their consequences obviously are harmful to marginalized, outsider communities. Without doubt, then, we must guard always against any tendency toward theory for theory's sake, or toward art for art's sake; besieged communities cannot subsist only on art, nor only on theory. But these reasons and

dangers ultimately do not and cannot justify our rejection of critical theory as a key tool in our antisubordination arsenal, nor can these reasons lead to our self-defeating acceptance of, or acquiescence to, the theory-versus-action dichotomy. Our approach, I repeat, must be to fuse theory to action; to make social justice synergies from the fusion of antiessentialist theory and antisubordination action; to combust personal and collective action out of critical theory. Our approach to social struggles must include the embrace of critical theory, for critical theorizing is what permits us to name, to understand, and then to combat the structures and systems of subordination that surround and stifle us.

Only our approach paves the way for effective practical application and policy implementation Johnson, 1985 (John J. Johnson, professor emeritus of Latin American history at Stanford, One Hundred Years of
Historical Writing on Modern Latin America by United States Historians, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 745-765, JSTOR)

Recent publications in diplomatic history do not bode well. There has been a strong tendency to ground arguments more in ideological conviction than in empirical data. Researchers have chosen to deal with the practical rather than the theoretical aspect of policy formation and implementation. There remains surprisingly little agreement on identifying the basic issues, to say nothing of how they should be studied. Official documents have been downgraded to the point that they figure only marginally in most studies, those of Bryce Wood being major exceptions. Relying upon quantitative methodologies and dependency themes, many authors may have overemphasized economic stakes as the principal factor in explaining foreign policy behavior. The ranks of those who would sustain the politico-security argument have been significantly reduced.

Second Affirmative Constructive

2AC Framework
Our Affirmative is an on-point criticism of their approach to DEBATING about LATIN AMERICA. Their call to debate THIS TOPIC using the SAME method we apply to EVERY topic reaffirms the SAME way that we have always thought about and understood the nations and people of Latin America. The same way the U.S. picks-and-chooses how the engage Latin America, the Negative picks-and-chooses how to debate us and by doing so reinforces the violent ideologies we criticize and prevents us from reconceptualizing the way we think about Latin America, which is a PRIOR QUESTION to any of their offense And Their framework precludes us from challenging dominant ideologies about Latin America. On this topic especially, it is important to insist on the inclusion of critical theory in unique forums like debate in order to achieve any form of real progress. Our radical politics offers the only hope of guiding concrete social change
Valdes, 2001 (Francisco, Professor of Law at the University of Miami, Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic and Caribbean
Legal Studies, B.A. from UC Berkeley, La Raza Law Journal, 12 La Raza L.J. 137, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Educat ion: Making Do While Making Waves, lexis) Given the sociolegal landscape of these times,

this entrenched status quo is not likely to change substantially

anytime soon , at least not without great and sustained struggle. This struggle will require students to insist on critical theory in legal education, and to do so over and over again so that incremental progress is achieved, and then sticks . It will require that law school applicants ask recruiters about the inclusion and integration of critical theory in the curriculum, and to make it plain that final enrollment decisions can be affected, for the better or
worse, by the school's response to this question.

This struggle also will require individual faculty members

and administrators to support student requests and demands, and also to intervene proactively and strategically within the institution whenever possible, to expand opportunities for critical theory
in various aspects of formal legal education. Clearly, this struggle is ongoing. In the meantime, and

faculty and administrators can

must , at a minimum, increase the use of seminar offerings and settings, as well as similarly discretionary

opportunities for curricular action, to expand access to critical theory for today's students in these virtually unilateral and relatively expeditious ways. And students should, at a minimum, enroll in these courses and talk them up to
new students, supporting these marginal efforts in every possible way , both as students and as alumni. Which, of course, takes us back to the present status quo: the ghetto - the place from which we make waves while making do. Of course, this ghetto of boutique seminars, projects, and centers that exists today is a wonderful and lively place. You should take advantage of these offerings and celebrate this progress, including right here, with the Center for Social Justice and the many activities that it offers to you. It is this ghetto, precisely, that allows us to make do while making waves - and while insisting on a real integration of critical theory in legal education. To make headway, however, it seems to me that we also must create a demand - a "market' demand, if you will - for this kind of basic curricular reform as a substantive way to diversify American legal education and as a way to enhance its value to those of us who remain committed to the example and the legacy of Judge Olmos.

If we instead are

dismissive or fearful of theory, or indifferent to it in this context of institutional hostility, then we simply are acquiescing to an oppressive status quo that deprives us of a tool that we very much need to help foster and guide social change.

And Their framework is a dangerous form of language regulation that manipulates rules to institutionalize dominance. By establishing a monopoly on the content and style of lingual interactions, they make it impossible to even be exposed to indigenous perspectives, which creates a rigged game for the violent ideologies they replicate
Valdes, 1997 (Francisco, visiting Professor of Law at the Univeristy of Miami Law School, LatCrit Theory, Outsider
Jurisprudence and Latina o Self=Empowerment, Harvard Latino Law Review, 2 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 1997, lexis) The third symposium article, by Steven Bender, focuses on language regulation and "language vigilantism" as sources of Latina/o subordination and targets of LatCrit intervention. Professor Bender shows how "popular initiatives" effectively create hostile social, political and legal environments for Latinas/os and in particular how this form of direct lawmaking licenses a broader array of anti-Latina/o microaggressions. 31 In this way, Professor Bender displays not only the prominence of language-related issues to Latinas/os and LatCrit scholars, he also displays the relationship of law to politics or of rules and doctrines to power and privilege. 32 The terms of the language regulation debate, Professor Bender shows, are riddled with racist and nativist sentiment; the rhetoric and professed aim of the English-Only and Official English

movements are monolingual hegemony and English supremacy

as adjuncts of Anglo and White dominance . These movements use majoritarian politics to fashion and enact formal legal rules that institutionalize this dominance as a matter of law, thereby consolidating the power of historically privileged social groups or forces. 33 In this way, Professor Bender effectively employs a contemporary debate -- language, diversity and conformity -- as a case study that shows the direct link between politics, law and subordination. Given this link, critical analyses of the "law" must be cognizant of the politics that produced the status quo; antisubordination scholarship must be "political" if it is to account for and counteract the political nature and slant of the law.

And We affirm the resolution by calling for a substantial increase in radical forms of openness and engagement with Latin America. This means we dont justify the completely off-topic affirmatives theyre worried about And Their framework is heavily soaked with conservative ideology; the procedural bracketing out of our Affirmative is a strategy to maintain the status-quo
Meszaros 89 (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, p. 232-234) Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality the self-proclaimed Wertfeihert or value neutrality of so-called rigorous social science stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded (or suitably bracketed out) by the scientifically adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of methodological neutrality is bound to yield value neutral solutions with regard t o highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility or otherwise of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable
validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and meta-theory) is said to be in principle

separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish
the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of rational discourse. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast

areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from this rational discourse as metaphysical, ideological, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of methodology itself, all

those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse . As a result, the propounders of the right
method are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily a rise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For far from offering an adequate scope

for critical enquiry the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter . Instead, the stipulated common methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of rational discourse into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology : a
tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. 6.1.2 Naturally, to speak of a common methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ideal communication communities. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ideal types (or by putting into methodological brackets) the discussion

of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms from the Viennes
version of logical positivism to Wittgensteins famous ladder that must be thrown away at t he point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of little by little to the emotivist theory of value inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the

given society out of bounds to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally common methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be fairly obvious that to consent not to
question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the common identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious rational interlocutors, extracted from t heir divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the

elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. In other
words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of fact and value, theory and practice, formal and substantive rationality, etc., the conflict -transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of rational discourse in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to

challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several
steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable methodologically sanctioned credentials of procedural rules, models and paradigms? Once, though, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of

reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted.
This is why the allegedly non-ideological ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated at time completely bewildering mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

And Counter Interpretation: the Aff must use the resolution as a starting point for discussion And Resolved includes debaters and judges as the true agents of the resolution
OED, 1989 Of persons: determined

And The colon proves our interpretation

Peck, 1996 (Frances, University of Ottawa, Ottawa Grammar Guide,

The colon focuses the reader's attention on what is to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce a list, a summation, or an idea that somehow completes the introductory idea . You may use the colon in this way, however, only after an independent clause: He visited three cities during his stay in the
Maritimes: Halifax, Saint John and Moncton. Their lobbying efforts were ultimately useless: the bill was soundly defeated. My mother gave me one good piece of advice: to avoid wasting time and energy worrying about things I cannot change.

And Their frameworks exclusive focus on the nation-state as the level of analysis dooms our ability to transform underlying thoughts and ideologies
Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, De velopmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374) In the capitalist world-system, a peripheral nation-state may experience transformations in its form of incorporation to the capitalist world- economy, a minority of which might even move to a semiperipheral position. However, to break with or transform

the whole system from a nation-state level is completely beyond their range of possibilities (Wallerstein 1992a, 1992b). Therefore, a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is not to deny the importance of political interventions at the nation-state level. The point here is not to reify the nation-state and
to understand the limits of political interventions at this level for the long-term transformation of a system that operates at a world scale. The

nation-state, although still an important institution of historical capitalism, is a limited space for radical

political and social transformations . Collective agencies in the periphery need a global scope in order to make an effective political intervention in the capitalist world-system. Social struggles below and above the nation-state are strategic spaces of political intervention that are frequently ignored when the focus of the movements privileges the nation-state. The social movements local and global connections are crucial for effective political intervention. The dependentistas overlooked this, due in part to their tendency to privilege the nation-state as the unit of analysis. This had terrible political consequences for the Latin American left and the credibility of the dependentista political project .
The political failure contributed to the demise of the dependentista school. The decline of this school enabled the reemergence of old developmentalist ideas in the region. Although the outlined problem was shared by most dependentista theorists, some dependentistas reproduced new versions of the Eurocentric denial of coevalness. Cardosos version of dependency theory is a good example.

And Questions of methodology are the most important ones - they dictate how conclusions are achieved
Bartlett 90 (Katharine, professor of law at Duke University, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)
Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These

methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

And Not only does policy debate construct a regime of truth that masks the constructed nature of their arguments but even if they win we should debate policy our Aff is the only way to access that world
Smith 97 (Steve, professor of political science at the University of Wales, Review of International Studies, Cambridge journals
online) My central claim is that Wallace has a very restricted notion of politics, such that it seems obvious to him just who are those who 'have to struggle with the dilemmas of power'. For him the political arena is public and it refers to the formal political process, specifically involving the academic in 'speaking truth to power'. I think that there are two fundamental problems with this view of politics. First, it is very narrow indeed, referring to the activities of elected politicians and policy-makers. It ignores the massive area of political activity that is not focused on the electoral and policy-making processes, and the host of 'political' activities that do not accord with the formal processes of politics. His is a very official and formal definition of politics, one that would omit a vast array of political activities. For Wallace, 'political' means having to do with the formal policy process, thereby restricting discussion of politics to a very small subset of what I would define as political. Therefore, Wallace would see detachment where I see engagement; hiding behind the walls of the monastery where I see deep enquiry into the possibilities of the political; and scholasticism where I see intellectual endeavour. Second, and for me more importantly, his view of politics is narrow

because it confines itself to policy debates dealing with areas of disagreement between competing party positions. The trouble with this view is of course that it ignores the shared beliefs of any era, and so does not enquire into those things that are not problematic for policy-makers. By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as 'economic' or 'cultural'
or 'private'). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the 'buzz' that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we 'know' things about the international political world . My main claim is that International

Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism's commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very political view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to 'speak truth to power'. For
these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace's view of politics ignores

its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work
enquires into how the current 'politics' get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm

of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

And Their framework causes what we call the fiat paradox if you exclude advantages based outside of fiat then you destroy the ability to generate offensive reasons why fiat is good. They could never justify their framework without allowing ours first And Education outweighs ground: Our framework is essential to educational debate debating solely about the ends without talking about the means makes it likely that whatever they talk about will never be enacted there is zero educational value to their framework The purpose of ground and fairness are to preserve good and educational debates we solve the impact to their argument Everyone is guaranteed to be a civic actor but very few will become policymakers this makes personal advocacy more relevant

And Our Defense: Case specific arguments there is huge literature and a robust debate concerning U.S. scholarship and policy about Latin America No ground loss they can say that our current approach to Latin America is good, they can attack our intersectional approach, they can criticize LatCrit, they can propose an alternative to radical openness, etc. No right to individual negative arguments there is no reason the Neg should be allowed things like politics, fairness comes from overall division of ground not specific issues Disads go non-unique overnight our framework forces stable debate over specific Affs

2AC Kritik (General)

Questions of philosophy should not undermine our attempts to create a discourse about Latin subordination
Carbado, 1998 (Devon W., Professor of Law at UCLA, JD Harvard, The Ties that Bind, Chicano-latino Law Review, spring)
I am persuaded that people of color are connected in the way that Hernandez-Truyol suggests. It is not clear to me, however, that the connections she identifies are a sufficient basis for the constitution of an identity-based political community.

