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Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada

Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (Mar ! 31" 19##$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 2" )oo&*o&e No.3

)ACTS+ Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no !urisdiction to ta"e further cogni#ance of this case$ without pre!udice to the re%filing thereof in the Juvenile &ourt, 'ecause he 'elieved that !urisdiction over 1( years olds up to under )1 was transferred to the Juvenile &ourt 'y the issuance of P* (+, or the &hild and -outh .elfare &ode, which defines youthful offenders as those over / years of age 'ut under )1 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE+ .01 the issuance of P* (+, transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile &ourt. ,ELD+ 2he Juvenile and *omestic Relations &ourt e3pressly confers upon it a special and limited !urisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 1( years of age at the time of the filing of the case$. 2he su'se4uent issuance of P* (+, "nown as the &hild and -outh .elfare &ode and defines a youth offender as one who is over / years of age 'ut under )1 at the time of the commission of the offense$ did not 'y such definition transfer !urisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 1( and under )1 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile &ourt. LATIN MA-IM+ ,5

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Primicias v. Municipality of 8rdaneta

Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-2.#02 (O &o/er 10" 19#9$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 4" )oo&*o&e No.14

)ACTS+ Petitioner, while driving his car in the !urisdiction of 8rdaneta, was charged with violation of 9rdinance 1o. ,, 6eries of 1/(:, particularly, for overta"ing a truc"$. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary in!unction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE+ .01 9rdinance 1o. ,, 6eries of 1/(:, 'y the Municipality of 8rdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. ,ELD+ 1o. 9rdinance 1o. , is said to 'e patterned after and 'ased on 6ection 5, of 7ct 1o. ,//). However, 7ct 1o. ,//) has 'een e3plicitly repealed 'y R7 1o. :1,( ;2he <and and 2ransportation &ode=. >y this e3press repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. 7lso, an essential re4uisite for a valid ordinance is that it must not contravene ? the statute$ for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and su'ordinate to the laws

of the state. LATIN MA-IM+ :, (c, :/

, &asco Philippine &hemical &o. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro @imene#

Case No. 40 G.R. No. L-1#931 ()e/r1ar2 20" 19.3$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 9" )oo&*o&e No.31

)ACTS+ Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on R7 )(+/ ;Aoreign B3change Margin Aee <aw= stating that the &entral >an" of the Philippines fi3ed a uniform margin fee of )5C on foreign e3change transactions. However, the 7uditor of the >an" refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that PetitionerDs separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of 6ec. ), par. 1E of R7 )(+/. 2he pertinent portion of this statute readsF 2he margin esta'lished 'y the Monetary >oard ? shall 'e imposed upon the sale of foreign e3change for the importation of the followingF GHIII. 8rea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported 'y and for the e3clusive use of end%users.$ ISSUE+ .01 urea$ and formaldehyde$ are e3empt 'y law from the payment of the margin fee. ,ELD+ 2he term urea formaldehyde$ used in 6ec. ) of R7 )(+/ refers to the finished product as e3pressed 'y the 1ational Institute of 6cience and 2echnology, and is distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde$ which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. 2he one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported 'y the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea$ and formaldehyde$ is not e3empt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (c, )5a

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7storga v. Hillegas

Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-234#3 (A%r45 30" 19#4$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 11" )oo&*o&e No.3#

)ACTS+ House >ill 1o. /)(( was passed from the House of Representatives to the 6enate. 6enator 7rturo 2olentino made su'stantial amendments which were approved 'y the 6enate. 2he House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of 'oth houses certified and attested to the 'ill. 2he President also signed it and thereupon 'ecame R7 :+(5. 6enator 2olentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House >ill 1o. /)(( was a wrong version of the 'ill 'ecause it did not em'ody the amendments introduced 'y him and approved 'y the 6enate. >oth the 6enate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced R7 :+(5 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding

officers of the &ongress is conclusive proof of a 'illDs due enactment. ISSUE+ .01 House >ill 1o. /)(( is considered enacted and valid. ,ELD+ 6ince 'oth the 6enate President and the &hief B3ecutive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the 'ill was not duly enacted and therefore did not 'ecome a law. 2he &onstitution re4uires that each House shall "eep a !ournal. 7n importance of having a !ournal is that in the a'sence of attestation or evidence of the 'illDs due enactment, the court may resort to the !ournals of the &ongress to verify such. .here the !ournal discloses that su'stantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed te3t sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the 'ill has not 'een duly enacted and did not 'ecome a law.$ LATIN MA-IM+ ')

: Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernande#, etc., and 6armiento

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-#993 (Ma2 31" 193#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 11" )oo&*o&e No.42

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a &hinese merchant who 4uestions the constitutionality of R7 11E+ 7n 7ct to Regulate the Retail >usiness$ on the following groundsF a= It is a violation of the B4ual Protection of the <aw &lause, denies them of their li'erty, property and due process of law )= It is a violation of the constitutional re4uirement that a 'illDs title must reflect the su'!ect matter of the same 'ecause regulate$ does not really mean nationali#e$ and prohi'it$ ,= the 7ct violates International treaties and <aws ISSUE+ .01 R7 11E+ is constitutional. ,ELD+ R7 11E+ is constitutional. In the a'ovementioned case, what has 'een pointed out is the constitutional re4uirement that 7 'ill shall em'race only one su'!ect as e3pressed in its title.$ 2his is to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'ecause the title must 'e a'le to apprise legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and conse4uences of that particular law. &onstitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsi'ilities of the other departments. 2he legislature is primarily the !udge of necessity, ade4uacy, wisdom, reasona'leness, and e3pediency of the law, and the courts have no !urisdiction to 4uestion this. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ):a, d

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Municipality of Jose Pangani'an v. 6hell &o. of the Philippines

Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-23#1. (6152 20" 19..$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 11" )oo&*o&e No.42

)ACTS+ 2his is an appeal from the decision of the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila dismissing the PlaintiffDs complaint for the collection of sales ta3es from *efendant on the ground that the law which authori#es collection of the same is unconstitutional. *efendant &ompany refused to pay ta3es accruing from its sales 'ecause according to them the ta3a'le sites of the property sought to 'e ta3ed is not the said Municipality. 7ccording to the *efendant, R7 1:,5 or 7ct to Provide Means for Increasing Highway 6pecial Aund is unconstitutional 'ecause it em'races two su'!ects which are 1=amendment of the ta3 code, and )= grant of ta3ing power to the local government, and ma"es reference to Road and >ridge Aund. ISSUE+ .01 R7 1:,5 is constitutional. ,ELD+ R7 1:,5 is constitutional 'ecause it em'races only one su'!ect reflected 'y its title Road and >ridge Aund.7 6tatutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. 2he constitutional re4uirement as to the title of the 'ill must 'e li'erally construed. It should not 'e technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. .hen there is dou't as to its validity, it must 'e resolved against the dou't and in favor of its validity. In the a'ovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional re4uirement that 7 'ill shall em'race only one su'!ect, e3pressed in its title.$ 2his is to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'ecause the title must 'e a'le to apprise legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and conse4uences of that particular law. LATIN MA-IM+ 1)a, ,7, d

5 People of the Philippines v. >uenvia!e

Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22943 (Mar ! 3" 1923$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 12" )oo&*o&e No.4.

)ACTS+ *efendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of illegal practice of medicine$ and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.$ *efendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. 6he Itreated and manipulatedD the head and 'ody of Regino 1o'le. 6he also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthori#ed use of title of doctor$ should 'e understood to refer to doctor of medicine$ and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that 7ct ,111 is unconstitutional as it does not e3press its su'!ect. ISSUE+ .01 chiropractic$ is included in the term practice of medicine$ under Medical laws provided in the Revised 7dministrative &ode. ,ELD+ 7ct ,111 is constitutional as the title 7n 7ct to 7mend ;enumeration of sections to 'e amended=$ is sufficient and it need not include the su'!ect matter of each section. I&hiropracticD is included in the Ipractice of medicine.D 6tatutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. 2he constitutional re4uirement as to the title of the 'ill must 'e li'erally construed. It should not 'e technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. .hen there is dou't as to its validity, it must 'e resolved against the dou't and in favor of its validity. 7 'ill shall em'race only one su'!ect, e3pressed in its title,$ to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'y apprising legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and conse4uences of the law.

LATIN MA-IM+ )a, 7a, )5c, ,7, d

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7lalayan v. 1ational Power &orporation

Case No. 0 G.R. No. L-2439. (6152 29" 19.0$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 12" )oo&*o&e No.4.

)ACTS+ Repu'lic 7ct 1o. ,+:, is entitled 7n 7ct to Aurther 7mend &ommonwealth 7ct 1o. 1)1$. In 6ection , of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 5+C of the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to reali#e a net profit of not more than 1)C annually of its investments plus )%month operating e3pensesJ and 1P& is allowed to renew all e3isting franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could 'e given effect. ISSUE+ .01 6ection , is a su'!ect which the 'ill title 7n 7ct to Aurther 7mend &ommonwealth 7ct 1o. 1)1$ does not em'race, thus ma"ing it a rider 'ecause it is violative of the constitutional provision re4uiring that a 'ill, which may 'e enacted into law, cannot em'race more than one su'!ect, which shall 'e e3pressed in its title.$ ,ELD+ 6ection , is constitutional. Repu'lic 7ct ,+:, is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title ma"es reference to the legislation to 'e amended ;in this case &ommonwealth 7ct 1)1=. &onstitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general o'!ect which the statute see"s to effect without e3pressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. 2itle doesnDt need to 'e a complete inde3 of the contents of the act. LATIN MA-IM+ ):a, ,7, d

( &ordero v. Hon. &a'atuando

Case No. 01 G.R. No. L-14342 (O &o/er 31" 19.2$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 12" )oo&*o&e No.4#

)ACTS+ Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 11// is the 7gricultural 2enancy 7ct of the Philippines. 6ection 5: of this act e3pressed that indigent tenants should 'e represented 'y Pu'lic *efendant of *epartment of <a'or. &ongress then amended this in Repu'lic 7ct 1o. ))(,F 7n 7ct 7mending &ertain 6ections of Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 11//.$ 6ection 1/ of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of 6ecretary of Justice. 6ection )+ also provides that indigent tenants shall 'e represented 'y trial attorney of the 2enancy Mediation &ommission. ISSUE+ .01 6ections 1/ and )+ of Rep. 7ct 1o. ))(, is unconstitutional 'ecause of the constitutional provision that 1o 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one

su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$ ,ELD+ 6ections 1/ and )+ are constitutional. 2he constitutional re4uirement is complied with as long the law has a single general su'!ect, which is the 7gricultural 2enancy 7ct, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may 'e, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general su'!ect, will 'e regarded as valid. &onstitutional provisions relating to su'!ect matter and titles of statutes should not 'e so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MA-IM+ ):a, ,7, d

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2o'ias v. 7'alos

Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114#03 (De e8/er 0" 1994$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 12" )oo&*o&e No.4#

)ACTS+ Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 7(75, otherwise "nown as K7n 7ct &onverting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly 8r'ani#ed &ity to 'e "nown as the &ity of Mandaluyong$ 'ecause 7rticle HIII, 6ection :/ of this act provided that the congressional district of 6an Juan0 Mandaluyong shall 'e split into two separate districts. ISSUE+ .01 the aforestated su'!ect is germane to the su'!ect matter of R.7. 1o. 7(75. ,ELD+ R7 7(75 is constitutional. &ontrary to PetitionersL assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a su'!ect separate and distinct from the su'!ect of its conversion into a highly ur'ani#ed city 'ut is a natural and logical conse4uence of its conversion into a highly ur'ani#ed city Moreover, a li'eral construction of the Kone title% one su'!ectK rule has 'een invaria'ly adopted 'y this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. 2he &onstitution does not re4uire &ongress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully inde3 or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. LATIN MA-IM+ )+a, d

7 7yson and Ignacio v. Provincial >oard of Ri#al

Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (6152 2." 1919$

)ACTSF 2he municipal council of 1avotas, Ri#al adopted its 9rdinance 1o. 1,, section ) of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry "nown as fishing, with nets denominated

Icua"itD and Ipantu"os,D 'efore engaging in fishing in the 'ay of this !urisdiction within three leagues from the shore%line of this municipality, are o'liged to provide themselves with a license issued 'y this municipal government, after payment of a fee of P5+ annually, paya'le every three months.$ 2he authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section ))7+ of the 7dministrative &ode. ISSUE+ .01 6ection ))7+ of the 7dministrative &ode of 1/1(, now 6ection ),): of the 7dministrative &ode of 1/17, is invalid. ,ELDF 6ection ))7+ of the 7dministrative &ode of 1/1(, now section ),), of the 7dministrative &ode of 1/17 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Philippine >ill which provided that no private or local 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect, and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill$ 'ecause the 7dministrative &ode is neither a private nor a local 'ill. 2he 7dministrative &ode of 1/17 has for its title, 7n 7ct amending the 7dministrative &ode.$ It does not violate Paragraph 17, section , of the Jones <aw, which provided that no 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill,$ 'ecause it was merely a revision of the provisions of the 7dministrative &ode enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones <aw and the Reorgani#ation 7ct. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7

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<idasan v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-20009 (O &o/er 23" 19.#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 13" )oo&*o&e No.31

)ACTSF Petitioner challenged Repu'lic 7ct :7/+, which is entitled 7n 7ct &reating the Municipality of *ianaton in the Province of <anao del 6ur$ as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes 'arrios located in another province, which is &ota'ato, violating the constitutional mandate that 1o 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$ 2his 4uestion was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of R7 :7/+, prompted 'y the upcoming elections. ISSUE+ .01 Repu'lic 7ct :7/+ is constitutional. ,ELD+ Repu'lic 7ct :7/+ is null and void. 2he title 7n 7ct &reating the Municipality of *ianaton, in the Province of <anao del 6ur$ pro!ects the impression that solely the province of <anao del 6ur is affected 'y the creation of *ianaton. 1ot the slightest intimation is there that communities in the ad!acent province of &ota'ato are incorporated in this new <anao del 6ur town. 2he phrase in the Province of <anao del 6ur$ ma"es the title misleading and deceptive. 2he title did not inform the mem'ers of the &ongress as to the full impact of the lawJ it did not apprise the people in the towns of &ota'ato that were affected 'y the law, and the province of &ota'ato itself that part of their territory is 'eing ta"en away from their towns and provinces and added to the ad!acent Province of <anao del 6urJ it "ept the pu'lic in the dar" as to what towns and provinces were actually affected 'y the 'ill. 2hese are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Repu'lic

7ct :7/+. LATIN MA-IM+ d

E Manila 2rading M 6upply &o. v. Reyes

Case No. 1.9 G.R. No. 432.3 (O &o/er 31" 1933$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 13" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTSF Respondent e3ecuted a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. 2he mortgaged property was sold at a pu'lic auction 'y the sheriff of the &ity of Manila. 7fter applying this sum, with interest, costs, and li4uidated damages to RespondentDs inde'tedness, the latter owed the company a 'alance of P)75.:7 with interest. 2he company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the de't. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid 'alance owed 'y him, as provided 'y 7ct 1o. :1)). ISSUE+ .01 7ct 1o. :1)), entitled 7n 7ct to amend the &ivil &ode 'y inserting 'etween 6ections fourteen hundred and fifty%four and fourteen hundred and fifty%five thereof a new section, to 'e "nown as section fourteen hundred and fifty%four%7,$ is valid. ,ELDF 7ct 1o. :1)) is valid and enforcea'le. 2he controlling purpose of 7ct 1o. :1)) is revealed to 'e to close the door to a'uses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were paya'le in installments. 2he general rule is adopted in this !urisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to 'e an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not 'e further stated. 2he proper approach in cases of this character should 'e to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the a'sence of a clear conflict 'etween it and the &onstitution. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,7

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People of the Philippines v. Aerrer

Case No. 200 G.R. No. L-32.13-14 (De e8/er 2#" 19#2$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 13" )oo&*o&e No.30

)ACTS+ Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 17++, otherwise "nown as the 7nti%6u'version 7ct. R7 17++ outlaws the &ommunist Party of the Philippines ;&PP= and other su'versive associations$ and punishes any person who "nowingly, willfully and 'y overt acts affiliates himself with, 'ecomes or remains a mem'er$ of the &PP or any other organi#ation su'versive$ in nature. 2ayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. 2he lower court declared the statute void on the

grounds that it was a 'ill of attainder and that it is vague and over'road. 2he cases were dismissed, to which the @overnment appealed. ISSUE+ .01 the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on 'ill titles. ,ELD+ -es. 2he title of the 'ill need not 'e a catalogue or an inde3 of its contents, and need not recite the details of the 7ct. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and conse4uences of the proposed law and its operation. 7 narrow and technical construction is to 'e avoided, and the statute will 'e read fairly and reasona'ly in order not to thwart the legislative intent. 2he 7nti%6u'version act fully satisfies these re4uirements. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /d, 51d

/ *el Rosario v. &ar'onell, et al.

Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-324#. (O &o/er 20" 19#0$

)ACTS+ Petitioner 4uestions the constitutionality of R7 (1,). 2he said 7ct purportedly encompasses more than one su'!ect for the title of the 7ct allegedly fails to include the phrase 29 PR9P96B 7MB1*MB126 29 2HB &9162I282I91 9A 2HB PHI<IPPI1B6.$ 2he statute plainly readsF 7n 7ct Implementing Resolution to >oth Houses 1um'ered 2wo as 7mended 'y Resolution of >oth Houses 1um'ered Aour of the &ongress of the Philippines &alling for a &onstitutional &onvention, Providing for Proportional Representation 2herein and 9ther *etails Relating to the Blection of *elegates to and the Holding of the &onstitutional &onvention, Repealing for the Purpose Repu'lic 7ct Aour 2housand 1ine Hundred Aourteen, and for 9ther Purposes.$ ISSUE+ .01 R7 (1,) is unconstitutional for em'racing more than one su'!ect. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary 'ecause the title e3pressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on 'oth Houses 1os. ) and : respectively of 1/(7 and 1/(/, and 'oth Resolutions 1o. ) and : li"ewise categorically state in their titles that the &onstitutional &onvention called for therein is to propose amendments to the &onstitution of the Philippines,$ which phrase is reiterated in 6ec. 1 of 'oth Resolutions. 2he power to propose amendments to the &onstitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison dDetre is to revise the present &onstitution. It is not re4uired that the title of the 'ill 'e an inde3 to the 'ody of the act or 'e comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general su'!ect and reasona'ly covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead &ongress or the people. 7ll the details provided for in R7 (1,) are germane to and are comprehended 'y its title. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /d, 51d

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People of the Philippines v. Haleriano Halensoy y Masa

Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9.39 (Ma2 29" 193#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 14" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTS+ *efendant was charged in the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila for violation of 6ection )( of 7ct 1o. 17E+ 'y concealment of a 'olo. 2he defendant moved to 4uash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was an 7ct to regulate the importation, ac4uisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohi'it the possession of same e3cept in compliance with the provisions of this 7ct,$ did not include weapons other than firearms, and that 6ection )( violated the constitutional provision that no 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$ ISSUES+ 1. .01 7ct 1o. 17E+ violated the one su'!ect%one title rule ). .01 it was inconsistent with the &onstitution. ,ELD+ 1o. 7t the time of the enactment of 7ct 1o. 17E+ on 9cto'er 1), 1/+7, the one su'!ect%one title rule referred to private and local 'ills only, and to 'ills to 'e enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and e3isting at the time the 1/,5 &onstitution too" effect. 2he provision of 6ection )( germane to the su'!ect e3pressed in the title of the 7ct remained operative 'ecause it was not inconsistent with the &onstitution, pursuant to 6ection ) of 7rticle GHI of the 1/,5 &onstitution. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+a, ,(a, :(a, 5+

1+ People of the Philippines v. 7polonio &arlos

Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (61*e 30" 194#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 1." )oo&*o&e No..3

)ACTS+ 2he PeopleDs &ourt found the 7ppellant, guilty of treason. 7ppellant attac"ed the constitutionality of the PeopleDs &ourt 7ct on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the su'!ect matter e3pressed in its title, such asF ;1= a provision which retains the !urisdiction of the &ourt of Airst InstanceJ ;)= a provision which adds to the dis4ualification of Justices of the 6upreme &ourt and provides a procedure for their su'stitutionJ ;,= a provision which changed the e3isting Rules of &ourt on the su'!ect of 'ail, and ;:= a provision which suspends 7rticle 1)5 of the Revised Penal &ode. ISSUE+ .01 the PeopleDs &ourt 7ct was unconstitutional. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he PeopleDs &ourt was intended to 'e a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and !udgment of treason cases. 2he provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the su'!ect matter and purposes of the PeopleDs &ourt 7ct. 2he &ongress is not e3pected to ma"e the title of an enactment a complete inde3 of its contents. 2he constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the su'!ect e3pressed in its title. LATIN MA-IM+


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People of the Philippines v. <eoncio <im

Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (6152 2." 19.0$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 19" )oo&*o&e No.03

)ACTS+ In March 1/5:, the 6ecretary of 7griculture and 1atural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him 'y 6ections , and : of 7ct 1o. :++, ;Aisheries 7ct= issued Aisheries 7dministrative 9rder 1o. ,7. 6ection ) of said order prohi'its trawl fishing in certain areas in 6amar. A79 1o. ,7 was su'se4uently amended with A79 1o. ,7N1. <eoncio <im, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the ground that A79 1o. ,7N1 was contrary to 7ct 1o. :++,, the former having no fi3ed period and thus esta'lishing a 'an for all time while the latter stating that prohi'ition was for any single period of time not e3ceeding five yearsD duration.$ ISSUE+ .01 6ection ) of A79 1o. ,7N1 was invalid. ,ELD+ 6ection ) of A79 1o. ,7N1 was valid. 7lthough A79 1o. ,7N1 was defective 'ecause it failed to specify a period for the 'an, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy 'etween a 'asic law and a rule issued to implement it, the 'asic law prevails 'ecause the rule cannot go 'eyond the terms and provisions of the law. A79 1o. ,7N1 would 'e inoperative in so far as it e3ceeded the period of five years for any single period of time, 'ut it was not necessarily rendered void 'y the omission. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, ,Ea

11 OM8 <a'or &enter v. @arcia Jr.

Case No. .0 G.R. No. 113301 (De e8/er 23" 1994$

)ACTS+ *92& Memorandum 9rder 1o. /+%,/5 was filed as"ing the <2AR> to allow provincial 'us operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15C a'ove and 'elow the <2AR> official rate for a period of one year. <2AR> issued Memorandum &ircular 1o./)%++/ allowing for a range of plus )+C and minus )5C of the prescri'ed fares. P>97P, without a pu'lic hearing and permission from <2AR>, availed of the deregulatory policy and announced )+C increase in e3isting fares. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. 6& issued a temporary restraining order to prevent P>97P from implementing fare increase. ISSUES+ 1. .01 authority given 'y <2AR> to P>97P to increase prices at )+C instead of 15C is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. ). .01 P>97P proved that there was a pu'lic necessity for the increase thus violating the Pu'lic 6ervice 7ct and Rules of the &ourt.


,ELD+ <2AR> did not have authority to delegate its powers to P>97P. ). P>97P was not a'le to prove and provide such pu'lic necessity as reason for the fare increase. LATIN MA-IM+ 1one

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hi!o Plantation, Inc. v. &entral >an"

Case No. 3# G.R. No. L-3432. (A1(1s& 9" 1900$

)ACTS+ &ongress approved R7 1o. (1)5 entitled 7n act imposing 627>I<IP72I91 27G 91 &916I@1MB126 7>R97* 29 7&&B<BR72B 2HB B&919MI& *BHB<9PMB12 9A 2HB PHI<IPPI1B6 A9R 92HBR P8RP96B6$ Petitioners e3pected to pay :C of the aggregate value from July 1, 1/7)% June ,+, 1/7,, as provided in the 7ct. 2he &entral 'an" released Monetary Resolution 1o. 1//5 which states thatF Aor e3ports of 'ananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1/7)% June ,+, 1/7)J the sta'ili#ation ta3 shall 'e at the rate of (C. Aor e3ports of 'ananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1/7) to June ,+, 1/7,J the sta'ili#ation ta3 shall 'e at the rate of :C. Aor e3ports of 'ananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1/7,% June ,+, 1/7:J the sta'ili#ation ta3 shall 'e at the rate of )C. ISSUE+ .01 &entral 'an" acted with grave a'use of discretion amounting to lac" of !urisdiction when it issued Monetary >oard Resolution 1o. 1//5. ,ELD+ &entral >an" acted with grave a'use of discretion. In case of discrepancy 'etween the 'asic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law, the 'asic law prevails. 2he rule or regulation cannot go 'eyond the terms of the 'asic law. LATIN MA-IM+ /c

1) &hina >an"ing &orp. v. &7

Case No. 39 G.R. No. 121130 (De e8/er 3" 199.$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 19" )oo&*o&e No.04

)ACTS+ Petitioner e3tended loans to 1ative .est &orp. and its president, 6o &hing, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. 2wo e3tra mortgages were additionally e3ecuted 'y 6o &hing and his wife on July and 7ugust 1/E/. 2he loans matured 'ut 6o &hing was not a'le to repay the said loans. 2his caused Petitioner to file for e3tra !udicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. 2he properties were to 'e sold0auctioned on 7pril ,, 1//,. 9n 7pril )E, 1/E/ the court ruled on the side of 6o &hing. 2he issuance of the preliminary in!unction was grantedJ therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and

elevated the case to the &ourt of 7ppeals. 2hey were appealing that 7ct 1o. ,1,5 was the governing rule in their case, instead of 7dministrative 9rder 1o. , as 6o &hing was contending. ISSUE+ 1. .01 Petitioner can e3tra%!udicially foreclose the properties. ). .01 7dministrative 9rder 1o. , should govern the e3tra !udicial foreclosure. 1. ,ELD+ Petitioner can foreclose the properties. ). 7ct 1o. ,1,5 is the governing law. 7dministrative 9rder 1o. , cannot prevail over 7ct ,1,5. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. 2hus, the statute cannot 'e repealed or amended 'y the administrative directive. LATIN MA-IM+ 1one

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6antos v. Honora'le Bsten#o

Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14#40 (Se%&e8/er 2." 19.0$

)ACTS+ 2he decedent is a driver for PeopleDs <and 2ransportation &ompany, of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. 2he .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission awarded the decedentDs widow the amount of P,,:/:.:+, plus 'urial e3penses not e3ceeding P)++. 7fter 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed 'y the mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P5++ as attorneyDs fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision 'e annulled or modified 'ased on 6ection 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission and prays further that the P5++ in attyDs fees e3ceeded the allowed fees according to 6ec.( Rule )( of the said Rules. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the Rules of the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission amended R.7. 1o. 77) and as a result deprived the court of its !urisdiction over the case. ). .01 the court committed a grave a'use of discretion in awarding the P5++ in attorneyDs fees. ,ELD+ Petition was dismissed. 1. 2he &ommission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of &ongress. Aurthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than ) years after the court had ac4uired !urisdiction over the main case. ). 2he court did not commit grave a'use of discretion in awarding the P5++ since the said rule only applies to the &ommission and not the &ourt. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+, ,5, :(a

1, @rego v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 120 G.R. No. 123933 (61*e 19" 199#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 23" )oo&*o&e No.90

)ACTS+ 9ne of the Respondents was elected for his ,rd and final term as councilor of the )nd *istrict of Manila. His 4ualifications are 'eing 4uestioned 'y herein Petitioner, who is also as"ing for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner 'rings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as *eputy 6heriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on 9cto'er ,1, 1/E1. Petitioner argues that Respondent should 'e dis4ualified under 6ection :+;'= of the <ocal @overnment &ode. Petitioner further argues that the <ocal @overnment &ode should 'e applied retroactively. ISSUE+ .01 or not the 6ection :+ of the <ocal @overnment &ode should 'e applied retroactively due to its wording. ,ELD+ 6ection :+;'= of the <ocal @overnment &ode should not 'e applied retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to 'e construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is e3pressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. 2he fact that the provision of the &ode in 4uestion does not 4ualify the date of a candidateDs removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. 2he term to 'e loo"ed at in the issue is RBI16272BMB12, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. 6ince Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the scope of the term. LATIN MA-IM+ )5a, :(c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6antos v. Municipal of &aloocan

Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-1300# (A%r45 22" 19.3$

)ACTS+ Respondent issued 9rdinance 1o. ): charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees,$ meat inspection fees,$ corral fees,$ and internal organ fees,$ pursuant to &ommonwealth 7ct 1o. (55. Petitioners 4uestioned the validity or said 9rdinance. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent, in the issuance of 9rdinance 1o. ):, e3ceeded the limits of its !urisdiction provided 'y &ommonwealth 7ct (55. ,ELD+ Respondent e3ceeded its !urisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. 2he &ommonwealth 7ct only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. .hen Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. 2he only other fees that would 'e accepta'le were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the e3ception of slaughterhouse fees.$ 9ne of the rules of statutory construction is that certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may 'e held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so inter'lended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.$ LATIN MA-IM+

15a, ,7

1: 1ational Housing 7uthority v. Reyes

Case No. 03 G.R. No. 49439 (61*e 29" 1903$

)ACTSF Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of )5,+++ s40rn, su'!ect of an e3propriation proceedings granted 'y the court in favor 1H7. Respondents claimed they should 'e paid the assessed value of P(,(++.++ pursuant to P* :). Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too e3cessive. He cited P* :(: which provides !ust compensation not to e3ceed the mar"et value declared 'y the owner in the amount of P1,:++.++. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P(,(++.++, 'ut Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to P* 1)): which states that the government shall choose 'etween the value of real property as declared 'y the owner 3 3 3 or the mar"et value determined 'y the &ity or Provincial 7ssessor, whichever is lower. ISSUEF .01 P* :(: as amended 'y P* 1)): determines the valuation on !ust compensation. ,ELDF &ourts accord the presumption of validity to e3ecutive acts and legislative enactments, 3 3 3 'ecause the legislature is presumed to a'ide 'y the &onstitution 3 3 3. 2he Respondent Judge should have followed !ust compensation in e3propriation cases, that the lower value made 'y the landowner should 'e the 'asis for fi3ing the price. 2he petition for &ertiorari is granted. LATIN MA-IMF ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Arancisco <ao <im v. &7 and >enito Hillavicencio *y

Case No. #3 G.R. No. 0#04# (O &o/er 31" 1990$

)ACTSF Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of , years. 7fter it e3pired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises, and hence, the filing of an e!ectment suit against the Respondent. 2he case was terminated 'y a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1/7/ to 1/E), then from 1/E) to 1/E5. 2he Petitioner filed another e!ectment suit. 2he trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that ;1= the lease contract has not e3piredJ and ;)= the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res !udicata. Petitioner appealed to the R2& of Manila and then to the &7 which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUEF 1. .01 the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lesseeQ ). .01 the action for e!ectment is 'arred 'y compromise agreement on res !udicataQ ,ELDF 2his is untena'le 'ecause the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. 9n the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language

employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. 9n the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply 'ecause the present case re4uires a different set of evidence. 2he compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res !udicata does not apply. LATIN MA-IMF 1, 11a, )(,

15 Hon. 7lfredo 6. <im v. Aelipe @. Pac4uingJ

Case No. #4 G.R. No. 113044 (6a*1ar2 2#" 1993$

)ACTSF B3ecutive 9rder 1o. ,/) was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai%7lai from local governments to the @ames and 7musements >oard ;@7>=. 2he &ity of Manila passed an 9rdinance 1o. 7+(5 authori#ing the mayor to allow the 7ssociated *evelopment &orporation ;7*&= to operate a J7I%7<7I. 2hen President Marcos issued a P* 771 revo"ing all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai%7lai and other forms of gam'ling. 2hen President 74uino issued an B.9. 1o. 1(/ e3pressly repealing P*. 1o. E1+ which revo"es and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai%7lai and 7musement &orporation. In 1//E, 7*& tried to operate a Jai%7lai, 'ut the @ames and 7musement >oard intervened and invo"ed P.*. 771 which e3pressly revo"ed all e3isting franchises and permits to operate all forms of gam'ling issued 'y local governments. ISSUEF 1. .01 the franchise granted 'y the &ity of Manila to 7*& is valid in view of B. +. 1o. ,/) which transferred from local governments to the @7> the power to regulate Jai%7lai. ). .01 the 7*& is correct in assailing that P.*. 771 is violative of e4ual protection and non% impairment clauses of the &onstitution. ,ELDF R.7. :+/ provides that &ongress did not delegate to the &ity of Manila the power to franchise$ the operation of Jai%7lai. 7nd B.9. ,/) removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. 7ll laws are presumed valid and constitutional. P* 771 was not repealed or amended 'y any su'se4uent law. It did not violate the e4ual protection clause of the &onstitution 'ecause the said decree had revo"ed all franchises issued 'y the local governments without e3ceptions. LATIN MA-IMF 5a, (c, ,7, ::, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hictoriano v. Bli#alde Rope .or"ersD 8nion

Case No. 1.9 G.R. No. L-2324. (Se%&e8/er 12" 19#4$

)ACTS+ Petitioner, an Iglesia ni &risto$, was a mem'er of the Respondent 8nion which had with their &ompany a collective 'argaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R.7. E75F Mem'ership in the 8nion shall 'e re4uired as a condition of employment for all

permanent employees wor"ers covered 'y this 7greement R7 ,,5+ amended R7 E75F 'ut such agreement shall not cover mem'ers of any religious sect which prohi'it affiliation of their mem'ers in any such la'or organi#ation.$ Petitioner resigned from Respondent 8nion, which wrote a formal letter to the &ompany as"ing to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE+ 1. .01 R7 ,,5+ violates right to form or !oin associationQ ). .01 R7 ,,5+ is constitutionalQ ,. .01 the lower court committed grave a'use of discretion when ruling that the 8nion should pay 5++ and attorneyDs fee. ,ELD+ 2he right to !oin associations includes the right not to !oin or to resign from a la'or organi#ation. 6ection 1 /(+ of 7rt III of the 1/,5 &onstitution, as well as 6ection 7 of 7rt IH of the 1/7, &onstitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not 'e a'ridged. 7rticle ))+E of the &ivil &ode provides that attorneyDs fees and e3penses of litigation may 'e awarded when the defendantDs act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur e3penses to protect his interest$ and in any other case where the court deems it !ust and e4uita'le that attorneyDs fees and e3penses of litigation should 'e recovered$. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :+'

1( 2aRada v. 2uvera

Case No. 20# G.R. No. L-.3913 (De e8/er 29" 190.$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 3#" )oo&*o&e No.139

)ACTS+ *ue process was invo"ed 'y the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a num'er of Presidential *ecrees which they claimed had not 'een pu'lished as re4uired 'y law. 2he government argued that while pu'lication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided$ as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to 'ecome effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE+ .01 the clause otherwise provided$ in 7rticle ) of &ivil &ode pertains to the necessity of pu'lication. ,ELD+ 1o, the clause otherwise provided$ refers to the date of effectivity and not to the re4uirement of pu'lication per se, which cannot in any event 'e omitted. Pu'lication in full should 'e indispensa'le. .ithout such notice or pu'lication, there would 'e no 'asis for the application of the ma3im ignorantia <egis non e3cusat$. 2he court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not 'een pu'lished shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpu'lished decrees 'e pu'lished in the 9fficial @a#ette immediately. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@utierre# v. &arpio

Case No. 33 G.R. No. 31023 (A1(1s& 13" 1929$

)ACTS+ 2he <itigants here compromised a civil case on July 1,, 1/)E, agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land, the ownership would vest in the *efendants. >ut when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the *efendants appealed that 'y that time, 7ugust 1,, 1/)E, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fi3ed period had already elapsed. ISSUE+ .01 the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. 2he a'ove issue depends upon the "ind of month agreed upon 'y the parties, and on the day from which it should 'e counted. 7rticle 7 of the &ivil &ode had 'een modified 'y 6ec. 1, of the 7dministrative &ode, according to which month$ now means the civil month and not the regular%,+%day month. In computing any fi3ed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act re4uired 'y law or contract to 'e done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is rec"oned is to 'e e3cluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. 2here is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,/a

17 @u#man v. <ichauco

Case No. 3. G.R. No. L-1#90. (O &o/er 21" 1921$

)ACTS+ Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. 2he trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. 2he unsuccessful *efendants having appealed in 'oth cases on *ec. /, 1/)+ to the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of 6ec. EE of the &&P, as amended 'y 7ct 1o. )5EE, in case they desire to avoid the immediate e3ecution of the !udgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, on or 'efore the 2B12H day of each &alendar month$, the sums of money fi3ed 'y the Justice of the Peace as the reasona'le value of the use and occupation of the property held 'y them. 2he *efendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to ma"e such payments on or 'efore the tenth day of the month. 7s a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to e3ecute the !udgments. 2he court ordered the immediate e3ecution of the !udgment. ISSUE+ .01 the payments were made on or 'efore the 2enth day of each month. ,ELD+ 2he payment made on 7ugust 11, 1/)1 was one day late. 2he term month$ must now 'e understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as 6ec 1, of the 7dministrative &ode has

modified 7rt. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fi3es the length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MA-IM+ )5a, )5c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

8.6. v. Paniaga

Case No. 1.1 G.R. No. 0223 (Mar ! 4" 1914$

)ACTS+ 2his is an appeal 'y the government from an order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of a 'ail 'ond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on Ae'ruary 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. 9n Ae' )E, the court ordered that the *efendantDs 'ond 'e forfeited and the e3ecution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias warrant 'e issued for the arrest of the *efendant. >y various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally occurred on July E, 1/1), with government as the purchaser. 9n July 1+, 1/1), the principal was arrested. 9n July 1,, 1/1), the court, on application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the 'ond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. ISSUE+ .01 the e3ecution sale occurred on the date directed 'y the court. ,ELD+ 6ec. : of the &ode of &ivil Procedure providesF unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is re4uired 'y law to 'e done shall 'e computed 'y e3cluding the first day and including the lastJ if the last 'e a 6unday or a legal holiday, it shall 'e e3cluded.$ 2his section is only applica'le if there is a computation needed to 'e done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fi3ed for when the act 'e performed. It is also directed that the sale should ta"e place on a named future date. 2he sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MA-IM+ (c

1E P1> v. &7

Case No. 230 G.R. No. 90302 (Ma2 1#" 1993$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 4#" )oo&*o&e No.193

)ACTS+ 2o secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner 'an". Aor failure to pay the o'ligation, Petitioner 'an" e3tra!udicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest 'idder at the auction sale. 2hen, a final deed of sale was registered in the >uacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner 'an" and later sold the said lots to a third party. 2he notices of sale of 7ppellantDs foreclosed properties were pu'lished on March )E, 7pril 11 and 7pril 1), 1/(/ issues of the newspaper *aily Record$. 2he date March )E, 1/(/ falls on a

Ariday, while the dates 7pril 11 and 1) fall on a Ariday and 6aturday, respectively. 6ection , of 7ct 1o. ,1,5 re4uires that the notice of auction sale shall 'e pu'lished once a wee" for at least three consecutive wee"s$. ISSUE+ .01 the Petitioner 'an" complied with the re4uirements of wee"ly pu'lication of notice of e3tra!udicial foreclosure of mortgages. ,ELD+ It must 'e conceded that that 7rticle 1, is completely silent as to the definition of what is wee"$. In &oncepcion v. 7ndueta, the term wee"$ was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. 2he *efendant%7ppellee 'an" failed to comply with the legal re4uirement of pu'lication. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, /a, /'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo

Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-2332. (Ma2 29" 19#0$ a*9 G.R. No. L-2332# (Ma2 29" 19#0$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 32" )oo&*o&e No.19

)ACTS+ Petitioners pray to 7grarian &ourt to 'e entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are wor"ing from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them 'y the vendor of the latterDs intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not e3ecute the affidavit re4uired 'y 6ec. 1, of the 7gricultural <and Reform &ode 'efore the registration of the deed of sale. 7grarian &ourt dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted 'y 6ec. 1) of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the !urisdiction of the code N that the code e3pressly grants said right to leaseholders only and no'ody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of &ongress was to e3tend the right of redemption to share tenants through !udicial legislation, the section would have e3pressly said so. ISSUE+ .01 not the right of redemption granted 'y 6ec. 1) of the 7grarian Reform &ode addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. ,ELD+ 7grarian &ourt fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing agricultural lessee$ to only leasehold tenants$. 2he purpose of the 7gricultural <and Reform &ode is the a'olition of agricultural share tenancy. 2he policy of the 6tate is to esta'lish owner cultivatorship. 7dherence to the letter would result in a'surdity, in!ustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, 11a, 1)a, ,(a, ,7, :+a Ma3ims invo"ed 'y lower courtF (c, ,+', :,


8.6. v. 1avarro

Case No. 300 G.R. No. .1.0 (Mar ! 21" 1911$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 32" )oo&*o&e No.20

)ACTS+ 2hey made an oath 'efore an election officer in the municipality of Piddig ;in proceedings in connection with the general election held on 1ov. ), 1/+/= that they owned real property with the value of P5++. Bvidence showed that the 7ppellants, e3cept for *aniel 1avarro and @enaro &ali3tro, did not own property of the assessed value of P5++. ISSUE+ .01 the said statuteDs true test of property 4ualification to vote is the actual0mar"et value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. ,ELD+ It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an e3amination of the immediate conte3t of provisions of the statute defining property 4ualifications$ of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property 4ualification is an alternative to 4ualification 'ased upon an annual payment. >oth 4ualifications are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation 'etween the two in the mind of the legislator. 7nother section of the statute dis4ualifies people who are delin4uent in the payment of pu'lic ta3es assessed since 7ug. 1,, 1E/E, from voting. 2his provision was directed to the case of delin4uency in the payment of land ta3es as well as all other ta3es. 2he statute as a whole ;as an election law= is intended to secure purity of the 'allot 'o3. If the property 4ualification is actual0mar"et value, it would 'e highly impro'a'le to enforce the statute within a reasona'le time 'ecause it will 'e difficult to determine. LATIN MA-IM+ 1+, 11a, 1)a, )E, ,(a, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<ite3 Bmployees 7ssociation v. Bduvala

Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-4110. (Se%&e8/er 22" 19##$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 33" )oo&*o&e No.22

)ACTS+ Respondent, 9fficer%in%&harge of >ureau of <a'or Relations, re4uired referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Aederation of Aree .or"ers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authori#ation for the Respondent to re4uire referendum election and that Respondent and the >ureau were 'eyond !urisdiction. ISSUE+ .01 there is a statute authori#ing Respondents and giving them !urisdiction. ,ELD+ 7rticle ))( of the <a'or &ode addresses this. Respondent and the >ureau were within !urisdiction. Petition denied. 7rticle ))( of <a'or &ode is very clear concerning e3ecutive departmentDs original and e3clusive authority to act$. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, )+a, ):a

)+ Regalado v. -ulo

Case No. 233 G.R. No. L-42293 ()e/r1ar2 13" 1933$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 33" )oo&*o&e No.23

)ACTS+ Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, 7l'ay. 9n 1ovem'er 1(, 1/,1, 7ct 1o. ,E// which provided for the age retirement among !ustices was approved. 7 few years later, Petitioner 'ecame (5 years of age ;age retirement as provided 'y 6ec. )+, of the 7dministrative &ode, amended further 'y 7ct. 1o. ,E//=. 6hortly thereafter, Bste'an 2. Hillar was appointed as Justice of Peace to ta"e the place of Petitioner. 9n *ecem'er 17, 1/,:, Hillar assumed office. ISSUE+ .01 under the provisions of 6ection )+, of the 7dministrative &ode, as further amended 'y 7ct 1o. ,E//, the Justices of Peace and au3iliary !ustices appointed prior to the approval of the 7ct shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of (5. ,ELD+ Justices appointed prior to the approval of the 7ct will not 'e affected 'y said amendment ;7ct 1o. ,E//=. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, :(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>.B. 6an *iego Inc. v. &7

Case No. 2. G.R. No. 00223 ()e/r1ar2 3" 1993$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 3." )oo&*o&e No. 2#

)ACTS+ 9n March ,, 1/E(, Petitioner instituted an action in the R2& of Halen#uela against Private Respondent *e Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. In her defense, *e Jesus argued that the land in 4uestion was covered 'y P* )+1( ;a complementary provision of P* 1517, which aims to protect tenants from un!ust eviction.= ISSUE+ .01 P* )+1( is a valid defense of *e Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. ,ELD+ P* )+1( is a valid ground for *e Jesus in invo"ing her rights as a tenant. .hile it may depart from its source, P* 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as un!ust eviction. LATIN MA-IM+ 1)a, )5a

)1 7raneta v. *inglasan

Case No. 04 G.R. No. L-2044 (A1(1s& 2." 1949$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 3." )oo&*o&e No. 29

)ACTS+ B3ecutive 9rders, in pursuance of &ommonwealth 7ct 1o. (71 ;Bmergency Powers 7ct=, were 4uestioned for its validity until the 1ational 7ssem'ly &onvention of 1/:) ISSUE+ .01 the proclamations are valid. ,ELD+ 2hese B3ecutive 9rders are valid 'ecause they have 'een enacted during the time of the ina'ility of the &ongress to function. 2hat when &ongress convened again on Jan. 1, 1/:), said proclamations were also terminated. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bndencia and Jugo v. *avid

Case No. 90 G.R. No. L-.333-3. (A1(1s& 31" 1933$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e 3." )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTS+ R7 5/+ declares that no salary received 'y a pu'lic officer shall 'e considered e3empt from income ta3, payment of which is here'y declared not to 'e a diminution of his compensation fi3ed 'y law. .hile 7rt. E, 6ec. / of the &onstitution states that !udges shall receive compensation as fi3ed 'y law, which shall not 'e diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners 4uestion the legality of R7 5/+. ISSUE+ .01 R7 5/+ unconstitutional. ,ELD+ 1o. 6aying that the ta3ing of the salary of a !udicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of .hich shall not 'e diminished during their continuance in office$, 'y the <egislature. 2hrough the separation of powers, such a tas" must 'e done 'y the Judiciary. Judicial officers are e3empt from ta3es on his salary not for his own 'enefit 'ut for the pu'lic, to secure and preserve his independence of !udicial thought and action. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (c, 7a, ):a

)) *aoang v. Municipal Judge of 6an 1icolas, Ilocos 1orte

Case No. 04 G.R. No. L-343.0 (Mar ! 20" 1900$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .1" )oo&*o&e No.30


Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Suirino >onilla and .ilson Marcos 'y, 7ntero 7gonoy and 7manda 7gonoy, stating that under 7rt. ,,5 of the &ivil &ode, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, ac"nowledged natural children, or children 'y legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the 7gonoys already had a daughter of the Bstrella 7gonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the 7gonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Aurthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. 2he Respondent &ourt ruled in favor for 7gonoy. ISSUE+ .01 the Respondent &ourt erred in their decision. ,ELD+ 1o, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in 7rt. ,,5, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. 2o add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal ma3im that, what is e3pressly included would naturally e3clude what is not included. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, ,+a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&IR v. <impan Investment &orporation

Case No. ## G.R. No. L-203#1 a*9 L-20.44 (6152 31" 19#0$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .2" )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTS+ In 1/5/ and 1/(+, Respondent &orporation filed income ta3 returns which later were 'ases for deficiency due to disallowance 'y the >IR. >rought to the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals, the deficiencies on 'oth cases were decided upon at P)(,1,7 and P7,):+.:E, resolved at 6eptem'er )+, 1/(7 ;<% )E571= and *ecem'er 11, 1/(7 ;<%)E(::= respectively. ISSUE+ .01 the &27 committed an error in its fi3ed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. ,ELD+ 2he &27Ds decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. 6ection 51 of the 1IR& provides the following% 9n 2a3 shown on the return, in failure to pay the re4uired amount on or 'efore the date prescri'ed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall 'e collected as part of the ta3, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescri'ed for the payment until paid, provided that the ma3imum amount for the interest doesnDt e3ceed the amount corresponding to a period of , years. 2he same goes with deficiencies, e3cept that the additional ta3 must 'e paid within ,+ days of the notice, else the same interests apply. .ith regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isnDt paid within ,+ days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of ta3 unpaid. In <%)E571, the interest shall 'e computed from 6eptem'er 7, 1/() to 6eptem'er (, 1/(5, at 1C for , years, plus the surcharge of 5C on failure to pay the deficiency ta3. In <%)E(::, from 7pril :, 1/(, to 7pril ,, 1/((, the interest shall 'e at 1C a month for , years, plus the 5C surcharge. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (c, 7a, ):a, )(

), &e'u Portland &ement v. Municipality of 1aga, &e'u

Case No. 33 G.R. Nos. 2411.-1# (A1(1s& 22" 19.0$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .2" )oo&*o&e No.3.

)ACTS+ Bfforts of defendant 2reasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license ta3 from 1/(+, 1/(1, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P)+:,,++, have all 'een met with re'uff. Municipal ta3 imposed 'y 7mended 9rdinance 1o. )1. Ainally on June )(, 1/(1, defendant 2reasurer decides to avail of &ivil remedies as provided for under 6ec. ),+: of the Revised 7dministrative &odeJ he gives Plaintiff a period of ten ;1+= days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. 9n July (, 1/(1, defendant 2reasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 1++,+++ 'ags of 7po &ement in satisfaction of PlaintiffDs delin4uency in municipal license ta3J notice was received 'y Plant 9fficer%in%&harge Hicente 2. @aragay, who ac"nowledged the distraint. 6aid articles ;the cement 'ags= will 'e sold 'y pu'lic auction to the highest 'idder on July )7, 1/(1, proceeds thereof will in part 'e utili#ed to settle the account. *espite notice of sale, it did not ta"e place on July )7, 1/(1 'ut on January ,+, 1/() ISSUE+ .01 the distraint and pu'lic auction were valid. ,ELD+ >oth actions are valid. 7ccording to the Revised 7dministrative &odeF 2he remedy 'y distraint shall proceed as followsF 8pon failure of the person owing any municipal ta3 or revenue to pay the same, at the time re4uired, the municipal treasurer may sei#e and distraint any personal property 'elonging to such person or any property su'!ect to the ta3 lien, in sufficient 4uantity to satisfy the ta3 or charge in 4uestion, together with any increment thereto incident to delin4uency and the e3penses of the distraint.$ 2he clear and e3plicit language of the law leaves no room for dou't. 7lso, this 'eing a direct appeal to the 6upreme &ourt, Plaintiff must 'e deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Resins, Inc. v. 7uditor @eneral

Case No. 2.0 G.R. No. L-1#000 (O &o/er 29" 19.0$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .2" )oo&*o&e No.3#

)ACTS+ Petitioner see"s a refund from Respondent &entral >an" on the claim that it was e3empt from the margin fee under R7 )(+/ for the importation of 8RB7 71* A9RM7<*BH-*B$, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. 2he specific language of the 7ct spea"s of 8RB7 A9RM7<*BH-*B$, a finished product which is distinct and different from 8RB7$ and A9RM7<*BH-*B$. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the 6enate, during consideration of the 'ill 'efore said House, 'y mem'ers thereof ;referring to the Journal=. Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action ta"en 'y the Respondent 7uditor @eneral in an endorsement to &entral >an" causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that

granted such e3emption. ISSUE+ .01 PetitionerDs allegations are valid. ,ELD+ 2he 7ct clearly states 8RB7 A9RM7<*BH-*B$ as a finished product and not 8RB7$ and A9RM7<*BH-*B$ as separate units. Individual statements made 'y 6enators do not necessarily reflect the view of the 6enate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mista"e in the printing of the 'ill, it should 'e corrected 'y legislation and not 'y !udicial decree. 2he 7uditor @eneral was !ust doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, :,

): Sui!ano v. *evelopment >an" of the Philippines

Case No. 240 G.R. No. L-2.419 (O &o/er 1." 19#0$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .2" )oo&*o&e No.30

)ACTS+ Petitioners filed an application for an ur'an estate loan with the Reha'ilitation Ainance &orporation ;RA&=, predecessor%in%intent of Respondent. 2hey mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loanJ loan was approved on 7pril ,+, 1/5,. Mortgage contract was e3ecuted 'y Petitioners in favor of *>P on March ),, 1/5:. 7s of July ,1, 1/(5, outstanding o'ligation of the Petitioners with *>P was P1,, /E,.5/. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P1:, +++ for his outstanding o'ligation out of his 'ac" pay pursuant to R7 E/7 ;>ac" Pay <aw=. Respondent advised Petitioners of the non%acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred 'efore or su'sisting on June )+, 1/5,, when R7 E/7 was approved. Respondent filed on 9cto'er 1:, 1/(5 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage e3ecuted 'y the PetitionersJ Respondent 6heriff scheduled the pu'lic auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed 'y *>P. ISSUE+ .01 the o'ligation of the Petitioners was su'sisting at the time of the approval of R7 E/7, the 7mendatory 7ct of June )+, 1/5,, to R7 ,+:, the original >ac" Pay <aw. .01 the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not su'sisting when R7 E/7 was enacted on June )+, 1/5,. ,ELD+ R7 E/7 has clear provisions that e3pressly re4uire that the o'ligations for which 'ac" pay certificates may 'e accepted as payments must 'e su'sisting at the time R7 E/7 was approved ;June )+, 1/5,=. .hile PetitionerDs loan was approved on 7pril ,+, 1/5,, they only availed of it much later on March ),, 1/5:. 2he o'ligation therefore attaches only on March ),, 1/5:. It cannot 'e said that there was an o'ligation su'sisting at the time of the approval of R7 E/7. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

OMMR& &redit 8nion v. Manila Railroad &ompany

Case No. .. G.R. No. L-2331. ()e/r1ar2 20" 19#9$

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner see"s to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, R7 )+), grants to them. Paragraphs 1 M ) of section () of R7 )+), compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of mem'ers of credit unions the de'ts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. 2he lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE+ .01 R7 )+), converts OMMR& credit unionDs credit into a first priority credit. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he 6upreme &ourt affirmed the decision of the lower court. 2he R7 Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall 'e granted first priority in the salary collections. 7ccording to Justice Recto in a su'se4uent opinion, it is well esta'lished that only specific legal rights are enforcea'le 'y mandamus, that the right sought to 'e enforced must 'e certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is dou'tful$. Justice >arrera addsF $? the writ never issues in dou'tful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to e3ercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MA-IM+ 7a

)5 *avao <ight M Power &o. v. &ommissioner of &ustoms

Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-20#39 (Mar ! 29" 19#2$

)ACTS+ Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of *avao. 9n two different occasions it imported materials and e4uipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the ta3es levied against its imports should 'e waived 'y the collector of customs in &e'u ;the materials were delivered at the port of &e'u= pursuant to section 17 of ;pre%commonwealth= 7ct ,(,( ;6tandard Blectric Power and <ight Aranchise <aw= which states that if any competing company should 'e granted franchise more favora'le than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall en!oy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE+ .01 section 17 of act ,(,( applies to the case of Petitioner. ,ELD+ 1o. Airstly, the provision cited 'y Petitioner states that the franchise must 'e granted to a Icompeting partyD. 1P&, to which the contract with ta3 e3emptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. 6econdly, Petitioner cannot rely on R7 ,5E as amended 'y R7 /E7 to support its ta3 e3emption. B3emption from ta3ation is never presumed, it is always e3plicitly stated.


6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7lfredo Ramos v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 232 G.R. No. L-41293 (De e8/er 4" 1909$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .2" )oo&*o&e No..0

)ACTS+ 2he municipality of Hagonoy, >ulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 7: hectare fishpond. 7tty. 7ngel &ru#, a private lawyer and head of the &ru#, *urian and 7cademia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is o'liged to pay them not less than )+C of the amount to 'e recovered. Petitioners move to dis4ualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE+ .01 it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. ,ELD+ 1o. 8nder section 1(E, of the Revised 7dministrative &ode, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Aurthermore, under section , of the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and e3ercise such powers as may 'e assigned to them 'y the council. 2he municipalityDs interest would 'e 'est protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. 2hese laws are implemented as well so as not to 'urden the municipality with the e3pense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MA-IM+ 7a

)( Aloresca v. Phile3 Mining &orporation

Case No. 4# G.R. No. L- 30.42 (A%r45 30" 1903$

)ACTS+ Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent &orporation who died as a result of a cave %in while wor"ing in underground mining operations. Petitioners, with the e3ception of Aloresca, recovered damages under the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct. However, a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent &orporation. 2hereafter, Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent &orporationDs rec"less and wanton negligence. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioners have the right to choose 'etween availing of the wor"erDs right under the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct or suing in the regular courts under the &ivil &ode for higher damages.

,ELD+ Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the &ivil &ode for higher damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount received from this 7ct shall 'e deducted to prevent the instance of dou'le recovery. 7n in!ured party cannot pursue 'oth courses of action simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the &ourt stated that it did not legislate in this case 'ut rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social !ustice. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 17, :+a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bnrile v. 6ala#ar

Case No. 40 G.R. No. 921.3 (61*e 3" 1990$

)ACTS+ Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of re'ellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from 1ovem'er )/ to *ecem'er 1+, 1//+. Petitioners contend that they are 'eing charged for a criminal offense that does not e3ist in the statute 'oo"s 'ecause technically, the crime of re'ellion cannot 'e comple3ed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE+ .01 case of Petitioners falls under the Hernande# doctrine. ,ELD+ 2he doctrine in the case People v. Hernande# remains as the 'inding doctrine operating to prohi'it the comple3ing of re'ellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. 2he charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are a'sor'ed in the crime of simple re'ellion. 2herefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should 'e understood as that of simple re'ellion under the RP&. Aurthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Aeliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could 'e prosecuted separately from re'ellion, then the principle of non%retroactivity would 'e violated. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, :(a, :E

)7 Mani"ad v. 2anod'ayan

Case No. 1.2 G.R. No. .309# ()e/r1ar2 20" 1904$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .3" )oo&*o&e No..3

)ACTS+ Petitioners were mem'ers of the B3port Processing Pone 7uthority ;BPP7= Police Aorce and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of 7nti%@raft <aw and 7nti%Aencing <aw 'efore the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged e3clusively upon the BPP7 and is not in the RespondentDs !urisdiction. 6ection 7

of P.*. 171(%7 statesF 2he BPP7 in the e3ercise of its sole police authority over the e3port processing #ones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the #ones owned and administered 'y the 7uthority?$ ISSUE+ .01 6ection 7 of P.*. 171(%7 precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the B3port Processing Pone. ,ELD+ 1o, the use of sole$ in P.*. 171(%7 refers to police authority. 7lthough the BPP7 Police Aorce is the only police authority within the Pone, it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the !urisdiction of the 6andigan'ayan. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ,5

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6enarillos v. Hermosisimo

Case No. 2#0 G.R. No. L-10..2 (De e8/er 14" 193.$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .#" )oo&*o&e No.#4

)ACTS+ Petitioner was appointed as &hief of Police in 6i'onga, &e'u. 8pon the charges filed 'y Petitioner, 6enarillos was suspended 'y Municipal Mayor of 6i'onga and investigated 'y a police committee$ composed of , councilors created 'y Resolution 1o.) 6eries 1/5) of the municipal council. 2he committee came up with an adverse decision su'se4uently signed 'y the mem'ers of the council. 2his was appealed to and affirmed 'y the &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice and 'y the &ivil 6ervice >oard of 7ppeals. ISSUE+ .01 6i'onga had !urisdiction to investigate the &hief of Police 6enarillos. ,ELD+ 1o. 8nder R7 1o.557 the investigation of police officers must 'e conducted 'y council itself and not 'y a mere committee thereof. 6i'onga therefore had no !urisdiction to investigate the &hief of Police 6enarillos. R7 1o.557 has eliminated the provision authori#ing investigation 'y a committee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in 'y the rest of the councilors. 2he fact that the decision of the Municipal &ouncil was issued 'efore the decision of the 6upreme &ourt cannot validate the action of the police committee. 2he initial proceeding was illegal a' initio and the su'se4uent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council 'y the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, ,a, (', 7a

)E People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang

Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12000 (De e8/er 23" 1939$

C!a%&er II" 'a(e .9" )oo&*o&e No.0#

)ACTS+ *efendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in <anao. *efendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invo"es as his legal e3cuse the appointment issued to him 'y @overnor *ima"uta as secret agent shown in the @overnorDs letter which he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith 'y previously surrendering to the office of the @overnor a firearm. He has then 'een appointed as 6B&RB2 7@B12 to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authori#ed to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE+ .01 a 6ecret 7gent tas"ed to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authori#ed to possess firearms. ,ELD+ -es. It may 'e true that the @overnor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit 'ut section E7/ of the Revised 7dministrative &ode provides the peace officers$ are e3empted from the re4uirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. 2he appointment sufficiently put him in the category of peace officer$ e4uivalent even to a Municipal Police e3pressly covered 'y section E7/. .herefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the *efendant ac4uitted. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ):a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People of the Philippines v. Mapa

Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (A1(1s& 30" 19.#$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .9" )oo&*o&e No.09

)ACTS+ *efendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invo"es in his defense that he was an appointed 6ecret 7gent of the provincial @overnor of >atangas. He sought to 'e ac4uitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE+ .01 a 6ecret 7gent falls among those authori#ed to possess firearms. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he court held that the law cannot 'e any clearer. 2he law does not contain any e3ception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. .herefore the conviction of the accused must stand. 2he &ourtDs ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (c, 7a, ,+a, ,5, :(c


&o v. &7

Case No. .3 G.R. No. 100##. (O &o/er 20" 1993$ C!a%&er II" 'a(e .9" )oo&*o&e No.91

)ACTS+ Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on 6eptem'er 1, 1/E, a chec" drawn against the 7ssociated &iti#ensD >an", postdated 1ovem'er ,+, 1/E,. 2he chec" was deposited on January ,, 1/E:. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely%stated reason given 'y the 'an" 'eingF &<96B* 7&&9812.$ 7 criminal complaint for violation of >atas Pam'ansa >ilang )) was filed 'y the salvage company against Petitioner. 7t the time of the issuance of the chec", the delivery of a ru''er$ or 'ouncing$ chec" as a guarantee for an o'ligation was not considered a punisha'le offense, an official promulgation made in a &ircular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is criminally lia'le. ,ELD+ 1o. 7ccording to them, Sue v. People should not 'e applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of !udicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. 2he decision in Sue should not 'e given retroactive effect to the pre!udice of &o and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the 6ecretary of Justice. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, )a, :(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6y Oiong v. 6armiento

Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-2934 (No:e8/er 29" 1931$

)ACTS+ Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the &ity of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to 'a"eries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. 6ometime in 6eptem'er 1/:E, the 2reasurer of the &ity of Manila assessed against him the sum of 5((.5+php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license ta3 due from him on his gross sales of flour to 'a"eries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE+ .01 the sales of flour made 'y the Petitioner to 'a"eries to 'e manufactured into 'read are retail or wholesale. ,ELD+ 2he sale of flour to 'a"eries to 'e manufactured into 'read and to 'e resold to the pu'lic, in the a'sence of any e3press provision of law on the matter, should 'e treated as a sale at retail and should su'!ect the vendor to the retail ta3 law. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ):a, ,7, :,


6umulong v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 149 G.R. No. 40.34 (O &o/er 0" 1941$

)ACTS+ 9n 6eptem'er 15, 1/:1, Respondent granted the Popular Aront Party of 7'ad 6antos the e3clusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Aront Party of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Bleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Aront Party of 7'ad 6antos. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent committed grave a'use of discretion. ,ELD+ .here the minimum num'er of votes re4uired 'y law was polled 'y a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the 'oard of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot 'e claimed 'y any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. LATIN MA-IM+ ,(a, ,7, d

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&entral &api# v. Ramire#

Case No. 3. G.R. No. L-1.19# (Mar ! 12" 1920$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e #9" )oo&*o&e No.0

)ACTS+ Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner &orporation for a term of ,+ years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to 'e converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encum'rance upon the land, and 'inding to all future owners of the same. 2he Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thin"ing it might violate 7ct 1o. )E7:, 7n 7ct to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of pu'lic domain, and for other purposes,$ since more than (1 percent of the capital stoc" of the corporation is held and owned 'y persons who are not citi#ens of the Philippine Islands or of the 8nited 6tates. 2he land involved is a private agricultural land. ISSUE+ .01 said 7ct no. )E7: is applica'le to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. ,ELD+ 2he limit and purpose of the <egislature in adopting 7ct 1o. )E7: was and is to limit its application to lands of pu'lic domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever there'y. Jones <aw of 1/1(F 2hat no 'ill may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect, and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$ LATIN MA-IM+ d

,1 Bugenio v. *rilon

Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (6a*1ar2 22" 199.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 01" )oo&*o&e No.20

)ACTS+ Private Respondent purchased on installment 'asis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amorti#ations 'ecause of non%development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. 7pplying P.*. /57 2he 6u'division and &ondominium >uyersD Protective *ecree$, the Human 6ettlements Regulatory &ommission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private RespondentDs purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment ;including interest= he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the B3ec. 6ec. erred in applying P.*. /57 saying it should have not 'een given retroactive effect and that non% development does not !ustify the non%payment of the amorti#ations. ISSUEF .01 the B3ecutive 6ecretary acted with grave a'use of discretion when he decided P.*. /57 will 'e given retroactive effect. ,ELDF 1o. Respondent B3ecutive 6ecretary did not act with grave a'use of discretion and P.*. /57 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts e3ecuted prior to its enactment in 1/7(. P.*. /57 did not e3pressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, 'ut such can 'e plainly inferred from the unmista"a'le intent of the law. 2he intent of the statute is the law.$ LATIN MA-IMF /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People of the Philippines v. Purisima

Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42030-.. (No:e8/er 20" 19#0$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e #." )oo&*o&e No.1.

