Political Law Cases

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
CASES
Article III of the 1987 Constitution Bill of Rights DUE PROCESS ERMITA MA!ATE "OTE! A#D MOTE! OPERATORS ASSOCIATIO# $% CIT& O' MA#I!A () SCRA 8*9 '+cts, The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of anila is !iolating of due process clause. "t was alleged that Sec. # of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and !oid for being unreasonable and !iolate of due process insofar as it would impose $%T fee per annum for first class motels and $&'()) for second class motels' that Sec. *' prohibiting a person less than #+ years from being accepted in such hotels' motels' lodging houses' ta!ern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and ma,ing it unlawful for the owner' manager' ,eeper or duly authori-ed representati!e of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice e!ery *& hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lac, of certainty and for its unreasonable' arbitrary and oppressi!e character. Issue, -hether or not the or.in+nce is /iol+ti/e of the .ue 0rocess cl+use1 "el., A anila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels' motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characteri-ed as the most essential' insistent and the less limitable of powers e.tending as it does to all great public needs. ush discretion is gi!en to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for re!enue. The mere fact that some indi!iduals in the community may be depri!ed of their present business or a particular mode of earning a li!ing cannot pre!ent the e.ercise of police power. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. "t furnishes though a standard to which go!ernmental action should conform in order that depri!ation of life' liberty or property' in each appropriate case' be !alid. The standard of due process which must e.ist both as a procedural and as substanti!e requisite to free the challenged ordinance' or any go!ernmental action for that matter' from imputation of legal infirmity is responsi!eness to the supremacy of reason' obedience to the dictates of justice. "t would be an affront to reason to stigmati-e an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawma,ing body considers an e!il of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious e.ercise of authority. /hat should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to go!ern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. The pro!ision in Ordinance No. &0%) of the City of anila' ma,ing it unlawful for the owner' manager' ,eeper or duly authori-ed representati!e of any hotel' motel' lodging house' ta!ern or common inn or the li,e' to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice e!ery *& hours' with a pro!iso that in all cases full payment shall be charged' cannot
be !iewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary' because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable e.istence of an undesirable situation and the legislati!e attempt at correction. oreo!er' e!ery regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty' which cannot be absolute. P"I!% P"OSP"ATE 'ERETI!I2ER CORP% $S TORRES (31 SCRA 334 '+cts, $hilphos o!ement for $rogress' "nc 1$ $"2 filed with the 3O4E a petition for certification election among the super!isory employees of $5"4$5OS. The said petition was not opposed by $5"4$5OS. "n fact it submitted a position paper with the ediator6Arbiter. 4ater' $ $" filed an amended petition with the ediator6Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the super!isory employees of $5"4$5OS but also its professional7technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respecti!e position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. The ediator6Arbiter issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election. $5"4$5OS appealed said order to the Sec. Of 4abor' which appeal was denied. $5"4$5OS alleged that it was denied due process in the proceedings before the ediator6Arbiter. Issue, -hether or not P"I!P"OS 5+s .enie. .ue 0rocess1 "el., The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or' as applied to administrati!e proceedings' an opportunity to e.plain one8s side or an opportunity to see, a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. /here' as in the instant case' $5"4$5OS agreed to file its position paper with the ediator6Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties' there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process' as $5"4$5OS was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. oreo!er' $5"4$5OS could ha!e' if it so desired' insisted on a hearing to confront and e.amine the witnesses of the other party. 9ut it did not' instead' it opted to submit its position paper with the ediator6Arbiter. 9esides' $5"4$5OS had all opportunity to !entilate its arguments in its appeal to the Sec. Of 4abor. 6A$IER $S COME!EC 1** SCRA 19* '+cts, The petitioner and pri!ate were candidates in Antique for the 9atasang $ambamnsa in the ay #:+& elections. On the e!e of the elections se!eral followers of the petitioner were ambushed and ,illed allegedly by the pri!ate respondent8s men. This heightened the tension in the pro!ince. "t was in this atmosphere that the !oting was held. $etitioner went to the Comelec to question the can!ass of the election returns. 5is complaint was dismissed and pri!ate respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second 3i!ision of the body. Said decision was signed by among others. Commissioner Opinion who was pre!iously as,ed to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of pri!ate respondent $acificador. Opinion had refused. The decision of said di!ision is being contested by petitioner.
Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Right R! !"#!$ by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE O% LAW BAR OPERATIONS &''(.
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Issue, -+s there + .ue 0rocess o7ser/e. 78 the COME!EC in 0rocl+i9ing 0ri/+te res0on.ent1 "el., No. ;i!en the general attitude of the CO E4EC toward the party in power at the time and particular relationship between Opinion and pri!ate respondent' one could not be at least apprehensi!e' if not certain' that the decision of the body would be ad!erse to petitioner. Opinion8s refusal to inhibit himself cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. This court has repeatedly demanded <the cold neutrality of an impartial judge= as the indispensable imperati!e of due process. To bolster that requirement' we ha!e held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. They must trust the judge' otherwise they will not go to him at all. The relationship of the judge at one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. /here this is probable or e!en possible' due process demands that the judge inhibit himself' if only out of a sense of delicade-a. >or refusing to do so' he di!ested the second di!ision of the necessary !ote for the questioned decision' assuming it could act and rendered proceeding null and !oid. E:UA! PROTECTIO# C!AUSE DUM!AO $S COME!EC 9; SCRA 39( '+cts, 9$ (* was enacted in connection with ?anuary @)' #:+) 4ocal Elections. The petitioners question Sec. & of the said law on the ground that it !iolates the equal protection clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence. The first paragraph of Sec. & reads <A any retired electi!e pro!incial city' municipal official' who has recei!ed payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall ha!e been %( yrs. of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he see,s to be elected' shall not be qualified to run for the same electi!e office to which he see,s to be elected' shall not be qualified to run for the same electi!e office from which he retired.= On the other hand' par. * of Sec. & pro!idesB <Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State' including acts amounting to sub!ersion' insureccion' rebellion or other similar crimes' shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices co!ered by this Act' or to participate in any partisan political acti!ity thereinA and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a ci!il court of military tribunal after preliminary in!estigation shall be prima facie e!idence of such facts.= Issue, -hether or not the +forecite. 0ro/isions of Sec% * of BP 4( +re /iol+ti/e of the constitution+l 0rinci0les of e<u+l 0rotection +n. 0resu90tion of innocence% "el., $ar. #' Sec & of 9$ (* does not transgress the constitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. Of Sec & is CA4"3. As ad!erted to in many decisions' the equal protection clauses does not prohibit classification' pro!ided it complies with the requisites what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. The distinction here is substantial. The *nd par. of Sec & howe!er' !iolates the constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so' since a candidate is disqualified from running for a public office on the ground alone that charges ha!e been filed against him. "n this wise' it is as if he is placed in the same category as a person who has already been con!icted of a crime whose penalty carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.

A!MO#TE $S $AS:UE2 =%R% #o% 943;7> M+8 (3> 1994 '+cts, This is a petition for certiorari' prohibition and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman' requiring the chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic "ntelligence and "n!estigation 9ureau 1E""92 to produce <all documents relating to $ersonal Ser!ices >unds for the year #:++ and all e!idence' such as !ouchers for the whole plantilla of E""N for #:++= and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his in!estigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing sa!ings from unfilled positions in the E""9 has been illegally disbursed' petitioners mo!e to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the following issuesB #. whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal ser!ices and salary !ouchers of E""9 employees on the plea that such documents are <classified=' *. whether petitioner8s right to the equal protection of laws ha!e been !iolated. $etitioners complain that in all forum and tribunal the aggrie!ed parties can only hale respondents !ia their !erified complaints and sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed' while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an in!estigationD @. that the subpoena duces tecum is !iolati!e of the petitioners right against self6incrimination. Issue, -ere 0etitioners correct in for5+r.ing the +fore9entione. issues1 "el., /here the claim of confidentiality does not !est on the need to protect military' diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his con!ersation' courts ha!e declined to find it in the constitution an absolute pri!ilege of the $resident against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. "n the case at bar' there is no claim that the military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the E""9. "ndeed' E""98s function is the gathering and e!aluation of intelligence reports and information regarding illegal acti!ities affecting the national economy. Consequently' while in cases which in!ol!e state secrets' it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the e!idence will e.pose military matters without compelling production' no similar e.cuse can be made for pri!ilege resting on other consideration. 4i,ewise' no law or regulation was shown which considers personnel records of E""9 as classified information. The Constitution e.pressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint file in any form or manner concerning official acts or omissions 1Sec. #*' Art. E"2. Father than referring to the form of complaints' the phrase < in an appropriate case in Art E" Sec #* means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be illegal' unjust' improper or inefficient=. The phrase <subject to such limitations as may be pro!ided by law= refers to such limitations as may be pro!ided by Congress or in the absence thereof to such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. There is a !iolation of petitioners right to equal protection of laws since in the first place the procedure for the proceedings before the Office of the
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Ombudsman is pro!ided for in the Constitution itself. Second' it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints <in any form and in any manner= the framers of the Constitution too, into account the well ,nown reticence of the people which ,eep them from complaining against official wrongdoing. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other in!estigatory and prosecutory agencies of the go!ernment because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who through official pressure and influence can quash' delay or dismiss in!estigations held against them. The issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would not !iolate petitioners right against self6incrimination. "t is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are go!ernment officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. ART%III> SEC% ( SEARC"ES A#D SEI2URES TAMBASE# $S PEOP!E '+cts, On August @#' #:++ $ Sgt. Natal applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the TCC' alleging that he recei!ed information that petitioner had in his possession at his course < 6#% armalite rifle' hand grenades' .&( pistol' dynamite stic,s and sub!ersi!e documents=' which articles were used or intended to be used for illegal purposes. On the same day' the application was granted by the TCC which allowed the sei-ure of the items specified in the application. At around %B@)pm of September :' #:++' a police team searched the house of petitioner and sei-ed the following articlesB a2 * en!elopes containing cash in the total amount of $#&')))D b2 # hand set c2 handset with antenna A$etitioners prays that the search warrant and the sei-ure of his personal effects be declared illegal. Issue, -hether or not the se+rch 5+rr+nt 5+s leg+l% "el., The search warrant !iolates Section @' Fule #*% of the Fe!ised Fules of Court' which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. oreo!er' by their sei-ure of articles not described in the search warrant' the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section *' Art. """ requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the thing to be sei-ed. The e!ident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be sei-ed to those and only those' particularly described in the search warrant to lea!e the officers of the law no discretion regarding what articles they should sei-e to the end that unreasonable searches and sei-ures may not be made and abuses may not be committed. Clearly then' the money which was not indicated in the search warrant' has been illegally sei-ed from petitioners. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their tas, of pursuing sub!ersi!es is not a !alid e.cuse for the illegal sei-ure. The same constitutional pro!ision is also aimed at pre!enting !iolations of security in person and property and unlawful in!asions of the sanctity of the home' and gi!ing remedy against such usurpation when attempted. $ERO& $S !A&A=UE (1) SCRA 97 '+cts, Spouses 4eopoldo and a. 4uisa Ceroy owned * houses' one in Gue-on City' where they are presently residing

and another in 3a!ao City. The house in 3a!ao City was entrusted to careta,ers. 5owe!er' the ,eys to the aster8s and children8s bedroom were retained by the Ceroy so the careta,er could not enter those rooms. On April #*' #::) Capt. Obrero called the telephone from 3a!ao City' rs. Ceroy to as, permission from the latter if he could enter and search the house in 3a!ao City as there was information that the said house was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. rs. Ceroy ga!e her permission on the condition that ajor acasaet' a long time friend of the Ceroys' be present during the search. Thereafter' Capt. Obrero and ajor acasaet conducted the search. /hen they were already inside the house' they opened the padloc, of the door leading to the children8s room. "nside the children8s room' they reco!ered a .&( caliber handgun with a maga-ine fully loaded' printed materials of FA 6S>$ and a boo, entitled <"slamic Fe!olution >uture $ath of the Nation=. As a consequence of which' the Ceeroy spouses were charged under $3 #+%%. Issue, Is the se+rch /+li.1 -hether or not the 9+teri+ls t+?en +re +.9issi7le in e/i.ence% "el., No. The search is not !alid. The permission gi!en by rs. Ceroy to brea, open the door of their residence was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items ta,en' were' therefore products of an illegal search' !iolati!e of their constitutional rights. As such' they are inadmissible in e!idence.
PEOP!E $S DE! ROSARIO (3* SCRA (*; '+cts, $ri!ate respondent was charged and con!icted of the "llegal $ossession of >irearm and Ammunitions and illegal sale of regulated 3rugs in * separate criminal cases filed against him with the FTC of Ca!ite. There appears to be certain irregularities in the procedure of the buy6bust operations and in the implementation of the search warrant. As to the buy6bust operations' the alleged poseur6buyer had to return to the police station and inform the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from the accused to implement the search warrant. Thereupon' the raiding team proceeded to the house of the accused to implement the search warrant. The usual procedure in a buy6 bust operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the !ery moment he hands o!er the dangerous drug to the poseur6buyer. As to the implementation of the search warrant' the search warrant specifically authori-ed only the search and sei-ure of ethamphetamine 5ydrochloride commonly ,nown as shabu and its paraphernalia but the raiding team also sei-ed certain firearms. Issue, -hether or not the fire+r9 sei@e. though not s0ecific+ll8 inclu.e. in the se+rch 5+rr+nt is +.9issi7le +s e/i.ence +g+inst the +ccuse.% "el., No. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to underta,e a fishing e.pedition to sei-e and confiscate any and all ,inds of e!idence articles relating to the crime. The Constitution itself 1sec. *' art."""2 and the Fules of Court 1Sec. @' Fule #*%2 specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be sei-ed. Thus' the search warrant was no authority for the police
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officers to sei-e the firearm which was not mentioned' much less described with particularity' in the search warrant. Neither' may it be maintained that the gun was sei-ed in the course of the arrest' for as earlier obser!ed' accused8s arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm' ha!ing been illegally sei-ed is not admissible in e!idence. PEOP!E $S TA#=!IBE# 18* SCRA (() '+cts, $atrolmen Guenedo and $un-alan were conducting sur!eillance mission at the Cictory 4iner Terminal aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanor at said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At :B@) pm' they noticed a person carrying a red tra!elling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested to open the bag but he refused only to accede later on when the petitioner identified themsel!es. >ound inside the bag were marijuana lea!es. The accused was then ta,en the police headquarters for further in!estigation. Issue, -+s the 9+riAu+n+ in+.9issi7le in e/i.ence on the groun. th+t it 5+s the 0ro.uct of +n unl+5ful se+rch 5ithout + 5+rr+nt% "el., No. One of the e.ceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 1Sec. #* Fule #*%2. Accused was caught in flagrante' since he was carrying a marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the e.ception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently !alid. This case also presented urgency. The transcript of stenographic notes re!eals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused as carrying marijuana. >aced with such on6the6spot information' the police officer had to act quic,ly. There was no enough time to secure a search warrant. PEOP!E $S =A!$E2 =R% #O% 13;79) MARC" (;> ())1 '+cts, The incident happened one e!ening at a local fair which was illuminated by fluorescent lights. $laying games at that time in one of the stalls throwing *( centa!o coins were 4arry' Fomy and Al while their companion 3anny was about three meters away playing bingo. After a while fi!e men arri!ed. Two of them approached Fomy while the two others ser!ed as the loo,out. Then the fifth man went directly to Fomy and stabbed him at the bac, with a ,nife. Afterwards the assailant threw the ,nife away and then fled with his companions. 4arry saw Fomy fall to the ground seriously wounded. Al was around three arms length away and saw the entire incident. 4arry and 3anny brought Fomy to the hospital where he was declared dead on arri!al. Then they informed Fomy8s relati!es of his death. "nitial police in!estigation showed that there were si. suspects but they could not be found in their respecti!e residences. "nside the bus terminal bystanders informed S$O# 4a-aro' the police in!estigator' that anny stabbed the !ictim. So the policeman fetched anny and told him to go to the house of the !ictim. 9ut when they arri!ed people just loo,ed at manny and did not point to him as the assailant. "n fact the !ictims brother Fey told the police that anny was not the one who stabbed his brother and should be released. So the police released anny.