Racial, cultural, and ethnic differences amongst people of color continue to trump, or at least obscure, the ways in which their minority status connects them. This might explain why there are very few examples of meaningful coalition building amongst and between people of color - even on
college campuses. I want to be careful to point out that I am not suggesting that people of color cannot constitute a political community. What I do mean to suggest, though, is that we cannot hope for meaningful coalition building among people of color unless we explore the ways in which each minority group is differently situated with

respect to racism and how this difference corresponds to particular forms of subordination with particular social, economic, and political consequences. This is a hard issue to explore, for it invites us to
engage in a discussion about hierarchies of oppression. Nevertheless, I do believe this discussion is one we ought to have - openly and honestly. Hernandez-Truyol might agree with this, at least to some degree. She writes: In order to promote

understanding of the margins, this work proposes that we continuously engage in, and regularly practice, polilocal hermeneutics, a process in which we keep firmly planted holds on all defining aspects of identity and community, in which the sources of knowledge... are "collective, interactive, inter-subjective, and networked." Only by engaging in such multilingual, multicultural, multiracial discourses within ourselves and between and among our various and varied communities... will we be able to understand and work within our cultural, racial, gender, sexuality, ethnic, [and] religious differences... 24 Hernandez-Truyol's commitment "to promote an understanding of the margins" is shared by Gerald Lopez. In
his essay, Learning About Latinos, Lopez stresses the importance of studying, appreciating, and articulating the contours of Latino life. 25 "To really matter, Latinos must be recognized." 26 To be recognized, Latinas/os must be visible. To be visible Latinas/os must move (be moved) be [*290] yond "the shadowy category "blacks and other minorities.'" 27 And how exactly is this to be accomplished? Lopez suggests that it be done through information dissemination: "We need more novels, more short stories, more plays. We need more telenovelas, more concerts, more feature length movies. We need more histories, more biographies, more memoirs, in print and on the small screen. We need more ethnographies, more surveys, more impossible-to-categorize-butilluminating accounts of Latino life." 28 But "more is not always better." 29 There are inherent dangers in producing and distributing "more" information about Latinas/os. We have to be concerned about methodology - the way in which information is gathered; the accuracy of the information; the potential (mis)uses of the information; whether the information will expose Latina/o "dirty laundry"; the extent to which the information might undermine a political cause. Lopez recognizes these potential "pitfalls ." 30 He argues, however, that they are outweighed by the importance of learning about Latinas/os - "in all our complexity." 31 Rather than avoiding or "denying the hazards we perhaps inevitably confront in producing and pushing knowledge about Latinos, we should regularly expose them . Instead of running from our own failings in the course of our professional work and everyday lives, we should face them down." 32

Our stance is not exclusive with ontological, epistemological, or teleological questions our radical openness is a conversation that can evolve. Their criticism functions as part of our discourse, not a reason to reject it
Carrasco, 1998 (Enrique R., Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, Who are We?, Chicano-latino Law Review, spring)
My references to vision lead to another question the organizers have put to us: "What are our visions, hopes, and practices?" The references to visions and hopes may strike post-modernists among us as quaint at best and dangerous at worst. For in our post-Hegelian world the visions we hold are contingent and, if we look closely enough, fractured and incoherent. Hope may be hard to sustain under such circumstances. I hope, though, that Latcrits will not abandon

modernism's emphasis on principled struggle for human liberation. La comunidad Latina has sustained itself on the convictions that principles matter and that human liberation is worthy of a good fight. Having said [*335] this, I don't believe we should make much of the distinction between modernism and post-modernism in this context. As Richard Rorty has argued, by showing us the contingency of our language, beliefs, and institutions, post-modernism provides us with the

freedom to redefine ourselves as our conversations evolve. 14 We can do this and still agree on public principles, such as solidarity and the condemnation of cruelty. 15 Put in the Latcrit context, we can continue to recognize the importance of a principled struggle for human liberation by encouraging what Frank Valdes has called post-postmodern Latcrit discourse which seeks to balance modernist and postmodernist theory. 16 This discourse is manifested, of course, through practices, which define, and emanate from our communities. Our teleological quests through life - our search for a morallyinformed vision of the good life - is, essentially, a narrative informed by communal experiences. 17 Returning to our Latina activist, her narrative has taken her from the ethnic streets of Chicago, to the mestizo communities of the Ecuadorean highlands, to black culture in the Deep South, to various academic and legal cultures in the United States, to her current academic setting in Iowa City. Her narrative has thus shaped her visions, hopes, and practices and informed her moral (but contingent) framework relating to justicia, dignidad, y comunidad.

Our criticism is not exclusionary with their form of politics

Kraniauskas, 2000 (John, Professor of Latin American Cultural History at Birckbeck College, University of London, Hybridity
in a Transnational Frame: Latin-Americanist and Postcolonial Perspectives on Cultural Studies, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 1, p. 111-137) Different, although overlapping,

historical forms of racism and subordination of heterogeneous worlds to the time of capital are evoked in the work of these critics: slavery and debt-peonage in plantations, mines, and haciendas at the colonial beginnings of modernity, as well as continuing processes of uprooting and dispossession, nation building, proletarianization, and racist marginalization. The
memories of such processes, meanwhile, are recorded in and through cultural form. The difference, however, is that in the case of Rama, while the popular memories of and resistance to the civilizing processes of ongoing primitive accumulation (modernization)which, arguably, accompany capitalism rather than merely precede it coexist with and interrupt the time of capital in a transculturated novel form, the latter does not return them to insubordinate alternative public spheres, as it does in the musical tradition described by Gilroy. Narrative transculturation thus possibly figures a process of contradictory cultural democratization and integration, the

widening of hegemonys cultural parameters under the impact of the expanded reproduction o f capital and the ideology of development. Which, of course, also says some- thing about the particular socialities of the
literature and music analyzed by both criticsRama is not analyzing a process of transculturation from below.6 The work of both Rama and Gilroy concretizes Chakrabartys deconstruction of history through reference to specific cultural practices, while Chakrabarty provides their work with a clear anticapitalist and even utopian frame. All also partake, as I have suggested, of the

kinds of in- terests, images, and tropes marshaled in the critique of the rhetoric of progress and development that hold together important components of the field of contemporary cultural studies traversed by postcolonial and Latin-Americanist concerns and are centered on the idea of the production of a break or disjuncture in the dominant order, a trace of something that cannot be enclosed, an element that constantly challenges from within (60). An outside that is inside, and an inside that is outside:7 in Chakrabarty this oxymoronic outside-inside is real labor; in Gilroy and Rama it is the
tactics of sound carrying alternative memories. At another level, contemporary reflection on cultural forms and practices i n an increasingly globalized worldthe hybrid as specific global-local configurationsalso stresses cultural mixture and underlines the ways in which subjects are always already marked by others, identity by al- terity. Indeed, this is a long tradition in Latin American critical thought. Similarly, while in her critique of sexual identity Judith Butler (1993) fore- grounds the ways in which the hegemonic imaginary is structured by what it excludes, Ernesto Laclau (1990) also theorizes the mythic unification of the social around its constitutive outside.8 The key word stitching together this field, however, is arguably the term hybridity, operating polysemantically at a number of levels both inside and outside academic institutions. In this sense, as Alberto Moreiras (1998) has pointed out, one could say that

it is a working, hegemonic idea: Becoming part of critical common sense, unifying and gathering together disparate themes from the experiences of imperialism to subjectificationand different strands of thought psychoanalytic and literary, sociological and historical , passing through the philosophic and fastening them into the interdisciplinary core of an increasingly internationalized and codified cultural studies . Which means that the idea is also the site of a politics of theory in which alternative uses of the termand alternatives to the termfight it out, are articulated and unraveled.

2AC Kritik (Capitalism/Neoliberalism)

Our Aff solves their criticism but their K has no hope of solving our Aff
Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, Developmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374) Dependentistas developed a neo-Marxist political-economy approach. Most dependentista

analysis privileged the

economic and political aspects of social processes at the expense of cultural and ideological determinations . Culture was perceived as instrumental to capitalist accumulation processes . In reductionism that had been criticized in orthodox Marxist approaches. This led to two problems: first, an underestimation of the Latin
many respects dependentistas reproduced some of the economic

American colonial/racial hierarchies ; and second, an analytical impoverishment of the complexities of political-economic processes. For most dependentistas, the economy was the privileged sphere of social analysis. Categories such as gender and race were frequently ignored, and when used they were reduced to class or to an economic logic. An bal Quijano is one of the
few exceptions to this. He developed the con- cept of coloniality of power to understand the present racial hierarchies in Latin America. According to Quijano, the social classification of peoples in Latin America has been hegemonized by white Creole elites through- out a long historical process of colonial/racial domination. Categories of modernity such as citizenship, democracy, and national identity have been historically constructed through two axial divisions: (1) between labor and capital; (2) between Europeans and non-Europeans (Quijano 1993); and I will add (3) between men and women. White male elites hegemonized these axial divisions. According to the concept of coloniality of power developed by Quijano, even after independence, when the formal juridical/military control of the state passed from the imperial power to the newly indepen- dent state, white Creole elites continued to control the economic, cultural, and political structures of the society (Quijano 1993). This continuity of power relations from colonial to postcolonial times allowed the white elites to classify populations and to exclude people of color from the categories of full citizenship in the imagined community called the nation. The civil, political, and social rights that citizenship provided to the members of the nation were never fully extended to colonial subjects such as In- dians, blacks, zambos, and mulattoes. Internal colonial groups remained as second-class citizens, never having full access to the rights of citizens. Coloniality is a

sociocultural relationship between Europeans and non- Europeans that is constantly reproduced as long as the power structures are dominated by the white Creole elites and the cultural construction of non-European peoples as inferior others continues. What is implied in the notion of coloniality of power is that the world has not fully decolonized. The first decolonization was incomplete. It was limited to the juridicopolitical independence from the European imperial states. The second decolonization will have to address the racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, and economic hierarchies that the first decoloniza- tion left in place. As a result, the world needs a second decolonization different and more radical than the first one. Many leftist projects in Latin America following the dependentista underestimation of racial/ethnic hierarchies have reproduced , within their organizations and white Creole domination over non-European people . The Latin American Left never radically problematized the racial/ethnic hierarchies built during the European colonial expansion and still present in Latin Americas coloniality of power . For instance, the conflicts
when controlling state power, between the Sandinistas and the Misquitos in Nicaragua emerged as part of the reproduction of the old racial/colonial hi- erarchies (Vila 1992). This was not a conflict created by the CIA, as Sandinistas used to portray it. The Sandinistas reproduced the historical coloniality of power between the Pacific coast and the Atlantic coast in Nicaragua. The white Creole elites on the Pacific coast hegemonized the political, cultural, and economic relations that subordinated blacks and Indians on the At- lantic coast. The differences between the Somocista dictatorship and the Sandinista regime were not that great when it came to social relations with colonial/racial others. Similarly, Cuban white elites hegemonized the power positions in the postrevolutionary period (Moore 1988). The historical continuities of the coloniality of power in Cuba are also greater than the discontinuities. The number of blacks and mulattos in power positions is minimal and does not correspond to the demographic fact that they are the numerical majority. The old racial/ethnic hierarchy in Cuba has not been significantly transformed during the Castro regime. Afro-Cubans are continously harassed in public spaces,

stereotyped (with racial slanders such as criminals and lazy), and marginalized from power positions. No radical project in Latin America can be successful without dis- mantling these colonial/racial hierarchies . This affects not only the scope of revolutionary processes but also the democratization of the social hierarchies. The underestimation of the problems of coloniality has

been an important factor that contributed to the popular disillusionment with leftist projects in Latin America. The denial of coevalness in developmentalist dependency discourses reinforces the coloniality of power within the nation-state by privileging white Creole elites in the name of technical progress and superior knowledge. Poor and marginalized regions within the nation-state, where black, mulatto, and
Indian populations frequently live, are portrayed by left-wing regimes as backward and underdevel- oped due to the laziness and bad habits of these regions inhabitants. Thus coloniality refers to the long-term continuities of the racial

hierarchies from the time of European colonialism to the formation of nation-states in the Americas. When it comes to the coloniality of power in Latin Amer- ica, the difference between the left-wing and right-wing
regimes is not that great. Today there is a coloniality of power in all of Latin America even when colonial administrations have disappeared.

Their criticism addresses economic ideology without examining the coloniality of power that perpetuates racial and ethnic hierarchies only the Aff decolonizes power relations
Grosfoguel, 2000 (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Califnornia Berkeley, Developmentalism,
Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347 -374)

Developmentalism, the denial of coevalness, and the concealment of coloniality of power in Latin America are three conceptual limitations of the de- pendentista school addressed in this article. These three conceptual processes are historically interrelated in the geoculture of the capitalist world-system. The construction of the other as inhabiting a distant space and a past time emerged simultaneously with the formation of a modern colonial capitalist world -system (Mignolo 2000) with its colonial/racial hierarchies. This created the historical conditions of possibility for the emergence of developmentalism, proposing that the solution to backwardness in time is to develop, to catch up with the West. Dependentistas form part of the longue dure of the ideology of modernity in Latin America. One of the main
arguments of this article is that dependentistas were caught up in developmentalist assumptions similar to the intellectual currents they attempted to criticize. By privileging national development and the control of the nation-state, they

reproduced the illusion that development occurs through rational organization and planning at the level of the nation-state. This emphasis contributed to over- looking alternative and more strategic antisystemic political interventions below (local) and above (global) the nation-state. Moreover,
dependentistas underestimated the coloniality of power in Latin America. This obscured the ongoing existence of the regions racial/ethnic hierarchies. Power relations in the region are constituted by racial/ethnic hierarchies that have a long colonial history. Leftist movements influenced by the dependentista paradigm reproduced white Creole domination when in control of the nation-state. Thus there can be no radical project in the region without decolonizing power relations. Finally, both the developmentalist assumptions and the underestimation of coloniality of power, together with the production of new forms of denial of coevalness, led some dependentistas such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Eurocentric assumptions about technical progress and devel- opment. This contributes to an understanding of the current complicity of many old dependentistas with the recent dominant neoliberal global designs in the region.

Marxism is just like neo-liberalism a grand theory that is too broad and totalizing to account for the diverse contexts of Latin American populations
Brohman, 1995 (John Brohman, Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies: From
Modernisation to Neoliberalism, Third World Quarterly: Volume 16: Issue 1, In recent years analysts in a variety

of disciplines have depicted both neoclassical theory 4 and mainstream development studies 5 as 'grand theories' characteristic of the Age of Enlightenment and 19thcentury thought. Grand theories whether neoclassical economics, orthodox Marxism, or Keynesianism construct a totalizing vision of society which attempts to provide a rational basis for understanding all aspects of development. Such theories, however, neglect much of the richness and diversity of development by reducing it to some fundamental essence. Postwar
development studies, for example, have been largely dominated by the concept of modernisation-the equation of development with modernization and the construction of a single model of modernity based on the experience of a few (industrialised) countries. If this model is followed, it is assumed that all countries may reach the goal of a similar type of 'modern society'. This type of grand theorization is prone to problems of reductionist bias, where by simplistic monocausal explanations

are sought for complex development realities. Within such explanations there is little room for plurality; much of the richness and diversity of societies that produces different trajectories of development is excluded from analysis. By contrast, a relativist approach recognises social diversity and the particularities of place within the theorization process. Relativism insists that human behavior and development can only be understood within its proper context-there are no models or theoretical constructs that are universally applicable. A growing number of social theorists have
recently adopted this position, rejecting tendencies towards grand theorisation which are regarded as outdated and inapplicable to contemporary global conditions.

Aff solves the K our engagement creates resistance to the neoliberal project
Phillips, 2005 (Nicola, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Sheffield , U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic
Governance in the Americas, Latin American Politics & Society, Volume 47, Number 4, Winter 2005, pp. 1-25, Project Muse) On the other hand, the

U.S.-led approach has also been oriented toward molding subregional approaches in a manner that brings them more closely into line with U.S. preferences, in that its bilateral negotiations
with subregional blocs afford greater leverage for the USTR and other government agencies over the shape of the rules agreed on in internal bargaining processes. The prospect of agreements between the United States and subregional units, in this sense, is designed to increase the incentives for subregional blocs to accept a range of rules consistent with those that have come to define the hemispheric agenda, as a result of U.S. leverage over its shape, and to fashion internal governance mechanisms in a manner conducive to the successful agreement of bilateral trade deals with the United States. What this paper has sought most strenuously to do, however, is to direct attention back to the importance of politics and power in understanding the emerging economic regime and approaches to its governance .

Issues of regional economic governance must be conceived as intrinsically political processes , which cannot be separated from discussions about the regions prevailing power structures and the ways power is exercised. By understanding how the hegemonic power of the United States manifests itself in the substance of the hemispheric project and the shape of the economic regime associated with it, we can also see the roots of resistance to the U.S. vision of the hemispheric project. Inasmuch as the FTAA process has been marked by the inability of the United States unilaterally to
determine the terms or the outcomes of the negotiationshence the USTRs turn to the apparently more conducive bilateral avenue with weaker partnersour attention is necessarily drawn to the contestation of the regional agenda that has been articulated both by governments and by the wide range of nonstate actors engaged in the process. In one sense, this indicates clearly that neoliberalism is not the unified and monolithic entity it is frequently assumed to be; rather, a variety of visions of the neoliberal project have generated

divergent and discordant positions in the range of trade negotiations, both in and outside the Americas.