)ACTS+ 2wenty%si3 petitions for review were filed charging the respective *efendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon$ in violation of Presidential *ecree 1o. /. 7n order 4uashed the information 'ecause it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penali#ed 'y P.*. 1o. /. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, vi#.F that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a 'laded, pointed, or 'lunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to su'version, insurrection, or re'ellion, organi#ed lawlessness or pu'lic disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.*. 1o. / shows that the prohi'ited acts need not 'e related to su'versive activities and that they are essentially malum prohi'itum penali#ed for reasons of pu'lic policy. ISSUEF .01 P.*. 1o. / shows that the prohi'ited acts need not 'e related to su'versive activities. ,ELD+

2he primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. <egislative intent is the controlling factor. >ecause of the pro'lem of determining what acts fall under P.*. /, it 'ecomes necessary to in4uire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can 'e found among others in the pream'le or whereas$ clauses which enumerate the facts or events which !ustify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ')

,) People of the Philippines v. Bchaves

Case No. 20# G.R. Nos. L-4##3#-.1 (6a*1ar2 20" 1900$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e ##" )oo&*o&e No.22

)ACTS+ 2he issue is whether or not P.*. 77), which penali#es s4uatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. 2he lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.*. 77) on the 'asis of B!usdem @eneris ;of the same "ind or species= since its pream'le does not mention the 6ecretary of 7griculture. 2he order of dismissal 'y Bchaves was then appealed to the 6upreme &ourt, thus 'ringing the case at hand. ISSUE+ .hether or not P.*. 77) applies to agricultural lands ,ELD+ 2he 6upreme &ourt held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring that P.*. 77) does not apply to pasture lands 'ecause its pream'le shows that it was intended to apply to s4uatting in ur'an communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in s4uatter areas made 'y well %to%do individuals.$ >ut the 6upreme &ourt disagreed to the lower courtDs usage of the ma3im B!usdem @eneris 'ecause the intent of the decree is unmista"a'le. It stated that the rule of B!usdem @eneris is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.$ LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7'oiti# 6hipping &orporation v. &ity of &e'u

Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-1432. (Mar ! 31" 19.3$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 02" )oo&*o&e No.23

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented 'y Respondent should 'e declared null and void 'ecause the ordinance see"s to generate revenue 'y collecting wharfage from vessels which doc" at the pu'lic wharves of piers located in the said &ity 'ut owned 'y the 1ational @overnment. 7ccording to Respondent, the legislature made no distinction 'etween those owned 'y the &ity of &e'u and the 1ational @overnment and that conse4uently, 'oth fall within the scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of pu'lic wharf$ as it may have 'earing on the right to charge wharfage.

ISSUE+ .01 the &ity of &e'u, through its ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages from doc"s which are owned 'y the 1ational @overnment. ,ELD+ 2he term pu'lic$ refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to impose wharfage rests on a different 'asis and that is ownership. 2he &ourt also referred to the previous su'section of the 4uestioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those doc"s that are owned 'y the &ity and those of the 1ational @overnment. 2he &ourt states that only those which are constructed 'y the &ity shall 'e considered as its property. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )5a, ,('

,, &ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. 2MG 6ales, Inc.

Case No. 00 G.R. No. 03#3. (6a*1ar2 13" 1992$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 03" )oo&*o&e No.23

)ACTS+ Respondent &ompany wants a refund to an erroneously collected ta3 as provided in 6ec. )/) of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode ;1IR&= which includes a two%year prescription. 2he Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such ta3 is already e3pired since it is already more than two years from the date the 4uarterly income ta3 was paid. 2he Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment ;Ainal 7d!ustment Return= is the one that should 'e considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the 4uarterly payment made. ISSUE+ .01 the two%year prescriptive period provided in 6ec. )/) of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode commence to run from the date the 4uarterly income ta3 was paid or from the date of filing of the Ainal 7d!ustment Return ;final payment=. ,ELD+ 2he date of filing of the final payment should 'e considered. 2he 6upreme &ourt said that, 6ec. )/) of the 1IR& should 'e interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the 2a3 &ode in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and a'surdity. 2he intention of the legislator must 'e ascertained from the whole te3t of the law and every part of the act is to 'e ta"en into view.$ LATIN MA-IM+ 11a, ,(', ,(d

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Aeliciano v. 74uino

Case No. 103 G.R. No. 10201 (Se%&e8/er 23" 193#$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 03" )oo&*o&e No.20

)ACTS+ Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of &oncepcion, 2arlac. Aour days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted 4uo warranto proceedings, challenging PetitionerDs eligi'ility on the ground that Respondent was not yet ), years old at the time of his election. 74uino claimed that age re4uirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the e3istence of a semi%colon, converted into a comma in the 1/51 Revised 7dministrative &ode, does not re4uire him to possess the remaining 4ualifications at the time of the election 'ut rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first two re4uirements. ISSUE+ .01 the election of 74uino is unlawful and illegal. ,ELD+ 2he primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation mar"s cannot 'e disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation mar"s are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligi'le meaning of written words. 1o reason is shown why, after plainly and une4uivocally re4uiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age 4ualification at the time of the election$, the law should suddenly change the re4uirement for the case of municipal officers. 1o argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligi'le or ineligi'le in the said section, ta"ing part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume office. *ecision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /d, 11a, 11e, ,('

,: 86. v. Hart

Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-032# (Mar ! 20" 1913$

)ACTS+ Respondent was caught in a gam'ling house and was penali#ed under 7ct 1o. 51/ which punishes every person found loitering a'out saloons or dram shops or gam'ling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visi'le means of support$. 2he said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated 'y the comma, separating those caught in gam'ling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. 2hough it was proven that Hart and the other *efendants had visi'le means of support$, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. 2he prosecution persisted that the phrase without visi'le means of support$ was in connection to the second part of the said portion of 7ct 1o. 51/, therefore was not a via'le defense. ISSUE+ How should the provision 'e interpretedQ ,ELD+ 2he construction of a statute should 'e 'ased upon something more su'stantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasona'le and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may 'e as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. 7n argument 'ased on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended 'y the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation

mar"s, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, visi'le means of support$ and that the a'sence of such was necessary for the conviction for gam'ling and loitering in saloons and gam'ling houses, defendants are ac4uitted. LATIN MA-IM+ 11e, ,,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

In reF Bstate of Johnson

Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12#.# (No:e8/er 1." 1910$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 0." )oo&*o&e No.30

)ACTS+ Petitioner was a native of 6weden and a naturali#ed citi#en of the 8nited 6tates 'ut died and left a will in Manila. 6ec. (,( of the &ode of the &ivil Procedure states .ill made here 'y an alienTwill made within the Philippine Islands 'y a citi#en or su'!ect of another state or country, which is e3ecuted in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citi#en or su'!ect, and which might 'e proved, allowed 'y the law of his own state or country, may 'e proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if e3ecuted according to the laws of these Islands.$ 2he will of Johnson was pro'ated and allowed in the lower court, 'ut Petitioner contends that 6ec. (,( is applica'le only to wills of aliensJ and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section spea"s only of the will made here 'y an alien and to further fact that the word state$ in the 'ody of the section is not capitali#ed. ISSUE+ .01 the will of Petitioner, a citi#en of the 8.6 and therefore an alien, is covered 'y 6ec. (,(. ,ELD+
2he fact that the words state$ and country$ are not capitali#ed does not mean that the 8nited 6tates is e3cluded from the phrase another state or country$. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitali#ation are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligi'le meaning of the written words. 2he epigraph, or heading, of a section 'eing nothing more than a convenient inde3 to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the 'ody of the te3t. Petitioner, 'eing a 86 citi#en, thus an alien, is covered 'y 6ec. (,(. 2he will duly pro'ated.

LATIN MA-IM+ ):a, )5a, )(, ,7, :)a, :E

,5 People of the Philippines v. -a'ut

Case No. 231 G.R. No. 034#2 (Se%&e8/er 2#" 1993$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 0#" )oo&*o&e No.43

)ACTSF *efendant was convicted for homicide. .hile serving sentence, he "illed another prisoner. He was conse4uently charged for murder. 7fter conviction, he was punished with the ma3imum period for murder, in accordance with 7rt. 1(+ of the Revised Penal &ode.

ISSUEF .01 the lower court erred in applying 7rt. 1(+. ,ELDF 1o. Respondent relied on the word another$ appearing in the Bnglish translation of the head note of 7rt. 1(+, and suggests that the law is applica'le only when the new crime committed 'y a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. 7ccording to him, his conviction for murder is not different 'ecause it involved homicide. 1o such deduction is warranted from the te3t itself, or from the 6panish caption. .hen the te3t of the law is clear and unam'iguous, there is no need to resort to the pream'le, heading, epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the te3t, which are mere catchwords or reference aids, consulted to remove, not create dou'ts. LATIN MA-IMF (c, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People of the Philippines v. Mendo#a

Case No.112 G.R. No. L-300#. (No:e8/er 4" 1933$

)ACTSF Respondents were accused for violation of 6ection )(5: of the 7dministrative &ode for allegedly depositing in the official 'allot 'o3 51 official 'allots which they prepared without the "nowledge and consent of the voters. 2hey were tried and convicted. ISSUEF .01 the evidence is sufficient to convict. ,ELDF 1o. .hat was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no pro'ative value to esta'lish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. 2he Bnglish te3t of 6ection )(5: is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applica'le when a person fraudulently depositDs a 'allot in the 'allot 'o3. 2he evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the 'allots in 4uestion. Judgment was reversed. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+, d

,( People of the Philippines v. Mana'a

Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-3903# (O &o/er 30" 1933$

)ACTS+ *efendant was charged for rape. 2he complaint was signed 'y the &hief of Police. 7fter trial, *efendant was convicted 'ut the !udgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no !urisdiction over his person or the su'!ect matter, 'ecause the complaint was not signed 'y the offended party. 6u'se4uently, the offended party signed a

complaint charging *efendant of rape. *efendant as"ed for dismissal on the ground of dou'le !eopardy, 'ut it was denied and he was convicted. ISSUEF .01 the *efendant was placed in dou'le !eopardy. ,ELDF 1o. .hether or not *efendant was placed in dou'le !eopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. 7rt. ,,: of the Revised Penal &ode re4uires the offended party to file the complaint. 7s the first complaint was not signed 'y the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law, and the !udgment of the court was void for lac" of !urisdiction over su'!ect matter, and defendant was never in !eopardy. 2he 6panish e4uivalent of the word filed$ is not 'ound in the 6panish te3t which is controlling, 'ecause it was the 6panish te3t approved 'y the legislature. LATIN MA-IMF (c, ,(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

8.6. v. Suintanar

Case No. 1.2 G.R. No. 3.34 (A1(1s& 2#" 1910$

)ACTS+ *efendants, on the night of March 1, 1/+E were caught in the act of smo"ing opium, in violation of 6ec. ,) of 7ct 1o. 17(1, the 9pium <aw$. 9n appeal, *efendants contend that they could not 'e legally convicted for they rely on the 6panish translation of the 7ct which provides that it will ta"e effect despues del primero de Mar#o.$ ;after the first of March= ISSUE+ .01 the *efendant should 'e punished under 7ct 1o 17(1 which ta"es effect despues del primero de Mar#o.$ ,ELD+ 2he translation of the *efendant is not accurate. 2he Bnglish and original te3t saysF on and after March 1, 1/+E$. .here the 7ct was originally promulgated in Bnglish, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MA-IM+ (c

,7 BmployeesD &lu', Inc. v. &hina >an"ing &orporation

Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40100 (6152 2#" 1934$

)ACTS+ Respondent &orporation contends that the order re4uires it to surrender the register of deeds of the &ity of Manila which is the duplicate of 2&2 1o. )11/) so that the contract lease might 'e noted and entered in the corresponding records. 2hey argue that the contract lease

cannot 'e registered in the register of deeds 'ecause it is not a real rightJ and under the &ivil &ode and the Mortgage <aw, only real rights can 'e registered. 2he only e3ceptions, which it does not har'or, are a term e3ceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an e3press covenant re4uiring the lease to 'e registered. ISSUE+ .01 contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not 'e registered. ,ELD+ 2he property in 4uestion is 192 under the Mortgage law 'ut under 7ct 1o. :/(, or the 2orrens system, 6ec. 51 and 5). 2his act e3pressly provides that all interests must 'e registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. 2he 6panish te3t of the law was relied upon 'y the Petitioner N the Mortgage <aw. >ut the Bnglish enacted 'y the <egislature, 7ct 1o. :/(, should prevail. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

McMic"ing v. <ichauco

Case No. 1#3 G.R. No. #09. (Mar ! 30" 1914$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 00" )oo&*o&e No.49

)ACTSF 2his is an appeal on a !udgment in favor of current Respondent against *efendant &hu &han &hac. However, there was another case pending in its durationF an appeal in the !udgment in favor of 7ntonio Alor Mata N where !udgment e3ecution is. 7nd li"ewise, in the duration of MataDs !udgment, there was yet another pending appeal where *efendant <ichauco owed his 7unt &lara <ichauco P17,(((.(+. ISSUE+ .ith these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed 'y <ichauco. ,ELD+ Preference should 'e secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. 2he preference on Mata was 'ased on 7rt. 1/): of the new &ode of &ivil Procedure, which secures preference to sentencias firmes only ;!udgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom=. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of <ichauco 'ased on the first !udgment. However, until the allotment of time for perfecting of a 'ill is not done yet and the appeal was not ta"en, the !udgment, strictly, is not 6entencia Airme as used in 6panish legal terminology N where it would 'e e3plained that the right to share in the distri'ution of the de'tor ;<ichauco= could not accrue the !udgment creditor ;Mata= until he has the right to. 9ne must ta"e into account that classification and the incidents of !udgments, orders and decrees that were once under 6panish 2erminology have 'een modified under the new &ode of &ivil Procedure, drawn in part from 7merican and Bnglish precedents. 9ne should loo" rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. 2he lien of a !udgment is not necessarily destroyed 'y the perfecting of an appeal 'ut simply suspended. Bven if there was a new !udgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, :/


7lon#o v. Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt

Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-#20#3 (Ma2 20" 190#$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 09" )oo&*o&e No.34

)ACTS+ Aive si'lings inherited in e4ual pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. 2wo si'lings sold their share to the same vendee. >y virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, )05 of the lot, representing the portions 'ought. 2hey su'se4uently enclosed their portion with a fence and 'uilt a semi%concrete house. 9ne of the sisters filed a complaint invo"ing the right to redeem the area sold. 2he trial court dismissed this complaint 'ecause the time had lapsed, not having 'een e3ercised within ,+ days from notice of the sales. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ 7lthough there was no written notice, there was actual "nowledge of the sales satisfying the re4uirement of the law. It is un'elieva'le that the co%heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi%concrete structure. .hile 7rt. 1+EE of the &ivil &ode stresses the need for a written notice of saleJ the Petitioners claimed that 'ecause there was no written notice, despite their o'vious "nowledge of it, the ,+%day period for redemption had not yet 'egun. 2he intent of the lawma"ers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the ,+% day period of redemption. 2he co%heirs in this case were undenia'ly informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, E, /a, 1+, 11d, 11e, 1)a, 17 .01 there was a valid notice. .01 7rt. 1+EE of the &ivil &ode was interpreted correctly.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hda. *e Maca'enta v. *avao 6tevedore 2erminal &ompany

Case No. 13. G.R. No. L-2#409 (A%r45 30" 19#0$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 09" )oo&*o&e No.3#

)ACTS+ 7t the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on 6eptem'er 1), 1/(1, which led to his death 1( days later, the claimant%widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already 'een living together as hus'and and wife for the past , months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded. 2he claimant widow gave 'irth on 7pril E, 1/(), to the posthumous daughter of the deceased, Rac4uel. ISSUE+ .01 the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct. ,ELD+ -es. 7ccording to the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 1E years of age or incapa'le of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent on the

deceased are considered dependents. 7lthough not his wife at the time of the accident 'ut at the time of his death, are still considered dependents under the 7ct. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, /c, 1)a, ,7

,/ 2inio, et al. v. Arances, et al.

Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-##4# (No:e8/er 29" 1933$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 90" )oo&*o&e No..1

)ACTS+ 6ergio 1icolas applied for a parcel of land in 1ueva Bci!a and was approved in 1/17. In 1/:,, the final proof was approved 'y the *irector of <ands who issued a patent in his favor, 'ut 'ecause 6ergio 1icolas died, he was su'stituted 'y his heirs, represented 'y his widow. In 1/:7, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the *efendants, with approval 'y the 6ecretary of 7griculture and &ommerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1/5,, heirs of the deceased 6ergio 1icolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE+ .01 the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of 6ergio 1icolas over the parcel of land was valid. ,ELD+ 1o. &onveyances made 'y the heirs of the homesteader to the *efendants do not comply with the first re4uirement of 6ec. )+ of the Pu'lic <ands 7ct that the *irector of lands is satisfied from proofs su'mitted 'y the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must 'e made with the prior or previous approval of the 6ecretary of 7griculture and &ommerce. 2hus the conveyance made 'y the heirs of 1icolas was null and void. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /', ,7, ,E', :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Home Insurance &ompany v. Bastern 6hipping <ines

Case No. 123 G.R. No. 34302 (6152 20" 1903$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 91" )oo&*o&e No..4

)ACTS+ Plaintiff &ompany instituted two cases of recovery of damages against *efendant &ompany. 2he Petitioner &ompany claimed for reim'ursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered 'y the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. ISSUE+ .01 the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lac"s legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.

,ELD+ -es. 2he law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff &ompany, must, in order to 'e capacitated to sue in the Philippine !urisdiction, prove legal capacity 'y esta'lishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was 'ased was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authori#ed 'y law to transact in the Philippines. 9therwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to see" relief from the court. In the case at 'ar, the insurance contracts 'etween the Plaintiff and the *efendant were e3ecuted long 'efore the Plaintiff secured its license to transact 'usiness in the Philippines. 2herefore, said insurance contracts were void from the 'eginning as the purpose was contrary to pu'lic policy. LATIN MA-IM+ :, E, /c, 11a, ,(a, ,7

:+ <u#on 6tevedoring &ompany v. 2rinidad

Case No. 134 G.R. No. 1031. (Se%&e8/er 23" 1922$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 91" )oo&*o&e No.#1

)ACTS+ Plaintiff is a corporation duly organi#ed under the laws of the Philippine Islands, doing 'usiness in the &ity of Manila. Bngaging in a stevedoring 'usiness, consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff &ompany hopes to recover from *efendant, the Internal Revenue &ollector, the sum of P),:)).E1, which had 'een paid under protest. *efendant alleged that during the first 4uarter of 1/)1, the Plaintiff was engaged in 'usiness as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said 'usiness amounting to P):), )E1.,,. 8nder the provisions of 6ec. 1:() of 7ct 1o. )711, the percentage ta3 amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring 'usiness. ISSUE+ .01 the Plaintiff is considered a KcontractorK provided 'y 6ec. 1:() of 7ct 1o. )711. ,ELD+ 7 contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his wor", and not as to the means 'y which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a KcontractorK 'ased on 6ec. 1:() of 7ct 1o. )711. 2herefore, the ta3 paid 'y the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should 'e repaid. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, :, 5', /c, 11a, )E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@o &hioco v. Martine#

Case No. 113 G.R. No. 190.4 a*9 19.03 (O &o/er 1#" 1923$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 93" )oo&*o&e No.93

)ACTS+ Petitioner made a loan of P:+,+++ to Respondent. 2hey e3ecuted a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay 'ac" the loan within three months. 9n the same

day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a chec" of P1,E++ to Petitioner, which was cashed. 7fter three months, Respondent Hermanos was una'le to pay the principal. He now e3ecuted a new promissory note, again due within the ne3t three months, and with this note, Respondent Hermanos sent a chec" for P1,E++. 7gain, he could not pay so they e3ecuted another promissory note and sent another chec" worth P1,E++. 2his cycle was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycleLs promissory note 'ring due only a month later and with a chec" for only P(++. 2hen Respondent Hermanos paid P)5,+++ for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,+++. 2herefore, Petitioner filed a complaint. 2he trial court ruled that the interest rate of 1EC was in violation of the 8sury <aw ;7ct )(55 as amended 'y 7ct 1o. )//)=. 2hus, he must give 'ac" P11,E5+ from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,+++. ISSUE+ .01 the charging of a usurious interest of 1EC forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. ,ELD+ 1o, since only the interest is forfeited. 2a"ing into consideration the history of the 8sury <aw, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law R7 )+7,, the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unli"e the previous law, the current law R7 )(55 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. 2he current law also does not e3pressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. 7s a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is am'iguous, one may consult the history of the law and its pream'le to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, ,(a, ,7

:1 86 v. *e @u#man

Case No. 29# G.R. No. L-9144 (Mar ! 2#" 1913$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 94" )oo&*o&e No.93

)ACTS+ *efendant, along with Pedro and 6erapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato ;murder= and sentenced to life imprisonment. *efendant was discharged 'efore he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the @overnment against his co%accused. 8pon reaching the witness stand, *efendant denied all "nowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co%accused and swore that statements made 'y him were made in fear of the police officers. 2he 6olicitor%@eneral as"s for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpa'le miscarriage of !ustice, nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and e3pressly 'ars a future prosecution. ISSUE+ .01 *efendant should 'e discharged. ,ELD+ 6ec. 1/ and )+ are constitutional. 2here is no provision for per!ury should the *efendant fail to comply with the agreement with the 6tate. However, loo"ing at the legislative history of the statute, it can 'e gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the 'ar to criminal prosecution. Aailure of the *efendant in the case at 'ar to faithfully and honestly carry out his underta"ing to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co%accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a 'ar to his prosecution. Ainally, discharge cannot 'e an ac4uittal since it was made prior to his trial.

LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ))a, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>asiana v. <una

Case *o. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34133-3. ()e/r1ar2 24" 1901$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 93" )oo&*o&e No.102

)ACTS+ Petitioner entered into a private agreement with &ipriano <una to prospect with <una getting (+C and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 1E, claims, /, were recorded for him with the rest going to <una, a clear disregard of their agreement. Reali#ing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records, <una amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie pointsJ Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. &onse4uently, <una cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping PetitionerDs claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely a'andoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE+ .01 PetitionerDs mining claims are valid. ,ELD+ 6ec. :7 par. ) of the Mining <aw ;&.7. 1o. 1,7= providesF Aor the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent o'!ect used as a tie point M7- 'e an intersection of "nown roadsJ a !unction of "nown rivers or cree"s, a "nown pu'lic or private structureJ a corner of approved pu'lic, private or mineral land surveyJ a "ilometer post of pu'lic roadJ or location monument or triangulation station esta'lished 'y the >ureau of <ands, >ureau of Mines, 7rmy &orps of engineers, >ureau of &ost and @eodetic 6urvey, or other government agencies.$ 7n initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. PetitionerDs contention that the word M7- suggests non% e3clusivity is untena'le since it goes against the legislatorDs intent to eliminate claim !umping and overlapping claims. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, ,+a, ,,, ,('

:) >aga v. P1>

Case No. 2# G.R. No. L-9.93 (Se%&e8/er 10" 193.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 93" )oo&*o&e No.103

)ACTS+ Petitioner was the recipient of 'enefits with Respondent as the guardian under R7 ,/+ or the 8niform Heterans @uardianship 7ct which was passed with the intention of 'eing modeled after the 86 version. R7 ,/+ provides that a guardianship can only 'e terminated upon reaching the age of ma!ority. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has 'ecome emancipated under 7rt. ,// of the 1ew &ivil &ode thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE+ .01 7rt. ,// of the &ivil &ode shall prevail over R7 ,/+.

,ELD+ 1o. 2he &ivil &ode does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the &ivil &ode would result in discordance with intent. R7 ,/+ is a special law and thus must 'e ta"en to constitute an e3ception to the general law which is the &ivil &ode. R7 ,/+ 6ec. ), applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to !udicial restoration and discharge of guardians. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 5+, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*e Hilla v. &7

Case No. 00 G.R. No. 0#41. (A%r45 0" 1991$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 9." )oo&*o&e No.110

)ACTS+ Petitioner was charged with a violation of >P )) ;>ouncing &hec"s <aw= for issuing a worthless chec". However, he contends that the chec" was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign 'an", and is therefore, not covered 'y the said law. ISSUE+ .01 the Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt has !urisdiction over the case in 4uestion. ,ELD+ 2he Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt has !urisdiction. 2he determinative factor ;in determining venue= is the place of the issuance of the chec". 2he offense was committed in Ma"ati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest !urisdiction in the Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt. 2he &ourt ac4uires !urisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. .ith regard to PetitionerDs allegation that the chec" is not covered 'y >P )), it will 'e noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. 2hus, the &ourt revealed that the records of >atasan, Hol. III unmista"a'ly show that the intention of the lawma"ers is to apply the law to whatever currency may 'e the su'!ect thereof. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 17, ):', )(, :,, ')

:, 1ational Police &ommission v. *e @u#man, Jr.

Case No. 103 G.R. No. 10.#24 ()e/r1ar2 9" 1994$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 9." )oo&*o&e No.110

)ACTS+ R7 (/75, otherwise "nown as 7n 7ct Bsta'lishing the P1P 8nder a Reorgani#ed *ept. of the Interior and <ocal @overnment,$ laid down the compulsory retirement age of P1P officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement ;5(= of said law cannot 'e applied to them since they are covered 'y 6ec. E/ of the same law ;which temporarily e3tended the age of retirement=. In other words, Respondents wanted to 'e e3tended the same privileges as the local police.

Hence, they contend that the term I1P$ includes 'oth the former mem'ers of the Philippine &onsta'ulary ;P&= and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated 1ational Police ;I1P=. ISSUE+ .01 the legislative intent was to classify the I1P as applica'le only to the local police force. ,ELD+ 2he intent was to classify the I1P in such manner that 6ec. E/ of R7 (/75 is applica'le only to the local police force. 2he use of the term I1P is not synonymous with the P&. Had it 'een otherwise, the statute could have !ust made a uniform reference to the mem'ers of the whole P1P for retirement purposes and not !ust the I1P. Indeed, the law distinguishes I1P from the P& and it cannot 'e construed that I1P$ as used in 6ec. E/ includes the mem'ers of the P&. 2he legislature did intend to e3clude the mem'ers of the P& from the coverage of 6ec. E/ insofar as the retirement age is concerned. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, 11a, 1)a, )7, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&hina >an"ing &orporation v. 9rtega

Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-349.4 (6a*1ar2 31" 19#3$

)ACTS+ 7 complaint was filed against >M> Aorest *evelopment &orporation for the collection of a sum of money. 2he trial court declared the said corporation in default. 2he Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the 'an" deposit of >M> Aorest with current Petitioner >an". 2hus, a notice of garnishment was issued 'y the *eputy 6heriff and served on Petitioner >an" through its cashier, 2an Oim <iong. He refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of R7 1:+5 which prohi'its the disclosure of any information relative to 'an" deposits to any person e3cept upon written permission of the depositor. Aurthermore, R7 1:+5 also imposes criminal lia'ility on any official or employee of a 'an"ing institution who 'rea"s the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE+ .01 a 'an"ing institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the 'an" deposit of a !udgment de'tor, 'y invo"ing R7 1:+5. ,ELD+ 1o. It was not the intention of the lawma"ers to place 'an" deposits 'eyond the reach of e3ecution to satisfy a final !udgment. 2he discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of &ongress indicates that the prohi'ition against e3amination of or in4uiry into a 'an" deposit under R7 1:+5 does not preclude its 'eing garnished to insure satisfaction of a !udgment. LATIN MA-IMF /a, 11e, 1)', ,+', ,5, ,E', :,, ')

:: Mayon Motors v. 7cting &IR

Case No. 1#3 G.R. No. 13000 (Mar ! 29" 19.1$

C!a%&er III" 'a(e 9." )oo&*o&e No.111

)ACTS+ Petitioner &ompany imported 17 Pontiac automo'iles in three different shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales ta3 on the automo'iles. Petitioner re4uested for reconsideration and, this re4uest having 'een denied, it recurred to the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals. 7fter the hearing, said court modified RespondentDs decision 'y re4uiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting &ommissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted 'y the ta3 court and insists the courtDs interpretation of the 2a3 &ode erroneous invo"ing a statement made 'y then &ongressman Aerdinand Marcos during the deli'erations on the amendments for the 2a3 &ode. ISSUE+ .01 the opinion of a legislator in the deli'erations of a law, controlling in the interpretation of the law. ,ELD+ 1o. &ourts are not 'ound 'y a legislatorDs opinion e3pressed in congressional de'ates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to 'e a mere personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MA-IM+ ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Oilos'ayan, Inc. v. Morato

Case No. .# G.R. No. 110910 (No:e8/er 1." 1993$

)ACTS+ Petitioners see" for reconsideration of Oilos'ayan, et al. v. @uingona. 2he &ourt has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue 'ut did not dismiss the case. Petitioners insist that the P&69 cannot hold and conduct charity sweepsta"es, lotteries and other similar activities in colla'oration or !oint venture with any other party 'ecause of the clause e3cept for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph ;7=$ in paragraph ;>= of 6ec. 1 of R7 11(/ as amended 'y >P :). ISSUE+ .01 under its charter ;R7 11(/, as amended= the Philippine &harity 6weepsta"es 9ffice can enter in any form of association or colla'oration with any party in operating an on%line lottery. ,ELD+ 1o. PetitionerDs interpretation fails to ta"e into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph ;>=, when it should 'e in paragraph ;7= had that 'een the intention of the lawma"ing authority, 'ut also the phrase 'y itself.$ .hat the P&69 is prohi'ited from doing is from investing in a 'usiness engaged in sweepsta"es, races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohi'ited from doing so whether in colla'oration, association or !oint venture$ with others or 'y itself.$ LATIN MA-IM+ ,:, ,('


<u#on 6tevedoring &o., Inc. v. <u#on Marine *epartment 8nion

Case No. ## G.R. No. 92.3 (A%r45 29" 193#$

)ACTS+ Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued 'y the &ourt of Industrial Relations ruling that the )+ minutesD rest given to employees after mealtime should not 'e deducted from the four hours of overtime wor". Bmployees of the company are seamen wor"ing in tug'oats from (F++ am N (F++ pm ;1) hours of wor", four hours overtime=, given three free meals a day and )+ minutesD rest after mealtime. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the definition for Khours of wor"K as presently applied to dry land la'orers e4ually applica'le to seamen. ). .01 a different criterion should 'e applied 'y virtue of the fact that the seamenLs employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of wor" from that of a dry land la'orer. ,ELD+ 2he definition of hours of wor"$ e4ually applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. 6ec. 1 of &.7. 1o. :::, "nown as the Bight%Hour <a'or <aw, provides that when the wor" is not continuous, the time during which the la'orer is not wor"ing and can leave his wor"ing place and can reset completely, shall not 'e counted$ in the eight wor"ing hours. 7 la'orer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or 'oat in order that his period of rest shall not 'e counted, it 'eing enough that he cease to wor",$ and may rest completely. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ommissioner of &ustoms v. &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals

Case No. #1 G.R. Nos. 4000.-0 (6152 21" 1993$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 101" )oo&*o&e No.133

)ACTS+ Iligan B3press &orporation maintains a 'erthing facility at Oiwalan, Iligan &ity. Respondent &ompany availed of such facilities and as thus assessed 'erthing fees 'y the &ollector of &ustom which were paid 'y the said shipping company under protest. ISSUE+ .01 a vessel 'erthing at a privately%owned wharf should 'e charged 'erthing fees under 6ec. )/+1 of the 2ariff and &ustom &ode, as amended 'y P.*. ,:. ,ELD+ 1o. <ia'ility does not attach if the port is privately% owned. 6ec. )/+1 of the 2ariff and &ustom &ode, as amended 'y P.*. ,: spea"s of the national ports$ only. 6ec. )/+1 did not distinguish 'etween national ports and private ports until it was amended 'y the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. 6ince the said law limits the 'erthing ta3es to national ports only, it is o'vious that the private ports are not included. Oiwalan is not a national port in the &ustom memorandum circular ,,%7, or B.9. 7).

LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )5d, ,+a

:( >uenaseda v. 6ecretary Alavier

Case No. 40 G.R. No. 10.#19 (Se%&e8/er 21" 1993$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 104" )oo&*o&e No.141

)ACTS+ 2he Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the 9m'udsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the 7nti%graft and &orrupt Practices 7ct. In response, the 9m'udsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. 2he Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid 'y the 9m'udsman under 6ec. ): of R7 (77+ is contemplated in 'y 6ec. 1,;E= of 7rt. / of the 1/E7 &onstitution, while the Petitioner contends that the 9m'udsman can only recommend to the Heads of *epartments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted 'y his office. ISSUE+ .01 the 9m'udsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials wor"ing in other offices other than that of the 9m'udsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. ,ELD+ -es. 2he 9m'udsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it 'e in punitive or preventive suspension. 6ec. 1,;,= of the &onstitution refers to suspension$ in its punitive sense, as the same spea"s of penalties in administrative cases, while 6ec. ): of R7 (77+ grants the 9m'udsman the power to preventively suspend pu'lic officials and employees facing administrative charges. 2his statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. 7 preventive measure is not in itself a punishment 'ut a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. LATIN MA-IM+ )7, )E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&arolina Industries Inc. v. &M6 6toc" >ro"erage Inc.

Case No. 4# G.R. No. L-4.900 (Ma2 1#" 1900$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 10." )oo&*o&e No.14.

)ACTS+ Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying and selling stoc"s and securities listed in the Ma"ati stoc" e3change. .ithin three months, the PetitionerDs amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission. Respondent says there was consent 'ut the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. Respondent now 4uestion the appellate courtDs ruling on their violation of the 6B& rules and securities 7ct, and how these statutes are interpreted, the appellate court used foreign !urisprudence in coming up with this decision. ISSUE+

.01 there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stoc" trading. ,ELD+ If the law renders the customers as incapa'le of protecting himself, it is the duty of the 'ro"er to do so. 2he courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right 'ecause the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the 8nited 6tates. LATIN MA-IM+ (d, /

:7 Pamora v. &ollector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 1#. G. R. No L-13290 (Ma2 31" 19.3$

)ACTS+ Mariano Pamora, owner of the >ay Hiew Hotel and Aarmacia Pamora Manila, filed his income ta3 returns for the years 1/51 and 1/5). 2he &ollector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowa'le. Mariano Pamora and his deceased sister Aelicidad Pamora, 'ought a piece of land located in Manila on May 1(, 1/::, for P1,),+++.++ and sold it for P75,+++.++ on March 5, 1/51. 2hey also purchased a lot located in S.&. for P(E,/5/.++ on January 1/, 1/:: which they sold for P/:,+++.++ on Ae'. /, 1/51. 2he &27 ordered the estate of the late Aelicidad Pamora, to pay the sum of P),5.++, representing alleged deficiency income ta3 and surcharge due from said estate. Bsperan#a Pamora appealed and alleged that the &27 erred. ISSUE+ .01 the &27 erred in computing the ta3es due for payment 'y Mariano Pamora. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he appraisal is correct and the court found no plausi'le reason to distur' the same. LATIN MA-IM+ ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

2amayo v. @sell

Case No. 202 G. R. No 10#.3 (De e8/er 22" 191.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 10." )oo&*o&e No.149

)ACTS+ 2his is an action for damages against the *efendant for personal in!uries suffered 'y >raulio 2amayo, 11%year old son of the Plaintiff. 2he in!ury was attri'uted to the 'oyDs ine3perience in the wor" which he had 'een assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE+ .01 the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the BmployerDs <ia'ility 7ct. ,ELD+

-es. 2he <egislature intended that the measure of damages in personal in!ury cases 'rought under the BmployerDs <ia'ility 7ct to 'e the same as that in the country from which the 7ct was ta"en, 'eing of 7merican origin. LATIN MA-IM+ ')

:E 9ssorio v. Posadas

Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31000 (De e8/er 3" 1929$

)ACTS+ Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the *efendant &ollector of Internal Revenue the sum of P5(,):(.7), which the *efendant, according to the complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in e3cess of what he should have collected 'y way of income ta3. ISSUE+ .01 the paraphernal property of the PlaintiffDs wife constitutes her separate estate$ within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income ta3. ,ELD+ -es. It is ordered that the *efendant ma"e two separate assessments of the additional income ta3, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property, returning the sum of P5(,)+,.5/ to said plaintiff, without pre!udice to his levying against and collecting from said PlaintiffDs wife upon her own separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income ta3 for the income from her paraphernal property. LATIN MA-IM+ ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ampos Rueda &orp. v. 6ta. &ru# 2im'er &o. and Aeli3

Case No. 1# G.R. No. L-.004 (Mar ! 21" 193.$

)ACTS+ 2he &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,1)5 and P1,+75, for lac" of !urisdictionJ holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P),+++. 2he Municipal &ourt li"ewise dismissed the case of Petitioner &orporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes o'!ect of the former action, on the ground that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in e3cess of its !urisdiction. ISSUE+ .01 the Municipal &ourt of Manila has !urisdiction over the su'!ect matter of appellantDs complaint. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he !urisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each single case

of action contained in the complaint, 'ut upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a

:/ 7ng @io" &hio vs. 6pringfield Aire M Marine Insurance &o.

Case No. 0 G.R. No. 33.3# (De e8/er 31" 1931$

)ACTS+ PetitionerDs warehouse was destroyed 'y fire while the policy ta"en out with Respondent for the amount of P1+,+++ was in force. 2he Respondent &ompany has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. ISSUE+ .01 a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void 'ecause it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance 7ct. ,ELD+ -es. 7 rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under 6ec. (5 of the Philippine Insurance 7ct as it was ta"en ver'atim from 6ec. )(+5 of the &ivil &ode of &alifornia which states, 2he section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may 'e contained in another instrument than the policy when e3pressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof.$ LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pando v. Oette and 6ellner

Case No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (Mar ! 2#" 1930$

)ACTS+ 2his is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January ,+, 1/)/, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in , pu'lic places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the mar"et, and on the municipal 'uilding of Pasay. 1otice of the sale was sent to the newspaper <a 9pinion for pu'lication, and the editor certified that he pu'lished it once a wee" for , consecutive wee"s, more particularly on the )nd, /th, and 15th of Ae'ruary, 1/)/ and the sale too" place on Ae'ruary 1/, 1/)/. ISSUE+ .01 the posted notices of the sale in , pu'lic places and pu'lication in <a 9pinion once a wee" for , consecutive wee"s satisfied the re4uirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in 4uestion. ,ELD+

-es. 2he Provision of our &ode of &ivil Procedure having 'een adopted from 6ec. (/) of the &alifornia &ode, the re4uirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in 4uestion have 'een su'stantially complied with. LATIN MA-IM+ ')

5+ Reyes v. .ells

Case No. 133 G.R. No. 3030# (De e8/er 4" 1929$

)ACTS+ *efendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truc" in a shed lot for P),,+++. However, Plaintiff @uerrero said that he could not do so for the lac" of money to operate the machine. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintiff would !ust have to ma"e out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. *efendant Rader and Plaintiff @uerrero went to J. 1orthcott, and on June )/, 1/)), the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff @uerrero, or to any of his co%Plaintiffs. *ue to the failure of J. B. Rader and J. 1orthcott to pay said amount of P1),+++, the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. ISSUE+ .01 the promissory notes in 4uestion which have not 'een paid, are not supported 'y the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of @uerrero. ,ELD+ 2here was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in 4uestion. 2hese are also in line with 6ec. :(+: of the &ode of Iowa. 2he prohi'ition contained in said law against a witnessD testifying upon any transaction or communication 'etween himself and a deceased person, is su'stantially the same as that contained in 6ec. ,E,;7= of our &ode of &ivil Procedure, as amended 'y 7ct 1o. ))5). 2herefore, we 'elieve that the construction placed upon it 'y the court in the cases cited is applica'le to the case at 'ar. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Phil. Bduc. &o. v. 6oriano

Case No. 233 G.R. No. L-22403 (61*e 30" 19#1$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 10#" )oo&*o&e No.13.

)ACTS+ Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post 9ffice. He managed to leave the 'uilding without "nowledge of the teller. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and su'se4uently deposited it in the >an" of 7merica. Respondent, &hief of the Money 9rder *ivision of the Manila Post 9ffice notified the >an" of irregularity, and deducted from the 'an"Ds clearing account the said amount, in the same way the 'an" of 7merica de'ited PetitionerDs account with the same amount. Petitioner re4uested to reconsider the action 'ut was

denied. ISSUE+ .01 the postal money order in 4uestion is a negotia'le instrument. ,ELD+ Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the 86. 2hese are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of 86Ds own postal statutes, in the a'sence of any special reason !ustifying departure from the policy or practice. 86 held that postal money orders are not negotia'le instruments. LATIN MA-IM+ )', /a, ')

51 &ru# v. Pahati

Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-023# (A%r45 13" 193.$

)ACTS+ *efendant 'ought an automo'ile from >ulahan, for P:,/++ which he paid in chec". He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the chec" upon impoundment and as a result, he returned the automo'ile to >ulahan who in then surrendered the chec" for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorneyLs fees. >ulahan claims that he 'ought the automo'ile from >eli#o without having any "nowledge of any defect in the title. It was found out that >eli#o falsified a letter that ena'led him to sell the car of >ulahan for profit. 2he court rendered !udgment declaring *efendant >ulahan entitled to the automo'ile in 4uestion and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said *efendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the sum of P:,/++, with legal interest from the date of the decision. 2he claim for damages and attorneyLs fees of >ulahan was denied. *efendant >eli#o was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P:,/++ and pay the sum of P5,+++ as moral damages. 2he counterclaim of *efendant was denied for lac" of evidence. ISSUE+ .ho has a 'etter right of the two over the car. ,ELD+ Plaintiff has a 'etter right to the car than >ulahan and therefore can recover the said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived 'ecause of the scheme of >eli#o even if 'oth the Plaintiff and >ulahan acted in good faith. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Repu'lic v. .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (Ma2 10" 19#2$

)ACTS+ Petitioners see" full compensation of P(,+++.++ plus attorneyDs fee of P(++.++ under the .&&, without deducting the P,,+++.++ as death 'enefit which they had 'een previously paid 'y virtue of the provisions of R7 (1+. ISSUE+ .01 the 'eneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under R7 (1+ should still 'e paid the death compensation under the .&&. ,ELD+ 2he resolution of the .&& is modifiedJ the P,,+++.++ received under R7 (1+ should 'e deducted from the full grant received under the .&&. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to dou'le the compensations received, considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceiva'ly permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Aurthermore, 6ec. / of R7 (1+ and 6ec. 5 of .&& 'ar payment under other laws. It was also contended that the phrase or any other law granting similar 'enefits to officers or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal government$ in 6ec. / is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation 'enefits under other laws. LATIN MA-IM+ 17, 1/', )/, ,E', ,/, :+'

5) @arcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.

Case NO. 33 G.R. No. L-1449 (No:e8/er 30" 1903$

)ACTS+ Judgment was rendered for the *efendants on May 1, 1/+,. 2he Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May )1. 2wo days after, they e3cepted to the !udgment and presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July ),. 9n July )E, the Plaintiffs presented their proposed 'ill of e3ceptions, which on 7ugust 5 was allowed and signed 'y the court. 2he term of the court in which the case was tried e3pired on May ,+. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 1:, of the &ode of &ivil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the !udge to order an e3tension of the 1+%day period. ,ELD+ 2he period of 1+ days and the su'se4uent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appealTthe preparation of the papers for transmission to the 6upreme &ourt. 2he right of the parties to the appeal was already fi3ed 'y the notice of the intention to prepare a 'ill of e3ceptions entered of record in the cler"Ds office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of 7merican origin, it cannot 'e e3tended. >ut that period is entirely different from the 1+ days for allowing the preparation of papers, after the right to remove the case has 'een secured. 2herefore, it cannot 'e said that an e3tension of this time is an e3tension of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law was adopted, it seems impossi'le that the &ommission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to e3tend the term, given the physical impossi'ility to comply with it in many cases. LATIN MA-IM+ 11a, 1/', )7, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

B669 6tandard Bastern Inc. v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue

Case No. 41 G.R. No. #003# (6152 #" 1909$

)ACTS+ 2he case is an appeal on the decision of the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals denying the PetitionerDs claims for refund of the margin fees P1+),):(.++ for 1/5/ and P:,:,),:./) for 1/(+. ISSUE+ .01 R7 )(+/, entitled 7n 7ct to 7uthori#e the &entral >an" of the Philippines to Bsta'lish a Margin over >an"sD 6elling Rates of Aoreign B3change$, is a police measure or a revenue measure. ,ELD+ R7 )(+/ is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our countryDs international reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are ta3es and cited the 'ac"ground and the legislative history of the Margin Aee <aw showing that R7 )(+/ was nothing less than a revival of the 17C e3cise ta3 on foreign e3change imposed 'y R7 (+1. 2his was a revenue measure formally proposed 'y President &arlos P. @arcia to &ongress as part of, and in order to 'alance, the 'udget for 1/5/%1/(+. 2he &27 stated that it is a well%settled !urisprudence that only in e3tremely dou'tful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of &ongress 'ecome important. 7s a matter of fact, there may 'e no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unam'iguous, since such legislative history may only 'e resorted to for the purpose of solving dou't, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had 'een decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a ta3. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 7a

5, &ommissioner of &ustoms v. B669 6tandard Bastern Inc.

Case No. 2. G.R. No. L-20329 (A1(1s& 1#" 19#3$

)ACTS+ Petitioner contends that the special import ta3 under R7 1,/: is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescri'ed 'y the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode, and that the e3emption en!oyed 'y Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1/:/ does not include e3emption from the payment of the special import ta3 provided in R7 1,/:. ISSUE+ .01 the e3emption en!oyed 'y Respondent from customs duties granted 'y R7 ,E7 should include the special import ta3 imposed 'y R7 1,/:, or the 6pecial Import 2a3 <aw. ,ELD+ Petitioner too" e3ception to the finding of the &27 that K2he language of R7 1,/: seems to leave no room for dou't that the law intends that the phrase L6pecial Import 2a3L is ta"en to include customs dutiesK. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular

clauses and phrases of the statute should not 'e ta"en as detached and isolated e3pressions, 'ut the whole and every part thereof must 'e considered in fi3ing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will ma"e it harmoni#e with the pre%e3isting 'ody of laws. 7ntagonism 'etween the 7cts to 'e interpreted and e3isting or previous laws is to 'e avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either e3pressly or 'y implication. 7nother rule applied 'y this &ourt is that the courts may ta"e !udicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. 2he &ourt e3amined the si3 statuettes repealed 'y R7 1,/:. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,(', ,Ea, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pascual v. *irector of <ands

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-1301. ()e/r1ar2 29" 19.4$

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of 6ec. 1+) &.7. 1o. 1:1, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the ta3es thereon since 1/:7, and on the further ground that he and his successors%in%interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. 2he policy in the disposition and concession of pu'lic land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. 2hus, in cases of lease the law re4uires that no lease shall 'e permitted to interfere with any prior claim 'y settlement or 'y occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had, or until such claim shall 'e legally e3tinguished ;6ec. ,,, &.7. 1o. 1:1=. If anyone should 'e given prior right of entry at all, it should 'e the actual occupants who have presented several petitions for the su'division or and sale of the land to them. ISSUE+ .01 the ruling of the trial court upholding PetitionerDs claim to a right of entry was correct. ,ELD+ 1o. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given 'y administrative officials to a law they are 'ound to enforce or implement deserves great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the 6ecretary of 7griculture and 1atural Resources 'ut that of the 9ffice of the President, without the record disclosing in our opinion, that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. 2o the contrary, they appear to 'e in consonance with the purpose of the law invo"ed 'y Petitioner, namely, to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of pu'lic land which Petitioner is not. LATIN MA-IM+ )a

5: 9rencia v. Bnrile

Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-2099# ()e/r1ar2 22" 19#4$

)ACTS+ Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy cler" of court of the &ler"s of &ourt *ivision of the <and Registration &ommission, and he has 'een performing functions of 7ssistant &hief of said division and has 'een considered and recogni#ed as such until R7 :+:+, increasing the salaries of 7ssistant &hiefs of *ivisions, among others, was implemented where he was left out while co% assistant chief of the nine other divisions of the <and Registration &ommission were so recogni#ed and e3tended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and after usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is un4ualified for the position of 7ssistant &hief, and 'eing a new position created under R7 :+:+, the same can only 'e filed 'y a 4ualified personJ that Respondent, 'eing a lawyer, is more 4ualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligi'ility, and praying that the petition 'e dismissed ISSUE+ .01 the Petitioner should 'e recogni#ed as the deputy cler" of court of the &ler"s of &ourt *ivision of the <and Registration &ommission. ,ELD+ Aor Respondent officials, the answer was not in dou't. 6ince there was a new legal provision to 'e construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner, has an am'iguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle that a pu'lic office is a pu'lic trust. &ertainly, such a contemporaneous construction, one moreover dictated 'y the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to the highest respect from the !udiciary. LATIN MA-IM+ )a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

m i " iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernande#

Case No. 10# G.R. Nos. L-39040 a*9 L-39041 (De e8/er 23" 1933$

)ACTS+ Respondent ran for governor in &amarines 1orte and assumed office on 9cto'er 1(, 1/,1. 7t this time, he was a delin4uent in the payment of P),+++ for land ta3es to the government. 2wo or three days 'efore Respondent assumed office, the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said ta3es 'ut he failed to do so. 2he Insular 7uditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the condition that it would 'e used to pay off the delin4uent ta3es. 2he &hief of B3ecutive >ureau and 7ttorney @eneral agreed with Insular 7uditor. >y 6eptem'er, 1/,), ta3es had 'een paid for. However, in 7pril 1/,), he was charged for violating 6ec. )(5/ of the 7dministrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and pu'lic office. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. )(5/ can 'e applied to refrain Respondent from ta"ing office as @overnor in &amarines 1orte. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. )(5/ refers to a person who assumes office to which he had 'een elected without possessing the necessary 4ualifications to hold pu'lic office as provided 'y law. *elin4uency of payment of ta3es is no longer a dis4ualification for assuming a pu'lic office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land ta3es, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. 8nder these circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. RaffertyF long continued administrative interpretation of a ta3 law, while not conclusive, should 'e followed

unless clearly erroneous. 7nd in this case, it was not. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,), :)'

55 6agun v. PeopleDs Homesite and Housing &orporation

Case No. 2.. G.R. No. #3.03 (61*e 22" 1900$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 112" )oo&*o&e No.100

)ACTS+ Respondent &orporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for those who are una'le to provide themselves with this. In accordance with R7 ,)+E, the lots located in >loc" ,,+, <&H Pro!ect ,, Sue#on &ity were meant to 'e used for this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, 'efore converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1/71, Petitioners decided that they wanted to 'uy these lots from Respondent &orporation 'ut filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent &orporation was selling the lots at P5+0s4 m., which was in violation of R7 ,E+). ISSUE+ .01 Respondent &orporation can 'e compelled 'y mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P1+0s4 m. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest, in reference to 6ec. 1 of R7 ,E+). ,ELD+ 1o. Aor mandamus to lie, PetitionerDs rights should 'e well%defined, clear and certain. In the case at 'ar, there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent &orporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is 'eing offered. 2he Petitioners first leased these units for 'usiness purposes. 2hus, the price of P5+ is not e3cessive or unreasona'le considering that the mar"et value for the lots is at least P1)+. 2he action of Respondent &orporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any a'use of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is no o'ligation of Respondent &orporation, under R7 ,E+), aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price re4uires e3ercise of discretion on their part. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine @lo'al &ommunications, Inc. v. Relova

Case No. 23. G.R. No. L-.0340 (No:e8/er 10" 190.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 112" )oo&*o&e No.101

)ACTS+ In 1/7(, Petitioner filed with the >oard of &ommunication, now 12&, an application for authority to esta'lish a 'ranch station in &e'u for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from &e'u to any point outside the Philippines where it is authori#ed to operate. In 1/77, Manila was designated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1/7/, >9& gave Petitioners authority to esta'lish a station in &e'u, su'!ect to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations. Respondents filed a !oint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which ruled in

favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to esta'lish other stations aside from the station in Ma"ati. 2his is a petition see"ing to set aside the ruling rendered. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is authori#ed under R7 :(17 to esta'lish stations in places or points outside Metro ManilaQ ,ELD+ -es. R7 :(17 clearly authori#es Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate, apart from its principal station in Ma"ati, other stations or 'ranches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. 2his can 'e seen in 6ec. , and : wherein other stations may 'e esta'lished as long as it is approved 'y the 6ecretary of Pu'lic .or"s and &ommunications. 2he opinion of the 6ecretary and 8ndersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authori#ation of other stations is material and must 'e considered in favor of the Petitioners. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,('

5( 7sturias 6ugar &entral v. &ommissioner of &ustoms

Case No. 24 No. L-1933# (Se%&e8/er 30 19.9$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 112" )oo&*o&e No.103

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavora'le decision of the &27 which denied the recovery of the sum of P)E,()/.:) which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import ta3. 8nder the law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of ta3es and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re%e3ports said containers within a 1year period. 7lso 7sturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1C under 6ec. 1+(;'= of the &ustoms and 2ariff 7ct. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import ta3es and duties. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he 1%year period mentioned in the Philippine 2ariff 7ct contains no e3press mention of any e3tension or of any grounds for it to 'e e3tended. 2he provisions invo"ed 'y the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer two options to an importer. 2he first gives him the privilege of importing, free from import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he e3ports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non%e3tendi'le. 2he second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid su'!ect to refund to the e3tent of //C of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are e3ported within three years from importation. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, :, ,E', :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Phil. 6ugar &entral 7gency v. &ollector of &ustoms

Case No. 241 No. 2##.1 (De . . 192#$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 113" )oo&*o&e No.10.

)ACTS+ Petitioner acts as agency and attorney%in %fact of Ma%ao 6ugar &entral &o. Ma%ao 6ugar &entral &o. shipped 5,1):,:1( gross "ilos of centrifugal sugar to 8nited 6tates in a wharf on Pulapandan, 9ccidental 1egros on steamship Hannover. .harf was 'uilt and maintained solely 'y the Ma%ao 6ugar &entral &o. *efendant collected wharfage dues on petitionerDs wharf. ISSUE+ .01 the *efendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned 'y government. ,ELD+ -es. 2he @overnment can 'e allowed to collect 'ecause not to do so would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the @overnment, in and 'y which millions of pesos have 'een levied and collected and e3pended in the construction of @overnment wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the @overnment wharf at Pulapandan.$ D4sse*&4*( O%4*4o*+ Historically, wharves not owned nor operated 'y government cannot 'e ta3ed or levied upon. LATIN MA-IM+ ,a, :, ,7, 5', 11d

57 Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc. v. @ames and 7musement >oard

Case No. 1.4 No. L-12#2# ()e/r1ar2 29" 19.0$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 114" )oo&*o&e No.190

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain 6undays unreserved for any event and that reducing the num'er of said days is an infringement of their right. Petitioner relies on the strength of 6ec. : of R7 ,+/, as amended 'y R7 /E,, that the unreserved 6undays may 'e used 'y private individuals or groups duly licensed 'y the @ames and 7musement >oard ;@7>= . R7 15+) increased the sweepsta"es draw and races to 1) 'ut without specifying the days on which they are to 'e run, the @7> reduced the num'er of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities 'y si3. ISSUE+ .01 the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. ,ELD+ 1o. Arom the wording of the R7 ,+/ and R7 /E,, it is clear that the te3t is permissive and is not mandatory. 2he private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. PetitionerDs claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepsta"es to 'e run on the same day are untena'le. 2he words of mem'ers of &ongress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or 6enate. 7lso, PetitionerDs claim that to allow the P&69 to use their e4uipment and property is deprivation of property is also untena'le 'ecause they have a rental agreement with the P&69. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (g, ,7, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Ramos v. &7

Case No. 233 G.R. No. L-22#33 (De e8/er 10" 19.#$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 113" )oo&*o&e No.193

)ACTS+ 2he present case had its incipiency in a petition filed 'y the then 1ational Rice and &orn &orporation ;17RI&= wor"ers for an o'ligation created 'y agreement confirmed 'y the &ourt of Industrial Relations directing 17RI& to pay )5C for additional compensation for overtime wor", night wor" and wor" rendered on 6undays and legal holidays 'y its la'orers and employees. Rice and &orn 7dministration ;R&7= claims that unli"e 17RI&, which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate e3istence, they are merely an office directly under the President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to sta'ili#e the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. 2o carry out this function, 'y law of the &ommonwealth 7ct otherwise "nown as the >udget 7ct, R&7 depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside 'y the @eneral 7ppropriations 7ct. 2here has 'een consistent administrative interpretation 'y the 9ffice of the President as to what may, under law, 'e granted to R&7 wor"ers and employees for overtime wor" and wor" on 6undays and holidays. 1ot a matter of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the >udgetary 7ct. ISSUE+ .01 R&7 should 'e held answera'le N when 17RI& ceased to e3ist and R&7 was created N for the said o'ligation. ,ELD+ .hile e3ecutive construction is not necessarily 'inding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. 2he reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular 'ranch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. 2hus, unless the President specifically appropriates the )5C compensation, R&7 is not lia'le to the a'ovementioned o'ligation. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, 11a, ,E'

5E 6alaria v. >uenvia!e

Case No. 2.# G.R. No. L-43.42 ()e/r1ar2 20" 19#0$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 113" )oo&*o&e No.193

)ACTS+ Petitioner has 'een staying on the land of &ailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. 7 formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent 'y Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. 7 complaint for unlawful detainer was filed 'y Mendiola against Petitioner 6alaria. 7fter the trial, the &ity &ourt ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. 9n appeal, the &AI through Respondent Judge >uenvia!e affirmed the decision of the inferior court. 2hus, a petition for review on &ertiorari was filed with the 6upreme &ourt. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent can e!ect Petitioner from the lot.

,ELD+ 1o. Memorandum &ircular 1o. /7+ was issued 'y the President stating that e3cept for the causes for !udicial e!ectment of lessees ? 'ona fide tenants of dwelling places covered 'y said decree are not su'!ect to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property 'y the owners or their families.$ &onstruction 'y B3ecutive >ranch of @overnment of a particular law although not 'inding upon courts must 'e given weight as the construction comes from that 'ranch called upon to implement the law. 2he ground relied upon 'y the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property 'y the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for !udicial e!ectment of lessees. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,+a, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

8niversity of the Philippines v. &7

Case No. 303 G.R. No. L-20133 (6a*1ar2 20" 19#1$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 113" )oo&*o&e No.193

)ACTS+ .ith the filing of Petition for in!unction in the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila, Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not 'e dismissed from the Philippine @eneral Hospital 'y herein Respondent 'ut 'y the &ivil 6ervice &ommissioner. ISSUE+ .01 the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case 'y the >oard of Regents is final, or re4uires further action 'y the &ivil 6ervice &ommission. ,ELD+ 2he management of Philippine @eneral hospital was initially under the 9ffice of the President of the Philippines. 8nder R7 51 and B.9. /:, the President transferred them under herein Respondent. 2hus, the 6upreme &ourt ruled that the President and >oard of Regents of the 8.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, suspension, and removal of the civil service employees of the 8niversity, including those of the Philippine @eneral Hospital, independently of the &ommissioner of the &ivil 6ervice and the &ivil 6ervice >oard of 7ppeals. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (c, /', )+c, ,E'

5/ Philippine 7ssociation of Aree <a'or 8nions ;P7A<8= v. >ureau of <a'or Relations

Case No. 120 G.R. No. L-43#.0 (A1(1s& 21" 19#.$

)ACTS+ Petitioner lost to 1ational Aederation of Aree <a'or 8nions ;17A<8= in the certification elections for the e3clusive 'argaining agent of the employees in Philippine >looming Mills,

&ompany, Inc. 2allied votes are as followsF 17A<8 :)/ P7A<8 :1: 17 ;not 6poiled >allots counted= 7'stained : 2otal >allots E(: ;1oteF 17A<8 didnDt o'tain the ma!ority vote, which is :,).= Petitioner contends that the spoiled should 'e considered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was 'ased on the Industrial Peace 7ct, which has 'een superseded 'y the present <a'or &ode and as such cannot apply to the case at 'ar. ISSUE+ .01 the Respondent acted with grave a'use of discretion 'y not allowing the spoiled 'allots to 'e considered as in the previous case of 7llied .or"ers 7ssociation of the Philippines vs. &IR. ,ELD+ 2here was no grave a'use of discretion made 'y Respondent since the 'asis of the ruling in the 7llied .or"ers case has 'een superseded 'y the present <a'or &ode. 7lso, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present <a'or &ode has 'een already 'een made "nown to pu'lic and as such has the enforcing power in the case at 'ar. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, )a, ,/a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bverett v. >autista

Case No. 43 G.R. No. 4.303 (No:e8/er #" 1939$

)ACTS+ Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed SueenDs 2heater during the first Suarter of 1/,7. 2he partnership charged admission fees of P+.:+ per seat and at other times charged more than P+.:+ 'ut not more than P+.7+ per seat. *uring the first Suarter of 1/,7, their receipts were P15, EE1.:1. 7t that time, imposition ta3 is at 5C of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs, etc. whose admission price e3ceeds P+.:+ ;6ec. 1M, of &.7. 1o. 1)E=. 2he law does not say how ta3 should 'e imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. 7s such, the &ollector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations 1o. /:, which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will 'e !ointly ta"en into account for computation purposes. 6ec. 1:5E of the 7dministrative &ode states that penalty for late payment will 'e at )5C of the ta3 imposed. 2he parties failed to pay the ta3 on time and therefore su'!ect to 6ec. 1:5E. 2hey were as"ed to pay P//).5+, which they refused to pay. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ -es to 'oth. 2he interpretation given to a law 'y an officer charged 'y reason of his office to carry out its provisions should 'e respected. It has also 'een held that where there is am'iguity in .01 the collection to said ta3 is in accordance with law. .01 Regulations 1o. /: is in accordance with law.

the language of the law, contemporaneous construction is given weight. LATIN MA-IM+ )a

(+ Insular >an" of 7sia and 7merica BmployeesD 8nion ;I>77B8= v. Inciong

Case No. .2 G.R. No. L-32413 (O &o/er 23" 1904$

)ACTS+ Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower &ourt against Insular >an" of 7sia and 7merica ;I>77= for not paying the holiday pay. 2he Petition was granted and I>77 paid for the holiday wage. <ater, I>77 stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of 6ec. ) of the Rules and Regulations implementing the <a'or &ode and the Policy Instruction 1o. / issued 'y Respondent ;then 6ecretary of *9<B=. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of e3ecution to enforce the ar'iterDs decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. I>77 then appealed to 1<R& and 1<R& dismissed the appeal. 7t this point, I>77 filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted I>77Ds motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave a'use of discretion amounting to lac" of !urisdiction. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the decision of the <a'or 7r'iter can 'e set aside 'y Respondent considering that it has 'ecome final and had 'een partially e3ecuted. ). .01 6ec. ) of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction 1o. / are valid. ,ELD+ 7 !udgment in a la'or case that has 'ecome e3ecutory cannot 'e revo"ed after finality of !udgment. In the case at 'ar, I>77 waived its right to appeal 'y paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the !udgment as correct. 6ec. ) and Policy Instruction 1o. / are 'oth null and void since they amended the provisions of the <a'or &ode. It has 'een held that where the language of the law is clear and une4uivocal the law must 'e ta"en to mean e3actly what it says. 7nd also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the same must 'e declared null and void. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 17, ,7, :+c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine 7pparel .or"ers 8nion vs. 1<R&

Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-30320 (Mar ! 30" 1900$

)ACTS+ 7 collective 'argaining agreement was made 'etween Petitioners and Management of Philippine 7pparel Inc. ;P7I= on 7pril ), 1/77 and was signed on 6eptem'er 7, 1/77. &>7 stipulated a P)).++ increase in monthly wage of wor"ers that will retroact from 7pril 1, 1/77. However, on May of the same year, P.*. 11), granted a P(+.++ increase in living allowance which will ta"e effect from January 1, 1/77, provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P(+.++

will 'e given the difference. Management argues that since on 7pril ), there has 'een an agreement to a P)).++ increase, P7I only had to pay the difference of P,E.++. Moreover, P7I was a'le to get the opinion of the 8ndersecretary of <a'or supporting the P7I Management. <a'or contends that increase does not fall within the e3emption since the &>7 was signed on 6eptem'er after P.*. 11), has 'een passed. ISSUE+ .01 the case falls under the e3ception of P.*. 11),. ,ELD+ 1o. 2here was no formal agreement on 7pril ), 1/77 regarding the increase. Moreover, the opinion of the 8ndersecretary of <a'or was 'ased on a wrong premise and misinterpretation 'y P7I Management. It was unlawful and 'eyond the scope of law. LATIN MA-IM+ )a

(1 8nited &hristian Missionary 6ociety vs. 6ocial 6ecurity &ommission

Case No. 293
G.R. No. L-2.#12- 1. (De e8/er 2#" 19.9$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 20." )oo&*o&e No.20.