9ut as soon as they had left' the people inside the house particularly 3anny' 4arry and Al told Fey that it was anny who stabbed his brother as they were him and saw the entire incident. So at the instance of Fey' the 9arangay Tanod apprehended anny and too, the latter to the police headquarters. The tanod had no warrant of arrest when he too, anny into custody. At the police station' the statements of the witnesses were prepared pointing to anny as the assailant. anny was charged with murder and was denied bail. At the trial' after pleading not guilty' the eyewitnesses pointed to anny as the culprit. So anny was found guilty as charged and sentence to reclusion perpetua despite his alibi and despite the fact that the ,nife was not found. On appeal' among the points raised by anny was the legality of his arrest. 5e alleged that he was arrested not because of the positi!e identification of the eyewitnesses but on the basis of the hearsay testimony of Fey. 9esides' he was arrested without warrant. Issue, -+s M+nn8Bs +rrest leg+l1 "el., NO. anny8s arrest was illegal. The 9arangay Tanod arrested anny on the basis solely of what Fey told him and not because he saw anny commit the crime charged against him. "ndeed there was no warrant issued against anny when the latter was ta,en into custody by the tanod. Considering that anny was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer ha!e any personal ,nowledge of facts indicating that anny committed a crime' his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified. 9y entering a plea of not guilty and participating at the trial howe!er' anny wai!ed his right to raise the issue of the illegality of arrest. Objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquires jurisdiction o!er the person of an accused must be made before he enters a plea' otherwise the objection is deemed wai!ed. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings !oid and deri!e the State of its right to con!ict the guilty when all the facts point to culpability of the accused. And in the case all the facts point to the culpability of anny. 5e was positi!ely identified as the assailant by the eyewitnesses who were found by the court to be credible. The failure to present as e!idence of the murder weapon is not fatal because the positi!e identification of the eyewitnesses is sufficient to pro!e the culpability of anny. ART% III> SEC% 3 PRI$AC& O' COMMU#ICATIO# A#D CORRESPO#DE#CE =AA#A# $S IAC 1*4 SCRA 11( '+cts, $etitioner Edgardo ;aanan was requested by his client Atty. 4eonardo 4aconico to secretly listen to the telephone con!ersation with Atty. Tito $intor through a telephone e.tension so as to hear personally the proposed condition without complainant8s consent' complainant charged ;aanan and 4aconico with !iolation of the Anti6/iretapping Act 1FA No. &*))2. After trial on the merits' the lower court found both ;aanan and 4aconico guilty of Ciolating Sec. # of FA No. &*))' which pro!idesB <Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
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device or arraignment to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detecphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or otherwise decribed . The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. The "ntermediate Appellate Court now the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trila court holding that the communication between the complainant and the accused 4aconico was pri!ate in nature and therefore co!ered by FA No. &*))D that the petitioner o!erheard such communication and that the e.tension telephone which was used by the petitioner to o!erhear the telephone con!ersation is co!ered in the term <de!ice= as pro!ided in the FA No. &*)). Issue, -hether or not +n eCtension tele0hone is +9ong the 0rohi7ite. .e/ices in Sec% 1 of the Act such th+t its use to o/erhe+r + 0ri/+te con/ers+tion 5oul. constitute l+5ful interce0tion of co99unic+tions 7et5een the ( 0+rties using the tele0hone line% "el., The unlawful refers to a <tap= of a wire or cable or the use of a <de!ice or arrangement= for the purpose of secretly o!erhearing' intercepting or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a de!ice or arrangement in order to o!erhear' intercept or recorded the spo,en words. An e.tension telephone cannot be place in the same category as a 3ictaphone' dictagraph or other de!ices enumerated in Sec. # of FA No. &*)) as the use thereof cannot be considered as <tapping= the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone e.tension in this case was not installed for that purpose. "t just happened to be there for ordinary office use. "t is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislati!e' the statute should not be ta,en as detached and isolated e.pressions' but the whole and e!ery part thereof must be considered in fi.ing the meaning of any of its parts. 5ence' the phrase <de!ice or arrangement= in Sec # of FA No. &*))' although not e.clusi!e to that enumerated therein' should not b e construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature' that is' instrument the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of telephone. "t refers to instrument whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being o!erheard because by their !ery nature' they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping intercepting or recording a telephone con!ersation. PEOP!E $S A!BO'ERA 14( SCRA 1(3 '+cts, Albofera and 4awi6an were con!icted in the FTC of 3a!ao del Sur for the murder of a forester and were sentenced to capital punishment. There was no direct e!idence lin,ing both accused to the crime charged' their alleged participation therein ha!ing been found by the trial court to ha!e pro!ed by circumstantial e!idence adduced by the prosecution. On appeal' the accused assails the trial court8s decision on the ground of among others' a letter written in the Cisayan dialect by accused Albofera' while under detention' to witness Fodrigo Esma' a friend of Albofera' as,ing Esma to testify in fa!or of Albofera. Albofera contends that the admissibility thereof was specifically e.cluded under Sec. &' Art. "C of the #:0@ Constitution on the $ri!acy of Communication and Correspondence. Issue, -hether or not the +.9ission of such letter +s e/i.ence 5+s /+li.%

"el., Hes' Albofera8s contention is untenable. The production of the letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and sei-ure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or in!asion into Albofera8s pri!acy. Albofera admitted ha!ing sent the letter to Esma' and Esma produced such letter in the course of his testimony before the trial court. 9esides' there was nothing really self6incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his affida!it and testify in Albofera8s fa!or. Nothing Albofera stated in this letter was ta,en against him in assi!ing at a determination of his culpability. 1#OTE, !he Supreme "ourt affirmed the #udgement of conviction of the trial court based on circumstantial evidence of which $sma%s testimony was much noted for its worthiness, even if &lbofera%s e'tra-#udicial confession was disregarded as invalid.( ART% III> SEC% * 'REEDOM O' EDPRESSIO# #ATIO#A! PRESS C!UB $S COME!EC ()7 SCRA 1 '+cts, $etitioner in these cases are questioning the !alidity of Sec. ## 1%2 of FA %%&% which prohibits the selling or donating space and time for political ad!ertisements e.cept to the CO E4EC as pro!ided under Sec. :) and :* of the Omnibus Election Code. $etitioner8s argue that the pro!ision !iolates and in!ades the constitutional guarantees comprising >reedom of E.pressionD that it amounts to censorship' that the prohibition is in derogation of media8s role and function to pro!ide adequate channels of public information and public opinion rele!ant to election issues. "el., #o infringe9ent of the 'ree.o9 of EC0ression% 1% The constitution itself' has e.pressly authori-ed the CO E4EC to super!ise or regulate the enjoyment or utili-ation of franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. 1Art "E6C' &2. The fundamental purpose of that is to ensure equal opportunity' time and space and the right to reply' as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the used of such media facilities' in connection with <public information campaigns and forums among candidates=. (% The technical effect of Art "E6C'& of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of in!alidity arise in respect of e.ercises of super!isory or regulatory authority on the part of the CO E4EC for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office' although such super!ision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. >or super!ision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely inconcei!able without accompanying limitation. Thus' the applicable rule is the general time honored one6 that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and con!incingly pro!ing that assertion. 3% The assailed pro!ision is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability in time to election period. *% "t is limited in scope of application. "t applied only to sale and purchase' and donation of print space or airtime for campaign and other report or commentary or other co!erage that' in responsible media > is not paid for by candidates ad!ertisements of particular candidates.
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4% "t does not limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themsel!es. The limitation howe!er' bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objecti!e. >or it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and tele!ision time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are li,ely to ma,e a crucial difference. A&ER PRODUCTIO#S PT&% !TD% $S CAPU!O#= 1;) SCRA 8;1 '+cts, $etitioner Ayer $roduction $ty. 4td. >or $hilippines and "nternational release' the historic struggle of the >ilipinos at E3SA entitled <The >our 3ay Fe!olution=. 3uring the filming of said motion picture' pri!ate respondent ?uan $once Enrile' who played a major role in the e!ents proposed to be filmed' filed a complaint with application for Temporary Festraining Order and a writ of $reliminary "njunction with FTC of a,ati see,ing to stop mo!ie production alleging that petitioners production of said mo!ie is without his consent and o!er his objections constitutes a !iolation of his right of pri!acy. $etitioner' on the other hand maintained that the film would not in!ol!e the pri!ate life of the Enrile nor that of his family and that a $reliminary "njunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free e.pression. The lower court then issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner company. The latter then filed a petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer or preliminary injunction. The Court then granted a limited temporary restraint order partially enjoining the implementation of respondent8s judge order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein' and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the mo!ie which do not ma,e any reference to pri!ate respondent Enrile or of his family or to any fictitious character based on bearing substantial resemblance or similarity to or identifiable with Enrile. Issue, -hether the E7+l+ncing of interest testF or the Ecle+r +n. 0resent .+nger testF 7e +00lie.% "el., The court belie!es that a different conclusion must be reached. The production and filming by petitioner of the projected motion picture does not in the circumstances of this case constitute as unlawful intrusion upon pri!ate respondents <right of pri!acy=. The subject matter of the mo!ie is one of public interest and concern and does not relate to the indi!idual life. Inli,e in the 4agun-ad case which concerned the lifestory of oises $adilla necessarily including at least his immediate family. /hat we ha!e here is not a film biography' more or less fictionali-ed' of pri!ate respondent Enrile. The film is not principally about nor is it focused upon' the man Enrile' but is compelled' if it is to be historical' to refer to the role played by Enrile in the precipitating and constituent e!ents of the change of go!ernment in >ebruary #:+%. The respondent judge should ha!e his hand' instead of issuing an e. parte TFO' for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not e.hibited to any audience. Neither Enrile nor the respondent judge ,new what the completed film would precisely loo, li,e. There was in other words' no <clear and present danger= or any !iolation of any right to pri!acy that pri!ate respondent could lawfully assert. EASTER# BROADCASTI#= CORP% GD&REH $S "O#% DA#S> 6R 137 SCRA ;(8

'+cts, The petition was filed to compel the respondents to re6 open the radio station 3HFE which had been summarily closed on the ground of national security. The petitioner contends that it was denied due process when the radio station was closed based on the mere allegation that it was used to incite people to sedition. No hearing and action were ta,en on the petitioner8s motion for reconsideration. The petition also raises the issue of freedom of speech. 9efore the court could promulgate a decision' the petitioner withdraw his petition since the radio station had already been sold. "el., Considering that the case has become moot and academic' the petitioners motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is ;FANTE3. The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court for the guidance of inferior courts and administrati!e tribunals e.ercising quasi6judicial functions' to witB #. The cardinal primary requirements in administrati!e proceedings laid down in Ang Tibay C C.A. should ha!e followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. All forms of media' whether print or broadcast' are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and e.pression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of e.pression continues to be the clear and present danger rule6 that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substanti!e e!ils that the lawma,er has a right to pre!ent. The clear and present danger test howe!er' does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of e.pression clause. Necessarily' howe!er' the freedom of tele!ision and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. The transistor radio is found e!erywhere' the tele!ision set is also becoming uni!ersal. Their message may be simultaneously recei!ed by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or tele!ision set. The impact of the !ibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Inli,e readers of the printed wor,' the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate' analy-e and reject the utterance. The clear and present danger test must ta,e the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. 9roadcast stations deser!e the special protection gi!en to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of e.pression clauses of the Constitution.
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There is a simple' e.tremely narrow class of cases in which the >irst Amendment8s ban on prior restraint may be. /hen the nation is at war' 9ut the go!ernment has failed to e!en allege an emergency that could be tantamount to an undeniable and e.treme danger so as to justify the restraint. ere conclusions are insufficient. "n the area of national defense and foreign affairs' the e.ecuti!e is endowed with enormous power unchec,ed by the other branches of go!ernment. The only restraint to this power would be an enlightened citi-enry. >or this reason' the press must be ,ept alert' aware and so as to inform and enlighten the people. Secrecy is the best maintained through credibility. An effecti!e internal security is premised on disclosure.
There is no proof that the publication of the study would lead to immediate and irreparable damage to our nation and people. Should the go!ernment fail to proceed with its grie!ance' it may do so in other ways but not through restraint by constitutional entitlement. ART% III> SEC% * ASSEMB!& A#D PETITIO# Pri9ici+s $S 'ugoso 8) Phil 71 '+cts, The resondent ayor sought to defend his refusal to allow the nacionalista party to hold meeting at the $4AJA "FAN3A by what he called <a reasonable ground to belie!e basing upon pre!ious and upon the fact that passions' especially on the part of the losing groups' remain bitter and high' that similar speeches will be deli!ered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their go!ernment' and in the duly peace constituted authorities which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order.=

Issue, -hether or not the 9+8or h+s the .iscretion to +llo5 hol.ing of + 9eeting in + 0u7lic 0l+ce%
"el., The $hilippine 4egislature has delegated the e.ercise of police power to the unicipal 9oard of the City of anila' which according to Sec. *&&& of the Administrati!e Code has the following powers' among others' is to regulate the use of streets' a!enues' par,s' cemeteries and other public places and to enact ordinances it may deem necessary. The Supreme Court rejected the ayor8s argument noting that the condition of anila at that time did not justify the mayor8s fears. The power of local officials is only one of regulation and not prohibition. The said pro!ision odes not confer the ayor the power to refuse to grant the permit' but only the discretion in issuing the permit to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. They cannot bar the use of public places for lawful assemblies. #O# $S DAMES II 184 SCRA 4(3 '+cts, $etitioner urge the Court en 9anc to re!iew and re!erse the doctrine laid down in &lcuaz ) *S+& 1,1 S"-& ., to the effect that a college student' once admitted by the school' is considered enrolled only for one semester and hence' may be refused readmission after the semester is o!er' as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated. $etitioners' students in pri!ate respondent abini Colleges' "nc. in 3aet' Camarines Norte' were not allowed to re6 enrol by the school for the academic year #:++6#:+: for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protest is not' howe!er' made clear in the pleadings. Ipholding the primacy of freedom of e.pression because the students do not shed their constitutionally protected right at the schoolgate.
"el., The Court in Alcua-' anchored its decision on the <termination of contract= theory. 9ut it must be repeatedly emphasi-ed that the contract between the school and the student is not ordinary contract. "t is imbued with public interest' considering the high priority gi!en by the Constitution to educate and the grant to the State of super!isory and regulatory powers o!er all educational institutions 1See Art. E"C' Sec. #6*' &1#2 Fespondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on $ar. #@0 of the manual of regulations for pri!ate schools' which pro!ides that <when a student registers in a school' it is understood that he is enrollingA for the entire semester for collegiate courses'= which the Court in Alcua- construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract' which has a term of one semester' has already e.pired. The <termination of contract= theory does not e!en find support in the anual par. #@0 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. "t ser!es to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on a installment basis. Thus' e!en if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled' but has stayed on for more than two wee,s' he may required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is gi!en his credentials for transfer. On the other hand' it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process' in the manner e.pressed in ;u-man' before they were refused re Kenrollment. "n fact' it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re Kenrollment because of failing grades was a mere after thought. "t is not denied that what incurred the fire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in >ebruary #:++ and which were led and7or participated in by petitioners. Certainly' e.cluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action ta,en against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a !iolation of the basic tenets of fair play. #OTE, The Supreme Court pointed out that this is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re Kenrollment or returning students. Indisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re6enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. $etitioners are students of respondent school who' after leading and participating in student protests were denied readmission and re6enrollment for the ne.t semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as e.ercised by students !is6L6!is the right of school officials to discipline pronouncements in the cases of /alabanan ) -amento and )illar ) !I*. ART%III> SEC% 4 'REEDOM O' RE!I=IO# =ARCES $S ESTE#2O 1)* SCRA 41) '+cts, On arch *@' #:0%' the 9arangay Council of Calencia' Ormoc City adopted se!eral resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Cicente >errer to be used in the celebrations of his annual feats day and the construction of waiting shed. >unds for the two projects would be obtained through the <selling of tic,ets and cash donations=. /ith those funds' the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image was acquired. The image was temporarily places in the altar of the Catholic Church of 9arangay Calencia. A contro!ersy arose
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after the mass when the parish priest refused to return the image to the barangay council. A repli!in case was filed against the priest. "n his answer to the complaint' he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. Issue, -hether or not the resolutions /iol+te. the constitution+l 0ro/ision 0rohi7iting the use of 0u7lic fun.s for religious 0ur0ose% "el., No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion' nor abridge religious liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any religious sect' priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with pri!ate funds' not with ta. money. The construction of awaiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio first honoring the patron saint' San Cicente >errer' and not for the purpose of fa!oring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass' consequently' the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass celebrated. The barangay council' as owner of the image has the right to determine who should ha!e custody thereof. EBRA!I#A= $S DI$ISIO# SUPERI#TE#DE#T O' SC"OO!S O' CEBU (19 SCRA 4(; '+cts, About %+ students 1grade school and highschool2 were e.pelled by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag' sing the National Anthem and recite the $atriotic $ledge as required by FA #*%( and by the 3epartment Order No. + of the 3ECS ma,ing the flag ceremony in all educational institutions. These students were members of the <?eho!ah8s /itnesses= which teaches their children not to salute the flag' sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge for they belie!e that those are acts of worship or religious de!otion. Issue, -hether or not the chil.ren 9+8 7e eC0elle. fro9 school G0u7lic +n. 0ri/+teH for refusing> on +ccount of their religious 7eliefs to t+?e 0+rt in the fl+g cere9on8% "el., ?eho!ah8s /itnesses are accorded e.emption to the obser!ance of flag ceremony in deference to their religious beliefs but said right not to participate does not gi!e them the right to disrupt such patriotic e.ercises. Their e.pulsion will !iolate their right as $hil. Citi-ens under the #:+0 Constitution' to recei!e education' for it is the duty to protect and promote the right of all citi-ens to quality education and to ma,e such education accessible to all. 1Sec. #' Art. E"C2 Compulsion to obser!e the flag salute law on pain of dismissal from one8s job or e.pulsion from school is alien to the conscience of present generation of >ilipinos' being !iolati!e of their constitutional right to free speech and free e.ercise of religious profession and worship. PAMI! $S TE!ERO# 8; SCRA *13 '+cts, $ri!ate Fespondent >ather argarito F. ;on-aga was elected as municipal mayor of Alburquerque' 9ohol in #:0#. 5e was duly proclaimed. $etitioner filed a suit for quo warranto for

responsdent8s disqualification based on sec. *#0( of Administrati!e Code of #:#0 which readsB <"n no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiaticsA= The court a quo sustained the right of the pri!ate respondent to the office holding that the abo!e quoted pro!ision was already impliedly repealed by the Election Code of #:0#. "el., There is no clear cut answer. To render the challenged pro!ision ineffecti!e' + !otes are required to be attained. "n this case howe!er' only 0 ?ustices are of the !iew that the lower court8s judgment should be affirmed because the challenged pro!ision is no longer operati!e either because it was superseded by the #:@( Constitution or it was repealed. >i!e members howe!er belie!e that no repeal was made' the pro!isions of the prohibition being unequi!ocal in terms. $rocedurally' the required number of !otes not ha!ing been attained' the !alidity of Sec. *#0( is upheld and >ather ;on-aga is ordered to !acate his position. #OTE, As to the constitutional dimension of the case' ?ustice >ernando' with si. other ?ustices are of the !iew that the Constitution 1both #:0@ and #:@(2 prohibits religious test as a requirement for the e.ercise of Ci!il or $olitical rights. ?ustice Teehan,ee notes that the pro!ision declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or appointment to a municipal office is inconsistent with and !iolati!e of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution because to do so bar them is to impose a religious test in !iolation of the Constitution. On the other hand' ?ustice 9arredo opines that there is no repugnancy as between the challenged pro!ision and the freedom of religion protected by the Constitution. The <no religious test= means that no public office may denuded to any person any reason of his religious belief. 9ut when he becomes an ecclesiastic' he becomes the official minister of his church with distinct duties and responsibilities which may not always be compatible with the posture of absolute indifference and impartiality to all religious beliefs which the go!ernment must maintain at all times ?ustice a,asiar notes that to allow an ecclesiastic to head the e.ecuti!e department of a municipality is to permit the erosion of the principle of church and state because there can be no assurance that the decision of such ecclesiastic in the e.ercise of his powers !ested in him by reason of his local position will be clothed with impartiality. ART%III> SEC% ; !IBERT& O' ABODE A#D TRA$E! MARCOS $S MA#=!APUS 177 SCRA 4;8 '+cts, 3eposed $res. arcos e.iled in 5awaii wishes to return to the $hilippine' howe!er' $res. Aquino rendered a decision to bar their return to the $hilippines considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at the time when the stability of the go!ernment is threatened. r. arcos filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel the Sec. >oreign Affairs to issue tra!el documents to him and his family' alleging that his right to return to the $hilippine is guaranteed under the 9ill of Fights' and questions $res. Aquino8s power to impair their right to tra!el in the absence of legislation to that effect. Issue, M+8 the Pres% 0rohi7it the M+rcoses fro9 returning to the Phili00ines1
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"el., HES. The right to return to one8s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the 9ill of Fights' which treats only of the 4iberty of Abode and the right to tra!el' but it is well considered !iew that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and' under the Constitution' is part of the law of the land. 5owe!er' it is distinct and separate from the right to tra!el. The constitutional guarantees they in!o,ed are neither absolute nor infle.ible. >or the e.ercise of such freedoms admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interest. The request or demand of the arcoses to be allowed to return to the $hilippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional pro!isions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to tra!el' subject to certain e.emptions' or of case law which clearly ne!er contemplated situations similar to the present one. "t must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the president which are implicit in and correlati!e to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. The president did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the arcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. SI!$ERIO $S C%A 194 SCRA 7;) '+cts, $etitioner Sil!erio was charged with the !iolation of the Fe!ised Securities Act in a criminal case filed with the FTC. 5e posted a bail for his pro!isional liberty. Two years after the filing of the information' respondent $eople of the $hilippines filed a otion to Cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure order against accused6petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad se!eral times without the necessary Court appro!al resulting in the postponements of the arraignment and schedules hearings. The FTC granted the otion. $etitioner questioned the FTC8s Order contending that the right to tra!el can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court only on grounds in the <interest of national security' public safety or public health= as was pre!iously stated in the #:0@ Constitution. Issue, M+8 the right to tr+/el 7e i90+ire.1 "el., HES. Art. """' Sec % of the #:+0 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of tra!el may be impaired e!en without Court order the appropriate e.ecuti!e officers or administrati!e authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of <national security' public safety or public health= and <as may be pro!ided by law=' a limited phrase which did not appear in the #:0@ te.t. Article """' sec. % of the #:+0 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused to ma,e himself a!ailable at all times whene!er the court requires his presence operates as a !alid restriction of his right to tra!el. An accused on bail may be re6arrested without the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to depart from the $hilippine without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. 5olding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by pre!enting his departure from the $hilippine

