Southern California International Review

Volume 3, Number 2 • Fall 2013

Southern California International Review
scinternationalreview.org

Staff
Editor-in-Chief: Matthew Prusak Editors:
Natalie Tecimer Cristina Patrizio Brad McAuliffe Dhwani Thapar

Layout: Cristina Patrizio Cover: Samir Kumar

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdisciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund. Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues. SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.

Copyright © 2013 Southern California International Review. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of the Southern California International Review. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.

ISSN: 1545-2611

Dedicated to Malala Yousafzai and all those who fight for justice through the spread of ideas

Editor’s Note:
Dear Reader, It is with great pleasure that I introduce the sixth issue of the Southern California International Review (SCIR). The SCIR offers a platform for undergraduate scholars to disseminate their work to a wider audience. Our goal is to feature ideas that not only give greater depth to yesterday’s international affairs but also provide our readers with a readiness for tomorrow’s headlines. The journal’s selection of articles from around the world, chosen through a blind review process, reflects our global aspirations. A 21st century IR journal should take a global approach not only in its content, but also in its sources. Whether in an assessment of the Central African Republic’s future or in a historical analysis of Australia’s “fighting spirit,” we hope that you, the reader, find that the journal makes contribution to your own worldview. In turn, we hope that you spread these ideas to others. As Editor-in-Chief, I have had the pleasure to work with a wonderful team on this issue. Their combined efforts have been crucial in the journal’s creation. It is only through their skills, ideas, and passion for the study of international relations that SCIR’s latest issue has found its way into your hands. In fulfilling our mission, the SCIR is additionally grateful for the generous support of the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations. We greatly appreciate the support of the school’s director, Dr. Robert English, as well as the rest of the faculty and staff who have played a pivotal role in supporting our endeavor. Finally, I would like to thank Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship that supports the publication of our journal. Sincerely, Matthew Prusak Editor-in-Chief

Contents

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Peace Façade The Follies of Peacekeeping in Creating Legitimate Security Steven Strozza Perceptions of Sites in the Holy Land The Impact of Media and Marketing Jamie Bergstrom Brands of Justice Cate Partain ANZAC and ANZUS Australian Identity Through Decades of War Gabriel Yue Ending the Self-Perpetuating Violence in the Central African Republic Jewel Conrad

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The Follies of Peacekeeping in Creating Legitimate Security
Steven Strozza
This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping by analyzing its impact on the human trafficking industry and post-conflict economy. I posit the idea of a peace façade: although violent conflict has ended and peacekeepers prevent the resurrection of hostilities, their presence does not ensure human security. This results in a gendered dimension that creates vulnerabilities for women and feminized groups. Furthermore, this false peace prolongs the rebuilding process and destabilizes an area by encouraging human trafficking and distorting the local economy. When the fighting ends, the real work begins. Rebuilding a state after violent conflict is an extremely expensive and labor-intensive task—one to which United Nations peacekeepers have been intimately tied. While peacekeepers (or the “blue helmets,” as they are often called) have become a sensationalized symbol representing the altruism and humanitarianism of the West, this account neglects a larger, recurring narrative of gender violence in peacekeeping missions.1 Often, the image of the benevolent peacekeepers put forth by Western media and U.N. rhetoric contrasts greatly with the reality of their roles and contributions in the rebuilding process. Recent feminist scholarship on peacekeeping conjectures that the institution can destabilize the post-conflict state due to its strong association with sex trafficking. The rise of the sex trafficking industry has created many gendered insecurities and complications for the civilian populations in a post-conflict states, signaling that peacekeeping efforts can actually undermine human security. The duality of peacekeeping in both creating political security that is deemed stable and peaceful by the West, and creating insecurity, which threatens the wellbeing of civilians in the state, has given rise to the concept of a peace façade. In order to lay a theoretical foundation for the term, the notions and respective uses of gender, hegemonic masculinity, and human security, in this article will first be explained. The rationale for the term will then be explained using arguments based on human trafficking and the post-war economy.
1  Daniel Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution: A Case Study of the Swedish Experience from Kosovo and Bosnia,” (Master’s Thesis, 2005), 22; Jessica Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies: Understanding Sex Trafficking in Conflict,” (Paper presented at ISA West Annual Conference, Pasadena, California, 2011), 7; Paul Higate and Marsha Henry, “Engendering (In) security in Peace Support Operations,” Security Dialogue 35 No. 4 (2004), 481 and 493.

Peace Façade

Steven Strozza is a junior at the University of Southern California pursuing a B.A. in Biological Sciences and a B.A. in International Relations.

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Theory
Gender is the socially institutionalized construct attributed to the differences between the sexes.2 Gender is composed of masculinities and femininities: the traits, roles, and practices associated with men and women respectively. Masculinities, such as rationality and aggression, are viewed as being binary to femininities; for example, irrationality and passivity. This notion of dichotomous genders gives rise to hegemonic masculinity, the valuation of masculinities over femininities, and certain subordinated masculinities and a reification of male dominance. Under this premise, acceptable masculinities are viewed as homogenous and exclusionary, thereby creating a sense of unity among all men of the dominant subset.3 The exclusivity of exemplary masculinities subordinates effeminized groups, such as male homosexuals and, in some cultures, men of nationalities or races that differ from the norm. Even men who do not actively seek to subordinate women or comply with the hegemonic model in other ways still benefit from the power derived from it. Accordingly, hegemonic masculinity produces patriarchy, an ideological power structure that justifies and naturalizes the systemic domination of men over women.4 Under a patriarchal system, which by definition privileges hegemonic masculinity, women are constructed as passive and, therefore, lacking agency. This notion is further exacerbated in war settings. The protection of helpless women and children is recurrently presented as the stimulus for intervention, and peacekeepers are cast as their chivalrous and valiant defenders.5 Jessica Peet, a University of Southern California lecturer and gender studies expert, writes that this protective “good masculinity” is juxtaposed and reinforced against the overly aggressive “bad masculinity” demonstrated by the belligerents of the conflict.6 The cessation of conflict paints the peacekeepers as heroes or victors, which necessitates the perception of the civilian population as “protected” even if protection is not actually provided. By maintaining an end to hostilities, peacekeepers establish protection of the state and, in doing so, provide political security; however, humanitarian missions must create an environment of human security to ensure the protection of the civilian population. Human security is defined as physical safety of individuals and communities, and it is the provision of human rights that insulates civilians from cultural, social, and economic oppression by an
2  3  4  5  Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 11. Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 483-485. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 17-19. Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 7; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 481 and 493; V. Spike Peterson and Anne S. Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2003), 176; Sandra Witworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. (New York: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 27. 6  Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 7.

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equally applied, rule-based—rather than war based—government.7 The presence of human trafficking in a post-conflict region demonstrates an overarching lack of human security. Human trafficking is a deceptive practice that takes on many forms. One of the most common involves individuals, generally women, who are promised improved economic prosperity in another country or region if they pay a trafficker to smuggle them through a border. Alternatively, they are simply abducted and relocated. Once transplanted, the women are often coerced into sex work, as prostitutes (this phenomenon is referred to specifically as sex trafficking). The coercion is achieved through intimidation and threats made against their families, as well as other means.8 Treated as expendable sex objects, the women are disempowered and used until they can no longer physically or emotionally complete the requisite work, at which point they are replaced by a subsequent round of trafficked victims.9

Peacekeeping
In human trafficking, as in times of conflict, the agency of women is clearly rendered invisible. As discussed below, peacekeepers majorly perpetuate the constraint of women’s agency by their active patronization of the sex industry. Women are positioned as being ‘in need of protection’ due to their passivity as trafficked victims, which provides the peacekeepers with justification for their presence in the region. Ironically, it is their passivity and, thus, their lack of agency that creates a vulnerability that allows peacekeepers to sexually exploit women in the first place. Nonetheless, peacekeepers are, effectively, absolved of any blame. When contrasted with those of traffickers, peacekeepers’ actions are deemed less reprehensible even though both groups take an active role in removing female agency. Because of their role in ending violent hostilities, peacekeepers are viewed as altruistic protectors and therefore deemed to embody “good masculinity” even though they fail to provide the agency or human security expected of individuals occupying their roles. 10 Peacekeepers are almost entirely comprised of individuals with a military background. The military is a male-dominated, innately gendered institution that draws its power from hegemonic masculinity.11 Pugnacity, dominance, brutality, and other masculinized traits are implicitly valorized and inculcated in recruits. In the armed forces, adopting feminized traits is deemed the worst thing a soldier can do, and training officers employ varied
Mary Kaldor, “Human Security,” Society and Economy 33 No. 3 (2011), 445-446; Ann J. Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 54-55. 8  Alja Klopcic, “Trafficking in Human Beings in Transition and Post-Conflict Countries.” Human Security Perspectives 1 No. 1 (2004), 8-9; Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 212. 9  Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 7; Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling, “Desire Industries: Sex Trafficking, UN Peacekeeping, and the Neo-Liberal,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, No.1 (2003), 140. 10  Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 23-25; Charles Smith and Brandon Miller-de la Cuesta, “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones: The Role of Peacekeepers in the Formation of Networks,” Human Rights Review 12 (2011), 288. 11  Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 484; Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 22. 7 

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techniques to attempt to destroy any vestiges of femininity.12 In a conflict setting, these aggressions are reconfigured towards the belligerent; however, the misogynistic sentiments and the need to demonstrate an acceptable masculine identity remain.13 This becomes problematic in peacekeeping settings where such induced masculinities persist and conceivably hinder the ability to establish human security.14 With the continued need to prove their masculinity and women posed as passive actors, peacekeepers use both physical and sexual, gendered violence. Under the patriarchal military system, sexual relations—and, more specifically, sexual domination—are deemed biologically central to manhood. Accordingly, sexual exploitation through prostitution (and, to a lesser extent, rape) becomes the common conduit for expressing masculinity or hegemonic masculine identity. Through their sexual exploits, the peacekeepers are able to reprise their identity as a conqueror and ensure their personal and relational sense of security in an environment where they have control over little but the citizens they were sent to help.15 In this way, the peacekeeper’s personal desires supersede the importance of the female personhood. However, the peacekeeper in question is simply a product of his military training that poses women as objects to be used as a continuous sexual outlet. Cynthia Enloe, a research professor at Clark University, describes this institutionalized form of gender violence as recreational rape: the assumption that soldiers are entitled to perpetual sexual outlets as a perk of serving in the military.16 In the narratives of some peacekeepers, the renting of a prostitute has even been constructed as a benevolent act of providing the woman with financial support.17 The lack of peacekeeping professionalization and the low proportion of women involved in rebuilding equates to such actions being overlooked or tacitly accepted. Through affirming the patriarchal system under which they were indoctrinated, the use of prostitutes strengthens homo-social bonds between peacekeepers and serves to alienate and even effeminize those who choose to remain uninvolved.18 When violent hostilities have otherwise abated, the use of prostitutes continues to represent insecurity for women and

12  13  14  15  16  17 18 

Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 40. Gustafsson,”Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 25-26; Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 162-164. Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 484; Agathangelou and Ling, “Desire Industries,” 133. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 24-25; Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 167; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 489; Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 17. Enloe, Cynthia. “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives,” Berkeley: University of California Press (2000), 111; Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 167-168. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 25; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 491 and 494. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 25-26.

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girls of the war-torn state.19 Invisible to the international community, the stigmatizations of rape and other forms of sexual violence still destroys lives and communities. While U.N. rules expressly forbid peacekeepers from engaging in sexual activity or exploiting the citizens they were mobilized to assist, regulations stipulate scant repercussions for offenders. The homo-social bonding aspect of using prostitutes, the premium placed on loyalty in the military, the high-ranking military status of some peacekeepers, the quick turnover of peacekeepers, and the secrecy of the peacekeepers’ interactions with prostitutes make it difficult to uncover and catch the culprits.20 Even if they are caught, adjudication of punishment for the accused is under the jurisdiction of the sending state of the peacekeeper. Many cases brought to sending states have been ignored in the past, suggesting a widespread lack of accountability for upholding the U.N.’s regulations.21 Instances that have been brought to light are portrayed by the U.N. as isolated, abnormal, or unsubstantiated and are regarded as “lessons learned”; in this way, despite the atrocity of the actions, the mission can still be deemed successful.22 Citizens of the states that peacekeepers occupy are generally prohibited from taking action against peacekeepers, as peacekeepers are deemed immune from the laws of the country in which they serve.23 In some cases, such as during the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo, states contributing peacekeepers have gone as far as to dictate that its delegations cannot be held legally responsible for any actions perpetrated within the conflicted area.24 To ensure continued economic support by international donors, the government of the rebuilding nation generally does not take a stand on this issue.25 While the international community effectively sanctions the right of peacekeepers to use prostitutes without legal ramification, trafficked women do not enjoy the same protections and are regularly prosecuted and deported for their work.26

Economy
Trafficking has the potential to net enormous profits and can even create markets that are financially dependent on the industry.27 The need to consistently prove masculinity
19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 175; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 482; Agathangelou and Ling, “Desire Industries,” 133. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 48; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 493. Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 32-33. Whitworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping, 17, 64. Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 175; Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 32-33; Agathangelou and Ling, “Desire Industries,” 175. Tony Robson, “Bosnia: The United Nations, Human Trafficking and Prostitution,” World Socialist Web Site (2009). Smith and Miller-de la Cuesta, “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones,” 290. Klopcic, “Trafficking in Human Beings in Transition and Post-Conflict Countries,” 10. Agathangelou and Ling, “Desire Industries,” 134; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 494.

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in order to fit the desired hegemonic masculine construct requires a large population of prostitutes to fill such demand. Swells in trafficking rates can be directly correlated with the number of peacekeepers present locally. This correlation is further reinforced by data that shows that once peacekeepers are removed, trafficking problems within an area dwindle and become negligible.28 Despite comprising only a small portion of clientele, peacekeepers’ business generates a much larger proportion of income.29 Bracketing its connections to the sex industry, peacekeeping also significantly impacts the economy of the host country. Conflict produces scarcity, which drives up the costs of basic necessities. Relative to the civilian population, peacekeepers are generally far wealthier (sometimes making more in one day than the average civilian makes in a year) and are able to afford the increased costs, thus enabling inflation and long-term currency devaluation.30 The inflated prices of the market are only sustainable while the mission remains intact, meaning that the economic wellbeing of the society is based on the continued presence of peacekeepers. Peacekeeping missions are finite in nature, and the region’s dependence means that the community will be negatively impacted when the peacekeepers leave.31 Locals and displaced individuals, who cannot afford the higher prices of basic necessities, have their individual security placed at risk. This also has gender dimensions, as strains on resources disproportionately affect women who are tasked with social reproductive activities, such as gathering food and firewood.32 Furthermore, the exclusion of women from the rebuilding process means they are unable to receive the benefits of programs aimed at providing education or employment opportunities.33 The lack of opportunities for legitimate income further promotes illicit activity. Criminal organizations established to traffic humans can be adapted to accommodate the trafficking of illegal arms and narcotics that can further destabilize the rebuilding state. Similar to human trafficking, the comparatively high level of income for peacekeepers creates a stimulus for the expansion of these industries.34

Peace Façade
The environment of compromised human security and the unsustainable economy peacekeepers create in a post-conflict state clearly jeopardize the stability of civil society.
28  29  30  31  32  33  34  Smith and Miller-de la Cuesta, “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones,” 293; Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 485. Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 485; Agathangelou and Ling, “Desire Industries,” 135; Smith and Miller-de la Cuesta, “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones,” 287-288; Robson, “Bosnia;” Gustafsson, “Peacekeeping and Prostitution,” 32. Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 485; Whitworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping, 62-63. Higate and Henry, “Engendering (In)security,” 483 and 485. Peet, “Beautiful Souls and Bodies,” 23. Whitworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping, 27. Smith and Miller-de la Cuesta, “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones,” 287 and 297.