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not "now that they had to pay ta3 for their operations. 1evertheless, upon "nowledge thereof, they paid their premium remittances 'ut refused to pay the incredi'le penalty fees since they did not "now that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the assessed penalties were ine4uita'le. Respondent said that their organi#ation is em'raced in the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ctJ therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct to condone, waive or relin4uish the penalty prescri'ed 'y law for late payment of remittances. ,ELD+ Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the a'sence of an e3press provision in the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or relin4uish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the 66 7ct. 2he reason of the law is to develop, esta'lish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall 'e suita'le to the needs of the people? to provide employees against the ha#ards of disa'ility, sic"ness, old age, and death.$ @ood faith and 'ad faith are irrelevant since the law ma"es no distinction. .here the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is e4ually plain, there is no room for interpretation. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, (', 7a, /a, )(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

-ra v. 7'aRo

Case No. 31. G.R. No. 3010# (No:e8/er 13" 1920$

C!a%&er III" 'a(e 110" )oo&*o&e No.214

)ACTS+ Respondent was running for office in >ulacan, his hometown. However, he is a registered voter in Manila and to 'e a candidate, one of the 4ualifications is that he0she who is running should 'e a duly 4ualified elector therein$. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent is an eligi'le to run as a local official of >ulacan. ,ELD+ -es. He is 4ualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the Philippine 7ssem'ly, Aernando Ma. @uerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. 7ssem'ly was alleged to 'e un4ualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. 2he conclusion to which was, 4ualified elector$ meant that he has all the 4ualifications provided 'y the law to 'e a voter and need not 'e register. 2he same was the case and decision of the B3ecutive >ureau on the 4ualifications of 6enator Jose P. <aurel. It is sufficient that he possess the 4ualifications stated in 6ec. :,1 and none of the dis4ualifications stated in 6ec. :,) of the Blection <aw. However, it is not least to disregard the forci'le argument advanced that when the law ma"e use of the phrases, 4ualified electors$ and 4ualified voter$ the law means what it says. It would 'e an a'surdity to hold one a 4ualified elector who was not eligi'le to vote in his own municipality. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,a, (c, 11a

() Interprovincial 7uto'us &o., Inc. v. &IR

Case No. 134 G.R. No. L-.#41 (6a*1ar2 31" 193.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 120-121" )oo&*o&e No.222 ; 22#

)ACTS+ Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight 'y means of 2P8 'uses in Misamis 9ccidental and 1orthern Pam'oanga. 2he provincial revenue agent for Misamis 9ccidental e3amined the stu's of the freight receipts that had 'een issued 'y Petitioner. 2he stu's and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to 6ec. 1)1 and 1)7 of the Revised *ocumentary 6tamp 2a3 Regulations of the *epartment of Ainance, the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner as"ed for a refund and the &ourt of Airst Instance of Misamis 9ccidental rendered a !udgment in their favor 'ut the &ourt of 7ppeals reversed the decision. ISSUE+ 1. ). .01 the &ourt of 7ppeals has !urisdiction over the case. .01 the &ourt of 7ppealsD decision is erroneous.

,ELD+ 2he &ourt of 7ppeals has no !urisdiction 'ecause according to 'oth the Judiciary 7ct of 1/:E and the &onstitution the 6upreme &ourt has the e3clusive appellate !urisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any ta3, impost, assessment or tolls, or any penalty in relation thereto. 2he decision of the &ourt of 7ppeals however was not erroneousF a. 6ec. 1)1 falls within the scope of administrative power of the 6ecretary of Ainance as authori#ed in 6ec. 7/ of the Revised 7dministrative &ode. '. 2he regulation ;6ec. 1)1= is valid also 'ecause of the principle of legislative approval 'e re% enactment. 2he regulations were approved on 6eptem'er 1(, 1/):. .hen the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode was approved on Ae'ruary 1E, 1/,/, the same provisions of stamp ta3, 'ills of

landing and receipts were re%enacted. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, :

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

In reF Mc&ulloch *ic"

Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-130.2 (A%r45 13" 1910$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 120" )oo&*o&e No.223

)ACTS+ Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Aree Press, filed for a writ of ha'eas corpus so that he may 'e discharged from detention 'y the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. He is 'eing detained 'ecause the @overnor%@eneral of the Philippines ordered his deportation. >efore the @overnor%@eneral gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescri'ed in 6ec. (/ of the 7dministrative &ode. ISSUE+ .01 the @overnor%@eneral has the power under 7ct 1o. )11, and 6ec. (/ of the 7dministrative &ode to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. ,ELD+ -es, the @overnor%@eneral has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. .hen the provisions of 7ct 1o. )11, were enacted and Icontinued in forceD 'y the enactment of the 7dministrative &ode and again Icontinued in forceD 'y the enactment of the Jones <aw the construction theretofore placed upon it 'y this court 'ecame an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command.$ In the interpretation of reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. 2he legislature will 'e presumed to "now the effect which such statutes originally had, and 'y reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, ,a, :, /a

(, Howden M &o., <td. v. &ollector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-19392 (A%r45 14" 19.3$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 120" )oo&*o&e No.222 a*9 224

)ACTS+ &ommonwealth Insurance &o. ;&I&=, a domestic corporation, entered into reinsurance contracts with ,) >ritish companies not engaged in 'usiness in the Philippines represented 'y herein Plaintiff. &I& remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and, on 'ehalf of Plaintiff, paid income ta3 on the premiums. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid ta3, stating that it was e3empted from withholding ta3 reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies 'y foreign insurance companies not authori#ed to do 'usiness in the Philippines. Plaintiffs stated that since 6ec. 5, and 5: were su'stantially re%enacted$ 'y R7 1+(5, 1)/1 and ),:,, said rulings should 'e given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval 'y re% enactment.

ISSUE+ .01 the ta3 should 'e withheld. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is suscepti'le of the meaning placed upon it 'y a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re %enacts the provisions without su'stantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an e3tent that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. 2his principle is not applica'le for the aforementioned sections were never re%enacted. 9nly the ta3 rate was amended. 2he administrative rulings invo"ed 'y the &IR were only contained in unpu'lished letters. It cannot 'e assumed that the legislature "new of these rulings. Ainally, the premiums remitted were to indemnify &I& against lia'ility. 2his too" place within the Philippines, thus su'!ect to income ta3. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, :

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<a3amana v. >alta#ar

Case No. 144 G.R. No. L-3933 (Se%&e8/er 19" 1932$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 121" )oo&*o&e No.223

)ACTS+ 2he Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. >y virtue of 6ec. )1/5 of the Revised 7dministrative &ode, Respondent Hice Mayor assumed the office. However, the Provincial @overnor, 'y virtue of 6ec. )1 of the Revised Blection &ode, appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent is the right person to assume office. ,ELD+ -es, Respondent should assume the vacated position. 6ec. )1 of the Revised Blection &ode, which was ta"en from 6ec. )1E+ of the Revised 7dmin &ode, applies to municipal officers in general while 6ec. )1/5 of the Revised 7dministrative &ode applies to the office of mayor in particular. 7 special provision overrides a general one. 7lso, the incorporation of 6ec. )1E+ in 6ec. )1 does not enlarge its scope 'ut merely supplements it. It has also 'een consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice%mayor shall assume officeJ the legislature is presumed to 'e ac4uainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re%enacting 6ec. )1E+, the interpretation is deemed to have 'een adopted. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, :, ,E', 5+

(: >eng#on v. 6ecretary of Justice

Case No. 32 G.R. No. L-42021 (6a*1ar2 10" 193.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 121" )oo&*o&e No.22.


Petitioner was appointed !ustice of the peace for <ingayen, Pangasinan. He relin4uished his office after he had reached the age of (5 'ecause of the provisions of 7ct 1o. ,E//. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the 'enefits under the vetoed 6ec. 7 of the Retirement @ratuity <aw which entitled !ustices of the peace to gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the @overnor%@eneral 'y claiming that the 7ct was not an appropriation 'ill and hence, was not su'!ect to item%veto. ISSUE+ .01 the veto of the @overnor%@eneral of 6ec. 7 was valid. ,ELD+ -es. It is clear from reading 6ec. 1) that the <egislature intended this 7ct to 'e an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possi'ility of a future veto 'y the &hief B3ecutive. Hence, the @overnor can constitutionally veto certain items on this 'ill. Aurthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it. 2he e3ecutive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. &ontemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, 'ut when two co%e4ual 'ranches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes, they must 'e given great respect. 7lso, this practice of vetoing the separate items in a 'ill 'y the &hief B3ecutive has long 'een allowed and to rule against it would re4uire a clear showing of unconstitutionality. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, )', ,a, (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

1P& v. Province of <anao del 6ur

Case No. 10# G.R. No. 9.#00 (No:e8/er 19" 199.$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 122" )oo&*o&e No.232

)ACTS+ Petitioner &orporation was assessed real property ta3es 'y Respondent since its ta3 e3empt status was revo"ed 'y P.*. 1/,1. >ecause of the PetitionerDs failure to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole 'idder. Petitioner contends that its status was never revo"ed 'ut merely suspended. .ith the Resolutions issued 'y the Aiscal Incentives Review >oard ;AIR>=, the ta3 e3emption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued 'y the said >oard was void relying on an earlier case 'etween the Petitioner and the Province of 7l'ay stating that AIR> does not have power to restore ta3 e3emptions and that the said >oard can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Ainance which su'sidiary of the @overnment can 'e given e3emptions. 1ote however, that the 7l'ay case was already superceded 'y the Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that the AIR> Resolution is in accordance with the re4uirements of the law if it was properly approved 'y the Minister of Ainance. In the present case, the AIR> Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved 'y the Minister of Ainance. ISSUE+ 1. .01 Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RP2 against, and thereafter sell at pu'lic auction the su'!ect properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such ta3es. ). .01 Petitioner has ceased to en!oy its ta3 and duty e3emption privileges, including its e3emption from payment of RP2. ,ELD+ 2he Petitioner never lost its ta3 e3empt status, 'ut its privileges were only suspended. 2hus, the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RP2 against the Petitioner. Aurthermore, since the

Petitioner was never delin4uent in paying RP2, the su'se4uent auction and sale of the PetitionerDs assets is also considered void. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 5a, 5', /a, )+a, ,7, ,Ea, :/

(5 J.M. 2uason M &o. v. Mariano M 74uial M &ordova

Case No. .4 G.R. No. L-33140 (O &o/er 23" 19#0$

)ACTS+ Plaintiffs 74uial ;herein Respondents= claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in S& having an area of ,E, hectares. 2hey alleged that it had 'een fraudulently or erroneously included in 9&2 1o. 7,5 of the Registry of *eeds of Ri#al and that it was registered in the names of *efendants 2uason ;herein Petitioners= pursuant to a decree issued on July (, 1/1: in &ase 1o. 7(E1 of the &ourt of <and Registration. Plaintiffs 74uial prayed that 9&2 1o. 7,5 and the titles derived therefrom 'e declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. 2he 2uasonDs prayed that the petition 'e dismissed on the ground that the court has no !urisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior !udgment. Respondents &ordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were a'le to purchase 11 hectares from the 74uials. ISSUE+ .01 9&2 1o. 7,5 is valid. ,ELD+ 9&2 1o. 7,5 is valid. 2he validity of 9&2 1o. 7,5 was already decided upon 'y the 6upreme &ourt in the cases of >enin vs. 2uason, 7lcantara vs. 2uason and Pili vs. 2uason. 2he ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of 9&2 1o. 7,5. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, 5'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

J.M. 2uason v. <and 2enure 7dministration

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-210.4 ()e/r1ar2 10" 19#0$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 434" )oo&*o&e No.#

)ACTS+ Petitioner is the owner of a land called 2atalon Bstate in Sue#on &ity. 2hey see" to nullify R7 )(1( which directs the e3propriation of two lots inside the estate. 8nder 7rt. E, 6ec. : of the &onstitution, 2he &ongress may authori#e, upon payment of !ust compensation, the e3propriation of lands to 'e su'divided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals$ Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional 'ecause the provision in the &onstitution refers to lands$ not landed estates. ISSUE+ .01 R7 )(1( is unconstitutional.

,ELD+ 1o. 2he 4uestion is one of constitutional construction. 2he &onstitution clearly states that land$ not landed estates$ can 'e e3propriated. It has a 'roader scope, allowing the legislature to e3propriate more types of land. 2he law does not distinguish 'etween different types regardless of how 'ig or small it may 'e, as long as there is a need to address a growing social pro'lem such as ine4uality. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, ):a, )(, ,7, :+c

(( 2olentino v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 134 G.R. No. L-34130 (O &o/er 1." 19#1$

)ACTS+ 2he 1/71 &onstitutional &onvention see"s to amend 6ec. 1 of 7rt. 5 of the &onstitution reducing the voting age from )1 to 1E years old. 2his proposal was to 'e su'mitted to the people for ratification in a ple'iscite coinciding with the 1ovem'er 1/71 elections relying on 6ec. 1, 7rt. 15 of the &onstitutionF 2he &ongress in a !oint session assem'led, 'y a vote of three%fourths of all the Mem'ers of the 6enate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this &onstitution or call a convention for the purpose. 6uch amendments shall 'e valid as part of this &onstitution when approved 'y a ma!ority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are su'mitted to the people for their ratification.$ ISSUE+ .01 there is a limitation or condition in 6ec. 1 of 7rt. 15 of the &onstitution calling for a ple'iscite on the sole amendment contained in 9rganic Resolution 1o. 1. ,ELD+ 2here was a violation. >ecause such amendments regardless of how many are to 'e su'mitted to the people for their ratification in an election, 7n election$ only means one. 7lso, no fi3ed frame of reference is given to the voter. 1o one "nows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would 'e modified. 2he amendments 'eing proposed 'y the convention in must 'e seen in relation to the whole. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7glipay v. Rui#

Case No. 4 G.R. No. 43439 (Mar ! 13" 193#$

)ACTS+ Respondent, who is the *irector of Post, announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the cele'ration of the ,,rd International Bucharistic &ongress in accordance with 7ct 1o. :+5). Petitioner, who is the 6upreme Head of the Philippine Independent &hurch, see"s prohi'ition of such 'ecause it violates 6ec. 1,, 7rt. ( of the &onstitution.

ISSUE+ .01 the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. ,ELD+ 7ct 1o. :+5) contemplates no religious purpose in view. .hat it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would 'e Kadvantageous to the @overnment. In this case, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired 'y any sectarian feeling. 7ct. 1o. :+5) grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs Kas often as may 'e deemed advantageous to the @overnment.$ LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,(a, ,7

(7 8.6. v. 7ng 2ang Ho

Case No 293 G.R. No. 1#122 ()e/r1ar2 2#" 1922$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 433" )oo&*o&e No.12

)ACTS+ Respondent was charged for violating B.9. 5, ;which fi3es the ceiling price at which rice may 'e sold= when he sold rice at a price greater than that fi3ed 'y law. B.9. 5, follows 7ct 1o. )E(E which penali#es monopoly and hoarding of products under e3traordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the <egislature has not defined any 'asis for the order 'ut has left it to the discretion of the @overnor @eneral. .ithout leaving the discretion to say which e3traordinary circumstances to the @overnor @eneral are, *efendant will not 'e charged. ISSUE+ .01 7ct 1o. )E(E is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. ,ELD+ 2he act is unconstitutional. 2he &onstitution is something solid, permanent and su'stantial. 7s "nown, no nation living under repu'lican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fi3 the price at which rice should 'e sold. 2hat power can never 'e delegated under a repu'lican form of government. 2his power is e3clusive to the legislative. In fi3ing the price, the law is dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the &onstitution. LATIN MA-IM+ 1one

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

9rdillo v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 192 G.R. No. 93034 (De e8/er 4" 1990$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 43#" )oo&*o&e No.24

)ACTS+ 7 ple'iscite was held pursuant to R.7. 1o. (7(( ;9rganic 7ct creating the &ordillera 7utonomous Region= with the votes of the people in the provinces of >enguet, Mountain Province, Oalinga%7payao, Ifugao, 7'ra and the city of >aguio. 9ut of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to

get a ma!ority vote. Resolutions and memorandum from the &9MB<B& and the 6ecretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favora'ly in the ple'iscite shall constitute the region. ISSUE+ .01 Ifugao 'eing the only one which voted for the creation of &7R can alone, legally and validly constitute a region. ,ELD+ 7rt. G, 6ec. 15 of the 1/E7 &onstitution e3plicitly provides that there shall 'e created autonomous regions? consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas?$ Arom this, it can 'e derived that the term region$ used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. 2he provisions of R.7. 1o. (7(( also show that the &ongress never intended that a single province may constitute the 7utonomous Region. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 11g, )5a, )E

(E *e los 6antos vs. Mallare

Case No. 09 G.R. Nos. L-3043-. (A1(1s& 31" 1930$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 440 a*9 430" )oo&*o&e No.33 a*9 34

)ACTS+ 2his case 4uestions the legality of the PetitionerDs removal from the same office which would 'e the effect of RespondentDs appointment. Petitioner contends that under the &onstitution, he can not 'e removed against his will and without cause, citing 6ec. :, 7rt. 1) of the &onstitution which readsF 1o officer or employee of the &ivil 6ervice shall 'e removed or suspended e3cept for a cause provided 'y law.$ Respondent admits that the position of &ity Bngineer 'elongs to the unclassified service$. 7ccording to <acson vs. Romero, all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected 'y the a'ove provisionJ 'ut notes that there is a difference 'etween this case and the <acson case. 6ec. )5:5 of the Revised 7dministration &ode authori#es the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. 2he two provisions are repugnant and a'solutely irreconcila'le. ISSUE+ .01 the position of &ity Bngineer is an unclassified service. ,ELD+ 1o. Reading 7rt. 1), 6ec. 1 of the &onstitution, it is clear that 6ec. : protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the followingF policy%determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature$. 2he position of city engineer is neither of the a'ove% stated. 2his is confirmed 'y the enactment of &.7. 1o. 177. 7s a contemporaneous construction, this 7ct affords an inde3 to the meaning of &ivil 6ervice as conceived 'y the framers of the &onstitution. Aurthermore, the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to 'e given the sense they have in common use. 2he &ourt therefore held that Petitioner *e los 6antos is entitled to remain in office as the &ity Bngineer of >aguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that RespondentDs appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. LATIN MA-IM+ ,/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ivil <i'erties 8nion vs. B3ecutive 6ecretary

Case No. .4 G.R. No. 0309. ()e/r1ar2 22" 1991$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(es 443" 430 a*9 434" )oo&*o&es No. 41" 31 a*9 #1

)ACTS+ Petitioners maintain that the B3ecutive 9rder which, in effect, allows mem'ers of the &a'inet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. 2his runs counter to 7rt. 7, 6ec. 1, of the &onstitution which provides that the President, Hice%President, the Mem'ers of the &a'inet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided 'y the &onstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE+ .01 the prohi'ition in 7rt. 7, 6ec. 1, admits of the 'road e3ceptions made for appointive officials in general under 7rt. /%>, 6ec. 7, par. ). ,ELD+ 1o. 7 foolproof yardstic" in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. 2he practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to a'uses 'y unscrupulous pu'lic officials who too" the scheme for purposes of self%enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. 2he 4ualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this &onstitution$ of 6ec. 1,, 7rt. 7 cannot possi'ly refer to the 'road e3ceptions of 6ec. 7, 7rt. /%> of the 1/E7 &onstitution. 2he former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applica'le to all elective pu'lic officials and employees while the latter is meant for the e3ception of the President, Hice%President, mem'ers of the &a'inet, their deputies and assistants. 2o construe otherwise would 'e to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the &onstitution. B.9. )E: is therefore declared null and void. LATIN MA-IM+ (', /a, ')

(/ People of the Philippines vs. MuRo#

Case No. 21# G.R. No. L-309.9 ()e/r1ar2 9" 1909$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 44." )oo&*o&e No.42

)ACTS+ 2he *efendant was convicted of three counts of murder. 2he penalty for murder under 7rt. ):E of the Revised Penal &ode was reclusion temporal in its ma3imum period to death 'ut this was modified 'y 7rt. ,, 6ec. 1/;1= of the 1/E7 &onstitution providing that ?any death penalty already imposed shall 'e reduced to reclusion temporal.$ ISSUE+ .01 this &ourt would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the a'olition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. ,ELD+ 1o. In the case at 'ar, the &ourt found that the applica'le sentence would 'e the medium period of penalty prescri'ed in 7rt. ):E of the Revised Penal &ode, which does not follow the

Masangkay ruling, and that would 'e reclusion perpetua. LATIN MA-IMS+ 1, (c, )+a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

1itafan v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue

Case No. 190 G.R. No. #0#00 (6152 23" 190#$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 44#" )oo&*o&e No.4.

)ACTS+ Petitioners su'mit that any ta3 withheld from their emoluments and compensations as !udicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of 6ec. 1+, 7rt. E of the &onstitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not 'e decreased$, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent !udiciary envisioned 'y the &onstitution. ISSUE+ .01 the salary of the mem'ers of the !udiciary is su'!ect to the general income ta3 applied to all ta3payers. ,ELD+ -es. 2he salary of the mem'ers of the !udiciary is su'!ect to the general income ta3. 7ccording to Perfecto vs. Meer, income ta3es are part of the diminution of !udgesD salaries 'ecause the independence of !udges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from ta3ing their salaries$. Bndencia vs. *avid confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However 'oth decisions must 'e discarded 'ecause the framers of the fundamental law ;i.e. Ao3, &oncepcion, and >ernas=, as the alter ego of the people, have e3pressed in clear and unmista"a'le terms the meaning of 6ec. 1+ 7rt. E of the 1/E7 &onstitutionJ that is, to ma"e the salaries of the mem'ers of the !udiciary ta3a'le. LATIN MA-IM+ ,, '1

7+ 2aRada v. &uenco, et al

Case No. 20. G.R. No. L-1001. ()e/r1ar2 20" 193#$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e No. 431" )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTS+ 2he 6enate upon nomination of the 1acionalista Party chose 6enator <aurel, <ope#, and Primicias, as mem'ers of the 6enate Blectoral 2ri'unal ;6B2=. 8pon nomination of the &iti#ens Party, Petitioner was ne3t chosen 'y the 6enate as mem'er of 6B2. 2hen, the 6enate chose Respondents as mem'ers of the same 6B2. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of 6enator <aurel, <ope#, and Primicias of the 1acionalista Party as mem'ers of the 6B2, the other 6enators must 'e nominated 'y the &iti#ens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that si3 mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal shall 'e mem'ers of the 6enate or the House of Representatives$, is mandatory. 2he word shall$ is imperative in nature relative to the num'er of mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal and this is 'orne in the opinion of the 6ecretary of Justice.

ISSUE+ .01 the election of Respondents as mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal was valid or lawful. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted ? e3cept as to matters committed 'y the &onstitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily 'inding upon the courts, even in a dou'tful case.$ Hence, if the !udgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative 'y any paramount considerations of pu'lic policy, it may 'e re!ected.$ LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (', /', 11a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7ratuc v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-49#03-09 ()e/r1ar2 0" 19#9$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 432" )oo&*o&e No..2

)ACTS+ 2wo petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the &entral Mindanao elections for the Interim >atasang Pam'ansa. ISSUE+ .01 the 6upreme &ourt has the power to review decisions made 'y the Respondent in handling the pre%proclamation controversies cited 'y the Petitioners. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he 6upreme &ourt may only review actions carried out with grave a'use of discretion amounting to lac" or e3cess of !urisdiction. 2he 6upreme &ourt cited differences in the 1/,5 and 1/7, &onstitutions with regard to the 6upreme &ourtDs power over &9MB<B& decisions N in 1/,5, the 6upreme &ourt may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorariJ 1/7,, RespondentDs decisions may only 'e 'rought up on ground of certiorari alone. 2his highlights the 1/7, &onstitutionDs intent to strengthen RespondentDs independence. &onse4uently, errors of !udgment that were 'ased on su'stantial evidence are not reviewa'le in certiorari. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, /a, )5a

71 In ReF 7ppointment of Halen#uela and Hallarta

Case No. 39 A.M. No. 90-3-01-SC (No:e8/er 9" 1990$

)ACTS+ Judges were appointed to the R2& 'y the President on May 1) 1//E, within ) months 'efore the election. 2here are two conflicting provisions in the 1/E7 &onstitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscri'ing it. 9n the one hand, 7rt. E, 6ec. : re4uires that all vacancies in the !udiciary 'e filled within /+ days of such vacancy. 9n the other hand, 7rt. 7, 6ec. 15

prohi'its the President from ma"ing any appointments two months 'efore Presidential elections, e3cept for temporary appointments to e3ecutive positions when pu'lic interest is at sta"e. ISSUE+ .01 the appointments were valid. ,ELD+ 1o, the appointments were void. 2he general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within /+ days, 'ut this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every si3 years. 2emporary appointments to e3ecutive positions are the only e3ception. 2he prohi'ition is for pu'lic policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments$ N which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the !udiciary. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, ,5, ,(', ,Ea, 5+, '

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Magtoto v. Manguera

Case No. 139 G.R. Nos. L-3#201-02 (Mar ! 3" 19#3$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 43#" )oo&*o&e No.#9

)ACTS+ 2he present cases involve the interpretation of 6ec. )+ 7rt. : of the 1ew &onstitution which too" effect on Jan. 17, 1/7,. 2he provision readsF ? 7ny person under investigation?shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to 'e informed of such right?. 7ny confession o'tained in violation of this section shall 'e inadmissi'le.$ Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations 'oth dated Ae'. ),, 1/7,. *uring the trial, his e3tra!udicial confession dated 1ov. 15, 1/7) was admitted in evidence over the o'!ection that it was ta"en while the accused was in the preventive custody of the P& without his having 'een informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the PetitionerDs e3tra%!udicial confession dated on 1ov. 15, 1/7) is admissi'le as evidence. ). .01 6ec. )+, 7rt. : of the 1ew &onstitution can 'e applied retroactively. ,ELD+ 1. -es. PetitionerDs confession is admissi'le. 2he court ruled that a confession o'tained from a person under investigation, who has not 'een informed of his right to counsel, is admissi'le in evidence if the same had 'een o'tained 'efore the effectivity of the 1ew &onstitution, since no law gave the accused the right to 'e so informed 'efore that date. &onversely, such confession is inadmissi'le if the same had 'een o'tained after the effectivity of the 1ew &onstitution. ). 1o. 2he constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. @iving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. LATIN MA-IM+ 1)a, :(a

7) Ailoteo v. 6andigan'ayan

Case No. 10. G.R. No. #9343 (O &o/er 1." 199.$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 43#" )oo&*o&e No.00

)ACTS+ Petitioners were held guilty 'y Respondent &ourt for the crime of ro''ery of a postal delivery van. 8pon the capture of his co%accused, he was pointed out as the mastermind. .hen Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. 9n May ,+, 1/E), Petitioner e3ecuted sworn statements ;confessing what had happened=, without the presence of a counsel. 2he 1/E7 &onstitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot 'e waived e3cept in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applica'le to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation too" place in 1/E,. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the PetitionerDs e3tra%!udicial confession is admissi'le even without the presence of a counsel. ). .01 the said provisions of 1/E7 &onstitution can 'e applied retroactively. ,ELD+ 1. -es, it is admissi'le under the 1/7, &onstitution. 7ccordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the 'enefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1/7, &onstitution should, 'y such argumentation, 'e admissi'le. ). 1o. 2he specific provision of the 1/E7 &onstitution re4uiring that a waiver 'y an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must 'e made with the assistance of a counsel may not 'e applied to him retroactively or in cases where the e3tra!udicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 5a, :(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&o v. Blectoral 2ri'unal, House of Representatives

Case No. .. G.R. Nos. 92191-92 a*9 92202-03 (6152 30" 1991$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 43#" )oo&*o&e No.02

)ACTS+ Respondents declared Jose 9ng Jr., elected representative of 1orthern 6amar, as a natural 'orn Ailipino citi#en. Petitioners contend that 'ased on the 1/E7 &onstitution, Jose 9ng, Jr. who was 'orn on June 1/, 1/:E ;during which the 1/,5 &onstitution was operative=, is not a natural 'orn Ailipino citi#en having 'een 'orn to a &hinese father, Jose 9ng &huan and a Ailipina mother 7grifina <ao. ISSUE+ 1. .01 people who have elected Philippine citi#enship under the 1/,5 &onstitution are to 'e considered natural 'orn Ailipino citi#ens. ). .01 this provision should 'e applied retroactively. ,ELD+ -es. 8nder of 7rt. : 6ec. 1 par. , of the &onstitution, children 'orn of Ailipino mothers 'efore January 17, 1/7, shall 'e accorded natural 'orn status if they elect Philippine citi#enship upon reaching the age of ma!ority. 2hey need not perform any act of election$ granted that his father was naturali#ed and declared a Ailipino citi#en 'y 1/57, when he was only / years old. 2he provision in 4uestion must 'e applied retroactively since it see"s to remedy the ine4uita'le

situation under the 1/,5 &onstitution wherein people 'orn of Ailipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural 'orn while children 'orn of Ailipino mothers and alien fathers were not. LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, /a, :)a

7, 6armiento v. Mison

Case No. 2## G.R. Nos. 00319-21 (De e8/er 1#" 190#$ C!a%&er -I" 'a(e 430" )oo&*o&e No.04

)ACTS+ Petitioners 4uestion the validity of appointment of Respondent as &ommissioner of the >ureau of &ustoms on the ground that it was not confirmed 'y the &ommission on 7ppointments. 2he &ourt favored the Respondent 'ased on e3press provisions of the 1/E7 &onstitution. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 1(, 7rt. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to 'e appointed with the consent of the &ommission on 7ppointments. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. 1( 7rt. 7 only provides for the appointment, 'y the President of heads of e3ecutive departments, am'assadors, other pu'lic ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the ran" of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this &onstitution$ with the re4uirement of &7 approval. *eli'erations of the &onstitutional &ommission reveal that the framers of the 1/E7 &onstitution deli'erately e3cluded the position heads of 'ureaus$ from &7 confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1/,5 &onstitution which turned the &ommission into a venue for horse%trading$, and that of the 1/7, &onstitution which placed a'solute power of appointment in the President. 2he word also$ in the second sentence of 6ec. 1( 7rt. 7 must not 'e construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall 'e appointed in a li"e manner$ as that of the first group. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ):', ,), ,/a, '

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*omingo v. &ommission on 7udit

Case No. 3# G.R. No. 1123#1 (O &o/er #" 1990$

)ACTS+ Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region H of *6.*. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post% audit reports on the *6.* dis'ursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not 'e. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE+ .01 a commuta'le transportation allowance may still 'e claimed 'y a government official

provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. ,ELD+ 2he @eneral 7ppropriations 7ct of 1/EE, 1//+ and 1//1 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not 'e granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles e3cept as approved 'y the President. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ):a

7: @lo'e%Mac"ay v. 1<R& and 6ala#ar

Case No. 112 G.R. No. 02311 (Mar ! 3" 1992$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 124" )oo&*o&e No.3

)ACTS+ Petitioner placed Respondent 6ala#ar under preventive suspension 'ecause it appeared that she had full "nowledge of the loss and wherea'outs of an air conditioner that *elfin 6aldivar had stolen from the company 'ut failed to inform her employer. Respondent 6ala#ar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. 9n appeal, the Respondent &ourt affirmed the decision of the <a'or 7r'iter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent 'ut limited 'ac" wages to ) years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the <a'or 2ri'unal committed grave a'use of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent 6ala#ar. ). .01 there e3isted independent legal grounds to hold Respondent 6ala#ar answera'le as well and, there'y, !ustify her dismissal. ,ELD+ 2he <a'or &ode clearly provides that an employee who is un!ustly dismissed from wor" shall 'e entitled to reinstatement and to his full 'ac" wages. 7n e3ception to this is when the reinstatement may 'e inadmissi'le due to strained relations 'etween the employer and the employee. 2he position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may 'e characteri#ed as such. Moreover, Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent 6ala#ar had a special relationship with 6aldivar, she might have had direct "nowledge of 6aldivarDs 4uestiona'le activities. LATIN MA-IM+ (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<u#on >ro"erage &o v. Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission

Case No. #. G.R. No. L-3#..1 (No:e8/er 1." 1932$

)ACTS+ Petitioner has 'een operating a fleet of truc"s utili#ed e3clusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. 9n May /, 1/,), Respondent re4uired the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of pu'lic

convenience for the operation of his truc"s since they were said to 'e devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in 6ec. 1, of the Pu'lic 6ervice <aw. ISSUE+ .01 the amendments introduced into 6ec. 1, of 7ct 1o. ,1+E 'y 7ct 1o. ,,1( conferred !urisdiction on the Respondents over the PetitionerDs 'usiness, although it is not a common carrier. ,ELD+ 2he omission from 6ec. 1, of the phrase for pu'lic use$ in the definition of a pu'lic service does not mean that the <egislature meant to e3tend the !urisdiction of the P6& to private enterprises not devoted to pu'lic use. Pu'lic service is a service for pu'lic use. 2he insertion of the phrase for hire or compensation$ does not show the intent either. 2his is a stoc" phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a pu'lic utility. 7lso, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term pu'lic service$ introduced 'y 7ct 1o. ,,1(, there were no alterations made in the 'asic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no !urisdiction over Petitioner. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, ,(' 75



R981* )
7( 7parri v. &ourt of 7ppeals
Case No. 13 G.R. No. L-3003# (6a*1ar2 31" 1904$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 124" )oo&*o&e No.4

)ACTS+ R.7. 11(+ created the 1ational Resettlement and Reha'ilitation 7dministration ;17RR7=. 6aid law also empowered its >oard of *irectors to appoint and fi3 the term of office of the @eneral Manager su'!ect to approval of the President. 9n January 15, 1/(+, the >oard approved Resolution 1o. 1, appointing Petitioner as @eneral Manager of 17RR7. 9n March 15, 1/(), the >oard approved Resolution 1o. ): wherein the President e3pressed his desire to fi3 the term of office of the incum'ent @eneral Manager up to March ,1, 1/(). ISSUE+ .01 Resolution 1o. ): constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. ,ELD+ 1o, PetitionerDs term of office is deemed e3pired. R.7. 11(+ e3pressly gives the >oard the power to appoint and fi3 the term of office of the @eneral Manager. 2he word ItermD descri'es the period that an office may hold office and upon e3piration of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of office is not fi3ed 'y law, 'ut 'y the >oard. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Sui!ada

Case No. G.R. Nos. 113000 (6152 24" 199.$

)ACTS+ Respondent "illed *iosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was convicted of ) offenses, which were separately filedF 1= Murder under 7rt. ):E of the RP& )= Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under P* 1E(( Par ) of 6ec 1 of P.*. 1E(( states that, If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall 'e imposed.$ ISSUE+ 1= .01 the trial courtDs !udgment should 'e sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. 2ac%an, People v. 2io#on, People v. &aling, etc. 9R to modify the !udgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. >arros. )= .01 the )nd par of 6ec 1 of P*1E(( integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant "illing into a single integrated offense. ,ELD+ 1= 2he trial courtDs !udgment is affirmed. )= )nd par of 6ec 1 of P.*. 1E(( does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal possession with homicide or murder$. It does not use the clause as a result$ or on the occasion of $to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, 'ut rather it uses the clause with the use of$. LATIN MA-IM+ (c


>aranda v. @ustillo

Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-011.3 (Se%&e8/er 2." 1900$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 123" )oo&*o&e No.3

)ACTS+ >oth parties claim that they own a parcel of land, <ot 1o. :517. 2he &ourt, after discovering that private respondentDs 2&2 was fraudulently ac4uired, ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed 'y Private Respondents. 7nother group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the 2&2 of said lot, which the court found out to 'e privies of the Private Respondents tas"ed to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the &ourt. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the pendency of the appeal in su'se4uent civil case with the &ourt of 7ppeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and su'sisting 'y this &ourt. ). .hat is the nature of the duty of the Register of *eeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a 2orrens &ertificate of 2itleQ ,ELD+ 1. Respondent Judge a'used his discretion in sustaining the 7cting Register of *eedDs stand. He forgot the 1st par of 6ec. 77 of P.*. 15)/ which providesF &ancellation of lis pendens N >efore the final !udgment, a notice of lis pendens may 'e cancelled upon order of the &ourt after proper showing that ? it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to 'e registered. ?$ ). 6ec 1+ of P* 15)/ states that, It shall 'e the duty of the Register of *eeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration ?. If the instrument cannot 'e registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal 'y consulta.$ LATIN MA-IM+ (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>as'acio v. 9ffice of the 6ecretary, *ept. of Justice

Case No. G.R. No. 109443 (No:e8/er #" 1994$

)ACTS+ R7 7,+/, among other things, provides for compensation of persons un!ustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son%in%law >alderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for "illing >oyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the &7, Petitioner was ac4uitted on the ground that conspiracy 'etween him and his son%in%law was not proven. .hat was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son% in%law. Petitioner claims he was un!ustly accused and is entitled to compensation. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to R7 7,+/. ,ELD+

1o, he is not. Aor one to 'e un!ustly accused$ one must 'e wrongly accused from the very 'eginning, un!ustly convicted ;when a !udge "nowingly and deli'erately rendered an un!ust !udgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any 'asis for !udgment= and imprisoned. In the case at 'ar, Petitioner was ac4uitted 'ecause the prosecution was una'le to prove 'eyond reasona'le dou't that Petitioner was guilty. 2hus, he does not fall under R7 7,+/. LATIN MA-IMF /a, 11a, )5a

7E 6egovia v. 6andigan'ayan

Case No. G.R. No. 1240.# (Mar ! 2#" 1990$

)ACTS+ Petitioners were designated as mem'ers of the &ontracts &ommittee for 1P&Ds Mindanao pro!ect. 2he lowest 'idder, Joint Henture was dis4ualified after the P&7> verified that Joint Henture as well as the )nd lowest 'idder, 8r'an &onsolidated &onstructors, were downgraded$ there'y ineligi'le as 'idders. 6ince all other 'ids e3ceeded the allowa'le government estimate on the pro!ect, the committee declared a failure of 'idding and directed a re%'idding. 1P& >oard approved, 'ut for reasons not on record. 2he pro!ect was eventually cancelled. Petitioners were charged under R7 ,+1/ for in one way or the other, e3tending undue advantage to Joint Henture through manifest partiality, evident 'ad faith and gross ine3cusa'le negligence.$ Aor this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE+ .01 it is mandatory or discretionary for 6andigan'ayan to place under preventive suspension pu'lic officers who stand accused 'efore it. ,ELD+ -es, it is mandatory. 8nder the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government pu'lic funds or property whether the crime is simple or comple3, regardless of stage of e3ecution and mode of participation, shall 'e suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in @on#aga v. 6andigan'ayan, <uciano, et al. v. Mariano, 6ocrates v. 6andigan'ayan. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 5a, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

2anada v. -ulo

Case No. 200 No. 433#3 (Ma2 31" 1933$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 12#" )oo&*o&e No.11

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed 'y the @ov. @en. with the consent 'y the Philippine &ommission, assigned to 7la'at, 2aya'as. <ater in his service, he was transferred to Pere#, 2aya'as. He reached his (5th 'irthday on 9cto'er ,5, 1/,:, su'se4uent to the approval of 7ct 1o. ,E// which ma"es mandatory the retirement of all !ustices who have reached (5 years of age at the time said 7ct ta"es effect on January 1, 1/,,. 2he !udge of Airst instance, acting upon

the directive of the 6ecretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to 7ct 1o. ,E//. ISSUE+ 1. .01 Petitioner should cease to hold office. ). .01 his transfer is considered a new transfer$ and re4uires confirmation 'y the Philippine &ommission. ,ELD+ 1o, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as 7ct 1o. ,E// clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those (5 yrs of age at the time the 7ct ta"es effect, not thereafter. 2herefore, Petitioner shall 'e a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good 'ehavior or does not 'ecome incapacitated. 1o, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is re4uired as it is !ust an enlargement of the !urisdiction grounded on original appointment. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a

7/ Bliseo 6ilva v. >elen &a'rera

Case No. 14.

G.R. No. L-3.29 (Mar ! 19" 1931$ )ACTS+ Respondent filed an application with the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission for a certificate of pu'lic convenience, to 'e a'le to operate an ice plant in the &ity of <ipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, opposed RespondentDs application, claiming that pu'lic convenience did not need another ice plant. 7tty. 7spillera was delegated 'y the &ommissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contestJ thereafter the &ommission en 'anc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. 7fter which, Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one e3cept the &ommissioner may hear contested cases. ISSUE+ .01 delegation to 7tty. 7spillera to hear the case is lawful. ,ELD+ 1o, the delegation is unlawful. 7lthough 6ec. ,) of Pu'lic 6ervice 7ct allows the &ommission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or ta"e testimony, 6ec. , of the same act provides that in ;1= all contested cases and ;)= cases involving fi3ing of rates, the reception of evidence may only 'e delegated to one of the &ommissioners. 2hus, though the law ma"es it inconvenient or cum'ersome for the &ommission to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the &ommission nor the &ourt may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus, you have to loo" at the entire 7ct, and not !ust specific provisions, in applying the law. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, Ea, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Radio &ommunications of the Philippines v. 1ational 2elecom. &om.

Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-.0#29 (Ma2 29" 190#$

)ACTS+ Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1/57 'y R7 )+,( to operate a radio communications system, recogni#ed 'y the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission ;P6&=. Petitioner then esta'lished services in 6orsogon, Mindoro, and 6amar. In 1/E+, the Respondent, which replaced the P6&, authori#ed Oayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and 6amar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a complaint 'y Oayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, 'ecause it didnDt have a certificate of pu'lic convenience, which is necessary under B9 5:( for any pu'lic service to operate. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy 'efore it can validly operate. ,ELD+ -es, they need such certificates to validly operate. Petitioner was created under R7 )+,(, governed 'y the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission. 8nder it, radio companies did not need a certificate of pu'lic convenience to operate. However, P.*. 1 a'olished the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission and B9 5:( created the Respondent &ommission. 8nder B9 5:(, Respondent must issue a certificate of pu'lic convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (c, ,+, :(a, :/

E+ 1ational Aederation of <a'or v. Hon. Bisma

Case No. 04 G.R. No. L-.123. (6a*1ar2 31" 1904$

)ACTS+ Pam'owood 8nion went on stri"e 'ecause of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they 'loc"ed the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. 2hereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for o'struction of private property. Petitioners contended that !urisdiction over this case 'elongs to <a'or 7r'iter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE+ .01 courts may 'e la'or ar'iters that can pass on a suit for damages filed 'y an employer or is it the <a'or 7r'iter of the 1<R&Q ,ELD+ -es, the <a'or 7r'iter has !urisdiction. In the <a'or &ode, 6ec. )17 vested <a'or 7r'iters with original !urisdiction. However, P.*. 1,(7 amended 6ec. )17, vesting courts of first instance with original !urisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. >ut again P.*. 1(/1 amended 6ec. )17 to return the !urisdiction to <a'or 7r'iters. 7dditionally, >P 1,+ amended the same section, 'ut without changing original

!urisdiction of <7 over money claims arising from employer%employee relations. 2hus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no !urisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (c, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pascual v. Pascual%>autista

Case No. 190 G.R. No. 04240 (Mar ! 23" 1992$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 12#" )oo&*o&e No.1.

)ACTS+ Petitioners are the ac"nowledged natural children of the late Bligio Pascual, the latter 'eing the full 'lood 'rother of the decedent *on 7ndres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, ac"nowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. ISSUE+ .01 7rt. //) of the &ivil &ode of the Philippines, which states that 7n illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or motherJ nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child$, can 'e interpreted to e3clude recogni#ed natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. ,ELD+ In *ia# v. I7&, this &ourt ruled that 7rt. //) of the &ivil &ode provides a 'arrier or iron curtain in that it prohi'its a'solutely a succession ab intestate 'etween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. 2hey may have a natural tie of 'lood, 'ut this is not recogni#ed 'y law for the purposes of 7rt. //).$ Bligio Pascual is a legitimate child 'ut petitioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent 7ndres Pascual, full 'lood 'rother of their father. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 7', ,('

E1 People v. 7migo

Case No. 201 G.R. No. 11.#19 (6a*1ar2 10" 199.$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 12#" )oo&*o&e No.1.

)ACTS+ 2he Regional 2rial &ourt rendered a decision finding the 7ccused guilty 'eyond reasona'le dou't of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 7ccused%7ppellant argues that error was committed 'y the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that 6ec. 1/ ;1=, 7rt. , of the 1/E7 &onstitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. 7ccused%7ppellant contends that under the 1/E7 &onstitution and prior to the promulgation of R7 7(5/, the death penalty had 'een a'olished and hence, the penalty that should have 'een imposed for the crime of murder committed 'y 7ccused %7ppellant should 'e reclusion temporal in its medium period to )+ years of reclusion temporal.

ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 1/ ;1=, 7rticle , of the 1/E7 &onstitution means to re4uire a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohi'ition against the death penalty. ,ELD+ In People vs. MuRo#, the &ourt held that 7 reading of 6ection 1/ ;1= of 7rticle III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which e3pressly declares the a'olition of the death penalty.$ LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, 7'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. 6antayana

Case No. 113 No. L-22291 (No:e8/er 13" 19#.$

)ACTS+ 7ccused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years, and to pay the costs. ISSUE+ .01 the appointment of the 7ppellant as a special agent of the &I6, which apparently authori#es him to carry and possess firearms, e3empts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. ,ELD+ -es. 7t the time of appellantDs apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a Ipeace officerD e4uivalent even to a mem'er of the municipal police e3pressly covered 'y 6ection E7/$. LATIN MA-IM+ :(a

E) 1ational Mar"eting &orp. ;17M7R&9= v. Miguel *. 2ecson

Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-29131 (A1(1s& 2#" 19.9$ C!a%&er 4" 'a(e 12#" )oo&*o&e No.10

)ACTS+ 9n 1: 1ovem'er 1/55, defendants were ordered 'y the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila to pay PR72R7, the sum of P7,)++ plus 7C interest until the amount was fully paid until May )5, 1/(+. 9n )1 *ecem'er 1/(5, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the !udgment rendered in the initial case. *efendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lac" of !urisdiction over the su'!ect matter thereof and prescription of action. 2he complaint was dismissed as having prescri'ed.

ISSUE+ .01 the date on which ten years from *ecem'er )1, 1/55 e3pired was considered to 'e *ecem'er )1, 1/(5. ,ELD+ 19. K.hen the laws spea" of years ... it shall 'e understood that years are of three hundred si3ty%five days eachK according to 7rt. 1, of our &ivil &ode. 1/(+ and 1/(: 'eing leap years, the month of Ae'ruary in 'oth had )/ days, so that ten ;1+= years of ,(5 days each, or an aggregate of ,,(5+ days, from *ecem'er )1, 1/55, e3pired on *ecem'er 1/, 1/(5. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6antiago v. &ommission on Blections, et al.

Case No. 90 G.R. No. 12#323 (Mar ! 19" 199#$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 129" )oo&*o&e No.2.

)ACTS+ 9n *ecem'er (, 1//(, Private Respondents filed with Respondent &ommission a petition to amend the &onstitution through a system of initiative 6ec. ), 7rt. 17 of the 1/E7 &onstitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohi'ition 'ased on the argument that the constitutional provision on peopleDs initiative can only 'e implemented 'y law to 'e passed 'y &ongress and no such law has 'een passed. R7 (7,5 provides for three systems of initiativeF initiative on the &onstitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any su'title on initiative on the &onstitution, unli"e in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in 6u'title II and 6u'title III. 2his deli'erate omission indicates that the matter of peopleLs initiative to amend the &onstitution was left to some future law. ISSUE+ .01 R7 (7,5 is an ade4uate statute to implement 6ection ), 7rticle 17 of the 1/E7 &onstitution. ,ELD+ 19. .hile the 7ct provides su'titles for 1ational Initiative and Referendum ;6u'title II= and for <ocal Initiative and Referendum ;6u'title III=, no su'title is provided for initiative on the &onstitution. 2his conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the 7ct is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If &ongress intended R.7. 1o. (7,5 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the &onstitution, it could have provided for a su'title therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the &onstitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. LATIN MA-IMF /a, :,

E, Hillanueva v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 1#0 No. L = 34#10 (De e8/er 4" 190.$

)ACTS+ 9n January )5, 1/E+, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Hice Mayor of *olores for the January ,+ elections in su'stitution for his companion Mendo#a who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January :. Petitioner won in the election 'ut Respondent >oard disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent &andidate as the winner on the presumption that PetitionerDs candidacy was not duly approved 'y Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation 'ut was dismissed 'y Respondent &ommission on the grounds that Mendo#aDs unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was effective, PetitionerDs candidacy was not valid since Mendo#a did not withdraw after January :. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner should 'e dis4ualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he fact that Mendo#aDs withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not 'e used to frustrate the peopleDs will in favor of Petitioner as the su'stitute candidate. 7lso, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should 'e considered as having 'een made su'stantially and in truth after the last day, even going 'y the literal reading of the provision 'y Respondent &ommission. 2he spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent &ommission in resolving the issue of last%minute withdrawal and su'stitution of other persons as candidates. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, /a, ,/c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Mario R. Melchor v. &ommission on 7udit

Case No. 1## G.R. No. 93390 (A1(1s& 1." 1991$ C!a%&er I<. 'a(e 133" )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTS+ 9n July 15, 1/E,, Petitioner, as school administrator of 7langalang 7gro%Industrial 6chool of <eyte, entered into a contract with &e'u *iamond &onstruction for the construction of one of the school 'uildings. 2he school accountant issued a certificate of availa'ility of funds to cover the construction cost 'ut failed to sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved 'y the Minister of Bducation. *uring construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to la'or cost increase, 'ut eventually gave up the pro!ect to save itself from losses. &onse4uently, the matter was referred to Respondent &ommission who disallowed the payment in post%audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lac" of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. Aor this reason the petitioner was made personally lia'le for the amount paid to the contractor. 1. ISSUE+ .01 the contract was null and void. ). .01 the petitioner should 'e held personally lia'le for the amount paid to the contractor. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he chief accountantDs issuance of a certificate of fund availa'ility served as su'stantial compliance with the re4uirements of <9I /(E in the e3ecution of the contract. 2he contract was also valid and enforcea'le 'ecause it already 'ore the approval of the Minister of Bducation. 7lso, it was highly ine4uita'le for the &ourt to compel the Petitioner, who had su'stantially complied with the mandate of <9I /(E, to shoulder the construction cost of the 'uilding, which was 'eing utili#ed 'y the school when he was not reaping 'enefits from it.

LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, /a, 1)a

E: Mateo &asela v. &ourt of 7ppeals, and B3e4uiel Magsaysay

Case No. 30 G.R. No. L = 2.#34 (O &o/er 1." 19#0$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 134" )oo&*o&e No.30

)ACTS+ Petitioner was ordered, on 9ct. )(, 1/5(, to vacate the premises and remove his house. Petitioner refused to comply. 2hus, the &ourt issued two more writs on May (, 1/5E and 7pril 1:, 1/5/. Instead of o'eying the writs, the Petitioner filed a case 'efore the &ourt of Airst Instance of Pam'ales, as"ing Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of e3ecution. 2he &ourt granted the motion for suspension 'ut the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent &ourt. Aor this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for e3ecution of the writ dated *ec. (, 1/(, and another on Ae'. 11, 1/(:. &7R denied the motion holding that its decision dated 9ct. )(, 1/5( could no longer 'e e3ecuted on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. ISSUE+ .01 the motion for e3ecution which was filed 'eyond the reglementary period was time% 'arred. ,ELD+ 1o. Arom *ec. 17, 1/5( when the decision in 4uestion 'ecame final and e3ecutory, to *ec. 11, 1/(,, the date when Private RespondentDs motion for e3ecution was filed, a period of ( years, 11 months and ): days elapsed. Arom this period, the time during which the writs of e3ecution could not 'e served, or a period of , years, / months and )5 days must 'e su'tracted. &onse4uently, only , years, 1 month and )/ days can 'e charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private RespondentDs motion for e3ecution was not time%'arred. LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, /c, 11a, 11d, 11e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*e Jesus v. &ity of Manila

Case No. 0. G.R. No. L-933# (De e8/er 24" 1914$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 134" )oo&*o&e No.41

)ACTS+ In 1/+7, Petitioner 'ought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the 2orrens system. 7pparently, the original owner incorrectly declared the si#e of the land. 6o, from 1/+1 N 1/+7, the original owner was paying lesser ta3es than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1/+7 N 1/1+. 8pon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of ta3es, Petitioner paid the ta3es, fees, and interest of P), +/(.:/ for the unpaid 'alance of the years 1/+1% 1/1+. 6oon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. Petitioner was awarded P1, (:/.E).

Petitioner contends that the supposed ta3es from 'efore 1/1+ were not actually ta3es 'ecause they had not yet 'een assessed. 2a3es may not 'e due and paya'le until they are assessed. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner should still pay the ta3es which were not assessed 'efore. ,ELD+ Petitioner should only pay the ta3es when he was the owner of the property. LATIN MA-IMF (, /a, ,E', :,, 5+

E5 Aederation of Aree .or"ers v. Inciong

Case No. 43 G.R. No. L-40040 (Ma2 11" 1900$

)ACTS+ In 7pril 1/77, P* 11), was promulgated re4uiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an e3tra P(+0month as emergency allowance. 2he increase was set at May 1, 1/77, as well as the rules issued on the same day. 6ec. ( stated that Bmployers may apply for e3emption with the 6ecretary of <a'or within ,+ days from the effectivity of these rules. 9n 6eptem'er )7, 1/77, the company filed with the .age &ommission its application for e3emption from paying the increase. Respondent approved 'oth applications granting e3emptions for the company. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave a'use of discretion, amounting to loss of !urisdiction 'y approving 'oth applications. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the first application was filed 'eyond the ,+%day reglementary period. ). .01 the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance. ,ELD+ 1o, the application was not a strict rule. 2he purpose of the P* is to protect wages and income. 2he law ta"es into consideration that there is a possi'ility that some employers are not financially capa'le to pay such wages and such incapa'ility may happen anytime within the year. 1o, only the *epartment of <a'or and .age &ommission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. 2he *epartment is in a 'etter position to assess the matter. In a'sence of any grave a'use of discretion, their recommendations will 'e respected 'y the courts. Moreover, the company was a'le prove their financial situation 'y giving financial statements. LATIN MA-IM+ E, /a, :)

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Morales v. Paredes

Case No. 03 G.R. No. L-34420 (De e8/er 29" 1930$

)ACTS+ Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the &ourt of Airst Instance of Pangasinan. .hile the Motion was still pending, Petitioner 'rought the present action to the 6upreme &ourt praying that the decision of Respondent Judge 'e set aside and a new trial should 'e granted in accordance with 6ec. 51, if the &ode of &ivil Procedure. ISSUE+ .01 a new trial should 'e granted in accordance with 6ec. 51, of the &ode of &ivil Procedure. ,ELD+ 6upreme &ourt cannot open a new trial. 2he 6upreme &ourt does not have !urisdiction to reopen !udgments under 6ec. 51, if there are other ade4uate remedies availa'le. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the &ourt of Airst Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should 'e finished first. LATIN MA-IM+ /c

E( Prasni" v. Repu'lic of the Philippines

Case No. 123 G.R. No. L-0.39 (Mar ! 23" 193.$

)ACTS+ Petitioner see"s to adopt four children which he claims to 'e his and Pa# Has4ue#D children without the 'enefit of marriage. 2he 6olicitor @eneral opposed this stating that 7rt. ,,E of the &ivil &ode allows a natural child to 'e adopted 'y his father refers only to a child who has not 'een ac"nowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may 'e adopted 'y his natural father or mother there should not 'e an ac"nowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against 7rt. ,,5. ISSUE+ .01 the &ivil &ode allows for the adoption of ac"nowledged natural children of the father or mother. ,ELD+ 2he law intends to allow adoption whether the child 'e recogni#ed or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecogni#ed children, 7rticle ,,E would 'e of no useful purpose. 2he rights of an ac"nowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. &ontending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to ac4uire these rights. 2he trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the li'eral. 2he law does not prohi'it the adoption of an ac"nowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is e4uita'le. 7n ac"nowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law, they should 'e allowed adoption. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, Ea, /, 1), )(, ,(a, ,7, ,/'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*e @uia v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 30 G.R. No. 104#12 (Ma2 ." 1992$

)ACTS+ Petitioner contends that under Par ;d= of 6ec. , of R7 71((, mem'ers of the 6angguniang Panlulungsod and 6angguniang >ayan shall 'e elected at large. ISSUE+ .01 par ;d= 6ec. , of R7 71(( should 'e interpreted to mean that elective officials of the 6angguniang Panlulungsod and 6angguniang >ayan shall 'e elected at large. ,ELD+ 1o. Par ;d= 6ec., of the R7 refers only to elective officials of the 6angguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the 6angguniang >ayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. 2he law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should 'e divided into two and therefore should necessarily 'e elected 'y districts. Par ;d= should 'e interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have 'een no reason for the R7 to single out the single district provinces. 2he court reali#ed that the language of the law in this case seems a'struse and the "ey to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. 2he e3planatory note in the proposed 'ill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the num'er of candidates to 'e voted for in the 1//) elections. LATIN MA-IM+ ), /c, 11a, ,(', ,7, ')

E7 6alenillas v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. .0 G.R. No. #0.0# (6a*1ar2 31" 1909$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 133" )oo&*o&e No.4#

)ACTS+ 9n *ecem'er :, 1/7,, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine 1ational >an" as security for a loan of P),5++. Aor failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed 'y P1> and was 'ought at a pu'lic auction 'y Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under 6ec.11/ of the Pu'lic <and 7ct. Respondent states that the sale of the property dis4ualified Petitioners from 'eing legal heirs vis--vis the said property. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescri'ed 'ased on Monge et al. vs. 7ngeles. 1. ). ISSUE+ .01 petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said 7ct. .01 the prescription period had already prescri'ed. ,e59+ 2he provision ma"es no distinction 'etween the legal heirs. 2he distinction made 'y Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the 7ct. PetitionersD contention would 'e more in "eeping with the spirit of the law. .ith regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a

foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would 'e different. Aor foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the e3piration of the period of redemption when the deed of a'solute sale was e3ecuted. LATIN MA-IM+ /', )(, )7, /', :)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6arcos v. &astillo

Case No. 2#. G.R. No. L-29#33 (6a*1ar2 31" 59.9$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 13." )oo&*o&e No. 40

)ACTS+ Petitioner, the elected Mayor of >aro'o, 6urigao del 6ur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office 'y Respondent, the Provincial @overnor of 6urigao del 6ur. 2he act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of tim'er or logs for their own use and 'enefit, to the damage and pre!udice of the pu'lic and of the government. 7nd on the 'asis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension 'y Respondent pursuant to 6ec. 5, of R7 1o. 51E5, otherwise "nown as the *ecentrali#ation 7ct of l/(7$. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the *ecentrali#ation 7ct of l/(7. ,ELD+ 2he new law e3plicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial >oard. 2he purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations 'y vesting the power on a 'oard where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. 2he Provincial @overnor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. LATIN MA-IMF 1, (c, (d, 7a, /a, ,(', :/

EE 7la Mode @arments, Inc. v. 1<R&

Case No. # G. R. No. 1221.3 ()e/r1ar2 1#" 599#$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 130" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTS+ Respondents were 'oth employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders, tas"ed to supervise ,( sewers each. 9n May 5 and (, l//,, all the line leaders did not report for wor". 9n May (, l//,, Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then re4uired to su'mit written e3planations as to their a'sence. 9n May 1+, l//,, Private Respondents tendered their e3planation letters. *espite their e3planation, they were not allowed to resume their wor" and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their a'sence was intended to sa'otage the operations of Petitioner. >ut other line leaders were allowed to resume their wor" despite their a'sence on May 5 and (, l//,.

ISSUE+ 1. .01 the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their wor" constitutes dismissal from the serviceQ ). .01 the <a'or 7r'iter erred in limiting the award of 'ac"wages for only a period not e3ceeding three , yearsQ ,ELDF 8nder the old doctrine, the 'ac"wages that can 'e awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to e3ceed a period of three years. However, a new doctrine allowed the awarding of full$ 'ac"wages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case. 2he <a'or 7r'iter was wrong in awarding 'ac"wages for a period of not e3ceeding three years. LATIN MA-IMF 1, 5a, (a, (c, 7a, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Jose &omendador v. Renato 6. *e Hilla

Case No. .9 G.R. No. 931## (A1(1s& 2" 1991$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 142" )oo&*o&e No. .1

)ACTS+ 2he petitioners are officers of the 7rmed Aorces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup dDetat on *ecem'er l to /, l/E/. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre%Investigation Panel and a &ourt Martial was formed. *uring their trial, petitioners invo"ed their right to peremptory challenge. 2he same was denied 'y the &ourt Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential *ecree. ISSUE+ 1. .01 there was su'stantial compliance in the conduct of pre%trial investigation. ). .01 there was a legal 'asis for the @&M 1o. 1: to deny the right of petitioners to invo"e a peremptory challenge. ,. .01 there was a legal 'asis for the Regional 2rial &ourts to grant 'ail and order for the release of petitioners. ,ELDF 2he right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial <aw was declared. >ut when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. 2he reason 'eing, the right was suspended due to the creation of military tri'unals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may 'e referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tri'unals were a'olished, the right to peremptory challenge was revived. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, /a, 1+

E/ Mata'uena v. &ervantes

Case No. 1#2 G.R. No. L-20##1 (Mar ! 31" 19#1$

C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 143" )oo&*o&e No..9

)ACTS+ Aeli3 Mata'uena coha'itated with Respondent. *uring this period, Aeli3 Mata'uena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. <ater the two were married. 7fter the death of Aeli3 Mata'uena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing 7rt.1,, of the &ivil &ode Bvery donation 'etween the spouses during the marriage shall 'e void.$ 2he trial court ruled that this case was not covered 'y the prohi'ition 'ecause the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply coha'itating. ISSUE+ .01 the prohi'ition applies to donations 'etween live%in partners. ,ELD+ -es. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. 6ince the reason for the 'an on donations 'etween spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possi'ility of undue influence and improper pressure 'eing e3erted 'y one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohi'ition shall not apply also to common%law relationships. 2he court, however, said that the lac" of the donation made 'y the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have e3clusive rights to the disputed property 'ecause the relationship 'etween Aeli3 and Respondent were legitimated 'y marriage. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, /c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<ope# M 6ons, Inc. v. &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals

Case No. 131 G.R. No. L-92#4 ()e/r1ar2 1" 193#$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 144" )oo&*o&e No.#.