Their Alternative links to our criticism its based on the same neglect that we call into question
Wiarda, 1987 (Howard J. Wiarda, professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, foreign-policy
analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, Misreading Latin America: Again Foreign Policy, No. 65, Winter, 1986-1987, pp. 135153, JSTOR) Long-held assumptions in the social sciences, both Marxian and non-Marxian, about Latin America also helped account for American attitudes. Marx thought of Latin America , with its lack of industrialization and well- formed classes, as rather "Asiatic," a label he often used contemptuously. Hegel before him insisted that Latin America had "no history," a judgment that in his metaphysics consigned it to the category of the most primitive regions. And Social Darwinism condemned Latin America, with its racially mixed populations, to a low rung on the evolutionary ladder. More recently, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's famous quip that the axis of the world flows through Moscow, Berlin and Bonn, Paris, London, Washington, and Tokyo excluded Latin America entirely. Building upon these earlier traditions and prejudices was the development literature that loomed so large in the early 1960s--especially the influential 1960 anthology The Politics of the Developing Nations, edited by the political scientists Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Cole- man. The developmentalist writings classified Latin America and its institutions as "traditional"; these structures had to be either destroyed or

altered "fundamentally" if the region was ever to modernize. All but ignored in this literature and in the Alliance was the possibility that such traditional institutions were themselves capable of considerable modernization, and that sweeping them away might well leave Latin America in the worst possible bind: lacking both solidly grounded "modern" institutions and traditional structures that, however flawed, could hold societies together during the trauma of transition .

2AC Kritik (Ontology)

Ontological ponderings should be a part of our starting point but should never become a substitute for our form of politics
Carbado, 1998 (Devon W., Professor of Law at UCLA, JD Harvard, The Ties that Bind, Chicano-latino Law Review, spring)
Guadalupe T. Luna's "Zoo Island:" Latcrit Theory, "Don Pepe" and Senora Peralta, is the final essay in this cluster. 54 Like Guerra,

Luna is concerned with exploring the relationship between colonialism and the formation of Latina/o - or, more specifically here, Chicana/o - identity. According to Luna, we cannot understand Chicana/o identity unless we understand the role conquest has played in shaping and defining Chicana/o lives. 55 The general claim she advances is that the law has functioned systematically to subordinate Chicanas/os. 56 She develops this thesis employing cases involving land disputes between "Anglo-Americans" and Chicanas/os. More than illustrating the uneven application of the law, the cases she discusses reveal how judges construct Chicana/o identities in opposition to "Anglo-American" identity - citizen vs. resident; settler vs.
dependant worker - 57 to "disenfranchise[] Chicanas and Chicanos from their property interests." 58 Luna's essay reminds us that law can (and historically has) function(ed) to legitimize, protect, and preserve white social expectations. 59 Cumulatively, the essays in this cluster suggest that part of LCT's political project must continue to involve defining and redefining Latina/o identity. This makes sense. The project of defining oneself and one's community is liberating, consciousness-raising, and potentially transgressive. These definitions can help us understand that we are more than the social meanings attributed to our identities. But neither self- nor community definitions are easy. As this cluster of essays reveal, our identities are, on some level, unmanageable - fluid, contingent, and contestable. In the end, we will [*295] never be able to

articulate a definitive and unproblematic definition of "who we are." This should not immobilize us, however, but rather function as the starting point for our understanding of and theorizing about identity.

2AC Kritik (Deconstruction)

Deconstruction is insufficient in the context of our argument
Carrasco, 1998 (Enrique R., Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, Who are We?, Chicano-latino Law Review, spring)
What to do? Deconstruction

comes easily to mind. Although that technique of critical analysis helps clear away the cobwebs that have obscured the true nature of a particular theory or position , 19 it does little to reconstruct a progressive, responsive alternative. We can draw some comfort from the Kuhnian observation that normal scholarly activity will itself bring about Pdigm changes through the identification of anomalies that can't be reconciled with the Pdigm. 20 The anti-essential nature of the Latcrit project may provide us plenty of anomalies to keep us intellectually sharp and critical.
Put in Valdes' post-modern framework, an "intra-Latina/o politics of difference and identity" 21 and a construction of "politicized identities" 22 may help us keep the "critical" in Latcrit Theory.

2AC Disad (General)

Their disad perpetuates a violent way of thinking about Latin America their call to ignore the people of Latin America in favor of avoiding a future, potential security risk IS the benign neglect that we criticize
Levinson and Onis, 1999 (J., J. de, Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress, in Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in
U.S.-Latin American Relations, Ed Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, p.200-201) To be sure, most proponents of the Alliance in the United States considered themselves hardheaded and realistic. They viewed stepped-up support by Washington for national development in Latin America not only as a constructive and generous gesture toward the developing republics of the south, but as an essential and reasonable means of protecting the vital security interest of the United States. As they conceived it, the Alliance could counteract the appeal of Castroism to Latin Americas once docile masses of workers and peasants by offering them economic benefits and social reform within a democratic political framework. In retrospect, the program designed to kill two birds with one stone has hit neither squarely. It has not removed the danger of revolution and it has not brought significant economic, social, and political advancement to the poor of Latin America. Some of the internal contradictions of the Alliance were apparent even at its birth. The Pentagon had little confidence in the ability of reformers to maintain political stability in Latin America. The United States business community pointed out that the emphasis on reform was likely to produce economic instability and a poor climate for U.S. investment. And a great deal of the original enthusiasm for the Alliance was lost once the Cuban missile crisis reduced the appeal of Castroism in Latin America and its ability to arouse fear in Washington. Within the first few years of the decade, the reformist elements in Latin America proved less effective than their supporters in the United States had hoped, and administration officials learned that development in Latin America was a far more complex, expensive, and far-reaching process than reconstruction had been in western Europe. Conventional development assistance usually serves to accelerate the economic growth of the recipient country. The economic benefits will tend to follow the recipient countrys existing patter of income distribution; unless they are accompanie d by social or political restructuring, they will go primarily to those who already hold wealth and power. The Alliance principle of disturbing the benefits of economic growth throughout a society by means of social and political reforms was new to both development economists and loan officials in the United States. But experience soon showed them that social and political reforms were indeed destabilizing. Thus they gradually narrowed their focus to monetary stabilization and economic growth, in which they achieved significant advances, particularly toward the end of the decade. In education and agriculture, they turned their efforts away from adult literacy and agrarian reform, to technical education and agricultural production. These changes reflect not only an increasing technocratic orientation but a shift of political concern from bettering the lives of marginal masses to protecting the key elements of the core society. The Lessons of the Alliance What considerations, then, should shape future United States policy in the hemisphere? By and large, the major lesson of the Alliance is that the read of the United States should not exceed its grasp. Between the overambitious idealism of its development goals and the pointless obsessiveness of its concern for security, the United States really undermined the Alliance

before it could get started. When the security issue lost its urgency and when other problems arose to demand higher priority the war in Vietnam, the need to defend the dollar, the pressure of protectionist lobbies, the domestic urban crisis the Alliance was deflated and distorted. The resulting situation is the worst of both worlds.
The people of the United States feel that their generosity has not been appreciated and, in view of both domestic inflation and pressing domestic needs, appear unwilling to do more, while Latin Americans generally resent the restrictions places on use of the funds made available, as well as the patronizing attitude with which they were often provided. Another lesson of the Alliance is that a profound and perhaps very painful readjustment is taking place in Latin America, one that the United States may influence in minor ways but cannot begin to dominate or direct. Basic relationships economic, political, socialare being strained, broken down, rebuilt, and strained again, a process that must continue until it produces a new balance. In all likelihood, the upheaval that began before the Alliance but accelerated under it will become even more pronounced in the years ahead, so that further upheaval and experimentation and change will be the rule rather than the exception. Already various forms of authoritarian government have emerged; others are almost sure to follow. The United States, as a democracy dedicated to constitutional processes and civil liberties cannot provide financial assistance to authoritarian regimes without calling its own political system into question. This limitation on policy may make an Alliance impossible, but it is a real and practical constraint that springs from the nature of democracy. The lesson that the Alliance has taught in this critical area is that the United States must learn to live with and expect change, and that its response should be flexible and measured rather than excessively rigid or tough. In fact, long before the Alliance, the United States learned that it could accommodate such revolutionary change; in both Mexico and Bolivia it accepted new property relationships without permanent damage to its own interests. It is safe to predict that in the coming decade interAmerican relationships will face fresh uncertainties and harsh tests that demand policies much more effective than those of the Alliance decade. Policy-makers must use greater realism and sophistication in both the making and the implementation of commitments. They must also deepen their awareness of and sensitivity to the internal conflicts afflicting the varied social classes of Latin America. And they must achieve a profound and sure understanding of just what constitutes the

national interest of the United States in its relations with its sister republics.

2AC Disad (Economy)

The economy is consistently used as a justification, sometimes to ignore Latin America and, at other times to intervene in manipulative and exploitative ways. Their disad is based on the logic that our 1AC criticizes
Lowenthal, 1999 (Abraham F., Rediscovering Latin America, in Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American
Relations, Ed Michael LaRosa and Frank O. Mora, p.273-275) These distinct aspects of Latin Americas contemporary importance to the United States have major implications fo r U.S. policy in the 199 s. They suggest why the United States must concern itself with Latin Americas economic, social, and political condi tions. In an earlier era, when what mattered to Washington was obtaining military bases, preserving access to

raw materials, protecting investments in extractive enterprises, and gaining diplomatic support from client states, the U.S. government could afford to turn a blind eye to internal conditions within Latin America, to ignore poverty and inequality, and even to make its peace with unattractive dictators. But if what concerns the United States about Latin America in the 1990s is the capacity of its countries to buy U.S.
products and continue payments to U.S. banks, the rate and nature of migration, the prospects for sustained and effective cooperation on tough shared problems like drugs and the environment, and the protection of fundamental human rights then the United States has an important stake in the regions well -being. This framework suggests which Latin American countries are of greatest objective interest to the United States, and why. The relationship with Mexico is clearly of utmost importance, for Mexico scores high on all dimensions of U.S. concern. Brazil, a megacountry of nearly 150 million persons and the tenth-largest market economy in the world, has little significance for the United States on demographic grounds, but is very important on every other criterion. The Andean countries, at least for a time, will have high salience for Washington because of drugs and related sociopolitical deterioration and their spillover effects on the United States. Venezuela is important primarily because of its vast oil and gas reserves. The Caribbean islands and to some extent the countries of Central America will have a significance beyond their size due to the high degree of interpenetration caused by massive and sustained migration. Conversely, the United States in the 1990s may perceive that it has much less at stake in the outcome of Central America's civil wars than it thought in the 1980s. And the countries of the Southern ConeChile, Uruguay, and Argentinamay naturally return to the relatively modest prominence they had in U.S. foreign policy in the interwar years.The issues at the heart of U.S.-Latin American relations in the 1990s will increasingly be "intermestic"based on the international spillover of domestic concerns and involving both international and domestic aspects and actors. Trade, immigration, narcotics control, resource development, environmental protection, and public health will all require complex management, engaging the active participation not only of many executive departments but also of Congress, state and local authorities, corporations and trade unions, and many other nongovernmental organizations. The line between domestic policy and Latin American policy, consequently, will be hard to define in the 1990s. In sum, Latin America will be of heightened relative importance for the United States. For those who have seen the world almost exclusively in Cold War terms, the events of the past year have made Latin America seem virtually irrelevant , likely, as some say, to "fall off the map" of U.S. concerns. But as U.S. interests and energies turn inward to domestic challenges, Latin America may well be increasingly pertinent. Far from be-coming irrelevant, Latin America's problems and opportunities will increasingly be our own. For many years U.S. actions affecting Latin America have often been

determined for reasons having little to do with the region itself. Domestic choices about fiscal and monetary policy, trade and tax reforms, agricultural subsidies, energy, and welfare have had major consequences for Latin America because the region is so closely tied to the United States. Foreign policies toward the Soviet Union, Europe, and the Middle East frequently have had significant, if unintended, impacts upon our neighbors in the western hemisphere, and in administrations of sharply divergent ideological thrusts, Latin
America has sometimes been used as a stage, where points are scored for partisan political reasons or for broader international purposes rather than to respond to and affect hemispheric realities. After a strong beginning in formulating its policies toward Latin America, the Bush administration reverted before the end of its first year toward treating Latin American policy in these familiar ways, allowing it by and large to become a residual consequence of other choices and an arena for achieving quick political gains. The administration seemed inclined to ignore South America, push for short-term results in Central America and Panama that would predictably leave the fundamental problems there unaddressed, and focus its positive efforts almost exclusively on Mexico. The initial indications of a new U.S. approach in the hemisphere came, understandably, in connection with neighboring Mexico. The objective reasons for recognizing Mexico's increasingly vital significance for the United States were no doubt reinforced by the Texas backgrounds of the president and secretary of state and also by the opportunity for a fresh start afforded by the nearly simultaneous presidential transitions in the two countries and the accession to power in Mexico of the U.S.-educated and U.S.oriented Carlos Salinas. A second potentially important step toward a new Latin American policy came early in June [1990], when Secretary Baker flew to Central America to propose to the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama that the leading industrialized nations should undertake coordinated multilateral assistance for Central America's recovery and development. A great deal of follow-up will be required to convert this suggestion into a sustainable reality, but the proposal is significant in recognizing a long-term development interest in Central America even when the Cold War threat is receding, in proposing substantial multilateral consultation, and in inviting extrahemispheric actors to play a major long-term role in the region.

2AC Disad (Democracy)

Misleading appeals to democracy are used to legitimize the ongoing slaughter of Latin American peoples and cultures. Sociolegal policy has emasculated programs intended to alleviate social inequalities that rather are used to strip the Latin other of civil and human rights
Valdes, 2001 (Francisco, Professor of Law at the University of Miami, Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic and Caribbean
Legal Studies, B.A. from UC Berkeley, La Raza Law Journal, 12 La Raza L.J. 137, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Ed ucation: Making Do While Making Waves, lexis) And, I note the views of the framers on the notions in passing, and only because they are

of "democracy' and "popular lawmaking' - complex topics - only so often invoked in both judicial and political venues by backlashers to

justify their sociolegal violence ; I note it here only to keep any of you from being taken in by misleading appeals to "democracy' and "original intent' calculated to help legitimize morally, politically, and jurisprudentially the ongoing onslaughts of this culture war. [*143] The current equation of today's "popular' referenda with the "traditional'
ideals of "democracy' in this country is, well, imprecise. While the framers and their inheritors oftentimes have betrayed the principles adopted in their constitution - in forms not limited only to their constitutional dalliance with slavery and with its legacies since then - it is not true that "democracy' in this "compound republic' was "intended' to work this way - in ways

that facilitate patterns of inter-group hierarchy and abuse, and that allow demagoguery to control policy and become Law - at least not as intended by the core group of nationalist-Federalists who caused the 1787
convocation of the constitutional convention in Philadelphia, who then controlled its proceedings and during that summer literally framed the seven articles of the constitution, and who then immediately afterward spearheaded the ratification campaigns that sold their blueprint to the rest of their generation in the form we still obey today; 11 while that elite of white, (presumably straight), rich men of the framing generation certainly acted in resolutely self-interested and sometimes hypocritical ways, their basic views on this particular topic should provide no aid or comfort to backlash politicians and judges, nor to their masters or apologists. This line of attack, both through conventional lawmaking as well as "popular' lawmaking, has produced a torrent of legislation and referenda or propositions that have emasculated programs and policies designed to ameliorate social inequities. Quite explicitly, this line or prong of the culture war has been mobilized in the name of the "angry white male' bent on taking back what he still imagines always to have been naturally, eternally and righteously his. 12 Too often, this campaign has overwhelmed both the established branches of government and their deliberative processes, as well as progressive groups and organizations, at both the state and national levels of lawmaking. The

cumulative result has been a substantial gutting of civil rights laws and the steady (re)normalization of a social environment increasingly hostile to immigrants, sexual minorities, racial and ethnic minorities, women, the poor, the disabled, and other Others. The second line or prong of
attack amounts to court-packing, pure and simple, but on a massive scale. During this culture war, both state and federal judiciaries have been re-stocked methodically in explicitly ideological and demographic terms and, using the banner of "strict construction' when it comes specifically to civil and human rights, quite foreseeably to help circumvent principled judicial review of suspect state actions taken through the majoritarian line attack: at bottom, the purpose of this second line or prong is to neutralize the judiciary as a check on majoritarian backlash lawmaking, and thus to protect, even embolden, the cultural warfare of traditionally privileged factions and their footsoldiers.