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Despite the termination of violent hostilities, the perceived security is imaginary, and civilian wellbeing remains at risk. This is not to say that peacekeepers’ actions are wholly negative; actions such as establishing the right of women to vote or increasing literacy are surely beneficial.35 Nonetheless, the benefits are focused primarily on political improvements that fail to create overarching improvement in the lives of civilians. To describe this phenomenon, I suggest the term peace façade, which states that while political peace has been established, the citizens within the war-torn state remain at risk, primarily due to the presence of peacekeepers. The peace façade demonstrates that the focus of such humanitarian intervention is the cessation of violence, neither rebuilding the state nor establishing the prolonged security of the country’s citizens. The United Nations’ explanation of peacekeeping is primarily political, stating its advantages and goals as impartiality, burden-sharing, and facilitating the political process.36 Peacekeepers, as representatives of the U.N., are intimately tied to the Westphalian system. Thus, peacekeepers have become a tool to secure that system. When large-scale violence breaks out within a state, it threatens the status quo of the current international political and economic power configurations. As stakeholders of that system, members of the international community react by intervening in the conflict (generally a conflict that provides some ultimate benefit for the state) with the intent to end it quickly. This is acknowledged in the mandates of most missions, which situate the conflict in terms of international security and peace restoration.37 Once the conflict has ended, the international community has a continued interest in ensuring the conflict does not restart and that activities within the state normalize. Since peacekeeping is therefore a guised Machiavellian attempt at ensuring the continuation of the current international system, it cannot be expected to bring about human security and stabilized economies and societies post-conflict. In terms of human trafficking, the peace façade has its foundations in the gendered constructions of women through the militarized masculinity of the armed forces. Extending the feminist constructivist argument, the peace façade also removes the agency of the citizens of the conflicted country.38 The intent of the peace façade to return the state to the status quo ensures that the citizens of the country are not given full agency in the rebuilding process. Furthermore, the lack of female voices in the rebuilding process and their marginalization within the greater patriarchal system only permits some voices to be heard in the rebuilding process.39
35  36  37  38  39  Whitworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping, 2 and 66. United Nations. What is Peacekeeping? Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Whitworth, Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping, 32. Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 175. Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, 172-174.

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While the peace façade clearly represents a failure in the peacekeeping system, this is not to say that peacekeeping should be halted in the future. Rather, alterations can be made to the system to ensure peacekeeping is actually achieving its purported goals. Augmenting the number and visibility of women in peacekeeping positions and involving them in the rebuilding process will increase the likelihood that the security of women will be protected. Since the conflict and post-conflict periods represent different phases of intervention, and therefore different challenges, peacekeeping should not be monitored by overly masculinized peacekeepers. Peacekeepers should undergo appropriate gender- and culture-based training with a focus on providing human security. Furthermore, the legal consequences of actions endangering human security should be clearly outlined and enforced appropriately. The current system of peacekeeping creates an inaccurate image of a protected postconflict state, since the lack of individual protections in the post-conflict environment demonstrates that true human security has not been achieved. The strong association between peacekeeping and human trafficking further reduces the security of women and creates an economy dependent on the presence of peacekeepers and illicit trades. The construction of peacekeepers allows them to patronize an exploitative sex industry while still maintaining the image of chivalry and altruism to the greater world. Furthermore, ineffective U.N. policies ensure that peacekeepers are able to indulge without fear of legal or militaristic repercussions. The burdens the peacekeepers place on a post-conflict society underlie the concept of a peace façade—the belief that peace has been established in a region despite the lack of human security in an area. While peacekeeping has proved an ineffective means of rebuilding a post-conflict society, through reforms that focus on providing gender-sensitive and culture-sensitive methods of rebuilding, the premise of the institution has the potential to effectuate positive change.

Bibliography
Agathangelou, Anna M., and L.H.M. Ling. “Desire Industries: Sex Trafficking, UN Peacekeeping, and the Neo-Liberal.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, No. 1 (2003). Enloe, Cynthia. “Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives.” Berkeley: University of California Press (2000). Gustafsson, Daniel. “Peacekeeping and Prostitution: A Case Study of the Swedish Experience from Kosovo and Bosnia.” (Master’s Thesis, 2005). Higate, Paul, and Marsha Henry. “Engendering (In)security in Peace Support Operations.” Security Dialogue 35 No. 4 (2004). Kaldor, Mary. “Human Security.” Society and Economy 33 No. 3 (2011). Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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Klopcic, Alja. “Trafficking in Human Beings in Transition and Post-Conflict Countries.” Human Security Perspectives 1 No. 1 (2004). Peet, Jessica. “Beautiful Souls and Bodies: Understanding Sex Trafficking in Conflict.” Paper presented at ISA West Annual Conference, Pasadena, California, 2011. Peterson, V. Spike, and Anne S. Runyan. Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2003. Robson, Tony. “Bosnia: The United Nations, Human Trafficking and Prostitution.” World Socialist Web Site (2009). Smith, Charles A., and Brandon Miller-de la Cuesta. “Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones: The Role of Peacekeepers in the Formation of Networks.” Human Rights Review 12 (2011). Tickner, J. Ann.  Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. United Nations. What is Peacekeeping? Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Whitworth, Sandra. Men, Militarism and U.N. Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. New York: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

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Perceptions of Sites in the Holy Land
The Impact of Media and Marketing
Jamie Bergstrom

International perceptions of the Middle East reflect diverse views and opinions. Oftentimes, these opinions are shaped by external forces, such as news or media reports. Media is growing at an exponential rate, connecting users within seconds. Reporters share stories worth researching, yet reporting remains a subjective discipline. What facts are the most important? What should be left out? Determining answers to questions like these constitutes the science of crafting a good story. Reflecting on the state of media in Israel creates a desire to understand what drives the media to report on what they do. Is all journalism inherently biased? If so, what does this mean for the international perception of contested space and religious and political issues? This paper is the product of a desire to know what impact media has had on global perceptions of issues like these. The project ultimately asks what impact media and marketing have on the perception of Holy Land archaeology. Sites heavily involved in media and in marketing schemes are the best places to look when researching this question. Rather than make this project exclusive, the use of four case studies provides comparative evidence for the ultimate impact of media and marketing on perception. After careful consideration, the four sites analyzed are: (1) The Western Wall, (2) The Sea of Galilee Boat, (3) Masada, and (4) The Tomb(s) of Jesus. The first case study explores the Western Wall and the role of marketing, specifically through religious venues. To provide a sharp contrast to site marketing, the second case study engages with media coverage of the “Jesus Boat.” Drawing on the theme of media coverage is Masada and how heavy media crafted the future of its marketing. This project concludes with the selective marketing exhibited in the Garden Tomb and a comparison to the evaluation of the media sensationalism in the Talpiot Tomb. In comparing and contrasting their impact on each site, it can be seen that media and marketing often produce a limited perception, conveying feelings of exclusivity. Further analysis shows that exclusive site perception impacts the larger global community through the selective presentation of facts, often failing to highlight the overall contributions many other sites make in establishing world heritage and solidarity through history. From this angle, it can be seen as an instance of using soft power to control historical narrative on the world stage.

Jamie Bergstrom is junior at Duke University studying International Comparative Studies and Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.

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The Western Wall and Marketing

A visit to the Western Wall in Jerusalem will reveal the strong connections visitors share with the site. Guests often cry, touch the wall and recite religious verses. Singing and celebratory events, like bar mitzvahs, occur at the Western Wall. The holiest place in Judaism, the Western Wall is representative of the destruction of the Temple.1 The Temple Mount is important to Jewish people, but the perception of individuals practicing other religions is debatable. Through an evaluation of marketing and surveys, this section shows the contrast between what people want and how site management markets the space to the larger audience. These surveys show that people are interested in learning about more than their own culture, and changes in site marketing would alter the overall perception of the Western Wall. Tourism is extremely important to the Israeli economy. The Western Wall is an example of heritage tourism, or “visits to cultural settings or visits to the spaces considered by the visitors as relevant to their own heritage.”2 In a joint study by Ben-Gurion University and University of Surrey, researchers assert, “tourists experiences in spaces of cultural assets should be based on the interrelationship among site, attributes, visitors, and presentation of site.”3 This study pays close attention to how these interrelationships affect the visitor’s perception of the site. Although there is no cost to visit the Western Wall, other heritage settings compete with other tourist attractions to remain profitable. A consequence of this competition is the need to present the past as interesting and appealing, thus introducing modifications and manipulations, distancing the present form from the “real thing.” Planned efforts to create understanding of the history and significance of events, people, and objects are developed by the site management. These marketing techniques affect the interpretation and perception of the site. It is important to note that marketing of heritage sites attracts specific visitors, which has impact on the perception. Tony W. Cartledge outlines two types of visitors: the pilgrim and the tourist. These two roles are further clarified and divided as Poria, Biran, and Reichel explain what they believe to be the three types of heritage site visitors beyond the dichotomous view of pilgrims and tourists. These are (1) those who expect to feel the heritage, (2) those who expect to learn, and (3) those who expect other experiences.4 Marketing plays an extremely important role in consideration of these three types. Historically there is evidence of using heritage sites in the construction of collective memory, a type of political agenda. This represents the “dissonant heritage” seen in the marketing: deliberately ignoring certain
1  Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, The Holy Land: An Oxford Archaeological Guide; from Earliest times to 1700 (Oxford University Press, 1998): 108. 2  Y. Poria, A. Biran, and A. Reichel, “Visitors’ Preferences for Interpretation at Heritage Sites,” Journal of Travel Research 48.1 (2009): 97. 3  Poria, “Visitors’ Preferences for Interpretation at Heritage Sites,” 92. 4  Poria, “Visitors’ Preferences for Interpretation at Heritage Sites,” 95.

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components of human history. Through the use of strategic marketing in relation to the Western Wall, many only perceive the importance to Judaism. Although this is the holiest site to Judaism, the Western Wall is also important to Christianity and Islam. In regards to Christianity, it is believed that Jesus stood nearby and prophesized the downfall of the Temple, challenging its operation and the way religion was practiced.5 The destruction of the Temple symbolizes the need to follow Jesus and his religious ideas. This site is also of importance to Muslims; according to tradition, this is where the Prophet Muhammad tied his horse, named El-Boreq, on the way from Mecca to El-Aqsa. Through this lens, researchers can use the religious and heritage intersections to gauge how this site is perceived and interpreted through the marketing and presentation of historical material. The joint study by Ben-Gurion University and University of Surrey considered this when devising a project to understand visitor preferences at the Western Wall. The study was conducted in two stages. The first stage included 40-minute interviews with 20 individuals. These individuals ranged from tour guides to visitors of every religion to people who had never visited the site. Questions were asked about reasons for visiting and the benefits visitors gain from touring the Western Wall. The second stage was a questionnaire distributed over a six-week period from November 2005 to December 2005. The questionnaire clarified perceptions of site in relation to the interviewee’s own heritage and motivations to visit. In total, 227 interviews were conducted with members of Judaism, Islam, Christian, and nonreligious individuals. Interviews and questionnaires were conducted in different locations around Israel to avoid location bias. Visiting the site as a way to connect with one’s own heritage was very important. The following reasons for visiting proved to be statistically significant: highlighting a connection to personal heritage, providing an emotional experience, learning about religion, and teaching the nation’s history.6 The study proved to be statistically significant in teaching religious connections with other religions as well. In regards to Judaism, Christian and Muslim visitors believed that all of the connections should be shared.7 Despite the interest in learning about other religious connections, a majority of visitors believed the religious connections should be taught explicitly through the Old Testament.8 This shows that while people are interested in learning about other religions, the dominant marketing force still proves to shape opinions. In regards to the motivation to visit, many found it a religious duty, but a significant number of people wanted to visit the site for “non heritage reasons,” such as “because it is famous” and because they are “interested in learn[ing] something new.”9
5  6  7  8  9  E. Schiller, Guide to Historical Sites and Holy Places in Israel (Jerusalem: Arial, 1992): 7. See Appendix A, Table 1. See Appendix A, Table 3. See Appendix A, Table 2. See Appendix A, Table 4.

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The results reinforce ideas that people connect with culture through visits to the Western Wall and that the wall is important to personal heritage. What the study also shows is that many people appreciate the site for its heritage to other cultures. The interest in learning about the site and the connections to other religions shows that marketing should not be as exclusive. Certain individuals expressed interest in learning something new and experiencing a famous site that they had heard of, and this is important in understanding nonreligious motivations as well.

Media Coverage and the ‘Jesus Boat’
The Sea of Galilee Boat was discovered in 1986, by brothers Moshe and Yuval Lufan. Drought decreased the sea level enough so that the brothers discovered the remains of the boat on the northwest shore of the sea. Immediately after the discovery, they reported the boat to local authorities for help. After initial exploration, it was decided that the boat was a very important find, and professionals and members of the Kibbutz Ginosaur were called in. The Israel Antiquities Authority and top archeologists tried to keep the excavation top secret because they were afraid of what would happen if word spread too soon. Unfortunately, the secret dig turned into a media uproar full of speculation. The excavation itself was very delicate because of its location and the fact that it was partially embedded in mud. This excavation took only twelve days to complete, after which it was submerged in chemicals to prevent deterioration. Eventually, the media attention altered global perception and interpretation enough to coin the term “Jesus Boat.” The Sea of Galilee boat is a first-century boat (around the time of Jesus) that is linked to Christianity due to the time period and the biblical importance placed on boats. For example, Jesus and his disciples were fishermen, and the boat played a large role in Jesus’s ministry. Even though there is no biblical reference to Jesus ever owning a boat, boats themselves are mentioned over fifty times in the Bible. Through the exploration of media coverage, this section will show how these small connections turn into altered interpretations. Shelley Wachsmann was the director of the excavation in 1986. During this time, he was the Inspector of Underwater Antiquities for the Israel Department of Antiquities and Museums. As a leader in this 2,000-year-old discovery, he was bombarded with questions about the boat’s connections to Jesus. In Wachsmann’s book, he details the media attention that the dig received and the subsequent frustrations of the workers. Wachsmann provides readers with an overview of his experience. He mentions working on the excavation with the understanding that this project was to be fully excavated under the radar until the project was complete. To his surprise, a very small Hebrew newspaper leaked this discovery almost immediately. There was a section discussing a very accurate depiction of the discovery: “a boat was found with a date approximately to the time of Jesus’ ministry of the Sea of Galilee.” This small leak circulated around the media and made its Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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way to the Israeli television authority. With the new information, the television authority asked to probe the excavation with the alleged understanding that the footage would not be used until the boat had been made public. Wachsmann and the team agreed. Unfortunately, a loophole was found in the contract that allowed the television company to release the footage almost immediately. Since the boat was already leaked in the newspaper, the phrase “until made public” no longer applied. Consequently, every local newspaper in Israel had a front-page story of the “boat of Jesus.” This discovery brought excitement. Israel’s tourism industry was hurting due to Gaddafi’s terrorism, so it was hoped that a discovery linked to Jesus would encourage tourism despite the threats. Once one newspaper wrote about the story, the next source would embellish it even further just to maintain attention on the topic. What went from a very accurate depiction quickly advanced to media disagreements with skewed stories and misrepresentation of data. There were even cartoons of the site published in newspapers just to further contribute to attention. The stories became so out-of-control that over the course of twelve days, gold coins were rumored to fill the boat. This international attention stopped at nothing. Wachsmann discusses having a conversation with a friend in Burma who told him that she heard of the discovery while on an airplane. Although many viewed this discovery as an opportunity to bring Israeli archaeology back into the global picture, it was done in a way that horrified everyone involved in the excavation. The site was constantly under media supervision and had blockades put up with 24-hour surveillance just to ensure the safety of the dig. Wachsmann explained his disgust with reporters who openly expressed intentions to tell their own version of the site. One reporter is quoted as saying, “We never let the truth get in the way of a good story.”10 In his book, he lists and thanks only three reporters by name. These reporters are the only three he believes listened to him and respected what he said. Over the course of the excavation, the term “Jesus Boat” became universal. The boat today is marketed in a non-biased way at the Yigal Allon Museum at Kibbutz Ginosar, but the media attention from the past has proven to shape the overall perception of the artifact. Upon walking into the museum, visitors are greeted with a sign saying, “Is this really the boat of Jesus?” The answer is found beneath, “No one knows for sure.” Despite the very straightforward answers and attempts to mitigate the “Jesus” connotations, it is still widely used, and the boat itself is still called the Jesus Boat, not the Sea of Galilee Boat. There are many consequences that come with the media presentation of the “Jesus” boat. First, this artifact is a piece of cultural history, but by limiting exclusively to Christians, the boat loses any connection to Judaism that it ever had. The boat becomes symbolic for one religion, and others do not take part in the cultural heritage in the same way. Also, there
10  Shelley Wachsmann, The Sea of Galilee Boat: An Extraordinary 2000-year-old Discovery (New York: Plenum, 1995): 215.

