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Session 2004


R SUBRAMANIAN* H AL HOSANI Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (United Arab Emirates)

Abstract Developments in computer and communication technologies have now enabled comprehensive integration of a wide range of substation measurements, status, control, automation, and communication and protection functions within a computer control system. In particular, this new class of application has ushered in the achievement of secure, cost-effective and high performance operations of utility power grid substations. Coupled with the growing need for unattended, automatic operation of substations, the integrated Substation Control System has become the technology of choice in most utilities. A 3-level hierarchical control has evolved to become a standard design of architecture to meet the functional and performance requirements in Abu Dhabi substations. The first two levels of control are performed locally within the boundary of the substation, and the third level puts a large number of substations under remote control from the Network Control Centre. In this mode of control, the network operators are able to see graphic pictures of the dynamic states of all the remote outlying substations through a serial communication link. This paper gives a wide spectrum of technical details about the design and application goals to meet the control system functional and performance objectives in Abu Dhabi substations. The paper also reports on experience so far gained with several control systems installed and operated on the network. Looking longer term, it focuses on some new promising techniques, devices, and substation functions to lay the foundation of the next generation of control systems in the not-toodistant future. It ends with a prediction of where future control system technology will be heading in respect of building a corporate database providing reliable and timely information to different categories of utility personnel. Keywords IED-SCS-LAN-Gateway-Distributed Intelligence-Protocol-Station Processor-Database-WorkstationHMI-National Control Centre-GPS Time Reference-SDH Transmission. 1.0.0 Introduction

The Substation Control System (SCS) is a rich blend of offerings to provide a multi-level control of substation functions, to facilitate unmanned substation operation and to achieve full scale automation,

such as automatic voltage regulation, reactive power compensation, pre-set switching sequences, etc. The building blocks of an SCS are derived from a suite of decentralized Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), station processors, communication networks, gateways, and workstations with Human/Machine Interfaces (HMIs). All software applications are functionally integrated into a minimal number of hardware platforms with an objective of achieving the highest standards of control system performance and hardware reliability. To date, Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (ADWEA) has put up about 15 SCS controlled substations into commission, with another 10 under contract. Due to a compelling policy requirement laid out to put all substations under unmanned automatic operations, ADWEA decided to use SCS in the late 90s as the technology of choice in all future transmission and distribution substations. In the following sections of this paper, an introduction is given to the rationales behind and the common approaches to the SCS implementations. It also gives an overview of the status of the present hardware and software technologies, and outlines the few ADWEA s adverse experiences gained from SCS installations and operations. Special attention is devoted to the provision of new paradigms, advanced ideas and improved techniques in communications and functionality in future applications. It also examines the need in the SCS architecture to help build a global database at National Control Centre (NCC), which will be useful for personnel responsible for a wide range of engineering activities, such as planning, maintenance, performance monitoring, operation and so on. 2.0.0 2.1.0 SCS Platform Target Architecture

The SCS architecture used in Abu Dhabi substations is designed to give a rationalized approach for the operation and maintenance of substations with an economic optimum. Key design factors include implementation method, functionality, hardware technology and redundancy, communication system, performance, cost, etc. Fig.1 illustrates the typical network architecture of a control system used on large transmission class substations. In this architecture, the control system elements are divided into three hierarchical levels, such as bay level, station level and network level, respectively. Each level separates the hardware and software devices, providing the basis for distributed intelligence. The principle of redundancy is usually applied to reach a specified level of reliability, ensure a swift recovery from faults by switchover functions, survive outages and failures, and achieve a fault tolerant performance at any times of the control system operations. 2.2.0 Bay Level Devices

Bay level devices operate at the lowest level of the SCS hierarchy. These devices consist of a number of field-connected IEDs, which are distributed to interface with the substation primary equipment, such as Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS), power transformers, and current/voltage transformers. In the IED categories are bay level controllers, protection relays, voltage regulating and power factor correction relays, etc. Controller IEDs perform the functions of synchronized sampling of power system analogue signals, process monitoring, metering, status indications, control, etc. All bay level devices are connected to the station level by serial information links, preferably using fiber-optic Local Area Network (LAN). Controller IEDs are equipped with a simple alphanumeric front panel operator interface, to provide a summary list of alarms, switchgear mimics and limited metering facilities. It also provides a keyboard control function available closest to the primary plant equipment. The SCS is an event driven system wherein the bay level IEDs scan for substation data at a high sampling rate, and collect, process and transmit them to the higher level only when the newly scanned value differs from the old value held in the local database by a pre-defined amount in the case of analogue signals or by a change of status in the case of binary signals.