Democracy in Latin America is elusive so is their disad Luna, 2002 (Guadalupe T., Associate Professor of Law at Northern Illinois University, LatCrit VI, America Latina and
Jurisprudential Associations, Rutgers Law Review, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 8 3, Summer, 2002, lexis) Cluster I examines various definitions of democratization. Work place democracy for example is contrasted with liberal notions of democracy and yet distinctions fail to advance the dominant record. While "elected governments are reappearing throughout Latin America," 49 few are protecting civil liberties, and most "fail to guarantee anything approximating the rule of law, and fail to provide all sectors of the society a reasonable opportunity to

participate in the formation and implementation of public policy." 50 Democracy remains an elusive goal 51 with the
legacy of the Cold War period, civil strife, and military take-overs exerting influences on countries negotiating law reform in the present. 52 And while the United States represents that it believes in a co-equal citizenship in the Latin American hemisphere, as seen with NAFTA, democracy appears stymied. Border issues and xenophobia, for example, are difficult to reconcile with declarations that the various nations are in parity with the United States. The LatCrit community like many other organizations and

scholars are troubled by the types of projects [*815] that fall under "democracy" or democratization sometimes sponsored by the United States and, sometimes sponsored by the Latino American governments. Projects that represent promoting democracy, without questioning what is required structurally, fail to inspire a democratic vision. Within Cluster I, the authors take on this project with attendant future work required of
LatCrit investigators.



1NC Framework
Our Framework: The only reason to vote Affirmative must be based on the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan We have definitional support: The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not individual debaters
Websters, 2000 (Guide to Grammar and Writing,
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

And Resolved expresses intent to implement the plan

American Heritage Dictionary, 2000 ( To find a solution to; solve To bring to a usually successful conclusion

And the USFG is the government in Washington, D.C.

Encarta, 2000 (Online Encyclopedia, The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC .

Prefer our framework: First Fairness Defending the enactment of the plan by the government is the starting point for all negative ground. Non-policy frameworks collapse predictability and do not have balanced lit bases Second Clash Non-policy frameworks regress infinitely, which kills preparation and minimizes education And Unlimited advocacy collapses into conservatism our attempt to limit the discussion in a fair way enables productive political contestation and true revolutionary advocacies. Refusal to exclude anything means their framework is self-defeating
Shively, 2000 (Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics,
p. 180-181) 'Thus far, I have argued that if

the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of

openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the boundaries of behaviorif they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasmthey need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could
tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and

activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposesto tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they
deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the antidemocrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally

reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

And Their frameworks exclusive, moralizing presupposition that they have to be outside of the state prevents self-reflexivity and results in the total breakdown of dialogue and engagement
Keenan, 1998 (Alan, Ph.D., Member of the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University, Theory and Event,
Vol. 2 No. 1, The anti-political nature of guilt, in turn, helps explain the political failures of left "moralism" and its particular mode of politicization. By "moralism," I mean that form of discourse that speaks, acts, and calls others to act, from a presumed, or desired, position of moral and political purity and unquestionable correctness. 39 While not always explicitly grounding its political appeals in the language of guilt and innocence, moralism nonetheless amounts to the project of regulating personal and collective behavior according a preexisting code of right and wrong, the existence of which assures the possibility of correct behavior and decisions, the aim being to map behavior onto code without any excess or remainder. The most obvious and publicized examples of left moralism would be codes of speech and behavior, both explicit and implicit, concerned with issues of race, gender, sexuality, and other "sensitive" concerns, yet the animating moralistic attitude goes beyond any particular set of issues, and can be found throughout both the left and the right. 40 Moralism, especially when it is engaged in apparently political work, is profoundly anti-political. Its promised purity depends on the possibility of a non-interpretive and fully adequate relationship to a code or set of guiding principles, a relationship in which the subjectivity, peculiarities, interests, and power of the interpreter, together with the context of the action or interpretation, are ideally of no consequence. By promising a clear and complete set of rules, ones that can be lived by without ambiguity and without cost to other equally important values, moralism expresses the desire to remain untouched by, and without implication in, that which one rejects or is working to change (even when that includes much of the world within which one must work). The point is to purify oneself of society's and politics' dirt, rather than to work in and through the dirt to rearrange it in more just and equitable ways. 41 Hence moralism's reluctance to engage the doubtful, the uncommitted, or those with opposing political convictions in serious debate and argument. Refusing to entertain the possibility of any connections between itself and the

attitudes of its political opponents, the rhetoric of moralism often effectively refuses the process of argumentation itself; its invocations of the code often function as little more than gestures of one's good moral intentions-even as they express a basic mistrust, even cynicism about the value, of democratic political give and take. Thus its anti-rhetorical rhetoric drives away more than it converts, polarizing those it doesn't simply turn off from political discussion altogether. 42 Indeed, the discipline, policing, and purifying that is required to achieve the correct attitude and behavior necessarily appeal to a limited constituency. So,
too, with moralism's willful reduction of the world's complexity: simply too many people know that the world is more complicated than any single code or set of codes can manage. This is especially so in a society as saturated with everyday cynicism as ours, where the thought of remaining uncontaminated by guilt, injustice, and power is an impossible one for many. As with political rhetorics

more explicitly based on guilt, the pretense to purity of any form of moralizing discourse is a ripe target for cynical unmasking. To the extent that left moralism exudes a resentment at the political condition , then, it merely reinforces and recapitulates the anti-politics that is a major source of the problems it is ostensibly trying to change. 43 It sustains the mode of "politics"--with its over-simplification, polarization, inability to accommodate conflict and ambivalence, and disinterest in even listening to "the enemy"--that drives so much of contemporary cynicism and alienation from politics. It thus feeds the vicious cycle that needs to be reversed. Instead of yet another antipolitical politics, the political cynic and the politically alienated need something able to pull them away from their investment in the state of emergency and its displays of technical power, by challenging their belief in the futility, aggressivity, and dreariness of political action.

And Framework comes first it is the foundation of the debate without which we cannot test and refine the arguments they are asserting
Saurette, 2000 (Paule, Ph.D. Johns Hopkins, International Journal of Peace Studies, 5:1)

The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences. Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates. All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.8 In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur. These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate. There have been two
traditionally philosophical responses to this. The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value. Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation. While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises. From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural

preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.

And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor. On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of

this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not transparent and available to examination. Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured. Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

Framework Limits
It is not enough to merely talk about something related to the resolution defending the resolutional statement is the only way to ensure fair debate where we can engage them. Otherwise, the Aff can shift and dodge Neg arguments rather than engage us. Resolution-based learning is good and should be preserved we change topics every year to discuss a variety of issues, expanding our horizons. If not tied to the resolution, the material they present is impossible to predict and prepare to debate their framework makes debate impossible
Shively, 2000 (Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A & M, Political Theory and Partisan
Politics, p. 181-182) The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" tothey must reject and limit some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contestthat consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfectif there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and /or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Framework Ground
Restricting ground to arguments about the consequences of institutional adoption is a revolutionary conception of the political that re-orients citizen agency and invigorates social interdependence
Gundersen, 2000 (Adolf G., Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p.
108-9) Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of empirical findings which suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if deliberation will of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time enhance interdependence. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the

institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new , something that is at
once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminatingas efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, citizens must borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to view deliberation as their

responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congressothers who are, after all, under direct and constant pressure to act rather than deliberate. Politics, in other words, must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.

Framework Predictable Clash

Alternate frameworks infinitely delimit policy debate centered around the resolution is a much better starting point
Smith, 2003 (Ross, Head Debate Coach at Wake Forest, DRG Article, ) To this question the performers will say, "Oh, but the performance

must be germane to the resolution." Germane, relevant, or some other substitute for topical. Which brings us to the second damning indictment of the performative affirmative: they are unpredictable. As the negative, you should be prepared
to say that the federal government should not increase public health services for mental health care. But to be expected to oppose any performance that is in any way related to the resolution is a far greater task. First, there do not appear to be any real limits to things "germane" to the resolution. It includes the word, "should." So anything normative is fair game? Government. Mental. Care. There is not a novel, a song, nor a poem written that is not somehow germane. Second, there is no stable thing to oppose. It is ludicrous to say you can oppose one of the words your opponent chose. But what does it mean to oppose "the whole" of their performance? Do not all of the speeches count? If so, then there is not a stable focus of the debate and the last speaker wins. If not, then which parts and speeches count for what? The third, and final, indictment I will mention here is somewhat more esoteric but is most important. And that is that debate is a unique activity. Debate is the one activity we have in our educational system that teaches argumentative clash. Argumentative clash requires

advocates to separate the wheat from the chaff of all that is said on a subject. Debate accomplishes this by having a question that is answered in the affirmative by the affirmative. Arguments that do not address that question are dismissed. Advocates are required to explain how their arguments support or refute the question. Saying "my performance was good" does not come close. There are
individual events. There is music. Drama. Sculpture. All of these are activities where people perform. These activities have educated critics who can judge efforts of the performers. In debate we have debate judges who are very good at educating about one kind of performance: debate. Debate cannot be all things to all people any more than sculpture can. Some say we should not "silence voices" of those who want to do things differently, but surely they do not mean that we should reward people no matter what they say or do. And if not, then we're right back where we started. Again, I am not saying one should not be allowed to say or do anything in particular as long as it makes an argument that speaks to the focus (plan or resolution) of the debate. Nor am I arguing we should only have policy resolutions. But as long as we do have policy resolutions, then the question of the debate is a policy question. The question is interesting, controversial, and challenging. Those who do not engage it should lose to those who do.

Framework Switch-Side Debate

Insularity is not bad it forces us to step outside of our egocentric beliefs, which bolsters our personal values and resistance to dogmatism
Muir, 1993 (Star A., Department of Communications at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26 No. 4)
Firm moral commitment

to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives. Switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking
persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to them. This process, at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a process of critical-thinking not available with many traditional teaching methods. We must

progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in Slur own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the intellectual act of stepping outside of our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of everyday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral responsibility, but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness. Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully
advocating a position against one's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying ''I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, however, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stance. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch-side debate are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view and a reasoned assessment of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an alternative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable. Morality, an emerging focal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identity.

We debate these issues, not necessarily believe in them switch-side debate is good because it allows us a safe place to experiment which different ideas
Muir, 1993 (Star A., Department of Communications at George Mason, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26 No. 4)
The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from

the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.

Our method of argumentation enables challenges to normalizing and monological belief systems
Risse, 2000 (Thomas, International Organization, Vol. 54, Winter, p. 1-2)
The controversy between social constructivism and rational choice has become one of the most significant recent debates in the field of international relations and has largely crossed disciplinary boundaries between international relations and comparative politics.(n1) In the U.S.-dominated intellectual community, this debate largely focuses on the differences between the "logic of consequentialism" theorized by rational choice approaches and the "logic of appropriateness" conceptualized by mostly sociological institutionalism. Using insights from recent controversies within the German-speaking international relations community, I claim that

processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion constitute a distinct mode of social interaction to be differentiated from both strategic bargaining --the realm of rational choice--and ruleguided behavior--the realm of sociological institutionalism. Apart from utility-maximizing action, on the one hand, and rule-

guided behavior, on the other, human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus (verstandigungsorientiertes Handeln), challenging the validity claims involved in any communication. I claim that Jurgen Habermas's critical theory of communicative action is helpful in conceptualizing the logic of arguing and can actually be brought to bear to tackle empirical questions in world politics. A focus on arguing helps to clarify two issues in the rationalistconstructivist debate. First, it furthers our understanding of how actors develop a common knowledge concerning both a definition of the situation and an agreement about the underlying "rules of the game" that enable them to engage in strategic bargaining in the first place. Thus, arguing constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) step in a negotiating process. Arguing is also relevant for problem solving in the sense of seeking an optimal solution for a commonly perceived problem and for agreeing on a common normative framework. Seeking a reasoned consensus helps actors to overcome many collective action problems. I illustrate this point empirically using the negotiated settlement ending the Cold War in Europe. Second, argumentative rationality

appears to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. When actors engage in a trothseeking discourse, they must be prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities. Some of these debates actually take place in the public sphere, which has to be
distinguished from the realm of diplomatic negotiations. My empirical example for such a process concerns public discourses in the human rights area, particularly those between transnational human rights advocacy networks and national governments accused of norm violation.

Framework Roleplaying
Fiat is key to being informed citizens without it we never learn about the political process and do not take responsibility for the possible bad outcomes of our actions. Simulating policy solves all of their offense, allowing people a safe place to test new ideas
Joyner, 1999 (Christopher C., Professor of International Law at Georgetown, Teaching International Law, 5 Ilsa. J. Intl &
Comp. L. 377, Lexis) Use of the debate

can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other roleplaying simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States
national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions , along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policymaking, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

Policy debaters become policy makers, and even if we dont, simulating the government allows us to check government violence
Rawls, 1999 (John, Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, The Law of Peoples, p. 54-57)
Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reason for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies.

ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance, Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.
As for private citizens, we say, as before, that

Framework Anti-Politics
The Affirmatives retreat from politics dooms their ability to change the world it creates atrocity and causes a vacuum that gets filled by the right
Boggs, 1997 (Carl, Professor and Ph.D. in Political Science, National University, Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved ^ perhaps even unrecognized ^ only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time

when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num- bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it : the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites ^ an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The
fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise ^ or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

It is a question of curriculum their model is uniquely dangerous it damns us to disengagement in the face of the right and the hegemonic
Small, 2006 (Jonathan, Former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, Moving Forward, The Journal for Civic
Commitment, Spring, ) What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global

warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life
through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven.

Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankinds next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed
and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every

Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of
single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century .

It will require a radical transformation of our

conception of education.