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is absolutely no evidence linking the boat to Jesus other than the date and location. Mass media presentation has led to lasting impacts and altered perceptions of what the boat really is and what it means to the site’s visitors.

Masada through Media and Marketing
Masada is arguably one of the best-known archaeological sites in Israel. Built by Herod the Great, this location was the last refuge of Jewish revolt, giving the site special value to Jewish visitors. The site is also valuable beyond Jewish history. Masada contains complete and untouched Roman camps, as well as very intact Herodian palace architecture, all of which are extremely valuable to academia. Masada was conquered by the Imperial Roman Army in 73 AD. Historian Josephus Flavius describes this event in-depth, but his historical narrative was transformed in the 1900’s into a heroic myth in which the fall of Masada was described as a desperate “last stand.” From 1963-65, Masada was excavated and received more media attention than any other site in Israel. Now, the site remains a tourist attraction that is very important to national history. The unique media relations and transformation of a national project makes Masada a prime site to comparatively analyze how the culmination of media and marketing has affected the site’s perception by the world audience. Through analysis of newspapers and bias along with marketing techniques, it is evident how the interpretation of the site has been altered. To study media influence on the site, particular attention will be paid to the times of excavation: October 1963-May 1964 and November 1964-April 1965. Since television was not a viable option at this time in Israel, only journals and newspapers are considered. Drawing on surveys conducted by Ben Yehuda and his team, there are three focuses of the media’s use: how identity of the Sicarii was described, how the siege, battle and suicide were described, and how values and opinions concerning Masada were projected. Identity and language in presenting the people was important in the evaluation of media sources. The language used by Josephus Flavius refers to the Jews living at Masada as “Sicarii.” This name was given to these individuals because of the small daggers, called sicae, that they carried. Throughout the course of the excavation, the distinction of this group became obsolete. Only twice in the entire course of excavation was the term Sicarii used: once on October 13, 1963 and once on November 11, 1963. The term was still never defined to the public. Instead, other (typically loaded) terms were favored. Most commonly Zealots, primarily because the term is more encompassing of all Jewish people at the time, not just the extremists. Other terms include: Masada fighter, Hebraic fighters, last fighters of the rebellion, freedom fighters, defenders of Masada, last defender, the besieged, the besieged rebels, the revolutionary Jewish people of the first rebellion, Hebraic zealots and zealots for

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the freedom of Judea.11 Regardless of the terminology, there was no record of any neutral terms. It is already clear that the media was placing its own spin on the presentation of the site and sensationalizing the excavation to enhance journalistic success. This was meaningful considering the time of the excavation: the mid-1960’s, the same time Israel was currently under siege. The strong parallel explains why the media presented the data in such a biased way. Many looked at the courage of the Sicarii as a reminder to continue to fight for freedom, especially during the mid-1960’s. Even though the nationalist agenda can be seen through the media’s depiction, it is further depicted through specific events like the historic siege. Newspapers depict this as the last heroic battle against the Romans and state that the “Roman army included the tenth legion.” Josephus states that the Roman army at Masada was the tenth legion. As BenYehuda argues, these slight altercations reinforce ideas of heroism, going back to the “few against many” theme.12 Another inconsistency with the media narrative is that the original Roman attempts to capture Masada failed. Josephus, the most reliable source from the time, never mentions a failed capture. Many archeologists and scholars argue that the Roman army was acclaimed for its military prowess, and this siege would have been nothing different.13 There is not much evidence to back up the failed attempts theory, yet its recirculation in the media was constant. More falsifications were found circulating around the media. One of the largest discrepancies was the actual length of the rebellion. On three different occasions in the same newspaper, the length changed. Originally, it was four to eight months, but this drastically increased and explained that the siege was three years long with constant fighting and defending. A third time, the newspaper reported the fighting as two-and-a-half years long. Additionally, numerous reports were made discussing the excess amounts of soldiers, in the range of ten thousand or more. These numbers are largely inflated, considering that less than one thousand people lived in Masada.14 As far as the actual suicide goes, it is implied through Josephus’ writings that the Jews were hesitant to commit suicide, and it took numerous accounts by leaders to push the community to agree. However, in keeping with the theme of heroic deaths, it is never mentioned that the community was originally against the idea. Furthermore, around 960 were rumored to commit suicide; yet only 28 different human remains were found, a discrepancy the media shied away from in reports. The values of the Masada project were expressed through the media. There is a clear link to the people of Masada and the Israelis. Phrases like, “Masada shall not fall again” were
Nachman Ben-Yehuda, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1995): 162. 12  Nachman, 178. 13  Nachman, 180. 14  Nachman, 183. 11 

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regularly published, and the site was reported as the as “the mausoleum of the saints of the nation.” In 1964, the newspaper published, “Masada is now considered the most cherished national asset.”15 This rhetoric was so impactful that soldiers were sworn in at Masada, representative of the defenders of the past and the present. The media created the myth of Masada. It was not until the excavation and media attention that this myth was ever used in nation-building. The constant presentation of the suicide as an act of heroism was crucial in constructing this narrative. Furthermore, the media set a precedent for the interpretation of the site, which directly affects marketing. During tours, the guests are shown a video of the site’s history and are then given a tour of the actual site. This video is extremely one-sided and shows the Romans struggling to defeat Jewish people. The Jewish people are seen as strong-willed, fearless and heroic. The educational movie on the tour concludes by reminding the viewers how brave the rebels were. These themes are transmitted to visitors, and the perception is changed to include the historic Jewish struggle. This landmark is nationally marketed as a symbol of courage for the nation. This marketing is biased and aims to connect visitors with emotional aspects of the site, not just the hard facts from the excavation. Even though bias exists, there proves to be a steady increase in annual visitors.16 This kind of marketing shows us how the original media narratives were essential in constructing a national ideology that continues to impact perceptions until today. The media’s claims and continued recycling of these ideologies in marketing do not come without consequence. In 2001 the site was declared a UNESCO World Heritage site for “outstanding value to humanity.”17 While this may be true in regards to the history, archaeology and example of the human struggle, the overall interpretation is one of exclusivity. Even though World Heritage Sites “belong to all the peoples of the world,” the media’s presentation and the strategic marketing have made it difficult for non-Jews to connect with the site. The exclusivity of the site limits the appreciation and detracts from the overall value to the global audience. The use of the site in religious and national events makes it even harder for non-Jews to connect with the history. The strategies employed in nation-building have made this site’s interpretation very different between peoples. This case study shows how archaeological information can be distorted through both the media and marketing techniques, to employ a larger political agenda and to reinforce nation-building. The distortions and intentionally ambiguous reporting lent the heroic myth scientific legitimacy throughout the excavation. In actuality, the media sensationalism and the pick-and-choose journalism take away from the site’s larger contributions.
15  16  17  Nachman, 185. See Appendix B. UNESCO World Heritage Centre, Masada, Web. March-April 2013.

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The Tomb(s) of Jesus: Sensationalism and Sects

The following sites are explorations of the influence of marketing and media exclusive to the Garden Tomb and the Talpiot Tomb, respectively.

The Garden Tomb
The Garden Tomb is one of the supposed burial sites of Jesus. The site is located in Jerusalem, just outside of the city walls. The rock-cut tomb is near Golgotha (the skull-like rock formation). This was not a religious site until the 1900s, and it was never even mentioned until the late 1800s. Many suggest that through specialized marketing, the Garden Tomb has developed into a holy site in order to reclaim Protestant autonomy in the region. The most common tomb of Jesus is typically the Holy Sepulchre. The site was dominated by Catholics, Greek Orthodox and Monophysite Eastern Churches, leaving no room for the Protestant faith. Protestants were unable to gain access to the church because they were not recognized as an autonomous community within the then-Ottoman Empire.18 This rejection was motivation to find a site outside of the Old City and develop a Protestant connection. In 1894, the land was believed to fit the criteria for the tomb and resurrection location of Jesus, and it was therefore purchased. Following the purchase was a letter stating that “Skull Hill” and the tomb in question were likely to be Golgotha. Since then, the tomb has been developed into a site attracting Protestant visitors. The site is free and provides tour guides, who educate guests through scriptures that mirror the imagery of the Garden Tomb. It is clear that this site satisfies the desires of a particular religious group. Presenting the site as accurate due to rock formations and a location beyond the city gate is not proof of authenticity, but it does fulfill the specific desires of Protestant faith-based tourists. Wendy Murray Zoba depicts her experience of the Garden Tomb in “Where have they laid my Lord.” This article outlines the marketing techniques employed by the site management. Protestant guides “fit” historical information and the Garden Tomb together to produce the most believable story. For instance, discussion of Roman crucifixion in public sites is connected to the openness and visibility of the site in comparison to others. There are many biblical accounts used to bolster the claims, such as the verse in John’s gospel, “Where he was crucified, there was a garden” (John 19:41). The guide proceeds to remind visitors that no other proposed sites have gardens or fit the biblical description in the same way the limestone resembles a skull at the Garden Tomb. As Cartledge explains, “For many protestants, archaeology is real in a way that the church tradition is not,” and visitors like to experience

18 

Ruth Kark and Seth Frantzman, “The Protestant Garden Tomb in Jerusalem, Englishwomen, and a Land Transaction in Late Ottoman Palestine,” Palestine Exploration Quarterly 142.3 (2010): 203.

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the site the way Jesus would have.19 These ideas are echoed in evangelical scripture and song found in the 1845 account of the Garden Tomb, “There is a green Hill far away, Without a city wall, Where the Lord was crucified Who died to save us all,” These methods are evident of evangelical beliefs and show the difference in worship. Worship at the Garden Tomb is based on emotional and spiritual connection to the garden and site. It is rooted in faith and the gospel. Despite strong archaeological doubt in the authenticity of the tomb (the tomb dates closer to the second Iron Age, not the time of Jesus), the site is still marketed through Protestant beliefs and aims to provide emotional connections to fellow evangelicals. Presentation of the site as legitimate, despite widespread archaeological doubt, negates the prestige and significance of archaeological sites. Invention of the site and marketing schemes seen in this example prove to serve only a specific group. Again, this takes away from the gift of shared history for humanity.

Talpiot Tomb
In 1980, numerous ossuaries were excavated in the Jerusalem suburb, Talpiot. Thought to be of little significance, they were placed in storage. Later, Simcha Jacobovici claimed biblical links to the ossuaries. He argued that the ossuaries in question were from the tomb of Jesus. Information relating tangible items to Jesus always results in a media frenzy. Rather than constant bombardment by the press, Jacobovici’s claims were filmed by award-winning filmmaker, James Cameron. James Cameron is known for his films like Terminator and Titanic, not documentary work. Despite his career in the entertainment industry, Cameron decided to entertain viewers one more time, using archaeology. The issue with this documentary is that facts relayed through the film are not actually facts of Jesus’ presence, but instead just make use of similar names. As Eric Meyers points out, Jesus, Mary, Simon and Mathew are, “common names.”20 The premise of the documentary is that the unlikely nature of the names together is evidence of Jesus’ tomb. Jacobovici tried to justify this argument through use of statistic analysis and a low probability rate. Even more sensationalized
Tony Cartledge, “Walk about Jerusalem: Protestant Pilgrims and the Holy Land.” Archaeology, Bible, Politics, and the Media: Proceedings of the Duke University Conference, April 23-24, 2009. 20  Eric Meyers, “The Jesus Tomb Controversy: An Overview,” Near Eastern Archaeology 69.3-4 (2006): 116. 19 

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interpretation was the assertion that there was a pictorial diagram of what happened to Christ. This was in reference to the “x” on the lid of the ossuary. The “x” is used as a guide to determine if the lid was on straight. In the film, the “x” is presented as a cross, which of course, the filmmakers justify as a pictorial representation of the crucifixion of Christ. The film, called The Lost Tomb of Jesus, aired on the Discovery Channel in 2007. To no surprise, it received a great deal of attention. Many scholars were upset by this infotainment presentation of material; the story was highly embellished. Scholars involved in the film were asked to sign nondisclosure agreements, contributing to already prevalent levels of suspicion. Again, Eric Meyers spoke out: “That’s not how you do archaeology. That’s how you do show business, and it’s a disservice to biblical archaeology.” In this example, presentation of information was designed to reach as many viewers as possible. Using archaeology as a form of entertainment is extremely problematic because of such issues. As Chad Spigel asserts, “History is an interpretation.” Deciphering the past should not be a secret project. It should be quite the opposite: a collaborative effort with different viewpoints. Scholars should be able to openly question the legitimacy of an artifact. The film is much more a representation of inclusive filmmaking than an attempt to understand history. The misrepresentation and limited analysis pose problems for archaeology in the future if these actions are repeated. Media is one of the best forms of communication, and we should recognize the positive contributions it has made to our ability to share history. At the same time, journalists and filmmakers alike must be held accountable for thorough evaluation of history. Biased presentations that seek out profit are inappropriate and inexcusable presentations of archaeology. Rather than seeking opportunities for personal gain, those involved must remain conscious of the stakes. World history is for all to share, not something for profit.

Conclusion
Each of these case studies provides a different account of altered perceptions due to media and marketing. Presentation to audiences and viewers is crafted in a way that highlights certain facts more than others. Presentation bias is the overall impact of media and marketing. Biased journalism and site-exclusivity are problematic for the larger population. Prejudicial treatment of sites based on goals of nation-building, profitability, and other insincere motives are detrimental to the future of archaeology. As far as perception goes, there is a complete alteration in examples of exclusivity. One of the gifts of archaeology is the shared appreciation for history, yet some visitors do not share a connection with a site simply because of their religious affiliation. Through destructive techniques that break down the shared appreciation, the value is diminished. Members of the media, academia and site management alike ought to aid in the constructive presentation of sites. Through shared connections and gained knowledge, archaeology can serve as a bridge between diverse peoples. The first step is to break away from past habits of media and marketing techniques and Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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discontinue the presentation of archaeological sites as exclusive and culturally significant to only one group. Additionally, site value is only authentic if the history is as well. There needs to be an end to misrepresentation and pick-and-choose journalism. Finding ways of telling the history through integrated approaches can prove to be successful, but only if parties break down the self-interest. If these goals can be accomplished, perception of archaeological sites will represent a more universalized understanding of history.

Appendix Appendix A: Ben-Gurion University and University of Surrey-UK Results

Table 1

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Table 2

Table 3

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Appendix B: Number of Visitors to Masada Per Year

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Bibliography
Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1995. Ben-Yehuda, Nachman. “Sacrificing Truth: Archaeology and the Myth of Masada.” In The American Historical Review 108.4 (2003): 1254. Breger, Marshall J., Yitzhak Reiter, and Leonard M. Hammer. Holy Places in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict: Confrontation and Co-existence. London: Routledge, 2010. Cartledge, Tony W. “Walk about Jerusalem: Protestant Pilgrims and the Holy Land.” In Archaeology, Bible, Politics, and the Media: Proceedings of the Duke University Conference, April 23-24, 2009. By Eric M. Meyers and Carol L. Meyers. N.p.: n.p., n.d. 138-154. Fagan, Garrett G. Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the past and Misleads the Public. London: Routledge, 2006. Fienberg, Stephen E. “Editorial: Statistics and “The Lost Tomb of Jesus”.” In Annals of Applied Statistics 2.1 (2008): 1-2. Gibson, Shimon. “Is the Talpiot Tomb Really the Family Tomb of Jesus?” In Near Eastern Archaeology , Vol. 69, No. 3/4 (Sep. - Dec., 2006), pp. 118-124. Kark, Ruth, and Seth J. Frantzman. “The Protestant Garden Tomb in Jerusalem, Englishwomen, and a Land Transaction in Late Ottoman Palestine.” In Palestine Exploration Quarterly 142.3 (2010): 199-216. Klein, Menachem. Jerusalem: The Contested City. New York: New York UP in Association with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2001. Kohl, Philip Lantry., Mara Kozelsky, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. “Excavating Masada.” In Selective Remembrances. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007. Maheras, N. G. (2007, Mar 04). “Documentary claims discovery of Jesus’ tomb.” McClatchy Tribune Business News. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/46265 4926?accountid=10598 Mangan, Katherine S. “Unearthing ‘The Jesus Boat.’” In The Chronicle of Higher Education 9: (June 1995). Meyers, Eric M. “The Jesus Tomb Controversy: An Overview.” Near Eastern Archaeology 69.3-4 (2006): 116-118. ATLASerials, Religion Collection. Web. 3 March 2013. Murphy-O’Connor, Jerome. The Holy Land: An Oxford Archaeological Guide; from Earliest times to 1700. u.a.: Oxford UP, 1998. Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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Poria, Y., A. Biran, and A. Reichel. “Visitors’ Preferences for Interpretation at Heritage Sites,” In Journal of Travel Research 48.1 (2009): 92-105. Poria, Yaniv, Richard Butler, and David Airey. “Links between Tourists, Heritage, and Reasons for Visiting Heritage Sites.” In Journal of Travel Research 43.1 (2004): 19-28. Poria, Y., A. Reichel, and R. Cohen. “World Heritage Site—Is It an Effective Brand Name?: A Case Study of a Religious Heritage Site.” In Journal of Travel Research 50.5 (2011): 482-495. Schiller, E. Guide to Historical Sites and Holy Places in Israel. Jerusalem: Arial. (1992). UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Masada. n.d. Web. Mar.-Apr. 2013. Wachsmann, Shelley. The Sea of Galilee Boat: An Extraordinary 2000-year-old Discovery. New York: Plenum, 1995.