Substation LANs

The station level database is the core of the SCS function block and is responsible for information processing functionality. To populate the database in real-time with process information, high-speed data transfer is the key requirement over the fiber-optic LANs. Data is processed, exchanged and shared between a suite of bay level IEDs and station level computers on a time-critical basis over this LAN. Since the plant control requires a high degree of control system reliability and availability, most SCSs provide redundant communications from IEDs, and consequently, support for a redundant LAN. In high performance control systems, a controller IED communicates for information exchange with both the next higher level of control and other contemporaries performing at the same level, using high speed, peer-to-peer substation LANs. In this principle, each IED is authorized to send data as soon as it emerges in the buffer, but for the data transmission to occur, the LAN network must be in the idle status. A communication media supervision function is a pre-requisite to authorize one particular IED to access the medium and send data across the LAN at any given time. In this application, the present-days SCS technology still lacks in the adoption of an open communications architecture, and operates invariably with supplier-dependant, proprietary communication links.

It is also a practice in some control systems to exchange information over the substation LANs on a polled basis. In this technique, the station level processor is considered to be the master terminal. It sends a request to all bay level IEDs in a sequence for data, and a list of process data is then transmitted from IEDs as requested. This LAN works hierarchically with a higher-level device. To take care of transfer of some high-priority messages, a subset of the master-slave protocol is configured to support an unsolicited transfer mode, in which the event detection of special importance is automatically transmitted and processed without a request from the master. 2.4.0 Data Types

Substation data are of different types, and are handled with different speeds and priorities. The delivery of messages is divided into 3 categories, such as high-speed, medium speed and low speed. High-speed signals require a transmission time of less than 10 ms in the LAN delivery time; information relating to switchgear interlocks and inter-trip functions require this sort of a speed in message transmission. A peer-to-peer LAN is ideally suited to perform high-speed data transfer across the LAN network for all types of substation messages. 2.5.0 2.5.1 Station Level Architecture Classification of Components

At the centre of the architecture are the redundant station processors (SPs) housing the various communication interfaces to other SCS elements, such as gateways to NCC, GPS receiver for time synchronization, protection relays, workstations, dial-in access telephone modems, etc. The SPs run the database to reflect the real-time image of the whole substation processes. The collected information is further distributed for HMI display on the workstation screens, historical archiving, calculations, printing and further transmission to NCC. The SPs work on a main/standby configuration. During normal operation, the standby SP shadows the database of the main SP without its communication driver engaged. In the event of an in-service failure of the running SP, the standby unit takes over immediately according to a hierarchical plan, and starts to monitor and control the substation processes without loss of database information. Following return of the main SP to service, the standby unit is once again relegated to the task of shadowing. 2.5.2 Workstations

Workstations provide the operators with an intuitive graphical interface to the whole of the substation processes as well as the control system elements. Workstations are high-end PCs running Graphical User Interface (GUI) software, and contain a multitude of graphic screens to simulate and display the dynamics of the power system within the substation. They also perform data archiving and order hardcopy print facilities as part of the HMI functions. The HMI design must present the process information to the operator in a clear and precise manner. Regardless of the suppliers, it must have the same look and feel attributes in screen layouts, navigation aids, colour, fonts, equipment symbols, etc. As an X-or dumb terminal, local processing is limited to providing a set of high-resolution full-colour graphical screen presentations. Workstation assigned to maintenance engineers doesnt take part in the control of the substation equipment. The terminal is useful to viewing the details of the substation. It also contains the necessary base software tools for building, modifying, editing, creating and viewing the substation mimic diagrams, and system and application components, such as process and data objects, scales, system objects, command procedures, time channels, etc. The SCSs from most suppliers support the TCP/IP protocol as a common carrier for data at workstation level. This popular decision to use this protocol in lieu of other protocols is seemingly driven by the fact that the design and application of TCP/IP has been optimised, revised, and improved over regular time intervals. With further development of IP technology in recent times, the use of the TCP/IP over Ethernet has emerged as the primary communication protocol in the computer industry.

