EN BANC [G.R. No. L-27807. August 31, 1970.] LEONORA S. PALMA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ON. !OSE ORE"A, PRO#$NC$AL S ER$%% O% R$&AL '() *. + S., $NC.

, RespondentsAppellees. O. S'(tos ,o- Petitioner-Appellant. M. !. S.-'/0o Respondents-Appellees. 1EC$S$ON %ERNAN1O, J.2 There is nothing commendable, much less exemplary, in the willful omission by petitioner to lend an impress of plausibility to her special civil action for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Jose Oreta of the City Court of Caloocan. 1 In see ing to nullify respondent Judge!s decision in an e"ectment case ordering her to vacate possession as well as the writ of execution thereafter issued, she alleged that at the time of such decision there was a restraining order against the respondent Judge, who was thus bereft of authority to act on the matter. The truth came out when in the motion to dismiss filed by one of the respondents, the lessor, #. $ %., Inc., it was shown that before the decision on &ay '(, 1)*', the restraining order previously issued had been set aside as early as &arch ) of that year. This petition for certiorari and prohibition was dismissed by the Court of +irst Instance of ,i-al, Caloocan City .ranch, the /onorable +ernando Cru- presiding. /ence, this appeal to us. 0e sustain the order of dismissal. In the order of dismissal now on appeal, express reference was made to the failure of petitioner to mention that the restraining order had already been lifted. Thus1 2In the instant petition, respondents maintain, the petitioner wilfully and deliberately withheld from this Court the existence of the Order of &arch ), 1)*', of the Court of +irst Instance of ,i-al in Civil Case 3o. *)45, wherein it was expressly ruled that 6the previous order issued by this Court restraining the defendant from proceeding with the case is hereby set aside.! It was clear, therefore, that on &ay '(, 1)*', when the &unicipal Court of Caloocan City tried and rendered its decision, there was no longer a restraining order. The decision of the City Court having long become final and executory, the issuance of the writ of execution became merely a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent Judge to give due course.2 ' It was the conclusion of the lower court therefore1 27fter a careful consideration of the petition and the motion to dismiss as well as the opposition thereto, the Court is of the opinion that the petition does not state a cause of action since the order of dismissal dated &arch ), 1)*' was without any 8ualification and did not therefore carry the stay of the restraining order of &arch (, 1)*'. If it did, the said order of &arch ), 1)*' should have stated in clear and une8uivocal

55)1 until after a resolution on the :etition for certiorari and prohibition has been rendered and same becomes final. nonetheless.nder section @ of . ?illamor. is to put a premium on technicality. /onorable %alvador %. AII &oran. in deference to what had been shown to exist and could not thus be denied. There is nothing in the brief for petitioner. 9rd ed. :etitioner!s brief as appellant would stress this technical ob"ection thus1 2:ursuant to the above tests for the purpose of determining whether or not the :etition in the present case sufficiently states a cause of action against the appellee. namely. The court may deny the writ if from the answer it finds that the petition should be dismissed in the interest of "ustice. could there be an allegation as to the non<existence of the restraining order. . Certainly. 1)*' and obliterated the former. .C2 * Dven if petitioner were correct in his assumption that only what he did set forth could be the basis of the lower court decision. 2technicality. The Court is of the opinion that the order of &arch (. too careful pains to withhold from the Court the vital information that such restraining order had already been lifted. still he had failed to ma e a case for himself. Comments on the . that would call for a different conclusion. Oreta. Dven on the assumption that only in an answer. 1)*' was superseded by the order of &arch ).ules of Court.. %evilla.ule *4. in her brief as appellant. 55)1 on &ay '(. 1)*4 now on appeal was thus a necessary conse8uence. . once the answer to the petition for certiorariis filed 6the court may order the proceedings complained of to be forthwith certified up for review and shall hear the case.language. 0e affirm such order.2 9 The order of dismissal of +ebruary 1*. This fact is sufficiently alleged in the petition constituting the wrong or delicit in violation of petitioner<appellant!s rights . 1)*' issued by the Court of +irst Instance of . through his auxiliary. .2 5 :etitioner is under a misapprehension as to the controlling principle of law.ules of Court. and not as falsely painted by one of the parties. when it deserts its proper office as an aid to . 7s was held in 7rvisu v. =Only the contents of such petition may be ta en> into consideration to determine whether or not the :etition states a cause of action. deny that the restraining order had already been lifted as of the time the decision was rendered. It would then be to sacrifice needlessly the ends of a "ust and expeditious solution to a controversy if. still such a matter being brought to the attention of the court and being verified would have sufficed for the dismissal of this petition. 1@B. ?ergara1 ( 2. and not in a motion to dismiss. as above noted.nder the circumstances then. Oreta to refrain from proceeding with the trial of Civil Case 3o. the power to act of respondent Judge Oreta could not be assailed. the act of appellee /onorable Jose +. It would be to thwart the "udiciary in its avowed mission of rendering "ustice according to the facts as they exist. we can only go bac to the causes of action as alleged in the :etition. 4 decided as far bac as 1)1B. 7s was so aptly expressed by Justice &oreland in 7lonso v. the dismissal sought was granted. a persistence on the technicality that the /onorable +ernando Cru. :etitioner did not. because she could not.should rely not on the motion to dismiss but on the petition before him which. There is. animated by desire to attain his ob"ective even at the cost of preventing the truth. 1)*' despite the existence of the restraining Order dated &arch (. of proceeding with the trial of the e"ectment case sub"ect of Civil Case 3o.i-al directing appellee /onorable Jose +. To insist on such a doctrine in the face of the admitted fact that the petition was so artfully worded as to conceal the truth from the lower court which was revealed in the motion to dismiss.! .ut it is not mandatory upon the court to order the elevation of the proceedings and to hear the case. now appellant. the action ta en by the lower court does not call for a reversal.