must be considered as a !alid restriction on his right to tra!el so that he may dealt with in accordance with law. SA#TIA=O $S $AS:UE2 (17 SCRA ;33 '+cts, An information doc,eted as criminal case No. #%%:+ was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged !iolation of the Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices. An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner with bail for the release of the accused fi.ed at $#())). $etitioner filed an <Irgent e.6parte otion for Acceptance of Cash 9ail 9ond for and in behalf of 3r. iriam 3efensor Santiago=. eanwhile' in a resolution of Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner by reason of the announcement made by petitioner' which was publici-ed in both print and broadcast media' that she would be lea!ing for the Inited States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the ?ohn >. Mennedy school of go!ernment at 5ar!ard Ini!ersity' hence' this < otion to Festrain the Sandiganbayan from enforcing its 5old 3eparture Order with prayer for the issuance of a TFO and7of $reliminary "njunction=. Issues, 1% /ON the hold departure order !iolates her right to due process' right to tra!el and freedom of speech. (% /ON under the #:+0 Constitution' courts can impair the right to tra!el only on grounds of <national security' public safety or public health=. "E!D, #. No. "t is a!erred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing because of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the Sandiganbayan. $etitioner is in error. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction' in addition to those e.pressly conferred on them. A court has the inherent power to ma,e interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case' with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coerci!e measure where he disobeys a proper order. $etitioner does not deny and e!en made a public statement that she in ta,ing judicial notice of such fact of petitioner8s plan to go abroad and in issuing sua sponte the hold departure order is but an e.ercise of respondent court8s inherent power to preser!e and maintain the effecti!eness of its jurisdiction o!er the case and the person of the accused. *. No. "n the more recent case of Silverio ) ".&' it was held that Art. """' Sec. % of the #:+0 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of tra!el may be impaired or administrati!e authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of <national security. $ublic safety and public health= and <as may be pro!ided by law=. Art """' Sec.% should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their power of the effect in criminal cases pending before them. /hen by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or ?udicial Officer' all au.iliary writs' processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. ART% III> SEC 7 RI="T TO I#'ORMATIO#
)'

records may be pre!ented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the record may be insured. $A!MO#TE $S BE!MO#TE 17) SCRA (4; '+cts, $etitioner in this case of special action for mandamus with preliminary injunction in!o,ed their right to information and pray that respondent be directedB a. to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the 9atasan $ambansa members belonging to the IN"3O and $3$6 4A9AN who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the >ebruary 0 election thru the intercession on7marginal note of the then >irst 4ady "melda arcos' and to furnish petitioners with certified true copy of the documents e!idencing their respecti!e loans' and7or to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject8s information ART% III> SEC 8 RI="T TO 'ORM ASSOCIATIO# CE#ECO $S SECRETARR& O' DO!E ()1 SCRA 48* '+cts, $etitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperati!e see,s to annul the order issued by then Acting Secretary 4aques declaring the project certification election unnecessary and declaring petitioner to continue recogni-ing pri!ate respondent CENECO IN"ON of FAT"ONA4 E $4OHEES 1CIFE2 as the sole and e.clusi!e bargaining representati!e of all the ran, and file employees of petitioner8s electric cooperati!e for purposes of collecti!e bargaining. CENECO entered into a C9A with CIFE pro!iding for a term of three years up to arch @#' #::). CIFE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiation be conducted for a new C9A but CENECO denied on the ground that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperati!e are not entitled to form or join a union. $rior to the proposed C9S negotiation' CIFE members in a general assembly appro!ed Fesolution No. @( whereby it was agreed that all union members shall withdraw' retract or recall the union members8 membership from CENECO to a!ail of the full benefit under the e.isting C9A entered into by and between CENECO and CIFE. 5owe!er' the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO by reason of CENECO8s refusal to negotiate a new C9A' CIFE filed a petition for direct recognition or for certification election. CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperati!e are not entitled to form or join union for purposes of C9A for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co6owners. ed6arbiter issued an order granting petition for certification election. CENECO appealed to the 3O4E which issued the questioned order. 5ence' this petition. Issue, -O# e90lo8ees of CE#ECO 5ho 5ith.re5 their 9e97ershi0 fro9 the coo0er+ti/e +re entitle. to for9 or Aoin CURE for 0ur0oses of CBA% "el., The articles of "ncorporation of CENECO do not pro!ide any ground for withdrawal from membership which gi!es rise to the presumption that the same may be done anytime and for whate!er reason. oreo!er' membership is on a !oluntary basis. The right to join an organi-ation necessarily the equi!alent right not to join the same. $ICTORIA#O $S E!I2A!DE ROPE -ORIERSB U#IO# 49 SCRA 4* '+cts, 9enjamin Cictoriano' a member of the "glesia ni Cristo had been in the employ of the Eli-alde Fope >actory' "nc. since #:(+. As such employee' he was a member of the respondent union' which had with the company' a closed6shop pro!ision' pursuant to FA +0( 1"ndustrial $eace Act2. 4ater' FA @@() was enacted amending FA +0(' among others' it pro!ided that the agreement on closed shop <shall not co!er members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organi-ation=. Cictoriano resigned from the union. Thereupon' the Inion recommended to the company his termination.
b. c.
"el., The right to information is an essential premise meaningful to the right to speech and e.pression. 9ut this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the e.ercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. >ar from it' the right to information goes hand6in6hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosures and honesty in the public ser!ice. "t is meant to enhance the widening role of the citi-enry in go!ernmental decision ma,ing as well in chec,ing abuse in go!ernment. Het li,e all constitutional guarantee' the right to information is not absolute. As stated in the case of 4egaspi' the people8s right to information is limited to matters of public concern' and is further subject to such limitations as may be pro!ided by law. 5ence' before mandamus may issue' it may clear that the information sought is of public interest or public concern' and is not e.empted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The public nature of the loanable funds of the ;S"S and the public office held by the alleged borrower ma,e the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. On the alleged relationship of confidential nature between the ;S"S and its borrowers' respondent failed to cite any law granting the ;S"S the pri!ilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. 5is position is apparently based merely on consideration of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issue. The court can only declare what the law is' and not what the law should be. Inder our system of go!ernment policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the go!ernment and of the people themsel!es as the repository of all State power. On the issue of pri!acy there can be no doubt that the right to pri!acy belongs to the indi!idual in his pri!ate capacity' and not to public and go!ernmental agencies li,e the ;S"S. A corporation has no right of pri!acy in its name since the entire basis of the right to pri!acy is an inquiry to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and the corporation would not ha!e such ground on relief. Neither can the ;S"S' through its ;eneral anager' the respondent in!o,e the right to pri!acy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature' and hence may be in!o,ed only by the person whose pri!acy is claimed to be !iolated' which cannot' howe!er be in!o,ed in the instant case considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to ha!e been granted. "n fine' petitioners are entitled to access to the documents e!idencing loans granted by the ;S"S subjects to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of e.amination' to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be a!oided' that undue interference with the duties of the custodians of the
))
Issue, The constitution+lit8 of RA 334) 5hich +llo5s 9e97ers of religious sect to .is+ssoci+te fro9 the l+7or union .es0ite the 0resence of close. sho0 +gree9ent 7et5een e90lo8er +n. 7+rg+ining union% "el., The SC upheld the !alidity of FA @@()' allowing wor,ers to disassociate from or not to join a labor union despite a closed shop agreement' if they were members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members in any such labor organi-ation. The constitutional guarantees the <right= to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad nations' namelyB first' liberty or freedom 1whereby an employee may act for himself without being pre!ented by law2' and second' power 1whereby an employee may as he pleases join or refrain from joining an association2. "t is' therefore' the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not to join' he himself ma,e up his mind as to which association he would join' and e!en after he has joined' he still retains the liberty and the power to lea!e and cancel his membership with said organi-ations at any time. "t is clear' therefore' that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 5owe!er' the legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law' where a labor union and an employer ha!e agreed on a closed shop' by !irtue of which the employer may employ only the members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to ,eep their jobs. $'ceptionB To the all embracing co!erage of the closed shop agreement' FA @@() introduced an e.ceptionA < but such agreement shall not covers members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization . FA @@() merely e.cludes ipso jure from the application and co!erage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any labor organi-ation. /hat the e.ception pro!ides' therefore' is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions e!en when said unions ha!e closed shop agreements with the employersD that inspite of any closed shop agreement members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collecti!e bargaining union.

Issue, -O# the resolution of the unicipal Council of andaluyong declaring the parcels of land' among others' as part of the commercial and industrial -one of the municipality pre!ailed o!er the building restrictions imposed by the plaintiff on the lots in questionO "el., /ith regard to the contention that the said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by the defendant6 referring to the restriction incorporated in the deed of sale and later in the corresponding TCT issued to defendant it should be stressed that' while non6impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed' the rule is not absolute' since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate e.ercise of police power. Such power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of lands sold by subdi!isions e!en if said conditions are annotated in the Torrens Title. ART% III> SEC 1( CUSTODIA! I#$ESTI=ATIO# PEOP!E $ 6UD=E A&SO# 174 SCRA (1; '+cts, >elipe Famos' a freight tic,et cler, of $A4' was in!ited for in!estigation on >ebruary :' #:+% by the anagement' in accordance with $A48s Code of Conduct and 3iscipline on allegations of irregularities in the sales of plane tic,ets. On >eb. +' #:+%' Famos ga!e to his superiors a handwritten note or admission. At the in!estigation before the 9ranch anager and in the presence of the station agent' tic,et freight cler, and $A4EA8s shop steward was informed of the charge before him. Thereafter' his answers to the questions by the 9ranch anager were ta,en down in writing. After two months' Famos was charged for estafa. Trial on the merits ensued. At the close of the people8s case' the pri!ate prosecutors made an offer of e!idence to #2 the handwritten note or admission and *2 to the written question and answer before the 9ranch anager. The defense objected to the offered e!idence on the ground that the admission or confession was ta,en without the accused represented by counsel. ?udge Ayson ruled in fa!or of the defense declared that the written admission or confession and record of the in!estigation was inadmissible because the accused was not informed of his right to remain silent and to ha!e counsel. 5ence this petition. Issue, Is the constitution+l right of + 0erson sus0ecte. of h+/ing co99itte. + cri9e +n. su7se<uentl8 ch+rge 5ith its co99ission /iol+te. in this c+se1 "el., No. One of the rights specified e.ist only in custodial in!estigation. And as this court has already stated' a custodial in!estigation is <questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been ta,en into custody or otherwise depri!ed of his freedom of action in any significant way' which is not in the case at bar. "t seems quite e!ident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary in!estigation is not under custodial in!estigation. 9ut unquestionably' the accused in court possesses rights against self6incrimination. Inder the Fules of Court' in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled #2 to be e.empt from being a witness against himself and *2 to testify as witness in his own behalf' but @2 if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross6e.amined as any other witnessD howe!er &2 his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudiced or be used against him. "n fine a person suspected of ha!ing committed a crime and subsequently
ART% III> SEC 1) #O# JIMPAIRME#T C!AUSE ORTI=AS K CO%> !TD% $S 'EATI BA#I A#D TRUST CO% 91 SCRA 433 '+cts, Ortigas N Co.' plaintiff' sold two parcels of land on installments to $adilla who later on transferred their rights and interest to Cha!e-. The agreements of sale contained stipulation' among others that the parcel of land <shall be used by the buyer e.clusi!ely for residential purposesA= Such stipulation was annotated in the TCTs. The parcels of land were e!entually sold to >EAT" 9an,' who began constructing of the commercial building. The latter refused to comply with the demand' contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the unicipal Fesolution No. *0' -oning regulations which declared the area a commercial and industrial -one. $laintiff filed complaint see,ing for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction praying' among others' that the defendant obser!e and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the TCT. Trial court dismissed the complaint.
)&
charged with its commission in court' has the following Fights in the matter of his testifying or producing e!idence' to witB #2 9E>OFE T5E CASE "S >"4E3 "N COIFT 1or with the public prosecutor' for preliminary in!estigation2' but after ha!ing ta,en into custody or otherwise depri!ed of his liberty in some significant way' and on being interrogated by the policeB the continuing right to remain silent and to ha!e counsel' and to be informed thereof' not to be suspected to force' !iolence' threat' intimidation or any other means which !itiates free will' and to ha!e e!idence obtained in !iolation of these rights rejectedD and *2 A>TEF T5E CASE "S >"4E3 "N COIFT a2 to refuse to be a witnessD b2 to testify in his own behalf' subject to cross6 e.amination by the prosecutionD c2 not to ha!e any prejudice whatsoe!er result to him by such refusalD d2 /5"4E TEST">H"N;' to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

PEOP!E $S A=USTI# =R% #O% 11)(9) 6A#UAR& (4> 199; '+cts, On September %' #:+%' a shooting incident occurred in 9aguio City' which cause the death of two people and the wounding of three others. On >eb. #)' #:+0' appellant was pic,ed up in $angasinan by military personnel and brought to 9aguio City. "n the afternoon of the same day he was brought to the City >iscal8s Office where he was in!estigated in connection with the crime. Appellant alleged that although he was gi!en a lawyer and that the lawyer who assisted him inter!iewed him only for two minutes in Englsh and Tagalog nut not in "locano' the dialect he understands. Appellant also contends that the lawyer who assisted him was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City >iscal and the former is a law partner of the pri!ate prosecutor. oreo!er' he alleged that while he was gi!ing his statements at the >iscal8s office the armed men stayed with him and their presence deferred him from telling the in!estigating fiscal that he was being threatened. Issues,
PEOP!E $S MA:UEDA =R% #O% 11(983, MARC" ((>1994 '+cts, 5ector aqueda was con!icted by the FTC of 9enguet with the crime of robbery with homicide and !arious physical injuries. The trial court based its con!iction on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti. The e.tra6judicial confession referred to is the <Sinumpaang Salaysay= of aqueda ta,en by the police immediately after he was arrested. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the acccused although it was ta,en filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court' the SS was not therefore ta,en during custodial in!estigation and hence Sec. #* 1#2 Art.""" of the Constitution is not applicable' i.e..' the police in!estigation was no longer within the ambit of a custodial in!estigation. The trial court e!en stated at the time of the confession that the accused was already facing charges in court' thus he no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to be prejudiced whatsoe!er resulting from such refusal. Issue, Does +n +ccuse. lose his right to re9+in silent +n. to counsel +fter + cri9in+l co90l+int or infor9+tion h+s 7een file. +g+inst hi91 "el., No. The e.ercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Sec. #*1#2 Art """ of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information' but are a!ailable at that stage when a person is under the in!estigation for the commission of an offense. "t was wrong for the trial court to say that Sec. #*1#2 Art.""" of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial in!estigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses the right to remain counsel and to counsel. "f we follow the theory of the trial court' then the police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would ha!e a heyday in e.tracting confessions or admissions from the accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. The accused in this case was not e!en told of any of his constitutional rights. The statement was also ta,en in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled SS is wholly inadmissible pursuant to Sec. #* 1@2 Art """ of the Constitution.
1% (%
/as his e.tra6judicial admissions ta,en in !iolation of his rights under Art """' sec. #* of the ConstitutionO /as the arrest of the appellant !alidO
"el., 1% Hes. Sec. #* Art """ of the Constitution applies both to confessions and admissions. oreo!er' it was obser!ed by the court that the appellant was not e.plicitly told of his right to ha!e a competent and independent counsel of his own choice. 5e was not categorically informed that he could wai!e his right to remain silent and to counsel and that hi wai!er must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. 5e had' in fact wai!ed his right to remain silent by agreeing to be in!estigated' yet no written wai!er of such rights appears in the transcript and no other independent e!idence was offered to pro!e its e.istence. "t is doubtful for a suspect to ha!e understood his constitutional rights if he was informed of the same in English and Tagalog when he could only understand "locano. Also' where the fiscal immediately suggested the a!ailability of a particular counsel without first as,ing the suspect if he had a counsel of own choice and if he had one' whether he could hires such counsel or whether he would agree to ha!e one pro!ided for him then such counsel pro!ided was foisted upon the suspect ant not one who was !oluntarily and intelligently <accepted= by the suspect. A counsel appointed to assist a suspect must be an independent counsel' and he could not be one who is an associate of the pri!ate prosecutor in the same case. >urthermore' the presence during the custodial in!estigation before the fiscal of the military officer who had earlier threatened the suspect with death !itiated the latter8s free will. No. No arrest without a warrant could ha!e been legally and !alidly effected ( months after the commission of the crime. A warrantless arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Sec. (' Fule ##@ of the Fules of Court.
(%
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PEOP!E $S A!ICA#DO DECEMBER 1(> 1994 '+cts, "n the morning of ?une #@' #::&' the lifeless body of Mhaye ae & years old' was disco!ered. The autopsy report re!ealed that she was raped and that the pro.imate cause of her death was asphy.ia by strangulation. A neighbor pointed appellant as the offender. >orthwith' he was arrested and interrogated by the police. 5e !erbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of this follow up interrogation' the police reco!ered from his house the !ictim8s slippers' a pair of gold earrings' a buri mat' a stained pillow and a stained T6shirt' all of which were later presented as e!idence for the prosecution. The appellant was arraigned with the assistance of counsel. 5e pleaded guilty. The trial court found him guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. Issue, Is the confession of the +ccuse. +.9issi7le +g+inst hi91 "el., No. it is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmati-ed as inadmissible e!idence any uncounselled confession or admission. "n the case at bar' $O@ Tan did not e!en ha!e the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing shown that appellant wai!ed his right to silent and to ha!e competent and independent counsel. 3espite the blatant !iolation of appellant8s constitutional right' the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. "t is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible' but also e!idence deri!ed therefrom. The pillow and the T6shirt with the alleged bloodstains were e!idence deri!ed from the uncounselled confession illegally e.tracted by the police from the appellant. The burden to pro!e that an accused wai!ed his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before ma,ing a confession under custodial in!estigation rests with the prosecution. The burden has to be discharged by clear and con!incing e!idence. "ndeed' par. # of Sec. #* Art """ of the Constitution pro!ides that the wai!er must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. "n the case at bar' the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. "t matters not that in the course of the hearing' the appellant failed to ma,e a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally prescribed e!idence. The lac, of objection did not satisfy the hea!y burden of proof that rested on the prosecution. d.