Well need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay

civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the
between ideas of social justice, possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, lets not get bogged d own on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that todays youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high vo lunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and todays youth. But

todays youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it.
one thing is for sure; Author Kurt Vonnegut said, There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I dont know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president. Maybe the youths rejection of American politics isnt a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience . Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century,

our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social
we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

The practices in this debate round do matter we kritik them on a fundamental level
Boggs, 1997 (Carl, Professor and Ph.D. in Political Science, National University, Theory and Society 26: 741-780) The historic goal of recovering politics in the Aristotelian sense, there- fore, suggests nothing less than a revitalized citizenry prepared to occupy that immense expanse of public space. Extension of democratic control into every area of social life requires insurgency against the charade of normal politics, since the persistence of normal politics is just another manifestation of anti-politics. If authentic citizenship is to be forged, then information, skills, and attitudes vital to political efficacy need to flourish and be widely distributed throughout the population, without this, ``consciousness transformation'' is impossible, or at least politically meaningless. A debilitating problem with the culture of anti-politics, however, is that it precisely devalues those very types of information, skills, and attitudes.

Because politics is currently screwed up now, we need a political realm to capitalize upon its failings they give up on that, and we save it
Boggs, 1997 (Carl, Professor and Ph.D. in Political Science, National University, Theory and Society 26: 741-780)
So it follows that future attempts to revitalize the public sphere and reclaim politics for (and by) an empowered citizenry will face a Sisyphean battle, especially since corporate colonization, the global capital- ist order, media myth-making, and ``post-modern'' social fragmentation are all so rmly entrenched. And the main twentieth-century ideological discourses ^ nationalism, liberalism, socialism, Communism ^ can be expected to over few guideposts in a rapidly-changing, unpredictable field of social forces, popular struggles, and subjective human responses. The truth may be that such ideologies have in themselves contributed to the decline of political life since the 1970s. Meanwhile, the depoliticized culture that I am exploring in these pages is neither monolithic nor immune to powerful social contradictions generated within any highly-strained order; the system is vulnerable to change,

perhaps explosive change, as American society experiences further crisis and polarization. Popular movements and organizations have survived into the 1990s, even if many of them have been fully assimilated into normal politics or have become marginalized. Whether such movements can become repoliticized whether they can enter into and help transform the public sphere - will be the urgent question facing the United States and the world in the early twenty-first century.

Moralizing about utopian futures without concern for a political strategy is a recipe for disaster it doesnt awaken the system it falls on deaf ears and alienates
Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Spring, Vol. 49 No. 2)
Politics is about ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would

be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics. The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the
"riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukcs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies. What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweat-shops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of

moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value
of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans , who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "antiimperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jrgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of

contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live.

Abandoning politics leaves a vacuum that gets filled by the right

Grossberg, 1992 (Lawrence, Professor of Communication at the University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Out Of This Place, p. 390391) But this would mean that the

Left could not remain outside of the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against and with in bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case
of Amnesty International, an immesely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; memebership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes continuing) dismantling

of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the

institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions and it depended on a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people's attitudes and everyday practices (e.g. the 1990 Balck boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to
move the institutions (e.g.,banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic realtions of bleack and immigrant populations in place and which condition people's everyday practices . The Left needs institutions which can operate

within the system of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to
the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making power. Otherwise the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act with organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as responsibility) to fight them.

Case Negative

Case Advantage Defense

The picture painted by the Aff is persuasive but fails to take into account history which disproves their thesis
Pastor and Long, 2010 (Robert A., Tom, The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic
Interpretation of U.S. Policy, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 45 No. 3, p. 261-273) In fact, U.S. involvement in Latin America during the Cold War reflects a pattern that has defined U.S. policy since the Spanish-American War of 1898, and especially since construction of the Panama Canal: the United States has

intervened whenever it perceives that a foreign rival could exploit instability. When the crisis has passed, the United States disengages and shifts its attention elsewhere. This cycle has been described as a whirlpool that first sucks the United States into its vortex, and then allows it to float to the edge, thinking that it has escaped, only to draw it back in when a new crisis occurs .16 This model stands in contrast to the radical theory that the desire to dominate motivates U.S. policies. Were the latter true, U.S. involvement would deepen and expand after a crisis, because its rivals would be weaker. In this sense, the radical thesis coincides with that of the realist school, which argues that states
always seek to expand and that their only deterrent is the force of opponents.17 The division between the Cold War and post Cold War eras offers a clear test of the two theses. Radical-realists predict continued and more expansive U.S. efforts in the post Cold War era; the whirlpool thesis predicts a decline in attention and involvement. The consensus of the policy- oriented books examined here is that U.S. attention has lapsed. It is unlikely, Lowenthal and his coeditors write, that the new U.S. administration will find much time to think about the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (xi). The United States is at the edge of the whirlpool again. Works on the Cold War also offer an opportunity to test a second hypothesis this one on American exceptionalism. Anti-imperialist

scholars accuse the United States of failing to live up to its claims that it is different and better than other great powers. They seek to strip away the rhetoric and expose U.S. policy as motivated by a hunger for power, base economic interests, or racial prejudice, leaving the United States no different from other imperialist nations. Again, this perspective is con- sistent with the realist view that all major powers behave alike . Nonethe- less, the idea of American exceptionalism also, ironically, captures antiimperialists. Their harsh critique of U.S. policy is actually rooted not in how other powers behave but in how the United States professes to be- have, that is, idealistically. The history of U.S. policy toward Latin America is replete with real- ism and cynicism on the one hand and idealism on the other hand. Real- ists and radicals would have predicted that, after Mexicos surrender in 1848, the U.S. Army would have marched as far down through Central and South America as it could, whereas it stopped and agreed to the o Grande as a border.18 They would have expected the United States to respond positively to requests by El Salvador and the Dominican Republic to be annexed, whereas those requests were rejected. They would have ex- pected the United States to annex Cuba after the Spanish-American War, but President McKinley adhered to the Teller amendment. They would not have predicted the good neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt or the human rights policy of Jimmy Carter . Compared with the behavior of past great powers, U.S. exceptionalism has been imperfect but undeniable. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, democracy and free trade seemed to have consolidated, and it looked as though the United States had found an exit from the whirlpool. But as the first decade of this cen- tury concludes, that prediction seems premature. Democracy is again en- dangered, free trade has stalled and threatens to go into reverse, and the exit from the whirlpool is not as clearly marked. As the crisis in Honduras has made clear, instability still threatens. The hemisphere has not escaped the rules of the international system; its countries still compete with one another, and some of its leaders still seek ways to remain in power. These books offer a reinterpretation of the Cold War
in Latin America. However, when we turn to the past two decades, it is clear that we have yet to synthesize the concepts necessary to understand todays inter-American system. The job of historians and political scientists is not over.

Their benign neglect and racism arguments are wrong

Estrada, 1997 (Richard, associate editor of The Dallas Morning News, specializing in immigration issues, Is Latin America
Worth It? The Dallas Morning News, 6 1 , http:

Latin Americans continue to feel neglected by Washington . President Clinton did travel to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean recently, but critics here and abroad repeatedly asked why it took him so long. Is Washington dissing Latin America? No one can justifiably ignore the many indignities Latin American nations have suffered at the hands of the United States, including armed interventions and territorial conquest. But it's important to note that the issue behind modern neglect of the region has neither been racism, anti-Latin Americanism, nor disrespect . As students of European diplomatic history, Kissinger and other U.S. foreign policy gurus, such as
George F. Kennan, liked to cut to the chase. That meant focusing on the balance of power and spheres of influence as they related to U.S. vital interests in the context of the Soviet threat after World War II. Kissinger knew that the great diplomatic chess game was being played mainly in Europe, but also in Asia. Yet things began to change. As the Soviet Union began to dissolve and as countries like Mexico began to open up their economies, Kissinger came to see the U.S.-Mexico binational relationship as important--or nearly as important--as any other. The trouble with those who are demanding that the United States do more for Latin America is that they appear to be oblivious to what drove U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. The whole point of the Marshall Plan was to help the nations of Western Europe rebuild their economic infrastructure to turn them into a strong bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Kennan, the author of the containment policy that successfully checkmated Soviet expansionism during the Cold War, knows something about such misunderstandings. When he traveled around the United States in 1947 to speak in support of the Marshall Plan, those with a special interest in Latin America and Asia lobbied him for similar initiatives for those regions. With an explosion in the size of our Hispanic population since then, it is only natural that there should be even greater pleading for Latin American interests in Washington. For many observers, Latin America's significance lies in the enhanced trade that has resulted from market and democratic reforms. Others believe greater emphasis must be placed on challenges such as drugs and illegal immigration. In truth, the region represents both

an opportunity and a threat. What Latin America deserves is an opportunity to lift itself up. Inherent
in the mistaken argument that the United States should provide assistance to Latin America is the notion that the United States played Santa Claus in 1947. In truth, Washington chose to spend what in 1990 terms was $88 billion out of self-interest, which is to say, the national interest. The United States has a clear interest in helping promote a prosperous and stable Latin America, mainly through trade. But Latin America is not a bulwark against an expansive evil empire. To give the region less attention than what has been accorded to Europe is not an expression of disrespect. And during a period of heightened controversy over U.S. government expenditures abroad, the time to make that point is now, rather than manana.

No single root cause of violence or conflict empirics and incentive theory are the only adequate methods to understand war
Moore, 2004 (Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the
American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 41-42)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific
disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well

play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had
begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1

Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain
committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to

demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is

reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the
State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth

HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms . In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example,
the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment.

at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

The Aff reifies the Eurocentrist thinking that they criticize

Lund, 2001 (Joshua, Barbarian Theorizing and the Limits of Latin American Exceptionalism, Cultural Critique, 47 Winter, p. 54 90) Two important concepts for Latin American(ist) cultural criti- cism1 define the focus of this essay: exceptionalism and Eurocentrism. The objective of my critique is to interrogate the limits of Latin American exceptionalism by placing it in dialectical tension with Eurocentrism. I aim to signal the ways in which exceptionalism as a mode of theorizing Latin American singularity

while ultimately a critical endeavortends to overlook its own symptomatic relationship with Eurocentrism, and thereby succumbs to the same problems that it identifies in Eurocentric discourse. Exceptionalism, I propose, is not simply a reaction to or result of external factors, such as Latin Americas marginalization from the construction of Western knowledge. It is also a symptom of the tenacity of Eurocentrism within Latin American(ist) criticism. Just as Eurocentrism elides the intellectual contribution of peripheral or subaltern cultures to the epistemological constitution of the socalled West, so does exceptionalism reach its limits by focusing attention upon this very issue . Left aside is the engagement with epistemologies uncommonly, if ever, taken seriously in the rarefied discourses of Western knowledge production. At stake then is the role of the Latin American(ist)
intellectual as complicit in the erasure of the epistemological plurality of Latin America.

Case U.S. Centrism Turn

Turn A) The Affs interrogation focuses solely on the United States and U.S. interaction with the region, ignoring the congruence of forces at play in Latin America
Pastor and Long, 2010 (Robert A., Tom, The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic
Interpretation of U.S. Policy, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 45 No. 3, p. 261 -273) As Piero Gleijeses has shown, Guatemalas President Jacobo Arbenz knew that the United States opposed his government, not because of the United Fruit Company but because he was a communist.7 This also explains why U.S. policy was benign or supportive to the equally radical but noncommunist revolution in Bolivia and to the social democratic government of President Jos Figueres in Costa Rica.8 In In from the Cold, the chapters by Gleijeses and Spenser on the foreign policies of Cuba and the Soviet Union show Fidel Castro aggressively promoting revolution throughout Latin America before the United States reacted with the Alliance for Prog- ress and counterinsurgency efforts. The Soviet Union sometimes helped; at other times, it discouraged the Cubans. From the other side of the battle-field, as Ariel Armony describes, Argentinean foreign policy was equally aggressive while more repressive at home and in its fight against communism in Central America, even when the United States opposed its efforts. One may conclude that Cold War history was made not by the United States but by a clash of Latin American conservatives and revolutionaries, with each side welcoming support though not necessarily advicefrom one of the superpowers. Furthermore, contrary to Walter LaFebers thesis that revolutions are inevitable in Latin America,9 Brands shows that they were rare. Indeed, they succeeded only when they began as demands for democracy against long-standing dictators such as Porfirio D az, Fulgen- cio Batista, and Anastasio Somoza.10 This is not to excuse U.S. foreign policy or to suggest that it was un- important but to confirm only that Latin America has also played a

substantial role in inter-American relations, and that economic interests and the need to dominate are not the sole motivations of the United States. Leaders such as Jimmy Carter sincerely promoted human rights. Others such as John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton promoted economic reforms and democracy. And still others claimed to support human rights but actually did the opposite. No one captures this hypocrisy better than Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who came to the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly in Chile in June 1976 to give a speech on human rights. Tom Blanton refers to the memorandum of conversation in which Kissinger privately told the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to ignore his speech, which was intended to fool the U.S. Congress. My evalua - tion, Kissinger said to the dictator, is that you are a victim of all left- wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going communist. . . . I want you to succeed (Joseph and Spenser, 56).

B) This means the Aff falls into the same trap that they criticize their focus on U.S. intentions centers the United States as the only subject worth examining, which turns all of their epistemology arguments
Pastor and Long, 2010 (Robert A., Tom, The Cold War and Its Aftermath in the Americas: The Search for a Synthetic
Interpretation of U.S. Policy, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 45 No. 3, p. 261-273) Even more important than the lack of data was the predominance of a theoretical model in which the United States was the actor and Latin America, the dependent, defenseless object. With this premise, Peter H. Smith concluded that the study of inter-American relations required only a mediation on the character and conduct of the United States and how it exercised its perennial predominance.2 The title of his book, Talons of the Eagle, evokes a rapacious and unforgiving United States preying on the innocent victim of Latin America. Lars Schoultz similarly extracted

almost every morsel of duplicity, arrogance, and interventionism that he could locate in U.S. diplomatic history to cook a broth that would give heartburn to any U.S. president or idealistic citizen. In Schoultzs view, the United States was convinced not only of its superiority but also of Latin Americas inferiority, and racism and the desire to dominate motivated its actions .3 Crandall has dubbed this lens anti-imperialist; one of us has described it as radical. 4 Scholars who use this lens contend that U.S. policy makers used the Cold War to maintain control of the region, suppress progressive movements, and defend an unjust order. United States policy was the only subject worth studying. Latin Americas foreign policies were neither important nor influential. In a

prescient essay, Max Paul Friedman noted the prevalence of this

approach and suggested that it could not be sustained if historians were to incorporate Latin American sources, archives, and perspectives. The use of U.S. archives alone, he wrote, may help explain why the only actor in . . . inter American history is the northern colossus.5 Latin Americas Cold War and In from the Cold follow Friedmans call,
drawing on Latin American and Soviet archives, as well as Truth Commission reports. At their best, these works recall the work of Friedrich Katz, who delved deeply into the archives of nine countries to discover that Mexican revolutionaries invited and manipulated the imperialists more effectively than these foreigners manipulated them.6 A few authors in these collections, as well as oth- ers whom Friedman cites, dive sufficiently deeply into Cold War sources to test whether Katzs conclusion applies to other cases as well, and thus whether the radical view is confirmed or impugned by the evidence.