1B 0e have remained steadfastly opposed. but as means conducive to the reali-ation of the administration of the law and of "ustice. this Court has remained committed. &a alintal. ' %C. 19 Justice Ealdivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Fabrador that rules of procedure 2are not to be applied in a very rigid.ecto in .eyes. It is understandable. 0ith costs against petitioner Feonora %.F.ernabe.nfortunately. '<9. F<15'59. :hil. J. . *'9. . deserves scant consideration from courts. The ?illamor decision was cited with approval in . June 9B. p. 9. . C. 0/D. JJ. as a matter of fact it is expected of him.. '. the order of dismissal is affirmed. It certainly cannot go as far as "ustify as willful and deliberate omission to give the color of persuasiveness to an action clearly devoid of merit.7 *4(. 9''. /e is e8ually an instrument in the dispensation of "ustice through law. %uch a duty. @. 1)*1. . . 1* :hil. li ewise. Order. 5. to 2a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicality as with impairment of the sacred principles of "ustice.. 9<5.J. to give expression to our disapproval of what was done by counsel for petitioner.i-al and the #. Teehan ee. 4. +or him the interpretation of procedural rule should never 2sacrifice the ends of "ustice. +or he is li ewise an officer of the court. in the highly rhetorical language of Justice +elix. technical sense2 G but are intended 2to help secure substantial "ustice. Inc.2 15 0hat the lower court did was precisely to honor the above pronouncements.y v.2 0hile 2procedural laws are no other than technicalities2 to view them in their entirety. +ebruary 1*. .D+O..y. Hi-on. *'1 A1)(1C. pp. )B :hil. Ealdivar.. @5 :hil.2 1' In the latest decision in point. p. 2they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts have been organi-ed and function.lanco v. 91( A1)1BC. ?illamor. :alma. they 2should give way to the realities of the situation. $ %. 1)*4.egister of Heeds v. Endnotes: 1. pp. Ibid. 3at.2 @ To that norm. has its limits. pp."ustice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy. he does not mislead the court by an allegation which. '5<'(. Ibid. (. counsel for petitioner was deaf to such a command that the profession rightfully imposes and thus was guilty of a betrayal of the high standard expected of every member of the bar.D. *. ) was of a similar mind.. Castro. as in this case. was clearly shown to be contrary to the truth and was "ust as easily exposed.2 11 7s succinctly put by Justice &a alintal. . 7rguments. The other respondents named were the :rovincial %heriff of .arredo. concur. Ibid. and &a asiar. however peremptory in character. promulgated in 1)*@. It is re8uired of him that is discharging his role as advocate. . and . There is need.. that he should defend with -eal and militancy his client!s cause. Concepcion.an .. The late Justice ...rief for the :etitioner<7ppellant.

1*1 A1)(@C. @59. 1)*@.. F<'5'@@.dan v. Court of 7ppeals. F<1(94). &anoto . 11. 19. 15. *9 :hil. Ibid. &ay '@.7 '4'. 1B1).. 1)*'. 7mon. :otenciano v.rbayan v. 1'. F<15)*@. . p. 1)*1. . 91. 9 %C. . 1B5 :hil. p.7 1B1*. '4. 1'5 A1)9*C.7 @94 citing &cDntee v. 1B. '9 %C. Ibid. Caltex. Oct. ( %C. 7ug.). 1(*. 1'@.

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