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Brands of Justice
Cate Partain
This article examines the philosophical foundations of transitional justice and their practical applications in modern society, ultimately arguing that restorative justice is a viable and preferred alternative to retributive justice in cases aiming to achieve societal healing during a transitional period. Two cases in which transitional justice models were implemented are compared to substantiate this claim. The first case is the Allied Powers’ use of retributive justice against the Nazis at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, following WWII. The central element of the retributive model featured in this case is the prioritization of proportional punishment as the means to correct the societal disruption caused by the perpetrators of human rights violations. The second case discussed is the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. After a close examination of the South African case, the restorative model is shown to showcase the merits of the restorative justice model, which prioritizes rehabilitation and reconciliation within a transitioning society. The article concludes that retributive justice is effective in the short-term, but in order to ensure the longevity of societal healing and a peaceful transition, restorative justice is vital to the survival of open democracy in a transitional state. The need for justice in society is rooted in the belief that a transgression, or rule-breaking action, if intentional and blame-worthy, is an injustice that needs to be dealt with beyond restitution of a victim’s perceived losses. Rule-breaking actions cover a wide spectrum ranging from rude greetings to heinous crimes against humanity. In each instance, the decision to violate a law or agreed-upon norm results in the deprivation of respect, property, or even life of a victim at the hands of a perpetrator. Traditionally, in Western societies, these identified injustices are primarily handled through the distribution of punishments proportional to the severity of the violations. In an international context, the transgressions in question can result from politically motivated interstate and intrastate conflicts in the form of serious human rights abuses. These abuses include, but are not limited to: genocide, war crimes, disappearance, rape, and torture (both physical and psychological). Extrajudicial killings are also included, whether perpetrated by proponents of an authoritarian regime against its own population, by opposition forces, or by combatants in a civil war or international conflict. The aftermath of such conflicts leaves societies in a state of both political and moral transition. However, there is not just one single brand of transitional justice prescribed to all fledging democracies

Cate Partain is a senior at the University of Southern California majoring in International
Relations and minoring in Human Rights.

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struggling to reconcile with the atrocities of previous regimes. Rather, this essay presents two separate notions of transitional justice exist: retributive justice and restorative justice. Each is equipped with its own set of implementation mechanisms or tools. In evaluating these justice frameworks, it is important to examine the key question of whether restorative justice is truly a viable alternative to traditional forms of retributive or procedural justice to achieve societal healing during a transition period. In answering this question, this paper will first define retributive justice as a framework and present the historical example of its implementation following the defeat of the Nazis after World War II. Second, this paper will explain the existing arguments for a necessary alternative to the retributive approach to justice. Third, it will present the restorative justice framework as a possible alternative. After providing a definition of restorative justice it will introduce the tool used to implement restorative justice, namely truth commissions, and use the contemporary example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to demonstrate the real-world application of restorative justice. This paper will culminate in an evaluation of restorative justice as not only a viable, but preferred alternative to retributive justice to achieve societal healing during a transition period.

Retributive Justice
The retributive justice framework is derived from the psychological motivation of individuals to respond to rule breaking through punitive means with the objective of behaviorcontrol. This objective is achieved when offenders are punished and/or deprived of liberties. The desire for behavior-control is the psychological conception of justice that provides the initial basis for a retributive justice framework. In this framework, punishment or infliction of suffering and humiliation on the offender restores the sense of justice violated by the violent act or rule-breaking transgression committed by the offender. According to the retributive justice framework, the offender’s intentional violation of accepted rules or laws disrupts the existing moral balance, and as a result, they deserve to be punished unilaterally. 1 Unilateral punishment causes offenders to suffer against their will, and, as a result, their power status is lowered. This is significant because it reveals the implication of the punishment as a means by which to reorder the symbolic power or authority that was disturbed when the rule was broken. Through the creation of a conceptual synthesis, retributive justice can be defined as, “…the reestablishment of justice through unilateral imposition of punishment on the offender consistent with what is believed the offender deserves.”2 Retributive justice occurs when, “an offender, having violated rules or laws, deserves to be punished
1  Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather and Michael J. Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice” Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2008): 378. 2  Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice,” 381.

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and, for justice to be reestablished, has to be punished in proportion to the severity of the wrongdoing.”3 Retributive justice is primarily used in the prosecution of an individual or organization. In domestic cases, individual offenders are tried in criminal and appellate courts. More commonly in international relations, offenders are tried in international criminal tribunals. The legality of an offense determines the severity of the offense, rather than emotional distress, to ensure the objectivity of the tribunal not to that the tribunal does not favor one defendant over another. Prosecutors and judges serve as the administrators of justice to grieving families seeking a conviction of the individual responsible for their suffering. In addition to international criminal tribunals, military tribunals have also historically been used as arenas for prosecution. These courts operate outside of the scope of conventional criminal and civil proceedings to try members of enemy forces during wartime using an inquisitorial system. Military officers and personnel are actively involved in the investigation of charges, prosecution, jury, judgment and sentencing of defendants in military tribunal proceedings. A prominent example of this type of prosecution can be seen in the case of Allied prosecutions of Nazi defendants at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following WWII.

The Application of Retributive Justice
In the context of international relations, a classic example of the use of the retributive approach to transitional justice is seen in the treatment of the state-sponsored persecution and murder of approximately six million Jews under the Hitler regime and its Axis allies.4 In an attempt to remedy the stigmatization of the Jewish people as an inferior race, the Allied powers of France, United Kingdom, Russia and the United States called for the indictment of twenty-four military and political leaders of Nazi Germany, a crucial step in the country’s democratization process. These men were charged with aggressive war, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and brought to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, Germany in November of 1945. The twenty-four defendants selected to stand trial were meant to represent the full range of Nazi diplomatic, economic, political, and military leadership deemed responsible for the Holocaust. 5 The IMT chose to add a fourth charge of conspiracy to the indictment as well, with the purpose of including those crimes committed under domestic Nazi law as early as 1933 when the Nazi Party took power, as well as empowering the tribunal to indict Nazi organizations such as the “Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Elite Guard, the Security Service, the Secret State
3  4  Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice,” 375. “Holocaust Museum,” Holocaust Enclyopedia (2012): accessed November 29, 2012, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article. php?ModuleId=10005143. 5  “Holocaust Museum.”

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Police, the Stormtroopers, and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces,” in addition to the individual indictments. The information revealed through testimony at the Nuremberg trials brought to light details regarding the Auschwitz gas chambers as well as the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, which led to an estimated six million Jewish victims being murdered by Nazi officials and foot soldiers. On October 1, 1946, twelve of the twenty-four defendants were convicted and sentenced to death, three others were sentenced to life imprisonment, and four others faced prison terms ranging from ten to twenty years. Ultimately, only three of the twentyfour defendants were acquitted. In the years that followed, 183 more high-ranking officials were prosecuted in twelve subsequent trials conducted by American chief war crimes prosecutor, Telford Taylor. 6 Using the aforementioned definition of retributive justice, it is clear that in an effort to democratize Germany and reduce its capacity to further threaten the international system, the Allied powers used a retributive approach, subjecting numerous members of the Nazi regime to the humiliation of publically stripping the privileges and symbols of their military rank and punishing them with death and imprisonment. These punishments were viewed as proportional to the severity of their crimes against innocent civilians. In a speech to the Bar Association of Tennessee on June 14, 1946, Colonel Robert G. Storey recounts the satisfaction he felt walking through the Dachau concentration camp and seeing the commanders of the camp captured and held in the same cells that had recently held innocent civilians, stating, “I don’t find glory in human misery, but to me it was a great satisfaction to go through that great murder factory and see behind the bars the commandant of that camp and all of his satellites.”7 These men would later be tried by an American military tribunal and executed for their crimes.

Need for an Alternative
Although the Allied forces claimed to be morally superior to the German Nazis, they had no hesitations implementing a retributive interpretation of reciprocity, which allowed the Nazi offenders to ultimately meet the same fates as the victims they terrorized. The execution and imposed suffering through imprisonment of the Nazi war criminals was perpetrated as a means to restore the justice their actions destroyed. Although this brand of justice successfully satisfies victims’ desire for revenge and reciprocal suffering, it does not require a demonstration of remorse or guilt from the perpetrator. Conceptually, remorse is not critical for enabling retributive justice. 8 Admission of guilt and regret are not prerequisites for
6  “Holocaust Museum.” 7  Storey, Robert G, Tenn. L. Rev. (1945-1947): 519. 8  Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice,” 378.

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prosecution or conviction to retributive justice advocates. This then begs the question of whether proportional punishment is really enough. In his book No Future Without Forgiveness, Desmond Tutu responds to this question and evaluates the Nuremberg experience, stating, “The problem with this sort of justice is that it tends to keep the cycle of retribution and reprisal going. It is not about reconciliation, but about punishment.”9 Tutu concedes that because of the nature of the conflict and the indisputable nature of the defeat, retributive justice probably worked, but when a conflict is within a state and active intervention by another state or military alliance such as NATO is pursued, the retributive approach is not usually possible. Regarding intrastate conflicts such as apartheid in South Africa, Tutu asserts, “While the Allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg, we in South Africa had to live with one another…warriors from both sides, war criminals and victims alike live together in a now unified country, their futures tied together in a single destiny.”10 The success of the victims in the conflict is linked to the success of the offenders as both groups seek to rebuild a society they must learn to coexist in peacefully. Tutu warns that if this connection is ignored and a country allows itself to be dominated by forces of retribution, it becomes a country with no future. The South African case is not an isolated example. In his study “The More Things Change: Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict,” Paul Hensel argues that “…militarized conflict is fundamentally different today than it was in earlier times.”11 The Uppsala Conflict Data project defines armed conflict, “…as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory, or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state.”12 An armed conflict can occur between two or more states, geographically within one state with intervention from other states, or between parties within a single state without any foreign intervention. In contrast with the first half of the 20th century, interstate conflict accounted for less than 7 percent of all armed conflicts in the decade following the Cold War. Consequently those engaged in the majority of armed conflicts contest the incompatibility between the current regime and the values of the opposition to incite transition. This type of engagement is most commonly seen as the opposition proposes a transition towards democracy. As the state experiences these changes, the society is in transition and is faced with the challenge “…to respond appropriately to past evils without undermining the new
9  Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (2000): 264. 10  Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 264. 11  Paul Hensel, “The More Things Change: Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict”, Conflict and Peace Management (2002): 28. 12  Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Havard Strand, “Armed Conflict 19462001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research (2002): 618-619.

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democracy or jeopardizing prospects for future development.”13 As a result, the merits of an alternative approach that rejoins offenders and victims in a single productive society is not only necessary for South Africa but is also important to consider when evaluating the 115 identified conflicts recorded from 1989-2001. 14

Restorative Justice
In considering Tutu’s warning, it is important to introduce the second brand of transitional justice, restorative justice. In contrast to retributive justice, restorative justice is derived from the individual psychological motivation to restore justice with the objective of rehabilitation, rather than punitive behavior-control. The expectation then is that offenders will pursue basic steps to reintegrate themselves into society by accepting the assistance they are provided with to learn new skills, expand their perspective, and ultimately find a new, more constructive role in the democratized society. The psychological conception of rehabilitation as a component of justice provides the foundation of the restorative justice framework. “Crucial for proper restorative justice is a process of deliberation that places emphasis on healing rather than punishing: healing the victim and undoing the hurt; healing the offender by rebuilding his or her moral and social selves; healing communities and mending social relationships.”15 Restorative resolutions to illegal behavior require the offenders to do something meaningful and constructive for the victim or other members of the community by providing a service or participating in an educational program. This form of “constructive punishment” benefits both the offender in his or her journey to rehabilitation, and the community that suffered as a result of his or her past actions. In combination with an emphasis on healing, the restorative justice framework also perpetuates the view that offenses or crimes are conflicts in which the victims and perpetrators have ownership, and, as a result, both should be involved in its resolution. Specifically, restorative justice is defined as “…a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implication for the future.”16 A distinguishing characteristic of restorative justice is the prioritization of reconciliation over retribution. The emphasis on reconciliation emerges from a desire to reconstruct a new, just society instead of only punishing the guilty. Even in the absence of retribution, the restorative method requires violations to be

13 

David A. Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” Truth v. Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 100. 14  Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset”, 616. 15  Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice,” 376. 16  Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather and Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice,” 376.

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accounted for, victims to confront their perpetrators, reparations to be made, and emphasis on individual motivations to precede forgiveness and reconciliation.17 The main mechanism used to apply the restorative justice framework is a truth commission. Alternative to prosecutions, the objective of a truth commission is to reveal the truth and accountability, not to allocate punishments. By definition, a truth commission is an official body established to investigate human rights violations, war crimes, and other serious abuses committed in a specific state over a specified period of time. The institutional objective of the commission is to identify the causes and repercussions of abuses committed by oppressive regimes and armed groups.18 Truth commissions are not permanent bodies; typically each mandated commission will operate for a maximum of two or three years, during which it will employ hundreds of staffers to investigate, research, and record detailed information collected from thousands of victims’ and witnesses’ testimonies. The specific operating procedures of a commission are outlined in its official mandate and will reflect the perceived needs and realities of the societal environment in the country at the time of its creation. As a result, specific commission protocols will vary from country to country, but can include subpoena powers to access government documents, confidential hearings with perpetrators and high-level officials, or, in the case of South Africa and Sierra Leone, public hearings.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa
An important case for the evolution and implementation of restorative justice is South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The narrative of oppression in South Africa can be traced back to the promulgation of South Africa’s first constitution in 1910. The language used in the early constitution resembles the discriminatory and exclusionary terminology and tone that reappeared in the political rhetoric of the apartheid era forty years later. Apartheid, meaning “separateness” in Afrikaans, refers to the racist policies implemented and enforced by white supremacists in the South African leadership from 1948 to 1991. Policies, such as the Group Act of 1950 and the “resettlement” of black South Africans to impoverished townships, institutionalized a racial hierarchy in South African society that privileged the white South African minority. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission design was born from a democratic process. Unlike other truth commissions, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the product of a representative parliamentary process, rather than the product of an executive decree. In May of 1994, Minister of Justice Dullah Omar introduced the legislation that would become the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
17  Rotberg, “Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation,” 10-11. 18  Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “truth commission,” accessed December 1, 2012,.