Section 1% Statement of *olicy K "t is the policy of the state to !alue the dignity of e!ery human being and guarantee full respect for human rights. Section (% -ights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation0 Duties of public 1fficers a. b. Any person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation shall be at all times be assisted by counsel. Any public officer or employee' or anyone acting under his order or his place' who arrests' detains in!estigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter' in a language ,nown to and understood by him' of his rights to remain silent and to ha!e competent and independent counsel' preferably of his own choice' who shall at all times be allowed to confer pri!ate with the person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation. "f such person cannot afford the ser!ices of his own counsel' he must be pro!ided with a competent and independent counsel by the in!estigating officer. The custodial in!estigation report shall be reduced to writing by the in!estigating officer' pro!ided that before such report is signed' or thumbmar,ed if the person arrested or detained does not ,now to read and write' it shall be read and adequately e.plained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel pro!ided by the in!estigating officer in the language or dialect ,now to such arrested or detained person or otherwise' such in!estigation report shall be null and !oid and of no effect whatsoe!er. Any e.tra6judicial confession made by a person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter8s absence' upon a !alid wai!er' and in the presence of any of the parents' elder brothers and sisters' his spouse' the municipal mayor' the municipal judge' district school super!isor' or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him' otherwise' such e.tra6judicial confession shall be inadmissible as e!idence in any proceeding. Any wai!er by a person arrested or detained under the pro!isions of Art. #*( of the Fe!ised $enal Code or under custodial in!estigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel' otherwise such wai!er shall be null and !oid and of no effect. Any person arrested or detained under custodial in!estigation shall be allowed !isits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family' or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel' or by any national non6go!ernmental organi-ation duly accredited by the Commission on 5uman Fights or by any international non6go!ernmental organi-ation duly accredited by the Office of the $resident. The person8s <immediate family= shall include his or her spouse' parent or child' brother or sister' grandparent or grandchild' uncle or aunt' nephew or niece and guardian or ward.
c.
e.
f.
REPUB!IC ACT #O% 7*38 A# ACT DE'I#I#= CERTAI# RI="TS O' PERSO# ARRESTED> DETAI#ED OR U#DER CUSTODIA! I#$ESTI=ATIO# AS -E!! AS T"E DUTIES O' T"E ARRESTI#=> DETAI#I#= A#D I#$ESTI=ATI#= O''ICERS A#D PRO$IDI#= OPE#A!TIES 'OR $IO!ATIO#S T"EREO' +e it enacted by the Senate and house of -epresentatives of the *hilippines in "ongress assembled.
As used in this ACT' <custodial in!estigation= shall include the practice of issuing an <in!itation= to a person who is in!estigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
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ha!e committed' without prejudice to the liability of the <in!iting= officer for any !iolation of law. Section 3% &ssisting "ounsel KAssisting counsel is any lawyer' e.cept those directly affected by the case' those charged with conducting preliminary in!estigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes. The assisting counsel other than the go!ernment lawyers shall be entitled to the following feesB a. b. The amount of One 5undred fifty pesos 1$#().))2 if the suspected person is chargeable with light feloniesD The amount of Two 5undred fifty pesos 1$*().))2 if the suspected person is chargeable with less gra!e or gra!e feloniesD The amount of Three 5undred fifty pesos 1$@().))2 if the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense.

as may be necessary to secure his safety and pre!ent his escape. Section 4% -epealing "lause KFepublic Act No. +(0' as amended' is hereby repealed. Other laws' presidential decrees' e.ecuti!e orders or rules and regulations' or parts thereof inconsistent with the pro!ision of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. Section ;% $ffectivity KThis Act shall ta,e effect 1#(2 fifteen days following its publication in the 1fficial 2azette or in any daily newspaper of general circulation in the $hilippines. Appro!ed. April *0'#::*.
c.
ART% III> SEC 13 RI="T TO BAI! PEOP!E $S 6UD=E DO#ATO 198 SCRA 13) '+cts, Fodolfo Salas 1Commander 9ilog2 and his co6accused were charged for the crime of rebellion. Sales filed a petition for bail which was opposed by herein petitioner on the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under $3 #::%' :&@ and #+@& which amended Article #@( of the F$C' by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote' maintain or head a rebellion' the accused is no longer entitled to bail as e!idence of guilt is strong. Subsequently howe!er' the $resident issue EO #+0 restoring to fulll force and effect Article #@( F$C. Accordingly Salas was granted bail. $etitioner contends that it would be dangerous to grant bail to Salas considering the nature in the C$$6N$A hierarchy' whose ultimate o!erriding goals is to wipe out all !estiges of democracy and to replace it with their ideology' and that his release would allow his return to this organi-ation to direct its armed struggle to topple the go!ernment before whose courts he in!o,es the constitutional right to bail. $etitioner argues that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right' yet when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an indi!idual' that of the former shall pre!ail for the <the right of the State to self6 preser!ation is paramount to any of the rights of an indi!idual enshrined in the 9ill of Fights. Issue, -hether or not re7ellion is + 7+il+7le offense% "el., &ES% 9ail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Accordingly' the prosecution does ha!e the right to present e!idence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. 5owe!er' in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary' due process requires that the prosecution must be gi!en an opportunity to present within reasonable time all the e!idence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resol!e the motion for bail.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial in!estigation is conducted' pro!ided if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee' the pro!ince comprising such municipality or city shall pay the feeB $ro!ided' that the unicipal or City Treasure must certify that no funds are a!ailable to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the pro!ince pay said fees. "n the absence of any lawyer' no custodial in!estigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the in!estigating officer in accordance with the pro!ision of Article #*( of the Fe!ised $enal Code. Section *% *enalty "lause Ka2 Any arresting public officer or employee' or any in!estigating officer' who fails to inform any person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation of his right to remain silent and to ha!e competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice' shall suffer a fine of Si. Thousand pesos 1$%'))).))2 or a penalty or imprisonment of not less than eight 1+2 years but not more than ten 1#)2 years' or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the in!estigating officer who has been pre!iously con!icted of a similar offense. The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee' or anyone acting upon orders of such in!estigating officer or in his place' who fails to pro!ide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the ser!ices of his own counsel. b2 Any person who obstructs' pre!ents or prohibits any lawyer' any member of the immediate family of a person arrested' detained or under custodial in!estigation' or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel' from !isiting and conferring pri!ately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him' or from e.amining and treating him' or from ministering to his spiritual needs' at any hour of the day or' in urgent cases' of the right shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four 1&2 years nor more than si. 1%2 years and a fine of >our Thousand pesos 1$&'))).))2 The pro!isions of the abo!e section notwithstanding' any security officer with custodial responsibility o!er any detainee or prisoner may underta,e such reasonable measures
CA!!A#TA $S $I!!A#UE$A 77 SCRA 377
)+
'+cts, The !alidity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest by respondent City ?udge >elipe Cillanue!a based on the two complaints for gra!e oral defamation against petitioner is being contested on the ground that it should ha!e been the City >iscal who should ha!e conducted the preliminary e.amination. There was then' in the opinion of petitioner8s counsel a jurisdictional infirmity. >rom the !ery petition itself' howe!er' it was shown that after such issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fi.ed in the amount of $%)).))' petitioner posted such required bail bonds' thus obtaining her pro!isional liberty. Issue, -hether or not the 0etitioner c+n still <uestione. the .efect> if +n8> in the issu+nce of the 5+rr+nts of +rrest% "el., No. /ith the e.press admission by petitioner that she had posted the required bail to obtain her pro!isional liberty' it becomes futile to assail the !alidity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest. "n the case of Jacarias Cs Cru-' it was held that <posting of a bail of a person' stops him from discussing the !alidity of his arrest=. "n the case of 4una Cs $la-a' it was held that <where petitioner has filed an application for bail and wai!ed the preliminary in!estigation proper' he wai!ed his objection to whate!er defect' if any' in the preliminary in!estigation conducted prior to thr issuance of the warrant of arrest=. At any rate' it cannot be denied that the City fiscal of 3agupan City had been quite acti!e in the in!estigation and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The matter was referred to his office. "t was he who appeared at the hearing and manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. "t would be then to pay an undue premium to technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the procedural requisite' assuming that the contention of petitioner is correct' of such official conducting the preliminary e.amination was not in fact complied with.

"el., The fact of the secrete alacanang conference of ?an. #)' #:+( at which the authoritarian $resident discussed with the $residing ?ustice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all *% accuses 1as admitted by respondent ?ustice >ernande- to ha!e been confirmed by him to the then $resident8s <Coordinator= anuel 4a-aro on the proceeding day2 is not denied. This illegality !itiated from the !ery beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court healed by the !ery $residing ?ustice who attended. As the commission notedB <The !ery acts of being summoned to alacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining' are in themsel!es pressure dramati-ed and e.emplified.= Cerily' it can be said that any a!owal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the !ery moment they stepped inside alacanang $alace on ?an. #)' #:+(. No court whose presiding justice has recei!ed <orders or suggestions= from the $resident who by an amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan can be an impartial court' which is the !ery essence of due process of law. ?urisdiction o!er cases should be determined by law' and not by preselection of the e.ecuti!e' which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of indi!idual cases. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret alacanang conference 1and re!ealed only after #( months by ?ustice 5errera2 completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and !oided ab initio its !erdict. PRESUMPTIO# O' I##OCE#CE PEOP!E $S DRAMA&O *( SCRA 49 '+cts, The accused6appellants' 3ramayo and Carbin were charged and con!icted by the crime of murder. "n their appeal' accused appellants claim that there is an absence of e!idence sufficient to con!ict and that there is a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged' only two of the se!en accused were held culpable. Issue, -O# 0roof 7e8on. re+son+7le .ou7t is nee.e. to o/erco9e 0resu90tion of innocence% "el., Accusation is not' according to the fundamental law' synonymous with guilt. "t is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate the culpability lies. Appellants were not e!en called upon then to offer e!idence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for con!iction be in e.istence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this court has always been committed. There is need' therefore' for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state' both oral and documentary independently of whate!er defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arri!e at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an e.acting test should be sentence be one of con!iction. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged' that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it mounted to a crime. /hat is required then is moral certainly. "n the case at bar' the presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently o!ercome by the proof that was by the prosecution.
ART% III> SEC 1* CRIMI#A! DUE PROCESS =A!MA# $S SA#DI=A#BA&A# 1** SCRA *3 '+cts, $etitioners filed an action alleging that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to e.ert genuine and earnest efforts to present !ital and important testimonial and documentary e!idence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan ?ustices were biased' prejudiced and partial in fa!or of the accused. The court resol!ed to dismiss the petition and lift the TFO issued earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. $etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The court required the respondents to comment on the F but issued no restraining order. On 3ec. *' #:+(' Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged and absol!ed them of ci!il liability. The petitioners filed their second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the $resident ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the *% respondents. The SC thus created a fact finding commission to determine the allegations of the petitioners. Issue, -O# the interference +n. 0ressure of the Presi.ent /iol+ti/e of .ue 0rocess +n. 0re/ente. + f+ir +n. i90+rti+l tri+l%
),

RI="T TO BE "EARD B& "IMSE!' A#D COU#SE! PEOP!E $S E!O& MA=SI 1(* SCRA ;* '+cts, agsi' del Fosario and other co6accused were charged with the murder of ?esus ;allardo with se!eral aggra!ating circumstances attendant to the crime. They were con!icted but 3el Fosario appealed the said decision on the ground' among others' that the trial court erred in appointing as attorney de officio' a lawyer who is the compadre of the person ,illed by the accused' and who' because of special relationship with the deceased' reluctantly discharged his duties as attorney de officio' after the court had denied his repeated petition to be relie!ed of his appointment as such. Issue, -hether or not the con/iction 5+s /+li.% "el., No. "t is established the de officio counsel Atty. Fi!era and del Fosario were hardly afforded by the trial court any opportunity to discuss the case together' and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the court8s prodding rather than from the spontaneous !iolation of the accused. /here defendants are charged with capital offenses' mere pro forma appointment of de officio counsel' who fails to genuinely protect the interest of the accused' resulting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of e!idence when such fact was not conducted' perfunctory queries to the accused' whether he understands the charges and the gra!ity of the penalty' are not sufficient with the Supreme Court8s injunction.
reading of the information filed against him clearly shows that the same is a case of 3irect 9ribery' thus he cannot claim that he was depri!ed of his right to be informed. "t is not the title of the information that counts but the contents thereof.
RI="T TO SPEED&> IMPARTIA! A#D PUB!IC TRIA! MA#UE! MATEO 6R% $S "O#% $I!!A!U2 4) SCRA 18 '+cts, $etitioners were charged with robbery in band with homicide. They filed motions to dismiss the criminal cases which were not immediately resol!ed by the respondent ?udge. "n the meantime' another suspect' one Folando Feyes was arrested. 5e e.ecuted an e.tra6judicial statement and signed and swore to its truth before the respondent ?udge wherein he implicated the petitioners. On this basis' the respondent ?udge deferred action on the petitioner8s motion to dismiss until after the prosecution had presented and rested its case against Feyes. Feyes was tried separately and in the absence of petitioners. 3uring the petitioner8s trial' Feyes was called as an additional witness where he repudiated his e.tra6judicial statement contending that the same was procured through threats by a go!ernment agent. As a consequence' he petitioners filed a motion to disqualify the respondent ?udge on the ground that Feyes had repudiated the e.tra6judicial statement which the latter sworn to before the former and that the latter would ha!e to pass upon the repudiation. The motion to disqualify was denied by the respondent ?udge. Issue, -hether the res0on.ent 6u.ge shoul. .is<u+lif8 5+s .enie. 78 the res0on.ent 6u.ge% "el., $etition is granted. The restraining order issued is made permanent. "t is beyond that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objecti!ity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate e.pectation that the decision arri!ed at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal' and that e!ery litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. $etitioners can assert then that this court has the power to set aside the order denying the motion for disqualification. /hile the discretion in the first instance belongs to the respondent ?udge' its e.ercise is subject to this court8s correcti!e authority. There can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse disqualification is to cast !alid doubts as to court8s impartiality. "n this case' the respondent ?udge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such e.tra6judicial statement. "t is unli,ely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant8s turn about which his later declaration that there was intimidation by considering that the respondent ?udge would ha!e to pass judgment on a question that by implication had already been answered by him 1ha!ing already gi!en his opinion on the matter2. TRIA! I# ABSE#TIA
RI="T TO BE I#'ORMED O' T"E #ATURE A#D CAUSE O' ACCUSATIO# SORIA#O $S SA#DI=A#BA&A# 131 SCRA 187 '+cts, "n the course of an in!estigation for qualified theft alleged to ha!e been committed by Thomas Tan' herein petitioner demanded from the latter an amount of $&'))).)) as consideration for dismissing the case. The same was reported to the N9" thus an entrapment was made. A complaint for !iolation of the Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices Act was filed against petitioner with the public respondent. $etitioner contends that an <in!estigation cannot be regarded as a contract of transaction= within the pur!iew of the said Act hence cannot be con!icted of !iolation thereof. $ublic respondent then con!icted him for 3irect 9ribery. $etitioner now raises the defense of !iolation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him considering that he was charged of !iolation of the Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices Act. Issue, -+s there + /iol+tion of 0etitionerBs +7o/e 9entione. right1 "el., "t is ob!ious that the in!estigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was if a transaction because this term is analogous to the former term. A transaction' li,e a contract' is one which in!ol!es some consideration' li,e a credit transaction' and this element is absent in the in!estigation conducted by the petitioner' thus he cannot be liable for !iolation of the Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices Act. 5e howe!er could be liable for 3irect 9ribery. A
)PEOP!E $S SA!AS 1*3 SCRA 1;3 '+cts, arie Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of >irst "nstance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was rein!estigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the rein!estigation' an amended information was filed' with no bail recommended' to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but while it was in progress' the prisoner' ta,ing ad!antage of the first information for homicide' succeeded in decei!ing the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release and so he escaped. The respondent ?udge' learning later of the tric,ery' cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong8s re6arrest. 9ut he was gone' nonetheless' the prosecution mo!ed that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional pro!ision authori-ing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent ?udge denied the motion' howe!er' and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. Issue, -+s the or.er of the 6u.ge 0ro0er1 "el., No. The old case of $eople C A!ancena has been modified by Sec. #: of Art. "C of the #:0@ Constitution which now allows trial in absentia. Now' the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly e!entual pro!ided only thatB a2 he has been arraigned b2 he has been duly modified of the trial' and c2 his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases' trial of which in the past be indefinitely deferred' and many times completely abandoned' because of defendant8s escape. The old case of $eople C A!ancena has been modified. The right to present at one8s trial may now be wai!ed e.cept only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant8s escape will be considered as a wai!er of his right about the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not pre!ent it from continuing with his trial he will be deemed to ha!e recei!ed due notice. The same fact of his escape will ma,e his failure to appear unjustified. Su7Aect M+tter, $arty6list System Ang B+gong B+8+ni O'- !+7or P+rt8 /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. #&0(+:' ?une *%' *))# '+cts, $etitioner challenged a resolution issued by the CO E4EC. $etitioner see,s the disqualification of certain major political parties in the *))# party6list elections arguing that the party6list system was intended to benefit the marginali-ed and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties' the non6marginali-ed or o!er represented. Issues, /hether or not political parties may participate in the party6list elections. /hether or not the party6list system is e.clusi!e to marginali-ed and underrepresented sectors and organi-ations "el., Inder the Constitution and FA 0:&#' major political parties cannot be disqualified from the party6list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. 9ut while e!en