)ACTS+ Petitioner imported wire nettings from @ermany. 2he Manila &ustoms &ollector assessed the customs duties on the 'asis of the suppliers invoice. 2he duties were paid and the shipment released. 2hereafter, the Manila &ustoms &ollector reassessed the duties due on the 'asis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent &ourt 'ut they dismissed it for lac" of !urisdiction citing 6ec. 7 of R7 11)5 creating said 2a3 &ourt. Provision says that the &ourt has !urisdiction to review decisions of &ommissioner of &ustoms. However, under 6ec. 11 of same 7ct, the &ourt has !urisdiction to review rulings of the &ollector of &ustoms when 'rought 'y persons affected there'y. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent &ourt has !urisdiction to review the decisions of the &ollector of &ustoms. ,ELD+ -es, there is indeed a disparity 'etween 6ec. 7 and 11 of same R7. 2he 6upreme &ourt concurred with the positions of the 6olicitor @eneral that a clerical error was committed in 6ec. 11 and the word &ollector should read &ommissioner . 2o support this, the 6upreme &ourt cited that under the &ustoms <aw as found under 6ec. 11,7 to 1:1+ of the Revised 7dministrative &ode, Ithe &ollectors of &ustoms are mere 6u'ordinates of the &ommissioner of &ustoms over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling, the court did not engage in !udicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent

clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the <egislature. 8nder the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter, 'ut the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, 1(a, 1(c, ,(a

/+ <am' v. Phipps

Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-#00. (6152 12" 1912$ C!a%&er 4" 'a(e 144" )oo&*o&e No.#0

)ACTS+ Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal &olony and that all of his accounts are 'alanced. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that, as provided 'y law, there is no plain, speedy and ade4uate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.$ ISSUEF .01 the legislature intended to limit the !urisdiction to cases where there is no other ade4uate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts$ of law. ,ELDF 2here appears to 'e a typographical error in the wording of 6ec. ))) of 7ct 1o. 1/+ which reads in partF .hen the complaint in an action in a court of Airst Instance alleges that any inferior tri'unal, ? it may if there is no other plain, speedy and ade4uate remedy in the ordinary courts$ of law.$ 2he phrase courts of law$ should read as course of law$. &opied ver'atim from the &ode of &ivil Procedure of &alifornia, the said section in the &alifornia &ode reads course of law$ instead of courts of law$. 6panish translation of said 6ec. ))) more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In 6panish, the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary courts of law$. 9n its face, this evident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensi'le construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid in!ustice or an a'surd conclusion. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, /d, 11a, 11d, 1)a, ,(a, ,(', ,(d, ,(f, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&om. of Internal Revenue v. B669

Case No. 2# G.R. No. L-20302-03 (A%r45 10" 1909$

)ACTS+ Respondent overpaid its 1/5/ income ta3. It was accordingly granted a ta3 credit 'y Petitioner on 7ugust 5, 1/(:. However, RespondentDs payment for 1/(+ was found to 'e short. 2hus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency ta3 together with interest for the period of 7pril 1E, 1/(1 to 7pril 1E, 1/(:. 9n 7ugust 1+, 1/(:, Respondent paid under protest the amount

alleged to 'e due. It protested the computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should only 'e re4uired to pay interest for the amount of the difference 'etween the deficiency ta3 and RespondentDs overpayment. ISSUEF 1. ). ,ELDF 2he government already had in its hands the sum of P))1, +,, representing the e3cess payment of Respondent. Having 'een paid and received 'y mista"e, the sum 'elonged to Respondent and the government had the o'ligation to return such amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the o'ligation to reim'urse. 6ince the amount of P))1, +,, was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1/(+, whatever o'ligation Respondent might su'se4uently incur in favor of the government would have to 'e reduced 'y that sum, in respect of which no interest could 'e charged. It is well esta'lished that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to su'vert these truisms simply cannot and should not 'e countenanced. 1othing is 'etter settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to a'surd and unreasona'le conse4uences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is to 'e re!ected if it would 'e un!ust or lead to a'surd results. 6tatutes should receive a sensi'le construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an un!ust or a'surd conclusion. LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, E', 11a, 11d, 11e, 1)a, 1)' .01 Respondent shall pay the deficiency ta3 of P,(7, //: with interest. .01 Respondent is entitled to a refund.

/1 People v. Hillanueva

Case No. 11. G. R. L-13014 (A%r45 29" 19.1$

)ACTS+ *efendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical in!uries with damage to property in amount of P),,() through rec"less imprudence in the Justice of the Peace &ourt of >atangas. 2he case was considered 'eyond the courtDs !urisdiction 'ecause of the fine imposa'le upon the accused. 2he case was forwarded to the &ourt of Airst Instance, which also declared itself without !urisdiction 'ecause the penalty for the more serious offense of physical in!uries through rec"less imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even applied to its ma3imum degree. It should remain within the !urisdiction of the Justice of Peace. ISSUE+ .hether or not the &ourt of Airst Instance has !urisdiction. ,ELD+ -es. 7ngeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that !urisdiction was with the &ourt of Airst Instance and not the municipal court. 7lso, since the &ourt of Airst Instance would have !urisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property, it would 'e a'surd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical in!uries com'ined with damage to property through rec"less imprudence is in !urisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there is the possi'ility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical in!uries aspect of the case and esta'lish only the damage to property. 2he Justice of Peace, if given !urisdiction, would find itself without !urisdiction to impose the P),(,( fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot 'e less than the amount of the damage. LATIN MA-IM+

5, 11

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. *u4ue
Case No. 10.

G. R. 100203 (A1(1s& 13" 1992$

C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 149" )oo&*o&e No.9#

)ACTS+ 7ccused was charged with illegal recruitment 'ecause he was not licensed nor authori#ed 'y the proper government agency, P9B7. 2he <a'or &ode provides that the offense shall prescri'e in , years 'ut does not contain any provision of how to compute it. 6ec. ) of 7ct 1o. ,,)( provides that prescription shall 'egin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same 'e not "nown at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of !udicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment$. 7ccording to 7ccused, a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never 'egin to run. ISSUE+ .hat is the prescription of the criminal offense of the 7ccusedQ ,ELD+ Prescription 'egan from the time the activities of the 7ccused were ascertained 'y the complainants and 'y the P9B7 to have 'een carried out without any license or authority from the government. 2here is a'surdity in 6ec. ) 'ut 7ccused does not 'enefit from a literal reading. It must 'e construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid a'surd results. Institution of !udicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment$ may 'e either disregarded as surplusage or should 'e deemed preceded 'y the word until$. LATIN MA-IM+ /, 11a, 11d, 1), 15, ,E

/) >ello v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 13 G. R. L-301.1 (Mar ! 29" 19#4$

)ACTS+ Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the &ourt of Airst Instance, which should have 'een ta"en directly to Respondent &ourt. 2he Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invo"ed an analogous provision ;Rule 5+, 6ec. ,= directing the &ourt of 7ppeals in cases erroneously 'rought to it to certify the case to the proper court. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohi'ition and mandamus to prohi'it the e3ecution of !udgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent &ourt. 2hey dismissed the petition. 7lthough Respondent &ourt recogni#ed that the &ourt of Airst Instance may have e3ercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent &ourt, it held that Petitioners did not implead the &ourt of Airst Instance as principal party respondent$ and thus it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can 'e said to deserve some e4uities$. ISSUE+

.01 the case should 'e elevated to Respondent &ourt despite finality of !udicial decision. ,ELD+ -es. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance acted with grave a'use of discretion. 2he 6upreme &ourt cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that it is the essence of !udicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplora'le result of in!ustice or a'surdity$. 2he provision should also 'e ta"en within the conte3t and spirit of Rule 5+, 6ec. , as an analogous provision. 2he 6upreme &ourt finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and !ustice to 'e 'ound 'y the same rule. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, /d, /e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 1), ,(, E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&esario 8rsua v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 30. G.R. No. 1121#0 (A%r45 10" 199.$ C!a%&er 4" 'a(e 132" )oo&*o&e No.112

)ACTS+ Petitioner was charged 'efore the 9ffice of the 9m'udsman. He was re4uested 'y his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the 9m'udsman 'ecause the law firmDs messenger, 9scar Pere#, had to attend some personal matters. 7t the 9ffice of the 9m'udsman, he wrote his name at the log'oo" as 9scar Pere#.$ PetitionerDs real identity was eventually discovered 'y the employees of the 9m'udsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of &.7. 1o. 1:). ISSUE+ .01 the acts committed 'y the petitioner were among the evils sought to 'e remedied 'y &.7. 1o. 1:) ,ELD+ Petitioner was ac4uitted. 6tatutes are to 'e construed in the light of the purposes to 'e achieved and the evils sought to 'e remedied. 2he court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to in!ustice and a'surdity. <i"ewise, &.7. 1o. 1:) is a penal statute that should 'e construed strictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 11a, 1)a, :1a

/, Paat v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 93 G.R. No. 11110# (6a*1ar2 10" 199#$

)ACTS+ Petitioner 4uestioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truc" used in illegal logging operations. He insists that only the &ourt can do so, citing 6ection (E of P* 7+5 as amended 'y B9 )77 which reads 2he court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the @overnment?as well as the machinery, e4uipment? which are illegally used?$

ISSUE+ .01 the petition should 'e granted in light of 6ec. (E of P.*. 7+5. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he a'ove%4uoted provision should 'e read together with 6ec. (Ea. 6tatutes should 'e construed in the light of the o'!ect to 'e achieved and the evil to 'e suppressed, and they should 'e given such construction as will advance the o'!ect, suppress the mischief, and secure the 'enefits intended. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pritchard v. Repu'lic

Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-1#13 (6152 1#" 1940$ C!a%&er 4.1." )oo&*o&e No.114" %a(e 13.

)ACTS+ 2he 6olicitor @eneral opposed the claim of the Petitioner for e3emption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the re4uirement for e3emption, it is imperative that PetitionerDs children should 'e enrolled during the entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions re4uired to entitle him to e3emption from filing a declaration of intention. Iss1e+ .01 the Petitioner should 'e allowed to avail of the e3emption 'y invo"ing the aforementioned provision. ,ELD+ 2he provision of law invo"ed 'y appellant must 'e interpreted in the sense that the enrollment re4uired 'y law must 'e made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. 2he drafters of the law could not have intended to create an a'surd or impossi'le situation. LATIN MA-IM+ 11a, 1/a

/: 6alvacion v. &entral >an" of the Philippines

Case No. 243 G.R. No. 94#23 (A1(1s&" 21" 199#$ C!a%&er 4.1." )oo&*o&e No.114" %a(e 13.

)ACTS+ 7n 7merican tourist raped 1) year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the *eputy 6heriff of Ma"ati sent a notice of garnishment to &hina >an" in order to draw from the 7mericanDs 'an" account to pay the fees. &hina >an" responded 'y invo"ing 6ec. 11, of &ircular /(+ of &entral >an", which states that foreign currency deposits shall 'e e3empt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any court. Respondent >an" states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy.

ISSUES+ .01 6ection 1, of &entral >an" &ircular /(+ and 6ection E of R7 (:)7, as amended 'y P* 1):( should 'e made applica'le to a foreigner. ,ELD+ &entral >an" contends that the reason for the e3emption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. R7 (:): was enacted during a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. 7s, some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted R7 (:):, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the &ourt ruled that it is unthin"a'le that the guilty would 'e ac4uitted at the e3pense of the innocent, stating that if &ircular /(+ is to 'e followed, !ustice would 'e undermined, stating 7rt. 1+ of the &ivil &ode, in case of dou't as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawma"ing 'ody intended right and !ustice to prevail. LATIN MA-IM+ ), 1:, ,/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*emafiles v. &omelec

Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-2039. (De e8/er 29" 19.#$ C!a%&er 4.10" )oo&*o&e 12." %a(e 139

)ACTS+ Respondent @alido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial >oard voting to re!ect returns. Petitioner challenged the right of ) 'oard mem'ers to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent &ommission ruled in favor of Petitioner. @alido then as"ed for reconsideration, stating that the ) 'oard mem'ers in 4uestion were dis4ualified only when the 'oard was acting as a provincial 'ut not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent &ommission reversed its previous decision. ISSUES+ 1. .01 this case is moot and the 'oard had the authority to re!ect the returns from Precinct 7. ). .01 the 'oard mem'ers who were candidates for reelection were dis4ualified from sitting in the 'oard in its capacity as a municipal 'oard of canvassers. ,. .01 Respondent &ommission can order the 'oard of canvassers to count a return. ,ELD+ R7 :/7+ reads the first mayor, vice%mayor and councilors of the municipality of 6e'aste shall 'e elected in the ne3t general elections for local officials and shall have 4ualified.$ 2he 6upreme &ourt ruled that and shall have 4ualified$ is devoid of meaning. 2he term of office of municipals shall 'egin in the 1st day of January following their election, despite the fact that 6e'aste was a newly created municipality. 1o, a canvassing 'oard may not re!ect any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possi'ility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should 'e annulled. 2he law states any mem'er of a provincial 'oard or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall 'e incompetent to act on the said 'ody.$ 6ince Respondent &ommission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing 'odies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. LATIN MA-IM+ 15, ,5, :,, )(

/5 1ational Housing &orporation v. Juco

Case No. 0. G.R. No. L-.4313 (6a*1ar2 1#" 1903$

)ACTS+ Aor 'eing declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned 'y Petitioner, Private Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent &ourt and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent &ourt is without !urisdiction as Petitioner &orporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent &ourt however, despite past decisions, decided in favor of the Private Respondent. ISSUE+ .01 employees of Petitioner are covered 'y the <a'or &ode or 'y the laws and regulations governing the civil service. ,ELD+ Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stoc"holders. 2he 1/,5 constitutionDs section 1 article 1) states that 7 civil service em'racing all 'ranches and su'divisions of the government shall 'e provided 'y law.$ .hile the amendments in section 1 article 1)' of the 1/7, constitution states that 2he civil service em'races every 'ranch, agency, su'division and instrumentality of the government, including every government owned or controlled corporation.$ &learly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is 'road and all%em'racing. Aurthermore, P.*. E+7 6ec. 5( implements the said provision. In addition to this, the <a'or &ode states that the mentioned corporations shall 'e governed 'y the &ivil 6ervice <aw. LATIN MA-IM+ (, 7, ):, )(, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Me!ia

Case No. 111 G.R. Nos. 110940-41 a*9 G.R. No. 11940# (6152 #" 199#$

)ACTS+ 6ec. 1: of the 7nti%&arnapping 7ct readsF 6ec. 1:. 7ny person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle ta"en, 'e punished 'y imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed 'y means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon thingsJ and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when the owner, driver, or occupant is "illed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.$

ISSUE+ 1. .01 the phrase is "illed$ covers 'oth homicide and murder. ). If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty 'e life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to deathQ ,. .01 frustrated homicide would 'e treated as a separate offense. ,ELD+

2he words is "illed$ ma"e no distinction 'etween homicide and murder. .hether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof$ ma"es no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. 2he "illing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot 'e treated as a separate offense and only serves to 4ualify the carnapping. 2he phrase is "illed$ refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated murder. Arustrated homicide ;or murder= is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of 6ec. 1: 'y means of violence or in intimidation of persons$. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, )(, ,Ea, :,, :E

/( &ity of Manila v. Judge @ome# and Bsso Philippines

Case No. 23 G. R. No. L-3#231 (A1(1s& 31" 1901$

)ACTS+ 2he Revised &harter of Manila too" effect on June 1E, 1/:/. It fi3es the annual realty ta3 at one and one%half percent. 2he 6pecial Bducation Aund <aw ;R7 5::7=, which too" effect on Jan. 1, 1/(/, imposed an annual additional one percent ta3 and fi3es the total realty ta3 at three percent. .ith the three percent ma3imum limit set 'y R7 5::7, the municipal 'oard of Manila enacted 9rdinance 1o. 71)5, effective 'eginning the third 4uarter of 1/7), imposing an additional one%half percent realty ta3. Respondent &orporation paid the ta3, 'ut protested the 9rdinanceJ the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila ruled that the ta3 ordinance is void as it is not authori#ed 'y the city charter or 'y any law, and that the city of Manila should reim'urse Respondent &orporation said ta3. ISSUE+ .01 the ta3 ordinance is valid. ,ELD+ 2he &ourt holds that the doctrine of implications in 6tatutory &onstruction sustains the &ity of ManilaDs contention that the additional one%half percent realty ta3 is sanctioned 'y the provision of the 6pecial Bducation Aund <aw that the total real property ta3 shall not e3ceed a ma3imum of three per centum$. .hile the 1/:/ Revised &harter of Manila fi3ed the realty ta3 at one and one% half percent, the 1/(/ 6pecial Bducation Aund <aw fi3ed three percent as the ma3imum real property ta3. 2he o'vious implication is that an additional one%half percent ta3 could 'e imposed 'y municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fi3ed at two percent the realty ta3 that would accrue to the city or municipality. 2he fact that the 1/7: Real Property 2a3 &ode specially fi3es the real property ta3 at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawma"er to impose two percent as the realty ta3 proper. 2hat was also the avowed intent of the 4uestioned ordinance. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, )+a, ,E', :,, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&hua v. &ivil 6ervice &ommission

Case No. .0 G.R. No. 009#9 ()e/r1ar2 #" 1992$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1.4" )oo&*o&e No.14.

)ACTS+ R7 ((E, provided 'enefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorgani#ation. 6ection ) covers those who are 4ualifiedF 6ec. ). &overage. N 2his 7ct shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the 1ational @overnment. 2he 'enefits authori#ed under this 7ct shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two ;)= consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation?$ Petitioner <ydia &hua, 'elieving that she is 4ualified to avail of the 'enefits of the program, filed an application on January ,+, 1/E/ with Respondent 7dministration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse 'y the petitioner to Respondent &ommission yielded the same result. ISSUE+ .01 PetitionerDs status as a co%terminus employee is e3cluded from the 'enefits of R7 ((E, ;Barly Retirement <aw=. ,ELD+ 2he petition is granted. 2he Barly Retirement <aw would violate the e4ual protection clause of the constitution if the 6upreme &ourt were to sustain RespondentDs su'mission that the 'enefits of said law are to 'e denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered 'y the said law. 2he court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, 11e, 1)a, )+a, )+', ,7

/7 6olid Homes Inc. v. 2eresita Payawal

Case No. 200 G.R. No. 04011 (A1(. 29" 1909$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1.9" )oo&*o&e No.1.4

)ACTS+ 2he &ourt of 7ppeals sustained that the Regional 2rial &ourt of Sue#on &ity has !urisdiction over the case filed 'y the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends that the case should have 'een heard 'y the Housing and <and 8se Regulatory >oard and not the R2&. 1. ). ISSUE+ .01 the R2& has !urisdiction over the case. .01 the applica'le law is the general law ;>P 1)/= or the special law ;P* 1,::= ,ELD+ 2he R2& has no !urisdiction over the case since the respondentDs argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, )+c, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Richard @ordon v. Regino Heridiano II

Case No. 11. G.R. No. L-33230 (No:. 0" 1900$

C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1#0" )oo&*o&e No.1#1

)ACTS+ Respondent -am'ao owns a 6an 6e'astian *rugstore and an 9longapo &ity *rugstore. 7 Itest 'uyD operation at 6an 6e'astian *rugstore, wherein agents were sold )++ ta'lets of Halium without a doctorDs prescription, gave rise to the closure ordered 'y the A*7. >efore such order was promulgated, the Mayor revo"ed the MayorDs Permits issued to 6an 6e'astian *rugstore and su'se4uently, a sign'oard was posted 'y the Hice%Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. 9n May 7, 1/E+, A*7 approved RespondentDs re4uest to e3change the locations of the two drugstores ;which were 5m apart and in the same 'uilding=. 8pon "nowledge of this, Petitioner then revo"ed the MayorDs Permit issued to 9longapo &ity *rugstore. ISSUE+ 2he conflict 'etween the A*7Ds and the mayorDs power to grant and revo"e licenses for the operation of drugstores. RULING+ 2he A*7 had the authority to order the closure of 6an 6e'astian *rugstore, the Mayor however did not. In the case of 9longapo &ity *rugstore however, the authority rested on the Mayor ;local !urisdiction=. LATIN MA-IM+ )+c, ,E'

/E Bufronio <lanto v. Mohamad 7li *imaporo

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-21903 (Mar" 31" 19..$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1#1" )oo&*o&e No.1#0

)ACTS+ 2he Provincial >oard of <anao del 1orte reverted the D(+%D(1 salary appropriation for the position of 7ssistant Provincial 7ssessor to the general fund. 2he position, then held 'y the Petitioner, was a'olished. Petitioner came to the court on mandamus, wherein the RespondentDs motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. 1. ). ISSUE+ .as the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismissQ Is it voidQ RULING+ 2here is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. 2he motion to dismiss is grounded on lac" of cause of action, which can 'e determined 'y reference to the facts in the averred pleading. 2he 4uestion raised is purely one of law. 2he legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. 9ral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Aurther, petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the 6ecretary of Ainance is needed in a'olishing his position. 6uch action was, however, done away with 'y the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct ;6ec. ,a of R7))(:=. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )+a, ,), ,7, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. &oncepcion

Case No. 203 G.R. No. 19190 (No:e8/er 29" 1922$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1#." )oo&*o&e No.202

*efendant authori#ed an e3tension of credit in favor of Puno - &oncepcion, 6. en &, a co% partnership. *efendantDs wife was a director of this co%partnership. *efendant was found guilty of violating 6ec. ,5 of 7ct 1o. )7:7 which says that 2he 1ational >an" shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the mem'ers of the >oard of *irectors of the 'an" nor to agents of the 'ranch 'an"s.$ 2his 6ection was in effect in 1/1/ 'ut was repealed in 7ct 1o. )/,E approved on January ,+, 1/)1.

ISSUEF .01 *efendant can 'e convicted of violating 6ections of 7ct 1o. )7:7, which were repealed 'y 7ct 1o. )/,E. ,ELD+ In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the <egislature. 6ection :/ in relation to 6ec. )5 of 7ct 1o. )7:7 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the 7ct. *efendant contends that the repeal of these 6ections 'y 7ct 1o. )/,E has served to ta"e away 'asis for criminal prosecution. 2he &ourt holds that where an act of the <egislature which penali#es an offense repeals a former act which penali#ed the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the &ourts of !urisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, (', /a, ,7, ,E'

// 2antuico, Jr. v. *omingo

Case No. 203 G. R. No. 9.422 ()e/r1ar2 20" 1994$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1#." )oo&*o&e No.203

)ACTS+ 2he petition 4uestions the withholding of one%half of PetitionerDs retirement 'enefits. Petitioner was &hairman of the &97 from 1/7( to 1/E(. 9n *ecem'er 1/E5, he applied for and o'tained clearance, which covered the period from 1/7( to 1/E5, from all money, property, and other accounta'ilities in preparation for his retirement. 7fter the B*67 Revolution, he su'mitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1/E( to March /, 1/E(. Respondent, who too" over as &hairman, created an inventory0audit of all e4uipment ac4uired during the tenure of his ) predecessors. 7fter the committee recommended PetitionerDs clearance from accounta'ility and after another special audit, Respondent approved PetitionerDs application for retirement 'ut added that U of the money value of 'enefits due would 'e withheld su'!ect to the findings of the audit. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent can authori#e that half of PetitionerDs retirement 'enefits may 'e withheld. ,ELD+ 1o. 8nder 6ection : of R7 15(E providing for life pension to the 7uditor @eneral and mem'ers of &9MB<B&, the 'enefits granted shall not 'e su'!ect to garnishment, levy or e3ecution.

<i"ewise, under 6ection ,, of P.*. 11:( ;Revised @overnment 6ervice Insurance 7ct=, the 'enefits granted shall not 'e su'!ect, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.$ .ithholding PetitionerDs 'enefits is not allowed in this case. .ell%settled is the rule that retirement laws are li'erally interpreted in favor of the retiree 'ecause the intention is to provide for the retireeDs well%'eing. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /', /d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, ,E', :)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7lpha Investigation and 6ecurity 7gency, Inc. v. 1<R&

Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111#22 (Ma2 2#" 199#$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 1##" )oo&*o&e No.2

)ACTS+ Petitioner provides security services. 9ne of its clients is *on Mariano Marcos 6tate 8niversity ;*MM68=. 6ecurity guards wor"ing in *MM68 filed 'efore the Regional 9ffice of the *9<B a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. 2he <a'or 7r'iter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and *MM68 solidarily lia'le for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should 'e 'orne 'y *MM68. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner may 'e held !ointly and severally lia'le with *MM68 for non%payment of minimum wage. ,ELD+ -es, Petitioner is !ointly and severally lia'le with *MM68 for the payment of wage increases. 6ection ( of R7 (7)7 ;.age Rationali#ation 7ct= provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the lia'ility of the principal and contractor shall 'e !oint and several. 2he same lia'ility attaches under 7rticles 1+(, 1+7 and 1+/ of the <a'or &ode. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at 'ar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescri'ed in 6ection ( of R7 (7)7, and not wages in general as provided 'y the <a'or &ode. 2his interpretation is not accepta'le. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must 'e made. <egislative intent must 'e ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, )5a, ,(a, ,(c, ,E'

1++ 7lfon v. Repu'lic

Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-31201 (Ma2 29" 1900$

)ACTS+ Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Bstrella Heronica Primitiva *uterte to Bstrella 7lfon.

1. 2. 3. 4.

2he reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the followingF 6he has 'een using the name Bstrella 7lfon from infancy. 6he has 'een enrolled from @rade school to &ollege in the same name. 7ll ac4uaintances "now her as Bstrella 7lfon. 6he e3ercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE+ .01 legitimate and legitimated children are re4uired to use the surname of their father. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he word KprincipallyK as used in 7rticle ,(: is not e4uivalent to Ke3clusivelyK so that there is no legal o'stacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is e4ually entitled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Bstrella Heronica Primitiva 7lfon *uterte to Bstrella 7lfon LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 17, :)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bspino v. &leofe

Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (6152 13" 19#3$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 102" )oo&*o&e No.23

)ACTS+ Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed 'y 1E Respondents for a !udicial declaration of their rights under R7 1E() as amended 'y R7 :/+) in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE+ .01 the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17, 1/(7. ,ELD+ 1o. <oo"ing at the legislative intent through the e3planatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June )), 1/57 'ut prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1/(7. 7 contrary interpretation which would allow or authori#e retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually a'olish the essential distinction 'etween the two types of retirement 'enefits and render the IoptionD under the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, /a, )5a

1+1 Repu'lic Alour Mills, Inc v. &ommissioner of &ustoms

Case No+ 230 G. R. No. L-204.3 (Ma2 31" 19#1$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 104" )oo&*o&e No.39

)ACTS+ 2his is a petition for review of the decision of the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals in which they found in 6ec. )E+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the e3portation of 'ran ;ipa= and pollard ;darak= under 6ec. )E+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode which statesF There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for !harfage" ISSUE+ .01 the words products of the Philippines$ e3cludes 'ran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. ,ELD+ 1o. Bven without undue scrutiny it does appear 4uite o'vious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the a'ove section. 2he law is clearJ it must 'e o'eyed. 2he 2erm product of the Philippines$ should 'e ta"en in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the countryJ hence, 'ran; ipa# and pollard;darak# produced from wheat imported into the country are products of the Philippines. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (d, 7a, ):a, ):'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7siatic Petroleum &o. v. &ollector of Internal Revenue

Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12.0# (A1(1s& 2#" 1910$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 10#" )oo&*o&e No.4#

)ACTS+ 2he *efendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue 2a3 provided for under 6ec. 17 of 7ct 1o. ):,) upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1/15. 2he ta3 was paid under protest. 2he Plaintiff contends that the ta3 collected was illegal. 6ec. 17 Par 7)a of 7ct 1o. ):,) provides that no ta3 ;imposed 'y this law= shall 'e collected on such articles which, 'efore the ta"ing effect of this 7ct, shall have 'een disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.$ 6aid 7ct too" effect upon the 1st day of January, 1/15. ISSUE+ .01 a dealer is re4uired to pay the Internal Revenue 2a3, provided for under 6ec. 17 Par 7)a of 7ct 1o. ):,), upon mineral oils, composed of "erosene and gasoline which had 'een sold, 'ut not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1/15. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he <egislature evidently intended, 'y said phrase, to mean that merchandise dispose of$ had 'een sold. 2he <egislature, 'y 7ct 1o. )::5, fully recogni#ed that the phrase disposed of$ meant nothing more or less than a contract where'y the vendor was 'ound to furnish an article, 'ecause in said 7ct it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was su'!ect to pay such ta3 in the a'sence of stipulations to the contrary. 2he phrase disposed of$ as used in 6ec. 17 of 7ct 1o. ):,), should 'e given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MA-IM+ $, %c, &a, :,

1+) .il .ilhemsen, Inc v. >aluyut

Case No. 1#3 G.R. Nos. L-2#330-31 (Ma2 11" 19#0$

)ACTS+ Bmpty cargo vans were used 'y Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. 7fter the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had 'een emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de 6an Arancisco 6talag. 2he *efendant applied to the 6urveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. 2he re4uest was 'ased on the Memorandum 9rder 1o. 1/ and the Memorandum 9rder dated 7pril )+, 1/(:. 2he trial court held that the transfer of 7ppellantsD empty cargo vans to the warehouse of 7ppellee was done 'y authority of &ustoms Memorandum of 7pril )+, 1/(: and &ustoms 7dministrative 9rder 1o. ))%(:, and that the said o'!ects were lawfully detained 'y 7ppellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE+ .01 the decision of the trial court is legally valid. ,ELD+ -es. 7s plainly worded in the administrative order, it 'ecomes necessary for all empty sea vans to 'e removed from the pier premises 'y their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have 'een completely emptied of all their contents. 2his is in order to ma"e availa'le at all times ade4uate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no re4uirement similar to that found in Memorandum 9rder 1o. 1,+%(, where'y the owners of the impounded vans should 'e notified in writing. 2he two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as 'oth operate under the fle3i'le cargo system. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )5a, ,), ,5, ,Ea, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&alder M &o v. 2he 8nited 6tates

Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2039 (A1(1s& 13" 190#$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 10#" )oo&*o&e No.4.

)ACTSF 2he following were imported into the Philippines K9ne steam tur'ine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessoriesK the steam tur'ine was classified under Par )57' as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided forK. 2he trial court reversed the classification made 'y customs authorities and classified it under Par )5+ as K*ynamos, generators, e3citers, and all other machinery for the generation of power.K ISSUE+ .01 the machinery in 4uestion should 'e classified under Par )57' or Par )5+. ,ELDF 7 tur'ine engine and generator, although intended for use as a power%generating device,

does not constitute a complete power generation machine. &omponent parts must still 'e added for that purpose to 'e achieved it should 'e classified as Kother machineryK under Par )57'. LATIN MA-IM+ (', /c, )5a, :,

1+, Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o v. Ramos

Case No. 1.3

G. R. No. L-42.0 (6a*1ar2 10" 1931$

C!a%&er <" 'a(e 100" )oo&*o&e No.31

)ACTSF Respondent filed a li'el suit, doc"eted as &ivil &ase 1o. 115,1, against 7proniano @. >orres, Pedro Padilla and <oreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the *aily Record, a daily newspaper, as"ing damages aggregating P/+,+++. .ith the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P5+,+++ 'ond. 2he 6heriff of the &ity of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing e4uipment found in the premises of the *aily Record. Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a !oint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Suirino and Respondent &orporation, in which the former sought ;1= to en!oin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties a'ove mentioned and ;)= P:5,+++ damages. 2his suit was doc"eted as &ivil &ase 1o. 1))(,. Respondent Judge declared that the suit, in case 1o. 1))(,, was Kunnecessary, superfluous and illegalK and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o., Inc., and Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in &ase 1o. 115,1. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss &ase 1o. 1))(, at the stage when it was thrown out of court. ,ELD+ -es, the right to intervene, unli"e the right to 'ring a new action, is not a'solute 'ut left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )5a, ,+, ,(a, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Malanyaon v. <ising et. al

Case No. 1.0 GR No. L-3.020 (6152 30"1901$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 100" )oo&*o&e No.32

)ACTS+ 7 Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of R7 ,+1/ ;7nti @raft and &orrupt Practices 7ct=. He was suspended from office 'ut he died during his incum'ency, and while the case was pending. 2he case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to 6ec 1, of R7 ,+1/ which provides, 'hould he be convicted by final (udgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any la!, but if he is ac)uitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits !*c he failed to receive during suspension"+

ISSUE+ .01 the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes ac4uittal. ,ELD+ 1o. It is o'vious that when the statute spea"s of the suspended officer 'eing Kac4uittedK it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not 'een proven 'eyond reasona'le dou't. *ismissal of the case is not e4ual to ac4uittal of the accused. In People vs. 6alico ;E: Phil. 7))=, K 7c4uittal is always 'ased on the merits 'ut dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, )5a

1+: Rura v. <opena

Case No. 139

G. R. No. L-.9010-14 (61*e 19" 1903$

C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 109" )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTSF Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five ;5= counts of estafa committed on different dates. 2he counts were consolidated and tried !ointly. 9nly a single decision was rendered. 2he Petitioner then applied for pro'ation 'ut was denied 'y the fiscal on the ground that he had 'een previously convicted 'y final !udgment of an offense. 2he fiscal invo"ed 6ec. / of the Pro'ation <aw, which dis4ualifies persons who have previously 'een convicted 'y final !udgment from applying for pro'ation. 2he trial court denied his application on the 'elief that since the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those dates. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has not yet 'een previously convicted. ISSUE+ How should the word previously$ 'e construedQ ,ELD+ 2he word previously$ refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. 7lthough he was guilty of five counts of estafa, they were tried !ointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when Petitioner applied for Pro'ation he had not yet had a final !udgment of conviction on his record. He is eligi'le for pro'ation under such circumstances. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Oriven"o v. Register of *eeds

Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-3.0 (No:e8/er 13" 194#$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 190" )oo&*o&e No..0

)ACTS+ Petitioner, an alien, 'ought a residential lot 'ut its registration was interrupted 'y the war. In 1/:5, he sought to accomplish the registration 'ut was denied 'y the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot ac4uire land in this !urisdiction. Petitioner 'rought the case to

the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. ISSUE+ .01 residential land$ falls under the phrase agricultural lands$ as stated in 7rticle GIII of the 1/,5 &onstitution. ,ELD+ 8nder the &onstitution, aliens may not ac4uire private or pu'lic agricultural lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely 'e presumed that what the mem'ers of the &onstitutional &onvention had in mind when they drafted the &onstitution was this well%"nown classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. 6oon after, the 1ational 7ssem'ly revised the Pu'lic <and <aw and passed &.7. 1o. 1:1 which permits the sale of residential lots to Ailipino citi#ens or to corporations controlled 'y such citi#ens. 6uch revision is e4uivalent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the &onstitution, only agricultural lands may 'e alienated. In addition, the interpretation given 'y the 6ecretary of Justice ;1/,/= also supports the claim that residential land$ is part of pu'lic agricultural lands$. It is clear that the three 'ranches of the @overnment have always maintained that residential lots$ are included in agricultural lands$. If the term Kprivate agricultural landsK is to 'e construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the result would not 'e in line with the conservative spirit of the &onstitution. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, )a, 5a, /a, )5a, ,+a, '

1+5 &hang -ung Aa, et al. v. @ian#on, etc. and *e la &ru#, etc.
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-##03 (No:e8/er 23" 1933$

)ACTS+ Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre%arranged employment as immigrants under &.7. 1o. (1, with the e3press condition that their stay shall 'e limited to two years. 7n amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre%arranged employees from immigrants to non%immigrants. Petitioners contend that having 'een classified as non%4uota immigrants$, they should have 'een admitted for permanent residence in this country 'ecause the word immigrant$ is defined to 'e a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. ISSUE+ .01 the word immigrant$ only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. ,ELD+ 2he only definition given 'y our law to the term KimmigrantK isF Kany alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a nonimmigrant.K 2he law gives no definition to the term KnonimmigrantK from which we may imply that the term KimmigrantK is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended 'y appellants. 7 review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give 'road power to the &ommissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. LATIN MA-IM+ (', /a, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@arcia v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 109 G.R. No. 111311 (O &o/er 3" 1993$ C!a%&er <" )oo&*o&e No..#" 'a(e No. 192

)ACTS+ In its Pam'ayang Oapasyahan >lg. 1+, 6erye 1//,, the 6angguniang >ayan ng Morong, >ataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the 6u'ic 6pecial Bconomic Pone in accord with Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 7))7. Respondent &ommission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum on the ground that its su'!ect is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It contends through the 9ffice of the 6olicitor @eneral that under the <ocal @overnment &ode of 1//1, a resolution cannot 'e the su'!ect of a local initiative. 2he same is 'eing asserted 'y the respondent 6angguniang >ayan ng Morong. ISSUE+ .01 a local resolution of a municipal council can 'e the su'!ect of an initiative and referendum.

,ELD+ 2he petition to review and set aside the issued &9MB<B& resolutions is granted 'ecause resolutions are appropriate su'!ects for initiative and referendum ;6ec. ,) of 7rt. HI of the &onstitution=. 7lso, R7 (7,5, the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the su'!ects of initiative. 7lthough the <ocal @overnment &ode does not include the word resolution in its definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still proper su'!ects of an initiative according to the &onstitution and R7 (7,5. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, /c, 11a, 5+

Motoomull v. dela Pa# Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-43302 (6152 24" 1990$ C!a%&er <" )oo&*o&e No.#3" 'a(e No. 193

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the 6ar"ara 2rading &orporation. 2he &orporation issued a resolution authori#ing the issuance of unissued stoc"s on a one is to one 'asis to its stoc"holders. 2he resolution was then amended authori#ing the issuance of unissued shares of stoc" on a two is to one 'asis to its stoc"holders paya'le on 7ug. ,1, 1/7:. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary in!unction 'y the &ourt of 7ppeals to stop the enforcement of the 6B& decision pending resolution of the appeal. 2he &ourt however held that it had no !urisdiction according to R7 5:,: which readsF 7ppeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or !udgment unless the officer or 'ody rendering the same or the court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem !ust, should provide otherwise. 2he propriety of a stay granted 'y the officer or 'ody rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or !udgment may 'e raised only 'y motion in the main case.

ISSUE+ 1. ). .01 the word court$ refers to a trial court and not the &ourt of 7ppeals .01 the &ourt of 7ppeals can grant a stay in the e3ecution of the decision. ,ELD+ -es, the word court refers to the trial court. 2he law une4uivocally stated its declared o'!ection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order.$ 2he e3ception is given where the officer or 'ody rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. 2he law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted 'y the officer or 'ody rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may 'e raised only 'y motion in the main case. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is am'iguous in itself or is e4ually suscepti'le of various meanings, its o'scurity or dou't may 'e reviewed 'y reference to associate words. 7ccordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must 'e re!ected as not in accordance with the legislative intent. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 1)a, ,(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. 1a#ario

Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-44143 (A1(1s& 31" 1900$ C!a%&er <" )oo&*o&e No.01" 'a(e No. 19#

)ACTS+ 7ccused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance re4uiring him to pay municipal ta3es worth P,().5) as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. 6ec. 1 9rdinance 1o. : 6eries of 1//5 providesF 7ny owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pag'ilao, Sue#on, shall pay a municipal ta3 in the amount of P,.++ per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.$ He admits to the non%payment of the ta3es 'ut contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the ordinance is null and void 'ecause it is am'iguous and uncertain. ). .01 the ordinance applies to 7ccused. ,ELD+ 1o, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at 'ar 'e said to 'e tainted with vagueness. It is unmista"a'le from the a'ove provision that the 7ccused falls within the coverage. 7s the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term manager$. .hile it appears that the 1ational @overnment is the owner of the fishpond, the @overnment never shared in the profits they generated. It is therefore, logical that 7ccused alone shoulders the 'urden of the ta3es under the ordinance. 7nd o'viously, the word owner cannot 'e construed to include the @overnment 'ecause of the ancient principle that the government is immune from ta3es. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (c, ,7


People v. Bvangelista

Case No. 10. G.R. No. 04332-33 (Ma2 0" 199.$

)ACTSF Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Private Respondent filed a petition for pro'ation. However, &hief Pro'ation and Parole 9fficer recommended denial of Private respondentDs application for pro'ation on the ground that 'y appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to ma"e his application for pro'ation. 2he R2& set aside the Pro'ation 9fficerDs recommendation and granted Private RespondentDs application on 7pril ),, 1//,. ISSUE+ .01 the Respondent Judge committed a grave a'use of discretion 'y granting private respondentDs application for pro'ation. ,ELD+ -es. Private Respondent filed his application for pro'ation on *ecem'er )E, 1//), after P* 1//+ had ta"en effect. It is thus covered 'y the prohi'ition that no application for pro'ation shall 'e entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the !udgment of conviction$ and that the filing of the application shall 'e deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.$ Having appealed from the !udgment of the trial court and applied for pro'ation only after the &ourt of 7ppeals had affirmed his conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the 'enefits of pro'ation. LATIN MA-IMF (, )(, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>anco de 9ro 6avings and Mortgage >an" v. B4uita'le >an"ing &orporation

Case No. 12 G.R. No. #491# (6a*1ar2 20" 1900$

)ACTSF Respondent >an" filed a case against Petitioner >an" for reim'ursement of P:5,/E).), as a conse4uence of si3 crossed ManagerDs chec"s which turned out to have forged and0or unauthori#ed endorsements appearing at the 'ac" of each chec". Philippine &learing House &orp. ;P&H&= ordered Petitioner >an" to pay the said amount. Petitioner >an" appealed saying that P&H& had no !urisdiction 'ecause the chec"s involved were non%negotia'le chec"s. ISSUEF .01 P&H& had !urisdiction over chec"s which are non%negotia'le. ,ELD+ -es. 7s provided in the articles of incorporation of P&H&, its operation e3tends to clearing chec"s and other clearing items.$ &learly, the term chec"s$ refer to chec"s in general use in commercial and 'usiness activities, including non%negotia'le chec"s. 1o dou't non%negotia'le chec"s are within the am'it of P&H&Ds !urisdiction. 2here should 'e no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authori#ed to distinguish where the law ma"es no distinction. 2hey should instead administer the law not as they thin" it ought to 'e 'ut as they find it and without regard to conse4uences.

LATIN MA-IMF ):a, ):', )5a, )5', )(

1+E Ro'les v. Pam'ales &hromite Mining &o., et. al.

Case No. 2.1 G.R. No. L-123.0 (Se%&e8/er 30" 1930$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 199" )oo&*o&e No.90

)ACTSF Petitioner and Respondent &ompany entered into a contract 'y virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to e3tract, mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. 8pon violation of the terms of agreement, the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without !urisdiction in ta"ing cogni#ance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. ISSUEF .01 6ec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of &ourt includes any "ind of land, including mineral lands. ,ELDF -es. 7ny land spo"en of in this provision o'viously includes all "inds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well "nown ma3im in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. LATIN MA-IMF ):a, )(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Helasco v. <ope#

Case No. 300 G.R. No. 903 ()e/r1ar2 12" 1903$

)ACTS+ 6antiago Helasco died in 1amacpacan, <a 8nion on *ecem'er :, 1E/5, leaving a last will and testament. 2he Plaintiff see"s to declare such will void on several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated. ISSUE+ .01 the will of 6antiago Helasco is void 'ecause the hour of its e3ecution is not stated. ,ELD+ -es. >oo" III, 2itle II, &hapter I, 7rticle (/5 and (E7 of the civil &ode e3plicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will 'e voidF 2he testator shall e3press his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. 7fter the testament has 'een drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year, month, day and hour of its e3ecution its shall 'e read aloud,$ ;art (/5= 7ny will, in the e3ecution of which the formalities respectively esta'lished in this chapter have not 'een o'served, shall 'e void.$ ;art (E7= 2he law e3plicitly defines what shall consist in open wills ;art (/5= and what the sanctions shall 'e if such formalities arenDt met. ;art (E7=

It was stated that if the decision would 'e in favor of the *efendant ;overloo"ing the a'sence of the hour= the &ourt may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system esta'lished 'y the code. LATIN MA-IM+ (d, 7a

1+/ &olgate%Palmolive Phil, Inc v. @imene#

Case No. .# G.R. No. L-14#0# (6a*1ar2 20" 19.1$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 199" )oo&*o&e No.93

)ACTS+ Petitioner &orporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation of materials including sta'ili#ers and flavors$ is among those Petitioner imports. Aor every importation, Petitioner pays the &entral >an" of the Philippines 17C special e3cise ta3 on the foreign e3change used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to R7 (+1, the B3change 2a3 <aw. 8nder such law, it was also provided thatF Aoreign e3changed used for the payment of cost, transportation and0or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of ? sta'ili#er and flavors ? shall 'e refunded to any importer ma"ing application therefore.$ 2he petitioner therefore see"s a refund of the 17C special e3cise ta3 ISSUE+ .01 the imports of dental cream sta'ili#ers and flavors$ are su'!ect to a 17C transportation ta3 e3emption under the B3change 2a3 <aw. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he refusal to deny refund was 'ased on the following argumentF 7ll the items enumerated for the ta3 e3emption fall under one specific class, namelyF food products, 'oo"s supplies0 materials and medical supplies. 2he sta'ili#ers and flavors$ the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. >ecause such items will 'e used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not su'!ect to e3emption PetitionerDs arguments effected the grant of the refundF R7 (+1 does not categori#e the e3ceptions as stated a'ove. 2hough sta'ili#ers and flavors$ are preceded 'y items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly suchF fertili#er, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. 2herefore, the law must 'e seen in its entire conte3t, not the parts and categori#ations posited 'y the respondent. LATIN MA-IM+ )(, )/, ,(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

9liva v. <amadrid

Case No. 191 G.R. No. L-2319. (O &o/er 31" 19.9$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 200" )oo&*o&e No.9.

)ACTS+ Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the property was foreclosed and sold to

Respondent. However, under R7 7)+, the land could 'e redeemed two ;)= years after the sale, Ae'. : 1/(,. 1o redemption was made within that time. 9n May ,1 1/(,, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that under &.7. 1o. 1:1, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two ;)=, 'ut five ;5= years after the title was sold 'ecause he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. ISSUE+ .01 the period of redemption is governed 'y 6ec. 11/ of &.7. 1o. 1:1 of 6ec. 5 of R7 7)+. ,ELD+ 1o. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in R7 (+1 and therefore not su'!ect to the two ;)= year allotment for redemption. In July ,+, 1/51, the &ourt had already decided that 6ec. 11/ of &.7. 1o. 1:1 is applica'le to foreclosure sales of lands covered 'y a homestead or a free patentJ therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five ;5= years. .here the general law is the &ommonwealth 7ct and the specific law is the Repu'lic 7ct, they should 'e unified, and should a'ide 'y the conditions of the times. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, ,+a, ,Ea, ,/a, &,, b, b

11+ Bscosura v. 6an Miguel >rewery, Inc.

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-1..9. ; L-1.#02 (6a*1ar2 31" 19.2$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 200" )oo&*o&e No.9#

)ACTS+ Petitioners are employees of 6an Respondent &orporation who at various times during employment, fell ill. 2hey were given sic" leave pay pursuant to its Health, .elfare and Retirement Plan. *espite receipt of the sic" leave pay from Respondent &orporation, the employees claimed for sic"ness 'enefit allowances under the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct contending that their receipt of sic" leave pay of less than the full !age does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. Respondent &orporation countered that having already received sic" leave pay, they cannot claim 'enefits under the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct as these are e3clusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioners were entitled to additional sic"ness 'enefit allowance under the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct. ,ELD+ 2o uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sic" leave pay 'y a private 'enefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct, would 'e to ena'le the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. 2he 6ocial 6ecurity 7ct, having 'een enacted for the welfare of the employees, cannot 'e given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. LATIN MA-IM+ )(, )', ,a, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine >ritish 7ssurance v. Intermediate 7ppelate &ourt

Case No. 234 G.R. No. L-#2003 (Ma2 29" 190#$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 200" )oo&*o&e No.99

)ACTS+ 6ycwin &oatingM .ires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Harian Industrial &orporation. *uring the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of Harian Industrial &orp upon the posting of a supersedes 'ond. 2he latter in turn posted a counter 'ond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. 6ycwin filed a petition for e3ecution pending appeal against the properties of Harian, which was granted. However, the writ of e3ecution was returned unsatisfied as Harian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. 6ycwin prayed that Petitioner &orporation 'e ordered to pay the value of its 'ond which was granted. ISSUE+ .01 the counter 'ond issued was valid. ,ELDF 2he counter 'ond was issued in accordance with 6ec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of &ourt. 1either the rules nor provisions of the counter 'ond limited its application to a final and e3ecutory !udgment. It appllies to the payment of any !udgment that may 'e recovered 'y Plaintiff. 2he only logical conclusion is that an e3ecution of any !udgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may 'e charged against such counter 'ond. 2he rule therefore, is that the counter 'ond to life attachment shall 'e charged with the payment of any !udgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and e3ecutory !udgment 'ut also the e3ecution of a !udgment of pending appeal. LATIN MA-IM+ ):a, )(, ,(a

111 Ramire# v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 231 G.R. No. L-1..9. ; L-1.#02 (6a*1ar2 31" 19.2$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 201 " )oo&*o&e No.100

)ACTSF 7 civil case was filed 'y Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a confrontation in the latterDs office allegedly ve3ed, insulted and humiliated him. Petitioner produced a ver'atim transcript of the event to support her claim. 2he act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 2hus, respondent and filed a criminal case. ISSUE+ .01 the facts charged against him constituted an offense. ,ELDF 2he law ma"es it illegal for any person, not authori#ed 'y all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication 'y means of a tape recorder. 2he law ma"es no distinction as to whether the party sought to 'e penali#ed 'y the statute ought to 'e a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. 2he statuteLs intent to penali#e all persons unauthori#ed to ma"e such recording is underscored 'y the use of the 4ualifier KanyK. .here the law ma"es no distinctions, one does not distinguish. LATIN MA-IM+

(a, 7a, /a, 11a, ):a, >)

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pilar v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 242 G. R. No. 113243 (6152 11" 1993$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 201" )oo&*o&e No.100

)ACTS+ 9n March )), 1//), Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of mem'er of the 6angguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isa'ela. 2hree days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. 7s a result, Respondent &ommission imposed a fine of P1+,+++ pesos for failure to file his statement of contri'utions and e3penditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. ISSUE: .01 Petitioner can 'e held lia'le for failure to file a statement of contri'utions and e3penditures since he was a non%candidate$, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. ,ELD+ -es. 6ec. 1: of R7 71(( states that every candidate$ has the o'ligation to file his statement of contri'utions and e3penditures. 7s the law ma"es no distinction or 4ualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate$ must 'e deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, 'ut also to one who withdrew his candidacy. 6ec. 1, of Resolution 1o. ),:E categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy$. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, )(, ,7, ')

11) 6anciangco v. RoRo

Case No. 2#3 G. R. No. .0#09 (6152 19" 1903$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 203 " )oo&*o&e No.10.

)ACTS+ Petitioner was elected as >arangay &aptain. <ater, he was elected President of the 7ssociation of >arangay &ouncils ;7>&= of 9#ami# &ity 'y the >oard of *irectors of the said 7ssociation. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his &ertificate of &andidacy for the May 1:, 1/E: elections for Misamis 9ccidental under the 'anner of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections. ISSUE+ .01 an appointive mem'er of the 6angguniang Panglungsod, who ran for the position of Mam'a'atas Pam'ansa in the elections of May 1:, 1/E:, should 'e considered as resigned or on forced leave of a'sence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. ,ELD: 2he legislative intent of 6ec. 1,;)= of >P (/7 is clear that even appointive >arangay officials

are deemed also covered 'y the said provision. 6ince he is un4uestiona'ly an appointive mem'er, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to 'e such mem'er when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1/E: >atasan elections. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, /c, )E, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bastern 6hipping <ines, Inc. v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 30 G. R. No. 11.33. (61*e 29" 1990$

)ACTS+ *avao Pilots 7ssociation elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorneyDs fees alleging that *P7 had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner 'etween January 1:, 1/E7 to July )), 1/E/ with total unpaid fees of P7+,,)/+.1E. *espite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter 'e directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaintJ attorneyDs fees e4uivalent to )5C of the principal o'ligation. ISSUE+ .01 B9 1+EE is unconstitutional. ,ELD+ 1o. In Philippine Interisland 6hipping 7ssociation of the Philippines v. &ourt of 7ppeals, the court upheld the validity of B9 1+EE and it shall not depart from this ruling. 2he &ourtDs holding clearly de'un"s PetitionerDs insistence on paying the pilotage fees 'ased on the memorandum circulars issued 'y the PP7. 7dministrative or B3ecutive 7cts, 9rders and Regulations shall 'e valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the &onstitution. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 5a, /a, ,7 :/

11, &astillo%&o v. >ar'ers

Case No. G.R. No. 129932 (61*e 1." 1990$

)ACTS+ &ongressman Junie &ua filed a complaint 'efore the 9ffice of the 9m'udsman against @overnor &astillo%&o and Provincial Bngineer Hirgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy e4uipment 'y the @overnor and Provincial Bngineer. 2he items purchased were reconditioned$ instead of 'rand new and included other irregularities. Bmilio 7. @on#ales III, *irector, and Jesus @uerrero, *eputy 9m'udsman for <u#on, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for ( months. Petitioners contest that the *eputy 9m'udsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. ISSUE+ .01 the deputy 9m'udsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension.

,ELD+ -es. 2he deputy 9m'udsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. 2here is nothing in R7 7/75 which may suggest that the 9m'udsman and only the 9m'udsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade )7 or a'ove. 2he word or$ is clearly dis!unctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Martin

Case No. 214 G.R. No. L-3340# (Ma2 31" 19#1$ C!a%&er 3" 'a(e 204" )oo&*o&e No.110

)ACTS+ Respondents were charged with violating 6ec. :( of &.7. 1o. (1, or the Philippine Immigration 7ct 'y the &ourt of Airst Instance of <a 8nion, specifically in the act of 'ringing in and landing. 2he &ourt dismissed the charges on the ground of it 'eing a continuous offense with &riminal &ase ()5E%M filed in >ulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and har'oring the same &hinese Immigrants who were 'rought in therefore they had no !urisdiction. ISSUE+ .01 the act of 'ringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and har'oring. ,ELD+ 1o. 2hey are two separate offenses. &.7. 1o. (1, clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Bach act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. 2he word 9R in &.7. 1o. (1, cannot 'e given a non%dis!unctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. 2he words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ,7, 15'

11: @M&R v. >ell 2elecommunications Inc.

Case No. 49 G.R. No. 12.49. (A%r45 30" 199#$

)ACTS+ 12& &ommissioner Ointanar denied the re4uest of >ell 2elecommunications for a &ertificate of Pu'lic &onvenience and 1ecessity for the installation of telecommunications e4uipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. 2he denial was promulgated despite the approval of the &&7* of its feasi'ility and the endorsement of *eputy &ommissioners Aidelo S. *umlao and &onsuelo Pere#. ISSUE+

.hether the 12& is a collegial 'ody or under the direct and sole control of &ommissioner Ointanar. ,ELD+ 2he 12& is a collegial 'ody and its decisions should 'e reached 'y a ma!ority vote. B3ecutive 9rder 1:( creating the 12& clearly shows that the 12& shall 'e composed of a head commissioner and ) deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. 2herefore the acts of &hairman Ointanar are void a' initio for 'eing una'ashedly contrary to law. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 15a, ):a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Magta!as v. Pryce Properties &orp., Inc.

Case No. 130 G.R. No. 11109# (6152 20" 1994$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 200" )oo&*o&e No. 130

)ACTS+ P7@&9R, created 'y P.*. 1E/(, leased a 'uilding 'elonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in &agayan de 9ro &ity. Harious civic organi#ations, religious elements, womenDs and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily denounced the pro!ect. 2he 6angguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the 'uilding of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that 'y virtue of the <ocal @overnment &ode ;<@&=, the 6angguniang Panlungsod may prohi'it the operation of casinos 'y passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citi#ens from the harmful effects of gam'ling. ISSUE+ .01 the two ordinances as enacted 'y the 6angguniang Panlungsod of &agayan de 9ro are valid. ,ELD+ 2he two local ordinances are not valid. In >asco v. Phil. 7musements and @aming &orp., this &ourt sustained the constitutionality of the decree. 8nder the <@&, local government units are authori#ed to prevent or suppress gam'ling and other prohi'ited games of chance.$ 6ince the world gam'ling$ should 'e read as referring to only illegal gam'ling which, li"e the other prohi'ited games of chance, must 'e prevented or suppressed. 9n the assumption of a conflict 'etween P.*. 1E(/ and the <@&, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other 'ut to give effect to 'oth 'y harmoni#ing them if possi'le. &asino gam'ling is authori#ed 'y P.*. 1E(/. 2his decree has the status of a statute that cannot 'e amended or nullified 'y a mere ordinance. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, /c, 11e, )E, ,7, ,E, 5+

115 &ommissioner of &ustoms v. Philippine 7cetylene &ompany

Case No. #2 G.R. No. L-22443 (Ma2 29" 19#1$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 210" )oo&*o&e No. 133

)ACTS+ &harles >utler, manager of Respondent &ompany, imported a custom%'uilt <P@ tan" which

is used to contain <P@ from the refinery in >atangas and to transport it to the companyDs plant in Manila. R7 1,/: provides a ta3 e3emption for the importation of machinery and0or raw materials to 'e used 'y new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with R7 /+1. 2he 2a3 &ourt held that the term industry should 'e understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and0or la'or. ISSUE+ .01 the Philippine 7cetylene &o., Inc. may 'e considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in 6ec. ( of R7 1,/: and therefore e3empt from the payment of the special import ta3 with respect to the gas tan" in 4uestion. ,ELD+ Philippine 7cetylene is not e3empt from the special import ta3. 2a3 e3emptions are held strictly against the ta3payer. 2he o'vious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term industries$ to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. In granting the e3emption, it would have 'een illogical for &ongress to specify importations needed 'y new and necessary industries as the term is defined 'y law and in the same 'reath allowed a similar e3emption to all other industries in general. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, 11a, 11d, )E, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. 6antiago

Case No. 224 G.R. No. L-1#..3 (Ma2 30" 19.2$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 13." )oo&*o&e No. 211

)ACTS+ 2he information alleges that 6antiago has committed the crime of Kli'el.K 2he accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against Mayor <acson through an amplifier system 'efore a crowd of around a hundred persons. *efendant moved to 4uash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not li'el 'ut oral defamation. ISSUE+ .hether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under 7rt. ,5E of the Revised Penal &ode, or li'el, under 7rt. ,55, in relation to 7rt. ,5,, of the same &ode. ,ELD+ 2he facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. 2he word KradioK should 'e considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of pu'lication, and this e3plains the graver penalty for li'el than that prescri'ed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of pu'lication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening 'etween transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words 'y means of an amplifier system is not thru Kelectromagnetic wavesK 'ut thru the use of Kconducting wiresK intervening 'etween the transmitter and the receiver. It has also 'een held in the 8nited 6tates that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read 'y a spea"er over the radio constitute li'el. LATIN MA-IM+ 11h, )5a, )E, ')

11( &alte3 ;Phil.=, Inc. v. Palomar

Case No. 43 G.R. No. 19.30 (Se%&e8/er 29" 19..$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 13#" )oo&*o&e No. 211

)ACTS+ Petitioner conceived the &alte3 Hooded Pump &ontest$ where participants have to estimate the actual num'er of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. 2here was no fee or consideration re4uired to 'e paid, nor any purchase of any &alte3 products to 'e made in order to !oin the contest. Aoreseeing the e3tensive use of mail for advertising and communications, &alte3 re4uested clearance for Respondent Postmaster @eneral 'ut was denied citing said contest is a gift enterprise$ deemed as a non%maila'le matter under the anti%lottery provisions of the Postal <aw. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. ISSUE+ .01 the &alte3 Hooded Pump &ontest$ falls under the term gift enterprise$ which is 'anned 'y the Postal <aw. ,ELD+ 1o, said contest is not a gift enterprise. 2he word lottery$ is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are ;1= consideration, ;)= chance, and ;,= pri#e. 2he term gift enterprise$ and scheme$ in the provision of the Postal <aw ma"ing unmaila'le any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distri'ution of money or any real or personal property 'y lot, chance, or drawing of any "ind$ means such enterprise as will re4uire consideration as an element. 2he intent of the prohi'ition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gam'ling spirit and to corrupt pu'lic morals. 2here 'eing no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6an Miguel &orp. v. 1<R&

Case No. 2#2 G.R. No. 00##4 (Ma2 31" 1900$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 211" )oo&*o&e No. 130

)ACTS+ Petitioner &orporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to 6M& employees who will su'mit ideas and suggestions 'eneficial to the corporation. Rustico Hega su'mitted his proposal entitled Modified @rande Pasteuri#ation Process$ and claimed entitlement to the cash award. 6M& denied utili#ing such proposal 'ut Hega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the 1<R& which ar'itrated against the Petitioner. ISSUE+ .01 the money claim of Hega falls within the !urisdiction of the la'or ar'iter and the 1<R&. ,ELD+ 1o, said money claim falls outside the !urisdiction of said agencies. 2he !urisdiction of the 1<R& is outlined in 7rt. )17 of the <a'or &ode which includes in par. , all money claims of wor"ers, including those 'ased on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime

compensation, separation pay and other 'enefits provided 'y law or appropriate agreement?$ .hile par. , refers to all money claims of wor"ers,$ it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has 'een a'sor'ed into the !urisdiction of the 1<R&. Par. , should not 'e read in isolation with the conte3t formed 'y par. 1 ;unfair la'or practices=, par. ) ;terms and conditions of employment=, par. : ;household services=, par. 5 ;prohi'ited activities=. 2he unifying element of pars. 1%5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer%employee relationship. 2he scope of par. , is clarified 'y its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the original and e3clusive !urisdiction of the 1<R& are those which have some reasona'le causal connection with the employer%employee relationship. LATIN MA-IM+ )E, ,(', ,(e

117 @otiaco v. 8nion Ins. 6oc. 9f &amilon

Case No. 114 G.R. No. 13903 (Se%&e8/er 1" 1919$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 213" )oo&*o&e No. 141

)ACTS+ 2he @otiaco >rothers transported a cargo of rice from 6aigon to &e'u. 2he rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage 'ecause of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from *efendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo fromF Perils? of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, !ettisons,? 'arratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes?$ 2he trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and *efendant is not lia'le. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. ISSUE+ .01 the insurer is lia'le for the loss. ,ELD+ 1o, the owners of the damaged rice must loo" to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. 2he words all other perils, losses, and misfortunes$ are to 'e interpreted as covering ris"s which are of li"e "ind with the particular ris"s which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. 7 loss which, in the ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevita'le action of the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the shipDs owner to provide the vessel with proper e4uipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea.$ 2he insurer underta"es to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargea'le with negligence for failure to protect the pipe 'y putting a case over it. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. LATIN MA-IM+ )/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pilipinas 6hell Petroleum &orporation v. 9il Industry &ommission

Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-41313 (No:e8/er 13" 190.$

)ACTS+ Petitioner &orporation was contending that Respondent &ommission had no !urisdiction over the contractual disputes 'etween them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel -ap. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent &ommission had !urisdiction over the contractual disputes. ,ELD+ 2he contention of the Petitioner is well founded. 7 detailed reading of the entire 9I& 7ct will say that there has not 'een an e3press provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. 6ec ( of R.7. (17, restricts the e3tent and scope the 9I& prerogative of !urisdiction in su' paragraph a to f. .hat the law intend here is to 'e all em'racing to the !urisdictional power of Respondent &ommission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot 'e presumed or indicated. 2hus, the !urisdictional power should 'e restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not !udicial. 2he phrase, $to set the conditions$ means the right to prescri'e rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule ma"ing power and not ad!udication. 6uch limitation is included in the provision in 6ec. 7;:d= LATIN MA-IM+ )5, ,+, ,1, ,(

11E &agayan Halley Bnterprises, Inc. vs. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 43 G.R. No. 123240 (O &o/er 1." 199#$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 21#" )oo&*o&e No.130

)ACTS+ <a 2ondeRa registered with the Philippine Patent 9ffice, pursuant to R7 (),1, the ,5+ c.c. white flint 'ottles it has 'een using for its gin popularly "nown as @ine'ra 6an Miguel$. 2hereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the ,5+ c.c., white flint 'ottles with the mar" <a 2ondeRa, Inc.$ and @ine'ra 6an Miguel$ stamped or 'lown%in therein 'y filling the same with PetitionerDs li4uor product 'earing the la'el 6onny >oy$ for commercial sale and distri'ution, without <a 2ondeRaDs written consent, and in violation of 6ec. ) of R7 (), as amended 'y R7 57++. ISSUE+ .01 <a 2ondeRa was part of the protected 'everages of R7 (), amended 'y R7 57++. ,ELD+ 2he words other lawful 'everages$ is used in its general sense, referring to all 'everages not prohi'ited 'y law. >everage is defined as a li4uor or li4uid for drin"ing. Hard li4uor, although regulated, is not prohi'ited 'y lawJ hence, it is within the purview and coverage of R7 (),, as amended. 2o limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same "ind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )(, )/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and 2ecson

Case No. 23#

)ACTS+ 7cting on information received, which indicated the ac4uisition of wealth 'eyond his lawful income, the Philippine 7nti%@raft >oard re4uired Private Respondent to su'mit his e3planation or comment, together with his supporting evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was una'le to produce his supporting evidence, despite several postponements, 'ecause they were allegedly in the custody of his 'oo""eeper who had gone a'road. 2he anti%graft >oard was created 'y the P&@@ to investigate the une3plained wealth and corrupt practices of 7AP personnel, 'oth retired and in active service.$ ISSUE+ .01 Private Respondent may 'e investigated and prosecuted 'y the >oard, an agency of the P&@@, for violation of R7 ,+1/ and 1,7/. ,ELD+ 1o. 7pplying the rule in statutory construction, the term su'ordinate$ as used in B9 1 and ) would refer to one who en!oys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and0or his wife, similar to the immediate family mem'er, relative, and close associate in B9 1 and the close relative, 'usiness associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in B9 ). LATIN MA-IM+ )E, ,+, ,(', ,E

11/ &ommissioner of &ustoms vs. &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals

Case No. #1 G.R. Nos. 4000.-00 (6152 21" 1993$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 101" )oo&*o&e No.133

)ACTS+ Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in 4uestion is prohi'ited and the articles thus imported may 'e su'!ect to forfeiture under 6ec. )5,+ ;f= and 1+) ;"= of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode. 2he foodstuffs in 4uestion 'eing articles of prohi'ited importation cannot 'e released under 'ond. ISSUE+ .01 the imported foodstuffs in 4uestion are not contra'and, and are not as stated 'y Respondent &ourt, among the prohi'ited importations enumerated in 6ec. 1+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode therefore these foodstuffs may 'e released under 'ond as provided in 6ec. ),+1 of the same code. ,ELD+ -es. 2he imported foodstuffs are considered prohi'ited importation under 6ec. 1+) ;"= of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode. LATIN MA-IM+ )/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

8nited 6tates vs. 6to. 1ino

Case No. 302 C!a%&er <" 'a(e 220" )oo&*o&e No.1#2

)ACTS+ Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted under 7ct 1o. 17E+, which stated that it shall 'e unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any 'owie "nife, dir" dagger, "ris or other deadly weapons, provide that this prohi'ition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this 7ct. 2he trial court ruled that, using the principle of e(usdem generis, the law will only apply to 'laded weapons ISSUE+ .01 the trial court was correct in applying e(usdem generis+ ,ELD+ 1o. 2he trial court erred in applying e!usdem generis 'ecause the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered 'y the law and as such the law is not limited to 'laded weapons. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )/

1)+ Roman &atholic 7rch'ishop of Manila vs. 6ocial 6ecurity &ommission

Case No. 2.3 G.R. No. L-13043 (6a*1ar2 20" 19.1$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 221" )oo&*o&e No.1#3

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed with Respondent &ommission a re4uest that &atholic &harities, and all religious and charita'le institutions and0or organi#ations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated 'y the Roman 7rch'ishop of Manila$ 'e e3empted from compulsory coverage of R7 11(1, otherwise "nown as the 6ocial 6ecurity <aw of 1/5:. Petitioner contends that the term employer$ as defined in the law shouldT following the principle of e(usdem generis%%% 'e limited to those who carry on underta"ings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,$ 'ecause the phrase activity of any "ind$ in the definition is preceded 'y the words any trade, 'usiness, industry, underta"ing. ISSUE+ .01 the rule of e(usdem generis can 'e applied in this case. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he rule of e(usdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the <egislature would there'y 'e hindered and defeated. 2he definition of the term employer$ is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charita'le institutions or entities not organi#ed for profit. 2his is made more evident 'y the fact that it contains an e3ception in which said institutions or entities are not included.

LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Rep. v. Bsten#o Case No. G.R. No. L = 333#. (Se%&e8/er 11" 1900$

)ACTS+ Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision 'y the &adastral &ourt to declare <ot 1o. :)7, of the 9rmoc &adastre as pu'lic land. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming !urisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE+ .01 R7 (),( applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared pu'lic lands. ,ELD+ 1o. R7 (),( does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared pu'lic lands. 2he Respondent !udge was wrong in interpreting that R7 (),( is applica'leJ the !o' of the !udiciary is to apply laws, not interpret it. LATIN MA-IM+ (d, 7a, ,+, ,)

1)1 In re estate of Bnri4ue# and Reyes

Case No. 130 G.R. No. 9331 (6a*1ar2 ." 1913$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 223" )oo&*o&e No. 100

)ACTS+ Arancisca Reyes died intestate and was survived 'y his ) legitimate daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had ) legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, 7urea, and had 'egotten a natural child 'y a priest, Hicente. Petra, Pascuala, and 7urea have since died. 2he lower court held that Hicente was the owner of all the separate property of 7urea and half of the estate of Arancisca. ISSUE+ .01 Hicente was an ac"nowledged natural child. ,ELD+ -es. @. B. (E, which was promulgated on *ecem'er. 1E, 1E//, repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. 6ince Hicente was 'orn in 1/+5 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an ac"nowledged natural child. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+a, ,5, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Bmpire Insurance &o. v. Rufino

Case No. 9# G.R. No. L = 302.0 (Ma2 31" 19#9$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 223" )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ Hicente 7. Rufino died intestate and was survived 'y his widow and 7 children. 2hey then e3ecuted a Partition 7greement agreeing to pay for all lia'ilities or o'ligations of the decedent. 7lmost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a &ivil &ase claiming lia'ilities and o'ligations from the Rufino estate. 2he trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. 7 Petition for Review on &ertiorari was filed 'y the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent, 'ut a claim on the estates of the Respondents. ISSUE+ .01 the petition has merit. ,ELD+ 2he petition is dismissed for lac" of merit. 2he lia'ilities claimed 'y Petitioner were not listed in the o'ligations ac"nowledged 'y the Partition 7greement. LATIN MA-IM+ )/, ,+a, :5a

1)) &hing <eng v. @alang

Case No. G. R. No. L-11931 (O &o/er 2#" 1930$

)ACTS+ Petitioner o'tained !udgment granting his petition for naturali#ation. He and his wife later petitioned to the &ourt of Airst Instance in Ri#al for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and &hinese nationals. 2he petition was later granted. Petitioner then re4uested the &ommissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children 'ased on the following groundsF ;1= 'y virtue of their naturali#ation, the children are now considered as Ailipino citi#ens, ;)= adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter, ;,= since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter, the children are considered Ailipino &iti#ens. ISSUE+ .01 citi#enship can 'e ac4uired 'y a child through adoption. ,ELD+ &iti#enship is not a right 'ut a mere privilege. 7rt. )5: of the &ivil &ode enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and ac4uisition is not a part of the said enumeration. Aurthermore, 7rt. ,:1 of the &ivil &ode does not include ac4uisition of citi#enship. 7lso, 7rt. :/ of a special law that provides the character of naturali#ation enumerates the means of ac4uiring citi#enship and adoption is not part of it. LATIN MA-IM+


6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7costa v. Alor

Case No. 3 G. R. No. 2122 (Se%&e8/er 13" 1903$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 224" )oo&*o&e No. 10#

)ACTS+ 2he Plaintiff and the *efendant were candidates for the 9ffice of the Municipal President of <aoag, Ilocos 1orte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the *efendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. However, not a single witness presented 'y Plaintiff confirmed the latterDs allegations that he had o'tained a ma!ority of 1++ votes at the said election. 1or can it 'e inferred from the evidence introduced 'y the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal President of <aoag, now held 'y *efendant. ISSUE+ &an the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of e3cluding the *efendant from the e3ercise of said officeQ ,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. 1//, )++, and )+1 of the &ode of &ivil Procedure has reserved to the 7ttorney% @eneral and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may 'e, the right to 'ring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citi#ens ali"e the right to maintain an action for usurpation of pu'lic office, it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid dou't on a su'!ect of such far%reaching importance. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+a

1), <erum v. &ru#

Case No. 14. G. R. No. L-2#03 (No:e8/er 29" 1930$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 223" )oo&*o&e No. 192

)ACTS+ 2his is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. 7ttys. <erum and Aernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and pro'ative value of a testimony in a 'igamy case 'y ;former= Judge &ru# regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. ISSUE+ &an the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency and pro'ative value of ;former= Judge &ru#Ds testimonyQ ,ELD+ 1o, the petition for declaratory relief cannot 'e granted. 8nder 6ec 1, Rule (( of the Rules of &ourt, declaratory relief may only 'e granted to a person whose rights are affected 'y a statute or ordinance, or who is interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument.$ 2he sufficiency and pro'ative value of a testimony, which is the su'!ect matter for declaratory relief in the instant case, is not included in the enumeration. 2hus, the assailed order is affirmed.


6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&entral >arrio v. &ity 2reasurer of *avao

Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-23011 (A%r45 3" 19.0$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 223" )oo&*o&e No. 193

)ACTS+ 9n 7ugust )/, 1/(), the &ity of *avao passed Resolution 1o. 7,), pursuant to R7 ),7+, declaring as officially and legally e3isting several 'arrios of the city. 7mong these were 'arrios 7gdao, >ucana and Po'lacion. 6u'se4uently, 'arrio Po'lacion, also called 'arrio &entral, as"ed for its alleged 1+C share in ta3es collected on real property located within the 'arrio, as provided in 6ec. , of R7 ,5/+. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said 'arrio, in relation to 'arrios 7gdao and >ucana, cannot 'e determined 'ecause the respective 'oundaries of said 'arrios were not yet fi3ed as re4uired 'y law. 2he Petitioner thus filed a case against *avao &ityDs 2reasurer, &ouncil, 7uditor and Mayor with the &ourt of Airst Instance ;&AI= of *avao, which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had 'een rendered academic 'y the passage of R7 :,5:, amending the charter of *avao &ity. ISSUE+ .01 the dismissal order was correct. ,ELD+ 2he dismissal was affirmed. 6ec. ) of R7 :,5: enumerated the 'arrios comprising the &ity of *avao, which did not include the Petitioner. 2hus, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law a'olished >arrio &entral as part of *avao &ity. 7 non%e3istent 'arrio or a 'arrio not situated in *avao &ity cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in ta3es under R7 ,5/+. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+

1): Hera v. Aernande#

Case No. 33 G.R. No.L-313.4 (Mar ! 30" 19#9$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 223" )oo&*o&e No. 193

)ACTS+ 2his case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated 'y the &AI of 1egros 9ccidental, >ranch H in relation to the intestate estate of <uis *. 2ongoy. 2he cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income ta3es in the total sum of P,,)5:.E+ with 5C surcharge and 1C monthly interest, as provided in the 2a3 &ode. 2he Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were 'arred under 6ec. 5, Rule E( of the Rules of &ourt. ISSUE+ .01 the statute of non%claims under 6ec. 5, Rule E( of the 1ew Rules of &ourt 'ars claim of the government for unpaid ta3es.

,ELD+ 2he order appealed from is reversed. 7 perusal of the afore4uoted provision shows that it ma"es no mention of claims for monetary o'ligations of the decedent created 'y law, such as ta3es which is entirely different from the claims enumerated therein. Par. ,15 of the 2a3 &ode states that payment of income ta3 shall 'e a lien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made 'y the &ommissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. 2hus, 'efore the inheritance has 'een passed to the heirs, the unpaid ta3es due the decedent may 'e collected, even without its having 'een presented under 6ec. ) of Rule ,( of the Rules of &ourt. LATIN MA-IM+ )7, ,+, ::

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hillanueva v. &ity of Iloilo

Case No. 312 G.R. No. L-2.321 (De e8/er 20" 19.0$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 22." )oo&*o&e No. 19#

)ACTS+ 2he case is an appeal 4uestioning the lower courtDs !udgment declaring 9rdinance 1o. 11 as illegal. 2he Petitioners, Buse'io and Remedios Hillanueva, are owners of 5 tenement houses containing :, apartments. >y virtue of the ordinance, the city was a'le to collect P5,E): from the spouses for the years 1/(+%1/(:. 1. ). ,. :. ISSUE+ Is 9rdinace 11 illegal 'ecause it imposes dou'le ta3ationQ Is the &ity of Iloilo empowered 'y the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct to impose tenement ta3esQ Is it oppressive and unreasona'le 'ecause it carries a penal clauseQ *oes it violate the uniformity of ta3ationQ ,ELD+ 2he !udgment is reversedJ the ordinance is valid. 1o. 2he same ta3 may 'e imposed 'y the national government as well as 'y the local government. -es. R7 ))(: confers on local governmentsD 'road ta3ing authority. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment ta3, which is not among the e3ceptions listed in 6ec. ) of the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct. 1o. 2he lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that no person shall 'e imprisoned for a de't or non%payment of a poll ta3$, which should not applyJ the ta3 in 4uestion is neither a de't nor a poll ta3. 1o. 2a3es are uniform and e4ual when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the ta3ing authority. LATIN MA-IM+ 7a, )+c, ,+, ,5, :)

1. ). ,. :.

1)5 6anto 2o v. &ru#%PaRo

Case No. 2#3 G.R. No. L-33130 (6a*1ar2 1#" 1903$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 22." )oo&*o&e No. 199

)ACTS+ Petitioner 6anto 2o was convicted of estafa for a 'ouncing chec" and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the &ourt of 7ppeals, which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed a petition for pro'ation 'ut was denied 'y the Respondent !udge, Hon. &ru#%PaRo, despite the favora'le recommendation of the Pro'ation 9ffice, on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that 6anto 2o was not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the 6olicitor @eneral recommended the grant 'ecause the Petitioner was not among the offenders dis4ualified to avail pro'ation, as enumerated in the pro'ation law ;P.*. /(E= 6ec. /. ISSUE+ &an Petitioner 2o avail himself of pro'ationQ ,ELD+ -es. 2he law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a first%time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent !udge cannot assume that 2o had not shown repentance. >esides, where the Pro'ation <aw e3pressly enumerates the persons dis4ualified to avail of its 'enefits, the clear intent is to allow the 'enefits of pro'ation to those not included in the enumeration. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6amson v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 2#0 G.R. No. L-43102 (No:e8/er 23" 190.$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 22." )oo&*o&e No. 200

)ACTS+ Petitioner 6amson, the mayor of &aloocan, terminated the services of Respondent, Mr. 2alens, as 7ssistant 6ecretary, through 7dministrative 9rder 1o. ,, 'ecause of lac" and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. <iwag, co%Petitioner, to said position. R7 ))(+ ;&ivil 6ervice 7ct of 1/5/= 6ec 5;f= declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non%competitive. 2alens asserts his position was not covered 'y the said act and, 'eing permanently appointed, he can only 'e removed for a cause and after due process. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance ruled in favor of 2alens, declaring the order null and void. 2he &ourt of 7ppeals also affirmed said decision. ISSUE+ .as the termination of 2alens illegalQ ,ELD+ -es, 2alensD termination was illegalJ his position is not among those e3pressly declared 'y law as highly confidential. 2he nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. .here the law provides that positions in the government 'elong to the competitive service, e3cept those declared 'y law to 'e in the noncompetitive service and those which are policy%determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislature is presumed to have intended to e3clude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it would have included them in the enumeration. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,+

1)( Ainman @eneral 7ssurance &orp. vs. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 10# G.R. No 1009#0 (Se%&e8/er 2" 1992$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 220" )oo&*o&e No. 202

)ACTS+ &arlie 6urposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his 'eneficiaries. 9n 9cto'er 1E, 1/EE, &arlie 6urposa died of a sta' wound. 7fter a written notice of claim 'y the 'eneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. 2he insurance company was found lia'le 'y the Insurance &ommission to pay P15,+++, and this decision was affirmed 'y the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the &7 was wrong in using e3pressio unius e3clusio alterius$ in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and0or assault are impliedly e3cluded therefrom. ISSUE+ *id the &7 ma"e a mista"e in using the said principleQ ,ELD+ 1o. 2he fact remains that the death of 6urposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Aurthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 1+ circumstances where no lia'ility attaches to the insurance company. Aailure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not 'een intended to 'e e3empt from lia'ilities resulting from such. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&entano v. Hillalon%Pornillos

Case No. 34 G.R. No. 113092 (Se%&e8/er 1" 1994$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 220" )oo&*o&e No. 203

)ACTS+ In 1/E5, the officers of 6amahang Oatandaan ng 1ayon ng 2i"ay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of >arrio 2i"ay in >ulacan. Martin &enteno, chairman of the group, approached Judge 7ngeles, President of 2i"ay, and the latter solicited P 1,5++. However, this solicitation was made without a permit from the *6.* and as a result, it was contended that &enteno violated P.*. 15(:, which states 7ny person to solicit or receive contri'utions for charita'le or pu'lic welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional 9ffice of the *epartment of 6ocial services and *evelopment.$ ISSUE+ .01 the phrase charita'le purposes$ in P.*. 15(: is meant to include religious purposes. ,ELD+ 1o. .here a statute is e3pressly limited to certain matters, it may not, 'y interpretation or construction, 'e e3tended to others. 2he 1/E7 &onstitution treats the words charita'le$ and religious$ separately and independently from each other. 6ince P.*. 15(: merely states that charita'le or pu'lic welfare purposes need a permit from *6.*, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. 2he term charita'le$ should 'e strictly construed to e3clude solicitations for religious$ purposes.

Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must 'e construed strictly against the 6tate and li'erally in favor of the accused. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 11g, 11i, )5, )7, ,+, :E

1)7 Bscri'ano v. 7vila

Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-303#3 (Se%&e8/er 12" 19#0$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 229" )oo&*o&e No. 203

)ACTS+ &ongressman 6alipada Pendatun of &oto'ato, filed a complaint for li'el against Mayor Jose Bscri'ano of 2acurong 'efore the &ourt of Airst Instance ;now the R2&= to Judge *avid 7vila. Bscri'ano 4uestioned Judge 7vilaDs authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of &oto'ato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of R7 :,(, and 7rt. ,(+ of the RP& which does not empower the &ourt of Airst Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for 7rt ,(+. ISSUE+ .hether the &ourt of Airst Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of li'el or whether that power is lodged e3clusively in the city attorney of that city. ,ELD+ -es. 2he &ourt of Airst Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations 'ecause this power is not lodged e3clusively in the city attorney. 2he enumeration in the law of the pu'lic officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power 'ut not to deprive the &ourt of Airst Instance of that same power. 2he power of the &A2 to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a !udge to hold a preliminary e3amination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. .hat is important to remem'er is that preliminary investigations 'y the &A2 is the e3ception to the rule and not the general rule. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, 11e, 1), ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Mana'at v. *e 74uino

Case No. 1.1 G.R. No. L-3330 (A%r45 29" 1933$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 229" )oo&*o&e No. 200

)ACTS+ Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,)(1.7: plus interest for usury, wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. 1otified of the decision on 6eptem'er 7, 1/51, they filed for an appeal 'y registered mail on 6eptem'er )) of that same year. However, the papers were actually received 'y the court on 6eptem'er ):. 2hus, the Judge of Airst Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it.

ISSUE+ 1. .hether the appeal was deemed filed on 6eptem'er )), when they were deposited 'y registered mail, or 6ept ):, when they were actually received 'y the court. ). .01 the appeal has 'een perfected within 15 days. ,ELD+ -es. 2he appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule )7 6ec. 1 of the Rules of &ourt must 'e applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office 'y registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. 8niformity of rules is to 'e desired to simplify procedure. 2hus, Petitioners filed their appeal !ust in time. LATIN MA-IM+ ,a, /c, 11d, 1)a

1)E @ome# v. Hentura and >oard of Medical B3aminers

Case No. 113 No. 32441. Mar ! 29" 1930 C!a%&er <" 'a(e 229" )oo&*o&e No.209

)ACTS+ Plaintiff had his license revo"ed on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct 'ecause it has 'een repealed 'y su'se4uent 9pium <aws. ISSUE+ .01 Plaintiff should have his license restored. ,ELD+ 1o, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. 2he su'se4uent 9pium <aws cannot 'e held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. 2he 9pium <aws are in fact in force and the ill%defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Primero v. &7

Case No. 12. G.R. Nos. 404.0-.9. No:e8/er 22" 1909

)ACTS+ Petitioner carried a 'laded weapon outside of his residence while P* /, the prohi'ition against fan "nives, 'alisong$ or clu's was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answers in his defense that a 'ayonet, the 'laded weapon he was carrying, was neither a 'lunt nor 'laded weapon enumerated in P* / and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against 'laded or 'lunt weapons. ISSUE+ .01 a 'ayonet is not a 'laded or 'lunt weapon that falls under the purview of P* /.

,ELD+ 1o, the 'ayonet is a 'laded weapon that falls under P* /. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is wea" and incomplete. It would ma"e no sense if possession of a fan "nife, which is less lethal than a 'ayonet, would 'e punisha'le while possession of a 'ayonet would not. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,+a

1)/ 6B& <egal 9pinion re >IR Bmployees 7ssociation Inc.

Case No. 142 O &. 23" 190#

)ACTS+ Petitioners in4uired as to whether or not past presidents can run as 'oard mem'ers or are merely e3%officio 'oard mem'ers. ISSUE+ .01 past presidents of the association can run again as mem'ers of the 'oard or are automatically e3 officio mem'ers. ,ELD+ Past Presidents may run again for positions in the 'oard. 2here is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the >IR that past presidents of the association may not run again for 'oard mem'ership even as they are automatically made e3 officio mem'ers of the 'oard. LATN MA-IM+ /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Roldan v Hillaroman

Case No. 2.2 G.R. No. 4.023 (O &o/er 10" 1939$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 234" )oo&*o&e No. 229

)ACTS+ Respondents were charged of murder. *uring the trial, Respondent &uevas 'ecame ill and had to 'e confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner, denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of &uevas. 2he court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the &ourt of 7ppeals against the Petitioner, impugning the decision of the !udge for proceeding with the case in the a'sence of &uevas. 2he &7 then issued a writ of preliminary in!unction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial. ISSUE+ .01 the &7 has !urisdiction over the case. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he &7 resolutions denying the motions of the 6olicitor%@eneral rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mu!er vs. &AI of <aguna, which held that the phrase in aid of

its appellate !urisdiction$ only refers to its pro3imate antecedent and to all other au3iliary writs and process.$ 2his ruling is in con!unction with the rule of interpretation that a 4ualifying phrase should 'e understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of 4ualifying or conditional phrases found in a law, 'ut this rule is su'!ect to the e3ception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents em'raced in the provision, the same should 'e made e3tensive to the whole. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (d, /c, ,,, ,(', ')

1,+ Herras 2eehan"ee v. *irector of Prisons

Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-2#0 (6152 10" 194.$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 234" )oo&*o&e No. 230

)ACTS+ Petitioner was apprehended 'y the 86 &ounter Intelligence &orps *etachment under 6ecurity &ommitment 9rder 1o. )E( wherein she was specifically charged with ;a= active colla'oration with the Japanese,$ and ;'= previous association with the enemy.$ .hen she, along with her co%detainees and co%Petitioners in that case, was delivered 'y the 86 7rmy to the &ommonwealth @overnment pursuant to the proclamation of @eneral *ouglas Mac7rthur of *ecem'er )/, 1/::, she was detained 'y said @overnment under that charge. 7nd under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custody of the &ommonwealth @overnment. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is constitutionally entitled 'ail. ,ELD+ -es. 2he constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall 'efore conviction 'e 'aila'le, e3cept those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. 6ince the PeopleDs &ourt 7ct and the &onstitution and other statutes in this !urisdiction should 'e read as one law, and since the language used in this court in construing the &onstitution and other statutes on the matter of 'ail is su'stantially the same as the language used 'y the PeopleDs &ourt 7ct on the same su'!ect, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses 'efore conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 2o hold that the PeopleDs &ourt has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny 'ail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is a'solutely no evidence at all, is to ma"e the 7ct offensive not only to the letter 'ut also to the spirit of the &onstitution, which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (d, 11g, 1)a, )(, ,5, ,7, ,E', :)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Jose 7ntonio Mapa v. Hon. Jo"er 7rroyo and <a'rador *evelopment &orporation
Case No. 1#0 G.R. No. #0303 (6152 3" 1909$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 234" )oo&*o&e No. 231

)ACTS+ Mapa 'ought lots from <a'rador *evelopment &orporation which are paya'le in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders 'y <a'rador. 2he latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, 'ut Mapa invo"ed &lause )+ of the four contracts. 6aid clause o'ligates <a'rador to complete the development of the lots, e3cept those re4uiring the services of a pu'lic utility company or the government, within , years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.*. /57 re4uires <a'rador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development$ if offered and indicated in the approved su'division plans. ISSUE+ .01 &lause )+ of the said contracts include and incorporate P.*. /57 through the doctrine of last antecedent, ma"ing the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. ,ELD+ 1o. <a'rador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to &lause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.*. /57 does not apply 'ecause it was enacted long after the e3ecution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in &lause )+, no further written commitment was made 'y the developer. 2he words which are offered and indicated in the su'division or condominium plans$ refer not only to other forms of development$ 'ut also to facilities, improvements, and infrastructures$. 2he word and$ is not meant to separate words, 'ut is a con!unction used to denote a !oinder or a union. LATIN MA-IM+ (d, 7a, ,,

1,1 People of the Philippines v. 2eodoro 2amani

Case No. 22# G.R. No. L-221.0 a*9 G.R. No. L-221.1 (6a*1ar2 21" 19#4$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 234" )oo&*o&e No. 232

)ACTS+ 2amani was convicted of murder and attempted murder 'y the lower court on Ae'ruary 1:, 1/(,. 8pon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel su'se4uently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1/(,, which was denied. 2he lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel 'y registered mail on July 1,, 1/(, through the counselDs wife. &ounsel filed his appeal only on 6eptem'er 1+, 1/(,, forty%eight days from July ): th, which is the reglementary fifteen%day period for appeal. 7ppellees contend that the case should 'e dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty%eight days late. 2hey invo"ed 6ec. (, Rule 1)) of the Rules of &ourt which states that an appeal must 'e ta"en within fifteen ;15= days from the promulgation or notice of the !udgment or order appealed from. ISSUE+ .01 the fifteen%day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. ,ELD+ -es. 8sing the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word promulgation$ should 'e construed as referring to !udgment$, while notice$ should 'e construed as referring to order$. 2amaniDs appeal is therefore 5E days late, not :7, as 7ppellees contendJ he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 1,. 1onetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand to o'viate any possi'le miscarriage of !ustice$. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, Ea 11g, ,:

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7ndres >orromeo v. Aermin Mariano

Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-1.000 (6a*1ar2 3" 1921$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 23." )oo&*o&e No. 240

)ACTS+ 7ndres >orromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the 2wenty%fourth Judicial *istrict, effective July 1, 1/1:. 9n Ae'ruary, )5, 1/)+, he was appointed Judge of the 2wenty%first Judicial *istrict, and Aermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the 2wenty%fourth Judicial *istrict. Judge >orromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the 2wenty%first Judicial *istrict. 2he 7ttorney%@eneral assails the validity of the later appointment 'y arguing on the 'asis of 6ec. 155 of the 7dministrative &ode, which states that nothing herein shall 'e construed to prevent a !udge of first instance of one district from 'eing appointed to 'e !udge of another district.$ ISSUE+ .01 >orromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the ):th Judicial *istrict. ,ELD+ -es. 2he concluding part of 6ec. 155 of the 7dministrative &ode used 'y the 7ttorney% @eneral should 'e construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the usual introductory word, provided$. 2he word appointed$ in the proviso should 'e given its meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or designation of an individual$. 2he provisions of the Judiciary <aw are plain and unam'iguous. Judges of Airst Instance are appointed Judges of the &ourts of Airst Instance of the respective !udicial districts of the Philippine Islands. 2hey hold these positions of Judges of Airst Instance of definite districts until they resign, retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. 2he power to appoint lies on the appointing officer, 'ut the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence, appointeeDs consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In upholding the independence of the !udiciary and the stateDs separation of powers, the only way to remove >orromeo from power is 'y impeachment. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, /a, /c, 1)a, ):a, ,7

1,) 7<8%28&P v. 1<R&

Case No. 2 G.R. No. 109320 (A1(1s& 1." 1994$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 240" )oo&*o&e No. 230

)ACTS+ Petitioners were employed 'y the 1ational 6teel &orporation for their five year e3pansion program. 2he wor"ers contend that they should 'e considered regular wor"ers as opposed to pro!ect wor"ers, as the 16& and 1<R& ruled. 7<8%28&P claims that they have 'een wor"ing in 16& for more than ( years and that their wor" is necessary for the 'usiness, and that would have 'een more than enough to consider them as regular employees. PetitionersD contentions stemmed from 7rt. )E+ of the <a'or &ode. ISSUEF .01 Petitioners should 'e considered regular employees.

,ELD+ 1o. 2he provision calls for casual employees. 6ince Petitioners were considered pro!ect employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have 'een wor"ing in 16& for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. ;2hey were hired as pro!ect employees for the 5%year e3pansion program. 9nce that pro!ect$ is done, their services will no longer 'e needed.= In Mercado, 6r. vs. 1<R&, the proviso in par. ) of 7rt.)E+ relates only to casual employees and is not applica'le to those who do not 4ualify under the definition of such wor"ers in par. 1. 2he proviso is to 'e construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof. LATIN MA-IMF 1, (, ,,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7renas v. &ity of 6an &arlos, Pangasinan

Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-34024 (A%r45 3" 19#0$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 240" )oo&*o&e No. 231

)ACTS+ R7 5/(7 provides that second and third class !udges would receive an annual salary of P1E,+++. 7renas was receiving a monthly salary of P1+++.++, P,5+ of which was from the national government and the remaining P(5+ comes from the city government. Petitioner had repeatedly re4uested the city to enact the said R7 'ut the Respondent &ity refused. ISSUE+ .01 Judge 7renas should 'e granted the increase in his salary from P1),+++ to P1E,+++. ,ELD+ <oo"ing at the 6enate deli'erations, the intention in enacting the R7 was that the salary of a city !udge should not 'e higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover, e3ceptions, as a general rule, should 'e strictly 'ut reasona'ly construedJ they e3tend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all dou'ts should 'e resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the e3ception. In case there is repugnancy 'etween the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference 'ecause it is the latest e3pression of the intent of the legislation, 'ut more so 'ecause provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone.
LATIN MA-IM F (c, ,,, :,,:E, ')

1,, 2olentino v. 6ecretary of Ainance

Case No. 292 G.R. No. 113032 (A1(1s& 23" 1994$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 243" )oo&*o&e No. 2..

)ACTS+ Petitioner assail the constitutionality of R7 771( saying that 6. 1o. 1(,+ did not pass three reading on separate days as re4uired in the &onstitution 'ecause the second and the third readings were done on the same day. 2he President had certified 6. 1o. 1(,+ as urgent and the

presidential certification dispensed with the re4uirement not only of the printing 'ut also that of reading the 'ill on three separate days. ISSUE+ .01 R7 771(, an act that see"s to widen the ta3 'ase of the e3isting H72 system and enhance its administration 'y amending the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode, has 'een constitutionally passed. ,ELD+ 2here is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the re4uirement for the printing of the 'ill and its distri'ution three days 'efore its passage 'ut not with the re4uirement of three readings on separate days. 2he phrase Ke3cept when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.K in 7rt. HI, 6ec )(;)= 4ualifies the two stated conditions 'efore a 'ill can 'ecome a lawF ;i= the 'ill has passed three readings on separate days and ;ii= it has 'een printed in its final form and distri'uted three days 'efore it is finally approved. In other words, the KunlessK clause must 'e read in relation to the Ke3ceptK clause, 'ecause the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. 2o construe the Ke3ceptK clause as simply dispensing with the second re4uirement in the KunlessK clause ;i+e., printing and distri'ution three days 'efore final approval= would not only violate the rules of grammar 'ut it would also negate the very premise of the Ke3ceptK clauseF the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a 'ill which is certified in order to meet a pu'lic calamity or emergency. LATIN MA-IMF ,,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7<*B&97 v. Hong"ong and 6hanghai >an"

Case No. 12. 30 '!45. 220" (Mar ! 23" 1913$ C!a%&er <" 'a(e 243" )oo&*o&e No. 2#2

)ACTS+ 2he mother of the Plaintiffs, Isa'el Palet, was a general partner in the firm, 7ldecoa M &ompany. 2he said firm, however, was heavily inde'ted to the *efendant corporation. Isa'elDs remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and o'ligations to the *efendant &orporation, and to mortgage certain real properties of her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. 2he Petitioners now see" to cancel the instruments of mortgage e3ecuted 'y them. ISSUE+ .01 Isa'el Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1/+,, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to e3ecute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. ,ELD+ .e must loo" at the provisions of the &ode of &ivil Procedure ;7merican= relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the &ivil &ode ;6panish= relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. 2he &ode of &ivil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old 6panish code. 7ccording to the &ode of &ivil Procedure, there is no longer a need to 'e formally emancipated 'y the parents after attaining the age of ma!ority. 7t the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joa4in was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while PoiloDs mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother 'ecause he was a minor when he e3ecuted the mortgage. LATIN MA-IMF :/

1,: 9campo v. >uenaventura

Case No. 00 G.R. No. L-32293 (6a*1ar2 24" 19#4$

)ACTS+ 9n 6eptem'er 11, 1/(( the &e'u Police *epartment arrested and detained Bdgardo 9campo and other minors for an alleged violation of 9rdinance 1o. ))E which fi3ed curfew hours. 2he minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. 9n appeal, the minors were ac4uitted since the reason they violated the ordinance was to attend a 'irthday, which is considered as a wholesome assem'lage, and therefore falls under the e3ception to the curfew rule. Ro'erto 9campo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave a'use of authority, and commission of a felony. 2he Mayor issued an ordinance e3onerating the policemen. 9n March 17, 1/(/ a complaint was lodged with the Police &ommission for the same grounds. ISSUE+ .01 the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel. ,ELD+ 2he RespondentsD argument is devoid of merit. 2he power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has 'een transferred to the P9<&9M under R7 :E(:. 7ccording to &ommission v. Hon. >ello, 6ec. )( of the Police 7ct is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the 7ct ;6eptem'er E, 1/(/=. 6ec. )( may not 'e interpreted to mean that the >oard of Investigators and Police &ommission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the 7ct until after the lapse of the 1++ days. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, (c, (d

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7isporna v. &ourt of 7ppeals and People

Case No. . G.R. No. L-39419 (A%r45 12" 1902$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 240" )oo&*o&e No. 0

)ACTS+ Petitioner Mrs. 7isporna was charged with violation of 6ec. 1E/ of the Insurance 7ct for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance &ommissioner. Mrs. 7isporna, however, maintained that she was not lia'le 'ecause she only assisted her hus'and, and that she did not receive any compensation. ISSUE+ .01 the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of 6ec. 1E/.

,ELD+ Receipt of compensation is essential to 'e considered an insurance agent. Bvery part of a statute must 'e considered together with the other parts, a "ept su'servient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and independently. 2he term agent$ used in par. 1 of 6ec. 1E/ is defined in par. ) of the same section. 7pplying the definition of an insurance agent in par. ) to the agent in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned , paragraphs of 6ec. 1E/. 7 statute must 'e construed so as to harmoni#e and give effect to all its provisions wherever possi'le. Bvery part of the statute must 'e considered together with the other parts and "ept su'servient to the general intent of the whole enactment. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /c, )E, ,(', ,(c, ,(d, ,7

1,5 @aanan v. Indeterminate 7ppellate &ourt

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-.9009 (O &o/er 1." 190.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 249" )oo&*o&e No. 11

)ACTS+ 7tty. Pintor called <eonardo <aconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against <aconico in the &ity Aiscal of &e'u. 2hat same day, <aconico called the 7ppellant, 7tty. Bdgardo @aanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. .hen complainant Pintor called up, <aconico re4uested 7ppellant @aanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the e3tension phone. ISSUE+ .01 an e3tension telephone is one of the prohi'ited devices covered 'y 6ec. 1 of R7 :)++. ,ELD+ 2elephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the 7ct. 2here must 'e either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deli'erate installation of a device. 7n e3tension telephone cannot 'e placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in 6ec. 1 R7 :)++. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not 'e ta"en as detached and isolated e3pressions, 'ut the whole and every part thereof must 'e considered in fi3ing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of -mpire .nsurance /ompany v+ 0ufino, held that the phrase device or arrangement$ in 6ec. 1 of R7 :)++, although not e3clusive to that enumerated therein, should 'e construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of which would 'e tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Aurthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must 'e construed strictly in favor of the accused. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 11g, )/, ,+a, ,(c, ,(d, :E, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Radiola%2oshi'a Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate 7ppellate

Case No. 249 G.R. No. #3222 (6152 10" 1991$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 232" )oo&*o&e No. 20


2he levy on attachment against the su'!ect properties of spouses &arlos and 2eresita @atmaytan was issued on March :, 1/E+ 'y the &ourt of Airst Instance of Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the &ourt of Airst Instance of 7ngeles &ity was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. 8nder the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola%2oshi'a Phils. contended that its lien on the su'!ect properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved there'y. ISSUE+ .01 the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. ,) of the Insolvency <aw is clear that there is a cut off period N one month in attachment cases and thirty days in !udgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. 7lso, there is no conflict 'etween 6ec. ,) and 6ec. 7/. .here a statute is suscepti'le to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasona'le and 'eneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, ,(a, ,7

1,( <ope# v. Bl Hogar Ailipino

Case No. 132 G.R. No. L-22.#0 (6a*1ar2 12" 1923$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 231" )oo&*o&e No. 1.

)ACTS+ Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, Bl Hogar Ailipino caused the mortgaged properties to 'e sold pu'licly in an e3tra%!udicial sale. <ope# and Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. 2hey contended that the court erred in holding that the word void$, as used in the 8sury <aw, was intended to ma"e the entire transaction a nullity. ISSUE+ .01 the meaning of the word void$, as used in the 8sury <aw, was intended to ma"e the entire transaction a nullity. ,ELD+ 1o. Arom the very conte3t of the law, the legislature, in using the word void$, did not intend that the transaction should 'e a complete nullity. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. 2he intention of the legislature must 'e ascertained, not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, 'ut from the conte3t of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the whole. Bvery part of the act should 'e read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. LATIN MA-IM+ /', )5a, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

JMM Promotions v. 1<R&

Case No. 13. G.R. No. 109033 (No:e8/er 22" 1993$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 231" )oo&*o&e No. 21

)ACTS+ JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P,+, +++ and posted a cash 'ond of P1++, +++ and a surety 'ond of P5+,+++, as re4uired 'y the P9B7 Rules. .hen JMM Promotions appealed to 1<R& regarding a decision rendered 'y P9B7, the 1<R& dismissed the petition for failure to post the re4uired appeal 'ond as re4uired 'y 7rt. )), of the <a'or &ode. ISSUE+ Is JMM Promotions still re4uired to post the re4uired appeal 'ond, as re4uired 'y 7rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, considering it has already posted a cash 'ond and surety 'ond, as re4uired 'y the P9B7Q ,ELD+ -es. 2he P9B7 Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. 7 reading of the P9B7 Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety 'onds and the escrow money, an appeal 'ond in an amount e4uivalent to the monetary award is re4uired to perfect an appeal from a decision of the P9B7. LATIN MA-IM+ (', (d, 7a, 1)a, ,(a, ,7

1,7 7raneta v. &oncepcion

Case No. 1# G.R. No. L-9..#" (6152 31" 193.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 232" )oo&*o&e No. 24

)ACTS+ 2he hus'and filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. 7fter the issues were !oined, *efendant therein filed an omni'us petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,+++ for herself and said children, and the return of her passportJ to en!oin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting herJ and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. 2he !udge rendered his decision regarding the omni'us petition and granted the custody of the children to *efendant, a monthly allowance of P),,++ for support for her and the children, P,++ for a house, and P),+++ as attorneyDs fees. 2he !udge refused to reconsider the order. ISSUE+ .01 the parties are re4uired to su'mit evidence 'efore deciding the omni'us petition. ,ELD+ 1o. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omni'us petition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the (% month cooling period contained in 7rt. 1+, of the &ivil &ode. 7 recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one anotherJ the legislatureDs intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. 1ote, however, that the case was filed after ( months of the filing of the legal separation case. 7s such, the determination of the custody and alimony must have 'een given force and effect, provided it did not go to the e3tent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. LATIN MA-IMF /a, )7, ,(a, ,(c, ,(d, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<ichauco vs. 7postol

Case No. 14# G.R. No. L-19.20 (De e8/er 4" 1922$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 232" )oo&*o&e No. 23

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the 'usiness of importing cara'ao and other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom%Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and 'ovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the *irector of 7griculture refuses to admit said cattle, e3cept upon the condition stated in 7dministrative 9rder 1o. )1 of the >ureau of 7griculture that said cattle shall have 'een immuni#ed from rinderpest 'efore em'ar"ation at Pnom%Pehn. <egislations involved in the caseF 6ec. 17() of the 7dministrative &ode N prohi'ition against 'ringing of animals from infected foreign country 6ec. 177+ of the 7dministrative &ode N >ringing of diseased animal into islands for'idden 6ec. 17() of the 7dministrative &ode as amended 'y 7ct 1o. ,+5) N >ringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 17() of the 7dministrative &ode, as amended 'y 7ct 1o. ,+5), has 'een repealed 'y the implication in 6ec. 177+. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. 17(), as amended, is of a general nature, while 6ec. 177+ deals with a particular contingency not made the su'!ect of legislation in 6ec. 17(). 6ec. 177+ therefore is not considered as inconsistent with 6ec. 17() and it must 'e considered as a special 4ualification of 6ec. 17(). 6ec. 177+ of the 7dministrative &ode remains in full force and effect, 'eing a special law having special contingency not dealt within 6ec. 17(), which e3tends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, ,(a, ,E', 5+

1,E &assion v. >anco Ailipino

Case No. 31 G.R. No. L- 3340 (6152 30" 1931$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 23." )oo&*o&e No. 31

)ACTS+ Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to P1> for P(++. Plaintiffs defaulted and P1> e3tra !udicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to &a'atigan. 7fter 1 year 'ut 'efore the e3piration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land 'ut P1> turned down the offer. P1> relied on R7 )/,E and R7 ,1,5, which created the P1> and authori#es it to have e3tra !udicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively, while Plaintiffs relied on R7 )E7:, "nown as the Pu'lic <and act, which provided that every conveyance of land ac4uired under free patent or homestead provisions shall 'e su'!ect to repurchase 'y the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE+

.hich of the conflicting statues should prevailQ ,ELD+ .hen two or more conflicting statues e3ist, as when general and special provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. R7 )E7: specially relates to specific property, thus it is an e3ception to the coverage of R7 )/,E and ,1,5. LATIN MA-IM+ /, ,Ea, ,E', :+', 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Palmon

Case No. 220 G.R. No. L-20.0 (Ma2 11" 1930$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 23#" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTS+ Palmon was charged with serious physical in!uries ;prision correctional in med and ma3 period N ) yrs, : mos. 1 day N ( yrs= 'efore the &AI of &api#. >efore the arraignment of the accused, the !udge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under 6ec. E7 of R7 )/(, the crime falls under the !urisdiction of the !ustice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that &AI has !urisdiction. ISSUE+ .hich court has !urisdiction to try the caseQ ,ELD+ 6ec ::;f= of the Judiciary 7ct of 1/:E confers original !urisdiction on the &AI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than ( months. 6ec. E7 of the same act also confers original !urisdiction on the !ustice of the peace and the !udges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to "ill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the &AI and !ustice of the peace courts have concurrent original !urisdiction over the case. LATIN MA-IM+ ,(c, ,(d, ,7

1,/ &hartered >an" v. Imperial and 1ational >an"

Case No. 3# G.R. No. 1#222 (Mar ! 13" 1921$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 23#" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTS+ 8m'erto de Poli was declared to 'e in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to ta"e possession of all property of said *efendant. In an earlier case, the P1> had o'tained a writ 'y virtue of which the sheriff also sei#ed certain goods owned 'y the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted that since the insolvent had 'een declared as such, all civil proceedings against him should have 'een suspended according to the last portion of 6ec. (+ of the insolvency law.

ISSUE+ .hich provision is controlling upon the caseQ ,ELD+ 2o ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every section, provision and clause of a statue must 'e e3pounded in reference to every other. 2hus, 6ec. (+ should 'e understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law, and as such the P1> falls under the e3ception to 6ec. (+ as stated in the other provision of the same law. LATIN MA-IM+ /, ,(c, ,(d, ,(e, ,7, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Montenegro v. &astaReda and >alao

Case No. 1#9 G.R. No. L-4221 (A1(1s& 30" 1932$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 230" )oo&*o&e No. 39

)ACTS+ Ma3imino Montenegro was arrested in Manila 'y agents of the Military Intelligence 6ervice of the 7AP for complicity with a communistic organi#ation in the commission of acts of re'ellion, insurrection or sedition. Ma3iminoDs father then su'mitted an application for writ see"ing the release of his son. 2hree days after, Pres. Suirino issued Proclamation 1o. )1+ suspending the privilege of the writ of ha'eas corpus. ISSUE+ 1. .01 Proclamation 1o. )1+ is erroneous since it included sedition, which is not under the &onstitution. ). .01 the >ill of Rights prohi'ited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. ,ELD+ 2here is no dou't that it was erroneous to include sedition.$ 7rt. 7 only provides invasion, insurrection, re'ellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. 6edition$ should 'e deemed as a mista"e or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 7lso, as posed 'y Prof. 7ruego, the >ill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger, while 7rt. 7 e3pressly authori#ed the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the &onstitutional &onvention, the de'ates voted do!n an amendment to add another cause, which is imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or re'ellion.$ LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 15a, )+', ,(f, ')

1:+ 7ra'ay Inc. v. &AI of Pam'oanga

Case No. 1. G.R. No. L-3#.04 (Se%&e8/er 10" 19#3$ C!a%&er <I 'a(e 239" )oo&*o&e No. 43

)ACTS+ 2he Municipality of *ipolog enacted 9rdinance 1o. 1/ that charged ta3 for the selling and distri'ution of gasoline, lu'ricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleum%'ased products. 7ra'ay Inc., distri'utor of gas, oil and other petroleum products, contested the validity of such on the

ground that the ta3 is 'eyond the power of a municipality to levy under 6ec. ) of R7 1o. ))(:, which provides that municipalities may not impose ta3 on articles su'!ect to specific ta3 e3cept gasoline. ISSUE+ .01 7ra'ay Inc. is entitled to a refund. ,ELD+ 2he ordinance levied a sales ta3 not only 'ecause of the character of the ordinance as a sales ta3 ordinance, 'ut also 'ecause the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a ta3 on sale. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the ta3 that may 'e collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. 6ince 6ec. ) of the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct prohi'its the municipality from imposing sales and specific ta3, with the e3ception of gasoline, there su'sists the right of 7ra'ay Inc. to a refund. 2he reasona'le and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in 4uestion resulted in the conclusion that &ongress, in e3cluding gasoline, deli'erately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of ta3es. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 11e, 1)a, 1:, )+a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Paras v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 19. G.R. No. 1231.9 (No:e8/er 4" 199.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 239" )oo&*o&e No. 30

)ACTS+ 7 petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incum'ent Punong >arangay. 2he recall election was deferred due to PetitionerDs opposition that under 6ec. 7: of R7 1o. 71(+, no recall shall ta"e place within one year from the date of the officialDs assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. 6ince the 6angguniang Oa'ataan ;6O= election was set on the first Monday of May )++(, no recall may 'e instituted. ISSUE+ .01 the 6O election is a local election. ,ELD+ 1o. Bvery part of the statute must 'e interpreted with reference to its conte3t, and it must 'e considered together and "ept su'servient to its general intent. 2he evident intent of 6ec. 7: is to su'!ect an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. ;a= and par. ;'=. 2he spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. 2hus, interpreting the phrase regular local election$ to include 6O election will unduly circumscri'e the &ode for there will never 'e a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the &ourt assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. 7n interpretation should 'e avoided under which a statute or provision 'eing construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 11d, )5', )7, ,(', ,7, ,E


Javellana v. Ointanar

Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-331.9 6152 30" 1902 C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.2" )oo&*o&e No.33

)ACTS+ Petitioner is the owner of a mar"et ;'uilding and lot= in &rossing >ago, >ago &ity, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and mova'le stalls leased to vendors. 6aid mar"et has served the general population of the &ity of >ago for more than twenty ;)+= years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the , rd 4uarter of 1/(E on the ground that 9rdinance 1o. 15+ had 'een enacted prohi'iting the esta'lishment, maintenance or operation of a pu'lic mar"et in the &ity of >ago 'y any person, entity, or corporation other than the local government. 7ppellant claims that a pu'lic mar"et is one that is not owned privatelyJ whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general pu'lic. ISSUE+ .01 the mar"etplace owned 'y Petitioner is a pu'lic mar"et. ,ELD+ 2he test of a pu'lic mar"et is its dedication to the service of the general pu'lic and not its ownership. 7 scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that 'y pu'lic mar"et, it is meant one that is intended to serve the general pu'lic. 2he Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his mar"et is engaged in servicing the pu'lic, not only in >ago &ity, 'ut also those coming from other municipalities. LATIN MA-IM+ 1" 2a" .9" 40

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

1iere v. &AI of 1egros 9ccidental, >ranch II

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-30324 No:e8/er 29" 19#3 C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.2" )oo&*o&e No..0

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a &ivil 6ervice eligi'le and was appointed city engineer of <a &arlota &ity 'y the &ity Mayor pursuant to the provisions of 6ec. )1 of R7 :E5E ;the &ity &harter=. 7fter the enactment of the *ecentrali#ation 7ct, Private Respondent was appointed 'y the President of the Philippines as city engineer of <a &arlota &ity. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under R7 :E5E. House >ill 1o. /711, which 'ecame R7 :5E5, originally e3pressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under 6ec. )1 of said R7, 'ut during the period of amendment in the 6enate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of 6ec. )1. ISSUE+ 1. .01 deletion of the position of city engineer in 6ec. )1 of R7 :5E5 an amendment purely of form only or not. ). .01 appointing authority for the post of city engineer 'elongs to the city Mayor or not. ,ELD+ 1. 19, it is a su'stantial amendment. 1othing could 'e more su'stantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. If &ongress wanted to authori#e the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department, it could have easily re%phrased 6ec. )1 of the &ity &harter to that effect. 6uch section e3pressly limits the

appointing authority of the mayor. ). 19. 6ince the city mayor under 6ec. )1 is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only 'e e3ercised 'y the President of the Philippines, who, under 6ec. 1+;,= of 7rticle HII of the 1/,5 &onstitution, shall nominate with the consent of the &ommission on 7ppointments all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for?$ LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )/, ,+a, ,), ,E', ')

1:) 8ytengsu vs. Repu'lic of the Philippines

Case No. 30# G.R. No. L-.3#9 (Se%&e8/er 29" 1934$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.3" )oo&*o&e No..1

)ACTS+ Petitioner%appellee was 'orn, of &hinese parents in *umaguete, 1egros 9riental n 9cto'er (, 1/)7. 7fter finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines, he went to the 8nited 6tates to further his studies from the year 1/:7%1/5+. In 7pril of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four ;:= months vacation. 9n July 15, 1/5+, he filed for naturali#ation. Aorthwith, he returned to the 8nited 6tates and too" a post%graduate degree which he finished in July 1/51l 'ut he did not return to the Philippines until 9cto'er 1,, 1/51. Hence, the original date of hearing the case, originally scheduled to ta"e place on July 1), 1/51, had to 'e postponed. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the application for naturali#ation may 'e granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. ). .01 domicile and residence are synonymous. ,ELD+ 1. 1o. 6ection 7 of &.7. 1o. :7, re4uires applicant for naturali#ation to reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citi#enship. ). 1o. 7lthough the words residence$ and domicile$ are often used interchangea'ly, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other. 7ctual and su'stantial residence within the Philippines, not legal residence or domicile, is re4uired. Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or 'oarding, or temporary occupation. *omicile is residence with intention to stay. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7, 11a, )5a, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Manila <odge 1o. 17( v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 1.3 G.R. No.L-41001 a*9 G.R. No.L-41012 (Se%&e8/er 30" 19#.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.4" )oo&*o&e No. .3

)ACTS+ 2he Philippine &ommission enacted 7ct 1o. 1,+( which authori#ed the &ity of Manila to

reclaim a portion of Manila >ay. 2he reclaimed area was to form part of the <uneta e3tension. 2he act provided that the reclaimed area shall 'e the property of the &ity of Manila, and the city is authori#ed to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. <ater, the &ity of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. 2hen Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the 2arlac *evelopment &orporation ;2*&=. ISSUE+ .01 the su'!ect property was patrimonial property of the &ity of Manila. ,ELD+
2he petitions were denied for lac" of merit. 2he court found it necessary to analy#e all the provisions of 7ct 1o. 1,(+, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. 2he grant made 'y 7ct 1o. 1,(+ of the reclaimed land to the &ity of Manila is a grant of a pu'lic$ nature. 6uch grants have always 'een strictly construed against the grantee 'ecause it is a gratuitous donation of pu'lic money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at 'ar, the area reclaimed would 'e filled at the e3pense of the Insular @overnment and without cost to the &ity of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should 'e narrowed to e3clude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (c, /a, ,(', ,7, :,

7lmeda v. Alorentino
Case No. 10 G.R. No.L-23000 (De e8/er 21" 19.3$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.3" )oo&*o&e No. .#

)ACTS+ R71E,, the charter of Pasay &ity ;enacted June )1, 1/:7=, provides in its 6ec. 1: that the >oard shall have a secretary who shall 'e appointed 'y it to serve during the term of office of the mem'ers thereof?$ 9n June 1E, 1/(+, R7 )7+/ amended 6ec. 1) of R7 1E,. 9n the strength of Par. ) of 6ec. 1) of the Pasay &ity &harter, as amended, the Hice%Mayor of Pasay &ity appointed Petitioner 7lmeda as secretary of the Municipal >oard of said &ity. 2he very ne3t day, the >oard refused to recogni#e Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Alorentino to the position, purportedly under 6ec. 1: of the &ity &harter. ISSUE+ .hich law applies on the matter of the appointment of the 6ecretary of the Municipal >oard of Pasay &ityQ ,ELD+ 2he petition was dismissed. 2here is nothing in R7 )7+/ that indicates any intention on the part of the <egislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the provisions of 6ec. 1: of R.7 1E,. Repeals 'y implication are not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, ,7, :/, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7'ellana v. Marave
Case No. 3

G.R. No.L-2##.0 (Ma2 29" 19#4$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.." )oo&*o&e No. #1

)ACTS+ Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical in!uries through rec"less imprudence. 2he criminal case was filed with the city court of 9#amis &ity, which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the &AI. 7t this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another 'ranch of the &AI of Misamis 9ccidental presided 'y Respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the &ity &ourt of 9#amis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny PetitionersD motion to dismiss. ISSUE+ .01 the order was issued with grave a'use of discretion. ,ELD+ Petition for certiorari is dismissed. PetitionerDs literal reading of the 6ec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of &ourt ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in 6ec. 7 of Rule 1),. 6uch interpretation, does li"ewise, give rise to a constitutional 4uestion that may trench on a su'stantive right in accordance to 7rt. ,, of the &ivil &ode. ) 7s stated in 7rt. G, 6ec. 5, par.5 of the 1/7, &onstitution, the grant of power to this &ourt does not e3tend to any diminution, increase or modification of su'stantive rights. 2hus, it is a well%settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional dou't. <astly, in the case at 'ar, literal construction of the law is not favored. 2he law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to 'e fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant 'eing given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 1)a, ,7

1:: -u &ong Bng v. 2rinidad

Case No. 31# G.R. No. L-204#9 ()e/r1ar2 ." 1923$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.#" )oo&*o&e No. #0

)ACTS+ 7ct )/7) prohi'ited record 'oo"s of Merchants from 'eing written in a language other than Bnglish, 6panish, or a local dialect. -u &ong Bng, a &hinese merchant, was penali#ed for "eeping 'oo"s written in &hinese. He and other &hinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.

ISSUE+ Is 7ct )/7) constitutionalQ ,ELD+ It is constitutional. 2he purpose of the 7ct is to prevent fraud in 'oo" "eeping and evasion of ta3es for the protection of the pu'lic good. 2his decision is consistent with the ruling in Owong 6ing v. &ity of Manila, where laundrymen were prohi'ited from issuing receipts written in &hinese. &lass legislation is thus allowed if it is for the pu'lic good. Instead of interpreting the 7ct as a 'lan"et prohi'ition against "eeping 'oo"s in &hinese, it may 'e interpreted as a directory measure

that records pertaining to ta3es must 'e written or annotated in Bnglish, 6panish, or a local dialect, or have a duplicate in any of these languages. 2his li'eral interpretation is reasona'le and it upholds constitutionality. LATIN MA-IM+ 1a, (d, /c, 11e, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ity of 1aga v. 7gna

Case No. .3 G.R. No. L-3.049 (Ma2 31" 19#.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.0" )oo&*o&e No. 03

)ACTS+ 2he &ity of 1aga changed its ta3 system from graduated ta3 to percentage ta3. Respondent ta3payers insisted on paying the new ta3es the following year, pursuant to the Revised 7dministrative &ode ;6ec. ),+/=. It stated that ta3 enactments changing the current system prior to *ecem'er 15 should ta"e effect the following year. 2he 1aga &ity government, on the other hand, claimed that under the <ocal 7utonomy 7ct ;R7 ))(:=, ta3 ordinances ta"e effect 15 days after pu'licationJ this allegedly impliedly repealed 6ec. ),+/ of the 7dmin &ode. ISSUE+ *id R7 ))(: repeal 6ec. ),+/ of the Revised 7dministrative &odeQ ,ELD+ 1o, it did not. 2here is a presumption against implied repealJ a su'se4uent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can 'e harmoni#ed, then the &ourts shall do so. 6ec. ),+/ of the Revised 7dmin &ode applies in this case 'ecause the new ta3 changed a prior ta3 system. R7 ))(: only applies for entirely new ta3 provisions. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, ,Ea, ,E'

1:5 2an v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 132 G.R. No. 112093 (O &o/er 4" 1994$

)ACTS+ >P EE5 is an act creating the new province of 1egros del 1orte. 2he ple'iscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. 2he parent provinces, which will get also affected, were not included in the ple'iscite. ISSUE+ Is >P EE5 unconstitutionalQ ,ELD+ It is unconstitutional. 2he &onstitution provides that a ple'iscite must 'e held in all units affected, including the parent province, and not !ust the new areas. 2he draft 'ill provided that the ple'iscite 'e conducted in all units, and not !ust the areas constituting the new province, 'ut the final 'ill only limited it to the latter.


6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine @overnment v. Municipality of >inangonan

Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-10202 (Mar ! 29" 191.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.0" )oo&*o&e No. 04

)ACTS+ Petitioner Municipality of &ardona challenged the constitutionality of B9 (( 'y the @overnor% @eneral granting >inangonan municipal authority over 7 additional 'arrios. Petitioner claimed that the @overnor%@eneral has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the pu'lic good. ISSUE+ Is B9 (( constitutionalQ ,ELD+ It is constitutional. Bvery act of legislation is presumed to 'e constitutional and for the pu'lic goodJ facts need not 'e stated to prove it. LATIN MA-IM+ 1)a, ,7

1:( People v. *el Rosario

Case No. 103 G.R. No. L-#234 (Ma2 21" 1933$

)ACTS+ 9n July )7, 1/5,, information was filed in the Municipal &ourt of Pasay charging Pa# M. del Rosario with slight physical in!uries committed on May )E, 1/5,. 2he accused presented a motion to 4uash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescri'ed in accordance with 7rt. /+ and 7rt. /1 of the RP&. 2he municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, an appeal against the dismissal is made to the 6upreme &ourt. ISSUE+ 1. .hether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was committedJ ). .01 the term month$ in the RP& should 'e understood to 'e a month of ,+ days, instead of the civil0calendar month. ,ELD+ 1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to 'e done, the law has always directed that the first 'e e3cluded and the last included ; 1rt+ 2$, /ivil /ode =. 7rt. 1E of the && directs that any deficiency in any special law must 'e supplied 'y its provisions. 7s the RP& is deficient in that it does not e3plicitly define how the period is to 'e computed, resort must 'e had

to 7rt. 1, of the &&. ). >y e3press provision of 7rticle 1, on the new &ivil &ode, a month is to 'e considered as the regular ,+%day month. In accordance therewith, the term month used in 7rt. /+ of the RP& should 'e understood to mean the regular ,+%day month and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the &ourt held that the offense charged had not yet prescri'ed 'ecause July is the (+ th day from May )/. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, ,E', :(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6alvatierra v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. G.R. No. 10##9# (A1(1s& 2." 199.$

)ACTS+ Bnri4ue 6alvatierra died intestate and was survived 'y his legitimate 'rothers, 2omas, >artolome, Henancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate consisted of , parcels of land ;<ots )5, )(, M )7=. Macario sold the :+5 s4. mts. out of the 7:/ s4. mts. total area of <ot )( to his son, 7nselmo. Bventually, an e3tra!udicial partition with confirmation of sale$ was e3ecuted 'y and among the surviving legal heirs of Bnri4ue, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. 2hereafter, Henancio sold <ot 1o. 7 ;which 'elonged to him 'y virtue of the said partition=, and a 1:/%s4. m. portion of <ot )( to spouses <ongalongs. It turned out, however, that 7nselmo already o'tained an 9&2 covering the whole of <ot 1o. )(. 2he complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such 9&2 to 7nselmo. ISSUE+ 1. .hich prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, 7rt. 1,/1 of the new && or 7rt. 11:: of the same &odeQ ). .01 there was a dou'le sale. ,ELD+ 1. 7rt. 11:: of the && prevails. 2he prescriptive period for such actions is 1+ years, as held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescri'ed. 2here is no am'iguity in the terms and stipulations of the e3tra!udicial partition. 2hus, the literal and plain meaning thereof should 'e o'served. .hat 7nselmo 'ought from his father was only :+5 s4. m of <ot )(. 2he registration of the whole <ot )( in the name of 7nselmo was, therefore, done with evident 'ad faith. ). 2here was no dou'le sale. >oth parties did not dispute the contents of the e3tra!udicial partition. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, (c, 7a

1:7 Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina

Case No. 199 G.R. No. 31301 ()e/r1ar2 3" 1930$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2#3" )oo&*o&e No. 104


<a'itoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged , parcels of land to the P1>. .hen <a'itoria died, a petition was presented for the pro'ate of her last will and testament. *uring the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed 'y the court. 2he special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the P1> as"ed the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. 2he &AI ruled in favor of the special administrator re4uiring the sheriff to a'stain from selling the said lands. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the will is valid ). .01 the P1> had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was e3ecuted 'y <a'itoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. ,ELD+ 1. 2he law does not re4uire that the will shall 'e dated. 7ccordingly, an erroneous date will not defeat a will. ). -es. 2he P1> had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. 2he mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with 6ec. 7+E of the &ode of &ivil Procedure. 6ince 7ct ,1,5 fails to ma"e provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would 'e logical to suppose 6ec. 7+E of the &ode of &ivil Procedure would govern latter contingency. 7ct ,115 must 'e presumed to have 'een ac4uainted with the provisions of the &ode of &ivil Procedure. LATIN MA-IM+ ,Ea, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

& M & &ommercial v. 17.767

Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-2#2#3 (No:e8/er 10" 19.#$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2#4" )oo&*o&e No. 10#

)ACTS+ 17.767 conducted three separate 'ids for the three different waterwor"s pro!ects in Manila, *avao and Iloilo. However, & M & &ommercial &orporation, one of those who participated in the 'idding 'ut eventually lost, filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterwor"s pro!ects contending that 17.767 violated 6ec. 1 of R7 /1), which should give preference to local materials that are availa'le, practica'le and usa'le. 2he said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the construction or repair wor" underta"en 'y the @overnment.$ 17.767 alleged that it should not 'e included within the meaning of the term @overnment$ as used in the said law. ISSUE+ .01 17.767 falls under the term government$ under R7 /1). ,ELD+ -es. 2he 17.767 should 'e deemed em'raced within the term government$ found in R7 ,1), and in the construction of their wor"s or purchase of materials thereof, local material should 'e given preference whenever availa'le, practica'le and usa'le. @overnment%owned or controlled corporations are not e3empted from R7 /1). 2wo laws are 'eing considered in this caseF &.7. 1o. 1,E and R7 /1). >oth relate to the same su'!ect matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or o'!ect which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, wor"s or pro!ects of the @overnment ;referring to Ailipino%Airst policy=. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,5, ,(, ,7, ,Ea, ,E'

1:E >utuan 6awmill, Inc. v. &ity of >utuan

Case No. 41 G.R. No. L-2131. (A%r45 29" 19..$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2##" )oo&*o&e No. 119

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under R7 ,// for an electric light, heat, and power system in >utuan and &a'ad'aran, 7gusan, together with the issuance of a certificate of pu'lic convenience and necessity 'y the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission. However, the &ity of >utuan issued 9rdinances num'ered 11, 1,1 and 1:E imposing a )C ta3 on the gross sales or receipts of any 'usiness operated in the city. >utuan 6awmill, Inc. 4uestioned the validity of the ta3ing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the o'ligation of contract there'y depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. 9n the other hand, Respondent maintained that it was vested with the power to provide for the levy and collection of ta3es for general and special purposes$ as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1/5+. ISSUE+ .01 the inclusion of the franchise 'usiness of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the ta3ing ordinances pursuant to the cityDs power of ta3ation. ,ELD+ 1o. the inclusion of the franchise 'usiness of the >utuan 6awmill, Inc. 'y the &ity of >utuan is 'eyond the 'road power of ta3ation of the city under its charter. 1either could the latterDs power therein granted 'e ta"en as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the a'sence of an e3press or specific grant of power to do so. .here there are two statutes, the earlier special and the latter general N and the terms of the general are 'road enough to include the matter provided for in the special N the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to 'e considered as a remaining e3ception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a particular case. LATIN MA-IM+ )5, 5+, d

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Manila Railroad &o. v. Rafferty

Case No. 1.0 G.R. No. 14203 (Se%&e8/er 30" 1919$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2#9" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ 2he *efendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue ta3es upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine 'y virtue of an act of &ongress in 1/1,. 2he latter contended that the ta3es had 'een illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted 'y the legislature in 1/+(. 9n the other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1/1, 7ct of &ongress repealed the 1/+( private charter. ISSUE+ .01 the 1/1, 7ct of &ongress repealed the 1/+( private charter. ,ELD+

1o. 7 special law ;including private charters= having the character of a private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts and circumstances, the consideration of such 'eing em'odied in the special law. 7 general law su'se4uently enacted 'y the legislature cannot 'e ta"en to have modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. .here the general act is later, the special statute will 'e construed as remaining an e3ception to its terms, unless repealed e3pressly or 'y necessary implication. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, 5+

1:/ *e Jesus v. People of the Philippines

Case No. 0# G. R. No. L-.1990 ()e/r1ar2 22" 1903$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2##" )oo&*o&e No. 11#

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner, &9MB<B& registrar of &asiguran, was charged 'y the 2anod'ayan 'efore the 6andigan'ayan with the violation of the 1/7E Blection &ode. He filed a motion to 4uash the information on the ground that the !urisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the &9MB<B&, and, coincidentally, the &ourt of Airst Instance ;now R2&=. ISSUE+ .01 the 6andigan'ayan has !urisdiction over election offenses with respect to pu'lic officers. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. ) of 7rt. GII V&W of the 1/7, &onstitution granted &9MB<B& the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,$ while 6ec 1E) of the 1/7E Blection &ode vested the &ommission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and su'se4uently prosecute all election offenses punisha'le under the same &ode. 2he legislative intent in granting &9MB<B& the said power is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. 2o divest the &9MB<B& of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. 7t the same time, 6ec 1E: of the Blection &ode, which deals specifically with election offenses, must 'e favored over provisions of P.*. 1(+( which spea"s generally of other crimes or offenses committed 'y pu'lic officers in relation to their office. 2he former cannot 'e construed as impliedly repealed 'y the latter there'y continuing to 'e an e3ception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. LATIN MA-IM+ (, /, ,7, ,E, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

86 v. 7lmond

Case No. 13# G.R. No. 231# (61*e 2" 190.$

)ACTS+ 2he complaint alleges that R... 7lmond, master and in charge of the steamship Ru'i

'rought 2awas 2ahan, is an alien of Bast India who is afflicted with trachoma. He permitted 2awas 2ahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated 'y the immigration officers. 2he evidence showed that *efendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of 2awas 2ahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without the *efendantDs "nowledge or consent. ISSUE+ .01 a conviction can 'e sustained when it appears that there was no consent, either tacit or e3press, to the landing of the alien. ,ELD+ 6ec. 1E imposes upon one who has 'rought immigrant aliens into a 8nited 6tates port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated 'y the immigration officers and fi3es a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. 2he word permit$ implies that the landing of the alien must 'e with the e3press or tacit consent of the owner, officer, agent or person in charge of the vessel. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 11e, :1a, :E

15+ 86 v. Bstapia

Case No. 290 G.R. No. 12091 (O &o/er 19" 191#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 209" )oo&*o&e No. 23

)ACTS+ 7 case was filed against *efendants for having engaged in coc"fighting, in violation of 6ec. 1 of 7ct. 1o. :E+. 2he *efendants held a coc"fight on a clearing near a grove of 'uri palms. 2he prosecution argued that the term coc"pit$ should 'e construed to mean any place in which a coc"fight ta"es place. ISSUE+ .01 the clearing where the coc"fight was held 'y the *efendants is a coc"pit within the contemplation of the law. ,ELD+ 2he term coc"pit$ as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot 'e construed to mean or include a clearing such as had 'een used 'y the *efendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to 'e construed strictly and particular words used in the law should 'e construed in relation to the conte3t. LATIN MA-IM+ )5, ,7, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

8.6. v. 7'ad 6antos

Case No. 294 G.R. No. 122.2 ()e/r1ar2 10" 191#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 290" )oo&*o&e No. 20


2he 7ppellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue <aw 'y failing to ma"e an entry for the January 5, 1/15 indicating whether any 'usiness was done on that day or not. He had employed a 'oo""eeper with the e3pectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position, including the entries re4uired to 'e made 'y the &ollector of Internal Revenue. ISSUE+ .01 the 7ppellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue <aw. ,ELD+ 2he 7ppellant must 'e ac4uitted since it is undisputed that he too" no part in the "eeping of the 'oo" in 4uestion and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his 'oo""eeper. &ourts will not hold one person criminally responsi'le for acts of another done without his "nowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides. LATIN MA-IM+ :1a, :E 151



R981* ,
15) People v. 7top
Case No. 202 G.R. Nos. 124303-03 ()e/r1ar2 10" 1990$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 290" )oo&*o&e No. 29

)ACTS+ 7ppellant was found guilty of , counts of rape. 2he trial court sentenced him to ) terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third, holding that his common%law relationship with the victimDs grandmother aggravated the penalty. Private complainant Regina @uafin, 1) years old, is the granddaughter of 2rinidad Me!os, the common%law wife of the

7ppellant. ISSUE+ 1. .01 the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposa'le for the rape allegedly committed. ). .01 the trial court erred in finding 7ppellant guilty 'eyond reasona'le dou't of the crimes charged. ,ELD+ 1. 2he trial court erred. 1octurnity must have 'een deli'erately sought 'y the 7ppellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. 1either can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. 2he scope of the relationship under 7rt. 15 of the RP& encompasses only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted 'rother or sister, and relative 'y affinity in the same degrees.$ 9utside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must 'e li'erally construed in favor of the accused, no other relationship 'etween the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposa'le penalty for the crime committed. ). 2he 7ppellant was found guilty 'eyond reasona'le dou't. 2he offended partyDs straightforward and une4uivocal statements show indeli'le 'adges of truth. LATIN MA-IM+ ,+a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Padilla

Case No. 113 G.R. No. 4#02# ()e/r1ar2 4" 1941$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 291" )oo&*o&e No. 30

)ACTS+ 7ppellants Padilla, a Ailipino citi#en, and Hon 7rend, a @erman citi#en, acting !ointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally evaded the provisions of 7rt. : of &.7. 1o. 1,E, which re4uires Philippine or 8.6. citi#enship 'efore the e3ercise or en!oyment of the privilege esta'lished in said article. It is contended, however, that notwithstanding the infringement of 6ec. :. of 7ct 1o. 1,E, the 7ppellants cannot 'e punished therefore since the said 7ct imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. ISSUE+ .01 a violation of &.7. 1o. 1,E may 'e prosecuted under &.7. 1o. 1+E, entitled 7n 7ct to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationali#ation or certain rights, franchises or privileges.$ ,ELD+ -es. 7ny citi#en of the Philippines or of the 8nited 6tates who "nowingly allows his name or citi#enship to 'e used so that a person not so 4ualified may en!oy the privilege granted to domestic entities 'y &.7. 1o. 1,E, as well as any alien profiting there'y, is guilty of violation of &.7. 1o. 1+E. 2he very title of 7ct 1o. 1+E gives unmista"a'le notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationali#ation of certain rights, franchise or privileges. 6ec. 1 of the same 7ct applies punishment provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision re4uires Philippine or 8nited 6tates citi#enship as a re4uirement for the e3ercise or en!oyment of a right, franchise or privilege.$ 8nder 7ct 1o. 1+E, any legal provision, whenever e3isting at the time of the passage of said 7ct or promulgated thereafter, would fall within its scope. 9ne of such legal provision is 7rt. : of 7ct 1o. 1,E.