Case Imperialism Turn

Criticizing benevolent international action on the grounds of imperialism undermines liberation of oppressed peoples
Shaw, 2002 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in
the Global Era, 4-7-2002, It is worth asking how the

politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice. John Pilger, for example, consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny
their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention.against Serbia. He never attempted to MINIMISE the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent.

To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice- of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice; We need to support the victims regardless OF whether Western governments take up their cause or not, we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims. The task for civil society in the West is not therefore to oppose Western state policies as a matter of course , a la Cold War, but to mobilise solidarity with democratic oppositions and repressed peoples against authoritarian quasi-imperial states. It is to demand more effective global political legal and military institutions that genuinely and consistently defend the interests of the most threatened groups . It is to grasp the contradictions among and
within Western elites, conditionally allying themselves with internationalising elements in global institutions and Western governments, against nationalist and reactionary elements. The arrival in power of George Bush II makes this discrimination all the more urgent In the long run, we need to develop a larger politics of global social democracy and an ethic of global responsibility that address the profound economic, political and cultural inequalities between Western and non-Western worlds.

We will not move far in these directions, however, unless we grasp the life-and-death struggles between many oppressed peoples and the new local imperialisms, rather than subsuming all regional contradictions into the false synthesis of a new Western imperialism.

Criticizing Western imperialism obscures more insidious practices by regional powers

Shaw, 2002 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in
the Global Era, 4-7-2002, It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It

simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this
separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with

both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many nonWestern states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by

other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

The Affs post-colonialism essentializes oppression and makes resistance impossible

Ong, 1999 (Aihwa, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logic of Transnationality, p. 3334) More broadly, postcolonial theorists focus on recovering the voices of subjects silenced by patriarchy and colonial rule (The Empire Writes Back is the title of one popular collection); they assume that all contemporary racial, ethnic, and cultural oppressions can all be attributed to Western colonialisms. American appropriations of

postcolonial theory have created a unitary discourse of the postcolonial that refers to highly variable situations and conditions throughout the world; thus, Gayatri Spivak is able to talk about "the paradigmatic subaltern
woman," as well as "New World Asians (the old migrants) and New Immigrant Asians (often 'model minorities') being disciplinarized together?" Other postcolonial feminists also have been eager to seek structural similarities, continuities, conjunctures, and alliances between the postcolonial oppressions experienced by peoples on the bases of race, ethnicity, and gender both in formerly colonized populations in the third world and among immigrant populations in the United States, Australia, and England. 16 Seldom is there any attempt to link these assertions of unitary postcolonial situations among diasporan subjects in the West to the historical structures of colonization, decolonization, and contemporary developments in particular non-Western countries. Indeed, the term postcolonial has been used to indiscriminately describe different regimes of economic, political, and cultural domination in the Americas, India, Africa, and other third-world countries where the actual historical experiences of colonialism have been very varied in terms of local culture, conquest, settlement, racial exploitation, administrative regime, political resistance, and articulation with global capitalism. In careless hands, postcolonial theory can represent a kind of theoretical imperialism whereby scholars based in the West, without seriously engaging the scholarship of faraway places, can project or "speak for" postcolonial situations elsewhere. Stuart Hall has warned against approaches that universalize racial, ethnic, and gender oppressions without locating the "actual integument of power... in concrete institutions ." A more fruitful strand of postcolonial studies is represented by subaltern scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, who has criticized the Indian national projects, which are based on Western models of modernity and bypass "many possibilities of authentic, creative, and plural development of social identities," including the marginalized communities in Indian society. He suggests that an alternative imagination that draws on "narratives of community" would be a formidable challenge to narratives of capital. This brilliant work, however, is based on the assumption that both modernity and capitalism are universal forms, against which non-Western societies such as India can only mobilize "pre-existing cultural solidarities such as locality, caste, tribe, religious community, or ethnic identity." This analytical opposition between a universal modernity and non-Western culture is rather old-fashioned it is as if Chatterjee believes the West is not present in Indian elites who champion narratives of the indigenous community. Furthermore, the concept of a universal modernity must be rethought when, as Arif Dirlik observes, "the narrative of capitalism is no longer the narrative of the history of Europe; non-European capitalist societies now make their own claims on the history of capitalism."20 The loose use of the term "the postcolonial." then, has had the bizarre effect of contributing to a Western tradition of othering the Rest; it suggests a postwar scheme whereby "the third world" was followed by "the developing countries," which are now being succeeded by "the postcolonial." This continuum seems to suggest that the further we move in

time, the more beholden non-Western countries are to the forms and practices of their colonial past. By and large, anthropologists have been careful to discuss how formerly colonized societies have developed differently in
relation to global economic and political dominations and have repositioned themselves differently vis-a-vis capitalism and late modernity. By specifying differences in history, politics, and culture, anthropologists are able to say how the postcolonial formation of Indonesia is quite different from that of India, Nicaragua, or Zaire.

Case Solvency Defense

Declaring the intent of their critique is not enough - they need to explain HOW their Aff can be implemented or voting Affirmative means nothing
Jones, 1999 (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Security.
Strategy, and Critical Theory. Columbia International Affairs Online)

one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on mis issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Continues Thus, although the critical international theorists* critique of the role mat more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that "it
Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory" (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory-practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its

own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus mat it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

The inevitability of realism precludes their ability to change any political thought or ideology
Guzzini, 1998 (Stefano, Prof - Central European U, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p.
22) Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it

is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us understand real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about, and which permeates our daily language for making sense
of it. Realism had been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hards of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realims is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at a distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the language of those who make significant decisions, not only in the government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary this understanding as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claimsmade in the name , although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

Their claims to challenge ideology only throw out the good with the bad, replacing sound politics with slogans and jargon
Jarvis, 2000 (Darryl, Prof, School Economics- U. Sydney, International Relations: Defending the Discipline, p. 189-190)
First, the project of subversive-deconstructive postmodernism can be seen as contrary to the discipline of International Relations as a social sci-ence designed not so much to generate knowledge as to disparage


edge spawned through Enlightenment thinking and the precepts of rationality and science. At its most elemental, it is a project of disruption and an attack upon the complacency of knowledge generated in modernist quarters. Not that this is all bad. There is much good to come from a shakeup of the academy, from a reexamination of our ontological, episte-mological,
and axiological foundations and from the types of practices that ensue from certain modes of conceptualization and analysis. Pointing out silences and omissions from the dominant discourse is always fruitful and necessary, but, arguably, also accomplished under theories and paradigms and from critical quarters that are not necessarily postrnodern and which do not seek to undo all knowledge simply on the basis of imperfection. Mod- ernist discourse is not unreflective, can make autonomous corrections, engage in revisionist history, identify injustices, crimes of exclusion, and extend representation to groups that were otherwise not previously repre-sented (think of liberalism or socialism for example!). This, after all, is why we understand modernity to be progressive and history a forward-moving narrative that is self-effusive. More importantly, given the self-defeating con-tradictions endemic to subversive-deconstructive postmodernism, especially its specious relativism, it requires no great mind to postulate that the use of modernist/rationalist/Enlightenment discourse will better make the case for a progressive politics of ever greater inclusion, representation, and jus-tice for all than will sloganistic calls for us to think otherwise. The sim-ple and myopic assumption that social change can be engineered through linguistic policing of politically incorrect words, concepts and opinions, is surely one of the more politically lame (idealist) suggestions to come from armchair theorists in the last fifty years. By the same token, the suggestion that we engage in revisionism of the sort that would undo modernist knowledge so that we might start again free of silences, oppressions, and inequalities also smacks of an intelligentsia so idealist as to be unconnected to the world in which they live. The critical skills of subversive postmod-ernists, constrained perhaps by the success of the West, of Western capi-talism, if not liberal democracy, as the legitimate form of representation, and having tried unsuccessfully through revolution and political uprising to dethrone it previously, have turned to the citadel of our communal identities and attacked not parliaments, nor forms of socialpolitical-economic organization, but language, communication, and the basis of Enlightenment knowledge that otherwise enables us to live, work, and communicate as social beings. Clever though this is, it is not in the end compatible with the project of theory knowledge and takes us further away from an understanding of our world. Its greatest contribution is to cele-brate the loss of certainty, where, argues John ONeill, men (sic) are no longer sure of their ruling knowledge and are unable to mobilize suf ficient legitimation for the master-narratives of truth and justice. To suppose, however, that we should rejoice collectively at the prospects of a specious relativism and a multifarious perspectivism, and that absent any further constructive endeavor, the great questions and problems of our time will be answered or solved by this speaks of an intellectual poverty now famed perversely as the search for thinking space.26

Case Epistemology
Our understanding of the world is not dependent on epistemological questions prioritizing epistemology at the expense of political action and empirical explanation is a dangerous mistake
Owen, 2002 (David, Re-Orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millennium
Journal of International Studies) Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that a frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology often signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems , such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weaknessbut this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical

judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action , event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or
phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program in that it dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since

whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry. 6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is
that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander viewnamely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right , namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Case Utilitarianism/Consequentialism
Consequences matter the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of ones intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters ; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and

(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

An ethic of foresight is essential to human dignity and survival we must be willing to shape our present actions in a way that avoids short-term challenges to existence Hayward, 2006 (Peter C., Ph.D. from Swinburne University of Technology, From Individual to Social Foresight, The Case
for Foresight, November 8, The second response is commonly referred to as `TINA', (There Is No Alternative). However, there are alternatives and this is the primary justification for this research. Rather than accepting the `default' future of queue sera, there is the possibility of considering what future(s) we wish to live in; and of taking steps in the present to increase the

likelihood of `desired' futures and to reduce the likelihood of the `undesired' ones. To do this is to employ foresight. Foresight is an innate capability of every person, and it operates in us as an adjunct to other human
capabilities like experiential learning (Bell 1997). Rather than having to experience a challenge in order to learn how best to manage it, foresight allows us to prepare for a challenge and even to take actions to prevent the challenge occurring. Most importantly through social modelling, the advantages gained from the foresight of one person can be gifted to others, thereby making foresight a social as well as an individual capability. It is an explicit wish of many that we do not want to have to experience dystopia in order to learn how to prevent it. While there is a relationship between foresight and experience it is to be hoped that we do not require the latter in order to engage the former (Slaughter 2002b). If we have to wait until the challenges to our survival are so obvious before we take them seriously, then there will be no way back from the brink. If we want to maintain and realise notions of social justice, humanity and dignity for all, rather than human worth determined through social Darwinism, then it must be through purposeful human action. Foresight that can separate out the retrograde elements from our Western inheritance will play a significant role in such a process (Gaspar & Novaky 2002). Figure 1.1 is a simple representation of the intent of this thesis. The vertical axis represents an increasing scale of challenges over time. To respond to this the horizontal axis represents the expansion of our foresight capacity, both individual and social, over time. As the challenges to existence grow in scale then so to must our foresight capacities. The dotted line represents the belief that expanding foresight capacities will give us the ability to anticipate, perceive and act on our present and future challenges and thereby produce a trajectory of preferable futures for ourselves and future generations. The nature of human existence is that we will continue to face challenges into the future. Existence is precarious, and precious. No matter how good our thinking and technologies are, we will

continue to face an increasing scale of challenges to our existence. Our ancestors were aware of localised challenges. We, on the other hand, are aware of planetary challenges. Furthermore as we learn more about our planet and the galactic neighbourhood more challenges will be detected. This research seeks to make a contribution to understanding the expansion of foresight capacities and thereby, in some small way, to the trajectory towards preferable


Extinction comes first Bok, 1988 (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)
The same argument can be made for Kants other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: So act as to use humanity, both i n your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means; and So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends. No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following ones conscience would be, as Rawls said, irrational, crazy. And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the

extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kants moral theory.

Maximizing life allows people to decide their own values the alternative is totalitarianism Szacki, 1996 (Jerzy, Professor of Sociology at Warsaw University, Liberalism After Communism, p. 197)
Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards it neutrality as a virture. Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that as Joseph Raz wrote there are many worthwhile and

valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible.

It recognizes that as John Rawls put it a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take not of; he or she is ready to acknowledge that now this variety of conceptions of the good

is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different. Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not
treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.

Debates about foresight and prevention of catastrophes avert extinction and enable positive social change Kurasawa, 2004 (Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of
Prevention and the Work of Foresight, Constellations, 11:4, p. 455-456) This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that

we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on);

individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into risk communities that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing below the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders;

promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival
the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to move up and become institutionalized via strong publics. Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting sociopolitical and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the futures essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism of solidarity that extends to future generations can supplant the preeminence of short-termism with the help of appeals to the publics moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution

and transnational justice can hone citizens faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

Despite all the flaws associated with calculating risk, we are still right you must weigh survival as an a priori question and sculpt deliberate policies to protect humanity Matheny, 2007 (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns
Hopkins University, Reudcing the Risk of Human Extinction, Risk Analysis, Vol. 27 No. 5, http: www.upmc 9. Conclusion We

may be poorly equipped to recognize or plan for extinction risks (Yudkowsky, 2007). We may not be good at grasping the significance of very large numbers (catastrophic outcomes) or very small numbers (probabilities) over large timeframes. We struggle with estimating the probabilities of rare or unprecedented events (Kunreuther et al., 2001). Policymakers may not plan far beyond current political administrations and rarely do risk assessments value the existence of future generations.18 We may unjustifiably discount the value of future lives . Finally, extinction risks are market failures where an individual enjoys no perceptible benefit from his or her investment in risk reduction. Human survival may thus be a good requiring deliberate policies to protect. It might be feared that consideration of extinction risks
would lead to a reductio ad absurdum: we ought to invest all our resources in asteroid defense or nuclear disarmament, instead of AIDS, pollution, world hunger, or other problems we face today. On the contrary, programs that create a healthy and

content global population are likely to reduce the probability of global war or catastrophic terrorism. They should thus be seen as an essential part of a portfolio of risk-reducing projects.

LatCrit Turns

1NC LatCrit Turns

No offense and link the black-white paradigm provides the best method for dismantling all forms of oppression its also uniquely key to understanding black experiences
Rogelio A. Lasso, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School, 1-1-2005 (Some Potential Causalities of Moving Beyond the Black White Paradigm to Build Racial Coalitions online @ To prevail over white supremacy we must understand how it operates. The best method for understanding how it operates is through the use of the Black/White Paradigm. Only through this lens will we understand how white supremacists developed their political view that the world is either white (and right), or not white (and wrong). The Black/White Paradigm also offers a unique instrumentality to understand race-based
domination and subordination. 13 Race may be a tool which defines different racial groups against one another, but its seminal work was the definition of whites vis-avis Blacks. As Angela Harris states, caucasians became "white" only by contrasting themselves to Blacks, and the development of white supremacy was based on whites' anti-Black prejudice. 14 Racial animus is not limited to white supremacists, it has been deeply embedded in the fiber of the American psyche since the nation's inception. Even Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, presumes that it is an undisputable fact of nature that Whites are superior to Blacks.15 "The white race ... [is] the dominant race in this country ... and.., will continue to be for all time."'16

Only when we understand how deeply racial disdain for Blacks runs

through mainstream white America will we be able to dismantle its effects on other non-white groups . As several scholars have noted, white does not simply stand for members of the white race. White stands for a set of privileges that have always been associated with whites .1 7 Correspondingly, Black does not simply stand for members of the Black race. Black stands for the denial of the privileges accorded to persons deemed white. 18 In the spectrum of the denial of "white" privilege accorded all nonwhites, Blacks occupy the least privileged end. Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians may all be considered something less than white, but "[B]lackness is the worst kind of non-whiteness ."'19 Only through the application of the Black/White Paradigm can we begin to recognize and understand the spectrum of denied white privilege. For example, Asians have gone from being Black to superwhites,2 as when
Asians are the feared "model minority" who outperform whites in the same meritocratic games devised by whites to deny people of color access to power.