As a result, every computer hardware and operating system now produced has a driver available for TCP/IP. However, the use of this protocol on most SCSs is only limited to running the workstation LANs. 2.5.3 Event and Alarm Management

Events acquired in the IEDs are sent spontaneously to the SPs where the process database is held. All events of interest must be time-stamped with a resolution of 1ms, assembled in their chronological order, printed in the same sequence on event logs and stored in historical event facilities. An event list is produced in separate display pages on the workstation screen. Events are also distinguishable as alarms in separate pages, which are classified to different categories of priority, requiring operator acknowledgment for both emergence and clearance of all alarm types. A hard copy of a selected alarm list can be printed at any time. 2.5.4 Gateway Interface

The SCSs operate with a set of gateway interfaces to the NCC, which functions as the highest level of the hierarchy, facilitating remote switching and monitoring of all SCS substations. This telecontrol interface serves the real-time needs on a two-way communication link with data flow rates being restricted between 1200 and 2400 bps. Since the NCC is a remotely located facility hundreds of miles away, information and control signals are conveyed over larger distances on the link consisting of main and backup channels. This link is used to exchange the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) information, thwarting congestion of this link with too much data, although a large volume of data and information, both operational and non-operational, is acquired in the SCS database. On ADWEAs networks, the IEC 60870-5-101 is the protocol of choice to enable SCSs from a multitude of suppliers to communicate with NCC in a seamless manner [1]. This standardized interface gives ADWEA an ability to mix and match hardware products from different suppliers in each of the substations. 3.0.0 Redundancy Criterion

The control system for ADWEAs substations is designed based on the N-1 criterion, to make it reliable in continuous operation with an overall availability of 99.98 percent. The design ability to work with a larger degree of fault tolerance is therefore an important criterion. Data transmission requires maintenance of highly precise and coordinated timing between the sending and receiving devices, particularly when larger volumes of data are to be transmitted at a high baud rate. This duty requirement signifies the need for the communication system being designed with increasing design margins, fault tolerances and redundancies. However, the principle of redundancy is not applied to the plant level IEDs in the interest of achieving economies of scale. The substation communication interfaces, the workstation interfaces and the gateway interfaces are built with dual connectivity to function as main and backup links, providing the facility of automatically initiating communications on an alternative channel following failure of the main channel. 4.0.0 4.1.0 Substation Functions Generic List

The operation of SCS includes a myriad of substation functions configured on a distributed platform. The present days commercial offerings include a subset of, or all of the following: Control, synchronizing, and interlocking of switchgear and transformer, Graphical display of substation, voltage levels, and individual bays with status monitoring, Auto-reclose of overhead transmission lines, Automation for sequence control, transformer tap change control and reactive switching,

Serial interfacing of protective relaying and data exchange, Event and alarm processing, Metering of load and fault values, Instrumentations with derived values for electrical, thermal and gas pressure data measurements, Automatic load-shedding and load management, Fault location and disturbance recording, Plausibility check, Storage and archival of data and information, Telecontrol communication interface to NCC.

In ADWEAs substations, it is a standard practice to apply all of the functions listed above, regardless of the size of the substations and the operating voltage levels. All substation functions are software derived and distributed to different segments of the control system. For added security, a hardwired scheme is included in series with distributed software for GIS interlocking. 4.2.0 Automation Functions

The SCS also runs some of the automation functions [2], requiring the highest, efficient and highspeed communication architecture to enable it to exchange and process data, and support real-time performance. One of the SCS automation functions is the transformer tap change control. In this function, the SCS monitors all the times busbar voltage on the Low Voltage (LV) side of grid transformers. In the event of this voltage drifting beyond the set voltage limits, the SCS automatically initiates control of the transformer tap changer to restore the LV voltage within limits. When running in parallel with a bank of transformers, the SCS recognizes the topology of both the high-voltage and low-voltage busbars and the position of taps in each transformer for providing tap change control in transformer groups without resulting in circulating currents. The SCS derives the position of the transformer taps from the transformer tap change mechanism, which is displayed at both the local control point and workstation graphic screens in digital format. The SCS is also designed to convert the transformer tap position to a BCD (Binary Coded Decimal) format to NCC. 4.3.0 Protective Relaying Interface