LATIN MA-IM+ (a, (c, /a

15, People v. 6ala#ar

Case No. 223 G.R. No. L-133#1 (Se%&e8/er 24" 1939$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 292" )oo&*o&e No. 3.

)ACTS+ 2he 7ppellant was charged with the crime of malversation of pu'lic funds. 2he 7ppellant 'eing the then *eputy Provincial and Municipal 2reasurer, and as such, accounta'le for the funds collected and received 'y him, did willfully, feloniously and with grave a'use of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his own personal use and 'enefit, from said funds, the sum of P1,,E/7.77. 8pon arraignment, the 7ppellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. He was sentenced to 'e imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special dis4ualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the @overnment without su'sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 2he 7ppellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lac" of malice in the commission of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and 'enefit 'ut lost the same while he was drun". ISSUE+ .01 the penalties imposed 'y the lower court were e3cessive given the contention of 7ppellant. ,ELD+ 1o. 2here is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the 7ppellant was drun". .hen he entered the plea of guilty, he there'y admitted, not only his guilt, 'ut also all the material facts alleged in the information, namely, that he willfully, feloniously and with grave a'use of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, em'e##le, and convert to his own personal use and 'enefit, from said funds, the sum of P1,,E/7.77,$ thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the ac"nowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. LATIN MA-IM+ 7', 11e, :1a, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. @arcia

Case No. 209 No. L-20#3 ()e/r1ar2 20" 1930$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 293" )oo&*o&e No. 41

)ACTS+ 2he lower court, ignoring the 7ppellantDs minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of : years, ) months and 1 day of prision correccional to E years of prision mayor for the crime of ro''ery. R7 :7 which amended 7rt. E+ of the RP& 'y reducing from 1E to 1( the age 'elow which the 7ppellant has to 'e committed to the custody or care of a pu'lic or private, 'enevolent or charita'le institution,$ instead of 'eing convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. 2he 6olicitor @eneral 'elieves that the amendment 'y implication

has also amended par. ) of 7rt. (E of the RP&, which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 1E years of age, the penalty ne3t lower than that prescri'ed 'y law shall 'e imposed, 'ut always in the proper period.$ ISSUE+ .01 the 7ppellant, 'eing 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of 7rt. (E, par. ) of the RP&. ,ELD+ -es. .e find no irreconcila'le conflict 'etween 7rt. (E, par. ), as it now stands and 7rt. E+ as amended. 2here is no incompati'ility 'etween granting 7ppellant of the ages of 15 to 1E a privileged mitigating circumstance and fi3ing at 1( the ma3imum age of persons who are to 'e placed in a reformatory institution. 7ll parts of a statute are to 'e harmoni#ed and reconciled so that effect may 'e given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to 'e supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court 'y an unam'iguous language. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, ,E'

15: People v. 2errada, et. al.

Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23.23 (No:e8/er 23" 1903$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 293" )oo&*o&e No. 42

)ACTS+ 9n 1ovem'er 1/51 and May 1/5), 7ppellees 9'o, @undran, and 2errado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in &amarines 6ur. 2hese parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposa'le. 9n March 1/(), three separate informations for falsification of pu'lic document were filed against the 7ppellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the 4ualifications and had complied with all legal re4uirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. 7ppellees claim that the crime has already prescri'ed according to the RP&, 'ut the 6tate argues that the crime has not prescri'ed under 7ct 1o. ,5E5 where the crime of per!ury prescri'es in E years. ISSUE+ .01 the prescriptive period to 'e applied should 'e 1+ years under the RP& or E years under 7ct 1o. ,5E5. ,ELD+ 2he E year prescriptive period should 'e applied. Penal statutes must 'e strictly applied. .here a crime is punisha'le 'y 'oth a special law and the RP& 'ut with different prescriptive periods, the one favora'le to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should 'e applied. LATIN MA-IM+ :,, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

86 v. 2ori'o

Case No. 304

G.R. No. 30.0 (6a*1ar2 2." 1910$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 293" )oo&*o&e No. 40

)ACTS+ Bvidence suggests that 7ppellant slaughtered the cara'ao for human consumption, which is in violation of 7ct 1o. 11:7, 7n 7ct Regulating the Registration, >randing, 6laughter of <arge &attle.$ It appears that in the town of &armen in >ohol, there arenDt any slaughterhouses. 7ppellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of 7ct 1o. 11:7 do not penali#e slaughter of large cattle without permit. 7ppellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property ;cara'ao=. ISSUE+ .01 7ct 1o. 11:7 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a cara'ao is made therein. ,ELDF 1o. 7s long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the 7ct applies. 2he 7ct primarily see"s to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to ma"e recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and e3istence of the inha'itants of the Philippines, imperiled 'y the continued destruction of large cattle 'y disease, ma"ing it reasona'le for the legislative to prohi'it and penali#e a perfectly legal act utili#ing personal properties of citi#ens ;cattle= if not for the e3traordinary conditions0threat present. .ell settled is the doctrine of the 6tateDs legitimate e3ercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in !urisprudence. .here the language of the statute is fairly suscepti'le of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must 'e o'served. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, /a, ,7

155 86 v. @o &hico

Case No. 299 G.R. No. 49.3 (Se%&e8/er 13" 1909$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 293" )oo&*o&e No. 49

)ACTS+ 7ppellant is charged with the violation of 6ec. 1 of 7ct 1o. 1(/( or the Alag <aw, displaying in his store a num'er of medallions, in the form of a small 'utton, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Bmilio 7guinaldo, and the flag or 'anner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the 8.6. 7ppellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and conse4uently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims ac4uittal on the ground that his guilt must 'e proven 'eyond reasona'le dou't and that the law was referring to identical$ 'anners, em'lem, flag, etc. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ 1. 1o, criminal intent isnDt necessary for violation of the Alag <aw. ). 2he medallions, though not e3actly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to 'y the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made 'y statutory re4uirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial 'ecause to hold otherwise .01 to 'e in violation of the Alag <aw, 7ppellant must have acted with criminal intent. .01 the wording of the law e3empts the articles displayed 'y the *efendant.

would render the statute su'stantially worthless, and its e3ecution impossi'le. 2he statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is re4uired. &learly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. 2he description in the law refers not to a particular flag, 'ut to a type of flag. LATIN MA-IMF 5a, 7a, /a, /c, 11a, :,, a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7rriete v. *irector of Pu'lic .or"s

Case *o. 22 G.R. No. 3#123 (Se%&e8/er 30" 1933$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 29." )oo&*o&e No. 32

)ACTS+ 7ppellant 7rriete, as legal guardian on 'ehalf of minor &armen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold 'y the sheriff in a pu'lic auction to 7ppellee <edesma ;and thereafter sold to Aermin &aram= to satisfy the !udgment of a lien for nonpayment of ta3es, under the Irrigation 7ct 1o. )15). However, it was found that the delin4uent ta3payer was not the owner of said lots, 'ut &armen Jagunap was. ISSUE+ .01 7ppellee <edesma has any rights over the lots ac4uired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. ,ELD+ 1o, she ac4uired no right at all. 7ct 1o. )15) provided that regarding e3propriation of land, the list of lands filed 'y the *irector of Pu'lic <ands must 'e pu'lished, and notice should 'e given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. 1o such pu'lication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had actual$ "nowledge. 6tatutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. 2his is 'ecause people in a repu'lican state li"e ours en!oy inherent rights guaranteed 'y the &onstitution or protected 'y law, li"e the right against undue deprivation of property. 2hus, whenever there are statutes authori#ing the e3propriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, :,

15( Provincial &hapter of <aguna v. &9MB<B&

Case No. 24. G.R. No. L-334.0 (Ma2 2#" 1903$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 29#" )oo&*o&e No. 3#

)ACTS+ 1acionalista Party ;1P= filed a petition against Respondent 6an <uis of the Oilusang >agong <ipunan ;O><= for turncoatism. .hen Respondent 6an <uis ran as @overnor of <aguna under <i'eral Party ;<P= in 1/7), he won. 2he normal e3piry for the term was 1/75, 'ut it was e3tended lawfully 'y the President. 1ow ;1/E+= he is running for @overnor again under O><. 8nder the law, 1o elective pu'lic officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office?or within si3 months immediately preceding or following an election.$

ISSUE+ .01 &9MB<B& was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent 6an <uis should 'e dis4ualified from running due to turncoatism. ,ELD+ 1o, he cannot 'e dis4ualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was e3pelled from the <P in 1/7E and this canDt 'e construed as a willful change of affiliation. 7t that time, no one even "new when the ne3t elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the ne3t election. 2he constitutional prohi'ition cannot 'e applied to the period 'eyond the frame%up ;1/71% 1/75= term to which pu'lic officials were elected in 1/71 'ecause this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. >etween two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must 'e adopted. LATIN MA-IM+ 11a, ,7, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@enaro >. Reyes &onstruction Inc. v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 31 G.R. No. 100#10 (6152 14" 1994$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 29#" )oo&*o&e No. 3#

)ACTS+ Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent *P.H from implementing the notice of pre% termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement wor"s in >utuan &ity. Petitioners won in a pu'lic 'idding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a /.E(C negative slippage ;delay in the infrastructure pro!ect=, the government was either authori#ed to ta"e over the pro!ect or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly 'y *P.H, 'ut also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15C. ISSUE+ .01 termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. ,ELD+ 1o, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other 'idders. 2he discretion of Respondent *P.H to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15C or more, according to P.*. 1E7+ and *P.H &ircular 1o. 1+). 2he intent of the law in allowing the government to ta"e over delayed construction pro!ects with negative slippage of 15C or more is primarily to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial pro!ections and0or cash flow of the government.$ 2erminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously dis4ualified 'idder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, 1)a


2enorio v. Manila Railroad &o.

Case No. 209 G.R. No. L-..90 (Mar ! 29" 1912$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 29#" )oo&*o&e No. .2

)ACTS+ *efendant company too" possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the e3press consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands descri'ed in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE+ .01 Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to see" redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted 'y *efendant company. ,ELD+ 7s a general rule, the steps prescri'ed 'y the statute must 'e followed or the proceedings will 'e void. 6ince these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common%law modes of procedure, they must 'e strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must 'e at least su'stantially or Ifully and fairlyD complied with. In the a'sence of proof of a su'stantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthori#ed and unlawful sei#ure and occupation of her property. 2he theory on which the trial !udge correctly proceeded was that *efendant company having unlawfully ta"en possession of a part of the tract of land in 4uestion, and 'y its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. 2hus, Plaintiff is entitled to a'andon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MA-IM+ )1a, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ity of Manila v. &hinese &ommunity of Manila, et al.

Case No. .1 G.R. No. L-14333 (O &o/er 31" 1919$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 29#" )oo&*o&e No. .4

)ACTS+ 7ppellant presented a petition in the &AI of Manila praying that certain lands, 'e e3propriated for the purpose of constructing a pu'lic improvement N the e3tension of Ri#al 7venue. 7ppellee denied that it was either necessary or e3pedient that the parcels of land 'e e3propriated for street purposes. ISSUE+ .01 in e3propriation proceedings 'y the 7ppellant, the courts may in4uire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the e3propriation. ,ELD+ In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right e3ists for the e3ercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should in4uire into, and hear proof upon, those 4uestions ;of necessity=. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in 4uestion may 'e used 'y the general community of &hinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a pu'lic cemetery, would ma"e the cemetery in 4uestion pu'lic property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must 'e denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to

e3propriate pu'lic property. Bven granting that a necessity e3ists for the opening of the street in 4uestion, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. 2he record shows that ad!oining and ad!acent lands have 'een offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ):a, :,

15E Helasco v. Repu'lic of the Philippines

Case No. 1.3 G.R. No. L-14214 (Ma2 23" 19.0$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 299" )oo&*o&e No. #.

)ACTS+ Petition for naturali#ation of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the re4uirements of the law. ISSUE+ .01 the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturali#ation. ,ELD+ 1o. &onsidering that naturali#ation laws should 'e rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant$, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturali#ation. LATIN MA-IM+ :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<ee &ho v. Repu'lic of the Philippines

Case No. #2 G.R. No. L-12400 (De e8/er 20" 1939$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 299" )oo&*o&e No. #.

)ACTS+ >efore an applicant may apply for Philippine citi#enship, the law re4uires that he file a declaration of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en one year prior to the filing of application unless he is e3empt from complying with said re4uirement. 2he law e3empts one from filing a declaration of intention in two casesF ;a= if he is 'orn in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recogni#ed 'y the governmentJ and ; b= if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of ,+ years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a pu'lic school or private schools recogni#ed 'y the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en 'ecause, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than ,+ years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recogni#ed 'y the government. ISSUE+ .01 the Petitioner has complied with the re4uirement of the law regarding his duty to

afford primary and secondary education to all his children. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters 7ngelita and <ourdes. 2he reason that 7ngelita was not a'le to complete her studies 'ecause she got married is not only unsatisfactory 'ut 'etrays the sincerity of Petitioner in em'racing our citi#enship. It was further shown that in spite of <ourdesDs alleged sic"ness, she continued her studies in a &hinese school which strictly employed a &hinese curriculum. &onsidering that the provisions of the 1aturali#ation <aw should 'e strictly construed in order that its lauda'le and nationalistic purpose may 'e fully fulfilled, the 6upreme &ourt concluded that Petitioner has failed to 4ualify to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en and so his petition should 'e denied. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7', :,

15/ &o v. Repu'lic of the Philippines

Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12130 (Ma2 2." 19.0$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 299" )oo&*o&e No. #.

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed his petition for naturali#ation in the trial court. 2he court ordered that a certificate of naturali#ation 'e issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision 'ecame final and all the re4uisites provided for in R7 5+, were met. 2he government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced 'y Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the re4uirements prescri'ed 'y law in order to 4ualify him to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en. 2hus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he 'elieves in the principles underlying the constitution, 'ut rather stated that he 'elieves in democracy upon cross%e3amination. It is contended that such 'elief is not sufficient to comply with the re4uirement of the law that one must 'elieve in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE+ .01 the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the 4ualifications for naturali#ation and none of the dis4ualifications mentioned in the law. ,ELD+ -es. In so stating that he 'elieves merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles em'odied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproacha'le manner in his relation with our government as evidenced 'y his failure to register his family with the >ureau of Immigration and to file his income ta3 return. &onsidering that Knaturali#ation laws should 'e rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant,K the 6upreme &ourt held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturali#ation. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7', :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Mactan &e'u International 7irport 7uthority v. Marcos

Case No. 13# G.R. No. L-120002 (Se%&e8/er 11" 199.$

C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 03

)ACTS+ Respondent &esa, 9I&, 9ffice of the 2reasurer of the &ity of &e'u, demanded payment for realty ta3es on several parcels of land 'elonging to the Petitioner, who o'!ected to such demand claiming in its favor 6ec. 1: of R7 (/5E which e3empt it from payment of realty ta3es. Respondent &ity of &e'u alleges that as an <@8 and a political su'division, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect ta3es within its !urisdiction. 6uch power is guaranteed 'y the &onstitution and enhanced further 'y the <@&. .hile it may 'e true that under its &harter the Petitioner was e3empt from the payment of realty ta3es, this e3emption was withdrawn 'y 6ec. ),: of the <@&. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is a ta3a'le$ person. ,ELD+ -es. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a ta3a'le person$ under its &harter. It was only e3empted from the payment of real property ta3es. 2he grant of the privilege only in respect of this ta3 is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to ma"e it a ta3a'le person su'!ect to all ta3es, e3cept real property ta3. Bven if the Petitioner was originally not a ta3a'le person for purposes of real property ta3, in light of the foregoing dis4uisitions, it had already 'ecome, a ta3a'le person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of 6ec. ),: of e3emptions from the payment of real property ta3es. 6ince ta3es are what we pay for civili#ed society, or are the life'lood of the nation, the law frowns against e3emptions from ta3ation and statutes granting ta3 e3emptions are thus construed strictissimi (uris against the ta3payers and li'erally in favor of the ta3ing authority. Blse wise stated, ta3ation is the rule, e3emption therefore is the e3ception. LATIN MA-IM+ :,

1(+ 2he Roman &atholic 7postolic &hurch in the Philippines v. 7. .. Hastings, 7ssessor and &ollector of the &ity of Manila, and the &ity of Manila
Case No. 13.
G.R. No. 19#4 (Mar ! 13" 190.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 300" )oo&*o&e No. #9

)ACTS+ In 1/+1, 7ppellant imposed a ta3 upon the residence of the Roman &atholic arch'ishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was e3empt from ta3ation as provided 'y 6ec. :E of 7ct 1o. 1E, of the Philippine &ommission. 2he 7ppellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not ad!acent to the cathedral, 'eing E+ to 1++ meters distant from the church, and that the e3emption privilege was already e3hausted 'y its allowance to the parsonage of the ad!oining chapel. ISSUE+ .01 the house of the arch'ishop of Manila should 'e e3empted from ta3. ,ELD+ In enacting its e3emption laws, the &ommission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman &atholic parishes in the Islands, 'ut their intent was to e3tend the e3emption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. 7nd it is a general rule that statutes e3empting charita'le and religious property from ta3ation should 'e construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. 7lthough

separated from the cathedral 'y an intervening 'loc", and although a parsonage within the area was already e3empt, the residence of the arch'ishop should still 'e e3empted from ta3ation as a parsonage ad!acent to the cathedral. LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, /', :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt 9f 7ppeals, &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals and 7teneo de Manila 8niversity
Case No. #4
G.R. No. 113349 (A%r45 10" 199#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 300" )oo&*o&e No. 01

)ACTS+ Private Respondent is a non%stoc", non%profit educational institution with au3iliary units and 'ranches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine &ulture ;IP&=, which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1/E,, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institutionDs ta3 lia'ilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an independent contractor$ within the purview of 6ec. )+5 of the 2a3 &ode, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore su'!ect to ,C contractorDs ta3. ISSUE+ .01 Private Respondent, through its au3iliary unit or 'ranch, the IP&, performing the wor" of an independent contractor and, thus su'!ect to ,C contractorDs ta3 levied 'y 6ec. )+5 of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he research activity of the IP& was done in pursuance of maintaining private RespondentDs university status and not in the course of an independent 'usiness of selling such research with profit in mind. 2here was no evidence that the IP& ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in 'usiness apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of ta3 e3emption without first applying a strict interpretation of the ta3 laws. LATIN MA-IM+ :,

1(1 Manila Railroad &ompany v. Insular &ollector of &ustoms

Case No. 1.# G.R. No. 302.4 (Mar ! 12" 1929$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 04

)ACTS+ 7ppellee Manila Railroad &ompany used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the a3le 'o3 which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lu'ricant of the 'earings of the wheel. 8nder par. 1:1 of 6ec. E of the 2ariff <aw of 1/+/, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are su'!ect to :+C ad valorem. 9n the other hand, under par. 1/7 of same law, vehicles for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are su'!ect to 1+C ad valorem. 7ppellant Insular &ollector of &ustoms classified dust shields as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.$ 8pon appeal, however, the &AI

overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts$ of vehicles for use on railways. ISSUE+ .hether dust shields should 'e classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. ,ELD+ *ust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. 1/7. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying ta3es not to e3tend their provisions 'eyond the clear import of the language used. In case of dou't, they should 'e construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citi#en. 7nd when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is em'raced in the former, the particular enactment must 'e operative, and the general one must 'e ta"en to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. <72I1 M7GIMF ,Ea, :,, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Repu'lic v. Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt

Case No. 23. G.R. No. L-.9344 (A%r45 2." 1991$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 04

)ACTS+ Respondent spouses 7ntonio and &lara Pastor owed the @overnment P1,)E,, ()1.(, for ta3es from the years 1/55%1/5/. 7 reinvestigation of their de't was made and the amount was changed to P17,117.+E. 2hey applied for ta3 amnesty under P.*. ),, )1, and ,7+. *ue to this, their de't even decreased to a'out P1),+++. 2hey paid such de't to the @overnment and had receipts as proofs of such. 2he @overnment contended that the spouses could not avail of the ta3 amnesty under P.*. )1, 'ecause of Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the >IR. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) was null 'ecause P.*. )1, did not contain any e3emption wherein one should not 'e allowed to amnesty. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent spouses were properly given ta3 amnesty. ,ELD+ -es, 'ecause Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) was null and void. If Revenue Regulation 1o. E% 7) provided an e3ception to the coverage of P.*. )1,, then such provision is null and void for 'eing contrary to the Presidential *ecree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential *ecree. LATIN MA-IM+ E, )(

1() Misamis 9riental 7ssociation of &oco 2raders, Inc. v. *epartment of Ainance 6ecretary

Case No. 02 G.R. No. 100324 (No:e8/er 10" 1994$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 03

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a corporation whose mem'ers are engaged in 'uying and selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum &ircular ;RM&= :7%/1, copra was classified as a food product under 6ec. 1+,;'= of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode and therefore e3empt from ta3 in all stages, including distri'ution. 8nder 6ec. 1+,;a=, the sale of agricultural 191%food products in their original state is e3empt from H72 only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. 8nder 6ec. 1+,;'=, the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is e3empt from H72 in all stages. RM& :7%/1 then reclassified copra as a non%food product. ISSUE+ .01 copra is an agricultural food product which is e3empt from H72 and thus not under the purview of RM& :7%/1. ,ELD+ 1o, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not e3empt from H72. 2he &ommissioner of Internal RevenueDs interpretation is entitled to great respect 'ecause it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of ta3 laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and E+C of the coconut plant is edi'le, copra per se is not intended for human consumption. LATIN MA-IM+ )a, :)a, '

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7cting &ommissioner of &ustoms v. Manila Blectric &ompany

Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23.23 (61*e 30" 19##$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 03

)ACTS+ R7 1,/: e3empted payment of special import ta3 for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all ta3es of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are e3empt from ta3es. ISSUE+ .01 insulating oil is an insulator ma"ing Respondent e3empt from paying its ta3es. ,ELD+ 1o, insulating oil is different from insulators. 2he 6upreme &ourt loo"ed into the definition of insulating oils$ under Materials Hand'oo" 'y @eorge J. >rady, E th Bdition. 2he court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. 7nd there is no 4uestion that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. 2he law frowns on e3emption from ta3ationJ hence an e3empting provision must 'e construed stictissimi (uris. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :,, '

1(, &ollector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc.

Case No. .0 G.R. No. L-0#33 (Mar ! 23" 193.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 304" )oo&*o&e No. 9#

)ACTS+ Respondents Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc. and Philippine Racing &lu' Inc. are corporations organi#ed primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3 in the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode. ISSUE+ .01 rentals received 'y the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers, the P&69, the .hite &ross, the Philippine 7nti%2u'erculosis 6ociety are su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3. ,ELD+ 2he law refers to gross receipts$ and not gross income$. 2his clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts$ refer to the collections on days when the race trac" is open to the general pu'lic and admission fees are or are not charged. 2his necessarily e3cludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. 2he lease 'y the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to 'e remem'ered that the law ma"es the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place lia'le for the amusement ta3, the three ta3 payers 'eing connected 'y the dis!unctive con!unction or$, there'y positively implying that the ta3 should 'e paid 'y either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may 'e, singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, )7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. &astaReda Jr.

Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-4.001 (Se%&e8/er 13" 1900$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 30." )oo&*o&e No. 102

)ACTS+ Respondents were charged of E criminal cases for violating the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode for manufacturing alcoholic products su'!ect to specific ta3 without having paid the annual privilege ta3 therefore. Respondents argued that they are e3empt from ta3es 'ecause they are entitled to the 'enefits availa'le under P.*. ,7+ which declares ta3 amnesty. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent is entitled to the 'enefits of ta3 amnesty under the P.*. ,ELD+ 2o 'e entitled to the e3tinction of lia'ility provided 'y P.*. ,7+, the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously unta3ed income or wealth and paid the re4uired 15C ta3 on such previously unta3ed income or wealth. .here the disclosure was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the 'enefits e3pressly e3cluded from the coverage of P.*. ,7+. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already 'een discovered 'y the >IR when P.*. ,7+ too" effect. It is necessary to note that the Kvalid information under R7 ),,EK

referred to in 6ec. 1;a=;:= of P.*. ,7+ refers not to a criminal information filed in court 'y a fiscal or special prosecutor, 'ut rather to the sworn information or complaint filed 'y an informer with the >IR under R7 ),,E in the hope of earning an informerLs reward. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )5a, :,

1(: Pamora v. &ity of Manila

Case No. 1#3 G.R. No. 3433 (Mar ! 2" 190#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 30." )oo&*o&e No. 102

)ACTS+ 7ct 1o. /75 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an e3cessive assessment on ta3es prior to the creation of the >oard of 2a3 revision. Petitioner prays that the word land$ in the title and 'ody of the statute 'e interpreted to mean land including 'uildings and improvements thereon$. ISSUE+ .01 the word land$ should 'e interpreted li'erally to mean land with the 'uildings and improvements thereon. ,ELD+ .hile the distinction does not appear to have 'een consciously made in 7ct 1o. 1),, it is disregarded in 7ct 1os. E) and 551. 2he rule of strict construction of statutes granting e3emptions from ta3ation is not applica'le in this case. 2his rule is not without its e3ceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of !ustice suggest that the act under consideration should 'e construed with some li'erality. It is a remedial statute, providing for a refund of ta3es which have 'een collected un!ustly and upon an unfair and ine4uita'le valuation of land. .hile some of the 7cts of the &ommission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification, nevertheless such use has not 'een uniform and the deviations therefrom have 'een so fre4uent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /d, /f, )7, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Repu'lic Alour Mills, Inc. v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue

Case No. 239 G.R. No. L- 23.02 31 ()e/r1ar2 10" 19#0$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 30." )oo&*o&e No. 103

)ACTSF In 1/57, Petitioner was granted ta3%e3emption privileges pursuant to R7 /+1. In 1/5E, Petitioner imported a 4uantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used in the 'usiness that year. 2he surplus of wheat grains were finally utili#ed into flour and sold in 1/5/. Petitioner paid sales ta3 of P,7,)75.55, 'ut the cost of wheat left over was treated as deducti'le item from gross sales in 1/5/. Respondent &ommissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency ta3 of P),,17+.17 'ecause materials purchased from ta3%e3empt industries were not ac4uired from one en!oying ta3%e3emption privilege under our laws.

ISSUE+ .01 Respondent &ommissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales ta3. ,ELDF 1o. 6ec. 1E(%7 of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a ta3%free product is utili#ed in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the value of such finished article, the value of such ta3%free product shall 'e deducted. .hile It is true that ta3 e3emptions ;and deductions= are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi !uris against the ta3payer, it is e4ually a recogni#ed principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unam'iguous, so that there is no occasion for the courtDs see"ing the legislative intent, the law must 'e ta"en as it is, devoid of !udicial addition or su'traction. LATIN MA-IMF (c, 7a, :,

1(5 7!ero v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 3

G.R. No. 10.#20 (Se%&e8/er 13" 1994$

C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 309" )oo&*o&e No. 11#

)ACTSF Petitioners filed a petition for pro'ate of holographic will left 'y the late 7nnie 6and. 2hey alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was capacitated to dispose of her estate 'y will. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was also opposed 'y *r. Jose 7!ero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. 2he trial court granted and0or admitted the decedentDs holographic will to pro'ate. 9n appeal, said *ecision was reversed 'y the &7 for its failure to comply with 7rt. E1, and E1: of the 1ew &ivil &ode. ISSUEF .01 the &7 is correct that the will did not comply with the law. ,ELDF 1o. Aailure to strictly o'serve other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is un4uestiona'ly handwritten 'y the testator. 7rt. E1, of the 1ew &ivil &ode affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, 'ut not its pro'ate. 7 holographic will can still 'e admitted to pro'ate, notwithstanding non%compliance with 7rt. E1:. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lac" of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, 'ut not its entirety. 2he &7, however, correctly held that 7nnie 6and could not dispose the other property including the house and lot, which she shares with her fatherDs other heirs. LATIN MA-IMF 1, (c, 7a, /a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

In reF 2estate Bstate of 2ampoy

Case No. .1 G.R. No. L-14322 ()e/r1ar2 23" 19.0$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 309" )oo&*o&e No. 11#


In the matter of Petition for Pro'ate Proceedings 'efore the &AI of &e'u, the will consists of two pages and the last page had 'een duly signed 'y the testatri3 and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page 'ut the testatri3 failed to sign the left margin of the first page. 2he lower court denied the petition 'ecause the will was not e3ecuted in accordance with law, citing 6ec. (1E of 7ct 1o. 1/+, as amended. ISSUEF .01 the pro'ate court ;&AI= is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. ,ELDF -es. 6ec. (1E of 7ct 1o. 1/+, as amended, re4uires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which re4uirement should 'e e3pressed in the attestation clause. 2his re4uirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. 2hus, it has 'een held that 6tatutes prescri'ing the formalities to 'e o'served in the e3ecution of wills are very strictly construed. 7 will must 'e e3ecuted in accordance with the statutory re4uirementsJ otherwise it is entirely void. 7ll these re4uirements stand as of e4ual importance and must 'e o'served, and courts cannot supply the defective e3ecution of the will.$ 7ccordingly, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot 'e admitted to pro'ate. LATIN MA-IMF (c, 7a

1(( 7.<. 7mmen 2ransportation &ompany, Inc. v. >or!a

Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-1##30 (A1(1s& 31" 19.2$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 123

)ACTS+ Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the &AI of 7l'ay to recover compensation for overtime wor" rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent filed the present proceedings on the &ourt of Industrial Relations. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ 1. 2he Petitioner contends that the phrase action already commenced$ employed in the statute should 'e construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of !ustice. .ith this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot agree. 2he statute under consideration is undou'tedly a la'or statute and as such must 'e li'erally construed in favor of the la'orer concerned. ). 2he allegation in the complaint filed 'y the Respondent employee that he was separated automatically from the said employment with *efendants, and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, *efendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff,$ and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs !ustify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. 2his was within the !urisdiction of the &ourt of Industrial Relations. LATIN MA-IM+ /a .01 the scope of the term action$ falls under R7 1//:. .01 the &ourt of Industrial Relations has !urisdiction.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<a#o v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. #0 G.R. No. #0.1# (61*e 10" 1990$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 123

)ACTS+ Petitioner is a security guard of the &entral >an" of the Philippines assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from )pm to 1+pm. 9n June 1E, 1/E(, the Petitioner rendered full duty. >ut, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the ne3t day. 9n his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained in!uries. Aor in!uries sustained, he claimed for disa'ility 'enefits under P.*. ()( 'ut was denied 'y the @6I6. ISSUE+ .01 the denial of compensation under P.*. ()( was valid. ,ELD+ 1o. In the case at 'ar, it can 'e seen that Petitioner left his station at the &entral >an" several hours after his regular time off, 'ecause the reliever did not come on time. 2here is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. .hile presumption of compensa'ility and theory of aggravation under the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct may have 'een a'andoned under the 1ew <a'or &ode, it is significant that the li'erality of the law in general favor of the wor"ingman still su'sists. LATIN MA-IM+ /a

1(7 Hillavert v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. 313 G.R. No. L-40.03 (De e8/er 14" 1901$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ 2he Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Hillavert, who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine &onsta'ulary. 6he filed a claim for income 'enefits for the death of her son under P.*. ()(, as amended, with the @6I6. 2he said claim was denied 'y the @6I6 on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection 'etween the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. 2he Petitioner appealed to the B&& which affirmed the denial. ISSUE+ .01 the B&& committed grave a'use of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. ,ELD+ Arom the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated 'y the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and cler" typist of the Philippine &onsta'ulary. 2here is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a 'out of alcoholic into3ication$ shortly 'efore he died. 1either is there a showing that he used drugs. 7ll dou'ts in the implementation and interpretation of this &ode, including its implementing rules and regulations shall 'e resolved in favor of the la'or.


6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7'ella v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission

Case No. 2 G.R. No. #1013 (6152 20" 190#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda *anaoNRamona, in 1egros 9ccidental for a period of ten years. It is renewa'le at her instance, which she opted to do, for another ten years. *uring the e3istence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. 8pon e3piration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents. ISSUE+ .01 the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. ,ELD+ -es. 2he applica'le law on the case is 7rt. )E: of the <a'or &ode. 1otwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of o'ligations and contracts, 'ecause when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the o'ligation to pay separation pay to the wor"ers upon the e3piration of the lease. 2he court held such contention untena'le as the issue had already 'een ad!udicated in the case of 7nucension v. 1<R&. It was stated in the said case that the prohi'ition to impair the o'ligation of contracts is not a'solute and un4ualified. 2he prohi'ition is general.$ 2he court further stated that the purpose of 7rt. )E: is for the protection of the wor"ers whose employment is terminated 'ecause of the closure of esta'lishment. .ithout such law, employees li"e the Respondents will lose the 'enefits to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the <a'or &ode, the wor"erDs welfare should 'e the primordial and paramount consideration, and that all dou'ts shall 'e resolved in favor of la'or. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, /a, /d

1(E *el Rosario M 6ons v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission

Case No. 3. No. L-.4204 (Ma2 31" 1903$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with &almar 6ecurity 7gency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. 2he security guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. 2he <a'or 7r'iter found the security agency to 'e lia'le for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. 2he security agency appealed the case to the 1<R&. 2he latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure 'y which the appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.

ISSUE+ .01 the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. ,ELD+ 1o. 7ccording to 7rt. ))1 of the <a'or &ode, in any proceeding 'efore the &ommission or any of the <a'or 7r'iters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or e4uity shall not 'e controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the &ode that the &ommission and the 7r'iters shall use every and all reasona'le means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of !ustice.$ 2he lac" of verification could have easily 'een corrected 'y ma"ing an oath and even though the payment was late, it was still paid. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /d, :+'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Manahan v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. #9 G.R. No. L-44099 (A%r45 22" 1901$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ 1a#ario Manahan, Jr., died of Bnteric Aever while he was employed as a teacher in the <as PiRas Municipal High 6chool. 2he claimant, the widow of the deceased, filed a claim in the @6I6 for she contends that the death of her hus'and was due to his occupation. However, @6I6 denied such claim. &laimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attri'uta'le to his employment. 7gain she was denied 'y the @6I6. 6he then appealed her case to the Bmployees &ompensation &ommission which also denied her claim. ISSUE+ .01 the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim 'enefits. ,ELD+ -es. 2he findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for Bpigastric pain% and ulcer%li"e symptoms. 2his was supported 'y his medical records and a medical certificate issued 'y *r. >erna'e. Bpigastric pain is a symptom of 8lcer and 8lcer is a common complication of Bnteric Aever. Pursuant to the doctrine of &orales v. B&&, the provisions of the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct shall 'e applied, thus the presumption of compensa'ility should 'e in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of dou't, the case should 'e resolved in favor of the wor"er and that <a'or laws should 'e li'erally construed to give relief to the wor"er and his dependents. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, /a, /d, :+'

1(/ <iwanag v. .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. #3 G.R. No. L-121.4 (Ma2 2" 1939$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ 7ppellants >enito <iwanag and Maria <iwanag Reyes are co%owners of <iwanag 7uto 6uppy. 2hey hired Ro4ue >alderama as a security guard, who was "illed in the line of duty 'y criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission, which was granted in an award that ordered the 7ppellants to pay !ointly and severally the amount of P,,:/:.:+ to the claimant in lump sum. 7ppellants did not 4uestion the right of 7ppellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that 'ecause the .or"menDs &ompensation 7ct did not give an e3press provision declaring solidary o'ligations of 'usiness partners, the compensation should 'e divisi'le. ISSUE+ .01 the &ommission erred in ordering the 7ppellants to pay !ointly and severally. ,ELD+ 1o. 7lthough the .&7 does not contain any provision e3pressly declaring that the o'ligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show how their lia'ility is solidary. 7rt. 1711 and 171) of the 1ew &ivil &ode and 6ec. ) of the .&7 reasona'ly indicate that in compensation cases, the lia'ility of 'usiness partners should 'e solidary. If the responsi'ility were to 'e merely !ointly, and one of them happens to 'e insolvent, the award would only 'e partially satisfied, which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. 2he .&7 should 'e construed fairly, reasona'ly and li'erally for the employee and dependents. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, /d, ,(, ,E, :+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6i'ulo v. 7ltar

Case No. 2#9 G.R. No. L-191. (A%r45 30" 1949$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 123

)ACTS+ Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the wor" animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all e3penses of planting and cultivation. 2he net produce was to 'e divided e4ually. 2he contract was disapproved 'y the 2enancy <aw Bnforcement *ivision of the *epartment of Justice 'ecause the division contravenes with a provision of the 2enancy <aw. It was ta"en to the &ourt of Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against pu'lic policy as contemplated in 6ec. 7 of the 2enancy <aw, for the reason that instead of receiving (+C of his total share, the tenant shall receive 5+C only. Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those e3pressly declared to 'e against pu'lic policy in 6ec. 7 of the 2enancy <aw, which he argues to 'e an e3haustive list. ISSUE+ .01 the contract is against pu'lic policy as contemplated in 6ec. 7 of the 2enancy <aw. ,ELD+ 1o. In declaring certain stipulations to 'e against pu'lic policy, the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified, are similar to those e3pressly mentioned. 2he purpose of the law might easily 'e defeated otherwise. 2he 2enancy 7ct is a remedial legislation intended to 'etter the lot of the share%cropper 'y giving him a more e4uita'le participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. >eing a remedial statute, it should 'e construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent.

LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, 1)a, ,(, :+

17+ @uerrero v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 34

G.R. No. L-443#0 (Ma2 30"190.$

C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 12.

)ACTS+ 7polonio >enite# was hired 'y the Petitioners to wor" in their plantation. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 10, of the proceeds with his coconut% related responsi'ilities. 7fterwards, the Petitioners and >enite# e3ecuted an agreement allowing >enite# to continue wor"ing as tenantJ the 7gricultural 2enancy 7ct would govern their relationship. <ater the Petitioners ordered >enite# out. >enite# sued in the &ourt of 7grarian Relations, which ordered his reinstatement. 2he Petitioners appealed to the &7, which affirmed the &ourt of 7grarian ReformDs decision. 2he Petitioners then appealed to the 6upreme &ourt. Pending appeal, the &ode of 7grarian Reforms was passed repealing the 7gricultural 2enancy 7ct. 2he Petitioners then claimed that since the 'asis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity. ISSUE+ .01 share tenancy ended. ,ELD+ 1o. 7n agreement is not a'rogated 'y the su'se4uent repeal of the law. 2he phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired la'orers with no rights. 2he 7gricultural 2enancy 7ct and 7gricultural <and Reform &ode have not 'een entirely repealed 'y the &ode of 7grarian Reform. >ut assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the e3ception when vested rights are affected and o'ligations of contract are impaired. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 1), ,), ,E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hicente v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. 1.0 G.R. No. 03024 (6a*1ar2 23" 1991$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 310" )oo&*o&e No. 12#

)ACTS+ Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. 7t the course of his employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. 6o at the age of forty%five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income 'enefits$ under the @6I6 retirement program. 2he application was supported 'y a physicianDs certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disa'ility.$ 2he significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income 'enefits. @6I6 contended that Petitioner was only permanent partial disa'ility$. 2he B&& affirmed the @6I6 decision. ISSUEF

.hether Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility or permanent partial disa'ility. ,ELD+ Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility. 2he test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disa'ility is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his wor" notwithstanding the disa'ility he incurred. 2he &ourt ta"es this occasion to stress once more its a'iding concern for the welfare of government wor"ers, especially the hum'le ran" and file. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its 'eneficiaries and re4uires a construction of utmost li'erality in their favor. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 11', 1)a

171 2amayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel &ompany

Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-09#3 (61*e 29" 193#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 311" )oo&*o&e No. 120

)ACTS+ )(5 employees of 7ppellee Manila Hotel &o., who had to 'e dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under 6ec. )(( of the 7dministrative &ode, as amended 'y R7 (11, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June ,+, 1/5:, 'rought the present action to recover from the 7ppellee Manila Hotel &o. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to 'e due them under the same section of the 7dministrative &ode, as later amended 'y R7 1+E1, approved on June 15, 1/5:, that is to say, 15 days 'efore they were separated from the company. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued 'enefits. ,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. : of the 1ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. 7s R7 1+E1 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect, it can only 'e given effect from the date of its approval. LATIN MA-IMF :(a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&orporal v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission

Case No. 03 G.R. No. 0.020 (A1(1s& 3" 1994$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 311" )oo&*o&e No. 131

)ACTSF 1orma &orporal was an employed pu'lic school teacher. *uring the course of her wor", she had several pregnancies. 9n her :th pregnancy, she suffered complete a'ortion. 9n her 5th pregnancy, she gave 'irth to a 'a'y 'oy with the help of a hilot$. 7n hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal 'leeding. 6he underwent hysterectomy 'ut she died afterwards. Her hus'and, herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation 'enefit with @6I6. >ut said agency denied. 2he matter was elevated to B&& 'ut the petition was also dismissed 'ecause the cause of his wifeDs death was non%wor"%related.

ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner could avail the compensation 'enefit. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he determination of whether the prolapse of 1ormaDs uterus developed 'efore or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the 'ody. .hile as a rule that la'or and social welfare legislation should 'e li'erally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such li'eral construction cannot 'e applied if the pertinent provisions of the <a'or &ode are clear. LATIN MA-IMF (c, :,

17) People v. Moran

Case No. 21. G.R. No. 1#903 (6a*1ar2 2#" 1923$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 1.#

)ACTS+ 7ppellant was punished for violating the Blection <aw. .hen the decision was pu'lished, it was increased to ( months. *efendant alleges that the crime has already prescri'ed, pursuant to 6ec. 71 of 7ct 1o. ,+,+, which was enacted 'y the <egislature on March /, 1/)). ISSUE+ .01 7ct 1o. ,+,+ is meant to apply to the 7dministrative &ode and whether the said act should 'e retroactive with respect to 7rt. )) and 7 of the RP&. ,ELD+ 7ct 1o. ,+,+ is intended to 'e amendatory to several sections of the 7dministrative &ode. Aurthermore, 7rt. )) of the RP& can only 'e invo"ed with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to 7rt. 7, the 6& contends that 7rt. )) should still apply to special laws. 7lso, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. 7 statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. .hen the statute ma"es no distinction, it ma"es no e3ception. 6tatutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. 2he new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign ac"nowledges that the previous one was un!ust and enforcing the latter would 'e contradictory. LATIN MA-IM+ )(, ,7, :(a, :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. #422.-22# (6152 2#" 1909$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 1.0

)ACTS+ 9n June 1/E,, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mi#aph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the deed was registered on May )(, 1/(1, the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed.

ISSUE+ .hether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. ,ELD+ 2he 6& ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. 8nder this, it is also presumed that the purchaser has e3amined the instruments of the record. 2he court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not 'e left on a precarious 'alance, always suscepti'le possi'le challenges. 2his should also apply to criminal cases. Aurthermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes, a li'eral reading that is most favora'le to the accused is the one to 'e adopted. LATIN MA-IM+ :E

17, >oard of 7dministrators of the PH7 v. >autista

Case No. 3# G.R. No. L-3#0.# ()e/r1ar2 22" 1902$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 321" )oo&*o&e No. 1#0

)ACTS+ Respondent @asilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. 7fter finally complying with all the necessities, he was awarded with the full 'enefits of R7 (5, 6ec. / and R7 1/)+, for P1++ a month and an additional P1+ per minor. <ater, on June )), 1/(/, R7 575, was approved. However, due to the lac" of funds, Respondent @asilao only received a )5C increase and only after January 15, 1/71. 2he lower court granted Respondent @asilao his pension, starting from *ecem'er 1E, 1/55 at the rate of P5+, and then P1++ plus P1+ per minor, from June )), 1/57 up to 7ugust 7, 1/(E. 2o pay the difference of P1++ plus P,+ per month and P)+ per month for each minor from June )), 1/(/ up to January 15, 1/71, the difference of P75 plus P)).5+ per month for his wife, and P)+ per minor from January 1(, 1/71 up to *ecem'er ,1, 1/71. ISSUE+ .01 the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent @asilaoDs pension. ,ELD+ Respondent @asilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. 2he laws on veteran pension must 'e li'erally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. @ranting such pensions the earliest possi'le time is more in tune with the spirit of R7 (5. >ut, as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the !udgment of the lower courts is modified as, effective *ecem'er 1E, 1/55 at P5+ plus P1+ per month for each minor, increased to P1++ from June )), 1/57 to 7ugust 7, 1/(E. 2he difference from June )), 1/(/ to January 1:, 1/7) is su'!ect to the release of funds 'y the government. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :+'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<egaspi v. B3ecutive 6ecretary and 7grarian Reforms

Case No. 143 No. L-3.133 (No:e8/er 20" 19#3$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 322" )oo&*o&e No. 1#3

)ACTS+ Petitioner, an employee of the *epartment of 7grarian Reforms, sent a letter to the Respondent 6ecretary of the *epartment, &onrado Bstrella. Petitioner e3pressed his desire to 'e laid%off under the provisions of R7 ,E::, as amended 'y R7 (,E/, on the condition that he would also 'e paid the gratuity 'enefits to which he might 'e entitled under &.7. 1o. 1E(, as amended 'y R7 1(1(. @6I6 approved his retirement gratuity under &.7. 1o. 1E(, as amended 'y R7 1(1( 'ut denied his claim for gratuity under R7 ,E::, as amended 'y R7 (,E/. ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner is entitled to 'oth gratuity 'enefits under &.7. 1o. 1E(, as amended 'y R7 1(1(, and R7 ,E::, as amended 'y R7 (,E/. ,ELD+ 1o. 2here is nothing in R7 ,E::, as amended 'y R7 (,E/, that would suggest that an employee who is laid%off or prefers to 'e laid%off can receive two pension 'enefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to &.7. 1o. 1E(. 2his interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law em'odied in &.7. 1o. 1E( prohi'iting an employer from paying dou'le retirement 'enefits to an employee. >eing the law governing the retirement of government employees, all other laws e3tending retirement 'enefits to government employees should, in case of am'iguity, 'e construed in relation to &.7. 1o. 1E( and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same su'!ect matter, and that in the a'sence of an e3press repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should 'e deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy em'odied in prior statutes, which should all 'e construed together. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, ,E'

17: ReF Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices

Case No. .0 A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC (O &o/er 4" 1990$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 322" )oo&*o&e No. 1#4

)ACTS+ 2his matter was 'rought a'out due to two separate pu'lications in the 9fficial @a#ette of the same amendment to R7 /1+ ;6pecial Retirement <aw of Judges and Justices=. P.*. 1:,E was pu'lished in Hol. 7: of the 9fficial @a#ette, 1o. ,+, which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the si3th year of retirement. However, in Hol. 7: of the 9fficial @a#ette, 1o. :1 provided that the monthly pension starting from the si3th year of retirement is e4uivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. 6ince 1/7E however, @6I6 computed the monthly pension as followsF 1= highest salary, plus )= highest representation and transportation allowances ;R727=, plus ,= longevity pay ;which was considered part of the salary starting in 1/E, pursuant to 6ec. :), >P 1)/=. 2he 'asis was the copy of P.*. 1:,E which was pu'lished in Hol. 7: of the 9fficial @a#ette, 1o. ,+. ISSUE+ .hich version of P.*. 1:,E must 'e followed.

,ELD+ 2he &ourt directed @6I6 to continue implementing R7 /1+, as amended 'y P.*. 1:,E, in the same manner as it has done since 1/7E. 2his is definitely more in "eeping with and gives su'stance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that, 'eing remedial in character, retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to 'e 'enefited and all dou'ts as to the intent of the law should 'e resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor 'ut, more so, for those who have 'een incapacitated 'y illness or accident. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :+'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

ReF 7pplication Aor Retirement 8nder R.7. 1o. /1+ of 7ssociate Justice Ramon >. >ritanico of the I7&
Case No. 120
A.M. No. .404-Re&. (Ma2 13" 1909$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 323" )oo&*o&e No. 1##

)ACTS+ Justice >ritanico re4uested that he 'e granted retirement 'enefits under R7 /1+ in addition to or in lieu of 'enefits he received under R7 1(1( upon termination of his service in the Judiciary 'y the acceptance of his courtesy resignation 'y President 74uino, pursuant to Proclamation 1o. 1 dated Ae'ruary )5, 1/E(, re4uiring all appointive pu'lic officials to su'mit their courtesy resignations 'eginning with the mem'ers of the 6upreme &ourt. Justice >ritanico served the government for ,(.), years, of which 1+ years, ) months, and )7 days were served in the Judiciary. 7s provided in 6ec. 1 of R7 /1+, the !udges or !ustices who may en!oy retirement 'enefits with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered at least )+ years service in the !udiciary or in any other 'ranch of the government or 'oth.$ 2hey fall into three categoriesF GGG ). those who resign 'y reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least )+ years service in the !udiciary or in any other 'ranch of the government or 'oth GGG ISSUE+ .hich category Justice >ritanico 'elongs to. ,ELD+ He 'elongs to the second category of 6ec. 1. 2he acceptance of his courtesy resignation, not 'eing a voluntary resignation ;as held in 3rti4 v+ /3M-5-/=, resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 7+ years. Retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to 'e 'enefited there'y. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, :+', :,c


ReF @regorio @. Pineda

Case No. 132 A.M. No. .#09-RET (615 13" 1990$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 323" )oo&*o&e No. 1#0

)ACTS+ 2hese are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed 'y si3 retired !udges, namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de <ara, Montecillo, Paredes and @erochi, as"ing that they 'e granted gratuity and0or retirement 'enefits under R7 /1+, as amended, in addition to or in lieu of the 'enefits under R7 1(1( or P.*. 11:(. 2hey want to ta"e advantage of the Plana and >ritanico ruling. ISSUE+ .01 they should 'e granted 'enefits under R7 /1+ pursuant to the Plana or >ritanico ruling. ,ELD+ 1o. 7 close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the !udges is necessary to determine their 4ualification to receive 'enefits under R7 /1+. 2he rule is that retirement laws are construed li'erally in favor of the retiring employee. .hen the court allows e3emptions to fi3 rules for certain !udges, there are ample reasons 'ehind each grant. 2he crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. 2he court only allows the use of the Plana or >ritanico ruling if the career of the !udge was mar"ed 'y competence, integrity and dedication to the pu'lic service. Most of the !udges however retired 'owing to policy considerations, id est courtesy resignations. 2he *e <a <lana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the !udges should 'e granted the 'enefits they as" for. It stated that if a !udge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, /e, ,7, :)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Ramire# v. 7rrieta

Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-19103 (No:. 29" 19.2$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 323" )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed an action against 7polinar 6erina see"ing the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 2he &AI dismissed the complaint. 2he Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. 2he end of the ,+ day period fell on a 6unday hence it was moved to the following Monday 'ut one of the two 'ondsmen was una'le to sign the appeal 'ond. 2he cler" of court suggested that the document first 'e completed 'y the Plaintiff 'efore filing it. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the ne3t day. *efendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal 'ond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. 2he !udge disapproved the 'ond and rendered the !udgment final and e3ecutory. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the 6& saying that the &AI committed a grave a'use of discretion. ISSUE+ .01 the &AI committed grave a'use of discretion in disallowing the appeal 'ond. ,ELD+

-es, it did. 2he action of the &AI is harsh and improvident according to the 6&. 2he 'ond would have 'een filed on time if it had not 'een for the defect. 7ccording to the Rules of &ourt, a personal appeal 'ond need not necessarily 'e su'scri'ed 'y ) sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Aurthermore, the Rules of &ourt also state that the appeal needs only one surety. 6o long as the surety is solvent and accepta'le to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the defect in the appeal 'ond, even if indeed ) sureties were needed, the court would not have 'een deprived of !urisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. Rules of procedure should 'e li'erally construed in order to promote their o'!ect and assist the parties in o'taining a !ust determination of their cases. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /d, /e, 11'

17( International &orporate >an" v. Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt

Case No. .3 G.R. No. L-.9#0 (6a*. 30" 1900$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32." )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ Private Respondent secured a loan from PetitionerDs predecessor in interest 'y mortgaging her properties. 2he amount approved for release was used to pay for her other o'ligations to Petitioner. 2hus, private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money mar"et placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the 'an" refused to pay the interest earned 'y the placement, applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. 2he mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money mar"et investment which was su'se4uently granted 'y the court. 2he court issued a writ of e3ecution against PetitionerDs property. Private Respondent filed an e3 parte motion praying that five 'ranches of the 'an" pay her the total amount of the money mar"et interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. 2he supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred 'y erasures, alterations, and0or additions. 6uch 'ond was therefore rendered without force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made 'y the insurance company itself since there were no ready%made forms availa'le. ISSUE+ .01 there can 'e legal compensation in the case at 'ar. ,ELD+ &ompensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set%off against the other is neither clear nor li4uidated. &ompensation cannot e3tend to unli4uidated disputed claim arising from 'reach of contract. Petitioner is inde'ted to private Respondent in the amount of the money mar"et interest. 2he de't of P(.E1M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in dou't. 2his prevents legal compensation from ta"ing place under 7rt. 1)/+ of the &ivil &ode. 2he filing of insufficient or defective 'ond does not dissolve a'solutely and unconditionally the in!unction issued. 2he decision of the &7 is affirmed. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, /d, 11'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*el Rosario v. Hamoy

Case No. 33 No. L-##134 (61*e 30" 190#$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32." )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ Aor want of a one%peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre%trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent Judge declared him non% suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre%trial conference.$ ISSUE+ .01 Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case 'ecause the document did not have the re4uired one%peso documentary stamp. ,ELD+ -es. Had Respondent Judge 'een less technical and more sensi'le, the present proceedings and the conse4uent waste of time of this &ourt would have 'een avoided. >y such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner su'stantial !ustice. He could have easily re4uired counsel for Plaintiff to 'uy the documentary stamp and affi3 it to the special power of attorney and it would not have ta"en ten minutes. 2he Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of &ourt themselves, fortified 'y !urisprudence, mandate a li'eral construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect su'stantial !ustice. LATIN MA-IM+ Ec, /d, 1Ea, 1E'

177 <acsamana v. Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt

Case No. .9 No. L-#314.-33 (A1(1s& 2." 190.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32." )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ 7 decision was rendered against Petitioner 'y the R2&, thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days e3tension to file a petition for review. However, a decision was promulgated 'y the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot 'e e3tended and declared the case terminated. 2he Respondent court cited a 6upreme &ourt decision where the issue was regarding an e3tension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the 4uestion of granting a motion for e3tension of time to file a petition for review. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent court erred in terminating the case. ,ELD+ -es. 2he &ourt rules, for the guidance of >ench and >ar, that a motion for e3tension of time to file a petition for review under 6ec. )) of the Judiciary Reorgani#ation 7ct and 6ec. ));'= of the Interim Rules, may properly 'e filed with and granted 'y the I7& ;now the &ourt of 7ppeals=. 2he &ourt further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as followsF ? ;(= Period of e3tension of time to file petition for reviewF >eginning one month after the promulgation of this *ecision, an e3tension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may 'e granted 'y the &7, save in e3ceptionally meritorious cases. 2he motion for e3tension of time must 'e filed and the corresponding doc"et fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal.

LATIN MA-IM+ )a, 5', )7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@imene# v. 6ecurities and B3change &ommission

Case No. 32 No. L-.03.0 (De e8/er 2." 1904$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32." )oo&*o&e No. 101

)ACTS+ @imene# 6toc"'ro"erage filed a motion for reconsideration 'efore the &ommissioners of the 6B& )7 days after receiving their decision. 2he 6B& denied their motion for reconsideration for 'eing filed out of time. 2he 6B& ruled that the ,+%day period provided for in 6ec. ( of P.*. /+)%7 was modified 'y 6ec. ,/ of the Judiciary Revamp <aw ;>P 1)/= which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. ,/ of >P 1)/ applies to the 6B&. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. ,/ of >P 1)/ e3pressly refers to courts$. 2he 6B& is not a court. It is an administrative agency. Repeals 'y implication are not favored. 2he ,+%day period fi3ed 'y P.*. /+)% 7, the organic law of the 6B&, is still in force. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, ):a, ,7, ,E'

17E >lanco v. >erna'e and <awyers &ooperatuve Pu'lishing &o.

Case No. 3. G.R. No. L-449#0 (Mar ! 31" 193.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32." )oo&*o&e No. 103

)ACTS+ 2o comply with the re4uirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P1( to the &ollector of Internal Revenue. However the &ollector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to 'e its depositary. .ith such, the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the re4uirements. ISSUE+ .01 the re4uisites were complied with and .01 the court should grant the remedy prayed for 'y the Petitioners. ,ELD+ 8nder 6ec. 7( of 7ct 1o. 1/+ on how appeals are perfected, ? 2he 'ond to 'e given shall 'e filed with the !ustice of peace ?. In lieu of such 'ond the 7ppellant may file with the !ustice a certificate of the proper official that the 7ppellant has deposited P)5 with the municipal treasurer ;In Manila with the &ollector of Internal Revenue=. 2he Petitioners therefore have complied with said re4uirements. 2he non%presentation of this certificate was not due to the PetitionerDs failure or omission 'ut to the refusal of the &ollector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered 'y the

Petitioner. 2he fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not 'een issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (d, 7a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ase and 1ant# v. Jugo

Case No. 49 G.R. No. L-032 (O &o/er 14" 194.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32#" )oo&*o&e No. 10#

)ACTS+ Herein *efendants were to pay a counter'ond to which they had complied with. 2hey furnished the 6heriff with a copy of the said counter'ond to comply with the re4uirement. 2he 6heriff is then tas"ed to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. 9n the occasion when the 6heriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. He as"ed the latter if there were o'!ections to the said counter'ond and the counsel replied none. *ue to unfortunate circumstances the 6heriff failed to deliver a copy of such counter'ond to the counsel to formali#e the act of furnishing a copy. ISSUE+ .01 the *efendants complied with the re4uirement of filing a counter'ond and .01 the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. ,ELD+ -es to 'oth issues. 1egligence or unavoida'le circumstances should not adversely affect the *efendant under the circumstance of this case. 2he sole purpose of the counter'ond is to ena'le the Plaintiff to see that the 'ond is in the prescri'ed form and for the right amount. 2here was su'stantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the 6heriffDs office the *efendantDs counter'ond. LATIN MA-IM (d, /a, /d

17/ &. Hiuda de 9rdove#a v. Raymundo

Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-43133 (6152 31" 193.$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 32#" )oo&*o&e No. 109

)ACTS+ Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her 'rief within the 15%day period which ma"es her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the &7 had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her 'rief. ISSUE+ .01 the &7 had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the 7ppellant an additional , days with which to file her 'rief. ,ELD+ -es. 8nder the Rules of &ourt the court may, on motion to the 7ppellee and notice the

7ppellant or on its own motion dismiss the 'ill of e3ceptions or the appeal.$ 2he word may$ implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. LATIN MA-IM+ /d

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Javellana v. Mirasol and 1uRe#

Case No. .3 G.R. No. 14001 ()e/r1ar2 3" 1920$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 192

)ACTS+ 7 redemption of property from an e3ecution sale, which had 'een effected in 'ehalf of a 'rother of the e3ecution de'tor ;Julio Javellana=, was attac"ed in this case as void 'ecause of a supposed collusive agreement 'etween the redemptioner ;<uis Mirasol= and sheriff ;@eronimo 1uRe#= where'y the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in esta'lishing his title to the same property in other litigation. ISSUE+ .01 the redemption has 'een effected in good faith and in accordance with the re4uirements of law. ,ELD+ 7 li'eral construction will 'e given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that the property of the de'tor may 'e made to satisfy as many lia'ilities as possi'le. Redemption of property sold under e3ecution is not rendered invalid 'y reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected 'y means of a chec" for the amount due. 7ny ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a !udgment su'se4uent to that under which the property was sold may e3ercise the right of redemption. 2he act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasona'le protection of his right as a su'se4uent !udgment%creditor of Ma3imino Mirasol. LATIN MA-IM+ ,E', :1

1E+ *el Rosario v. B4uita'le Ins. and &asualty &o., Inc.

Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-1.213 (61*e 29" 19.3$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 192

)ACTS+ *efendant company issued Personal 7ccident Policy 1o. 71,( on the life of Arancisco del Rosario, 'inding itself to pay the sum of P1,+++ to P,,+++, as indemnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim for payment with *efendant company when his son died of drowning after 'eing forced to !ump off the motor launch I6<7M7$ on account of fire. *efendant company refused to pay more than P1,+++ since they alleged that their lia'ility was only said amount pursuant to 6ec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy.

ISSUE+ How much the *efendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Arancisco del Rosario. ,ELD+ 2he policy does not positively state any definite amount that may 'e recovered in case of death 'y drowning. 2here is an am'iguity in this respect in the policy, which am'iguity must 'e interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P,,+++. 2he insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,+++ to Petitioner so that there still remains a 'alance of P),+++ of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MA-IM+ 11a, ,E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*e la &ru# v. &apital Ins. M 6urety &o.

Case No. 13. G.R. No. L-1.130 (A%r45 29" 19.1$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 192

)ACTSF Bduardo de la &ru# was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten 'y the &apital Insurance M 6urety &o., Inc. In a 'o3ing contest participated into 'y the insured, Bduardo slipped and was hit 'y his opponent on the left part of the 'ac" of the head, causing Bduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. 2he cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left. 6imon de la &ru#, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. *efendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused 'y his participation in a 'o3ing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered 'y insurance. ISSUE+ .01 BduardoDs death falls under the definition of the policy against death or disa'ility caused 'y accidental means.$ ,ELDF 2he terms accident$ and accidental$, as used in insurance contracts, have not ac4uired any technical meaning, and are construed 'y the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. 2here is no accident when a deli'erate act is performed unless some additional, une3pected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or 'rings a'out the result of in!ury or death. 2he failure of the *efendant company to include death resulting from a 'o3ing match or other sports among the prohi'itive ris"s leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or e3empt itself from the lia'ility for such death. LATIN MA-IM+ ,, )5a, ,+a

1E1 2y Hs. Airst 1ational 6urety M 7ssurance &o., Inc.

Case No. 13. G.R. No. L-1.130 (A%r45 29" 19.1$

C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 320" )oo&*o&e No. 192

)ACTS+ Plaintiff *iosdado &. 2y insured himself in 1E local insurance companies, among which 'eing the eight a'ove named *efendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. 9n *ecem'er ):, 1/5,, a fire 'ro"e out which totally destroyed the >roadway &otton Aactory. Aighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was in!ured on the left hand 'y a heavy o'!ect which caused temporary total disa'ility of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the *efendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy 'ut the *efendants re!ected plaintiffLs claim for indemnity for the reason that there 'eing no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disa'ility suffered 'y him was not covered 'y his policy. ISSUE+ .01 it is necessary that there should 'e an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff 'efore he can recover on the insurance policies. ,ELD+ 2he clear and e3press conditions of the insurance policies define partial disa'ility as loss of either hand 'y amputation through the 'ones of the wrist. 2here was no such amputation in the case at 'ar. 7ll that was found 'y the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical in!uries Kcaused temporary total disa'ility of plaintiffLs left hand.K In addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law 'etween the parties. 7s the terms of the policies are clear, e3press and specific that only amputation of the left hand should 'e considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disa'ility not covered 'y the policies would certainly 'e unwarranted. LATIN MA-IM+ (', 7a, /c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&apati v. 9campo

Case No. 4. G.R. No. L-20#42 (A%r45 30" 1902$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 330" )oo&*o&e No. 0

)ACTS+ Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a su'%contract with the *efendant, a resident of 1aga &ity. 2he *efendant completed a construction !o' for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the &AI of Pampanga an action for recovery of conse4uential damages due to the delay. *efendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. 2he &AI of Pampanga dismissed the PlaintiffLs complaint on ground of improper venue. ISSUE+ .01 the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he rule on venue of personal actions cogni#a'le 'y the &AI is found in 6ec. );'=, Rule : of the Rules of &ourt, which provides that such Kactions may 'e commenced and tried where the *efendant or any of the *efendants resides or may 'e found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff.K 2he word KmayK is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. 8nder ordinary circumstances, the term Kmay 'eK connotes possi'ilityJ it does not connote certainty. KMayK is an au3illary ver' indicating li'erty, opportunity, permission or possi'ility.

LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )5a, '

1E) &hartered >an" v. 1ational @overnment 7uditing 9ffice

Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-30313 (Mar ! 31" 190#$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 331" )oo&*o&e No. 10

)ACTS+ Iloilo city 'ranch of Petitioner 'an" was accepting postal money order from the general pu'lic since 1/:(. 2hese orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their remaining 'alance. 9n 1/(E, the >ureau of Posts issued an unnum'ered circularF KMemorandum of 8nderstanding &overing &ashing and &learing of Money 9rders,K effective 9cto'er 1, 1/(E, involving the installation of a new postal money order system which re4uires that all commercial 'an"s, regardless of location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the &entral >an" at Manila. Petitioner 'an" continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latterLs 7cting &ashier 'eyond 9cto'er 1, 1/(E. 2he post office said that the arrangements made 'y the acting cashier and the Petitioner 'an" were private, unauthori#ed arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should 'e directed against the said cashier. ISSUE+ .01 the unnum'ered circular and the undated memorandum of understanding are directory and permissive in nature. ,ELD+ Respondents are correct 'y saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial 'an"s operating in the Manila area only. LATIN MA-IM+ 7a, /a, ,(a, ,('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@uiao v. Aigueroa

Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-.401 (Ma2 1#" 1934$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 333" )oo&*o&e No. 1#

)ACTS+ In the trial of People v. @ope#, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio *i#on and Bmiliano Manalo as witnesses for the 6tate. 7fter the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus @uiao and Bulogio 6errano. >ut *i#on and Manalo were not included. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus was filed 'y Jesus @uiao to compel the fiscal to include *i#on and Manalo as accused in his information. ISSUE+ .01 a fiscal may 'e compelled 'y mandamus to include in an information persons who

appear to 'e responsi'le for the crime charged therein. ,ELD+ -es. 6ec. 1 of Rule 1+( of the Rules of &ourt ta"en from 7ct 1o. )7+/ states that, Bvery prosecution for a crime shall 'e in the name of the 8nited 6tates against all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le therefor, e3cept in the cases determined in 6ec. ) of this 7ct.$ 7 perusal of 7ct 1o. )7+/ discloses the legislative intent to re4uire that all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le for an offense should 'e included in the information. 2he use of the word KshallK and of the phrase Ke3cept in cases determinedK shows 6ec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, )5a

1E, <oyola @rand Hillas Homeowners ;6outh= 7ssociation, Inc. v. &ourt of 7ppeals
Case No. 133 G.R. No. 11#100 (A1(1s& #" 199#$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 334" )oo&*o&e No. 22

)ACTS+ 2he <oyola @rand Hillas Homeowners 7ssociation Inc. ;<@HH7I= was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and @uaranty &orporation ;HI@&= as the sole homeownersD organi#ation in the said su'division 'ut it did not file its corporate 'y%laws. <ater, it was discovered that there were two other organi#ations within the su'divisionF the 1orth and 6outh 7ssociations. Respondent HI@& then informed the president of <@HH7I that the latter has 'een automatically dissolved 'ecause of non %su'mission of its 'y%laws as re4uired 'y the &orporation &ode. 2his resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. <@HH7I complained and got a favora'le result from Respondent HI@& declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent &7 su'se4uently affirmed the said decision. Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE+ .01 the failure of a corporation to file its 'y%laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he legislatureDs intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its 'y%laws. 2he word must$ in a statute is not always imperative 'ut it may 'e consistent with an e3ercise of discretion. 2he language of the statute should 'e considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must$ or shall$. LATIN MA-IM+ /c, )5a, ,(a, ,E', '

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*irector of <ands v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 93 G.R. No. 102030 (6152 20" 199#$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 334" )oo&*o&e No. 23

)ACTS+ Private Respondent 2eodoro 7'istado filed a petition for original registration of a land title.

*uring the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented 'y Josefa 7'istado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. 2he trial court dismissed the petition for want of !urisdiction$. However, it was found that the applicant had 'een in open, continuous and e3clusive possession of the su'!ect land since 1/,E. 2he reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to pu'lish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. 2he &7 set aside the decision of the trial court. 2hus, Petitioner 'rought the case to the 6upreme &ourt. ISSUE+ .hether the newspaper pu'lication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. ,ELD+ It is mandatory. 2he law used the term KshallK in prescri'ing the wor" to 'e done 'y the &ommissioner of <and Registration upon the latterLs receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. 2he said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. .hile such literal mandate is not an a'solute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its conte3t in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must 'e understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a

1E: >ersa'al v. 6alvador

Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-33910 (6152 21" 19#0$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 333" )oo&*o&e No. 23

)ACTS+ Private Respondents filed an e!ectment suit against the Petitioner. 2he su'se4uent decision was appealed 'y the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that ? counsels for 'oth parties are given ,+ days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to 'e su'mitted for decision 'y the court.$ 7fter receipt, Petitioner filed a motion e3 parte to su'mit memorandum within ,+ days from receipt of notice of su'mission of the transcript of stenographic notes ta"en during the hearing of the case which was granted 'y the court. >ut the Respondent !udge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute PetitionerDs appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the su'mitted e3 parte motion 'ut the court denied it. ISSUE+ .01 the mere failure of an 7ppellant to su'mit the mentioned memorandum would empower the &AI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. ,ELD+ 2he court is not empowered 'y law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an 7ppellant to su'mit his memorandum. 2he law provides that &ourts? shall decide? cases on the 'asis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city? courtsF Provided? parties may su'mit memoranda? if so re4uested?$ It cannot 'e interpreted otherwise than that the su'mission of memoranda is optional. LATIN MA-IM+ (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Repu'lic Planers >an" v. 7gana 6r.

Case No. 133 G. R. No. 31#.3 (Mar ! 3" 199#$

)ACTS+ Private Respondents filed in court a )uo, an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem E++ preferred shares of stoc" with a face value of PE,+++.++ and to pay 1C 4uarterly interest thereon as 4uarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stoc". 2he court a )uo rendered !udgment in favor of Private Respondents. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent Judge committed grave a'use of discretion amounting to e3cess or lac" of !urisdiction in compelling Petitioner 'an" to redeem Private RespondentsD preferred shares ,ELD+ -es. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in 4uestion, stated that, 9n the 4uestion of the redemption 'y the *efendant of said preferred shares of stoc", the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stoc" certificates clearly allows the same.$ .hat Respondent Judge failed to recogni#e was that while the stoc" certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner >an". 2he redemption therefore is clearly the type "nown as KoptionalK. Aurthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word KmayK. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word KmayK denotes discretion, and cannot 'e construed as having a mandatory effect. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (', 7a, ,+', ,(a

1E5 Phil. &onsumers Aoundation , Inc. v. 1atDl 2elecommunications &ommission

Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-.3310 (No:e8/er 23" 1903$

)ACTS+ Respondent &ommission approved a revised schedule for 6u'scri'er Investment Plan ;6IP= filed 'y Private Respondent. Petitioner states that 6IP schedule presented 'y the Private Respondent is pre%mature and, therefore, illegal and 'aseless, 'ecause the Respondent &ommission has not yet promulgated the re4uired rules and regulations implementing 6ec. ) of P.*. )17 which provides, 2he *epartment of Pu'lic .or"s, 2ransportation and &ommunications through its >oard of &ommunications and0or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may 'e promulgated ...$ ISSUE+ .01 Respondent &ommission acted with grave a'use of discretion. ,ELD+ -es. P.*. )17 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that e3isting su'stantive and procedural laws would not 'e applica'le. 2hus, the 6IP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial via'ility of pu'lic telecommunications companies which in turn assures the

en!oyment of the population at minimum cost the 'enefits of a telephone facility. .ithout promulgation of rules and regulation there would 'e confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers and the government itself. 2he plan to e3pand the company program and0or improve its service is lauda'le, 'ut the e3penses should not 'e shouldered 'y the telephone su'scri'ers. &onsidering the multi%million profits of the company, the cost of e3pansion and0or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. LATIN MA-IM+ E', /d, 11', 1)a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Phil. &onsumers Aoundation, Inc. v. 12& and P<*2 ;Resolution=

Case No. 94 G.R. No. L-.3310 (A1(1s& 10" 1904$

)ACTS+ Respondent &ommission filed a manifestation that it is !oining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. 2he decision promulgated interprets the rule%ma"ing authority delegated in 6ection ) of P.*. )17 to the then *epartment of Pu'lic .or"s, 2ransportation and &ommunications as mandatory, which construction is not supported 'y the actual phraseology of said 6ection ). ISSUE+ .01 the previous decision rendered ma"ing it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P.*. )17 should 'e reconsidered. ,ELD+ -es. 2he 'asic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must 'e given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase Kmay 'e promulgatedK should not 'e construed to mean KshallK or KmustK. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, (d, /f, ,+', ):, ,(, ,/c

1E( *io"no v. Reha'ilitation Ainance &orporation

Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-4#12 (6152 11" 1932$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 33." )oo&*o&e No. 32

)ACTS+ Petitioner, the holder of a 'ac" pay certificate of inde'tedness issued under R7 ,+:, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his 'ac" pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His 'asis was 6ec. ) of R7 ,+:, which provides that investment funds or 'an"s or other financial institutions owned or controlled 'y the government shall su'!ect to availa'ility of loana'le funds ? accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate$ for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word shall$ used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. 2he lower court sustained Respondent company.

ISSUE+ .01 Petitioner can use his 'ac" pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. ,ELD+ 1o. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall$ is imperative. However, the rule is not a'soluteJ it may 'e construed as may$ when re4uired 'y the conte3t or 'y the intention of the statute. 2he modifier, at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.$, the interest to 'e charged, that the ver'%phrase is mandatory 'ecause not only the law uses at not more$ 'ut the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the 'ac" pay certificate for the 'enefit of the holders, for whose 'enefit the same have 'een issued, can 'e carried out 'y fi3ing a ma3imum limit for discounts. >ut as to when the discounting or acceptance shall 'e made, the conte3t and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to 'e su'!ect$ to the condition of the availa'ility of loana'le funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall 'e allowed on the condition that there are availa'le loana'le funds.$ In other words, acceptance or discount is to 'e permitted only if there are loana'le funds. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, )5a, )(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>erces v. @uingona, et. al.

Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112099 ()e/r1ar2 21" 1993$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 33#" )oo&*o&e No. 34

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of 2iwi, 7l'ay for 1= a'use of authorityJ and )= dishonesty, with the 6angguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in 'oth cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the 9ffice of the President and prayed for stay of e3ecution under 6ec. (7;'= of the <@&. 2he 9ffice of the President stayed e3ecution, citing 6ec. (E of R7 71(+ and 6ec. ( of 7.9. 1o. 1E. 7ccording to Petitioner, the governing law is R7 71(+, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final and e3ecutory. Petitioner further contends that 7.9. 1o. 1E was repealed 'y R7 71(+. ISSUE+ .01 R.7. 71(+ repealed 7.9. 1o. 1E. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. 5,+;f=, R7 71(+ did not e3pressly repeal 6ec. (, 7.9. 1o. 1E 'ecause it failed to identify or designate the laws on e3ecutive orders that are intended to 'e repealed. If there was any repeal, it was 'y implication which is not favored. In the a'sence of an e3press repeal, a su'se4uent law cannot 'e construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcila'le inconsistency and repugnancy e3ists 'etween the two. 2here is none in this case. 2he first sentence of 6ec. (E provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final or e3ecutory.$ It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay e3ecution. 2he term shall$ may 'e read mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. LATIN MA-IM+ )5a, )(, 5+


Mers 6hoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission, et al.

Case No. 01 G.R. No. 123..9 ()e/r1ar2 2#" 1990$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 33#" )oo&*o&e No. 33

)ACTS+ Petitioner hired Respondent wor"ers as piece rate wor"ers. 7lleging serious 'usiness decline, Petitioner 'arred its wor"ers from entering the company to wor". 2he wor"ers challenged the legality of PetitionerDs stoppage of operations. 2he <a'or 7r'iter found the shutdown with cause 'ut without the re4uired notice, and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to Respondent 1<R& 'ut sought a reduction of the cash or surety 'ond. *espite the reduction granted, Petitioner still failed to post 'ond within 1+ days, resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. ISSUE+ .01 Respondent 1<R& committed grave a'use of discretion. ,ELD+ 1o. 8nder 7rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, an appeal 'y the employer may 'e perfected only upon posting of cash or surety 'ond in an amount e4uivalent to the monetary award. Perfection of appeal is !urisdictional and non%compliance with such legal re4uirements is fatal. 2he word only$ ma"es it perfectly clear that the posting of 'ond is to 'e the e3clusive means 'y which an employerDs appeal may 'e perfected. LATIN MA-IM+ )5a, )(

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Aule v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 40 G.R. No. L-#9094 (61*e 22" 1900$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 33#" )oo&*o&e No. 3#

)ACTS+ Petitioner, an agent of the 2owers 7ssurance &orporation, issued and made out chec" 1o. )(7:1 in favor of Roy 1adera. 6aid chec" was dishonored for the reason that the said chec"ing account was already closed, thus in violation of >P )), the >ouncing &hec"s <aw. 8pon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he su'mitted a memorandum confirming the 6tipulation of Aacts. He was convicted 'y the trial court, and on appeal, the 7ppellate &ourt. ISSUE+ .01 the &7 erred in affirming the decision of the R2& 'ased on the 6tipulation of Aacts that was not signed 'y the Petitioner nor his counsel. ,ELD+ 2he &7 erred. &ase is re%opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. 6ec. : of the Rules on &riminal Procedure provides, 1o agreement or admission made or entered during the pre %trial conference shall 'e used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed 'y him and his counsel$. >ecause of the word shall$, in its language, the rule is mandatory. 1egative words and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. 2herefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. 7lso, penal statues are to 'e li'erally construed in favor of the accused.


1EE Mc@ee v. Repu'lic

Case No. 1#4 G.R. No. L-330# (A%r45 29" 1934$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 33#" )oo&*o&e No. 3#

)ACTS+ Petitioner, an 7merican citi#en married to <eonarda &risostomo, wants to adopt her children 'y her first hus'and. However, he is 'arred from doing so under 7rt. ,,5 of the old &ivil &ode which states that those who have legitimate, legitimated, ac"nowledged natural children, or natural children 'y legal fiction$ cannot adopt. Petitioner and <eonarda have one legitimate child. *espite 7rt. ,,5, the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invo"ing 7rt. ,,E which states that a step%child, 'y the step%father or step%mother$ can 'e adopted. ISSUE+ .01 a hus'and having a legitimate child may adopt a step%child. ,ELD+ 1o. 9ne strong argument presented 'y the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render 7rt. ,,E meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must 'e noted that 7rt. ,,5 and 7rt. ,,E should 'e considered in relation to each other. 2hat a parent can adopt a step%child is limited 'y 7rt. ,,5 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to 4ualify as an adopter. 9ne principle 'ehind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. 7rt. ,,5 is phrased in a negative mannerF cannot adopt+ .hile 7rt. ,,E is positiveF the follo!ing may be adopted+" LATIN MA-IM+ 15a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Penid v. Hirata

Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (Mar ! 23" 1903$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 330" )oo&*o&e No. 40

)ACTS+ &onfidential Information 1o. )E of the >IR was filed 'y the Petitioners. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had 'een falsely declaring their gross earnings N on the 'asis of a parity rate of P).++ to 86 X1.++ N defrauding the Philippine @overnment of millions of pesos in ta3es. Aurther, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the &onfidential Information. 9ne of these was Pan Ail &o. Inc. 1ow the Petitioners see" their )5C reward ta"en from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies N as provided 'y R7 ),,E. ISSUE+ .01 the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Ail &o. Inc, a company which is not included in the &onfidential Information.

,ELD+ -es. 7ccording to 6ec. : of R7 ),,E, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given 'y him must lead to or 'e instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation ? and results in the recovery of collection of revenues ?.$ 1ot only did the >IR rely on the &onfidential Information su'mitted 'y the Petitioners for their investigation, 'ut also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, conse4uently, recovery of collection. 2herefore, this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. In !urisprudence, statues offering rewards must 'e li'erally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /d

1E/ Pahilan v. 2a'al'a, et al.

Case No. 9. G.R. No. 1101#0 ()e/r1ar2 21" 1994$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 342" )oo&*o&e No. .3

)ACTS+ Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of @uinsili'an, &amiguin. Respondent 2a'al'a was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the doc"et fees he paid were insufficient. 2he trial court dismissed the election protest for non%payment on time of the re4uired fees for filing an initiatory pleading. .ithin the 5%day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a verified appeal$ 'rief. >ut the &ler" of &ourt said that his office did not receive any notice of appeal$ from Petitioner. PetitionerDs appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescri'ed period. ISSUEF 1. .01 the verified appeal$ was validly dismissed. ). .01 the trial !udge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non%payment on time of the re4uired fees. ,ELDF 1. 1o. 2he notice of appeal can 'e validly su'stituted 'y an appeal 'rief. 2he filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. 2he R2& was sent copies 'y registered mail within the prescri'ed period, and is assumed to 'e received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing. ). 1o. 2he doc"et fee was paid although insufficient. 6tatutes providing for election contests are to 'e li'erally construed that the will of the people in the choice of pu'lic officers may not 'e defeated 'y mere technical o'!ections.
LATIN MA-IMF /a, /c, /d, :+'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pimentel v. Aeste!o

Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-232# (6a*1ar2 11" 1949$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 342" )oo&*o&e No. .4

)ACTSF Aeste!o was proclaimed Mayor of 6anta <ucia with 7ppellant protesting. 7ppellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 5/ 'allots which would have made him win. 7ppellantDs name in the 5/ 'allots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice%mayor, mem'er of the provincial 'oard or councilor. 7ppellant claimed that his name was only misplaced 'ut the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUEF .01 7ppellant can claim as votes in his favor 'allots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. ,ELD+ 1o. Aor any 'allot to 'e counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensa'le that his name 'e written 'y the voter in the 'allot and cannot 'e mista"en 'y a person who, as provided 'y the &onstitution, is a'le to read. 7 name can 'e counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the 'allot for the vote for such office. It is impossi'le to count a 'allot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. &onsidering that in 5/ 'allots claimed 'y 7ppellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. LATIN MA-IM+ (d" 7', :,

1/+ Ro3as v. Rafferty

Case No. 2.4 G.R. No. L-12102 (Mar ! 2#" 1910$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 343" )oo&*o&e No. #3

)ACTS+ Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1/1,, the construction of a reinforced concrete 'uilding was 'egun. It was finished in all respects on Ae'ruary 15, 1/15. 2he city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of *ecem'er 1, 1/1:, sent Plaintiffs notice, received 'y them on *ecem'er )5, 1/1:, re4uiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1/15. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the ta3es, which amounted to P,,+++, under protest. 6uit was 'egun in the &AI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment. ISSUE+ .01 the assessment was legal. ,ELDF 1o. 2he assessor cannot ma"e a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. 2he law re4uires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during 1ovem'er. His attempted notification on *ecem'er )5, 1/1:, was not given during the time fi3ed 'y statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Ro3as >uilding for the year 1/15. Aurthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the o'ligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. 2he city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 1/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6erfino v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 143 G.R. No. 40030 (Se%&e8/er 13" 190#$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 343" )oo&*o&e No. #3

)ACTS+ 7 parcel of land, consisting of )1.1(7( hectares situated in 6agay, 1egros 9ccidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico &asamayor, under Homestead Patent 1o. ::1,/. 8pon registration of said patent, 9&2 1o. 1E,/ was issued 'y said office in the name of Pacifico &asamayor. In 1/:5, &asamayor sold the land in favor of 1emesia >alta#ar. 7pparently, 9&2 1o. 1E,/ was lost during the war and upon the petition of >alta#ar, the &AI of 1egros ordered its reconstitution in the name of &asamayor. 9n the same day, 2&2 1o. 57% 1 was issued in the name of 1emesia >alta#ar 'ut after the cancellation of 9&2 1o. 1:%R. In 1/51, >alta#ar sold the property to Respondent <ope# 6ugar &entral, which did not present the documents for registration until *ecem'er 1/(: to the 9ffice of Registry of *eeds. 6aid office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered 'y another certificate of title, 2&2 1o. )E/E5, in the name of Petitioner. ISSUE+ .01 the purchase 'y Respondent <ope# 6ugar &entral of the lot in 4uestion was null and void from the 'eginning. ,ELD+ 1o, applying 6ec. 11E of &.7. 1o. 1:1, which prohi'its the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent, and not 6ec. 1)1 which governs sale to corporations. 6ince the grant was more than 5 years 'efore, the transfer to 1emesia >alta#ar was valid and legal. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7', :,

1/1 Sui!ano v. *evelopment >an" of the Philippines

Case No. G. R. No. 2.419 (O &o/er 1." 19#0$

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed an ur'an estate loan with respondent which was approved. 2he loan was to 'e released in installments. 2he outstanding o'ligation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P1,,/E,.5/. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P1:,+++ for his outstanding o'ligation, out of the proceeds of his 'ac" pay pursuant to R7 1o. E/7 ;R7 E/7=. Respondent advised petitioners of the non%acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred 'efore or su'sisting on June )+, 1/5, when R7 E/7 was approved. ISSUE+ .01 petitionerDs o'ligation is su'sisting at the time of the approval of R7 E/7. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he provision e3pressly provides that the o'ligations must 'e su'sisting at the time of the approval of R7 E/7. Hence, when such 'ac"pay certificates are offered in payment to a

government%owned corporation of o'ligation thereto which was not su'sisting at the time of the enactment of said 7ct on June )+, 1/5,, such corporation may not legally 'e compelled to accept the certificates. 2he &ourt cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unam'iguous language of the provision of law. LATIN MA-IM+ )E, 7a, (c, 1

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Romualde#%Marcos v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 13# G.R. No. 1199#. (Se%&e8/er 10" 1993$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 34#" )oo&*o&e No.04

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed her &ertificate of &andidacy for the position of Representative of the Airst *istrict of <eyte. Private respondent Monte!o, the incum'ent Representative of the Airst *istrict of <eyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for &ancellation and *is4ualification$ with respondent &9MB<B& alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional re4uirement for residency. ISSUE+ .01 petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the Airst *istrict of <eyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1//5 elections. ,ELD+ -es. Residency 4ualification pertains to domicile. 7s a minor, petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in 2aclo'an, <eyte. 7s domicile, once ac4uired, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the 'eing 'orn in Manila, 2aclo'an was her domicile of origin 'y operation of law. Parenthetically, when she married then &ongressman Marcos, petitioner was o'liged, 'y virtue of 7rt. 11+ of the &ivil &ode, to follow her hus'andDs actual place of residence fi3ed 'y him. 7lthough Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. 2herefore, she did not lose her domicile of origin. LATIN MA-IM+ )5a, ,7, ,/a

1/) Portillo v. 6alvani

Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-32101 (Mar ! 10" 1930$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 101" )oo&*o&e No. 130

)ACTS+ 7ppellant 6alvani won the elections in 1/)E for the office of provincial governor of 7nti4ue. 7ppellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest on July /, 1/)E. *ecision was rendered on 7ugust 15, 1/)/ declaring appellee Portillo the winner. ISSUE+ .01 the decision 'y the trial !udge declaring appellee Portillo is valid.

,ELD+ 2he decision is void for want of !urisdiction. 2he Blection <aw provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall 'e terminated within one year. <egislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and e3plicit provision suggests the legislative intent to ma"e the provision mandatory. 9ne year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses !urisdiction rendering any su'se4uent decision void for want of !urisdiction. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 7', /a, :,, :5, ')

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Sueru'in v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 24# G.R. No. L-2301 (De e8/er 2" 1940$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 332" )oo&*o&e No. 14

)ACTS+ Petitioner defeated Aelipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereafter. 2he appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost !urisdiction. ISSUE+ .01 the &7 had lost their !urisdiction to decide the appeal. ,ELD+ 1o. 6ec. 17E of the Blection &ode provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should 'e decided within three months after filing. However, this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. 2he dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of !ustice. 2he doctrine in Portillo v. 6alvani should 'e a'andoned. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, ), 5', 1E', ,/'

1/, 1ilo v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 109 G.R. No. L-3430. (A%r45 2" 1904$ C!a%&er III" 'a(e 09" )oo&*o&e No. 39

)ACTS+ Private respondent @atchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at >ulacan with an area of ) hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. Private respondent then filed for e!ection citing personal cultivation$ on March 7, 1/(E. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that R7 ,E:: was amended on 6eptem'er 1+, 1/71 removing personal cultivation$ from the grounds for e!ectment. ISSUE+ .01 the amendment of R7 (,E/ has retroactive effect.

,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. : of the 1ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is e3plicitly provided. 2he legislation involves social !ustice, however the landowners 'eing holders of only small parcels of land should also 'e entitled to social !ustice. Aurthermore, to rule against the small landowners would 'e thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self%reliant farmers. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :(a, :('

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6alcedo and Ignacio v. &arpio and &arreon

Case No. 130 G.R. No. L-4493 (61*e ." 1931$

)ACTS+ Petitioners were appointed mem'ers of the >oard of *ental B3aminers. R7 5:( was approved and 6ec. 1 thereof amended 6ec. 1+ of the Reorgani#ation 7ct 1o. :++7. >y virtue of this law, a >oard of *ental B3aminers was appointed 'y the President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. ISSUE+ .01 it was the intention of &ongress, in enacting R7 5:(, to a'olish all the pre%e3isting >oards of B3aminers e3isting after the time of the enactment thereof. ,ELD+ 7ppointment of the respondents is valid. It is o'vious that it is the intention of &ongress to do so, 'ecause the provisions of said 7ct are inconsistent with those of the Revised 7dministrative &ode as amended 'y 7ct 1o. :++7. In the case of &amacho vs. &ourt of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well esta'lished rule recogni#ed 'y all authorities without e3ception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new o'ligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disa'ility in respect to a transaction already pastJ 'ut that status is not made retrospective 'ecause it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the re4uirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, /c, :(, :/

1/: &ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. <ingayen @ulf Blectric Power &o., Inc.
Case No. #0
G.R. No. L-23##1 (A1(1s& 4" 1900$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 333" )oo&*o&e No. 14

)ACTS+ 2he >ureau of Internal Revenue ;>IR= assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise ta3es and surcharges applying the franchise ta3 rate of 5C as prescri'ed in 6ec. )5/ of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, R7 ,E:, was passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light, heat, and power. 2his law lowered the franchise ta3 rate to )C.

ISSUE+ .01 R7 ,E:, is unconstitutional for 'eing violative of the uniformity and e4uality of ta3ation$ clause of the &onstitution. ,ELD+ It is valid. 6ec. )5/ of the 2a3 &ode was never intended to have a universal application. R7 ,E:, did not only fi3 and specify a franchise ta3 of )C on its gross receipts, 'ut made it in lieu of any and all ta3es, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding,$ thus leaving no room for dou't regarding the legislative intent. &harters or special laws granted and enacted 'y the <egislature are in the nature of private contracts. 2hey do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. 2he <egislature considers and ma"es provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. R7 ,E:, specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /c, :(, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@allardo v. >orromeo

Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-3.00# (Ma2 23" 1900$

)ACTS+ Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he ;plaintiff= may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government !o' as a letter carrier. 8pon appeal, the &7 applying 6ec. 7 of R7 (,E/, held that the landownerDs desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. ISSUE+ .01 the &7 correctly gave retroactive application to 6ec. 7 of R7 (,E/. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he applica'le law when petitioner filed his complaint was R7 ,E:: which provided a ground for the e!ectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. 2he newer law, R.7. (,E/ eliminated this ground. In applying 7rt. : of the 1ew &ivil &ode, R7 (,E/ cannot 'e given retroactive effect in the a'sence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. 6ince &ongress failed to e3press an intention to ma"e said R7 retroactive, it may not apply to e!ectment cases then already pending ad!udication 'y the courts. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, :(e

1/5 &e'u Portland &ement v. &IR

Case No. 32 G.R. No. 203.3 (O &o/er 29" 19.0$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 333" )oo&*o&e No. 13


2he case involves petitionerDs claim for refund of sales ta3 paid from 1ovem'er 1/5: to March 1/55, and ad valorem ta3 paid from 7pril 1/55 to 6eptem'er 1/5( from the sale of 7P9 Portland cement produced 'y petitioner. 6ince 1/5), however, petitioner had 'een protesting the imposition of the sales ta3 on its 7P9 Portland cement, and on January 1/5,, it also protested the payment of the ad valorem ta3es. Petitioner claimed for refund and 'rought its case to the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage ta3es collected 'y respondent are refunda'le since under R7 1))/ ;effective June 1/55=, producers of cement are e3empt from the payment of said ta3. 2he &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals ruled otherwise. ISSUE+ .hether R7 1))/ applies prospectively or retroactively. ,ELD+ 7 statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either 'y the e3press terms of the statute or 'y necessary implication. In every case of dou't, the dou't must 'e resolved against the retrospective effect. .hile the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the e3planatory note to the 'ill, was not only to accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem ta3es 'ut also clarify the dou't of the ta3%paying pu'lic on the interpretative scope of the two terms,$ it certainly could not have 'een the intention of the lawma"ers to unsettle previously consummated transactions 'etween the ta3payer and the @overnment. LATIN MA-IM+ :(a, :(c, :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ailipinas &ompaY ia de 6eguros

Case No. #. G.R. No. 14000 (A%r45 29" 19.0$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 134" )oo&*o&e No. 41

)ACTS+ Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in 'usiness as a real estate dealer. R7 1(1) amended the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode and provided for a scale of graduated ratesJ this too" effect on 7ugust of 1/5(. Petitioner assessed against the respondent ta3es ;to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1/5(= for the year 1/5( 'ased on R7 1(1). Respondent appealed to the &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. ISSUE+ .01 R7 1(1) should 'e applied retroactively. ,ELD+ 1o. 7s a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 2he rule applies with greater force to the case at 'ar, considering that R7 1(1), which imposes the new and higher ta3es, e3pressly provides that said 7ct shall ta"e effect upon its approval. LATIN MA-IM+ :(a, :(c, :(e


<aceste v. 6antos

Case No. 140 G.R. No. 3.00. ()e/r1ar2 1" 1932$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 331" )oo&*o&e No. 1

)ACTS+ Petitioner committed rape along with 1icolas <achica. 2he crime too" effect 'efore the effectivity of the RP&. However, <achica married the victim, Magdalena de 9campo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. 2he petitioner continued to serve his sentence 'ut now prays for the &ourt to set him at li'erty through the writ of ha'eas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer 'ased on the last sentence of 7rt. ,:: of the RP&. ISSUE+ .01 the last paragraph of 7rt. ,:: of the RP& has retroactive effect. ,ELD+ -es. 2he petition for ha'eas corpus was granted. 2he principle granting to the accused in certain cases an e3ception to the general rule that laws shall not 'e retroactive when the law in 4uestion favors the accused applies. &onscience and good law !ustify this e3ception. LATIN MA-IM+ :E

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>alat'at v. &ourt of 7ppeals and Passion

Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-3.3#0 (6a*1ar2 2#" 1992$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3.3" )oo&*o&e No. #3

)ACTS+ Petitioner has an agricultural land in 6ta. 7na, Pampanga containing 1E,:/+ s4uare meters of land owned 'y @arcia. @arcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for ta3ation purposes under 2a3 *eclaration 1o. 1)(. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to 6ec. ,(;1= of R7 ,E::. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have 'een decided in light of 6ec. 7 of R7 (,E/ since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to ac4uire the land. ISSUEF .01 6ec. 7 of R7 (,E/ should 'e given retroactive effect. ,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. : of the &ivil &ode provides that there should 'e no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided 'y law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should 'e understood which is not em'odied in the law. Aurthermore the law is a rule esta'lished to guide our action with no 'inding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times 'ut laws loo" forward in the future. LATIN MA-IMF )+, :(', :(e


People v. Peta

Case No. 232 G.R. No. L-#140 (De e8/er 22" 1933$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.." )oo&*o&e No. #2

)ACTS+ 7ppellant was found guilty of violating R7 1:5 for having collected fees in e3cess of 5C of the amount received 'y the claimant as compensation for services rendered. 7t the time the agreement was made the law in force was &.7. 1o. (75 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5C of any amount that the claimant would collect. 2he trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5C fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE+ .01 R7 1:5 has a retroactive effect. ,ELD+ 1o. It does not appear in the language of R7 1:5 that it should 'e given retroactive effect. 2here is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of R7 1:5 for it to act on cases under the old law. <aws cannot 'e given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. Aurthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as not to pre!udice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. LATIN MA-IM+ 11', )+, :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6an Jose v. Reha'ilitation Ainance & orp.

Case No. 2#1 G.R. No. L-##.. (No:e8/er 29" 1933$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3.9" )oo&*o&e No. 104

)ACTS+ Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre%war loan with defendant. 2he 'asis of the suit was R7 (71 amending R7 :+1, the former law condoning the pre%war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1, 1/:( to March 1:, 1/51. 2he lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. ISSUE+ .01 the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff 'y the defendant. ,ELD+ -es. R7 (71 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. .here a statute was amended and reenacted, the amendment should 'e construed as if it had 'een included in the original actJ 'ut it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so 'y the terms of the amendment. LATIN MA-IM+ )+, :(e

1/E People v. 6umilang

Case No. 22. G.R. No. L-4910# (De e8/er 10" 194.$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#1" )oo&*o&e No. 111

)ACTS+ 2he petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and : months and )1 days of prision correctional to 1+ years and 1 day of prision mayor. 9n appeal, 'oth the &7 and the 6& affirmed the sentence of the lower court. >ased on the records, a copy of the resolution of the &ourt denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitionerDs attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice 'ecause then he was already hiding in the mountains of <aguna as a guerilla officer of the Mar"ings guerilla. 2he attorney prays that the reading of the sentence 'e suspended and that petitioner 'e allowed to file whatever pleading that may 'e allowed 'y this Honora'le 2ri'unal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. ISSUE+ .01 the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should 'e granted. ,ELDF 1o. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tent. LATIN MA-IM+ :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Palomo >uilding 2enants 7ssociation v. Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt Case No. 9# G.R. No. L-.0043 (O &o/er 31" 1904$ )ACTS+ Petitioner filed an action for *eclaration of 1ullity of 6ale and *amages with Preliminary In!unction 'efore the then &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila against respondents @overnment 6ervice Insurance 6ystem ;@6I6= and &apitol Hills, as principal defendants, and the five ;5= !udges of the then &ity &ourt of Manila in the in!unction aspect of the case. Respondent @6I6 and &apitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending 'etween the same parties for the same cause. Respondent !udge granted private respondentsL motion to dismiss. ISSUE+ .01 the Intermediate 7ppellate &ourt ;I7&= erred in sustaining the order of respondent, denying petitionerLs motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. ,ELD+ -es. Petitioners invo"e 6ection ,/ of the Judiciary Reorgani#ation 7ct of 1/E+ ;>P 1)/= which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent I7& erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in 1lday vs+ /amilon, KVtWhe reorgani#ation having 'een declared to have 'een completed, >P >ig. 1)/ is now in full force and effect. 7 Record on 7ppeal is no longer necessary for ta"ing an appeal. 2he same proviso appears in 6ection 1E of the Interim Rules and @uidelines issued 'y this &ourt on January 11, 1/E,. >eing procedural in nature, those provision s may 'e applied retroactively for the 'enefit of petitioners, as appellants.

L6tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tentL ;People vs+ 'umilang, 77 Phil. 7(: V1/:(1.W K LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, :(e

1// MR&7, Inc. v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. #0 G.R. No. 0..#3 (De e8/er 19" 1909$

)ACTS+ 2he petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the &7 affirming the order of the R2& dismissing the complaint for non%payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, e3emplary damages, attorneyDs fees and litigation e3penses sought to 'e recovered 'y it from the defendants 'ut left them to the discretion of the Honora'le &ourt. ISSUE+ .01 the petition has merit. ,ELD+ -es. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tent. LATIN MA-IM+ :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

9campo v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 09 G.R. No. #9.0 (De e8/er 0" 1909$

)ACTS+ Petitioner 'egan construction of his house without permit from the owner, while 'eing informed of P.*. 77). Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. 6ec. 1 of P.*. 77), otherwise "nown as the 7ntiN 64uatting <aw has three elementsF ;a= accused is not the owner of the landJ ;'= he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force, intimidation, or threat or 'y ta"ing such advantage of the a'sence or tolerance of the ownerJ ;c= such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. 6ec. 15, Rule 11/ of the Rules on &riminal Procedure states that after prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.$ ISSUE+ 1. ). .01 petitioner is guilty of the crime of s4uatting. .01 a motion to dismiss 'ars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.

,ELD+ -es on 'oth counts. >y moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to su'stantiate his defense and in effect su'mits the case for !udgment on the 'asis of the evidence for the prosecution. LATIN MA-IM+ :5a, :('

)++ -a"ult Philippines v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 313 G.R. No. 9103. (O &o/er 3" 1990$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#2" )oo&*o&e No. 11#

)ACTS+ Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for in!uries arising from alleged criminal negligence, 'eing without malice, cannot 'e filed independently of the criminal action under 7rt. ,, of the &ivil &ode. ISSUE+ .01 a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. ,ELD+ -es. 8nder the 1/E5 Rules of &riminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil lia'ility is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. LATIN MA-IM+ ,E', :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7ris ;Phil.= Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission

Case No. 21 G.R. No. 90301 (A1(1s& 3" 1991$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#2" )oo&*o&e No. 119

)ACTS+ Petitioner assails the constitutionality of 6ec. 1) of R7 (71( to 7rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, and 2ransitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the 'asis of 'eing in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively. ISSUE+ .01 amendments introduced 'y 6ec. 1) of R7 (715 to 7rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, and 2ransitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. ,ELD+ -es on 'oth counts. 2he provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found un!ustified 'y the la'or ar'iter is a valid e3ercise of the

police power of the state, and the contested provision is then a police legislation$. 2he 4uestioned Interim Rules can 'e given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. LATIN MA-IM+ Ea, :(e

)+1 7tlas &onsolidated Mining and *evelopment &o. v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-34303 ()e/r1ar2 14" 1990$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#3" )oo&*o&e No. 124

)ACTS+ Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with &8B1&9%HB<BP where'y the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 1) mining claims 'elonging to the latter located at 2oledo &ity, &e'u. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with >I@7 &9PPBRJ su'!ect of this 9perating 7greement are ,1 mining claims of >I@7%&9PPBR li"ewise located at 2oledo &ity, &e'u. However, of the total mining claims KleasedK 'y petitioner from 'oth &8B1&9%HB<BP and >I@7 &9PPBR, / mining claims overlap. 2hese / overlapping mining claims 'ecame the su'!ect of administrative cases where &8B1&9% HB<BP won. *uring the pendency of this appeal, &8B1&9% HB<BP and >I@7 &9PPBR, entered into a compromise agreement. 2his compromise agreement ena'led >I@7 %&9PPBR to eventually lay claim over the / overlapping mining claims. *ue to the promulgation of P.*. 1)E1, a num'er of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 2hey alleged that the operating agreement which >I@7 &9PPBR signed with petitioner had already 'een revo"ed 'y a letter and that 'y reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost !urisdiction pursuant to 6ec. 7;a=;c= and 6ec. 1) of P.*. 1)E1. ISSUE+ .01 P.*. 1)E1 prevails. ,ELD+ P.*. 1)E1 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@overnment of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of >inalonan

Case No. 11# G.R. No. L-0243 (De e8/er 24" 1913$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 12" )oo&*o&e No. 44

)ACTS+ 2his is a registration proceedings instituted 'y the *irector of <ands under 6ec. (1 of 7ct 1o. /)(, see"ing to compel the registration of all private property within a prescri'ed area in the municipality of >inalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of land. 7ct 1o. /)( is not applica'le to any other than pu'lic lands, or, at most, lands claimed 'y the @overnment. 2he 7ct does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. &adastral 7ct ;1o. ))5/= authori#es the *irector of <ands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has 'een regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescri'ed in the 7ct. 6ec. (1 of 7ct 1o. /)( does not permit of similar proceedings. 2he title of the Pu'lic <and 7ct contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. 1o reference is made

in 7ct 1o. ))5/ to the repeal or amendment of 6ec. (1 of 7ct 1o. /)(. ISSUE+ .hether 6ec. (1 of 7ct 1o. /)( authori#es the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined e3clusively to pu'lic lands. ,ELD+ 7ct 1o. ))5/ was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of e3isting legislation on the same su'!ect. 2he fact that the new 7ct does not e3pressly state that it amends or repeals 6ec. (1 of 7ct 1o. /)( does not necessarily re'ut this conclusion. LATIN MA-IM+ :(e

)+) *evelopment >an" of the Phil. v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-20##4 ()e/r1ar2 20" 1900$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 1#3" )oo&*o&e No. 199

)ACTS+ 2he >oard of @overnors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing pro!ect for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for )+ years. However, the area sold was then part of a 'igger parcel of land and 'ecause the su'division plan for the area was still pending approval 'y the >ureau of <ands, the sales agreement 'etween the *>P and the PHH& was not presented immediately for registration 'y the *>P. *>P e3pressed its dou'ts as to whether it could ac4uire the property in 4uestion for the intended purpose of a housing pro!ect in the light of the then 6ec. 1, of R7 E5. However, without the "nowledge of the *>P, a portion of the property including the 15/ lots sold to the *>P, were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHH& wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. 2hen, R7 ,1:7 was enacted, amending certain provisions of the *>P &harter ;R7 E5=, among which was 6ec. 1,. ISSUE+ .01 there is retroactivity of the amendment of 6ec. 1, of R7 E5, 'y R7 ,1:7. ,ELD+ -es. 9ne of the purposes of &ongress when it enacted R7 ,1:7, 'y amending 6ec. 1, of R7 E5, was to erase any dou'ts regarding the legality of the ac4uisition 'y the *>P of the 15/ lots from the PHH& for the housing pro!ect which it intended to esta'lish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the ac4uisition 'y the *>P of the 15/ lots from the PHH&. LATIN MA-IM+ :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>riad 7gro *evelopment &orp. v. Hon. dela 6erna, and dela &ru#, et al.
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 03223 (61*e 29" 1909$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#." )oo&*o&e No. 13.

)ACTS+ 2he case arose out of a complaint filed 'y 2rade 8nion of the Philippines and 7llied 6ervices .A28 <ocal &hapter 1o. R9I%++5 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment0non%payment of minimum wage, B&9<7, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 1,th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Respondent failed to su'mit controverting evidence despite due noticeJ *irector >al'in thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5,,(/,/+/.,+. In its appeal to the 1<R&, >riad 7gro 4uestioned the Regional *irectorDs authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of wor"ers, which 1<R& dismissed on the strength of B.9. 111 amending 7rt. 1)E;'= of the <a'or &ode, which granted to Regional *irectors !urisdiction over monetary claims. ISSUE+ .01 the !urisdiction over money claims is e3clusive to the <a'or 7r'iters, 'y force of 7rt. )17 of the <a'or &ode. ,ELD+ 2he &ourt held that B.9. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision su'!ect of the amendment. 2his was clear from the provisoF 2he provisions of 7rt. )17 of this &ode notwithstanding?$ 2he intended effect was clearly to ma"e the 6ecretary of <a'or and the various Regional *irectors have concurrent !urisdiction. B.9. 111 therefore has retroactive effect. LATIN MA-IM+ (a, /, ,+', ,E', :(e

)+, Brectors, Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission, Hon. 7ndres, Jr. and >urgos
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104213 (Ma2 0" 199.$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3##" )oo&*o&e No. 140

)ACTS+ Private respondent was recruited to wor" in 6audi 7ra'ia as a service contract driver. Months after, another contract was e3ecuted which changed his position into that of a helper0la'orer. .hen private respondent returned to the Philippines, he invo"ed his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference 'etween his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual 'onus. Private respondent filed the complaint with the <a'or 7r'iter 'ut B.9. 1o. 7/7 was passed, creating the Philippine 9verseas Bmployment 7dministration ;P9B7=, vested with the original and e3clusive !urisdiction over money claims 'etween employers and employees a'road. 2he <a'or 7r'iter still proceeded with the case and rendered a *ecision in favor of private respondent. ISSUE+ .01 B.9. 7/7 should 'e given retroactive effect and thus divest the <a'or 7r'iter of !urisdiction. ,ELD+ 1o. B.9. 7/7 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the e3ception to the rule on prospectivity. <aws should only 'e applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is e3pressly declared or is necessitated. Aurthermore, the !urisdiction over the su'!ect matter is determined 'y the law in force at the time of the commencement of the actionJ in this case, these were P.*. 1(/1 and 1,/1. LATIN MA-IM+ ,5, :(a, :(c, :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6antos v. *uata and the &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 2#4 G.R. No. L-20901 (A1(1s& 31" 19.3$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#." )oo&*o&e No. 134

)ACTS+ *uata and 7guilar 'ought a parcel of land which su'se4uently 'ecame a 4uarter part of <ot 1o. ,7. 2he lot was purchased 'y 6antos, @aanan and 7guilar. Aor convenience, the title was issued in 6antosDs name. 9n 7ugust ,, 1/55, private respondent *uata, the daughter of the *uata spouses, instituted an action for reconveyance of Z of <ot 1o. ,7. 6antos denied the spousesD ownership, claiming that the land had 'een sold to her 'y 7guilar in a private document. 2he trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of 6antos. 8pon appeal, the &7 ruled that the transaction was actually an e4uita'le mortgage under 7rt. 1(+) of the 1ew &ivil &ode and set aside the decision of the trial court. ISSUE+ .hether 6antos and 7guilar, in e3ecuting the said private document, intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. ,ELD+ It is a mortgage. 7rt. 1(+) was designed primarily to curtail the evils 'rought a'out 'y contracts of sale with right of repurchaseJ it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract purporting to 'e a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. 6aid article is remedial in nature and can thus 'e applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the 1ew &ivil &ode. LATIN MA-IM+ Ec, 17, )1, :(e

)+: Municipality of 6an 1arciso, Sue#on v. Mende#, 6r.

Case No. 102 G.R. No. 103#02 (De e8/er ." 1994$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 301" )oo&*o&e No. 130

)ACTS+ President &. @arcia, issued B.9. ,5, creating the municipal district of 6an 7ndres, Sue#on. 2hen 'y virtue of B.9. 17:, issued 'y President *. Macapagal, the municipal district of 6an 7ndres was later officially recogni#ed to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality 'y operation of 6ec. ) of R7 1515. It was then attac"ed of its validity. .hile petitioners would grant that the enactment of R7 71(+ may have converted the Municipality of 6an 7ndres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition for )uo !arranto had 'een filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had ac4uired a vested right to see" the nullification of B.9. ,5,, and any attempt to apply 6ec. ::) of R7 71(+ to the petition would perforce 'e violative of the e4ual protection clause of the &onstitution. ISSUE+

.01 the B.9. creating the municipality of 6an 7ndres was cured 'y 6ec. ::);d= of R7 71(+. ,ELD+ -es. 2he de !ure status of the Municipality of 6an 7ndres in the province of Sue#on must 'e conceded. 6ec. ::);d= of the <@& of 1//1, which provides that municipal districts organi#ed pursuant to presidential issuances or e3ecutives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth 'e considered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities 'y e3ecutive orders which had 'een held to 'e an invalid usurpation of legislative power. LATIN MA-IM+ :(e, (c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

9rtigas M &o. v. Aeati >an" M 2rust

Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-24.#0 (De e8/er 14" 19#9$ C!a%&er <III" 'a(e 312" )oo&*o&e No. 133

)ACTS+ 7ppellee 'egan laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a 'uilding on <ots 1os. 5 and (, to 'e devoted to 'an"ing purposes. 7ppellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial 'uilding on the said lots. 2he latter refused to comply, contending that the 'uilding was 'eing constructed in accordance with the #oning regulations, defendant having filed 'uilding and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. ISSUE+ .01 the resolution of the Municipal &ouncil of Mandaluyong declaring <ots 1os. 5 and (, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial #one of the municipality, prevailed over the 'uilding restrictions imposed 'y plaintiff%appellant on the lots in 4uestion and if Resolution 1o. )7 s%1/(+ is a valid e3ercise of police power. ,ELD+ 2he trial court held that the su'!ect restrictions were su'ordinate to Municipal Resolution 1o. )7. It upheld the classification 'y the Municipal &ouncil of the area along B*67 7venue as a commercial and industrial #one, and held that the same rendered Kineffective and unenforcea'leK the restrictions in 4uestion as against defendant. Resolution 1o. )7 was passed in the valid e3ercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Bven if the su'!ect 'uilding restrictions were assumed 'y the defendant as vendee of <ots 1os. 5 and (, in the deeds of sale and in the 2&2s the contractual o'ligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution 1o. )7. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, :(e

)+5 >illones v. &ourt of Industrial Relations

Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-1#3.. (6152 30" 19.3$ C!a%&er I-" 'a(e 3#2" )oo&*o&e No. 119

)ACTS+ Petitioners were allegedly employees of <u#on 6tevedoring &orporation, which re4uired them to wor" 1E hours a day without giving them additional compensation. 2here was an amica'le settlement 'ut petitioners disclaimed having "nowledge stating they did not authori#e the filing. Respondent contends that petitioners are 'arred due to prescription under 6ec. 7%7 of &.7. 1o. 1::, as amended 'y R7 1//,. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 7%7 of &.7. 1o. 1::, as amended 'y R7 1//, to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this 7ct shall 'e commenced within three years after such cause of action accruedJ otherwise it shall 'e 'arred forever. ,ELD+ It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced 'efore the effective date of this act shall not 'e affected 'y the period prescri'ed. 7s the statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the si3 years from their accrual. 2he court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. >ecause the statute shortened the period within which to 'ring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims were in!uriously affected there'y should have a reasona'le period of one year from the time the new statute too" effect within which to sue on such claims. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, :(e

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine 1ational >an" v. 7suncion

Case No. 23# G.R. No. L-4.093 (No:e8/er 23" 19##$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 30#" )oo&*o&e No. 3

)ACTS+ 9n January 1/(,, Philippine 1ational >an" ;P1>= granted Aa'ar Incorporated a loan secured 'y !oint signatures of Jose >arredo, &armen and 2omas >orromeo and Manuel >arredo. >y May, 1/77 the outstanding 'alance was over PE million. P1> filed a case against all : signatories. However, 'efore the case was decided, Manuel >arredo passed away. 2he case was dismissed pursuant to 6ec. (, Rule E( of the Rules of &ourt that the claim of P1> should 'e filed with the estate proceedings of M. >arredo and cannot 'e 'rought against other surviving de'tors. ISSUE+ .01 the &ourts interpretation of 6ec. (, Rule E( prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary de'tors is accurate. ,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. 1)1( of the 1ew &ivil &ode gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary de'tors, or some, or all$. 2hus, the choice is left up to P1> to decide. 6ec. ( of Rule E( simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased de'tor. 2o re4uire P1> to go against the estate would deprive P1> of his su'stantive rights provided 'y 7rt. 1)1(. In this case, the Rules of &ourt may not prevail over 7rt. 1)1( 'ecause su'stantive law cannot 'e amended 'y a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1/E7 &onstitution states that rules promulgated 'y the 6upreme &ourt should not diminish, increase of modify su'stantive rights. LATIN MA-IM+

/a, /c

)+( 9ngsia"o v. @am'oa

Case No. 90 G.R. No. L-10.# (A%r45 0" 1930$

)ACTS+ In 1/:(, 9ngsia"o ;landowner= and @am'oa ;tenant= entered into a contract pursuant of 6ec. E of 7ct :+5:. 2his act provided that the palay would 'e divided e4ually 'y the ) parties. However, later that same year, 7ct :+5: was amended 'y R7 ,:. *uring li4uidation, @am'oa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55%:5 'asis in favor of the tenants. 9ngsia"o insists that R7 ,: is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot 'e given retroactive effect. >ecause of this, the original contract starting an e4ual sharing of profits should 'e followed. ISSUE+ .01 R7 ,: is remedial in nature and should 'e given retroactive effect. ,ELD+
-es. In the past, laws concerning this issue have 'een amended with the intent of 'eing remedial and therefore, producing retroactive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning R7 ,: that this 'ill see"s to amend the Rice 6hare 2enancy 7ct in such a way to ma"e the division of the crops more e4uita'le to the tenants? 2he principal feature of this 'ill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating.$

LATIN MA-IM+ )a, (', /a, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

7mandy v. People

Case No. # G.R. No. #9010 (Ma2 23" 1900$

)ACTS+ Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.( grams of mari!uana. >ecause he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of si3 years and 1 day ;the minimum time for his offense=. Petitioner then filed for pro'ation alleging P.*. /(E. However, the petition was denied 'ecause P.*. 1//+ had repealed P.*. /(E, no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligi'le for pro'ation. ISSUE+ .01 the lower court erred in disapproving 7mandyDs petition for pro'ation. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he law clearly declares who are entitled to pro'ation and who arenDt. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled 'ecause those who have 'een sentenced to serve a ma3imum term of more than si3 years$ are e3cluded from the 'enefits of the Pro'ation <aw. >ecause P.*. 1//+

was promulgated after P.*. /(E, the former prevails. .here the law is clear and unam'iguous, it must 'e ta"en as it is, devoid of !udicial addition or su'traction. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 7', ))a, )5a, ,(a, :,, :/

)+7 Parras v. <and Registration &ommission

Case No. 19# G.R. No. L-1.011 (6152 2." 19.0$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 390" )oo&*o&e No. 1.

)ACTS+ Petitioner was re4uired 'y the <and Registration &ommissioner ;<R&= to remit to the &ommissionerLs office, pursuant to 6pecial Provisions of R7 ),++, otherwise "nown as the 7ppropriations 7ct for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.++ as estimated cost of pu'lication in the 9fficial @a#ette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional 'eing as it is revenue%raising. He prays that he 'e e3empt from such a deposit and that the <R& and the *irector of Printing 'e ordered to pu'lish the notice in the 9fficial @a#ette. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ Petitioner was made to pay. 2he law that petitioner relies on was 6ec. 11: of 7ct :/(. 2he reenactment of the same law as R7 117 did not include the said provision of 7ct :/(. LATIN MA-IM+ 11, ,), ,E' .01 petitioner can 'e e3empted. .01 the law states that persons will 'e made to pay for the pu'lication.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*iu v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. 9. G.R. No. 113213 (De e8/er 19" 1993$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 391" )oo&*o&e No. 20

)ACTS+ 9n several occasions, private respondent Pag'a purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitionersL store all valued at P7,E().55. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners 'rought the matter 'efore the >arangay &hairman and the latter set the case for hearing, 'ut private respondents failed to appear. .hen the parties met, they failed to reach an amica'le settlement. Private respondents in their 7nswer, while admitting inde'tedness, interposed two counterclaimsF ;1= for P(,))7.++ as alleged e3penses for maintenance and repair of the 'oat 'elonging to petitioners, and ;)= another for P1),++++.++ representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. ISSUE+ .01 parties did not meet in presence of a Pang"at as re4uired 'y law.

,ELD+ Petition was granted without pre!udice to the re%filing of the case 'y petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.*. 15+E, otherwise "nown as the KOatarungang Pam'arangay <awK. It must 'e noted that P.*. 15+E has 'een repealed 'y codification in the <@& of 1//1. 2he 'asic complaint was filed 'y petitioners 'efore the trial court 'efore the effectivity of the <@&. 1evertheless, 6ec. : and ( of the former law have 'een su'stantially reproduced in 6ec. :1+;'= and :1) respectively, of the latter law. LATIN MA-IM+ :, 5', /a, ,('

)+E @overnment v. 6pringer

Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-2.9#9 (A%r45 1" 192#$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 30" )oo&*o&e No. 1..