Thats key in Latin America Afro-Latin American populations remain subjugated under indigenous movements they retrench oppression Cevallos, Inter Press Service correspondent, 5-19-2005 (Diego, LATIN AMERICA: AfroDescendants Marginalised and Ignored, http: 2 descendants-marginalised-and-ignored/) 5 5 latin -america-afro-

The indigenous population, which comprises an estimated 40 million people, has taken on an increasingly active political role in Latin America. By contrast, the 150 million Afro-descendants in Latin America and the Caribbean have extremely limited political power and lack cohesive organisations to represent their interests. Their situation also receives far less attention in international forums and academic research. Available studies reveal that over 90 percent of the descendants of slaves brought from Africa to the Americas during the colonial era live below the poverty line, have access to only the most poorly paid jobs, and have low levels of formal education. They also face intense discrimination based solely on the colour of their skin. Blacks remain the most excluded sector of the population , even more so than indigenous people, noted Quince Duncan, a Costa Rican researcher and member of the International Scientific Committee of the Slave Route Project. The project, launched in 1994 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), is aimed at breaking the silence surrounding the slave trade an d promoting greater awareness of its causes, modalities and consequences, especially the interactions between the peoples involved in Europe, Africa and the Caribbean. Related IPS Articles The Slave Route UNESCO ECLAC A 2001 study by the Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) noted that the Afro-Latin American and Afro-Caribbean population, which represents almost 30 percent of the regions total population , is characterised by high density and little resonance. The study, titled Ethnic-Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia in Latin America and the Caribbean, shows that while there are 150 million people of African descent in the region with the largest numbers concentrated in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela they have a highly limited presence in politics and government, while very little detailed information is available on their economic conditions. Essentially,

the problems

facing the black population in the region are ignored to the point of being invisible , the study concluded. In Brazil, the white population is 2.5 times wealthier than the black population; in Colombia, 80 percent of Afro-descendants live in extreme poverty; and in Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere with a socialist economic system, blacks are largely relegated to the worst housing and the poorest paid jobs, according to studies conducted in these countries. The situation of blacks has received less attention than that of indigenous people, because they arrived in the Americas after the European conquest, they do not constitute an aboriginal culture in the region, and their integration into the workforce was faster and more complete, Duncan told IPS in a telephone interview from Costa Rica. In Latin America and the Caribbean, racism is focused above all against blacks , even more so than against indigenous people, and this is evident throughout the Americas, although some countries are making significant efforts to change this situation, he added.

LatCrit Turns Top Level

Experience DA rejecting the Black/White Paradigm makes resisting domination impossible we must draw on black experiences
Rogelio A. Lasso, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School, 1-1-2005 (Some Potential Causalities of Moving Beyond the Black White Paradigm to Build Racial Coalitions online @
Perhaps the

most important function of the Black/White Paradigm is that its adoption can unite people of color and progressive whites into a formidable force against white supremacy. Only a unified nation can fulfill the American promise of prosperity and justice for all. While Blacks, Latinos, Native Americans and Asians may share a history of discrimination in America, the faces at the very bottom of the well are still overwhelmingly Black. For this reason, only a claim to Blackness by all people of color and progressive whites will lead to a truly effective force to overcome white supremacy. The strength of a nation is directly related to the strength of its weakest members . The nation can only reach its full potential when all Americans are given the opportunity to reach their full potential. A majority of white Americans live comfortable lives of economic prosperity. For those whites who have not achieved prosperity, it is not because of their race. For example, there may be many poor whites in rural America, but these folks are not poor because they are white. By contrast, for nonwhites in general, and for Blacks in particular, economic prosperity and justice are closely tied to race. And for these groups, the reason for their continued subordinated status is ultimately race. Thus, for people of color, the challenge is to define our role within the national debate on race, as well as within the nation's promise of prosperity and justice for all. As Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans seek to define their role, challenging the Black/White Paradigm may have some superficial appeal. However, for the American race dilemma to be resolved for any one of us, it must be resolved for all of us. And for the dilemma to be resolved for all Americans, it must first be resolved for the weakest members of society. For all people of color, constructing racial identity must be about bringing power to the disenfranchised, offering economic opportunity to the poor, and giving "voice to the silenced., 23 Any redefinition of ourselves must go beyond individual ethnic self-interest. It must confront fundamental questions of power and domination in American society. Latinos, Asians, Native Americans, and Blacks must all understand how the construction of racial identity is fundamentally a political struggle. All of our efforts today should focus on confronting and dismantling the white supremacist movement which has sought to assure the racial hegemony of whites. Since the original victims of white supremacy were Blacks, the first step all people of color and progressive whites must take to resolve the American dilemma of race is to resolve it for Blacks . The only effective way to do so is to have a better understanding of what it means to be Black. Understanding what it means to be Black within the Black/White Paradigm will make Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans better able to confront the resurgence of white supremacy.

LatCrit Turns Latin America Specific

Afro-Latin Americans are persecuted
Dixon, Assistant Professor of African American Studies at Syracuse University, 2006 (Kwame, Beyond Race and Gender: Recent Works on Afro-Latin America Latin American Research Review, Volume 41, Number 3, 2006, pp. 247-257, Project Muse)
While accurate census data are hard to come by, it is estimated that there are about 150 million people of African descent in Latin America, thus representing about one-third of the total population.1 At present strong

black movements exist in Latin American countries with varying degrees of organization. Many of these movements are fighting against police brutality, disappearances, extermination, coerced sterilization, poverty, and other systematic abuses. Positively, they are fighting for legal recognition and basic socio-political rights. In general these movements are striving for social and economic development, equality before the law, democratic reforms, human rights, and citizenship. The history of these communities, their levels of empowerment, and their social standing vis--vis the overall population vary from country to country; it is true, however, that these communities share many similar problems. This essay is focused on cutting edge scholarship that examines the
Afro-Latin problematic from various disciplinary perspectives such as history, cultural studies, sociology, and anthropology. George Reid Andrewss Afro-Latin America is a compelling historical narrative focused on the struggles of Afro-Latin Americans (1800 2000) for democratic participation, social equality, human rights, and citizenship. Such a work is long overdue. Perhaps not since Leslie B. Routs African Experience in Spanish America, Franklin Knights African Presence in Latin America, and Minority Rig hts Groups Afro-Latin America: No Longer Invisible has anyone focused on the collective struggles and problems of Afro-Latin communities in the Americas from a comparative perspective. While there are no new or novel questions posed, the ones raised are relevant, important, and are dealt with superbly. The author provides a tight analysis and synthesis of some of the key political issues facing Afro-Latin Americans. Andrews moves from country to country with ease as he situates the various struggles of AfroLatin communities within the fluid parameters of Latin American history. By doing so, he demonstrates his fluency in the sociological language of plantation slavery, slave resistance, caste laws, racial and gender discrimination, miscegenation or mestizaje, and AfroLatin social movements. He mainly focuses on Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. There are also important discussions on Mexico and Uruguay. It has been argued that the history of the African Diaspora in Latin America is inseparable from the history of the national and regional societies of which it is part. And, like Afro-North Americans who forced the United States to broaden the parameters of democracy, Afro-Latin Americans are challenging forms of inequality and discrimination and escaping the barriers that centuries of racism and poverty have imposed , thereby transforming these societies and making them more inclusive.

LatCrit Turns AT: Language Discrimination

Language discrimination is a shared injustice their failure to understand black racial experiences hurts anti-racism movements
Rogelio A. Lasso, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School, 1-1-2005 (Some Potential Causalities of Moving Beyond the Black White Paradigm to Build Racial Coalitions online @
The critique of the Black/White Paradigm should be applauded when it challenges race scholars to address the effects of racism on non-Black nonwhites, and when it asks them to cease claiming that White on Black racism represents the universality of the racial dilemma.24 However, because the Black/White Paradigm so deeply informs the American racial dilemma, failure to fully understand the binary aspects of racial discrimination prevents its use as a tool to dismantle discrimination for all races. Juan Perea's critique of the Black/White Paradigm shows the perils of not fully understanding how white racism against Blacks informs white racism against Latinos and Asians. In his critique, Perea argues that "one could study the American Black/white

relationship forever and never understand the language and accent discrimination faced by many Latinos and Asian Americans., 25 This overlooks the historical fact that when African Blacks were enslaved by whites, their very survival required abandoning their native African languages in favor of adopting "proper English., 26 While it surely is a mistake to ignore the effects of racism on Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans, it is dangerous to all racial groups to dilute the racial experience of Blacks by failing to fully understand it.

LatCrit Turns AT: Interracial Disputes

The alternative is worse for everyone
Roy L. Brooks, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UC San Diego Law School and Kirsten Widner, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, 2010 (In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y 107 (2010) Available at:
Professor Richard Delgado argues that binary thinking can harm the group whose interest it places at the center. It can, for example, pit one disadvantaged group against another to the detriment of both. This opposition can impair a group's ability to forge useful coalitions and to learn from other groups' successes and failures. What minority groups should do instead, Delgado argues, is set up a secondary market in which they negotiate selectively with each other . This market would take the form of exchanging support for issues important to various groups, creating win-win solutions whenever possible. Thus, a non-binary framework allows for racial minorities to approach whites in full force."12 Although Professor Delgado's arguments are not without merit, they are based on an unproven assumption that identities among racial minorities are sufficiently monolithic so as to make interracial alliances natural. "The idea would be," Professor Delgado asserts, "for minority groups to assess their own preferences and make tradeoffs that will, optimistically, bring gains for all concerned."' 1 3 However, as Professor Carbado points out, "Non-Black people of color have not always been interested in identifying themselves with the Black or marginalized side

of the Black/White paradigm. In fact, there are moments in American history when certain Asian Americans and Latinas/os have attempted to achieve equality by asserting that they are not Black or like Blacks, and/or that they are White." There are costs as well as advantages associated with occupying both ends of the polarity-the black (or subordinated) end as well as the white (or privileged) end-and non-black racial groups have often been able to avoid the costs and exploit the advantages .' 15 Self-interest is a powerful motivating force. Thus, it may be, as Professor Delgado maintains, that all binaries, including the black/white binary, are narrow nationalisms calculated to cutting the most favorable possible deal with whites '6-a possibility that African Americans can ill-afford to ignore. Therefore it is important to explore this possibility more closely to get a sense of how risky it would be for African Americans to abandon the black/white binary-which spawned the scholarly tradition and political strategy that together have been responsible for destroying Jim Crow and forging a racial consciousness from which all racial groups have benefitted ." When one
looks closely at the natural-alliance theory-more accurately, the presumed-alliance theory-one comes to the unhappy conclusion that the theory founders on the shoals of racial reality. In a world of limited resources, achieving progress on one group's agenda can come at the expense of another group's agenda. The game is, indeed, often zero-sum. The racial dynamic between blacks and Latinos/as, the latter of whom have been the most persistent critics of the black/white binary,' well illustrates this point.

LatCrit Turns AT: Coalitions

Leapfrogging DA coalitions are exploited to benefit other groups at the expense of African Americans
Roy L. Brooks, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UC San Diego Law School and Kirsten Widner, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, 2010 (In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y 107 (2010) Available at: African African African African Americans do not have this kind of racial flexibility. Phenotype and experience prevent Americans from benefitting as much as other racial minorities from the pole of privilege. Americans constitute the social marker for disadvantage, stuck at the pole of subordination. Indeed, Americans have watched as other racial and ethnic groups with whom they have aligned in

the past 135 have leapfrogged past them in resources and power, often distancing themselves from African Americans (what Professor Carbado calls "interracial distancing"' 36 ) once they obtained a certain level of success . There is palpable concern among African Americans that Latinos/as, with their increasing numbers and desire for acceptance, are poised to repeat this process. Like Asians in the context of affirmative action,' 37 Latinos/as might find interracial distancing to be within their self-interest. To ask African Americans to put aside this racial history and risk being a stepping-stone for yet another racial group's advancement may be overly optimistic. This is not to say that African Americans and other racial groups have never successfully collaborated or can never form mutually beneficial coalitions. As
Professor Perea correctly points out, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,38 a school desegregation case, provides an example of interest convergence. 39 Likewise, Mendez v. Westminister School District of Orange County,140 a Mexican-American school desegregation discussed earlier,' 4 ' shows that African Americans can support Latino/a interests when those interests converge with African-American interests. 142 But the crucial question is what happens when the interests clash rather converge? As Latinos/as continue to gain political strength and as both Latinos/as and Asians continue to become more integrated into the mainstream culture (becoming more "white" 43 ), will they find it more advantageous to forge coalitions with whites, whose experiences and interests they now share, than with African Americans, whose experiences and interests have become contraposed? For critical theorists' rejection of the black/white binary to be truly persuasive, they will have to answer these questions. To do so satisfactorily, they must further explore the means by which the historical differences and contraposed interests that have prevented effective collaboration and coalition building in the past can now be resolved.

Coalitionism bad creates one-size fits all solutions that hurt all racial groups
Roy L. Brooks, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UC San Diego Law School and Kirsten Widner, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, 2010 (In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y 107 (2010) Available at:
This statement does not mean that critical theorists have bad intentions. Critical theorists are motivated by the desire to create a diverse America in which everyone and every group gives up a little autonomy to create a harmonious whole. In this vision of a diverse society, all groups are honored for their uniqueness and none are subordinated. That, at least, appears to be the goal. But in the absence of a deeper reckoning with fundamental and sociohistorical conflicts of interests

among racial groups, the rejection of the black/white binary is dangerously premature. Given this country's longstanding racial hierarchy-whites on the top, blacks on the bottom-it makes sense for AfricanAmerican and other civil rights scholars to focus on black/white racial relations. Merging all racial groups hurts not only African Americans but other racial groups as well . According to a study by the U.S. Senate, one reason for the relatively high Latino /a dropout rate is that the discussions of the dropout problem have too often been "submerged in discussions of dropouts in general, the education of ethnic minorities in general, or politicized debates about immigration, language, and bilingualism." 20 ' This does not mean that blacks, browns, and other racial groups cannot or should not form coalitions. But it does mean that racial

problems facing particular groups must be analyzed separately to arrive at an accurate , undiluted understanding of the problems before we attempt to form coalitions.