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Act of 1995 and create the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Although the commission creation process represented partisan political compromise, under the leadership of seventeen commissioners, the commission would represent transparency and transition to the community. Chaired by Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the commission would hold public hearings over a two-year period to deal with human rights violations and violence committed between March 1, 1960 and President Mandela’s inauguration on May 10, 1994. The goals of the commission were to “…develop a complete picture of the gross violations of human rights that took place in and came through the conflicts of the past; to restore victims their human and civil dignity by letting them tell their stories and recommending how they could be assisted; and to consider granting amnesty to those perpetrators who carried out their abuses for political reasons and who gave full accountings of their actions to the commission.”19 The structure of the commission comprised of three committees: the Committee on Human Rights Violations (HRV), the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, and the Committee on Amnesty. The purpose of the Committee on Human Rights Violations was to listen to victim’s’ testimonies and determine in which cases gross violations of human rights occurred. The operating definition of a human rights violation used by the committee was, “the violation of human rights through the killing, abduction, torture, or severe ill treatment of any person…which emanated from conflicts of the past…and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded, or ordered by any person acting with a political motive.”20 In the committee’s two-year existence, over 22,000 victim statements were processed by the HRV, recounting the horrors of their apartheid-era experiences. The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation vetted the victims’ testimonials with the responsibility of determining how each identified victim should be compensated for his or her suffering and made recommendations to President Mandela. The committee held regional hearings from 1996 to 1997, in an effort to discover what forms of compensation the victims were specifically seeking, before it submitted its finalized recommendations on reparations to the Mandela administration. In contrast to the HRV and the Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation, the third and final branch, the Committee on Amnesty, worked independently from the other institutional organs of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Committee on Amnesty took applications from individuals seeking amnesty for “acts associated with political objectives.”21 In order for an individual act to be considered political, the applicant needed to demonstrate that the act had been committed by a member or supporter of a publically
19  20  21  Lyn S. Graybill, Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa Miracle or Model? (2002): 6. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995): 34. Graybill, Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? 7.

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recognized political organization or liberation movement, or needed to be an employee of the state acting either “in furtherance of a political struggle…or with the object of countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle.” 22 The act must also have been committed “in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her express or implied authority.”23 The collection of these criteria led to the widest mandate of any existing truth commission at the time. Of the three TRC committees, the Committee on Amnesty was the most controversial. Critics of TRC amnesties suggested that granting immunity from prosecution to known human rights violators was in direct conflict with the sovereign state’s obligation to enforce international conventions on gross human rights violations such as torture, war crimes, and extrajudicial killings. In addition to claims concerning the obligation of individual states to uphold international conventions, critics argued that amnesties undermine the long-term stability of a democratic society that values rule of law. Although the short-term contribution of amnesties to social stability in a transitional society is recognized by opponents of amnesty, the perceived repercussions of allowing violators to escape accountability were considered far too detrimental to overlook. Lastly, from the perspectives of the victims and their families, amnesty violates the right to a fair trial, the right to judicial protection, the right to justice, and the right to a remedy. In response to these critiques, proponents of amnesty argued that the inclusion of conditional amnesty in the South African reconciliation process was a necessary political compromise. The inclusion of conditional amnesties was imperative to ensure the participation of the former regime in the reconciliation process. The African National Congress’s (ANC) decision to pursue political transition through negotiation, instead of revolution or overthrow of the National Party, required some sacrifices. In the words of ANC Parliament Member Willie Hofmeyr, “We [the ANC] had to accept early on that we would not get complete justice.”24 In addition to the political motivations for amnesty supporters, he argued that the knowledge of the past gained in exchange for the amnesty would provide at least partial justice to the victims and society. Similarly, exposing the truth would force individual perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions. Although the institutions of apartheid perpetuated the suffering experienced by the population, individual South Africans committed the violence, and it would be those same individuals who would need to be invested in the success of South Africa’s transition to democracy. The underpinnings of the amnesty debate can be traced back to the opposing frameworks of retributive and restorative justice. While the critics of amnesty advocate for
22  23  24  Graybill, Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? 7. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 34. Graybill, Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa Miracle or Model? 59.

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proportional punishment through strict enforcement of the law to motivate societal progress and democratization after oppression, the champions of restorative reconciliation strongly disagree. The emotional scars of apartheid could not be healed with a magic wand or expected to disappear in the advent of democracy. A Nuremberg-style retributive justice through prosecution was suggested as a means of dealing with South Africa’s past. The societal story of apartheid resembled the horror of the Holocaust, and, as a result, the derived parallel between both situations is reasonable. However, the flaw of the Nuremberg system as identified by Desmond Tutu was that it merely provided a victor’s justice. The victor’s justice would place the ANC victors above the National Party losers, even though both parties were responsible for the violence. After World War II, because the accused had no say in the matter and despite the fact that the Russians who sat in judgment were themselves guilty of human rights violations perpetrated under Stalin, a bitter feeling of resentment was instilled in the Germans. The resentment the Germans possessed was against foreigners, Russians, but if this same pattern of resentment were to be repeated in South Africa, it would have serious consequences, as both sides of the conflict needed to learn to peacefully coexist within the same society.

Case Analyses
In evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s approach to societal healing, the murder of Amy Biehl provides an illustrative case. A Fulbright scholar from California, Biehl had been an active participant in the anti-apartheid student movement at Stanford University, and, when given the opportunity, she chose to travel to South Africa to further pursue her anti-apartheid activism at the University of the Western Cape. On August 25, 1993, Biehl offered to give some of her fellow students and friends a ride back to their homes in the Guguletu Township. Upon arrival, Biehl and her friends were surprised by an angry mob of black militants chanting anti-white slogans as they stoned and stabbed her to death. She was 26-years-old. Four young men were found guilty of her murder, and each was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. With the advent of the amnesty process as a part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Biehl’s killers applied for amnesty. To the surprise of many, Linda and Peter Biehl, Amy’s parents, did not oppose the application for amnesty filed by her killers, but instead embraced the Truth and Reconciliation process. Through the hearing, it was learned that the men responsible for the murder of their daughter were members of the Pan-Africanist Students Organization, the student wing of the Pan-African Congress (PAC). One of the men responsible for Biehl’s death, Nteobeko Peni, explained in his testimony that the seemingly mindless, violent death of young activist Biehl was political, “The order was that we should make South Africa ungovernable, burn down government

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vehicles-and every white person we came across an enemy.”25 Another petitioner, Mangezi Manquina explained “I stabbed Amy Biehl because I saw her as a target, a settler.”26 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Biehl’s supported the commission’s decision to grant amnesty to the petitioners, concluding that apartheid is what had really killed their daughter, and not the four men sitting in front of them. The structure of the amnesty process created by the TRC valued learning the truth above all else. Amnesty hearings were not intended to mirror the function of a criminal trial. There was no need for strategic questions or omissions of incriminating information - it was about forgiveness. Essential to the success of the restorative justice process was the rehabilitation of offenders. Easy Nofemela and Ntobeko Peni, two of the men responsible for Amy’s death, would take steps to reintegrate into South African society, guided by the Biehls themselves as employees of the charity they created in their daughter’s honor. In speaking about the men, Linda Biehl stated, “Easy and Ntobeko are fascinating, and I really do love them…They have given me so much.”27 Through the rehabilitation process, these men have transitioned from violent political activists to productive members of their society, devoting their time to running after-school programs and job skills workshops for former anti-apartheid activists in Guguletu and other townships in the Cape flats. The second case analysis, the Cradock 4 story, illuminates the participation of the Afrikaner police in the murder of anti-apartheid activists. As a young man, Eric Taylor was recruited to join the South African Security Police. He excelled in the force, firmly believing his service would aid in South Africa’s fight against communism. As his career progressed and he rose in ranks, his orders became increasingly more violent and ultimately required him to kill “enemies of the state.” 28 For years, Taylor was haunted by his violent involvement in maintaining the apartheid system. Seeking resolution for his emotional turmoil, he petitioned for amnesty for his actions in what became known as the Cradock 4 murders. In his testimony before the commission, Taylor recounted a night in 1985 when he and fellow security special operations officers intercepted four United Democratic Front activists on their way home from a meeting in Port Elizabeth. The activists were murdered and their bodies burned by the officers and left on the side of the road. The truth was hidden from the families and the community that loved them as the police justified the men’s deaths as the actions of a rival anti-apartheid group. Eric Taylor’s application for amnesty was not born of fear but of regret. In his testimony, he explains, “…Amnesty is a technical matter and will do nothing towards reconciliation. I have realized that the only way to find peace is to tell the families, wives, children, brothers, and sisters that I am sorry for a lot that happened and to
25  26  27  28  Amnesty Hearing, Cape Town, July 8, 1997. Amnesty Hearing. Scott Kraft, “A Journey of Forgiveness for Amy Biehl’s Killers” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008. Piet Meiring, Chronicle of the Truth Commission (Thorold’s Africana Books, 1999): 126.

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ask them if they can find strength through God to forgive.”29 While some members of the grieving families embraced his apology, the widow of Fort Calata (one of the Cradock 4) rejected his apologies, criticizing him for his unrealistic expectation of forgiveness. Taylor’s admissions of guilt and responsibility would never bring back Nomonde Calata’s husband or her children’s father, but neither could a prosecution. Resistance to forgiveness is natural and does not discredit the effectiveness of open dialogue in the reconciliation process. The goal of restorative justice for South Africa was to create a secure foundation for the people of South Africa to confront the horrors of their shared national past. Taylor’s participation in the TRC amnesty process showed his acknowledgement of the importance of individual participation from offenders and victims in the healing process. Before the TRC, the perpetrator of apartheid was a faceless state devoid of emotion and impossible to engage. Sicelo Mhlawuli, the daughter of one of the Cradock 4 activists, explained at a Committee on Human Rights Violations hearing “We want to forgive, but we don’t know who to forgive.”30 The identification of offenders through the TRC process makes it easier for members of a society to move on. Instead of having to forgive the entire system that oppressed them, the victims are able to focus their efforts on individuals with whom they can engage and question. The restorative nature of the TRC process considers the importance of the emotional health of the population as essential to the progression towards an open democratic society. Retributive justice punishes the guilty and establishes rule of law, but it cannot teach a society to trust.

Conclusion
Retributive and restorative approaches to justice are a means to achieve a single end: the fulfillment of the societal need for resolution of rule-breaking actions. Retributive justice seeks to inflict humiliation and proportional punishment on parties identified as guilty offenders. The psychological desire to control behavior motivates proponents of retributive justice to view unilateral punishment as the only option able to restore the sense of justice violated when an offender commits an act of violence or other rule-breaking transgression. Manifested in the Nuremberg Trials, retributive justice uses proportional punishment to maintain rule of law as a society democratizes. Nonetheless, retributive justice fails to account for its tendency to perpetuate the cycle of retribution and reprisal. The importance of reconciliation as an essential element in societal healing is ignored within the retributive justice framework. In contrast, restorative justice recognizes that the capacity of the victims to positively participate in the new transitional society is linked to experiences of their offenders.
29  30  Meiring, Chronicle of the Truth Commission,126. Human Rights Violations (HRV) hearing, East London, April 16, 1996.

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Consequently, restorative justice seeks to address transgressions through the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into society. As seen in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, it is crucial for both the victims and offenders to have a stake in the healing process. Societal reconstruction cannot be pursued through a single perspective. Just as it is inappropriate to perpetuate a victor’s justice system, it is equally inappropriate to implement a victor’s society. Although one political party or subset of the population may be responsible for a significant majority of the violence – as was arguably the case in apartheid-era South Africa – the victims and the offenders must be equal partners in the transition process. The equality of both sides is essential in order to prevent the recreation of a climate of discrimination that serves only the victor’s needs. Restorative justice is a viable and preferred alternative to retributive justice because it serves a greater purpose: societal healing. By requiring human rights violations to be accounted for, making victims confront their perpetrators, and emphasizing individual motivations as prerequisites to forgiveness and reconciliation, the “never again” normative principle is established. This attitude as described by Desmond Tutu is what prevents societies from experiencing regressive changes during periods of transition. Only through exposing the whole truth of the past can a society ensure that the horrors will not be repeated. Awareness of the truth, even if it is painful, ensures that memory of the past will be considered as the society’s plan for the future is drafted. The “never again” principle, as embodied by the TRC process, is an essential safeguard against ignorance because it forces the victims and offenders to confront the events of the past and identify the causes of the oppression and violence together. It reaches past punishing the guilty and strives for a reprioritization of societal values to discourage violence from occurring in the future. Retributive justice is effective in the short-term, but, in order to ensure the longevity of societal healing and a peaceful transition, restorative justice is vital to the survival of open democracy in a transitional state.

Bibliography
Amnesty Hearing, Cape Town, July 8, 1997. Crocker, David A., “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” Truth v. Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 100. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. “truth commission,” accessed December 1, 2012. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Havard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research (2002): 618-619. Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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Graybill, Lyn S., Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa Miracle or Model? (2002), 6. Hensel, Paul, “The More Things Change: Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict”, Conflict and Peace Management (2002): 28. “Holocaust Museum,” Holocaust Enclyopedia (2012): accessed November 29, 2012, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005143. Human Rights Violations (HRV) hearing, East London, April 16, 1996. Kraft, Scott, “A Journey of Forgiveness for Amy Biehl’s Killers” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008. Meiring, Piet, Chronicle of the Truth Commission (Thorold’s Africana Books, 1999): 126. Office of the President of South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (1995): 34. Rotberg, Robert, “Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation,” 10-11. Storey, Robert G., Tennessee Law Review (1945-1947): 519. Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness (2000): 264. Wenzel, Michael, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather and Michael J. Platow, “Restorative and Retributive Justice” Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2008): 375-381.

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Australian Identity Through Decades of War
Gabriel Yue
Within Australia, debates over the necessity of fighting “other peoples’ wars” have been reignited due to the societal costs of its participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. However, the impact of Australia’s involvement in global conflict has not all been negative. This essay argues that Australia’s participation in WWI saw the creation of the ANZAC legend, which has since been essential to the Australian identity. It emphasizes that too much weight is placed on the efforts to demystify the legend and that not enough significance is given to its role as a powerful nation-building tool. This essay further argues that WWII resulted in a concrete alliance with the United States that provided the foundation for Australia’s security and economic stability. These conditions in turn led to the country’s rise as an influential middle power. The emergence of the ANZAC legend following both of these world wars has ultimately done much to benefit Australia. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in two of the longest lasting conflicts in recent memory and took a toll socially, politically, and economically on all the states that participated in and contributed to the conflicts. The United States suffered a $6 trillion cost for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a toll representing almost 40% of its ever-increasing national debt.1 Australia, too, has been involved in most American military engagements since World War I, and it has not been spared from the toll of the conflicts. Accompanying these conflicts are the calls against going to war. Two primary arguments are made: that there is a heavy burden on the economy, where money can be better spent on social goods, and that it is morally questionable to sacrifice Australian lives to defend citizens of states so distant from Australia that they cannot concern Australia’s national security. However, Australia has had much to gain from its participation in the wars that it has been a part of – particularly in World Wars I and II. The loss of life and suffering, caused by WWI, spawned the mythological ANZAC spirit which has been critical to building the very notion of Australia as a nation and has provided the foundations for building a unique national identity. This is demonstrated by identifying the criticisms surrounding the ANZAC spirit and justifying them with regards to the necessity of said spirit. Furthermore, WWII saw the forging of a military alliance with the U.S. (referred to as the ANZUS alliance), which created a series
1  Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy Of Iraq And Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard: Harvard Kennedy School, 2013.

ANZAC and ANZUS

Gabriel Yue is a second year student at the Australian National University majoring in International Relations and minoring in Political Science.