)ACTS+ 2he 1ational &oal &ompany elected its 'oard of directors via vote in accordance with its 'y% laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected 'y the proper shareholders. 2he 1ational &oal &ompany was formed 'y the Philippine @overnment. 2he @overnment intended to retain a ma!ority sta"e in the said companyJ however, it ended up occupying almost /+C of the stoc". *uring the election of directors, three mem'ers of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the e3ecutive. ISSUE+ .01 the e3ecutive is the sole administrator of the Philippine @overnment. ,ELD+ -es. 6ec. : of 7ct 1o. )7+5, as amended 'y 6ec. ) of 7ct 1o. )E)), as purports to vest the voting power of the government%owned stoc" in the 1ational &oal &ompany in the President of the 6enate and the 6pea"er of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, /a, ,+a, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Mecano v. &ommission on 7udit

Case No. 1#. G.R. No. 103902 (De e8/er 11" 1992$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 393" )oo&*o&e No. 43

)ACTS+ Petitioner see"s to nullify the decision of the &ommission on 7udit ;&97= em'odied in its Bndorsement denying his claim for reim'ursement under 6ec. (// of the Revised 7dministrative &ode ;R7&=, as amended. Petitioner is a *irector II of the 1ational >ureau of Investigation ;1>I=. He was hospitali#ed for cholecystitis from March )( to 7pril 7, 1//+, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitali#ation e3penses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the &97. However, the

reim'ursement process was stalled 'ecause of the issue that the R7& 6ec. (// was repealed 'y the 7dministrative &ode of 1/E7. ISSUE+ 1. .01 petitioner can claim from the &97. ). .01 6ec. (// of R7& was repealed 'y the 7dministrative &ode of 1/E7. ,ELD+ Petition was granted. 2he 4uestion of whether or not petitioner can claim from &97 is rooted on whether or not 6ec. (// of the R7& has 'een repealed. 2he &ourt finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the 7dministrative &ode of 1/E7 is merely under implied repeal, and the &ourt considers such implied repeal as not favora'le. 7lso the &ourt finds that laws must 'e in accord with each other. 2he second sentence of 7rt. 17, of the <a'or &ode, as amended 'y P.*. 1/)1, e3pressly provides that Kthe payment of compensation under this 2itle shall not 'ar the recovery of 'enefits as provided for in 6ec. (// of the R7& ? whose 'enefits are administered 'y the system ;666 or @6I6= or 'y other agencies of the government.$ LATIN MA-IM+ ,+a, ,), ,7, ,E', :/

)+/ &hin 7h Aoo and -ee 6hee v. &oncepcion and <ee Hoo
Case No. 20 G.R. No. 33201 (Mar ! 31" 1930$

)ACTS+ 2he accused, one &han 6am, was ac4uitted of murder 'ut was ordered to 'e committed to an asylum. 2he court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctorDs reports. In issuing the order of release the respondent !udge relied upon 7rt. E, par. :, of the Penal &ode. 9n the other hand, 6ec. 1+:E of the 7dministrative &ode confers on the *irector of Health the authority to say when a patient may 'e discharged from an insane asylum. ISSUE+ .01 the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person su'se4uently to leave the asylum without the approval of the *irector of Health. ,ELDF It is a well%"nown rule of statutory construction that when there is no e3press repeal, none is presumed to 'e intended. <i"ewise, when two portions of the law can 'e construed so that 'oth can stand together, this should 'e done. 7rt. E of the Penal &ode has not 'een impliedly repealed 'y 6ec. 1+:E of the 7dministrative &ode. 2he powers of the courts and the *irector of Health are complementary with each other. 2hus, any person confined in any asylum 'y order of the court in accordance with 7rt. E of the Penal &ode cannot 'e discharged from custody without the ac4uiescence of the *irector of Health. 2he converse proposition e4ually holds true. LATIN MA-IM+ ,E', :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

-nchausti M &o v. 6tanley

Case No. 1#4 G.R. No 12330 (6a*1ar2 23" 191#$

)ACTS+ 2he petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping 'usiness, sought to prohi'it the Insular &ollector of &ustoms from enforcing the re4uirement, which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. 2he petitioner relied upon the ground that 7ct 1o. )(1: was not and could not have 'een repealed 'y the 7dministrative &odeJ 7ct 1o. )(1: 'eing specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE+ .01 there is a conflict 'etween 7ct 1o. )(1: and paragraph ;e= of 6ec. 1,1) of the 7dministrative &ode. ,ELDF 2here is no e3press repeal of 7ct 1o. )(1:. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. 2he Philippine <egislature could not have intended to repeal said 7ct within less than three wee"s after its passage and su'stitute in its place a'solutely nothing e3cept the uncontrolled !udgment of the Insular &ollector of &ustoms. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, /c, :/, 5+

)1+ 8.6. v. 2antoco

Case No. 1.4 G.R. No. 11330 (A1(1s& 13" 191.$

)ACTS+ 2he defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. 2he trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that 7ct 1o. ),E1 and all other laws had 'een repealed 'y the 7ct of the 8nited 6tates &ongress. 2he @overnment appealed. ISSUE+ .hat the effect of said 7ct was upon local legislation dealing with the su'!ect of opium. ,ELD+ 2hat the 8nited 6tates &ongress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the su'!ect of opium appears from the law itself. .hether or not an 7ct is impliedly repealed is a 4uestion of legislative intent to 'e ascertained 'y an e3amination of 'oth statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and o'!ect of 'oth. 2he 8nited 6tates &ongress never intended to rela3 the stringent provisions relating to the smo"ing of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Aa'ros, et al. v. <aya

Case No. 44 G. R. No. #0032 (De e8/er 10" 190#$

)ACTS+ 2his is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authori#ed tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in 6ec. ,;a= of P.*. :51, and thereafter, under the Bducation 7ct of 1/E) ;>P ),)=. 2hen Minister of Bducation Jaime &. <aya promulgated the disputed MB&6 9rder 1o. )5, entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of >P ),), 2he Bducation 7ct of 1/E), relative to 6tudent Aees for 6chool -ear 1/E5% 1/E(. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations, which was granted to them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the 2R9 on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already 'een approved pursuant to P.*. :51, which the &ourt there'y lifted. ISSUE+ .01 >P ),) has repealed P.*. :51 which there'y ma"es MB&6 9rder 1o. )5 valid. ,ELD+ -es. 8nder P.*. :51, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges 'y private schools is lodged with the 6ecretary of Bducation and &ulture, where 6ec. :) of >P ),) li'erali#ed the procedure 'y empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. P.*. :51 provides that (+C of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall 'e applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of mem'ers of the faculty and other employees of the schoolJ while >P ),) provides that the increment shall 'e applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated 'y the MB&6. Hence, there was a repeal. LATIN MA-IM+ :, ,/'

)11 Iloilo Palay and &orn Planters 7ssociation, Inc. v. Aeliciano

Case No. 12# G.R. No. L-24022 (Mar ! 3" 19.3$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 399" )oo&*o&e No. .1

)ACTS+ Private respondent Aeliciano, the &hairman and @eneral Manager of the Rice and &orn 7dministration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the 1ational Bconomic &ouncil as em'odied in its Resolution 1o. 7+, series of 1/(:. It was approved. 2he President designated the Rice and &orn 7dministration as the government agency authori#ed to underta"e the importation pursuant to which &hairman Aeliciano announced an invitation to 'id for said importation and set the 'idding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to R7 ,:5) which prohi'its the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. ISSUE+ .01 R7 ))+7 was repealed 'y R7 ,:5). ,ELD+ 2he importation may 'e illegal on the ground that such importation 'elong e3clusively to

private parties, there'y prohi'iting any government agency from doing so. R7 ))+7 provides that should there 'e an e3isting or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified 'y the 1ational Bconomic &ouncil, the President may authori#e such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. 2he two laws, although with a common o'!ective, refer to different methods applica'le to different circumstances. 2he two laws can therefore 'e construed as harmonious parts of the legislative e3pression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal 'y implication, the latter statute must 'e irreconcila'ly inconsistent and repugnant to the prior e3isting law, hence there was no repeal. LATIN MA-IM+ ,E', ,/a

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>rias de &oya v. 2an <ua, et al.

Case No. 1. G.R. No. 30#3. (Se%&e8/er 22" 1931$

)ACTS+ *efendant%appellant 2an <ua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in &hina. 7t this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encum'er her properties situated in the Philippines. 7 certain Hicente 1epomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. *efendant%appellant e3ecuted a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. 2he assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. ISSUE+ .01 the mortgage given 'y respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has 'een made. ,ELD+ 2he Insolvency <aw and the <and Registration 7ct compliment each other and are 'oth intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors, according the latter a means for securing their insolvent de'torLs property, against which they may enforce their credits. &onstruing the Insolvency <aw together with the <and Registration 7ct, we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the insolvent de'torLs real property made 'y the cler" of the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, 'oth such proceedings and the assignment must have 'een recorded in the registry of deeds, the former from their commencement. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him 'y the latter, which was registered with a 2orrens title, is legal and valid. LATIN MA-IM+ ,E', ,/a

)1) Hillegas vs. 6u'ido

Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31#11" (Se%&e8/er 30" 19#1$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 411" )oo&*o&e No.9.

)ACTS+ 2he 6ecretary of Ainance authori#ed Jose R. @loria of the 9ffice of the &ity 2reasurer of Manila to assume the duties of 7ssistant &ity 2reasurer. In an 7dministrative 9rder, series of 1/(E, Petitioner, Mayor of the &ity of Manila, directed @loria to desist and refrain from e3ercising the duties and functions of the 7ssistant &ity 2reasurer, saying that Romualde# is not empowered to ma"e such designation. Petitioner, appointed Manuel *. <apid as 7ssistant &ity 2reasurer. Respondent, disapproved the appointment, 'asing his action, on an opinion of the 6ecretary of Justice, to the effect that the appointment of 7ssistant Provincial 2reasurers is still governed 'y 6ec. )+EEa of the Revised 7dministrative &ode, and not 'y 6ec. : of the *ecentrali#ation <aw, R7 51E5. ISSUE+ .01 the *ecentrali#ation <aw should govern. ,ELD+ 1o. It has 'een the constant holding of this court that repeals 'y implication are not favored and will not 'e so declared unless it 'e manifest that the legislature so intended. 6uch a doctrine goes as far 'ac" as 8nited 6tates v. Reyes, a 1/+E decision. It is necessary then 'efore such a repeal is deemed to e3ist that it 'e shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same su'!ect matter and that the latter 'e inconsistent with the former. 7 su'se4uent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, /, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Jalandoni vs. Bndaya

Case No. 13# G.R. No. L-23094" (6a*1ar2 24" 19#4$ C!a%&er -" )oo&*o&e No. .2

)ACTS+ Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for li'el against a 6erafin &ru# in the Municipal &ourt of >atangas presided over 'y the Respondent Judge. *uring the hearing of the li'el case &ru#, through counsel manifested in open court that under 7rt. ,(+ of the Revised Penal &ode, ;the court of first instance of the province or city where the li'elous article is printed and first pu'lished or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense=, Respondent Judge was devoid of !urisdiction to do so. 2here was, as noted, a negative response. Respondent still tried the case. ISSUE+ .01 Municipal &ourt of >atangas has !urisdiction over case at hand. ,ELD+ 1o. 7s is clear from his well%written memorandum, he did 'ase his action on what for him was the conse4uence of the Judiciary 7ct as amended 'y R7 ,E)E, 6ec. E7 of which would confer concurrent !urisdiction on municipal !udges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for 'y law does not e3ceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than si3 years or fine not e3ceeding si3 thousand pesos or 'oth. <i'el is one of those offenses included in such category. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June )), 1/(,, the provisions of 7rt. ,(+ as last amended 'y R7 1)E/ conferring e3clusive !urisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed 'y implication.

LATIN MA-IM+ 1, /, :/

)1, &IR vs. Rio 2u'a 1ic"el Mining &orporation.

Case No. #9 G.R. Nos. 03303-04 Se%&e8/er 30" 1991 C!a%&er -" 'a(e 400" )oo&*o&e No..4

)ACTS+ Respondent &orporation filed with the &ommissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P/7:,/7E.5+ and P:):,,+,.,,, respectively, representing )5C of the specific ta3es collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utili#ed in its operations as a mining concessionaire, using R7 1:,5 as 'asis. 2he &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals decided that Respondent &orporation can no longer claim this due to P.*. ),1, :,( and 711. ISSUE+ .01 Repu'lic 7ct 1o. 1:,5 ;7n 7ct 2o Provide Means of Increasing the Highway 6pecial Aund= or certain provisions thereof have 'een repealed 'y su'se4uent statutes. ,ELD+ -es. .e find that the disputed proviso found in 6ec. 5 of R7 1:,5 was drafted to favor a particular group of ta3payers%the miners and the lum'ermen%'ecause it was KunfairK to su'!ect them to the increased rates and in effect ma"e them su'sidi#e the construction of highways from which they did not directly 'enefit. @iven the present concept of the general fund and its wide application, then the proviso in 6ec. 5 of R7 1:,5 has truly 'ecome an anachronism. It is inevita'le that, sooner or later, the miners will stand to 'enefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer 'e correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific ta3es to augment the general fund for government underta"ings is KunfairK to the miners 'ecause they are not directly convenienced. .hile we generally do not favor repeal 'y implication, it cannot 'e denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative 'ut to concede the point that an earlier law has 'een impliedly repealed or revo"ed 'y a later law 'ecause of an o'vious inconsistency. LATIN MA-IM+ :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Halde# v. 2ua#on

Case No. 111 G.R. No. L-1493# (Mar ! 1." 1920$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 300" )oo&*o&e No. 9

)ACTS+ 2his is a petition for divorce filed 'y petitioner against his respondent wife. 7ct 1o. )71+ states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concu'inage cannot 'e granted e3cept upon conviction. 2he respondent has never 'een convicted of the offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce 'ased on prevailing laws 'efore the enactment of 7ct 1o. )71+. ISSUE+

.01 7ct 1o. )71+ should 'e applied in the case. ,ELD+ 7ct 1o. )71+ should 'e applied. Bven if the said 7ct has no repealing clause, when there is a plain and unavoida'le repugnancy 'etween two laws, the later must 'e given effect. 1egative statutes are mandatory, and must 'e presumed to have 'een intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. 2he situation in this case does not re4uire the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmista"a'le. LATIN MA-IM+ 7a, :/

)1: Bstate of Mota v. &oncepcion

Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-34301 (Mar ! 31" 1932$

)ACTS+ In 1/1/, <a#aro Mota and 6alvador 6erra entered into a partnership to construct several "ilometers of railroad in 9ccidental 1egros. In 1/)+, 6erra transferred his half interest to &oncepcion and .hita"er. In *ecem'er of the same year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. 9n the last sale, only part of the price was paid, so &oncepcion and .hita"er mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ 1. 7ccording to 6tandard 9il &o. vs. &astro, 6ec. 1/: of the 7dministrative &ode clearly recogni#es the validity of such a contract 'etween the contracting parties. ). 2he election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. 6erra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. LATIN MA-IM+ 1 .01 a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. .01 enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

2orrente v. @rove

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-2340 (De e8/er 21" 1903$

)ACTS+ 2his case is an appeal from a ha'eas corpus proceeding, discharging the petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no !urisdiction to issue the order directing the ma"ing of an arrest outside the Province of &e'u. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner, were illegal and void.

ISSUE+ .01 the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may 'e in the Philippines. ,ELD+ 8nder the provision of 6ec. 1, of @.9. 1o. 5E, a !ustice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may 'e in the Philippines. *ue to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed the 6panish law. 2he contention of the petitioner that 7ct 1o. 5/ is a proof that the &ivil &ommission deemed it necessary to ma"e an e3press grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the pu'lication of the said law the processes of the !ustices of the peace did not run throughout the province, much less the archipelago. 2he court however said that the opinion of the law ma"ing authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration, 'ut it is not conclusive on the courts. LATIN MA-IM+ :, :/

)15 Pamil v. 2eleron

Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-34034 (No:e8/er 20" 19#0$ C!a%&er I" 'a(e 33" )oo&*o&e No. 140

)ACTS+ Respondent Ar. @on#aga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of 7l'u4uer4ue, >ohol. 2he petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for @on#agaDs dis4ualification 'ased on 6ec. )175 of the 7dministrative &ode which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics 'e elected to a municipal office. ISSUE+ .01 an ecclesiastic is eligi'le to 'e elected. ,ELD+ 2he vote was indecisive. 6even 'elieved 6ec. )175 was no longer operative. Aive 'elieved that the prohi'ition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. 2hough the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. @on#aga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. D4sse*&4*( Se:e*+ 2he challenged provision was superseded 'y the 1/,5 &onstitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall 'e re4uired for the e3ercise of political rights. 6ec. )175 was also repealed 'y the Blection &ode for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligi'le persons. 7lso, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the su'!ect shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. M4*or )4:e+ Aor a later provision to repeal a prior one there must 'e such a'solute repugnance 'etween the two. 1o such repugnance is discerni'le. 6ec. )175 has neither 'een repealed nor superseded. 2he section also admitted no e3ception, therefore there can 'e none. 2he &ourt cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. LATIN MA-IM+ D4sse*&4*( Se:e*+ /a, ,+a, ,), :/ M4*or )4:e+ (c, 7a, 7c, ,7, :,

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

People v. 7lmuete

Case No. 200 G.R. No. L-2.331 ()e/r1ar2 2#" 19#.$ C!a%&er I<" 'a(e 142" )oo&*o&e No. .1

)ACTS+ 7lmuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of 6ec. ,/ of the 7gricultural 2enancy <aw ;72<=. 2he accused, tenants of Aernando, allegedly pre%threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or o'taining her consent. 2he accused filed a motion to 4uash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE+ .01 pre%threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. ,ELD+ 6ec. ,/ was impliedly repealed 'y the 7gricultural <and Reform &ode which was already in force at the time of the act. 2he 7<R& suspended the 72<. It instituted the leasehold system and a'olished the rice share tenancy system. 2he prohi'ition against pre%threshing is premised on the e3istence of the rice share tenancy system and is the 'asis for penali#ing clandestine pre% threshing. 2he evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. 2he legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenantDs act of pre%threshing is evident 'y not re%enacting 6ec. ,/ of the 72<. 7 su'se4uent statute, revising the whole su'!ect matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. 2he repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of !urisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 1+, :7, :/

)1( 6mith >ell M &o. v. Municipality of Pam'oanga

Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-33310 (De e8/er 20" 1930$

)ACTSF Municipality of Pam'oanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the 'aling of hemp in accordance with 9rdinance 1o. ))(. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such ta3 and that the ordinance in 4uestion is null and void. 2he defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the ta3 in 4uestion under 6ec. )()5;d= of the 7dministrative &ode 'ut it does have such power under a su'se4uent enactment of 7ct 1o. ,:)). ISSUEF .01 7ct 1o. ,:)) repealed 6ec. )()5;d= the 7dministrative &ode. ,ELD+ Repeals 'y implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its repeal, it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in e3pressly repealing 6ec. ):+7 of the 7dministrative &ode. 7 general affirmative act will not 'e construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. LATIN MA-IMF ,7, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<echoco v. &ivil 7eronautics >oard

Case No. #1 G.R. No. L-329#9-01 ()e/r1ar2 29" 19#2$

)ACTS+ Petitioner contends that 'y the enactment of R7 )(77 amending 6ec. 1,;a= and 1: of &.7. 1o. 1:(, !urisdiction to control rates of airships was ta"en away from the &ivil 7eronautics >oard ;&7>= and re%vested in the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission ;P6&= since R7 )(77 impliedly repealed R7 77( which conferred to the &7> the power of control over air rates and fares. 9n the other hand, respondents argue that !urisdiction over air fares and rates were, under 'oth statutes, e3ercisa'le concurrently 'y the &7> and the P6&. ISSUEF .hether the authority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in the &7> or in the P6&. ,ELD+ 7uthority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in 'oth the &7> and the P6&. 8nder R7 77(, the &7> can fi3 and determine reasona'le individual, !oint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers 'ut is su'!ect to the ma3imum rates on freights and passengers that may 'e set 'y the P6& under R7 )(77. Aurthermore, implied repeal of statutes is not favored. LATIN MA-IMF ,7, ,E'

)17 Hillegas v. Bnrile

Case No. 1#1 G.R. No. L-2902# (Mar ! 31" 19#3$

)ACTSF It is the contention of the petitioner that if 6ec. : of the *ecentrali#ation 7ct 'e given effect, then the authority to appoint a &ity Aiscal is not lodged in respondent 6ecretary of Justice 'ut in him as Mayor of the &ity of Manila. 2he defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the &harter of the &ity of Manila, which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. ISSUEF .01 the *ecentrali#ation 7ct impliedly repealed the provision of the &harter of the &ity of Manila. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he issue in this case was already decided in previous !urisprudence in the case of Hillegas v. 6u'ido. Aurthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that the &ity Aiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the *ecentrali#ation 7ct. LATIN MA-IMF )a, 5a, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Hillegas v. 6u'ido

Case No. 1#2 G.R. No. L-24012 ; L- 24040 (A1(1s& 9" 19.3$

)ACTS+ 2he &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice claims that R7 ))(+ impliedly repealed R7 557and :+/ providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. 2he &ity Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and su'mit to the &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice all pending disciplinary cases. ISSUE .01 R7 ))(+ impliedly repeal R7 557 and 6ec. )) of R7 :+/ so as to vest in the &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice the e3clusive and original !urisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila in the competitive service. ,ELD+ 1o. R7 ))(+ states that the removal and suspension 'y the &ity Mayor can 'e passed upon or reviewed 'y the &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other 'ody. R7 557 and :+/ are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila, R7 557 and :+/ su'sists side %'y%side with R7 ))(+ and are not impliedly repealed 'y the latter which is a general law. R7 ))(+ contemplates appeal from the decision of the &ity Mayor to the &ommissioner of &ivil 6ervice, instead of to the President. Repeal 'y implication is not favored and if two laws can 'e reconciled, the construction will 'e against such repeal. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,E', 5+

)1E 8.6. v. Palacio

Case No. 301 G.R. No. 11002 (6a*1ar2 1#" 191.$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 40." )oo&*o&e No. ##

)ACTS+ Respondent was accused of violating 6ec. E7 of 7ct 1o. E) when he willfully omitted from the ta3 lists real property which he "nows to 'e lawfully ta3a'le. He posits that 7ct 1o. )),E repeals 'y implication 7ct 1o. E) 'ecause of the clause in 6ec. 1E that states all acts or parts of 7cts in conflict therewith are repealed.$ ISSUE+ .01 7ct 1o. )),E had repealed the penal effect of 7ct 1o. E). ,ELD+ 1o. 7ct 1o. )),E had done nothing 'ut to change the method and procedure provided in 7ct 1o. E). Repeals 'y implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. 7ct 1o. )),E provides no penalty thus, 6ec. E7 of 7ct 1o. E) continues in force. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, ,E'

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Marin v. 1acianceno

Case No. 1#1 G.R. No. 3939 (Mar ! 29" 1911$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 411" )oo&*o&e No. 100

)ACTS+ Aelisa Hernande# died 'efore the testatri3, 'ut the testatri3 did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 2he petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon 6ec. 75E of the &ode of &ivil Procedure which provides that .hen a devise or a legacy is made to a child? and the devisee or legatee dies 'efore the testator, leaving issues? such issue shall ta"e the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done? unless a different disposition is re4uired 'y law.$ 2he e3ecutor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died 'efore the testator so as to pass to the heirs. ISSUE+ .01 the heirs of Aelisa Hernande# 'ecome the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. ,ELD+ -es. 2he construction 'y the respondent would repeal or annul the section a'solutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy, then 6ec. 75E would have no value and might as well have never 'een written which is an a'surd interpretation. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 11

)1/ Helunta v. &hief, Philippine &onsta'ulary

Case No. 309 G.R. No. L-#1033 (6a*1ar2 20" 1900$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 412" )oo&*o&e No. 102

)ACTS+ Petitioner as patrolman and mem'er of the Integrated 1ational police ;I1P= apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. 7n altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver <o#ano. 7nacorita, the widow of <o#ano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there e3ists a prima facie evidence that petitioner, with deli'erate intent and with intent to "ill,$ shot <o#ano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends that @eneral &ourt Martial has no !urisdiction since P.*. 1E5+ was repealed 'y B.9. 1+:+ M 1+1). ISSUE+ .01 the &ourt Martial has !urisdiction. ,ELD+ -es. It is specifically stated under B.9. 1+1) that it is only the operational supervision and direction$ over all units of the I1P that was transferred from the &onsta'ulary to the city0municipal government. 8nder B.9. 1+:+, it is the e3ercise of administrative control and supervision$ over units of the I1P that was transferred to the President. 2he allegation that P.*. 1E5+ has 'een

e3pressly repealed 'y clear and precise provision of B.9. 1+:+ is inaccurate. Repeals 'y implication are not favored and will not 'e so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )+c, )7, ,7

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Pacis v. 7veria

Case No. 194 G.R. No. L-2232. (No:e8/er 29" 19..$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 413" )oo&*o&e No. 103

)ACTS+ Petitioner, the 7cting &ollector of &ustoms, commenced a sei#ure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for 'oat loaded with unta3ed cigarettes. 9n the same day, Marges, the alleged 'oat owner, filed a &ivil &ase for replevin alleging that the 'oat was stolen. 2he fishing 'oat therein was transferred to the Provincial 6heriff, and later on to Marges as commanded 'y respondent Hon. 7veria. ISSUE+ ,. .01 Marges could recover the fishing 'oat. :. .01 Provincial 6heriff may 'e held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. ,ELD+ 1. 1o. 2he !urisdiction of the &ollector of &ustoms is provided for in R7 1/,7 which too" effect much later than the Judiciary 7ct. It is a3iomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. ). -es. 2he writ was received 'y respondent 6heriff. It has also caught the 6upreme &ourtDs notice that respondent sheriff has practically ta"en the cudgels for the 'oat owner. He went 'eyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the 'oat owner giving impression that his interest in the su'!ect is more than !ust the interest of a pu'lic official. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, )+c, :/

))+ Herman v. Radio &orporation of the Philippines

Case No. 123 G.R. No. 2.002 (6152 13" 192#$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 414" )oo&*o&e No. 10#

)ACTS+ 2wo Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio 'usiness ;Aar Bastern Radio Inc. and Radio &orp.= agreed to merge. 2he petitioner herein has 'een largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should 'e offered the post of manager of the traffic department. ISSUE+ .01 HermanDs claim for salary has 'een e3pressly waived in the final agreement.

,ELD+ -es. In 6ec. ,,, of the &ode of &ivil Procedures, it mentions that whenever a party has, 'y his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deli'erately led another to 'elieve a particular thing is true and to act upon such 'elief, he cannot 'e permitted to falsify it. 6ec. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. 2he &ode of &ivil Procedures must prevail 'ecause it is a later e3pression of legislative will than 7rt. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, :/

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine 1ational >an" v. &ru#, et al.

Case No. 239 G.R. No. 00393 (De e8/er 10" 1909$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 414" )oo&*o&e No. 100

)ACTS+ 7ggregate Mining B3ponents ;7MBG= suffered huge financial losses and was una'le to pay its remaining employees. 2wo years after, 7MBG entered into an operation contract agreement with 2.M. 6an 7ndres *evelopment &orporation, thus ena'ling the latter to ac4uire on lease the e4uipment of 7MBG. 2he unpaid wor"ers filed for monetary compensation 'efore the <a'or 7r'iter. 2he said 7r'iter awarded 'ac"wages and separation pay. 7MBG did not appeal 'ut P1>, as mortgage% creditor, appealed and alleged that the wor"ers should 'e given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. 2he 1<R& denied the appeal of P1>. Hence, this instant petition 'y the P1> on the grounds that 7rticle 11+ of the <a'or &ode does not create lien in favor of the wor"ers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. ISSUE+ .01 7rt. 11+ of the <a'or &ode is to 'e construed as not favoring the unpaid wor"ers 'ecause of the order of preference provided in 7rt. )):1 to )):5 of the &ivil &ode. ,ELD+ 1o. 7rt. 11+ of the <a'or &ode provides for wor"er preference in case of 'an"ruptcy$. It specifically states that In the event of 'an"ruptcy? of an employerDs 'usiness, his wor"ers shall en!oy AIR62 preference as regards to their unpaid wages, any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding? such unpaid wages shall 'e paid in A8<< 'efore claims of the government and other creditors may 'e paid.$ LATIN MA-IM+ (a, :/

))1 *avid v. &ommission on Blections

Case No. 03 G.R. No. 12#11. (A%r45 0" 199#$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 413" )oo&*o&e No. 103

)ACTS+ >arangay &hairman 7le3 *avid raised the 4uestion of when the 'arangay elections should

'e held and 4uestions the &9MB<B&Ds schedule of holding such elections on the ) nd Monday of May 1//7. 2he &9MB<B&Ds 'asis is R.7. 71(+ or the <ocal @overnment &ode which mandates 'arangay elections every , years. Petitioner *avid contends that an earlier law, R.7. ((7/, should 'e the one followed. R.7. ((7/ provides that 'arangay elections should 'e held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of 7rt. 1+, 6ec. E of the &onstitution. ISSUE+ 1. ). ,ELD+ 1. It is 'asic in cases of irreconcila'le conflict 'etween two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Aurthermore, the 6upreme &ourt in Paras v+ /3M-5-/ had the opportunity to mention when the ne3t 'arangay election should 'e when it stated that the ne3t regular election involving the 'arangay office is 'arely 7 months away, the same having 'een scheduled in May 1//7$. ). 1o. 7rt. 1+, 6ec. E of the &onstitution provides that, I2he term of office of elective local officials, e3cept 'arangay officials, which shall 'e determined 'y law, shall 'e three years?$ It is not to 'e construed as prohi'iting a ,%year term of office for 'arangay officials. LATIN MA-IM+
1, /a, )+a, :/

.hat the term of office of 'arangay officials is. .01 there was a violation of 7rt. 1+, 6ec. E of the &onstitution.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of 7ppeals

Case No. #3 G.R. No. 93022 (Mar ! 23" 1992$ C!a%&er <II" 'a(e 300" )oo&*o&e No. 01

)ACTS+ 2his is a petition to reverse the *ecision ordering the refund of the @&< Retirement Plan representing the withholding ta3 on income. R7 :/17 e3empted the @&< Retirement Plan, including all the retirement 'enefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income ta3. 6oon after, P.*. 1/5/ was promulgated a'olishing the e3emption from withholding ta3 of interest on 'an" deposits previously given 'y P.*. 17,/ if the recipient of the interest is e3empt from income ta3ation. 2he @&< Plan is one of those e3empted from income ta3 under R7 :/17. Petitioner contends that P.*. 1/5/ impliedly repealed the provisions of R7 :/17 and R7 1/E,, and that @&< Plan is su'!ect to the final withholding ta3. ISSUE+ .01 @&< Retirement Plan retains its ta3 e3emption after the promulgation of P.*. 1/5/. ,ELD+ -es. 2he deletion in P.*. 1/5/ of the provisions regarding ta3 e3emption under the old law canDt 'e deemed to 'e applica'le to the employeesD trusts. P.*. 1/5/ is a general law, hence, it canDt repeal a specific provision impliedly. It is "nown in statutory construction that a su'se4uent statute that is general in character canDt 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. 7lso in Hillegas v. 6u'ido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. LATIN MA-IM+ 1, 5a, :,, 5+

))) People v. <eachon, Jr.

Case No. 100 G.R. No. 100#23-2. (Se%&e8/er 23" 1990$

)ACTSF 2he Provincial Prosecutor of 9ccidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P.*. 77), also "nown as 7nti%64uatting <aw 'efore the R2& presided over 'y respondent !udge. 7fter presenting the evidence, the prosecution rested the cases. 7lmost a year after the prosecution has rested, respondent !udge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lac" of !urisdiction. 2hereafter, the &7 ordered the continuation of trial of the su'!ect case. 7 month after, the respondent !udge dismissed the case again, opining that P.*. 77) is o'solete and deemed repealed 'y 6ec. / and 1+ of 7rt. 1, of the 1/E7 &onstitution, which provide that, ur'an or rural poor dwellers shall not 'e evicted nor their dwellings demolished e3cept in accordance with law and in a !ust and humane manner.$ ISSUEF .01 responded !udge acted in grave a'use of discretion in dismissing the su'!ect criminal case. ,ELDF -es. 2he 7nti%64uatting law en!oys the presumption of constitutionality. 8nless otherwise repealed 'y a su'se4uent law or ad!udged unconstitutional 'y this court, a law will always 'e presumed valid. 7t the time the order was issued 'y respondent !udge, P.*. 77) was still effective. 1either has this court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social !ustice provision of the &onstitution. LATIN MA-IMF ,7, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine 7irlines Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission

Case No. 110 G.R. No. 11430# (6152 0" 1990$

Private respondent Bdil'erto &astro was hired as manifesting cler" 'y petitioner P7<. Respondent was apprehended 'y government authorities while a'out to 'oard a flight en route to Hong"ong in violation of &entral >an" ;&>= &ircular )(5, as amended 'y &> &ircular ,E,, in relation to 6ec. ,: of R7 )(5, as amended.

P7< placed &astro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. 2hree years and si3 months after his suspension, P7< issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged 'ut nonetheless reinstated the latter. 2he said resolution li"ewise re4uired respondent to affi3 his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action ta"en 'y P7<. 8pon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against P7< for 'ac"wages and salary increases granted under the collective 'argaining agreement ;&>7= covering the period of his suspension. ISSUEF .01 &astro is entitled to 'ac"wages and salary increases granted under the &>7 during his period of suspension.

,ELDF -es. 2he rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not e3ceed a ma3imum period of ,+ days, after which period, the employee must 'e reinstated to his former position. If the suspension is otherwise e3tended, the employee shall 'e entitled to his salaries and other 'enefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension.
LATIN MA-IMF 7a, 1,'

)), Province of Misamis 9riental v. &agayan Blectric Power and <ight &ompany, Inc.
Case No. 12# G.R. No. 43333 (6a*1ar2 12" 1990$

)ACTSF Respondent &BP7<&9 was granted a franchise under R7 ,):7, ,57+, and (+)+ to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in &agayan de 9ro &ity and its su'ur's including the municipalities of 2agoloan, 9pol, Hillanueva, and Jasaan. 2he franchise of &BP7<&9 e3pressly e3empts it from payment of all ta3es of whatever authority$ e3cept ,C ta3 on its gross earnings. 2he Provincial treasurer of Misamis 9riental, however, demanded payment of the provincial franchise ta3 from &BP7<&9 in accordance with the <ocal 2a3 &ode ;P.*. ),1= and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue 9rdinance 1o. 1/. ISSUEF .01 &BP7<&9 is e3empt from paying the provincial franchise ta3. ,ELDF 1o. 1o provision in P.*. ),1 e3pressly or impliedly amends or repeals R7 ,):7, ,57+ and (+)+. 7 special and local statute applica'le to a particular case is not repealed 'y a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are 'road enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. 7lso, the 6ecretary of Ainance made it clear that the franchise ta3 provided in the <ocal 2a3 &ode may only 'e imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain e3empting clause. LATIN MA-IMF )a, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

*e Joya v. <antin

Case No. 31 G.R. No. L-2403# (A%r45 2#" 19.#$

)ACTS+ Respondent Arancindy &ommercial purchased 'ales of te3tile from &e'u &ompany Brnerose &ommercial. However, the >ureau of &ustoms discovered that the goods to 'e delivered 'y Brnerose were different from those declared. &ustoms too" custody of the shipment. Arancindy &ommercial filed a petition in the &ourt of Airst Instance for &ustoms to release the goods. Arancindy insisted that the &AI had !urisdiction N on the 'asis of the Judiciary 7ct N and not the >ureau of &ustoms. R7 1/,7 and 11)5, on the other hand, vest e3clusive !urisdiction over sei#ure and forfeiture proceedings to the >ureau of &ustoms.

ISSUE+ .ho has !urisdiction over the shipment. ,ELD+ 2he >ureau of &ustoms does. R7 1/,7 and 11)5 are special laws, whereas the Judiciary 7ct is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general ones. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

)): 7rayata v. Joya

Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-200.# (Mar ! 10" 1920$

)ACTS+ &ecilio Joya was leasing si3 friar lots, and he started paying the @overnment for such. >ecause the num'er of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of the lots to respondent A. Joya as administrator. &ecilio died 'efore fully paying the @overnment for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one%half of the lot 'ased on the &ivil &ode provision on con!ugal property. 2he court then sought to deliver the property to Alorentino for li4uidation and distri'ution. Petitioner claimed that under 7ct 11)+, 6ec. 1(, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with re4uirements of the law. ISSUE+ .hether the &ivil &ode provision on con!ugal property prevails or 7ct 11)+Ds full conveyance of the property to the widow. ,ELD+ 7ct 11)+ prevails. It lays down provisions regarding ac4uisition, disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the &ivil &ode. 2he &ivil &ode is a general law, while 7ct 11)+ is a special law. 2he special law must prevail. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

6itchon, et al. v. 74uino

Case No. 14# G.R. No. L-0300 ()e/r1ar2 2#" 193.$

)ACTS+ Respondent 74uino, the &ity Bngineer of Manila, demolished the houses of the si3 petitioners in this class suit, 'ecause their houses were pu'lic nuisances$ 'uilt on pu'lic streets and river 'eds. Petitioners contend that under the &ivil &ode, 7rt. 7+1 and 7+), it is the district health officer who should remove pu'lic nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that R7 :+/, the Revised &harter of the &ity of Manila, grants the power to remove pu'lic nuisances to the &ity

Bngineer. ISSUE+ .hose !o' it is to determine and demolish pu'lic nuisances, the health officer under the &ivil &ode or the city engineer under R7 :+/. ,ELD+ 2he &ity Bngineer, under R7 :+/, has !urisdiction. 2he &ivil &ode is a general law applica'le throughout the Philippines, whereas R7 :+/ is a special law that pertains solely to the &ity of Manila. .hen a general and a special law are in conflict, the latter prevails. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

))5 >ellis v. >ellis

Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-23.#0 (61*e ." 19.#$

)ACTS+ 7mos >ellis, a citi#en of 2e3as 867, died. He had 7 legitimate and , illegimate children, all surnamed >ellis. 7fter the e3ecution of the decedentDs will, which was e3ecuted in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the e3ecutor divided the residuary estate into 7 e4ual portions for the 'enefit of the testatorDs 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying on 7rt. 1( of the 1ew &ivil &ode which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply ;2e3as <aw=, which did not provide for legitimes, the &AI of Manila denied such oppositions. ISSUE+ .hether 2e3as <aw or the Philippine <aw must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. ,ELD+ 2e3as <aw should apply. 7rt. 1(, par ), and 7rt. 1+,/ of the &ivil &ode render applica'le the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions. It must have 'een the purpose of the &ongress to ma"e 7rt. 1(, par. ) a specific provision in itself which must 'e applied in testate and intestate succession. 7s further indication of this intent, 7rt. 1+,/ provides that the capacity to succeed is governed 'y the national of the decedent. It is thus evident that &ongress has not intended to e3tend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. LATIN MA-IM+ (', /c

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

Philippine 2rust &o. v. Macuan

Case No. 123 G.R. No. 32200 (Mar ! 24" 1930$

)ACTS+ *efendant Macuan married A. 2ormo, who 'ecame mentally incapacitated. *efendant filed a petition to the &ourt as"ing that he 'e appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements, which is claimed to 'e con!ugal property. 6u'se4uently, M. 2ormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted 'y the &ourt, praying that the guardian 'e instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property 'elonging to his ward. 7 special guardian, Philippine 2rust &o., was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. ISSUE+ 1. .01 a married woman !udicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is con!ugal. ). .01 the defendant may 'e compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wifeDs property, her undivided half of the con!ugal property. ,ELD+ 1. 1o. 6he is not entitled to include half of the legal con!ugal partnership, which still su'sists, in the inventory of her property. ). 2he defendant, 'eing the guardian, cannot 'e compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said half of the con!ugal property. 2he &ourt relied on 1= the &ode of &ivil Procedure, which is general in characterJ and )= the &ivil &ode, which is more specific, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. 2hus, &ivil &ode ta"es precedence over the &ode of &ivil Procedure. LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

))( 2an <iao v. 7merican President <ines, <td.

Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-#200 (6a*1ar2 20" 193.$

)ACTS+ 2his is an action filed 'y plaintiff%appellant 2an <iao for the recovery of P/),755.++, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered 'y plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthori#ed delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs underta"en 'y defendant for plaintiff from the port of 1ew -or", 867 to the port of Manila. 2he suit was 'rought more than a year from the receipt of the goods, and there'y, claimed 'y the defendant to have already prescri'ed in accordance with the prescription given 'y the &arriage of @oods 'y 6ea 7ct. ISSUE+ .01 the action for damages had already prescri'ed, and thus, 'arred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. ,ELD+ -es, it has already prescri'ed. 2he &arriage of @oods 'y 6ea 7ct provides that loss or damage suit must 'e 'rought within one year after the delivery of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the &ourt held that the prescriptive period of 1 year esta'lished 'y the &arriage of @oods 'y 6ea 7ct modified pro tanto the provisions of 7ct 1o. 1/+ as to goods transported in foreign trade, the former 'eing a special act while the latter is a law of general application. LATIN MA-IM+ 5a, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of 2a3 7ppeal

Case No. #3 G.R. No. 4400# (Mar ! 20" 1991$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 413" )oo&*o&e No. 113

)ACTS+ Private respondent, a >ritish%owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise, pursuant to R7 E+E, which included a ta3 e3emption from the payment of all ta3es e3cept a franchise ta3 of 5C on the gross earnings and ta3 on its real property. 2he &IR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income ta3 maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with 6ec. E, 7rt. 1: of the 1/,5 &onstitution which limits the grant of franchise to Ailipino%owned corporations. 2he &ourt of 2a3 7ppeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitionerDs assessment without effect having 'een made 'eyond the prescri'ed period stipulated in the 2a3 &ode. ISSUE+ .01 the provision in the franchise re4uiring the payment of only 5C of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all ta3es is unenforcea'le and without legal effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1/,5 &onstitution, the &orporation <aw and the Pu'lic 6ervice 7ct. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he legislative franchise was valid. 7s a charter is in the nature of a private contract, the imposition of another franchise ta3 on the corporation 'y the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract 'etween the government and the corporation. R7 E+E as a special statute must 'e deemed an e3emption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances. LATIN MA-IM+ /a, 5+

))7 1PH& v. Presiding Judge R2& >r. GGH

Case No. 0# G.R. No. #24## (O &o/er 1." 1990$

)ACTS+ 2he Province of Misamis 9riental filed a complaint with the Regional 2rial &ourt of &agayan de 9ro &ity, >ranch GGH against 17P9&9R for the collection of real property ta3 covering the period 1/7E to 1/E:. Petitioner contends that the court has no !urisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the ad!udication of the case pursuant to P.*. ):) which provides that disputes 'etween agencies of the government including @9&&Ds shall 'e administratively settled or ad!udicated 'y the 6ecretary of Justice. 9n the other hand respondent invo"es P.*. :(: which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of ta3ation 'y provinces, cities and municipalities there'y !ustifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE+ .01 the respondent court has !urisdiction over the civil action. ,ELD+ -es. P.*. ):) must yield to P.*. :(: on the matter of which tri'unal or agency has !urisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property ta3es. granted that the latter is a

special law dealing specifically with real property ta3es whereas P.*. ):) is a general law that deals with a 'road coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes, claims and controversies 'etween or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 6pecial laws ought to 'e upheld and construed as e3ceptions to the general law in the a'sence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MA-IM+ 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

<ope#, Jr. v. &ivil 6ervice &ommission

Case No. 130 G.R. No. 0#119 (A%r45 1." 1991$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 413" )oo&*o&e No. 11.

)ACTS+ 2he Hice%mayor of Manila su'mitted to the &ivil 6ervice &ommission the appointment of 1/ officers in the B3ecutive 6taff of the 9ffice of the Presiding 9fficer pursuant to the provisions of R7 :+/. However, the &ity >udget of Manila 4uestioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may 'e paid out of city funds on the 'asis of the appointments signed 'y the Hice Mayor. 2he &ity <egal 9fficer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the &ity Mayor and not the &ity &ouncil. ISSUE+ .01 the &harter of the &ity of Manila has 'een repealed 'y R7 51E5 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out 'y city funds and >P ,,7 empowering local e3ecutives to appoint all officers and employees of the city. ,ELD+ 1o. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law ;R7 :+/= providing specifically for the organi#ation of the @overnment of the &ity of Manila prevails over a general law. R7 51E5 and >P ,,7 as general laws were not meant to deprive the &ity &ouncil of Manila of its appointing power. 7lso, since repeals 'y implication are not favored, conflict 'etween the statutes should 'e very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, ,E', 5+

))E Man#ano v. Halera

Case No. 00 G.R. No. 1220.0 (6152 0" 1990$

)ACTS+ 7 criminal complaint for li'el was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who initially recogni#ed that the Regional 2rial &ourt had !urisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the 9ffice of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, the latter opined that the M2& should ta"e cogni#ance of the case 'ased on Repu'lic 7ct 7(/1 which e3panded the !urisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal 2rial, and Municipal &ircuit 2rial &ourts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not e3ceed ( years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondentDs acceptance of the case for the M2&Ds lac" of !urisdiction over the offense charged.

ISSUE+ .01 the M2& has e3clusive !urisdiction over complaints for li'el. ,ELD+ 1o. 2he applica'le law is still 7rticle ,(+ of the Revised Penal &ode which categorically provides that !urisdiction over li'el cases are lodged with the &ourts of Airst Instance ;now Regional 2rial &ourts=. 7lthough R7 7(/1 was enacted to decongest the clogged doc"ets of the Regional 2rial &ourts 'y e3panding the !urisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of 7rticle ,(+ of the RP&, which is a law of special nature. @ranted that there seems to 'e no manifest intent to repeal or alter the !urisdiction in li'el cases from the provisions of R.7. 7(/1it must 'e maintained that a special law cannot 'e repealed, amended or altered 'y a su'se4uent general law 'y mere implication. LATIN MA-IM+ ,7, ,E, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

@arcia v. Pascual, et al.

Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-1.930 (De e8/er 22" 19.1$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2##" )oo&*o&e No. 110

)ACTS+ Petitioner, a !unior typist civil service eligi'le, was appointed 'y the Justice of Peace as cler" of the municipality of 6an Jose, 1ueva Bci!a. .hen vouchers were su'mitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was R7 1551 has repealed 6ec. 75 of R7 /)(, otherwise "nown as the Judiciary 7ct. 6ec. 75 of the Judiciary 7ct provides that !ustices of peace may have cler"s of court at the e3pense of the municipalities and shall 'e appointed 'y respective !ustices. R7 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed 6ec. 75 of R7 )/( provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall 'e appointed 'y the mayor. ISSUE+ .01 6ec. 75 of R7 /)( has 'een repealed 'y R7 1551. ,ELD+ 2he !udge ruled that said R7 1551 did not e3pressly repeal 6ec. 75 of the Judiciary 7ct and that the two laws may 'e reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed 'y a su'se4uent general law. 7lso, there 'eing no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the cler" of court, the power to appoint should not 'e considered lodged in the said mayor. <astly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the cler"s in the !ustice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of pre!udicial politics. LATIN MA-IM+ (', /a, ,), ,(d, 5+, ')

))/ <agman v. &ity of Manila, et al.

Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-23303 (61*e 30" 19..$ C!a%&er -" 'a(e 420" )oo&*o&e No. 12.

)ACTS+ Petitioner operates 15 auto truc"s with fi3ed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. 2he Municipal of Manila repealed R7 :+/ and enacted 9rdinance 1o. :/E(, entitled 7n 9rdinance Rerouting 2raffic on Roads and 6treets within the &ity of Manila, and Aor 9ther Purposes.$ ISSUE+ .01 the enactment and enforcement of 9rdinance 1o. :/E( is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. ,ELD+ 1o. R7 :+/ is a special law and of later enactment than &.7. 1o. 5:E and the Pu'lic 6ervice <aw, so that even if conflict e3ists 'etween the provisions of the former act and the latter acts, R7 :+/ should prevail over 'oth &ommonwealth 7cts. Moreover, the powers conferred 'y law upon the Pu'lic 6ervice &ommission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 11a, :/, 5+

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

>agatsing v. Ramire#

Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-41.31 (De e8/er 1#" 19#.$ C!a%&er <I" 'a(e 2.0" )oo&*o&e No. 03

)ACTS+ 2he Municipal >oard of Manila enacted 9rdinance 1o. 75)), 7n 9rdinance Regulating the 9peration of Pu'lic Mar"ets and Prescri'ing Aees for the Rentals of 6talls and Providing Penalties for Hiolation thereof and for other Purposes.$ Respondent were see"ing the declaration of nullity of the 9rdinance for the reason that a= the pu'lication re4uirement under the Revised &harter of the &ity of Manila has not 'een complied with, '= the Mar"et &ommittee was not given any participation in the enactment, c= 6ec. ,;e= of the 7nti%@raft and &orrupt Practices 7ct has 'een violated, and d= the ordinance would violate P.*. 7 prescri'ing the collection of fees and charges on livestoc" and animal products. ISSUE+ .hat law shall govern the pu'lication of ta3 ordinance enacted 'y the Municipal >oard of Manila, the Revised &ity &harter or the <ocal 2a3 &ode. ,ELD+ 2he fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to 'e considered an e3ception to the general. 2he Revised &harter of Manila spea"s of ordinance$ in general whereas the <ocal 2a3 &ode relates to ordinances levying or imposing ta3es, fees or other charges$ in particular. In regard therefore, the <ocal 2a3 &ode controls. LATIN MA-IM+ (c, 7a, 11a, 17, :+', :/, 5+


<atin Ma3ims
&hapter II N &9162R8&2I91 71* I12BRPRB272I91 >. P9.BR 29 &9162R8B 1. Le(4s 4*&er%re&a&4o* 5e(4s :48 o/&4*e&. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute ac4uires the force of law. &hapter III N 7I*6 29 &9162R8&2I91 &. &912BMP9R7R- &9162R8&2I91 ). Co*&e8%ora*ea e>%os4&4o* es& o%&48a e& ?or&4ss48o 4* 5e(e. &ontemporary construction is strongest in law. O%&48a es& 5e(18 4*&er%res o*s1e&19o. &ustom is the 'est interpreter of a statute. Re(15a %ro 5e(e" s4 9e?4 4& 5e>. In default of the law, the ma3im rules. ,. O%&481s 4*&er%res rer18 1s1s. 2he 'est interpreter of the law is usage. Co881*4s error ?a 4& @1s. &ommon error sometimes passes as current law. A1o9 a/ 4*4&4o *o* :a5e& 4* &ra &1 &e8%or4s *o* o*:a5es 4&. 2hat which was originally void, does not 'y lapse of time 'ecome valid. :. Ra&4!a/4&4o 8a*9a&o aeB14%ara&1r. <egislative ratification is e4uivalent to a mandate. 5. S&are 9e 4s4s e& *o* B14e&a 8o:ere. Aollow past precedents and do not distur' what has 'een settled. I*&eres& re%1/54 ae 1& s4& ?4*4s 54&418. 2he interest of the state demands that there 'e an end to litigation.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&hapter IH N 7*HBRB1&B 29, 9R *BP7R28RB AR9M, <71@87@B 9A 627282B <I2BR7< I12BRPRB272I91 (. I*9e> a*484 ser8o es&. 6peech is the inde3 of intention. A*481s !o84*4s es& a*48a s r4%&4. 2he intention of the party is the soul. <er/a 5e(4s *o* es& re e9e*918. Arom the words of the statute there should 'e no departure. Ma5e94 &a e& e>%os4&4o* B1ae orr18%4& &e>&18. It is 'ad construction which corrupts the te3t. L4&&era s r4%&a 8a*e&.

2he written word endures. C5a1s15a re/1s s4 s&a*&4/1s. 2hings thus standing. 7. A/so51&a se*&e*&4a5 e>%os4&ore *o* 4*94(e*&. .hen the language of the law is clear, no e3planation is re4uired. D1ra 5e> se9 5e>. 2he law may 'e harsh 'ut it is the law. ,o B149e8 %erB1a8 91r18 es&" se9 4&a 5e> s r4%&a es&. It is e3ceedingly hard, 'ut so the law is written. >. *BP7R28RB AR9M <I2BR7< I12BRPRB272I91

E. AeB14&as *1*B1a8 o*&ra:e*4& 5e(4s. B4uity never acts in contravention of the law. AeB118 e& /o*18 es& 5e> 5e(18e. .hat is good and e4ual is the law of laws. /. Ra&4o 5e(4s es& a*48a 5e(4s. 2he reason of the law is the soul of the law.

61s ars /o*4 e& aeB14. <aw is the art of e4uity.

),1 L4&&era *e a& s%4r4&1s :4:4?4 a&e. 2he letter "ills 'ut the spirit gives life. <er/a 4*&e*&4o*4" *o* e o*&ra" 9e/e*& 4*ser:4 e. .ords ought to 'e more su'servient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Ce*4(*1s 5e(es 4*&er%re&a*9ae s1*&" B1o9 :o51*&as era18 o*ser:e&1r. <aws are to 'e construed li'erally, so that their spirit and reason 'e preserved. A14 !are& 4* 54&&era !are& 4* or&4 e. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes 'ut s"in deep into its meaning. A1a*9o :er/a s&a&1&e s1*& s%e 4a54" ra&4o a1&e8 (e*era54a" s&a&18 (e*era54&er es& 4*&e554(e*918. .hen the words used in a statute are special, 'ut the purpose of the law is general, it should 'e read as the general e3pression. 1+. 11. Cessa*&e ra&4o*4 5e(4s" essa& e& 4%sa 5e> . .hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. I*&er%re&a&4o &a54s 4* a8/4(14s s48%er ?4e*9a es& 1& e:4&e&1r 4* o*:e*4e*s e& a/s1r918. .here there is am'iguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and a'surdity is to 'e adopted. Le(4s o*s&r1 &4o* *o* ?a 4& 4*@1r4a8. 2he construction of the law will not 'e such as to wor" in!ury or in!ustice. Ar(18e*&18 a/ 4* o*:e*4e*& %51r4818 :a5e& 4* 5e(e. 7n argument drawn from inconvenience is forci'le in law. <er/a *4!45 o%erar4 8e541s es& B1a8 a/s1r9e. It is 'etter that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate a'surdly. Le> s48%er 4*&e*94& B1o9 o*:e*4& ra&4o*4. 2he law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. U/4 ea9e8 ra&4o 4/4 49e8 @1s. <i"e reason doth ma"e li"e law.

Ar(18e*&18 a s48454 :a5e& 4* 5e(e. 7n argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De s48454/1s 49e8 es& @194 418. &oncerning similars, the !udgment is the same.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

U/4 ea9e8 es& ra&4o" 4/4 es& ea9e8 5e(4s 94s%os4&4o* . .here there is the same reason, there is the same law 1). Ea es& a 4%4e*9a 4*&er%re&a&4o* B1ae :4&4o are&. 2hat interpretation is to 'e adopted which is free from evil or in!ustice. Le> 4*@1s&a *o* es& 5e>. 7n un!ust law is not a law. )4a& @1s&4&4a" r1a& oe518 . <et right 'e done, though the heavens fall. Ne8o es& s1%ra 5e(4s. 1o'ody is a'ove the law. N155a %o&e*&4a5 s1%ra 5e(4s esse 9e/e&. 1o power must 'e a'ove the law. 61rae *a&1rae aeB118 es& *e84*e8 18 a5&er41s 9e&r48e*&o e& 4*@1r4a ?4er4 5o 1%5e&4ore8. It is certainly not agreea'le to natural !ustice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another manDs wor". S1r%51sa(418 *o* *o e&. 6urplusage does not vitiate a statute. U&45e %er 4*1&45e *o* :4&4a&1r. 2he useful is not vitiated 'y the non%useful. = )a5sa 9e8os&ra&4o *o* *o e&" 18 9e or%ore o*s&a&. Aalse description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. N45 ?a 4& error *o84*4s 18 9e or%ora :e5 %erso*a o*s&a&. Brror in name does not ma"e an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. Cer&18 es& B1o9 er&18 re994 %o&es&. 2hat is sufficiently certain which can 'e made certain. I/4 B149 (e*era54&er o* e94&1r" 4*es& !ae e> e%&4o*" s4 *o* a54B149 s4& o*&ras @1s /asB1e. .here anything is granted generally, e3emption from rigid application of law is impliedJ that nothing shall 'e contrary to law and right.






),) 1E. S18818 @1s" s188a 4*@1r4a. 2he rigor of the law would 'e the highest in!ustice. 61s s18818 sae%e" s188a es& 8454&4a. B3treme law is often e3treme wrong. Ne8o &e*e&1r a9 48%oss4/454a. 2he law o'liges no one to perform an impossi'ility. I8%oss4/4518 *155a o/4(a&4o es&. 2here is no o'ligation to do an impossi'le thing.


Le> *o* o(4& a9 48%oss4/454a. 2he law does not re4uire an impossi'ility. Le> *o* 4*&e*94& a54B149 48%oss4/5e. 2he law does not intend the impossi'le. &. IMP<I&72I916 )+. E> *e ess4&a&e 5e(4s. >y the necessary implication of law. I* eo B1o9 %51s s4&" s48%er 4*es& e& 84*1s. 2he greater includes the lesser. C14 @1r4s94 &4o* 9a&a es&" ea B1oB1e o* essa esse :49e*&1r s4*e B14/1s @1r4s94 &4o* e>%54 ar4 *o* %o&14&. .hen !urisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its e3ercise are also given. U/4 @1s" 4/4 re8e9418. .here there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof. U/4 @1s 4* er&18" 4/4 @1s *15518. .here the law is uncertain, there is no right. E> 9o5o 8a5o *o* or4&1r a &4o*. 7n action does not arise from fraud. N15541s o88o918 a%ere %o&es& 9e 4*@1r4a s1a %ro%r4a. 1o one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. I* %ar4 9e54 &o %o&4or es& o*94&4o* 9e?e*9e*&4s. .here the parties are e4ually at fault, the position of the defending party is the 'etter one.



6272829R- &9162R8&2I91


A1a*9o a54B149 %ro!4/e&1r e> 94re &o" %ro!4/e&1r e& %er o/54B118. .hat cannot, 'y law, 'e done directly cannot 'e done indirectly. &hapter H N I12BRPRB272I91 9A .9R*6 71* PHR76B6

7. ):.

I1 @B1BR7< Ge*era54a :er/a s1*& (e*era54&er 4*&e554(e*9a. @eneral words should 'e understood in their general sense. Ge*er4s 94 &18 (e*era54&er es& 4*&er%re&a*918. 7 general statement is understood in its general sense. <er/a a 4%4e*9a s1*& se 1*918 s1/@e &a8 8a&er4a8. 7 word is to 'e understood in the conte3t in which it is used. <er/a 8ere aeB14:o a" s4 %er o881*e8 1s18 5oB1e*94 4* 4*&e55e &1 er&o s181*&1r" &a54s 4*&e55e &1s %re?ere*91s es&. B4uivocal words or those with dou'le meaning are to 'e understood according to their common and ordinary sense. <er/a ar&4s e> ar&e. .ords of art should 'e e3plained from their usage in the art to which they 'elong. <er/a (e*era54a res&r4*(1*&1r a9 !a/454&a&e8 re4 :e5 %erso*a8. @eneral words should 'e confined according to the su'!ect%matter or persons to which they relate. U/4 5e> *o* 94s&4*(14& *e *o* 94s&4*(1ere 9e/e81s. .here the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.



)7. D4ss484518 94ss48454s es& ra&4o. 9f things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. >. )E. )/. 7669&I72B* .9R*6 Nos 4&1r a so 44s. 7 thing is "nown 'y its associates. E@es9e8 (e*er4s. 9f the same "ind or specie.

),, ,+. E>%ress4o 1*41s es& e> 51s4o* a5&er41s. 2he e3press mention of one person, thing or conse4uence implies the e3clusion of all others. E>%ress18 ?a 4& essare &a 4&18. .hat is e3pressed puts an end to that which is implied. ,1. Ar(18e*&18 a o*&rar4o. 1egative%9pposite *octrineF what is e3pressed puts an end to that which is implied. ,). Cass1s o84ss1s %ro o84sso !a/e*91s es&. 7 person, o'!ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must 'e held to have 'een omitted intentionally. ,,. A9 %ro>4818 a*&e e9e*s ?4a& re5a&4o *4s4 48%e94a&1r se*&e*&4a5. 7 4ualifying word or phrase should 'e understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. ,:. Re99e*9o s4*(15ar s4*(154s. Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or e3pression to its appropriate o'!ect, or let each 'e put in its proper place. &. PR9HI696, BG&BP2I916 71* 67HI1@ &<786B6 ,5. rule. &hapter HI N 627282B &916I*BRB* 76 7 .H9<B I1 RB<72I91 29 92HBR 627282B6 7. 627282B &9162R8B* 76 7 .H9<B ,(. O%&48a s&a&1&e 4*&er%re&a&r4> es& 4%s18 s&a&1&18. 2he 'est interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. E> &o&a 8a&er4a e8er(a& reso51&4o*. 2he e3position of a statute should 'e made from all its parts put together. E> e%&4o ?4r8a& re(15a8 4* as4/1s *o* e> e%&4s. 7 thing not 'eing e3pected must 'e regarded as coming within the purview of the general

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

I*@1s&18 es&" *4s4 &o&a 5e(e 4*s%e &a" 9e 1*a a54B1a e@1s %ar&4 15a %ro%os4&a 4*94 are :e5 res%o*9ere. It is un!ust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without e3amining the

whole of the law. Ne8o e*48 a54B1a8 %ar&e8 re &e 4*&e554(ere %oss4& a*&eB1a8 &o&18 4*&er18 a&B1e 4*&er48 %er5e(4&. 2he sense and meaning of the law is collected 'y viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only 'y itself. E> a*&e e*9e*&4/1s e& o*seB1e*&4/1s ?4& o%&48a 4*&er%re&a&4o*. 7 passage will 'e 'est interpreted 'y reference to that which precedes and follows it. <er/a %os&er48a %ro%&er er&4&194*e8 a994&a a9 %r4ora B1ae er&4&194*e 4*94(e*& s1*& re?ere*9a. Reference should 'e made to a su'se4uent section in order to e3plain a previous clause of which the meaning is dou'tful. ,7. >. ,E. I*&er%re&a&4o ?4e*9a es& 1& res 8a(4s :a5ea& B1a8 %erea&. 7 law should 'e interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. 627282B &9162R8B* I1 RB<72I91 29 &9162I282I91 71* 92HBR 627282B6 'ar4 8a&er4a. 9f the same matter. I*&er%re&are e& o* or9are 5e(es 5e(4/1s es& o%&481s 4*&er%re&a*94 8o91s. Bvery statute myst 'e so construed and harmoni#ed with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. D4s&4*(1e &e8%ora e& o* or9a/4s @1ra. *istinguish times and you will harmoni#e law. Te8%ora 81&a*&1r e& 5e(es 81&a*&1r 4* 4554s. 2imes have changed and laws have changed with them. M1&a&4s 81&a*94s. .ith the necessary changes.

,/. % %

),: &hapter HII N 62RI&2 9R <I>BR7< &9162R8&2I91 7. :+. I1 @B1BR7< Sa51s %o%154 es& s1%re8a 5e>. 2he voice of the people is the supreme law. S&a&1&a %ro %1/54 o o88o9o 5a&e 4*&er%re&a*&1r. 6tatutes enacted for the pu'lc good are to 'e construed li'erally. 'r4:a&18 4* o88o918 %1/54 o /o*o %e*sa&1r. 2he private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the pu'lic. 627282B6 62RI&2<- &9162R8B* :1. A &1s *o* ?a 4& re18 *4s4 8e*s s4& rea. 2he act does not ma"e a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. A &1s 8e 4*:4&o ?a &1rs *o* es& 8e1s a &1s. 7n act done 'y me against my will is not my act.
:). 'r4:45e(4a re 4%41*& 5ar(a8 4*&er%re&a&4o*e8 :o51*&a&e o*so*e8 o* e9e*&4s.


Privileges are to 'e interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. Re*1* 4a&4o *o* %raes184&1r. Renunciation cannot 'e presumed.

:,. ::.

S&r4 &4ss484 @1r4s. Aollow the law strictly. N15518 &e8%1s o 1r4& re(4. 2here can 'e no legal right as against the authority that ma"es the law on which the right depends.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91

&hapter HIII N M71*729R- 71* *IRB&2I917< 627282B6 7. M71*729R- 627282B6 :5. <4(45a*&4/1s e& *o* 9or84e*&4/1s @1ra s1/:e*41*&. 2he law aids the vigilant, not those who slum'er on their rights. 'o&4or es& 4* &e8%ore" %o&4or es& 4* @1re. He who is first in time is preferred in right. &hapter IG N PR96PB&2IHB 71* RB2R97&2IHB 627282B6 7. :(. I1 @B1BR7< Le> %ros%4 4&" *o* res%4 4&. 2he law loo"s forward, not 'ac"ward. Le> 9e ?1&1ro" @19e> 9e %rae&er4&o. 2he law provides for the future, the !udge for the past. No:a o*s&4&1&4o ?1&1r4s ?or8a8 48%o*ere 9e/e& *o* %rae&er4&4s. 7 new statute should affect the future, not the past. Le(es B1ae re&ros% 41*&" e& 8a(*a 18 a1&4o*e s1*& a9!4/e*9ae *eB1e e*48 @a*1s 5o a&1r 4* 5e(4/1s. <aws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has really no place in the laws. Le(es e& o*s&4&1&4o*es ?1&1r4s er&18 es& 9are ?or8a8 *e(o&44s" *o* a9 ?a &a %rae&er4&a re:o ar4" *4s4 *o84*a&48 e& 9e %rae&er4&o &e8%ore e& a9!1 %e*9e*&4/1s *e(o&44s a1&18 s4&. <aws should 'e construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are e3pressly made applica'le to past transactions and to such as are still pending. 627282B6 @IHB1 PR96PB&2IHB BAAB&2 :7. N15518 r48e* s4*e %oe*a" *155a %oe*a s4*e 5e(e. 2here is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. :E. )a:ora/454a s1*& a8%54a*9a" o94osa res&r4*(e*9a. Penal laws which are favora'le to the accused are given retroactive effect.

% %


),5 &hapter G N 7MB1*MB12, RBHI6I91, &9*IAI&72I91 71* RBPB7< 7. RBPB7<

:/. 5+.

Le(es %os&er4ores %r4ores o*&rar4as a/ro(a*&. <ater statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. Ge*era54a s%e 4a54/1s *o* 9ero(a*&. 7 general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

>I1*I1@ A9R&B 9A R8<B6 9A I12BRPRB272I91 71* &9162R8&2I91 7. I(*ora*&4a 5e(4s *e84*e8 e> 1sa&. Ignorance of the law e3cuses no one. <71@87@B 9A 627282B .HB1 7M>I@8986 >. I* o/s 1r4s 4*s%4 4 so5ere B1o9 :ers484541s es&" a1& B1o9 %5er18B1e ?4er4 so5e&. .hen matters are o'scure, it is customary to ta"e what appears to 'e more li"ely or what usually often happens. A8/4(14&as :er/or18 %a&e*s *155a :er4?4 a&4o*e e> 5194&1r. 7 patent am'iguity cannot 'e cleared up 'y e3trinsic evidence.

PRB68MP2I91 7@7I162 I1J862I&B 71* H7R*6HIP &. A9 ea B1ae ?reB1e*&4/1s a 491*& @1ra a9a%&a&1r. <aws are understood to 'e adapted to those cases which most fre4uently occur. 61s o*s&4&14 o%or&e& 4* !4s B1ae 1& %51r4818 a 491*& *o* B1ae e> 4*or94*a&o. <aws ought to 'e made with a view to those cases which happen most fre4uently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. A1o9 se8e5 a1& /4s e>4s&4& %rae&ere1*& 5e(4s5a&ores. <egislators pass over what happens only once or twice. De 84*484s *o* 1ra& 5e>. 2he law does not concern itself with trifling matters.

6272829R- &9162R8&2I91


2I2<B 9A 2HB 7&2 ;I12RI16I& 7I*= N4(r18 N1*B1a8 E> e9ere De/e& R1/r18. 2he 'lac" ;'ody of the act printed in 'lac"= should never go 'eyond the red ;title or ru'ric of the statute printed in red=.