Their form of coalition-building dilutes racial equality and causes interracial disputes the black/white paradigm is comparatively more effective at challenging white supremacy
Rogelio A. Lasso, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School, 1-1-2005 (Some Potential Causalities of Moving Beyond the Black White Paradigm to Build Racial Coalitions online @ The notion of building coalitions among Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans is appealing. After all, there is power in numbers. Soon the number of people of color will outnumber whites in America. Perhaps the implication is that if we form coalitions, people of color as a group will be able to wrest our rightful share of power away from whites. There is also the idea that coalitions of non-whites will be able to defeat the barriers that the Black/White
Paradigm has fostered. A few years ago, Ingrid Duran, then Executive Director of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute, described "Race Relations" as: the ability to build coalitions across different communities, whether it be black/brown, brown/Jewish, black/Jewish, whatever the case may be; it is the ability to build coalitions to work together without all of the barriers that have been put up in the past. Unfortunately, the notion of coalition building fails to take into account two critical factors: human nature and the deeply rooted racism of white America . Before we can embrace the ideal of coalition building, two questions need to be answered: (1) are coalitions effective and if so, for whom are they effective and (2) if racial coalitions are only effective when they form to demand racial equality, can

they achieve racial equality for all people of color? The process of building coalitions is often used as a tool to dilute racial equality and to turn people of color against each other .28 An example of this occurred a few years ago while I was a visiting professor at Santa Clara Law School. While discussing my potential visit with the dean, he mentioned that U.S. News & World Report had ranked SCU in the second tier. He stated proudly that this was accomplished at a time when the percentage of "minority" students had increased to nearly forty percent of the student body. When I arrived at Santa Clara to teach the following semester, I noticed that out of approximately eighty students in my first year class, there were five Blacks and one Latino. When I mentioned this to some of my white colleagues, they immediately questioned why I had overlooked the Asian students. I responded that though I was happy to see so many Asian students in the class, there were too few Latino and Black students. My white colleagues responded that forty percent of the students were minorities and , again, questioned why I did not count the Asian students . When one colleague asked me whether I believed that Asians were less deserving of law school admission than Latinos or Blacks, I, of course, said no. I explained that regardless of the number of Asians in my classroom, I felt that the class should better represent northern California's population as a whole, particularly considering the large Latino population in the area. Considering that much of northern California's agricultural wealth had been built by Latino migrant workers, shouldn't there be more Latinos at this Jesuit school? "Maybe," said one of my colleagues, but she suggested I should focus on the positive fact that there was such a high number of minorities at SCU. Our discussion became circular with me pointing out that there were too few Latinos and Blacks and my white colleagues pointing out that forty percent of the students were minorities. This frustrating exchange helped me understand how the notion of coalition building can be turned on its head to refute arguments regarding how whites use the distribution of power to restrict racial equality . In this way, racial coalitions worked to pit people of color against each other in a way that primarily benefited whites. Another obstacle to achieving racial equality through coalition building is the natural, if somewhat irrational, tendency toward selfishness. In order for coalitions to be successful, power must be shared. Being human, we are often ruled by the need to compete with one another. Sharing does not occur without overcoming our natural, if irrational, self-interest. This is especially true when we are asked for personal sacrifice for the sake of others. Achieving racial equality through coalition building may also be impeded because we have a natural tendency to want to surround ourselves with people most like ourselves. Most of my close friends are white but, I am willing to admit that often I
seem to associate, at home and at work, with Latinos, preferably, of Caribbean background. Most Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans have a similar preference to associate with people most like them. This goes for whites as well. If this was not true, Sunday morning would not be the most segregated time in America.29 Whites, whether they consciously recognize it or not, will resist non-whites who interfere with their desire to associate with people most like themselves. This leads to a hierarchy acceptance, in which the closer one is to the White model, the more likely one is to encounter acceptance. For example, according to the 2000 census, there were 20.6 million Americans of Mexican descent and only. 1.23 million Americans of Cuban


descent. 30 Those Americans of Cuban descent are found in proportionately much greater numbers at all levels of government, business, and academia. VI. Conclusion: The Future Law and chaos are the dual creative principles of all nature, including human beings. We certainly have the capacity to do the right thing. We certainly can choose to fight first for those who have it worse than ourselves, to make sure that this nation first addresses its issues of racial subordination with poor Black men and only then concentrate on making demands for ourselves. But, to do the right thing, we must fight our dark side, our drive to chaos-our need to replicate ourselves at the expense of others, our drive not to share! If we were perfectly selfish, we would realize that by focusing on helping those at the bottom of the well first, we would in the long run be helping ourselves. Unfortunately, history informs that we may not be up to the task. My fear is that if we abandon our focus on the Black/White Paradigm as the essential tool to dismantle white supremacy, we will also abandon poor Blacks and, eventually, we will become a nation where whites are a racial minority but effectively control all the political, economic, educational, and social institutions of the republic. We will have only ourselves to blame.

LatCrit Turns AT: Ignores Others

No ignorance and our impacts outweigh
Roy L. Brooks, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at UC San Diego Law School and Kirsten Widner, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, 2010 (In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol'y 107 (2010) Available at: The idea that African Americans should incorporate other racial histories in their scholarship so as not to ignore those histories is thinly supported. Asian and Latino /a scholars, for example, do not need African-American scholars to validate their work, which is exceptionally good . 2 Similarly, although incorporating other racial histories into African-American scholarship may enrich one's perspective on racism, this exercise is typically not a prerequisite for understanding civil rights or the black ethos -nor is it necessary for addressing black issues. To illustrate the point, we refer to Mendez v. Westminister School District of
Orange County.103 This case is often cited by LatCrits to illustrate the indispensability of Latino/a history in understanding the history of school desegregation that culminated in Brown .104 In Mendez, the court overturned a school segregation statute applicable to Mexican-American students, a decision that predated Brown I by a few years. While interesting, the case is neither necessary nor sufficient in explaining Brown I or in understanding the NAACP's legal strategy. Mendez was a Ninth Circuit opinion, so its precedential value is low compared to that of the Supreme Court cases traditionally regarded as the predecessors of Brown 1.105 Nor was Mendez as significant as the scholarship that informed the NAACP briefs. 0 6 Furthermore, even these Supreme Court cases and scholarly works have little probative value in explaining why the Court decided Brown I the way it did.'07 Indeed, contemporary scholarship on Brown I that omits the geopolitical and other extra-legal factors that underpin the opinion is insufficiently theorized. 08 Authors who write about their own racial experiences are not necessarily signaling ignorance about other racial experiences. These writers are merely taking advantage of their unique position to get the story out more accurately and with greater insight. In fact, Professor Delgado himself rather enthusiastically embraced this position in his influential article, "The Imperial Scholar:" [I]t is possible to compile an a priori list of reasons why we might look with concern on a situation in which the scholarship about group A [outsiders] is written by members of group B [insiders]. First,

members of group B may be ineffective advocates of the rights and interests of persons in group A. They may lack information; more important, perhaps, they may lack passion, or that passion may be
misdirected. B's scholarship may tend to be sentimental, diffusing passion in useless directions, or wasting time on unproductive breast-beating. Second, while the B's might advocate effectively, they might advocate the wrong things. Their agenda may differ from that of the A's, they may pull their punches with respect to remedies, especially where remedying A's situation entails uncomfortable consequences for B. Despite the best of intentions, B's may have stereotypes embedded deep in their psyches that distort their thinking, causing them to balance interests in ways inimical to A's. Finally, domination by members of group B may paralyze members of group A, causing the A's to forget how to flex their legal muscles for themselves.' 0 9 There is an even more basic reason for African-American scholars to focus on the black experience. Harold Cruse suggested this reason in his seminal work The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, by raising the following rhetorical question: if African-American intellectuals do not focus on "Negro life," who will?

LatCrit Turns AT: BWP is Descriptive

Focus on descriptive function overlooks the paradigms analytical effectiveness
Kim, Associate Professor Of Law at Marquette University Law School, 1999 (Janine Young Kim, June 1999, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 108, No. 8, Symposium: Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism (Jun., 1999), pp. 2385-2412, JSTOR) Condemnation of the black/white paradigm is usually premised on the argument that the nation is no longer Black and White but multiracial, such that the paradigm has become obsolete. This critique of the black/white paradigm suggests that many scholars reduce the black/white paradigm to serve a purely descriptive function; the paradigm was acceptable in 1960 when ninety-six percent of the minority population was Black, but now that Black Americans constitute only fifty percent of the people of color, the paradigm can no longer stand.10 While the descriptive function is a significant aspect of the black/white paradigm, it is not the paradigm's only, nor its most important, function. Thus, a rejection of the paradigm based solely on its apparent failure to reflect racial demographics underestimates its sophistication and fails to explain its longevity. Recent race scholarship by Asian-American and Latino/a scholars has relied on this oversimplified, descriptive version of the black/white paradigm.-' The works of Robert Chang, a leading AsianAmerican race theorist, and Juan Perea, a Latino scholar who has grappled directly with the "dominant and pervasive character" of the black/white paradigm, are particularly thoughtful.12 Still, neither Professor Chang nor Professor Perea takes the discussion of the paradigm much further than Michael Omi and Howard Winant's seminal work on the racial formation theory and their 1994 critique of the black/white bipolar model."3 This Part will summarize these scholars' representations of the black/white paradigm and question some of their assumptions and prescriptions.

Thats not our paradigm its valuable to understanding how subjects become racialized
Kim, Associate Professor Of Law at Marquette University Law School, 1999 (Janine Young Kim, June 1999, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 108, No. 8, Symposium: Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism (Jun., 1999), pp. 2385-2412, JSTOR) There are two ways in which the black/white paradigm could occupy a descriptive role in race discourse. The first and more facile would be to view the black/white paradigm as descriptive of the relationship between two specific races: "black" signifying African Americans and possibly West Indians, and " white" signifying European Americans. This descriptive definition is of central importance in Professors Chang's and Perea's articles, as well as in Professors Omi and Winant's book. If the black/white paradigm's sole purpose is to reflect racial demographics, it would be truly false and underinclusive, rendering invisible Asians, Latinos, Native
Americans, and other groups in race discourse. In that case, the paradigm would indeed suffer from a problem of " coverage" by failing to understand and incorporate the experiences of other groups that also contend with racism and discrimination.42 Another harmful effect of a race- specific paradigm would be its ratification of the notion that only the relationship between Blacks and Whites matters. This is the starting point for Professor Perea's critique of the black/white paradigm as expressed in textbooks and history books that do not document the struggles of Asian Americans, Latinos, or Native Americans while purporting to write about race and civil rights history in general. In this way, both Professor Chang and Professor Perea are attempting to discuss what they perceive to be certain groups' fundamentally existential crisis in race discourse in the United States. This

definition is, however, too limited and superficial . A more complex aspect of the descriptive dimension of the black/white paradigm is its reflection of racial stratification and conceptualization in the United States.43 This more complex descriptive dimension is implicit in both Professors Chang's and Perea's discussions of the black/white paradigm's persistence in race discourse. Racial conceptualization and stratification in the United States are dominated by the notion that "black" and " white" are positioned at opposite extremes that denote race oppression and privilege. The black/white structure may exist in
the form that it does because of the priority in time of racial discrimination against Blacks or because of the sheer virulence of racism targeting Blacks, thereby rendering the Black American experience most salient. Regardless of how the paradigm came about, it is undeniably one of the chief mechanisms by which individuals and groups become racialized , and

even self-identify, on both legal and social/cultural planes. One example of how Asian Americans have been racialized according to the black/white paradigm can be found in People v. Hall, 4 a case that nullified a Chinese witness's
testimony under a law that prohibited Blacks, Mulattos, and Indians from testifying in trials involving White defendants. In that decision, the court determined that "Black" included all non-Whites. An event of self-identification within the black/white paradigm occurred in Hudgins v. Wrights,46 a case that illustrates how slavery laws constructed "black" to be almost synonymous with "enslavement" in 1806, prompting three Native American women to declare themselves not black.47 Finally, Professor Haney Lopez's analysis of the racial prerequisite cases demonstrates that both dynamics can occur simultaneously through legal and social pressures. "White" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries meant citizenship, and individuals of Asian ancestry attempted to define themselves as "white" in order to naturalize and acquire the rights attendant to citizenship.48 But because Blacks were also granted citizenship by the U.S. government, the prerequisite cases reveal that Asians attempting to define themselves as " white" may have wanted more than citizenship: By casting themselves as "white" rather than "black," they rejected the negative attributes and stereotypes associated with blackness. Racialization by association with blackness and whiteness endures. Frank Wu has been most eloquent in discussing the ways in which Asian Americans have interacted with the black/white paradigm. In an article on affirmative action, Professor Wu writes that " racial groups are conceived of as white, black, honorary whites, or constructive blacks."49 Professor Wu's choice of the words "honorary" and "constructive" expresses the poles of privilege and oppression. Asian Americans have stood on unstable ground between "black" and "white," falling under the honorary white category in anti-affirmative action arguments, but considered constructive blacks for the purposes of school segregation or antimiscegenation laws.50 To say that Asian Americans have been perceived as honorary whites or constructive blacks is, however, slightly misleading in that it tends to convey a notion of race specificity. It is important to keep in mind that although the status of honorary white does affect identity, recognition, and appellation, its more insidious function is cooptation. For example, within the economy of affirmative action policy, "whiteness" encompasses victimization through "reverse racism" and race-based disadvantage in certain educational or occupational opportunities. Insofar as a conservative like Newt Gingrich treats Asian Americans as honorary whites, he refers to common experience under affirmative action, not

racial similarity.

LatCrit Turns AT: Omi and Winant

Omi and Winant miss the boat theres a distinction between the blackwhite relationship and the black-white paradigm
Kim, Associate Professor Of Law at Marquette University Law School, 1999 (Janine Young Kim, June 1999, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 108, No. 8, Symposium: Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism (Jun., 1999), pp. 2385-2412, JSTOR)
Michael Omi

and Howard Winant's project in Racial Formation in the United States is to explore the construction of race. They argue that race is not essential, but social and political; the concept of race can and is transformed through political struggle and sociohistorical processes generally."4 They call this continual process of constructing and reconstructing race "racial formation." 15 The theory of racial formation embraces the
notion that race is not merely a classificatory system based on the distinctions among human bodies at any given moment, but that it also contains traces of past struggle over, and present understanding of, social and political relationships."6 In the epilogue to the second edition of Racial Formation in the United States, written after the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Professors Omi and Winant seem to address the prevalence of the black/white paradigm.17 They reject the project of dichotomizing race and identify five problems in the black/white conception." First, they argue that the complex nature of race relations must be analyzed in light of changing dynamics within and among racial groups. Second, they suggest that biracial theories ignore issues specific to non-Black, non-White racial groups. Third, in a related point, they argue that biracial theories also ignore the different consequences of policies such as affirmative action or welfare to different racial groups. Fourth, they assert that the black/white model overlooks "particularities of contemporary racial politics" such as nativism.'9 Finally, they posit that the model marginalizes or eliminates other-non-Black, non-White-voices in race discourse. These critiques provide important insights, but Professors Omi and Winant clearly indicate that

their critiques are aimed at biracial theorizing because the privileging of the Black-White relationship ignores ".widespread and multiracial discontent." 20 There is , however, a difference between a focus on the Black-White relationship and the black/white paradigm, and Professors Omi and Winant's discussion does not clarify to which they object.