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of knock-on effects that have allowed Australia to elevate itself in the international system, much to its benefit in the following decades. These ‘knock-on’ effects include the ANZUS Treaty, The United States – Australia Free Trade Agreement, Australia’s continuing involvement in U.S.-led conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the presence of U.S. bases on Australian soil. Critics have charged that the ANZUS alliance has impeded Australia’s freedom to act as it wants, making domestic and foreign policy subject to American whims and turning it into a de facto American satellite.2 However, as a direct consequence to the continuing alliance between Australia and the U.S. since WWII, Australia has gained a boost in security both in political and economic terms, allowing itself to be transformed into an influential middle power, capable of pursuing national interests and exerting influence far beyond its prior level. WWI gave rise to the idea of the ANZAC spirit and gave Australia a sense of nationhood. The ANZAC spirit has been described as a nationally defining character trait, holding that Australian soldiers (and by extension, Australian citizens) should espouse the qualities of courage, mateship, endurance and larrikinism. The ANZAC spirit was arguably borne out of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign and the subsequent battles of WWI that saw the loss of some 49,000 (out of four million) Australian lives. It has been suggested that the term ‘ANZAC,’ while initially meant to abbreviate the Australian and New Zealand Army Corp, has been reclaimed by nationalistic fervour and entered national mythology so much so that it is now held sacrosanct; it can be used to mean any possible permutation of positive attributes. Any dissension against it is seen as unpatriotic and un-Australian (Seal 2007). Critics cite modern retellings of the ANZAC spirit as distorting our understanding of historical fact and replacing it with mythology. Examples include hailing John Simpson Kirkpatrick as a war hero when, in fact, he enlisted in the war effort as a means to get home to England; or claiming that Australian soldiers fought well despite poor British intelligence at the Gallipoli landing.3 Ernest Renan qualifies a nation as being a nation when its constituents share a past of “glorious heritage and regret” and have “suffered, hoped and enjoyed together.”4 In his argument, the crux of nationhood lies in collective memory – “the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories.”5 This is in stark contrast to the proposal of political theorist Benedict Anderson, who argues that the conception of a nation depends on the belief

2 

David McLean. “From British Colony To American Satellite? Australia And The USA During The Cold War.” Australian Journal Of Politics & History 52, no. 1 (March 2006): 64-79. 3  Jenny Macleod. “The Fall And Rise of Anzac Day: 1965 And 1990 Compared.” War & Society 20, no. 1 (May 2002): 149-168. 4  Ernest Renan. “What Is A Nation?” trans. Martin Thom, In Becoming National: A Reader, by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 41-55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 5  Ernest Renan. “What Is A Nation?’

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in fundamental similarities among the members of a nation.6 Despite the strong AngloSaxon ancestral ties that Australia has to Britain, it was the disdain for class and desire for egalitarianism that set the identity of the “Australian” individual and nation apart from the “British” cultural predecessor. This wedge was the first step in defining Australia as having a distinct individual cultural and national identity, therefore separating it from its ancestral mother state. Additionally, the painful loss of lives is a cornerstone in the establishment and construction of the Australian national identity. It is through this constant teaching and reteaching of the disasters of WWI and how they spawned the ANZAC myth that subsequent generations of Australians are able to build a set of ideals that is nationally shared and with which all Australians can identify. Certainly, courage and loyalty are universally respected traits that are not unique to Australia, but it is through the amalgamation with the sacrifice of the Australian soldiers that the idea of the ANZAC was first created and subsequently promulgated. As Renan notes, the universality of these ideals can be understood and internalized despite differences in ethnicity or language.7 This enables the ANZAC spirit to circumvent the fact that, while most of the soldiers who died were of Caucasian descent, subsequent generations of migrants and new Australians can internalize and identify with said qualities. This deep sense of nationhood and pride was extended to honoring the deaths of regular Australian citizens, such as those who died in the 2002 Bali bombing incident, likening the victims to being the modern counterparts of the original ANZAC.8 With prominent Australian sportsmen among the casualties, the media and politicians were able to frame their suffering in such a way that the images of said tourists were aligned with the suffering of pioneering soldiers in WWI.9 Recent evidence has also called into question the idea that Australian soldiers were poorly led or were fighting against insurmountable odds, yet this should not detract from the fact that the national myth of the ANZAC spirit has spurred many generations of Australians to work for the betterment of the nation.10 It is of utmost importance to note that the ANZAC spirit, which originated a century before, is neither a political tool nor a reclaimed, radical, quasi-nationalist sentiment. The ANZAC spirit is perhaps the most indelible legacy of WWI to Australia – a series of positive traits that a nation wants its warriors and its civilians to possess.
6  Benjamin Anderson. Imagined Communities:Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism. (New York: Verso, 1991). 7  Ernest Renan. “What Is A Nation?” 41-55. 8  Brad West. “Collective Memory And Crisis: The 2002 Bali Bombing, National Heroic Archetypes, And The Counter-Narrative Of Cosmopolitan Nationalism.” Journal Of Sociology 44, no. 4 (2008), 337-353. 9  West, “Collective Memory And Crisis: The 2002 Bali Bombing, National Heroic Archetypes, And The Counter-Narrative Of Cosmopolitan Nationalism.” 337-353. 10  Hugh Dolan. “The Australian Landings On Gallipoli: Myth Versus Reality.” United Service 62, no. 2 (June 2011): 21-23.

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WWII marked the beginning of an alliance with the U.S. that has been to Australia’s benefit in the past six decades. It also saw the beginnings of an autonomous Australian foreign policy, free from British interference. The ANZUS alliance has greatly elevated Australia’s prestige in the international system, allowing it to further pursue its strategic interests. Firstly, the participation of the U.S. in WWII after the attack on Pearl Harbor was the perfect justification for Australia to jump on the bandwagon of a rising world power. As Britain’s status as the global hegemon waned, Australia looked to cement ties with a new security guarantor without losing diplomatic ties with Britain. Having always seen itself as an “outpost of the West,” the alliance with the U.S. was the surest way to gain security in light of the aggressive imperial Japanese expansions in the Pacific region. As scholars of international relations will note, this is simply a reflection of prevailing realist assumptions that a state acts in self-maximising ways; Australia was seeking to bandwagon with a rising power as their original backers waned, by providing soil on which to base the forthcoming U.S. troops to fight off existential threats in the form of the Japanese. This resulted in an obvious win-win situation for Australia in which it could use its solidified backing from the United States as a deterrent from a Japanese invasion. In addition, the shared communications between Allies in WWII gave birth to the UKUSA Agreement, bringing into a single collective the signals intelligence (SIGINT) of the U.S., Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The implications of sharing the duties of monitoring various parts of the globe meant that Australia was now recognised by the rising hegemon as a state worth sharing confidential information, and thus a significant relationship, with. As some have observed, the lack of this partnership would mean that Australia is deemed a minor ally with which the U.S. has merely an ad hoc relationship.11 This alliance formed the basis of relations that later came to be solidified in the ANZUS Treaty and the United States – Australia Free Trade Agreement. Both these pacts straddled Australia’s concern with power and survival, as well as strengthened its economic security. Indeed, these relations have been the basis of much cooperation between Australia and theU.S., with Australia being involved in every major American led conflict. While the loss of lives and morality of war have been unpopular with some citizens, this reaffirms Australia’s commitment to the ANZUS treaty. While theU.S. has more than a few allies that it can rely on, however, not many states are willing to come to its aid with the provision of armed combatants. This most certainly raises the profile of Australia not only in the eyes of America, but in the international system as well. This is reflected in the fact that former President Bush recognized the long-standing relationship with Australia before signing the Australia – United

11 

Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley. “The Australian Intelligence Community.” In Making Australian Foreing Policy, by Al lan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, 133-160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

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States Free Trade Agreement, citing that both states have “never been closer.”12 Surely, this does wonders to boosting Australia’s reputation. It must now be determined whether a wartime alliance between both states was necessary and if there were any alternatives. In truth, this mutually beneficial alliance stemmed from the fact that there were no alternatives. Having seen themselves as being different from the Southeast Asian region, Australian policymakers chose an alliance with a country that they felt they had similarities with. Certainly, Australia’s immediate neighbours were either already invaded by the Japanese (the very enemy that Australia was trying to balance against), or were fundamentally different from Australia in terms of race, language and ideology. Australia could hardly look to Britain for security in the Pacific either. Being tied up in the war for Europe meant Britain did not have the additional resources needed to fund a Pacific campaign.13 Furthermore, as Australian policymakers noted, simple geographical deliberations reflected that Australia had a far larger stake in the Pacific or Southeast Asia than Britain did; what the Far East was to the imperial headquarters was the near north to Australia.14 This demonstrates why an alliance with the U.S. was the only strategic option. Subsequently, the ANZUS alliance limited Australia’s freedom to act as it wanted in the years to come, resulting in obligations to support the United States’ Vietnam War and recognize America’s stance on the non-recognition of a Communist China.15 These trade-offs cannot deny the fact that although Australia traded off some of its ability to act as it pleased, what it gained in turn was the assurance of security and survival – the ultimate goal of any state. The ANZUS alliance between both states ensures stability and security in the East Asia and Asia Pacific regions – the regions that are the fastest growing in terms of population and economic growth (Kakwani and Krongkaew 2000). Indeed, although Australia has traditionally seen itself as being a Western state in a predominantly Asian region, it stands to gain by not only playing a part in stabilizing the region, but also increasing links with the states that are its neighbors; its role is to provide security in Asia, rather than security from Asia. The ANZUS alliance will continue to play a key role in America’s “pivot” towards the Asia Pacific region. As the U.S. withdraws from the Middle East and turns its attention towards the Asia Pacific region to protect its interests, it cannot do so alone – especially in the face of a rising China. The decades-old ANZUS alliance has been brought to bear as a means of providing bases for U.S. troops and hardware that can respond to threats in the immediate
12  Office of the Press Secretary. “President Bush Signs U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement.” The White House. August 3, 2004. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040803-1.html (accessed April 4, 2013). 13  Dean E. McHenry, and Richard N. Rosecrance. “The “Exclusion” Of The United Kingdom From The Anzus Pact.” Interna tional Organization 12, no. 3 (June 1958): 320-329. 14  David McLean. “From British Colony To American Satellite? Australia And The USA During The Cold War.” 64-79. 15  David McLean. “From British Colony To American Satellite? Australia And The USA During The Cold War.” 64-79.

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region. This has not escaped criticism. Political critics have responded to former President George W. Bush’s remark that Australia could be “a sheriff of the region,” pointing out that Australia is merely a crude transplant from another region.16 However, this cannot detract from the fact that through that one off-hand remark, President Bush was able to point out that Australia is a key ally, if not the key ally, in the region. The knowledge that Australia is backed by the most militarily-powerful nation on Earth has allowed itself a measure of great security that could only come about through years of high taxation and channelling vital public funds to defence spending. A penny saved is a penny earned, as the aphorism goes, and all the crucial resources that were ‘saved’ through an alliance with the U.S. has gone into socially beneficial programs for Australia i.e. education, healthcare, social security. These ‘savings’ have gone on to greatly benefit Australia’s domestic constituents, allowing them security through which they can prosper. It is therefore evident that the ANZUS alliance, grounded in WWII relations, is comforting in two ways. First, it provides protection from threats to national security. Second, the prestige that comes with such backing allows Australian politicians to behave, in the region, as if they had a larger military footprint than they could in the absence of American support. Certainly, all wars come with sacrifice. The question that is relevant here is how Australia has come to benefit from conflicts in which it has participated. As seen previously in this essay, the development of a nation is to an extent predicated on taking on, forgetting and glorifying of past sacrifices.17 Indeed, the loss of one percent of fledgling Australia’s population in the First World War was a morbid but necessary event that would create a sense of identity for Australians. I maintain that the most lasting legacy and benefit of Australia’s participation in WWI is the creation of nationhood, and the discourse that surrounds this identity is one that continues to affect Australia today. The criticisms that surround the ANZAC spirit and the accompanying discourse, whether they identify with said spirit, are all part of the dialogue that shapes the unique Australian culture and image, and continues to help Australia carve out its niche in the world today. The ANZUS alliance that was forged in WWII also provides Australia the stability and influence to pursue its national interests, at a basic level of national survival and eventual prosperity, and the ability to shape the arena that it shares with other states seeking out their own interests. Credence given to Australia through said alliance allows it to ‘punch above its weight’ in the past decades despite not being included in the G8 or NATO. The history of international relations is indeed the history of conflict, and it is through these conflicts that Australia has been indelibly shaped for the better.

16 

Brendan O’Connor. “Perspectives On Australian Foreign Policy, 2003.” Australian Journal Of International Affairs 58, no. 2 (June 2004): 207-220. 17  O’Connor. “Perspectives On Australian Foreign Policy, 2003.” 207-220.

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Bibliography
Anderson, Benjamin. Imagined Communities:Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism. (New York: Verso, 1991.) Bilmes, Linda J. The Financial Legacy Of Iraq And Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, (Harvard: Harvard Kennedy School, 2013). Dolan, Hugh. “The Australian Landings On Gallipoli: Myth Versus Reality.” United Service 62, no. 2 (June 2011): 21-23. Gyngell, Allan, and Michael Wesley. “The Australian Intelligence Community.” In Making Australian Foreing Policy, by Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 133-160. Kakwani, Nanak, and Medhi Krongkaew. “Economic Growth, Poverty And Income Inequality In The Asia-Pacific Region.” Journal Of The Asia Pacific Economy 5, no. 1-2 (2000): 9-13. Macleod, Jenny. “The Fall And Rise of Anzac Day: 1965 And 1990 Compared.” War & Society 20, no. 1 (May 2002): 149-168. McHenry, Dean E., and Richard N. Rosecrance. “The “Exclusion” Of The United Kingdom From The Anzus Pact.” International Organization 12, no. 3 (June 1958): 320-329. McLean, David. “From British Colony To American Satellite? Australia And The USA During The Cold War.” Australian Journal Of Politics & History 52, no. 1 (March 2006): 64-79. O’Connor, Brendan. “Perspectives On Australian Foreign Policy, 2003.” Australian Journal Of International Affairs 58, no. 2 (June 2004): 207-220. Office of the Press Secretary. “President Bush Signs U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement.” The White House. August 3, 2004. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2004/08/20040803-1.html (accessed April 4, 2013). Renan, Ernest. “What Is A Nation?” trans. Martin Thom, In Becoming National: A Reader, by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 41-55. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Seal, Graham. “ANZAC: The Sacred In The Secular.” Journal Of Australian Studies 31, no. 91 (2007): 135-144. West, Brad. “Collective Memory And Crisis: The 2002 Bali Bombing, National Heroic Archetypes, And The Counter-Narrative Of Cosmopolitan Nationalism.” Journal Of Sociology 44, no. 4 (2008): 337-353.

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Ending the Self-Perpetuating Violence in the Central African Republic
Jewel Conrad
This research report examines the failures of the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) that have led it, again, into a period of violence and instability; this report proposes what needs to be done in order to end this cycle of violence and raise the Central African Republic out of violence and poverty. On March 24, 2013 the Seleka Coalition, made up of three different rebel groups, overthrew the government and installed an interim government. In order for the CAR to have a chance at future peace and stability the interim government must demobilize rebels, facilitate the delivering of much needed humanitarian aid, and create a power sharing government that has representation from all the rebel groups and offers posts in the government as a mean of coercive disarmament. Long-term peace can be achieved by building accountable institutions and necessary infrastructure that provide the most basic needs to the CAR population, which would require external assistance from international institutions.

Introduction
The Central African Republic is a failed state that lacks the economic infrastructure and political institutions to secure its resources and protect its citizens. Many political scientists and international institutions consider it to be worse than a failed state, calling it a “phantom” or “hollow” state because the government is unable to maintain control of the country and it remains in a state of permanent rebellion. Distrust governs the actions of rebel and governmental actors in the Central African Republic. Rebels seek power and profit as a way to guarantee their individual security in this state that has never been able to provide the protection to its citizens. This has led to a historically self-perpetuating cycle of violence in which the inability of the government to provide security increases the number of rebel opposition groups, which leads to further turmoil and distrust from the government and increases the severity of the government’s authoritarian nature. Additionally, the government uses brutal campaigns to marginalize rebels, which leads to more frequent insurrections and usually will culminate in a violent regime changes. Since its colonial independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been riddled by violence and instability. The CAR remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and according to the Worldbank has the fifth lowest GDP per capita

Jewel Conrad is a senior at the University of Southern California studying International Relations.