major political parties are e.pressly allowed by FA 0:&# and the Constitution to participate in the party6list system' they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling >ilipino citi-ens belonging to marginali-ed and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. "n other words' while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties' they must show' howe!er' that they represent the interests of the marginali-ed and underrepresented. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section ( 1@2' 1&2 M+ri+no> 6r% /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. ##+(00' arch 0' #::( '+cts, Two petitions are filed assailing certain pro!isions of FA 0+(&' An Act Con!erting The unicipality of a,ati "nto a 5ighly Irbani-ed City to be ,nown as the City of a,ati' as unconstitutional. Section (* of FA 0+(& is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislati!e district of a,ati only by special law in !iolation of Art. C"' Sec. (1&2 requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within @ years following the return of e!ery census. Also' the addition of another legislati!e district in a,ati is not in accord with Sec. (1@2' Art. C" of the Constitution for as of the #::) census' the population of a,ati stands at only &()'))). Issue, /hether or not the addition of another legislati!e district in a,ati is unconstitutional "el., Feapportionment of legislati!e districts may be made through a special law' such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly pro!ides that Congress shall be composed of not more than *() members' unless otherwise fi.ed by law. As thus worded' the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law' other than a general reapportionment law. This is e.actly what was done by Congress in enacting FA 0+(& and pro!iding for an increase in a,ati8s legislati!e district. oreo!er' to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law' with a re!iew of all the legislati!e districts allotted to each local go!ernment unit nationwide' would create an inequitable situation where a new city or pro!ince created by Congress will be denied legislati!e representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will depri!e the people of a new city or pro!ince a particle of their so!ereignty. $etitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislati!e district in a,ati is not in accord with Sec. (1@2' Art. C" of the Constitution for as of the #::) census' the population of a,ati stands at only &()'))). Said section pro!ides that a city with a population of at least *()'))) shall ha!e at least one representati!e. E!en granting that the population of a,ati as of the #::) census stood at &()')))' its legislati!e district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of *()'))).
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Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section (1&2 MonteAo /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. ##+0)*' arch #%' #::( >actsB The pro!ince of 4eyte is composed of ( legislati!e districts. 9iliran' located in the third district of 4eyte' was made its sub6pro!ince by !irtue of FA *#&#. /hen 9iliran was con!erted into a regular pro!ince' + municipalities of the third district composed the new pro!ince. As a consequence' the composition of the third district was reduced to ( municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants' !oters and municipalities in 4eyte' the CO E4EC promulgated Fesolution No. *0@% where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of $alompon of the fourth district to the third district of 4eyte. Issue, /hether or not the CO E4EC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislati!e district to another legislati!e district "el., The CO E4EC relies on the Ordinance appended to the #:+0 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to ma,e laws. 9ut based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission' it denied to the CO E4EC the major power of legislati!e apportionment as it itself e.ercised the power. Section * of the Ordinance only empowered the CO E4EC to ma,e minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to ma,e minor adjustments' Sec. @ of the Ordinance did not also gi!e the CO E4EC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislati!e district to another district. "t may well be that the con!ersion of 9iliran from a sub6pro!ince to a regular pro!ince brought about an imbalance in the distribution of !oters and inhabitants in the ( legislati!e districts of 4eyte. 9ut the issue in!ol!es a problem of reapportionment of legislati!e districts and petitioner8s remedy lies with Congress. Section (1&2' Art. C" of the Constitution categorically gi!es Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that CO E4EC committed gra!e abuse of discretion amounting to lac, of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of $alompon of the fourth district to the third district of 4eyte.

ConstitutionPs one6year residency requirement for candidates for the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. Issue, /hether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. C"' Sec. % of the Constitution 5eldB >or election purposes' residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner' despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 0 months' because of the followingB 1a2 a minor follows the domicile of her parentsD Tacloban became petitioner8s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to 4eyteD 1b2 domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual remo!al or change of domicile' a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one' and acts which correspond with the purposeD in the absence of clear and positi!e proof of the concurrence of all these' the domicile of origin should be deemed to continueD 1c2 the wife does not automatically gain the husband8s domicile because the term <residence= in Ci!il 4aw does not mean the same thing in $olitical 4awD when petitioner married $resident arcos in #:(&' she ,ept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home' not a domicilium necessariumD 1d2 e!en assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died' her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban' her domicile of origin' as her domicile of choice.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article %' Section % A<uino /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. #*)*%(' September #+' #::( >actsB $etitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Fepresentati!e for the Second 3istrict of a,ati City. $ri!ate respondents o!e a,ati' a duly registered political party' and ateo 9edon' Chairman of 4AMAS6NIC36I 3$ of 9rgy. Cembo' a,ati City' filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lac,ed the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which' under Sec. %' Art. C" of the Constitution' should be for a period not less than # year immediately preceding the elections. Issue, /hether or not the petitioner lac,ed the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. %' Art. C" of the Constitution 5eldB "n order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Fepresentati!e of the Second 3istrict of a,ati City' he must pro!e that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section % M+rcos /s% COME!EC ;.F. No.##::0%' September #+' #::( '+cts, $etitioner "melda Fomualde-6 arcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Fepresentati!e of the >irst 3istrict of 4eyte. $ri!ate respondent Cirilo Foy ontejo' a candidate for the same position' filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the CO E4EC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. $ri!ate respondent contended that petitioner lac,ed the
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$etitioner' in his certificate of candidacy for the #::* elections' indicated not only that he was a resident of San ?ose' Concepcion' Tarlac in #::* but that he was a resident of the same for (* years immediately preceding that elections. At that time' his certificate indicated that he was also a registered !oter of the same district. 5is birth certificate places Concepcion' Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. /hat stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the #::( elections was Concepcion' Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in a,ati City is e!ident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. /hile a lease contract may be indicati!e of petitioner8s intention to reside in a,ati City' it does not engender the ,ind of permanency required to pro!e abandonment of one8s original domicile. $etitioner8s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to a,ati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile' petitioner must pro!e an actual remo!al or an actual change of domicileD a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. "n the absence of clear and positi!e proof' the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Fecords show that petitioner8s domicile of origin was Candon' "locos Sur and that sometime in #::#' he acquired a new domicile of choice in Gue-on City' as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representati!e of the Third 3istrict of Gue-on City in the ay #::( election. $etitioner is now claiming that he had effecti!ely abandoned his residence in Gue-on City and has established a new domicile of choice in the $ro!ince of Sarangani. A person8s domicile' once established' is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile' one must demonstrate an actual remo!al or an actual change of domicileD a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in ?anuary #::0 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicati!e of 3omino8s intention to reside in Sarangani' but it does not engender the ,ind of permanency required to pro!e abandonment of one8s original domicile. The mere absence of indi!idual from his permanent residence' no matter how long' without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus' the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used' in the absence of other circumstances' as the rec,oning period of the one6year residence requirement. >urther' 3omino8s lac, of intention to abandon his residence in Gue-on City is strengthened by his act of registering as !oter in Gue-on City. /hile !oting is not conclusi!e of residence' it does gi!e rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where 3omino registered in his former barangay.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article %' Section % Do9ino /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. #@&)#(' ?uly #:' #::: >actsB $etitioner 3omino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Fepresentati!e of the lone legislati!e district of the $ro!ince of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he see,s to be elected for # year and * months. $ri!ate respondents filed a petition see,ing to cancel the certificate of candidacy of 3omino' alleging that 3omino' contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy' is not a resident' much less a registered !oter' of the pro!ince of Sarangani where he see,s election. Thereafter' the CO E4EC promulgated a resolution declaring 3omino disqualified as candidate for the position of representati!e of the lone district of Sarangani in the ay ##' #::+ polls for lac, of the one6year residency requirement and li,ewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Coter8s Fegistration Fecord and his address indicated as *& 9onifacio St.' Ayala 5ts.' Old 9alara' Gue-on City. Issue, /hether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani $ro!ince for at least # year immediately preceding the ay ##' #::+ elections 5eldB The term <residence'= as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for electi!e office' means the same thing as <domicile'= which imports not only an intention to reside in a fi.ed place but also personal presence in that place' coupled with conduct indicati!e of such intention. <3omicile= denotes a fi.ed permanent residence to which' whene!er absent for business' pleasure' or some other reasons' one intends to return.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #) Phili00ine Constitution Associ+tion> Inc%GP"I!CO#SAH /s% M+th+8 ;.F. No. 46*(((&' October &' #:%% '+cts, $etitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor ;eneral of the $hilippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the $hilippines see,ing to permanently enjoin them from authori-ing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authori-ed by FA &#@& to the Spea,er and members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es before 3ecember @)' #:%:. The #:%(6#:%% 9udget implemented the increase in salary of the Spea,er and members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es set by FA &#@&' appro!ed just the preceding year #:%&. $etitioner contends that such implementation is !iolati!e of Article C"' Sec. #&1now Sec. #)2 of the Constitution. The reason gi!en being that the term of the + senators elected in #:%@' and who too, part in the appro!al of FA &#@&' would ha!e e.pired only on 3ecember @)' #:%:D while the term of the members of the 5ouse who participated in the appro!al of said Act e.pired on 3ecember @)' #:%(. Issue, 3oes Sec. #&1now Sec. #)2 of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the 5ouse but also that of all the Senators who appro!ed the increase must ha!e fully e.pired before the increase becomes effecti!eO
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"el., "n establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effecti!e' the Constitutional pro!ision refers to <all members of the Senate and the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es= in the same sentence' as a single unit' without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasi-ed by the fact that the pro!ision spea,s of the <e.piration of the full term= of the Senators and Fepresentati!es that appro!ed the measure' using the singular form and not the plural' thereby rendering more e!ident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indi!isible components of one single 4egislature. The use of the word <term= in the singular' when combined with the following phrase <all the members of the Senate and the 5ouse'= underscores that in the application of Art. C"' Sec. #&1now Sec. #)2' the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the 4egislature that enacted the measure must ha!e e.pired before the increase in compensation can become operati!e. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation pro!ided by FA &#@& is not operati!e until 3ecember @)' #:%:' when the full term of all members of the Senate and 5ouse that appro!ed it will ha!e e.pired. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section ## Peo0le /s% 6+losAos ;.F. No. #@*+0(60%' >ebruary @' *))) >actsB The accused6appellant' Fomeo ?alosjos' is a full6 fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his con!iction for statutory rape and acts of lasci!iousness is pending appeal. The accused6appellant filed a motion as,ing that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman' including attendance at legislati!e sessions and committee meetings despite his ha!ing been con!icted in the first instance of a non6 bailable offense on the basis of popular so!ereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue, /hether or not accused6appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of 5ouse of Fepresentati!es "el., Election is the e.pression of the so!ereign power of the people. 5owe!er' inspite of its importance' the pri!ileges and rights arising from ha!ing been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es arises from a pro!ision of the Constitution. The pri!ilege has always been granted in a restricti!e sense. The pro!ision granting an e.emption as a special pri!ilege cannot be e.tended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. "t may not be e.tended by intendment' implication or equitable considerations. The accused6appellant has not gi!en any reason why he should be e.empted from the operation of Sec. ##' Art. C" of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than si. years is not merely authori-ed by law' it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused6appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for ( days or

more in a wee, will !irtually ma,e him a free man with all the pri!ileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only ele!ates accused6appellant8s status to that of a special class' it also would be a moc,ery of the purposes of the correction system.
Subject atterB Article C"' Section ## 6i9ene@ /s% C+7+ng7+ng ;.F. No. 46#(:)(' August @' #:%% >actsB 3efendant Cabangbang was a member of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es and Chairman of its Committee on National 3efense. 5e wrote an open letter to the $resident and caused its publication in se!eral newspapers of general circulation e.posing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious A>$ officers regarding a massi!e political build6up of then Secretary of National 3efense' ?esus Cargas' to prepare him to become a candidate for $resident in #:%#. "ssueB /hether or not the publication in question is a pri!ileged communication 5eldB The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the pur!iew of the phrase <speech or debate in Congress= as used in Art. C"' Sec. #( 1now Sec. ##2. Said e.pression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions' such as speeches deli!ered' statements made' or !otes cast in the halls of Congress' while the same is in session' as well as bills introduced in Congress' whether the same is in session or not' and other acts performed by Congressmen' either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices' in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authori-ed to perform its functions as such' at the time of the performance of the acts in question. The publication in!ol!ed in this case does not belong to this category. "t was an open letter to the $resident' when Congress presumably was not in session' and defendant caused said letter to be published in se!eral newspapers of general circulation. "n causing the communication to be so published' he was not performing his official duty' either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. 5ence' said communication is not absolutely pri!ileged.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section ## Os9en+> 6r% /s% Pen.+tun ;.F. No. 46#0#&&' October *+' #:%) >actsB Congressman Osmena' in a pri!ilege speech deli!ered before the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' made serious imputations of bribery against $resident ;arcia. Thereafter' a special committee of #( members was created to in!estigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the
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$resident. Osmena refused to produce before the 5ouse Committee e!idence to substantiate such imputations. >or ha!ing made the imputations and for failing to produce e!idence in support thereof' Osmena was' by resolution of the 5ouse' suspended from office for a period of #( months for serious disorderly beha!ior. Issue, /hether or not there is an infringement of Osmena8s parliamentary pri!ilege of speech 5eldB Sec. #( 1now Sec. ##2' Art. C" of the Constitution pro!ides that for any speech or debate in Congress' the Senators or embers of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental pri!ilege cherished in e!ery legislati!e assembly of the democratic world. "t guarantees the legislator complete freedom of e.pression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or ci!il actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional 5all. 9ut it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislati!e body itself whene!er his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether deli!ery of speeches attac,ing the $resident constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined' the Court belie!es that the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es is the judge of what constitutes disorderly beha!ior' not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it' but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the 5ouse ,nows best but which can not be depicted in blac, and white for presentation to' and adjudication by the Courts. >or one thing' if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmena8s conduct constituted disorderly beha!ior' it would ha!e assumed appellate jurisdiction' which the Constitution ne!er intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the go!ernment.

/hether or not Assemblyman >ernande-' as a stoc,holder of "$"' may inter!ene in the SEC case without !iolating Sec. ##' Art. C""" 1now Sec. #&' Art. C"2 of the Constitution "el., Ordinarily' by !irtue of the motion for inter!ention' Assemblyman >ernande- cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly' he is not appearing on behalf of another' although he is joining the cause of the pri!ate respondents. 5is appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of #) shares of "$" in respect of the matter in litigation. 5owe!er' certain salient circumstances militate against the inter!ention of Assemblyman >ernande- in the SEC case. 5e had acquired a mere $*)).)) worth of stoc, in "$"' representing #) shares out of *%*'+&@ outstanding shares. 5e acquired them <after the fact= that is' after the contested election of directors' after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and # day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more' before he mo!ed to inter!ene' he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero' but which was objected to by petitioners. Feali-ing' perhaps' the !alidity of the objection' he decided' instead' to inter!ene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Inder those facts and circumstances' the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrati!e body. "n the opinion of the Court' that is a circum!ention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. ##' Art. C""" 1now Sec. #&' Art. C"2. The inter!ention was an afterthought to enable him to appear acti!ely in the proceedings in some other capacity.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #%1#2' Article C"""' Section # Defensor S+nti+go /s% =uingon+ ;.F. No. #@&(00' No!ember #+' #::+
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #& Pu8+t /s% De =u@9+n> 6r% ;.F. No. 46(##**' arch *(' #:+* '+cts, After an election for the 3irectors of the "nternational $ipe "ndustries Corporation 1"$"2 was held' one group' the respondent Acero group' instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings' questioning the election. ?ustice Estanislao >ernande-' then a member of the "nterim 9atasang $ambansa' entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner' $uyat group' objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could <appear as counsel before any administrati!e body'= and SEC was an administrati!e body. Assemblyman >ernande- did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman >ernande- had purchased #) shares of "$" for $*)).)) upon request of respondent Acero. >ollowing the notari-ation of Assemblyman >ernande-8 purchase' he filed a motion for inter!ention in the SEC case as the owner of #) "$" shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted lea!e to inter!ene on the basis of >ernande-8 ownership of the said #) shares. Issue,
'+cts, 3uring the first regular session of the ele!enth Congress' Senator >ernan was declared the duly elected $resident of the Senate by a !ote of *) to *. Senator Tatad manifested that' with the agreement of Senator Santiago' allegedly the only other member of the minority' he was assuming the position of minority leader. 5e e.plained that those who had !oted for Senator >ernan comprised the majority' while only those who had !oted for him' the losing nominee' belonged to the minority. Senator >la!ier manifested that the senators belonging to the 4a,as6NIC36I 3$ $arty numbering 0 and' thus' also a minority had chosen Senator ;uingona as the minority leader. Thereafter' the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 0 4a,as6 NIC36I 3$ senators' stating that they had elected Senator ;uingona as the minority leader. 9y !irtue thereof' the Senate $resident formally recogni-ed Senator ;uingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto' alleging that Senator ;uingona had been usurping' unlawfully holding and e.ercising the position of Senate minority leader' a position that' according to them' rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues, /hether or not the Court has jurisdiction o!er the petition
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/hether or not there is an actual !iolation of the Constitution "el., Fegarding the first issue' jurisdiction o!er the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition' regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. "n light of the allegations of the petitioners' it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction o!er the petition. "t is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a !iolation of the Constitution or gra!ely abused their discretion in the e.ercise of their functions and prerogati!es. 5owe!er' the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution' the laws' the Fules of the Senate or e!en from practices of the Ipper 5ouse. The term <majority'= when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate' it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. "n effect' while the Constitution mandates that the $resident of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof' it does not pro!ide that the members who will not !ote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority' who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. /hile the Constitution is e.plicit in the manner of electing a Senate $resident and a 5ouse Spea,er' it is' howe!er' dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. C"' Sec. #%1#2 is that <each 5ouse shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.= The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a deri!ati!e of the e.ercise of the prerogati!e conferred by the said constitutional pro!ision. Therefore' such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself' not by the Court.