The design of protective relaying interface is of major importance in the SCS operation. Many designs of numeric relays have now hardware limitations to support and maintain full data exchange with SCS via serial communication ports. As a result, most of them are now configured with a hardwired interface only to provide SCADA information to SCS, which is a sub-set of the total information available in the relaying internal memory. It should be remembered that modern relays contain valuable information useful for maintenance and fault analysis. The use of relays with a limited integration capability to SCS is not according to state-of-the-art technology. The serial communication interface must be designed with greater emphasis on all relay information being uploaded to SCS, which must include details about short circuit currents, voltages, phases(s) involved, start/reset, trip/reset, fault duration, distance to fault impedance, status information, fault waveforms, etc. The transmission of fault location information must occur to workstations for real-time display and logging to help operators judge the severity and location of the fault before deciding on operational requirements appropriately fitting to individual fault incidents. In the same breath, the maintenance workstation must run with data retrieval application software for interrogation of relays for the purpose of setting display, verification and bulk storage. This software enables displaying, editing, changing, uploading of old settings to, and downloading of new settings from, workstation. This software is also useful for management and database storage of the settings applied on the entire gamut of relays in the substation. This software program establishes a serial port

communication to each relay directly by a manual command. In this manner, an amount of tens of thousands of settings were set and managed with ease and comfort in the whole of the relay population. 4.4.0 System Support Functions

In optimum execution and management of all the software-based functions, the SCS itself needs some software functions to manage the system structure in a coherent manner. These system functions run continuously as a background operation, which typically include system management, time synchronization, and self-supervision and diagnostics. 4.4.1 System Management

System management is about configuring and maintaining the communication system across the control system platform. Due to the classification of SCS components as functional nodes, node identification becomes a major part of the system management. Activation and deactivation of a node must be well checked and treated as event in the station. Switchover facility is another system support function provided in the control system. The SCS is also to be configured to the operational parameters of the substation and power grid. The SCS must be equipped with engineering software to deal with the entire complement of configuration, functional and operational parameters, and their maintenance and amendment during the lifetime of the control system. This engineering software allows for software management, configuration management, database management and diagnostic facilities in their entirety. 4.4.2 Time Synchronization

The requirement for all SCS components to have a common time reference is very important for monitoring and control applications. Events are generated in the data acquisition units of IEDs when changes take place in the substation processes or in the control system architecture itself. All events require time-tags as close to the process as possible, i.e., at the end point of the system in the field. The time resolution needed for power utility application is of the order of 1 ms for functions such as event management, distributed check-synchronization, sampling of analogue data, etc. The Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite clock provides a time reference for SCS operations. The distribution of GPS time takes place across the whole system by the hierarchical synchronization of all real-time clocks resident individually in all SCS hardware devices. The GPS clock receiver is connected to an SCS clock interface receiver located in each of the redundant SPs. The SPs are set as a time master from where the time synchronization frame is transmitted to all other IED clocks as either a broadcast message in a continuous manner or a single message per software clock every minute or second. 4.4.3 Self-supervision and Diagnostics

The SCS works with a higher level of integration of many different functions on a distributed intelligence architecture. Such a deeper level of integration is permissible and acceptable only if the overall system reliability and availability are improved by the use of on-line monitoring and selfdiagnostic facilities. These on-line facilities operate for the timely detection and management of inservice faults occurring in the systems, sub-system, discrete components, etc. These self-check functions run continuously in the background while the hardware performs the substation functions in the foreground. Hardware failures and loss of communication between devices and/or any two hierarchical levels must be detected and alarmed. Internal and external auxiliary power supplies must be supervised. The function of A-D converters must also be checked. Special algorithms must check regularly the processors memories. A watchdog must supervise the proper execution of users application programmes. In short, the run-time diagnostics should be capable of detecting and alarming any failures and deficiencies as they occur in any parts of the control system during service.

In self-supervision and diagnostic functions, two important issues are worthy of consideration. In the first, attention should be paid to variations or differences in the fault detection capability between SCS systems, and as a result, some types of failure in hardware and software sub-systems may remain undetected. The second consideration is related to generating an alarm in the station when the selfsupervision system itself fails in service. Until now, such a detection possibility doesnt exist on most systems, barring one or two. 5.0.0 Experiences with SCS