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at $489.1 A combination of regional and governmental factors mitigates its underdevelopment. These include that the state is land locked, surrounded by hostile states, and lacks essential infrastructure to facilitate trade. Although the CAR is in fact resource rich and has an immense source of diamonds, uranium, and timber, the government has become kleptocratic and enriches itself from the spoils of the country’s natural resources while the population remains extremely impoverished, a majority of which is reliant on subsistence farming. As is the pattern in the Central African Republic, on March 24, 2013, disgruntled rebels overthrew the government. The many times that the government has been overthrown in the past have been due to its failure to maintain control of the military, to stop insurgent groups, to adhere to agreements brokered with opposition groups, and its inability and unwillingness to provide security and infrastructure to its population. The international community has been half-heartedly involved in the CAR and has tried to provide aid and guidance to its government. However, the CAR remains unsecure and its development has stagnated. The Seleka coalition, made up of four different rebel groups, led the latest coup of the CAR’s government due to the group’s frustration with the government’s failure to implement conditions in a 2008 peace and “power-sharing” agreement between the government and various rebel groups. The Seleka leader Michael Djotodia named himself leader and has been recognized by neighboring central African states after being nominally elected by a transitional council. Djotodia says he will hold elections within 18 months; however, it is unknown if his transitional government will last long since Djotodia does not have control of all of the Seleka rebel groups and many are still committing violence, looting, and causing general disarray because they want power for themselves. Whether the Seleka leader can maintain power while bringing some peace and development to the CAR or whether he will continue the kleptocratic tradition and risk being overthrown by a coup of opposition groups in the future is yet to be determined. In order for Djotodia to maintain power and peace in the CAR, past mistakes of previous leaders must not be repeated and will require the intervention of many external actors to provide security, humanitarian aid, and help expand governmental capacity. First of all, the violence must be put to an end. Additionally, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the rebels must occur immediately along with inviting rebels to take part in a “power-sharing” government. Ideally this would be done prior to the elections scheduled tentatively for August 2014. If the CAR can get through elections without the government collapsing then it can start pursuing economic, military, and institutional reform in order to maintain long-term peace.
1  “Central African Republic Overview,” Worldbank, October 2012, http://www.worldbank.org/country/centralafricanrepublic/ overview.

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Stages of Conflict: Why & How Seleka Came to Power
The Seleka coalition formed due to underlying tensions between Francois Bozizé’s government and rebels. Many rebels who joined the Seleka coalition had previously aided Bozizé in his coup d’etat, which occurred in 2003. Insurrections of rebel groups, who eventually formed Seleka, started in 2005 after Bozizé was formally elected president, and the March 2013 coup d’etat came about after a rigged election in 2011 and two failed peace agreements: one from January 2013 and another from 2007. This section of the paper will expose the underlying motivations of the rebels and government based on Louis Pondy’s 5 stages of conflict.2 These include the pre-conflict conditions, mounting tensions, events triggering violence, crisis management, and post-conflict policies, which made it possible for the 2013 coup d’etat to take place.

Phase 1: Stages of Conflict and Peace Failures
Prior to Bozizé’s government, citizens of the CAR were unhappy with the former leader, President Patasse, whose administration enriched itself at the expense of civilians, marginalized ethnic groups other than President Patasse’s own ethnic group, and mismanaged the economy.3 The military and civil servants were especially disgruntled because Patasse had not paid them for months. After Bozizé launched a successful coup in 2003, he was welcomed by civilians, the military, civil servants, and rebel opposition groups. Citizens of the CAR were hopeful that Bozizé would establish a government that would be inclusive, provide security, and spur economic growth. He announced a national recovery plan, ordered a national dialogue to be held, and promised to end corruption and promote economic recovery. He held elections in 2005 that he easily won. Patasse’s supporters in the northwest were displeased by the coup of their president. Though Bozizé’s government promised recovery, Patasse’s supporters, and those of his ethnic group, were marginalized by Bozizé’s government. Further displeasure stemmed from Bozizé barring Patasse from running in the 2005 election on the basis that he was corrupt and had committed human rights violations. The same could be said of Bozizé’s government in their use of violence for the coup, but not on the scale of Patassé’s supporter Bemba who led the MLC, a group of Congolese soldiers. In fact, the Bozizé government sought to prosecute Bemba for committing human rights violations. Since it lacked the capacity to do so, the government has referred the case to the International Criminal Court and the ICC is in the process of holding Bemba’s trial. The coup and barring of Patasse led
2  3  Louis Pondy, “Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models,” Administrative Science Quarterly: 300. Andreas Mehler, “Rebels and parties: The impact of armed insurgency on representation in the Central African Republic,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49.1 (2011): 122.

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to opposition from Patasse supporters and strongholds and caused opposition groups to form in the northwest. Tensions in the Vakaga region in northeastern Central African Republic were also increasing as many rebels who had fought alongside Bozize’ in his coup were dismissed to this marginalized, lawless region and not given any promised compensation or governmental posts. Vakaga is an underdeveloped region with a wealth of poverty, violence, and rebel groups. It borders Darfur, Sudan and many refugees fleeing the violence in Darfur have sought refuge in Vakaga. Ethnic tensions cause clashes between these different ethnic groups who co-exist. The murder of a Gula (a CAR ethnic group) spiritual leader by Sudanese refugees led to rising tensions between these cultural groups. Sudan resolved the conflict between the Gula and Sudanese by offering compensation to the Gula people; however, the compensation was never given to the Gula because the corrupt government never distributed it to them. Disgruntled with Bozize’s government, the Gula and the ex-rebels formed rebel groups. The presidential election of 2005, resulting in Bozizé’s election, triggered violent insurrections in the northeast and northwest of rebel groups who were displeased with the leader and his government. The Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (ARPD) rebel group in the northwest and the Union of Democratic Forces for Liberty (UFDR) rebel group in the northeast seized cities throughout the Central African Republic. This caused several other rebel groups to spring up amongst the violence and begin their own opposition movements. The government responded by sending in its military, the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), which has a history of killing civilians and committing human rights violations. The FACA killed both rebels and civilians and burned down villages in their quest to draw out and defeat the rebels. Responding to Bozizé’s request, French troops intervened and aided the FACA with a small bombing campaign. By doing so they were able to regain the territory and force the rebels to a ceasefire agreement. In partnership with the UN and government of Gabon, the Central African Republic created the Global Peace Accords that the UFDR, ARPD, and FDPC signed in Libreville, Gabon during 2008. The peace agreement granted amnesty to the rebels and the liberation of political prisoners, the reintegration of rebels who were previously in the armed forces, the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of rebel fighters into society, and a followup committee to create a national dialogue and establish representative posts in the government for the opposition groups. The follow up committee came together in 2008 in the form of the Inclusive Political Dialogue talks which included the government and ethnic and rebel groups in order to continue to thwart tensions and build confidence in the government. The UFDR, ARPD, UFR, and MLCJ rebel groups participated along with six distinct ethnic groups. The talks were Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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extremely successful and addressed a comprehensive demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program for rebel forces, security reform, and a power sharing government. Institutional reform was also decided upon such as audits on government revenue. President Bozizé invited each rebel group that took part in the talks to propose two representatives for a new consensus government. Also, a reform to the electoral committee was provisioned to fix laws and codes in election laws in order to promote free, fair, unrigged elections.

Phase 2: Unresolved Conflicts
The fragile peace in the Central African Republic began to unravel again when rebels realized that Bozizé was not upholding many of the agreements reached at the Inclusive Political Dialogue and the Global Peace Accords. Instead, he was becoming more authoritarian and tightening his monopoly on power. The general population and rebel groups voiced their frustrations that minimal reforms were implemented, including the incomplete disarmament and compensation of rebel groups, non-adherence to agreements to release political prisoners and grant amnesty to rebels, and not reforming governance to include representation of rebel groups. The failure to implement key components of the peace agreement is the biggest reason for the failure of peace and resumption of violence. The agreement did establish a committee to monitor the government’s implementation but it did not provide this committee with any real power. Weaknesses with the disarmament program were not providing security to disbanded rebels and not seeking to disband other rebel groups not involved in the agreement. This increased insecurity and decreased adherence to the peace agreement. The government did start the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) process but bureaucratic and funding issues caused implementation issues and a lack of funds to compensate rebels with. The government was able to effectively disband some rebel groups, however it did not provide enough security or incentive for rebel groups who were defending their territory against other rebel groups. For example, the UFDR faced a new challenge from the new CPJP rebel group comprised of mostly the Kara tribe and refused to demobilize since it was threatened by other forces. The UFDR and CPJP rebel groups both operated in the northeast and clashed in their attempt to control diamond sources in the region. The government left 10,000 rebels armed and frustrated about not being compensated or integrated into security forces, causing instability. Adherence to the designated policies and an inclusive dialogue would have led to peace in the Central African Republic, however like all of his predecessors Bozizé did not keep his promises and instead decided to hold a monopoly on power and prosper from aid money and resource money while the general population suffered. The failure of the government to implement a power sharing system that would create an electoral committee representative of the rebel and ethnic groups caused representatives from rebel groups to harbor displeasure and distrust of the Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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government. Ironically, the government’s refusal to implement reforms that would diminish its power is what caused it to lose control by increasing ill-will among rebels. Support from the international community and security guarantees would have incentivized the government to implement reforms. A failure of the Inclusive Talks and Global Peace Accords was a lack of using international actors to secure their agendas; in this situation third party guarantees are needed to make secure and successful reforms. The failure of implementation was both a lack of ability and unwillingness on the part of the government and this led to its downfall. Amidst the government’s failure to uphold its peace agreement or promises of recovery, the presidential election of 2011 triggered the rebels to organize themselves into action. With the corrupt government and disgruntled citizens of the CAR, Bozizé was not well situated to win the election. Therefore, his government rigged the election. The rigged 2011 election was the last straw for the rebels, showing them that this government would not adhere to any agreements or benefit the country. The Seleka coalition, formed in December of 2012, brought together four rebel groups, the Union of Democratic Forces for Liberty (UFDR) and The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro (CPSK), and the Democratic Front of Central African People (FDCP). They claimed that the reason for their offensive was the failure of Bozizé to provide promised compensation and release political prisoners agreed to in the 2008 Global Peace accords. Two of the rebel groups, the UFDR and CPJP, had previously signed the ceasefire agreement of 2008 and the UFDR participated in the all-inclusive talks held in 2008. Ironically enough, both of these forces also jockeyed over resources in the northeast, but found they were stronger together showing that the Seleka coalition also had monetary motivations. They started their offensive in December of 2012 because of frustration with President Francois Bozizé’s government and its failure to uphold stipulations of peace agreements between rebels and the government in 2008. When Seleka was only 100km away from the capital Bangui, Boizizé was forced to ask for peace talks, which rebels agreed to. They took place in Libreville, Gabon and in January the peace talks culminated in an agreement to create a power sharing government in adherence to a ceasefire. The resulting political agreement stipulated that Boizizé could continue his governmental term until 2016 but could not run for president again. The agreement called for the appointment of a new prime minister from Seleka who would serve as head of state for a twelve month term, after which reelection would be possible. The agreement called for an inclusive government that would remain established for a year and could also be reelected. This government would consist of the presidential majority, the democratic opposition, the politico-military groups, the Séléka coalition, and civil society. In February, the government did in fact appoint Seleka rebels and leaders to position in the government and appointed Nicholas Tiangye from the opposition as prime minister. However, the deal Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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did not hold and the rebels resumed fighting and took the capital, Bangui, on March 24, 2013, effectively overthrowing Bozizé. The failure of the peace agreement was due to two large factors. First, it was too little, too late. The Bozizé regime waited too long to address the rebels and only did so once they and the rebels knew that Bozizé’s regime could be successfully overthrown. Secondly, the agreements were not reached through negotiations that included the rebels. Rebels criticized the peace deal as neglecting grievances of the CAR rebels and giving preference to those of the government.4 This was a failure on the part of negotiating parties who did not actively include the warring parties in negotiations. Another factor is the conflicting interests created by the coalition of four different rebel groups, some of whom criticized the rebel representatives there for accepting a peace agreement they deemed unacceptable. Given these three factors, resumption of violence was inevitable. Collectively, Seleka had no interest in pursuing peace involving him or his regime and disposed of his regime. Their leader, Michael Djotodia, declared himself president, abolished the constitution, and said he would rule by decry. However, due to the violence of the overthrow, the international and regional community condemned the coup and refused to recognize him as leader. The UN, United States, France, many leaders in central Africa, and the African Union condemned the coup and the African Union failed to recognize Djotodia as a legitimate ruler. In N’djamena, Chad a summit of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was held to create a regional response. The ECCAS members stressed the need for legitimacy before they could move forward in aiding or intervening in the Central African Republic. At the request of the summit leaders, Djotodia agreed to hold elections within 18 months and establish a National Transitional Council to elect a leader in order to legitimize his role. Djtodia was the only candidate for leader, and was of course elected as leader. However, this is not to be confused with the title of president, as he is not considered legitimately elected but may participate in elections that will be held in the upcoming 18 months. All the while, conditions in the Central African Republic are deteriorating. There continues to be widespread looting, violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Djotodia had agreed to get rebels off of the streets of Bangui and other towns and into camps, but he lacks the capacity to do so. Since the Seleka coalition is made up of four different rebel groups there is a clear lack of organization and communication between the factions. Even though they have effectively overthrown the government, violent clashes between rebels, the military, and civilians continue to the point that Djotodia, leader of the Seleka, needs military aid to contain his rebel coalition. Djotodia has called on regional and international forces to aid him in restoring order and regional leaders have agreed to supply more troops. The
4  Tendai Marima, “Central African Republic: Rebel Surge Shatters Fragile Peace,” Think African Presss, accessed March 22, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201303250009.html?page2.

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FOMAC forces, of the ECCAS, have proven insufficient and 2,000 more troops will be sent by states in the region. Containing the conflict, and once again trying to build a legitimate government and sustained peace in the Central African Republic will be a long, hard road and one which will need much assistance from outside forces in order to not repeat mistakes of past peace agreements and failures to implement reforms.

External Actors – Roles and Motivations
Due to its history of violence, the Central African Republic has had many external forces providing assistance in the area of governance, military, and humanitarian aid. Regional states in Central Africa and institutions such as the African Union and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) continue to provide guidance and military aid to the Central African Republic in the hope that it can help the CAR achieve some semblance of stability. France, being the CAR’s former colonial power, has had a relationship of intervention with the CAR, though now it does not want to be involved in the conflict. The UN and many non-governmental organizations also are extremely invested in the Central African Republic, and provide humanitarian and technical assistance. Additionally, the World Bank and IMF have active projects in the CAR and provide funds for development projects. The ECCAS has played a major role in coordinating peace talks in Libreville, Gabon and is playing an integral role in shaping the way forward for the Central African Republic. The interests of the ECCAS and regional leaders are the stability of the region. The CAR presents a security threat because conflict and refugees spillover into nearby states. The ECCAS and regional leaders have the capacity and will to aid the Central African Republic and will be integral in providing security and ending violence in the CAR. The ECCAScoordinated summit held in N’djadena, Chad established the regional response to the situation in the CAR, as before mentioned in the post-conflict section. The ECCAS and other regional powers will continue to play an integral role in establishing order in the Central African Republic. Furthermore, it is a good sign that leader Djotodia is adhering to their stipulations amongst the growing insecurity in the CAR. The ECCAS will hold another summit in the April 2013 where Djotodia will be allowed to attend since his governance has been established as legitimate. France’s role in the CAR has gone from extremely interventionist and neo-colonial to a hands-off approach. France only maintains troops in the CAR to provide security to its citizens there, and despite both Bozizé and now Djotodia’s call for French troops to provide security to the CAR, France has refused. After withdrawing their troops from the CAR in 1997, when a UN peacekeeping force arrived, France has still been economically and governmentally tied to the CAR. Just in 2006, France aided Bozizé in putting down rebels in their first separatist campaign, which it was criticized for aiding a brutal struggle and Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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decimating villages in a northern region. France’s colonial policy has changed and President Francois has declared its objective “to protect our nationals and our interests and in no way to intervene in the internal business of a country...Those days are over.”5 This is an interesting statement given France’s current involvement in Mali, suggesting that France simply has no interest in the CAR and does not consider Bozizé’s or Djotodia’s regime worth saving. Bozizé and now Djotodia both have invited France to provide military support so it would not be a violation of the nation’s sovereignty. France has no real interest in intervening in the CAR as it has in the past, due to changing colonial and economic ties. However, France does provide a majority of troops to the MICOPAX, the European Union security force deployed in the Central African Republic which is used by the ECCAS works in partnership with FOMC. The MICOPAX and FOMC troops will help the government retain sovereignty because the pledge of regional troops will boost the legitimacy of its government and also create security for the regime. If the CAR government is able to provide security, even with the help of external actors, it will be sovereign in its country because it will gain a monopoly over force, which the government has not ever possessed in the CAR. The UN’s role in the Central African Republic has included one peacekeeping mission in 1997 and a human rights mission in 2007, which resulted in a permanent office there. However, this office has no security troops and only provides structural support and policy recommendations. The UN and Security Council have done little to aid the reduction of violence in the CAR. They condemn the coup and violence but have not deployed any troops and have only observed and participated in administering peace talks. The UN’s interest in the situation in the CAR is to provide humanitarian support; its members do not have an incentive to intervene there militarily since there are not enough economic, political, or humanitarian issues in the form of mass human rights atrocities. The UNHCR and UNICEF are involved in providing humanitarian aid to the CAR but have reduced their efforts due to a lack of security in the CAR. The UN has pledged its intervention but it will not be using force, which makes sense, given that members of its Security Council, including France and the United States, do not want to intervene. At this point in the conflict, given the ECCAS response, the UN’s role in providing humanitarian support will be sufficient. Though additional troops to aid security would help, the 2,000 arriving from ECCAS states in late 2013 should be sufficient. However, the CAR will need the UN’s technical assistance in moving forward and monitoring the newly established government, once it is established, to make sure that it implements promised reforms and is held accountable. Third party monitoring will be essential in maintaining a sense of trust in the government and upholding long-term peace.
5  Aufa Hirsch, “Central African Republic rebels advance towards capital,” The Guardian, December 13, 2012, http://www. guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/27/central-african-republic-rebels-capital.