simultaneously. Thus' although Fep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the ajority 4eader8s motion' the appro!al of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day' the bill was signed by the Spea,er of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es and the $resident of the Senate and certified by the respecti!e secretaries of both 5ouses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by $resident Famos. Issue, /hether or not FA +*&) is null and !oid because it was passed in !iolation of the rules of the 5ouse
"el., Fules of each 5ouse of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to re!ocation' modification or wai!er at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily ha!e no concern with their obser!ance. They may be wai!ed or disregarded by the legislati!e body. Consequently' mere failure to conform to them does not ha!e the effect of nullifying the act ta,en if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. 9ut this is subject to qualification. /here the construction to be gi!en to a rule affects person other than members of the legislati!e body' the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. E!en its !alidity is open to question in a case where pri!ate rights are in!ol!ed. "n the case' no rights of pri!ate indi!iduals are in!ol!ed but only those of a member who' instead of see,ing redress in the 5ouse' chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the 5ouse with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Fep. Arroyo was effecti!ely pre!ented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Fep. Arroyo8s earlier motion to adjourn for lac, of quorum had already been defeated' as the roll call established the e.istence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is ob!iously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the 5ouse. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #%1&2 Astorg+ /s% $illeg+s ;.F. No. 46*@&0(' April @)' #:0& '+cts, 5ouse 9ill No. :*%%' a bill of local application filed in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' was passed on third reading without amendments. 9ut when the bill was discussed in the Senate' substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were appro!ed in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Fo.as but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as ha!ing been acted upon. The 5ouse of Fepresentati!es thereafter signified its appro!al of 5.9.:*%% containing the amendments recommended by Senator Fo.as and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually appro!ed by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' the Spea,er of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate $resident. Then the $resident affi.ed his signature thereto by way of appro!al. The bill became FA &)%(.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #%1@2 Arro8o /s% De $eneci+ ;.F. No. #*0*((' August #&' #::0 '+cts, A petition was filed challenging the !alidity of FA +*&)' which amends certain pro!isions of the National "nternal Fe!enue Code. $etitioners' who are members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' charged that there is !iolation of the rules of the 5ouse which petitioners claim are constitutionally6mandated so that their !iolation is tantamount to a !iolation of the Constitution. The law originated in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. The Senate appro!ed it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing pro!isions of the 5ouse and Senate !ersions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the 5ouse. 3uring the interpellations' Fep. Arroyo made an interruption and mo!ed to adjourn for lac, of quorum. 9ut after a roll call' the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Fep. Arroyo8s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report' ajority 4eader Albano mo!ed for the appro!al and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declaredB <There being none' appro!ed.= At the same time the Chair was saying this' Fep. Arroyo was as,ing' </hat is thatA r. Spea,erO= The Chair and Fep. Arroyo were tal,ing
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Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of 5.9. :*%% signed into law by the $resident was a wrong !ersion of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and appro!ed on the Senate floor. As a consequence' the Senate $resident in!alidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter' the $resident withdrew his signature on 5.9. :*%%. Issue, /hether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to "el., The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments' which requires the judicial department to accept' as ha!ing passed Congress' all bills authenticated in the right manner. $etitioner8s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusi!e proof of a bill8s due enactment' required' it is said' by the respect due to a co6 equal department of the go!ernment' is neutrali-ed by the fact that the Senate $resident declared his signature on the bill to be in!alid and issued a subsequent clarification that the in!alidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had ne!er been appro!ed by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer' and consequently there being no enrolled bill to spea, of' the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and appro!ed by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed te.t sent to the $resident and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #0 =uerrero /s% COME!EC ;.F. No. #@0))&' ?uly *%' *))) '+cts, ;uillermo Fui- sought to disqualify respondent >arinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the >irst 3istrict of "locos Norte. Fui- alleged that >arinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the ay ##' #::+ polls' despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On ay +' #::+' >arinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Che!ylle >arinas who withdrew on April @' #::+. On ay #)' #::+' the CO E4EC dismissed the petition of Fui- for lac, of merit. After the election' >arinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter' Fui- filed a motion for reconsideration' contending that >arinas could not !alidly substitute for Che!ylle >arinas' since the latter was not the official candidate of 4A $' but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Fui- claimed that >arinas8 certificate of candidacy was fatally defecti!e. On ?une @' #:++' >arinas too, his oath of office as a member of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. The CO E4EC dismissed the case for lac, of jurisdiction. Issue, /hether or not the CO E4EC has committed gra!e abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the

!alidity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent >arinas is already within the e.clusi!e jurisdiction of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es Electoral Tribunal 15FET2. "el., There is no gra!e abuse of discretion on the part of the CO E4EC when it held that its jurisdiction o!er the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent >arinas as Fepresentati!e for the first district of "locos Norte. while CO E4EC is !ested with the power to declare !alid or in!alid a certificate of candidacy' its refusal to e.ercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by >arinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the CO E4EC and the 5FET. Inder Art. C"' Sec. #0 of the Constitution' the 5FET has sole and e.clusi!e jurisdiction o!er all contests relati!e to the election' returns and qualifications of members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. Thus' once a winning candidate has been proclaimed' ta,en his oath' and assumed office as a member of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' CO E4EC8s jurisdiction o!er election contests relating to his election' returns and qualifications ends' and the 5FET8s own jurisdiction begins. Thus' the CO E4EC8s decision to discontinue e.ercising jurisdiction o!er the case is justifiable' in deference to the 5FET8s own jurisdiction and functions.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #0 Bon.oc /s% Pine.+ ;.F. No. :00#)' September *%' #::# >actsB "n the elections held on ay ##' #:+0' arciano $ineda of the 43$ and Emigdio 9ondoc of the N$ were candidates for the position of Fepresentati!e for the >ourth 3istrict of $ampanga. $ineda was proclaimed winner. 9ondoc filed a protest in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es Electoral Tribunal 15FET2' which is composed of : members' @ of whom are ?ustices of the SC and the remaining % are members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es 1( members belong to the 43$ and # member is from the N$2. Thereafter' a decision had been reached in which 9ondoc won o!er $ineda. Congressman Camasura of the 43$ !oted with the SC ?ustices and Congressman Cerilles of the N$ to proclaim 9ondoc the winner of the contest. On the e!e of the promulgation of the 9ondoc decision' Congressman Camasura recei!ed a letter informing him that he was already e.pelled from the 43$ for allegedly helping to organi-e the $artido $ilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly in!iting 43$ members in 3a!ao 3el Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision' the Chairman of 5FET recei!ed a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the 43$' the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the 5FET. Issue, /hether or not the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es' at the request of the dominant political party therein' may change that party8s representation in the 5FET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein 5eldB
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The purpose of the constitutional con!ention creating the Electoral Commission was to pro!ide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislati!e office' de!oid of partisan consideration. As judges' the members of the tribunal must be non6 partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment' impartiality and independence e!en independence from the political party to which they belong. 5ence' disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not !alid grounds for the e.pulsion of a member of the tribunal. "n e.pelling Congressman Camasura from the 5FET for ha!ing cast a <conscience !ote= in fa!or of 9ondoc' based strictly on the result of the e.amination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the !otes by the tribunal' the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es committed a gra!e abuse of discretion' an injustice and a !iolation of the Constitution. "ts resolution of e.pulsion against Congressman Camasura is' therefore' null and !oid. Another reason for the nullity of the e.pulsion resolution of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es is that it !iolates Congressman Camasura8s right to security of tenure. embers of the 5FET' as sole judge of congressional election contests' are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the ?udiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore' membership in the 5FET may not be terminated e.cept for a just cause' such as' the e.piration of the member8s congressional term of office' his death' permanent disability' resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal' formal affiliation with another political party or remo!al for other !alid cause. A member may not be e.pelled by the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es for party disloyalty' short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

political party' who is depri!ed of half a representation. The pro!ision of Sec. #+ on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not lea!e any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not require that the full complement of #* senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect #* senators to the CA. The o!erriding directi!e of Art. C"' Sec. #+ is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of #* members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the ma.imum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties e!en if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. E!en if the composition of the CA is fi.ed by the Constitution' it can perform its functions e!en if not fully constituted' so long as it has the required quorum.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section *# Beng@on> 6r% /s% The Sen+te Blue Ri77on Co99ittee ;.F. No. +::#&' No!ember *)' #::# '+cts, The Fepublic of the $hilippines' represented by the $C;;' filed with the Sandiganbayan a ci!il case against 9enjamin Fomualde-. The complaint alleged that 9enjamin Fomualde- and ?uliette ;ome- Fomualde-' acting by themsel!es and7or in unlawful concert with then $resident >erdinand arcos and "melda arcos' and ta,ing undue ad!antage of their relationship' influence and connection with the latter spouses' engaged in de!ices' schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themsel!es at the e.pense of the Fepublic of the $hilippines and the >ilipino people. Conflicting reports on the disposition by the $C;; of the Fomualde- corporations were carried in !arious newspapers. Other newspapers declared that shortly after the #:+% E3SA Fe!olution' the Fomualde- companies were sold for $( million' without $C;; appro!al' to a holding company controlled by Fomualde-' and that Ficardo 4opa' the $resident8s brother6in6law' had effecti!ely ta,en o!er the firm. "n the Senate' Senator Enrile deli!ered a speech on the alleged ta,e o!er by 4opa of SO4O"4 "ncorporated' the flagship of the >irst anila anagement of Companies owned by Fomualde-. Senator Enrile also called upon the Senate to loo, into the possible !iolation of the law' particularly with regard to FA @)#:' The Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices Act. The matter was referred by the Senate to the 9lue Fibbon Committee. Issue, /hether or not the Senate 9lue Fibbon Committee8s inquiry has !alid legislati!e purpose as mandated by Art. C"' Sec. *# "el., The Constitution e.pressly recogni-es the power of both 5ouses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section #+ =uingon+> 6r% /s% =on@+les ;.F. No. #)%:0#' arch #' #::@ '+cts, The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments 1CA2 is as followsB 43$Q0.(D 4$6$3$6 4A9AN66.(D N$CQ*.(D 4AMAS6NIC3Q#.(. The 43$ majority in the Senate con!erted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one6half or .( to 0.( to be able to elect respondent Senator Fomulo. "n so doing' one other party8s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced lea!ing the latter8s representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. Issue, /hether or not there is a !iolation of Art. C"' Sec. #+ Ruling, The respondent8s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the 43$ majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. #+ of Art. C" of the Constitution and therefore !iolati!e of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that #* senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together * hal!es to ma,e a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will gi!e the 43$ an added member in the CA by utili-ing the fractional membership of the minority
&+
legislation. 9ut the power of both 5ouses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As pro!ided under Art. C"' Sec. *#' the in!estigation must be <in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure= and that <the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.= "t follows then that the rights of persons under the 9ill of Fights must be respected' including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one8s self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or in!estigations is specifically pro!ided in the Senate Fules of $rocedure. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re6e.amination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also e.tend to any and all matters !ested by the Constitution in Congress and7or in the Senate alone. The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislationD he merely called upon the Senate to loo, into a possible !iolation of the Anti6;raft and Corrupt $ractices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relati!es of $resident Aquino' particularly 4opa' had !iolated the law in connection with the alleged sale of @% or @: corporations belonging to Fomualde- to the 4opa group. There appears to be' therefore' no intended legislation in!ol!ed. This matter appears to be more within the pro!ince of the courts rather than of the legislature. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Sections *&' *%1*2' *+1#'@2 Tolentino /s% Secret+r8 of 'in+nce ;.F. No. ##(&((' August *(' #::& '+cts, The !alue6added ta. 1CAT2 is le!ied on the sale' barter or e.change of goods and properties as well as on the sale or e.change of ser!ices. FA 00#% see,s to widen the ta. base of the e.isting CAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National "nternal Fe!enue Code. There are !arious suits challenging the constitutionality of FA 00#% on !arious grounds. One contention is that FA 00#% did not originate e.clusi!ely in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es as required by Art. C"' Sec. *& of the Constitution' because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of * distinct bills' 5. No. ###:0 and S. No. #%@). There is also a contention that S. No. #%@) did not pass @ readings as required by the Constitution. Issue, /hether or not FA 00#% !iolates Art. C"' Secs. *& and *%1*2 of the Constitution "el., The argument that FA 00#% did not originate e.clusi!ely in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es as required by Art. C"' Sec. *& of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with' it is not the law but the re!enue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate e.clusi!ely in the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es. To insist that a re!enue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislati!e process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the 5ouse bill would be to deny the Senate8s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. "ndeed' what the Constitution simply means is that the initiati!e for filing re!enue' tariff or ta. bills' bills authori-ing an increase of the public debt' pri!ate bills and bills of local application must come from the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es on the theory that' elected as they are from the districts' the members of the 5ouse

can be e.pected to be more sensiti!e to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the 5ouse' so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the 5ouse bill. The ne.t argument of the petitioners was that S. No. #%@) did not pass @ readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. 9ut this was because the $resident had certified S. No. #%@) as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the $resident the requirement of @ readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislati!e practice.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section *+1@2' Article E"C' Section &1@2 Co99issioner of Intern+l Re/enue /s% CA ;.F. No. #*&)&@' October #&' #::+ >actsB $ri!ate respondent H CA is a non6stoc,' non6profit institution' which conducts !arious programs and acti!ities that are beneficial to the public' especially the young people' pursuant to its religious' educational and charitable objecti!es. H CA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from par,ing fees collected from non6members. The Commissioner of "nternal Fe!enue 1C"F2 issued an assessment for deficiency income ta.' deficiency e.panded withholding ta.es on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding ta. on wages. H CA protested the assessment. Issue, /hether or not the income of pri!ate respondent H CA from rentals of small shops and par,ing fees is e.empt from ta.ation 5eldB H CA argues that Art. C"' Sec. *+1@2 of the Constitution e.empts charitable institutions from the payment not only of property ta.es but also of income ta. from any source. The Court is not persuaded. The debates' interpellations and e.pressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution re!eal their intent. ?ustice 5ilario 3a!ide ?r.' a former constitutional commissioner' stressed during the Concom debate that what is e.empted is not the institution itselfD those e.empted from real estate ta.es are lands' buildings and impro!ements actually' directly and e.clusi!ely used for religious' charitable or educational purposes. >r. ?oaquin 9ernas' an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom' adhered to the same !iew that the e.emption created by said pro!ision pertained only to property ta.es. "n his treatise on ta.ation' ?ustice ?ose Citug concurs' stating that the ta. e.emption co!ers property ta.es only. "ndeed' the income ta. e.emption claimed by H CA finds no basis in Art. C"' Sec. *+1@2 of the Constitution. H CA also in!o,es Art. E"C' Sec. &1@2 of the Constitution claiming that H CA is a non6stoc,' non6profit educational institution whose re!enues and assets are used
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actually' directly and e.clusi!ely for educational purposes so it is e.empt from ta.es on its properties and income. The Court reiterates that H CA is e.empt from the payment of property ta.' but not income ta. on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non6stoc,' non6profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its e.emption from the payment of income ta.. 4aws allowing ta. e.emption are construed strictissimi juris. 5ence' for the H CA to be granted the e.emption it claims under the aforecited pro!ision' it must pro!e with substantial e!idence thatB #. it falls under the classification non6stoc,' non6profit educational institutionD and *. the income it see,s to be e.empted from ta.ation is used actually' directly and e.clusi!ely for educational purposes. 5owe!er' the Court notes that not a scintilla of e!idence was submitted by H CA to pro!e that it met the said requisites. H CA is not an educational institution within the pur!iew of Art. E"C' Sec. &1@2 of the Constitution. The term <educational institution'= when used in laws granting ta. e.emptions' refers to a school' seminary' college or educational establishment. Therefore' H CA cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions co!ered by the said constitutional pro!ision. oreo!er' the Court notes that H CA did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually' directly and e.clusi!ely used for educational purposes.

the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Fule &( of the Fules of Court is !alid "el., The re!ised Fules of Ci!il $rocedure preclude appeals from quasi6judicial agencies to the SC !ia a petition for re!iew on certiorari under Fule &(. Inder the present Fule &(' appeals may be brought through a petition for re!iew on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. # thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi6judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a !erified petition for re!iew' under the requirements and conditions in Fule &@ which was precisely formulated and adopted to pro!ide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi6judicial agencies. Section *0 of FA %00) cannot !alidly authori-e an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrati!e disciplinary cases. "t consequently !iolates the proscription in Sec. @)' Art. C" of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section @) #+9uhe /s% O97u.s9+n ;.F. No. #*&:%(' October *:' #::+
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"' Section @) '+7i+n /s% Desierto ;.F. No. #*:0&*' September #%' #::+ '+cts, $etitioner Teresita >abian was the major stoc,holder and $resident of $FO AT Construction 3e!elopment Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. $ri!ate respondent Nestor Agustin was the 3istrict Engineer of the >irst etro anila Engineering 3istrict. $FO AT participated in the bidding for go!ernment construction projects' and pri!ate respondent' reportedly ta,ing ad!antage of his official position' in!eigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time' in the course of which' pri!ate respondent gifted $FO AT with public wor,s contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. /hen petitioner tried to terminate their relationship' pri!ate respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the e.tent of employing acts of harassment' intimidation and threats. $etitioner filed an administrati!e complaint against pri!ate respondent. Ombudsman found pri!ate respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for # year. After pri!ate respondent mo!ed for reconsideration' the Ombudsman disco!ered that the pri!ate respondent8s new counsel had been his classmate and close associate' hence' he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent 3eputy Ombudsman who e.onerated pri!ate respondent from the administrati!e charges. $etitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Fule &( of the Fules of Court. Issue, /hether or not Section *0 of FA %00) which pro!ides for appeals in administrati!e disciplinary cases from the Office of
'+cts, $etitioners were employed at the ountain $ro!ince Engineering 3istrict and "fugao Engineering 3istrict of the 3$/5. "n connection with the purported public bidding held for the 9ailey bridge components for use in ainit' ountain $ro!ince' they were charged with dishonesty' falsification of official documents' gra!e misconduct' gross neglect of duty' !iolation of office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the ser!ice. As a result' the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed petitioners from the go!ernment ser!ice. Issue, /hether or not the SC has jurisdiction o!er appeals of administrati!e disciplinary decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman "el., "n >abian !. 3esierto 1;.F. No. #*:0&*' September #%' #::+2' the Court held that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrati!e disciplinary cases should be ta,en to the CA under Fule &@ of the #::0 Fules of Ci!il $rocedure. "n so holding' the Court en banc declared as unconstitutional Sec. *0 of FA %00) or the Ombudsman Act of #:+:' which pro!ided that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by way of a petition for re!iew on certiorari under Fule &( of the Fules of Court. Such pro!ision was held !iolati!e of Sec. @)' Art. C" of the Constitution' as it e.panded the jurisdiction of the SC without its ad!ice and consent.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #' Article C"""' Section #
&M+rcos /s% M+ngl+0us ;.F. No. ++*##' September #(' #:+: >actsB "n #:+%' >erdinand arcos was deposed from the presidency !ia the non6!iolent people power re!olution and was forced into e.ile. "n his stead' Cora-on Aquino was declared $resident of the Fepublic. This' did not howe!er' stop bloody challenges to the go!ernment. The armed threats to the go!ernment were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of arcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist mo!ement in indanao which gained ground during the rule of arcos. The woes of the go!ernment are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to arcos and his cronies left the economy de!astated. arcos' in his deathbed' has signified his wish to return to the $hilippines to die. 9ut $resident Aquino' considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of go!ernment is threatened from !arious directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and mo!e forward' has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of arcos and his family. Issues, /hether or not the $resident has the power under the Constitution to bar the arcoses from returning to the $hilippines /hether or not the $resident acted arbitrarily or with gra!e abuse of discretion amounting to lac, or e.cess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the arcoses to the $hilippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return 5eldB Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the e.ercise of the specific powers of the $resident' it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of e.ecuti!e power. Corollarily' the powers of the $resident cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. "n other words' e.ecuti!e power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. "t has been ad!anced that whate!er power inherent in the go!ernment that is neither legislati!e nor judicial has to be e.ecuti!e. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles ser!ice and protection of the people' the maintenance of peace and order' the protection of life' liberty and property' and the promotion of the general welfare. >aced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the arcoses to return to the $hilippines' the $resident is' under the Constitution' constrained to consider these basic principles in arri!ing at a decision. ore than that' ha!ing sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution' the $resident has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people' promote their welfare and ad!ance the national interest. To the $resident' the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the e.ercise of rights of certain indi!iduals. The power in!ol!ed is the $resident8s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. "t is a power borne by the $resident8s duty to preser!e and defend the Constitution. "t also may be !iewed as a power implicit in the $resident8s duty to ta,e care that the laws are faithfully