With the proliferation of SCS systems from a number of suppliers, ADWEA has been subject to experiencing dismal control system performance in some of the substations. Following is the consolidated list of points to show on-site SCS operation in a poor light. In some substations, the performance of the informative relaying interface to SCS is far from perfect and satisfactory. The problem is particularly more acute in cases of SCS and protection relays being sourced from different suppliers. Chronological listing of events itself is a problem for some systems. Tap change events, control command and feed back status information are not reported in the strictest chronological order. Substation LANs do not comply in any case with the highest standards of reliability and availability. Switchover function fails to take place in the event of a genuine failure of the running LAN. In some cases, switchover takes place without detecting any LAN failure and in others, switchover takes place but the failed LAN remains undetected by the on-line selfcheck function. Some systems have been impeded by a number of in-service hardware and software failures. There are cases of failure of power supply units, CPUs, firmware, network communication and workstation PCs, to say a few. Some hardware failures were traced to the inadequate assessment in design of the electrically hostile substation environmental conditions. Also, incidents of failure of station level computer components are more frequent. There is also a case of a particular supplier facing an uphill task to commission the SCS system with full configuration of a generic list of functionality specified in the contract, and in the process, the SCS firmware and application software were subject to revisions on-site. As a result, configuration, testing, and commissioning times became excessive. Also, changing software on a tutorial basis on-site may not detect hidden software bugs, which is resulting in SCS running with beta-release software in actual installations.

As of now, SCS technology has been littered with too many failures, both functional and operational. By hindsight of ADWEAs operational experiences, the authors of this paper perceive that SCS technology has to go a long way to feature high performance and operate in real-world conditions with a sufficient degree of maturity and success. This technology requires to be pushed forwards with more rigorous hardware quality control and faultless software debugging procedures, to meet the operational service requirements with high reliability, security and availability. 6.0.0 6.1.0 Future Trends IEC 61850 Standards

The focus of IEC 61850 is on developing an open-system communication architecture to meet functional and performance requirements in utility substations. As a result, the standards have considered a number of potential substation functions, in order to asses the total communication

requirements in their entirety, and the best way of achieving interoperability among products supplied by different manufacturers. 6.1.1 Advanced Functions

With knowledge of IEC 61850 becoming a formidable reality in future, manufacturers are now realizing the need to enhance and upgrade system performance and reliability, and supply control system platforms with many value-added functions, services and features. Among such advanced candidate functions are: Plant performance and condition monitoring, Point-on-wave switching, Dynamic transformer loading, Parameter set switching, Breaker failure protection, reverse blocking and zero voltage tripping, Revenue metering and power quality data, Load restoration, Automatic adaptive protection.

The employment of primary plant performance and condition monitoring is discussed [3] to maintain power system equipment in healthy operating conditions with a minimal of operation and maintenance costs. These techniques are proactive to detect major failures well before they impact service adversely. The application is to detect the emergence of any abnormal conditions during the operation of the equipment, and provides the capability to forestall equipment failure with a timely maintenance action. The future SCS will be built with extra computer programmes and hardware enhancements to perform a new paradigm of on-line monitoring of the substation equipment. Enhanced monitoring increases the economic life and short time overload capacity of substation equipment. The point-on-wave switching is proposed to limit the switching stresses on the circuit breaker and the object being energized during opening or closing of a circuit breaker. In order to fulfil this function, the future controller IEDs must operate with a time-resolution of 0.1 ms, instead of 1 ms, as is the case now. To achieve this level of time-tagging performance, the clock in the IEDs must work with a resolution of time of 0.01 ms. Circuit breaker fail protection and auto-reclose function will be treated in the future as a breakeroriented bay level function, with the algorithms shifted to the designated controller IEDs from protection relays. In transformer dynamic loading, the inherent short time overload capability available in transformers is utilized to tide over some momentary overload conditions on the network, keeping a close check on the internal working temperatures from not exceeding the design permissible limits. The IEC 61850 gives details of the reverse blocking facility on protection relays provided on all outgoing feeders operating in a radial configuration at smaller distribution substations designed without dedicated busbar protection. On a feeder fault, the high-speed protection element on the faulted feeder sends immediately a blocking pulse to the transformer incomer relay to stop operating in the high-speed zone. For an internal fault on the busbars, the incomer breaker is allowed to trip off-line immediately due to non-receipt of a blocking signal from any of the outgoing feeders. Traditional time-coordinated backup protection elements will also be available to perform a complementary function on all switchgear bays.