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Short Term Peace
For the Central African Republic, the meaning of “peace” in the short term is to end violence from operational rebel groups, create a power sharing transitional government, and stop a food security crisis from occurring. All of this must be achieved before scheduled elections in 18 months, in order for the elections to bring about further stability and not increased violence. Peace in the Central African Republic will not come quickly or easily. The first priority of the Central African Republic and regional powers is to stop the violence occurring locally. The rebels are still looting and clashing with the population of Bangui and the Central African Republic. Michael Djotodia, though the Seleka leader, never had full control of the rebel force because it is made up of four distinct groups. Currently, many of these rebel groups continue to operate despite their Seleka leader gaining power. The motivation of the rebels to form a coalition was to overthrow the government, but they never established a clear plan of power sharing once the government was disposed of. Nelson N’djadder, rebel leader of the CPSK of Seleka, has claimed that Djotodia is implementing policies which they had not agreed upon and his rebel group will keep operating and seek to attack Djotodia. Djotodia does not have the capacity to stop the rebels; he needs more support from international and regional powers. He needs them immediately, especially before elections, which he promised will take place in 18 months. Once violence is stopped, the rebels can be disarmed and reintegrated into society. The regional powers and ECCAS have pledged to aid Djotodia with the deployment of 2,000 troops. This should be a sufficient amount to bring about short-term peace since it will supplement the 500 FOMC troops already there. These forces will face the remaining fighters from the originally approximately 3,500 rebels that comprise Seleka’s armed contingent. Djotodia has said that he plans to take rebels off of the street and put them into camps. The rebels need to be taken off the streets and stopped from committing violence; however, forcibly removing them and putting them in a camp is a breeding ground for violence and dissatisfaction. The CAR must learn from its past policies. After Bozizé led his coup and took power in 2003, he sent rebels, who had fought alongside him and that he did not want to deal with, to Vakaga, which caused a disgruntled group of rebels to start insurrections after he was elected president in 2005. Ultimately, these rebels contributed in overthrowing his government during the most recent 2013 coup. If Djotodia can successfully place rebels into camps, there needs to be a quick turn-around to reintegrate rebels into society and official armed forces. Otherwise, the situation will again deteriorate and lead to new insurrections after presidential elections. Instead of forcing rebels into capture, mixing force with economic and power incentives are more beneficial ways to demobilize rebel forces. A program similar to the DDR (demobilization, disbarment, reintegration) program implemented under Bozizé should be Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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drafted, but it will need to be monitored, implemented, and partially funded by third party actors because Djotodia does not have the capacity to do so. The success of first demobilization, and the disarmament of rebels and the program to reintegrate them into society will be reliant on international monetary and military aid. Restoring security is the top priority in the Central African Republic and will take manpower. If regional governments fail to contribute promised troops to add security and the UN does not get involved in providing forces, the country will continue to implode. The government institutions and structures of the CAR are insufficient and do not provide basic infrastructure, security, or needs of the state’s citizens. The largest failures of governance in the CAR have been the inability to provide security, proper compensation for civil servants and military forces, and an inclusive government. Instead, power has been concentrated in the hands of one ruler and his particular ethnic group and family members. This perpetuates a cycle wherein all the tension created by the presence of rebel forces has led rulers to become extremely authoritarian and not adhere to inclusive governance agreements, which in turn makes opposition groups more disgruntled and contributes to insurrections. This trend must end and be counteracted by forming an inclusive “power-sharing” government with security guarantees from outside forces. This will help to incentivize rebels to demobilize and create a much more stable CAR if rebel groups feel that they are being heard and that their security and economic welfare is provided for. Djotodia is adhering to some of the stipulations from the January peace agreements. The agreement stipulated a government of national unity, which included democratic opposition and political-military groups. This was expected to restore peace, security, and dissolve the National Assembly and hold new elections.6 Djotodia has dissolved the National Assembly and put together a temporary government, but it is not one that is inclusive of all of the rebels or opposition groups that he faced. Offering and encouraging rebels to gain posts in the National Assembly if they lay down their weapons can contribute to a short-term peace during this transitional period. This would serve as coercive means for still-operating rebels to disarm. The Central African Republic is almost ungovernable with so many groups who have profit and power as their motive, but an inclusive government backed by regional forces may be able to bring some semblance of peace. The failure of previous peace agreements in 2008 and early 2013 to bring about lasting peace is not because the policies or ideas were not well thought out, but because they were never implemented or implemented too little, too late. The establishment of a National Assembly based on principles, presented by political scientist Stephen Stedman, of proportionality between the four rebel groups which comprise
6  “6899th Meeting,” United Nations Security Council, Official Records of the Security Council, January 11, 2013, http://www. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6899.pdf.

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Seleka would signal to the opposition and population of the CAR that the government is willing to respect all groups in the CAR.7 Djotodia and the rebels wanted a government of national unity and this is what is needed to thwart continuing violence. Additionally, in view of the upcoming election to take place in CAR within 18 months, Djotodia and his government should begin to form an electoral commission which is also representative of the four rebel groups along with political and civil servants. Since elections have been triggers for violence in the CAR’s history, it will be important to form a representative electoral commission so that the results cannot be easily contested and confidence is regained among the population in the legitimacy of the leader they elect. If all groups are represented in the armed forces and electoral council, there should be a reduced chance of violence or disputed elections. One resource that Djotodia can rely on in the process of forming a unity government is the strategic and analytical support of the UN. The United Nations is unlikely to put a peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic given that there is no clear peace to enforce. Margaret Vogt and the UN office in the CAR are trying and willing to supplement in mediating peace talks and providing strategic and structural support. If a transitional government could be established with the UN’s support and the violence dies down, the Security Council might send a peacekeeping force to the area to monitor adherence to a unity government agreement. A huge obstacle to peace is the insecurity and impoverishment of the CAR’s general population. Amidst the governmental coup and continual fighting of rebel groups, the 4.6 million people living in the CAR continue to suffer. Widespread looting, rape, and getting caught in violent crossfire is not something new to the citizens of the Central African Republic. Both now and in the past, many have left their villages and gone deep into the bush, where rebels and military are unlikely to cross their path. It is estimated that 37,000 civilians have fled the CAR to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Cameroon. There is an impending food crisis if the violence continues because it has delayed preparations and the sowing of seeds for the growing season, which is what the majority of the population of CAR relies for food and income. The rebels have also stolen large food stores and seed in their campaign to seize the capital. Even worse, non-profit organizations providing aid cannot get to regions which need medical and food supplies most because of the danger the rebels impose. Many remain without electricity and water and children are the most vulnerable. An estimated 2,000 children have been recruited by armed forces since the violence started. All of these considerations make the situation
7  J. Stedman, D. Rothchild, E. Cousens, and L. Rienner, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 122-123.

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in the Central African Republic one that concerns the UN Security Council, the UNHCR, and UNICEF. If the population of the CAR is not secured, it may lead to increased violence amongst the population and more looting by rebels if there is food security. The UN and other international actors are willing to provide aid to the Central African Republic in the form of food, medical supplies, and other much needed services, but have reduced their efforts due to the still-occurring violence. The international community must provide humanitarian aid. In partnership with the regional and FOMAC/MICOPAX troops, they can provide security for humanitarian workers while the others seek to actually fight the rebels. Emergency supplies continue to be stolen from UN warehouses and though it is willing to provide aid, it is not willing to provide any military support. Thus far, empty words condemn CAR rebels and appeal to them to stop their raids and looting. However, this resolution to grant humanitarian workers UN troops for security must come from the Security Council. The UN should authorize a peacekeeping force to provide security to humanitarian workers of the UNHCR, UNICEF, and other NGOs in the state so that the deteriorating conditions do not get worse.

Long Term Peace
Lasting, long-term peace in the Central African Republic will require a well functioning state and economy. This must be formed among immense violence and essentially no manufacturing sector or infrastructure. Peace for the Central African Republic must be concentrated on the government establishing widespread legitimacy, accountability, efficient sectors for resource extraction, and security. The legitimacy and accountability of the CAR government must be established in order to restore civilian and rebel confidence in the government. Free and fair elections will establish legitimacy while adhering to good governance and policies which enrich the state, and not the government, have the power to restore confidence in the government and reduce violence.8 If the Central African Republic can maintain legitimacy over the sole use of force in its country by turning the FACA into a democratic army, maintain legitimacy through fair elections, and remain accountable to its citizens then it will be able to move forward and reform its economic structures and utilize natural resources. In order for the Central African Republic to maintain long term peace, its army must be reformed to be more inclusive of regional and ethnic groups, submit to the government, and reform its military policies to have regard for civilian life. Building an efficient, reliable armed force that has the capacity to provide security for the country will contribute to solving many problems in the CAR. Once rebels are demobilized as soon as possible to bring
8  Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, (Harpers Perennial, 2010).

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about short-term peace, rebels need to be disarmed and given the option to integrate into the armed forces. This will stop them from fighting further and include them in the government while also providing security to civilians, which will create goodwill among both the general population and the government. The role of the military in the CAR must also be better defined. The FACA have been used exclusively in the civil conflicts of the CAR, which is different than protecting its borders from an actual threat. The armed forces and rebels who want to integrate into them should split into two distinct security forces: one being a special internal peace force to interfere in actions of civil unrest and another to provide security to the CAR from foreign threats and protect its border. This is especially important because then the government can provide security for civilians against external threats, including the Lords Resistance Army, and the conflicts and violence, which occur on its border with Sudan. An internal security force focused specifically on civil unrest would provide support to the civilians and government, especially if it is comprised of former rebel groups. The FACA ideology and way of fighting must be addressed, along with their loyalty to the government. The FACA are overwhelmingly used to fight internal opposition and implement a scorched earth policy to combat any opposition. They have committed human rights atrocities and in seeking to crush opposition have decimated whole villages that rebels were suspected of harboring. The retraining of rebels by third parties can bring about the teaching of a more civilized way of fighting which takes the civilian population into consideration. The CAR will need to reach out to the international community to help restructure and retrain its security forces. The FACA has been dominated by whichever ethnic group is in power, so the integration and inclusion of other ethnic groups is important to building a military force representative of the Central African Republic’s different regions. If rebels reintegrate into the army, then these regional groups will be represented. A well-represented military force will also be beneficial in stopping the military’s scorched earth policy if the forces are from diverse regions because the villages they consider decimating will be another soldier’s home. Keeping an integrated, well-trained army loyal to the CAR government will depend on money. If the government of the CAR can provide timely, adequate pay for the military, former rebels and past military officers will be very happy with the government since one of major grievance of the military has been that they do not get paid. As long as the military feels that the government is doing a better job than it could, by providing security and wages, and the government remains accountable to the military and citizens of CAR, the armed forces should respect its authority. The government of the CAR has not provided for the basic needs of their citizens largely because they do not have the funds or capacity to do so. Eventually, a plan to provide healthcare, education, infrastructure, and food security will be necessary, but until there are Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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economic resources the first step in establishing long term peace will be providing security and adhering to agreements made, as well as keeping the military and civil servants paid and loyal to the government. The newly elected government should put in place a representational National Assembly and a representative electoral system as mentioned beforehand in the Short Term Peace section. Additionally, the elected government should establish a system of regional representatives in order to include all regions in a continuing national dialogue. Even a federal system where governance is shared by the government and regional representatives would be beneficial. This would solve the problems of unrepresented and marginal regions. The securitization and promotion of dialogue within the Vakaga region will be essential to stopping violence from resurging. The Vakaga region in the northeast is a breeding ground for rebellion since the marginalized region has virtually no government presence and fends for itself in clashes with Sudanese refugees who also occupy the region. Most of the rebels came from the northeast, including the UFDR, so sending a security force to the Vakaga region, made up of former rebels from these groups, will dissuade dissatisfaction with the government and the formation of rebel groups, also allowing the government to watch for forming rebel coalitions before they launch violence. Also, the government should implement a program to provide some of the basic needs of this region’s population as a tactic for winning hearts and minds. Until the CAR has revenue to support these programs itself, it can call on of the many non-profit organizations that provide food and medical aid in the CAR to go to Vakaga on the condition that their security is provided for. Alternatively, the CAR could implement a government program where the security force distributes food and medical supplies. However, this comes with issues of accountability of regarding the military. Strong structures of punishment and accountability, including support and observance from the UN will allow the effective development and use of the armed forces. Michael Djotodia’s and future governments cannot hoard aid or resource money if they want to establish long-term peace. Institutional reform to hold ministries accountable for distributing aid money must be established so that the government can pay the military and keep it satisfied and loyal. Technical assistance to create these mechanisms through the UN office in the CAR will help create an accountable government. This institutional framework of accountability must be implemented by whoever resumes the position of president once elections take place. The last factor in establishing long-term peace in the CAR is maintaining and utilizing the immense natural resources of the CAR and promoting economic growth. The CAR possesses many resources, including diamonds, uranium, and timber. Despite being blessed with such rich resources, the CAR has suffered from its poor landlocked position and lack of infrastructure, unskilled population, and misdirected economic policies. Rebel groups fight over diamond mines and areas abundant with natural resources, while the government Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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has controlled other key mines or resource abundant land and plundered the resources. The government has become wealthy from the resources of the CAR while leaving its population in poverty. Most of the population is reliant on farming, most of which is subsistence farming, and the volatility that comes with being commodity-dependent means foreign direct investment does not flow into the region easily because of multiple government barriers. In order to reap the benefits of its resource rich country, the CAR must implement programs to train workers, build mines and structures to extract resources, and process resources in order to trade them. Revenue will be needed to build the initial infrastructure, but the CAR could reap huge rewards if it is able to implement a productive resource extraction sector. Retraining low-skilled workers and providing subsistence farmers with wage paying jobs will be favorable to the CAR economy and reflect well on the government. If the CAR is able to transition to a level of little-to-no violence it should seek aid money for developmental projects from the World Bank and IMF. The government will need to sponsor these programs initially, but once a productive functioning sector is produced it can take a less active role and privatize economic industries. Focusing on one industry and/or particular resource extraction site at a time can eventually lead to an extremely prosperous nation. Security will also be integral in this extraction because of the threat of looting by domestic and neighboring rebels.

Conclusion
The most important factor in determining peace in the Central African Republic is security. The interim government must demobilize rebels, then facilitate the delivering of much needed humanitarian aid to its most isolated regions in order to stop a food crisis. If demobilization is successful, Djotodia’s government must create a “power-sharing” government that has representation from the three other rebel groups and offers posts in the government as a means of inducing disarmament. Disarmament would also necessitate integrating rebels into the armed forces or civil society. In order for this to be successful, the CAR will need a lot of external assistance. Long-term peace can be achieved by building accountable institutions that provide the most basic needs to the CAR population, and through constructing necessary infrastructure. The World Bank and IMF will be needed to provide loans that help rebuild the CAR. The UN will be needed to provide technical assistance and monitor the accountability of the government. The ECCAS must help provide security while the CAR builds up its own reliable armed forces. The largely forgotten and unknown conflict of the CAR can finally end if external actors commit technical, military, and humanitarian aid and if the Djotodia and future governments remain accountable to their promises, creating an inclusive government. Southern California International Review - Vol. 3 No. 1

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