e.ecuted. ore particularly' this case calls for the e.ercise of the $resident8s power as protector of the peace. The $resident is not only clothed with e.traordinary powers in times of emergency' but is also tas,ed with attending to the day6to6day problems of maintaining peace and order. Another question to determine is whether or no there e.ist factual bases for the $resident to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the arcoses to the $hilippines. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well6organi-ed communist insurgency' a separatist mo!ement in indanao' rightist conspiracies to grab power' urban terrorism' and the murder with impunity of military men' police officers and ci!ilian officials. /ith these before her' the $resident cannot be said to ha!e acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the arcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Sections + and ## Estr+.+ /s% Desierto ;.F. No. #&%0#)6#(' arch *' *))# Estr+.+ /s% Arro8o ;.F. No. #&%0@+' arch *' *))# >actsB "n the ay ##' #::+ elections' petitioner ?oseph Estrada was elected $resident while respondent ;loria acapagal6Arroyo was elected Cice6$resident. >rom the beginning of his term' howe!er' petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October &' *)))' "locos Sur ;o!ernor Cha!it Singson' a longtime friend of the petitioner' accused the petitioner' his family and friends of recei!ing millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The e.pose8 immediately ignited reactions of rage. On No!ember #@' *)))' 5ouse Spea,er Cillar transmitted the Articles of "mpeachment signed by ##( representati!es or more than #7@ of all the members of the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es to the Senate. On No!ember *)' *)))' the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On ?anuary #%' *))#' by a !ote of ##6#)' the senator6judges ruled against the opening of the second en!elope which allegedly contained e!idence showing that petitioner held $@.@ billion in a secret ban, account under the name <?ose Celarde.= The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter' the Armed >orces and the $N$ withdrew their support to the Estrada go!ernment. Some Cabinet secretaries' undersecretaries' assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On ?anuary *)' *))#' at about #* noon' Chief ?ustice 3a!ide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as $resident of the $hilippines. On the same day' petitioner issued a press statement that he was lea!ing alacanang $alace for the sa,e of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. "t also appeared that on the same day' he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to e.ercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution' the Cice6$resident shall be the Acting $resident. A copy of the letter was sent to Spea,er >uentebella and Senate $resident $imentel on the same day.
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After his fall from the power' the petitioner8s legal problems appeared in clusters. Se!eral cases pre!iously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. "ssuesB /hether or not the petitioner resigned as $resident /hether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as $resident Ruling, $etitioner denies he resigned as $resident or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Fesignation is a factual question. "n order to ha!e a !alid resignation' there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The !alidity of a resignation is not go!erned by any formal requirement as to form. "t can be oral. "t can be written. "t can be e.press. "t can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear' it must be gi!en legal effect. "n the cases at bar' the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before lea!ing alacanang $alace. Consequently' whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before' during and after ?an. *)' *))# or by the totality of prior' contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial e!idence bearing a material rele!ance on the issue. The Court had an authoritati!e window on the state of mind of the petitioner pro!ided by the diary of E.ecuti!e Sec. Angara seriali-ed in the $hil. 3aily "nquirer. 3uring the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition' the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. 3uring the second round of negotiation' the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a gi!en fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be underta,en by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. "t was confirmed by his lea!ing alacanang. "n the press release containing his final statement' 1#2 he ac,nowledged the oath6ta,ing of the respondent as $resident of the Fepublic' but with the reser!ation about its legalityD 1*2 he emphasi-ed he was lea!ing the $alace' the seat of the presidency' for the sa,e of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. 5e did not say he was lea!ing the $alace due to any ,ind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappearsD 1@2 he e.pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to ser!e themD 1&2 he assured that he will not shir, from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same ser!ice of the countryD and 1(2 he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructi!e national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court also tac,led the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency' and hence is a $resident on lea!e. The inability claim is contained in the ?an. *)' *))# letter of petitioner sent to Senate $res. $imentel and Spea,er >uentebella. 3espite said letter' the 5ouse of Fepresentati!es passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as $resident. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of ;uingona as Cice6$resident. 9oth houses of Congress ha!e recogni-ed respondent Arroyo as the $resident. "mplicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner8s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner8s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. "t is a political issue which cannot be

decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #( In Re A00oint9ents of "on% M+teo $+len@uel+ +n. "on% Pl+ci.o $+ll+rt+ A. . No. :+6(6)#6SC' No!ember :' #::+ >actsB Feferred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the $resident dated arch @)' #::+ of 5on. ateo Calen-uela and 5on. $lacido Callarta as judges of the FTC of 9ago City and Cabanatuan City' respecti!ely. These appointments appear prima facie' at least' to be e.pressly prohibited by Sec. #(' Art. C"" of the Constitution. The said constitutional pro!ision prohibits the $resident from ma,ing any appointments two months immediately before the ne.t presidential elections and up to the end of his term' e.cept temporary appointments to e.ecuti!e positions when continued !acancies therein will prejudice public ser!ice or endanger public safety. Issue, /hether or not' during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. #(' Art. C"" of the Constitution' the $resident is nonetheless required to fill !acancies in the judiciary' in !iew of Secs. & 1#2 and : of Art. C""" 5eldB 3uring the period stated in Sec. #(' Art. C"" of the Constitution <two months immediately before the ne.t presidential elections and up to the end of his term= the $resident is neither required to ma,e appointments to the courts nor allowed to do soD and that Secs. &1#2 and : of Art. C""" simply mean that the $resident is required to fill !acancies in the courts within the time frames pro!ided therein unless prohibited by Sec. #( of Art. C"". This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once e!ery % years. The appointments of Calen-uela and Callarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. /hile the filling of !acancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest' there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the ma,ing of the appointments during the period of the ban
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #( De R+9+ /s% CA ;.F. No. #@##@%' >ebruary *+' *))# >actsB Ipon his assumption to the position of ayor of $agbilao' Gue-on' petitoner Conrado 3e Fama wrote a letter to the CSC see,ing the recall of the appointments of #& municipal employees. $etitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were <midnight= appointments of the former mayor' done in !iolation of Art. C""' Sec. #( of the Constitution. The CSC denied
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petitioner8s request for the recall of the appointments of the #& employees for lac, of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner8s allegation that these were <midnight= appointments' pointing out that the constitutional pro!ision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing $resident and cannot be made to apply to local electi!e officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can !alidly issue appointments until his term has e.pired' as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position. Issue, /hether or not the appointments made by the outgoing ayor are forbidden under Art. C""' Sec. #( of the Constitution 5eldB The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so6called <midnight appointments'= specifically those made within * months immediately prior to the ne.t presidential elections' applies only to the $resident or Acting $resident. There is no law that prohibits local electi!e officials from ma,ing appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

('

Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #0 Ber9u.e@ /s% Torres ;.F. No. #@#&*:' August &' #::: >actsB $etitioner Oscar 9ermude-' the >irst Assistant $ro!incial $rosecutor of Tarlac and Officer6in6Charge of the Office of $ro!incial $rosecutor' was a recommendee of then Sec. of ?ustice ;uingona for the position of $ro!incial $rosecutor. $ri!ate respondent Atty. Conrado Guiaoit had the support of then Fepresentati!e Hap of the Second 3istrict of Tarlac. Guiaoit was appointed by $res. Famos to the office. Guiaoit too, his oath and assumed office. 9ermude- refused to !acate the Office of the $ro!incial $rosecutor. Nonetheless' Guiaoit' performed the duties and functions of the Office of $ro!incial $rosecutor. $etitioner 9ermude- challenged the appointment of Guiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lac,s the recommendation of the Sec. Of ?ustice prescribed under the Fe!ised Administrati!e Code of #:+0. Section :' Chap. ""' Title """' 9oo, "C of the Fe!ised Administrati!e Code pro!ides that <all pro!incial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the $res. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.= Issue, /hether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of ?ustice to the $resident can be held fatal to the appointment of Guiaoit 5eldB An appointment to a public office is the unequi!ocal act of designating or selecting by one ha!ing the authority therefor of an indi!idual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effecti!e. The power to appoint is' in essence' discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may e.ercise freely according to his judgment' deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who ha!e the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. /hen the Constitution or the law clothes the $res. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer' such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The $res. is the head of go!ernment whose authority includes the power of control o!er all <e.ecuti!e departments' bureaus and offices.= Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify' or e!en nullify or set aside' what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties' as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter' as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The $res. has the power to assume directly the functions of an e.ecuti!e department' bureau and office. "t can therefore be inferred that the $res. can interfere in the e.ercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. The phrase <upon recommendation of the Secretary= found in Sec. :' Chap. ""' Title """' 9oo, "C of the Fe!ised Administrati!e Code should be interpreted to be a mere ad!ice' e.hortation or indorsement' which is essentially persuasi!e in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more
than ad!isory in nature. The $res.' being the head of the E.ecuti!e 3epartment' could !ery well disregard or do away with the action of the departments' bureaus or offices e!en in the e.ercise of discretionary authority' and in so opting' he cannot be said as ha!ing acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #0 Bl+<uer+ /s% Alc+l+ ;.F. No. #):&)%' September ##' #::+ >actsB On >eb. *#' #::*' then $res. Aquino issued AO *%+ which granted each official and employee of the go!ernment the producti!ity incenti!e benefits in a ma.imum amount equi!alent to @)R of the employee8s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than $*' ))).)). Said AO pro!ided that the producti!ity incenti!e benefits shall be granted only for the year #::#. Accordingly' all heads of agencies' including go!ernment boards of go!ernment6owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions' are strictly prohibited from granting producti!ity incenti!e benefits for the year #::* and future years pending the result of a comprehensi!e study being underta,en by the Office of the $res. The petitioners' who are officials and employees of se!eral go!ernment departments and agencies' were paid incenti!e benefits for the year #::*. Then' on ?an. #:' #::@' then $res. Famos issued AO *: authori-ing the grant of producti!ity incenti!e benefits for the year #::* in the ma.imum amount of $#'))).)) and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 0 of AO *%+' enjoining the grant of producti!ity incenti!e benefits without prior appro!al of the $resident. Sec. & of AO *: directed all departments' offices and agencies which authori-ed payment of producti!ity incenti!e bonus for the year #::* in e.cess of $#' ))).)) to immediately cause the refund of the e.cess. "n compliance therewith' the heads of the departments or agencies of the go!ernment concerned caused the deduction from petitioners8 salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to co!er the alleged o!erpayments. Issue, /hether or not AO *: and AO *%+ were issued in the !alid e.ercise of presidential control o!er the e.ecuti!e departments 5eldB The $res. is the head of the go!ernment. ;o!ernmental power and authority are e.ercised and implemented through him. 5is power includes the control of e.ecuti!e departments as pro!ided under Sec. #0' Art. C"" of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The $res. can' by !irtue of his power of control' re!iew' modify' alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the e.ecuti!e departments' bureau or offices under him. /hen the $res. issued AO *: limiting the amount of incenti!e benefits'
()
enjoining heads of go!ernment agencies from granting incenti!e benefits without appro!al from him and directing the refund of the e.cess o!er the prescribed amount' the $res. was just e.ercising his power of control o!er e.ecuti!e departments. The $res. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of producti!ity incenti!e benefits and to pre!ent discontent' dissatisfaction and demorali-ation among go!ernment personnel by committing limited resources of go!ernment for the equal payment of incenti!es and awards. The $res. was only e.ercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the go!ernment agencies who granted incenti!e benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the $res.' thereby resulting in the une!en distribution of go!ernment resources. The $resident8s duty to e.ecute the law is of constitutional origin. So' too' is his control of e.ecuti!e departments.

Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #+' Article ""' Section @ IBP /s% 2+9or+ ;.F. No.#&#*+&' August #(' *))) >actsB "n!o,ing his powers as Commander6in6Chief under Sec. #+' Art. C"" of the Constitution' the $resident directed the A>$ Chief of Staff and $N$ Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utili-ation of the arines to assist the $N$ in pre!enting or suppressing criminal or lawless !iolence. The $resident declared that the ser!ices of the arines in the anti6crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only' until such time when the situation shall ha!e impro!ed. The "9$ filed a petition see,ing to declare the deployment of the $hilippine arines null and !oid and unconstitutional. Issues, /hether or not the $resident8s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial re!iew /hether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the $N$ in joint !isibility patrols !iolates the constitutional pro!isions on ci!ilian supremacy o!er the military and the ci!ilian character of the $N$ 5eldB /hen the $resident calls the armed forces to pre!ent or suppress lawless !iolence' in!asion or rebellion' he necessarily e.ercises a discretionary power solely !ested in his wisdom. Inder Sec. #+' Art. C"" of the Constitution' Congress may re!o,e such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the pri!ilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may re!iew the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. 5owe!er' there is no such equi!alent pro!ision dealing with the re!ocation or re!iew of the $resident8s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the pri!ilege of the writ of habeas corpus' otherwise' the framers of the Constitution would ha!e simply lumped together the @ powers and pro!ided for their re!ocation and re!iew without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the $resident the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the pri!ilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law' both of which in!ol!e the curtailment and suppression of certain basic ci!il rights and indi!idual freedoms' and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and re!iew by the Court. "n !iew of the constitutional intent to gi!e the $resident full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces' it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the $resident8s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such hea!y burden' as there is no e!idence to support the assertion that there e.ists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the arines' the ci!ilian tas, of law enforcement is <militari-ed= in !iolation of Sec. @' Art. "" of the Constitution. The deployment of the arines does not constitute a breach of the ci!ilian supremacy clause. The calling of the arines constitutes permissible use of military assets for ci!ilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the !isibility patrols at all times' the real authority belonging to the $N$ oreo!er' the deployment of the arines to assist the $N$ does not unma,e the ci!ilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a ci!ilian institution' the $N$' and not with the military. Since none of the arines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the $N$' there can be no appointment to ci!ilian position to spea, of. 5ence' the deployment of the arines in the joint !isibility patrols does not destroy the ci!ilian character of the $N$. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #: Peo0le /s% C+si.o ;.F. No. ##%(#*' arch 0' #::0 '+cts, "n an effort to see, their release at the soonest possible time' accused6appellants /illiam Casido and >ran,lin Alcorin applied for pardon before the $residential Committee on the ;rant of 9ail' Felease or $ardon 1$C;9F$2' as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission 1NAC2. The $C;9F$ was constituted in line with the confidence6building measures of the go!ernment. Thereafter' accused6appellants were granted conditional pardon. 9ut the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused6 appellants is !oid for ha!ing been e.tended during the pendency of their appeal. $rior to the resolution' the NAC fa!orably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused6 appellants. Issue, /hether or not the release of accused6appellants is !alid "el., The release of accused6appellants was !alid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon. $ardon is granted by the Chief E.ecuti!e and as such it is a pri!ate act which must be pleaded and pro!ed by the person pardoned because the courts ta,e no notice thereofD
(&
while amnesty by the $roclamation of the Chief E.ecuti!e with the concurrence of Congress' and it is a public act of which the courts should ta,e judicial notice. $ardon is granted to one after con!ictionD while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses' generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after con!iction. $ardon loo,s forward and relie!es the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been con!icted' that is' it abolishes or forgi!es the punishment' and for that reason it does not wor, the restoration of the rights to hold public office' or the right of suffrage' unless such rights be e.pressly restored by the terms of the pardon' and it in no case e.empts the culprit from the payment of the ci!il indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. /hile amnesty loo,s bac,ward and abolishes and puts into obli!ion the offense itself' it so o!erloo,s and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. /hile the pardon in this case was !oid for ha!ing been e.tended during the pendency of the appeal or before con!iction by final judgment and' therefore' in !iolation of the first paragraph of Sec. #:' Art. C"" of the Constitution' the grant of amnesty' for which accused6appellants !oluntarily applied under $roclamation No. @&0 was !alid. This $roclamation was concurred in by both 5ouses of Congress. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #: Peo0le /s% P+tri+rc+> 6r% ;.F. No. #@(&(0' September *:' *))) '+cts, Accused6appellant ?ose $atriarca' ?r.' a member of the N$A' was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Are!alo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused6appellant appealed the decision of the FTC. Accused6appellant applied for amnesty under $roclamation No. 0*&. 5is application was fa!orably granted by the National Amnesty 9oard concluding that his acti!ities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs. Issue, /hat is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the con!iction of the accused6appellantO "el., Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses' or the forgi!eness which one so!ereign grants to the subjects of another' who ha!e offended' by some breach' the law of nations. Amnesty loo,s bac,ward' and abolishes and puts into obli!ion' the offense itselfD it so o!erloo,s and obliterates the offense with which he is charged' that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. $aragraph @ of Art. +: of the Fe!ised $enal Code pro!ides that criminal liability is totally e.tinguished by amnesty' which completely e.tinguishes the penalty and all its effects. The grant of amnesty ser!es to put an end to the appeal. Accused6appellant is acquitted of the crime of murder.

