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ESCAO FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorne ys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative. Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation. Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action. Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Pacete vs. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation. Ruling: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

Macadangdang vs. CA 108 SCRA 314 Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioners submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ (Matrimonial Home) Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed Issues: (1) Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven; (2) Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife. The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. (3) Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

Restituto Alcantara vs Rosita Alcantara Marriage Valid Marriage Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for the m before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252 FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.