Descriptions of the entire lot of candidate functions listed above are considered beyond the scope of this paper for the shake of brevity. For more information, the interested reader is referred to the standard part, IEC 61850 document-Part 5 on Communication Requirements for Substation and Device Models. 6.1.2 Digital Data Bus

IEC 61850 foresees the possibility of implementing a Digital Data Bus (DDB) at process level for analogue sampled values. The DDB will be fed from optical transducers for primary system voltages and currents, and from optical sensors for switchgear status and alarms, paving the way to the full replacement of conventional current and voltage transformers and other copper wiring in the substation. The DDB will supply power system data in digital bits to one or more processors through the serial links to perform different algorithmic functions, such as protection, control, metering, interlocking, fault recording, power quality monitoring, etc. DDB eliminates the individual hardware interface from the substation plant items to each of the dedicated IEDs and thus offers a cost-effective digital solution with a considerable reduction in the amount of parallel wiring in the substation. 6.1.3 Corporate Database

The need for swift information exchange has now arisen from a Corporate Database (CD) for optimal management of the power network, and for safe and reliable upkeep of the substation plant items. The emergence of CD is now within reach from the technological point of view, due to the maturing concept of client-server architectures and by the availability of modern telecommunication technologies. CD contains information, both operational and non-operational, which will be very useful to personnel covering a wide range of engineering activities within the utility. An enriched database will provide on-line information on the performance as well as state of the capital-intensive primary equipment. This will provide the foundation to enable utilities to move from time-based management to condition-based management, but requires some on-line monitors fitted into the primary equipment for transmitting operational signals to the designated IEDs.

The corporate database can be resident at either NCC in a dedicated suite of servers or any other convenient place. The CD servers should be designed with physical layers of separation from the SCADA operations. Fig.2 shows of both SCADA and CD signals being treated as tributary signals and transmitted from individual sites over the utility owned Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) transport network.



This paper has explained SCS technology in terms of functional and heirarchical blocks. Important issues and subtleties in hardware architecture, software functions, communication interface expedients and performance criteria are covered as part of the discussions. In essence, the SCS hardware platform is designed to excell at information collection, supply, sharing, exchange, etc. and operate the utility substations with fast real-time response, automation functions and hardware reliability. The SCS application has now become a central part of the business strategies of most utilities worldwide to achieve an economic optimum. The paper has brought the reader to the nonhomegenous application of substation LANs, which exists today due the lack of direction in the industry for defining a homogeneous architecture supported by standardized communication interfaces. The LAN is the backbone to let SCS share information and resources between different devices and computers. The main problem is that in most cases the type of LAN used places an overwhelming reliance on the supplier of the system. The paper has also demonstrated a desire for achieving both interoperability and interchangeability of hardware devices from different suppliers within substations. In this respect, this paper looks for the dawn of the IEC 61850 to provide seamless connectivity among a large number of SCS systems with a list of new substation functions and a high level of interoperable capability. In the functionality, some new software pacakges may be available in the near future to integrate assest management within the SCS system. The paper has also given insights into the development of a Corporate Database for giving timely and useful information to personnel working in different facets of the utility business in the present deregulated environment. The support from SCS technology to perform all new functions outlined in this paper is a near term possibility. Despite the advent of the IEC 61850, the achievement of interchangeability of devices from one manufacturer to another is still perceived to be some time away. Future developments must therefore focus on achieving a complete plug and play capability. At the same time, the paper has expressed some concerns and apprehensions about some SCS applications in hindsight of poor operating experiences borne by ADWEA in Abu Dhabi substations. The system performance has been impacted by design complexity, unreliable hardware and unproven software. As of now, discussion on experience is a thorny matter for ADWEAs control system maintenance personnel, which has arisen out of SCS systems failing to demonstrate many of their perceived functional and performance benefits, and hardware reliability in actual installations, as presented in this paper. This technology requires to be pushed forwards with more rigorous hardware quality control and faultless software debugging procedures to make SCS operate with high performance of reliability and availability, and meet the users high ergonomic requirements at any times of the substation and control system operations. 8.0.0 [1[ References Subramanian R, etal, Communication Requirements for Remote Operation of a Computer Controlled Substation 34-103, Cigre Session 2000, Paris. Subramanian R, etal, Cost Validation of Substation Control System in Abu Dhabi Substations 34-101, Cigre Session 2002, Paris. Steve Haache, etal, Plan Ahead for Substation Automation, Vol.1, March/April 2003, IEEE Power & Energy.