T+t+. /s% Secret+r8 of the De0+rt9ent of Energ8 ;.F. No. #*&@%)' No!ember (' #::0 '+cts, The petitions assail the constitutionality of !arious pro!isions of FA +#+) entitled the <3ownstream Oil "ndustry 3eregulation Act of #::%.= Inder the deregulated en!ironment' any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source' lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and mar,et such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement' subject only to monitoring by the 3epartment of Energy. Issues, /hether or not the petitions raise a justiciable contro!ersy /hether or not the petitioners ha!e the standing to assail the !alidity of the law /hether or not Sec. (1b2 of FA +#+) !iolates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution /hether or not Sec. #( of FA +#+) !iolates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power /hether or not FA +#+) !iolates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies' combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition "el., As to the first issue' judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual contro!ersies in!ol!ing rights which are legally demandable and enforceable' but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been gra!e abuse of discretion amounting to lac, or e.cess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the go!ernment. The courts' as guardians of the Constitution' ha!e the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. /here a statute !iolates the Constitution' it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and !oid. The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner8s locus standing where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. "n the case' petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deser!e the Court8s forthright resolution. "t is also contended that Sec. (1b2 of FA +#+) on tariff differential !iolates the pro!ision of the Constitution requiring e!ery law to ha!e only one subject which should be e.pressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention. The title need not mirror' fully inde. or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law ha!ing a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of pro!isions' no matter how di!erse they may be' so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject' and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by pro!iding for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. ( pro!iding for tariff differential is germane to the subject of FA +#+) which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Section #
((
$etitioners also assail Sec. #( of FA +#+) which fi.es the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being !iolati!e of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a !alid delegation of legislati!e powerB the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Inder the first test' the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it lea!es the legislati!e such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will ha!e to do is to enforce it. Inder the sufficient standard test' there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate8s authority and pre!ent the delegation from running riot. Section #( can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress e.pressly pro!ided in FA +#+) that full deregulation will start at the end of arch #::0' regardless of the occurrence of any e!ent. >ull deregulation at the end of arch #::0 is mandatory and the E.ecuti!e has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus' the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion gi!en to the $resident is to ad!ance the date of full deregulation before the end of arch #::0. Section #( lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the $resident. 5e is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world mar,et are declining and when the e.change rate of the peso in relation to the IS dollar is stable. $etitioners also argued that some pro!isions of FA +#+) !iolate Sec. #:' Art. E"" of the Constitution. Section #:' Art. E"" of the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade' the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition' and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. #:' Art. E"" of the Constitution which cannot be !iolated by FA +#+). $etron' Shell and Calte. stand as the only major league players in the oil mar,et. As the dominant players' they boast of e.isting refineries of !arious capacities. The tariff differential of &R on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products therefore wor,s to their immense benefit. "t erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equali-e the mar,et power of $etron' Shell and Calte. by building refineries of their own will ha!e to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disad!antage of increasing their product cost by &R. They will be competing on an une!en field. The pro!ision on in!entory widens the balance of ad!antage of $etron' Shell and Calte. against prospecti!e new players. $etron' Shell and Calte. can easily comply with the in!entory requirement of FA +#+) in !iew of their e.isting storage facilities. $rospecti!e competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibiti!e cost. The most important question is whether the offending pro!isions can be indi!idually struc, down without in!alidating the entire FA +#+). The general rule is that where part of a statute is !oid as repugnant to the Constitution' while another part is !alid' the !alid portion' if separable from the in!alid' may stand and be enforced. The e.ception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected' as conditions' considerations' inducements or compensations for each other' as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole' the nullity of one part will !itiate the rest. FA +#+) contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding' the Court held that the offending pro!isions of FA +#+) so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struc, down. The pro!isions on tariff differential' in!entory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of FA +#+). Congress could not ha!e regulated

the downstream oil industry without these pro!isions. Infortunately' contrary to their intent' these pro!isions on tariff differential' in!entory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition' encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of mar,et forces. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Section # Echeg+r+8 /s% Secret+r8 of 6ustice ;.F. No. #@*%)#' ?anuary #:' #::: '+cts, On ?anuary &' #:::' the SC issued a TFO staying the e.ecution of petitioner 4eo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent ?ustice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TFO arguing that the action of the SC not only !iolated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the e.ecuti!e to grant reprie!e. Issue, /hether or not the SC' after the decision in the case becomes final and e.ecutory' still has jurisdiction o!er the case "el., The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. 9y the finality of the judgment' what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend' modify or alter the same. E!en after the judgment has become final' the SC retains its jurisdiction to e.ecute and enforce it. The power to control the e.ecution of the SC8s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. "t cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution !ests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation' whether ci!il or criminal' is the process of e.ecution of decisions where super!ening e!ents may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to inter!ene and adjust the rights of the litigants to pre!ent unfairness. "t is because of these unforeseen' super!ening contingencies that courts ha!e been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to ma,e them comformable to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondent8s contention that by granting the TFO' the Court has in effect granted reprie!e which is an e.ecuti!e function under Sec. #:' Art. C"" of the Constitution. "n truth' an accused who has been con!icted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. >or instance' a death con!ict who becomes insane after his final con!iction cannot be e.ecuted while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an e.ercise of judicial power. "t is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprie!e though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the e.ecution of the death con!ict. "n the same !ein' it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the 3eath $enalty 4aw by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is li,e that of commutation of sentence. 9ut the e.ercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a !iolation of the power of the $resident to commute final sentences of con!iction. The powers of the E.ecuti!e' the 4egislati!e and the ?udiciary to sa!e the life of a death con!ict do not e.clude each other for the simple reason that there is no
(*
higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the E.ecuti!e can protect the right to life of an accused after his final con!iction is to !iolate the principle of co6equal and coordinate powers of the @ branches of the go!ernment. Su7Aect M+tter, 4egal Standing =on@+les /s% #+r/+s+ ;.F. No. #&)+@(' August #&' *))) '+cts, $etitioner Famon ;on-ales' in his capacity as a citi-en and ta.payer' assails the constitutionality of the creation of the $reparatory Commission on Constitutional Feform 1$CCF2 and of the positions of presidential consultants' ad!isers and assistants. The $CCF was created by $res. Estrada by !irtue of EO &@ in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and7or re!isions to the Constitution' and the manner of implementing them. Issue, /hether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case "el., "n assailing the constitutionality of EO &@' petitioner asserts his interest as a citi-en and ta.payer. A citi-en acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the go!ernmentD the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actionD and the injury is li,ely to be addressed by a fa!orable action. $etitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the $CCF and of the positions of presidential consultants' ad!isers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or pri!ileges ha!e been or are in danger of being !iolated' nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. "n his capacity as a ta.payer' a ta.payer is deemed to ha!e the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds ha!e disbursed in alleged contra!ention of the law or the Constitution. Thus' payer8s action is properly brought only when there is an e.ercise by Congress of its ta.ing or spending power. "n the creation of $CCF' it is apparent that there is no e.ercise by Congress of its ta.ing or spending power. The $CCF was created by the $resident by !irtue of EO &@ as amended by EO 0). The appropriations for the $CCF were authori-ed by the $resident' not by Congress. The funds used for the $CCF were ta,en from funds intended for the Office of the $resident' in the e.ercise of the Chief E.ecuti!e8s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. *(1(2 of Art. C" of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants' ad!isers and assistants' the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a ta.payer8s interest in this particular issue. Su7Aect M+tter, 4egal Standing !eg+s0i /s% CSC ;.F. No. 460*##:' ay *:' #:+0 '+cts,

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Calentin 4egaspi8s request for information on the ci!il ser!ice eligibilities of ?ulian Sibonghanoy and ariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the 5ealth 3epartment of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themsel!es as ci!il ser!ice eligibles who passed the ci!il ser!ice e.aminations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution' and that he has no other plain' speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information' petitioner prays for the issuance of the e.traordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC ta,es issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. "t is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of 4egaspi8s actual interest in the ci!il ser!ice eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. Issue, /hether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit "el., The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern' which' by its !ery nature' is a public right. "t has been held in the case of Tanada !s. Tu!era' #@% SCFA *0' that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty' the people are regarded as the real party in interest' and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result' it being sufficient to show that he is a citi-en and as such interested in the e.ecution of the laws. "t becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding in!ol!es the assertion of a public right' the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citi-en' and therefore' part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner' being a citi-en who as such' is clothed with personality to see, redress for the alleged obstruction of the e.ercise of the public right. Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Sec. ( par. *1d2 =+rci+> et% +l% /s% Peo0le ;.F. No. #)%(@#' No!ember #+' #::: '+cts, The $ro!incial >iscal of ;uimaras filed with the FTC an information charging petitioners with murder for the ,illing of one ?ose Estrella. After due trial' the trial court promulgated its decision con!icting petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. $etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The trial court denied the motion. $etitioners did not interpose an appeal from the decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus' the decision became final. Issue, /hether or not the SC must automatically re!iew a trial court8s decision con!icting an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua "el.,
(+
"t is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the SC for automatic re!iew of the con!iction. As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the decision con!icting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua' the decision became final and unappealable.

(,

Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Section % M+ce.+ /s% $+s<ue@ ;.F. No. #)*0+#' April **' #::@ '+cts, Fespondent Napoleon Abiera of $AO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner FTC ?udge 9onifacio San- aceda. Fespondent Abiera alleged that petitioner aceda has falsified his certificate of ser!ice by certifying that all ci!il and criminal cases which ha!e been submitted for decision for a period of :) days ha!e been determined and decided on or before ?anuary @#' #:+:' when in truth and in fact' petitioner aceda ,new that no decision had been rendered in ( ci!il and #) criminal cases that ha!e been submitted for decision. Fespondent Abiera alleged that petitioner aceda falsified his certificates of ser!ice for #0 months. Issue, /hether or not the in!estigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC8s constitutional duty of super!ision o!er all inferior courts "el., A judge who falsifies his certificate of ser!ice is administrati!ely liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. #' Fule #&) of the Fules of Court' and criminally liable to the State under the Fe!ised $enal Code for his felonious act. "n the absence of any administrati!e action ta,en against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of ser!ice' the in!estigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court8s power of administrati!e super!ision o!er all courts and its personnel' in !iolation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. C"""' Sec. % of the Constitution e.clusi!ely !ests in the SC administrati!e super!ision o!er all courts and court personnel' from the $residing ?ustice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court cler,. 9y !irtue of this power' it is only the SC that can o!ersee the judges8 and court personnel8s compliance with all laws' and ta,e the proper administrati!e action against them if they commit any !iolation thereof. No other branch of go!ernment may intrude into this power' without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. /here a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrati!e duties' the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrati!e duties.
respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of $#)'))).)) for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second 3i!ision of the SC. Issue, /hether or not the Second 3i!ision of the SC has the competence to administrati!ely discipline respondent judge "el., To support the Court8s ruling' ?ustice Fegalado relied on his recollection of a con!ersation with former Chief ?ustice Foberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the ?udiciary of the #:+% Constitutional Commission of which Fegalado was also a member. The !ery te.t of the present Sec. ##' Art. C""" of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations en!isaged therein. The first clause which states that <the SC en banc shall ha!e the power to discipline judges of lower courts'= is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to' and the determination of the procedure in the e.ercise thereof by' the Court en banc. "t was not therein intended that all administrati!e disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity. The second clause' which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma' declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can <order their dismissal by a !ote of a majority of the embers who actually too, part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and !oted therein.= "n this instance' the administrati!e case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. $ursuant to the first clause which confers administrati!e disciplinary power to the Court en banc' a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge' officer or employee of the ?udiciary' disbarment of a lawyer' or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than # year or a fine e.ceeding $#)' ))).)) or both. "ndeed' to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrati!e matters or cases regardless of the sanctions' imposable or imposed' would result in a congested doc,et and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court' especially in administrati!e matters' since e!en cases in!ol!ing the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. Su7Aect M+tter, Article EC"' Section @ USA /s% Rui@ ;.F. No. 46@(%&(' ay **' #:+( >actsB The IS had a na!al base in Subic' Jambales which was one of those pro!ided in the ilitary 9ases Agreement between the $hils. and the IS. The IS made an in!itation for the submission of bids for the repair of whar!es in said base. $ri!ate respondent Eligio de ;u-man N Co.' "nc. responded to the in!itation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto' the pri!ate respondent recei!ed from the IS * telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The pri!ate respondent complied with the requests. Thereafter' pri!ate respondent recei!ed a letter which said that the company did not qualify to recei!e an award for the projects because of its pre!ious unsatisfactory performance rating. The
Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Section ## Peo0le /s% =+cott> 6r% ;.F. No. ##%)&:' ?uly #@' #::( '+cts, >or failure to chec, the citations of the prosecution' the order of respondent FTC ?udge Eustaquio ;acott' ?r. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The
(pri!ate respondent sued the IS and the members of the Engineering Command of the IS Na!y. Issue, 5eldB The traditional rule of State immunity e.empts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or wai!er. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. 5owe!er' the rules of "nternational 4aw are not petrifiedD they are constantly de!eloping and e!ol!ing. And because the acti!ities of states ha!e multiplied' it has been necessary to distinguish themQ between so!ereign and go!ernmental acts 1jure imperii2 and pri!ate' commercial and proprietary acts 1jure gestionis2. The result is that State immunity now e.tends only to acts jure imperii. A State may be said to ha!e descended to the le!el of an indi!idual and can thus be deemed to ha!e tacitly gi!en its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. "t does not apply where the contract relates to the e.ercise of its so!ereign functions. "n the present case' the projects are an integral part of the na!al base which is de!oted to the defense of both the IS and the $hils.' indisputably a function of the go!ernment of the highest order. They are not utili-ed for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Su7Aect M+tter, Article EC"' Section @ De0+rt9ent of Agriculture /s% #!RC ;.F. No. #)&*%:' No!ember ##' #::@ >actsB $etitioner 3epartment of Agriculture 13A2 and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security ser!ices to be pro!ided by the latter to the said go!ernmental entity. $ursuant to their arrangements' guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the !arious premises of the 3A. Thereafter' se!eral guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages' nonpayment of #@th month pay' uniform allowances' night shift differential pay' holiday pay' and o!ertime pay' as well as for damages against the 3A and the security agency. The 4abor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the 3A jointly and se!erally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The 3A and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus' the decision became final and e.ecutory. The 4abor Arbiter issued a writ of e.ecution to enforce and e.ecute the judgment against the property of the 3A and the security agency. Thereafter' the City Sheriff le!ied on e.ecution the motor !ehicles of the 3A. Issue, /hether or not the doctrine of non6suability of the State applies in the case 5eldB The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that <the State may not be sued without its consent= reflects nothing less than a recognition of the so!ereign character of the State and an e.press affirmation of the unwritten rule effecti!ely insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. "t is based on the !ery essence of so!ereignty. A so!ereign is e.empt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no /hether or not the complaint may prosper

legal right as against the authority that ma,es the law on which the right depends. The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State8s consent may be gi!en e.pressly or impliedly. E.press consent may be made through a general law or a special law. "mplied consent' on the other hand' is conceded when the State itself commences litigation' thus opening itself to a counterclaim' or when it enters into a contract. "n this situation' the go!ernment is deemed to ha!e descended to the le!el of the other contracting party and to ha!e di!ested itself of its so!ereign immunity. 9ut not all contracts entered into by the go!ernment operate as a wai!er of its non6suabilityD distinction must still be made between one which is e.ecuted in the e.ercise of its so!ereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to ha!e descended to the le!el of an indi!idual and can this be deemed to ha!e actually gi!en its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. "t does not apply where the contract relates to the e.ercise of its so!ereign functions. "n the case' the 3A has not pretended to ha!e assumed a capacity apart from its being a go!ernmental entity when it entered into the questioned contractD nor that it could ha!e' in fact' performed any act proprietary in character. 9ut' be that as it may' the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. @)+@ gi!es the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim in!ol!ing liability arising from contract' e.press or implied. $ursuant' howe!er' to Commonwealth Act @*0' as amended by $3 ##&(' the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Su7Aect M+tter, Article EC"' Section @ C+lu7 +n. $+lenci+ /s% CA ;.F. No. ##(%@&' April *0' *))) >actsB The >orest $rotection and 4aw Enforcement Team of the Community En!ironment and Natural Fesources Office of the 3ENF apprehended * motor !ehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber. The dri!ers of the !ehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus' the apprehending team impounded the !ehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded !ehicles were forcibly ta,en by the dri!ers from the custody of 3ENF. Thereafter' one of the * !ehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of 3ENF6CENFO and $hil. Army elements. The !ehicle was again loaded with forest products. $ri!ate respondents anuela 9abalcon' the !ehicle owner' and Constancio Abuganda' the dri!er' filed a complaint for the reco!ery of possession of the !ehicle with an application for reple!in against petitioners 3ENF and 3ENF Officer Calub. Issue, /hether or not the complaint for the reco!ery of possession of impounded !ehicles' with an application for reple!in' is a suit against the State 5eldB /ell established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is' in effect' a suit against the State if its
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purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. 5owe!er' the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to acti!ities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness' malice or corruption. "n the present case' the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. "n implementing and enforcing Secs. 0+6A and +: of the >orestry Code through the sei-ure carried out' petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the 3ENF' and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. 5ence' a suit against the petitioners who represent the 3ENF is a suit against the State. "t cannot prosper without the State8s consent. Su7Aect M+tter, Article EC"' Section @ Re0u7lic /s% S+n.o/+l **) SCFA #*& '+cts, >armer6rallyists marched to alacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers6police confrontation which resulted in the death of #* rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result' then $res. Aquino issued AO ## creating the Citi-ens endiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an in!estigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded !ictims to be compensated by the go!ernment. 9ased on such recommendation' the !ictims of endiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Fepublic and the military7police officers in!ol!ed in the incident. Issues, /hether or not there is a !alid wai!er of immunity /hether or not the State is liable for damages "el., The Court held that there was no !alid wai!er of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the !ictims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO ## merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and' therefore' whate!er is the finding of the Commission only ser!es as the basis for a cause of action in the e!ent any party decides to litigate the same. Thus' the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military7police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. "t is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they e.ceeded their authority' hence' the acts cannot be considered official.

Su7Aect M+tter, Article EC"' Section @ !+ns+ng /s% CA ;.F. No. #)*%%0' >ebruary *@' *))) >actsB $ri!ate respondents ;eneral Assembly of the 9lind' "nc. 1;A9"2 and ?ose "glesias were allegedly awarded a !erbal contract of lease in #:0) to occupy a portion of Fi-al $ar, by the National $ar,s 3e!elopment Committee 1N$3C2' a go!ernment initiated ci!ic body engaged in the de!elopment of national par,s. $ri!ate respondents were allegedly gi!en office and library space as well as ,ios,s area selling food and drin,s. $ri!ate respondent ;A9" was to remit to N$3C &)R of the profits deri!ed from operating the ,ios,s. After the E3SA Fe!olution' petitioner 4ansang' the new Chairman of the N$3C' sought to clean up Fi-al $ar,. $etitioner terminated the so6 called !erbal agreement with ;A9" and demanded that the latter !acate the premises and the ,ios,s it ran pri!ately within the public par,. On the day of the supposed e!iction' ;A9" filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner. Issue, /hether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State' which could not prosper without the State8s consent "el., The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positi!e act' such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. $ublic officials are not e.empt' in their personal capacity' from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity' although the acts complained of may ha!e been committed while he occupied a public position. "n the case' the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as N$3C chairman but in his personal capacity. "t is also e!ident the petitioner is sued allegedly for ha!ing personal moti!es in ordering the ejectment of ;A9" from Fi-al $ar,. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of ;A9". The Court found no e!idence of such abuse of authority. Fi-al $ar, is beyond the commerce of man and' thus' could not be the subject of lease contract. That pri!ate respondents were allowed to occupy office and ,ios, spaces in the par, was only a matter of accommodation by the pre!ious administrator. This being so' petitioner may !alidly discontinue the accommodation e.tended to pri!ate respondents' who may be ejected from the par, when necessary. $ri!ate respondents cannot and do not claim a !ested right to continue to occupy Fi-al $ar,.

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CA!!A#TA $S $I!!A#UE$A 77 SCRA 377

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Su7Aect M+tter, Article C""' Section #' Article C"""' Section #

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decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

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Su7Aect M+tter, Article C"""' Section #

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