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I DonaldE.J.Kilmer, Jr.


2 A ProfessionalCorporation

1645Willow Street,Suite150
J SanJose,California 95125-5120
Telephone: 408/264-8489
4 Facsimile: 408/264-8487
E-Mail: Donlô
Attorney for Plaintiffs

18 Plaintiffs, Hearing Date: Oct.3.20 06

t9 Ilearing Time: 9:30A.M.

20 Judge: Martin J. Jertkilts
MARY V. KTNG,GAIL STEELE, Courthouse: U.S.Court House
2T WILMA CHAN, KEITH CARSON, 450 Golden Gate Ave.
22 Cali'fornia 94t02
& 23 Defendants.

@ 24
Plaintifß herebyaskthe courtto takejudicial noticeof facts,as authorizedby Federal
@ 25
26 Ruleof Evidence201.

27 1. Ptaintifß are setforth in the caption.

Dou¡ld Kilmer
Attomey at Iåw 28 2. Defendantsare setforth in the caption.
tú5 Witlow SEcet
Sü Jose,CA 95125
Yc:4081264-8489 Nordyke v. Kins PageI of 2 Request for Jud Notice
FK 408n64-8487
I 3. for violationsof their civil rights.

2 4. Plaintiff asksthis courtto takejudicial noticeof the following adjudicativefacts

J of the relevantdocumentsareattachedasExhibitsA - B.]:
4 A. PublicLaw 109-92:Protectionof Lawful Commercein Arms Act.

5 B. Gun ShowEnforcementand SecurityAction of 2000.Ca.PenalCode$ 12071.4.

6 C. Opinionfrom: Scope.Inc. v. Pataki; 386F.Supp.2d184(W.D.N.Y.2005)


8 5. The court musttakejudicial noticeof a fact if a parfy properlyrequeststhe court to take

9 judicial noticeandsuppliesthe courtwith the necessaryinformation.Fed.R. Evid.

10 20r(d).
1 1 6. If a parly makesa timely request,theparty is entitledto a hearingon the proprietyof

t2 takingjudicial noticeandthe tenorof thematternoticed. Fed.R. Evid. 201(e). Plaintiffs

13 herebyaskthat the courthold a hearingto considerthis requestfor judicial noticeif the

I4 court is not inclinedto summarilygrantthe request.


I6 Conclusion

t7 7. For thesereasons,Ptaintiffsaskthe courtto takejudicial noticeof the requestedfacts.


t9 RespectfullySubmitted.

20 5,2006
Date: September



23 DonaldE. J. Kilmer, Jr.

Attorney for the Plaintiffs


Donald Kilmer
Atùomeyat hw 28
1645Willow Stæt
suite 150
SÐ Jose,CA 95125
1'lc:4O8126Ç8489 Nordykev. Kine Page2of 2 Requestfor JudNotice
Fxi 4081264'8487
í )
109P.L.92,*; ll9 Stat.2095,**;
2005EnactedS. 397: 109EnactedS. 397



-- lst Session
l09th Congress

PUBLTCLAV/ 109-92[S.397]

109P.L. 92; 119Stat.2095;2005EnactedS. 397; 109EnactedS. 397

BILL TRACKING REPORT: 109Bill TrackingS. 397


An Act
To prohibit civil liability actionsfrom beingbroughtor continuedagainstmanufacturers,
distributors,dealers,or importersof firearmsor ammunitionfor damages,injunctiveor otherrelief
resultingfrom the misuseof their productsby others.

of the United Statesof Americain

Be it enactedby the SenateandHouseof Representatives
Congress assembled,
[*11 SECTION1.<]5 USC7901note>SHORTTITLE.
This Act may be cited asthe "Protectionof Lawful Commercein Arms Act".
, ì [*2] SEC.2. <15 USC7901>FINDINGS;PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress
finds the following:
(1) The SecondAmendmentto the United StatesConstitutionprovidesthat the right of the
peopleto keepandbeararmsshallnot be infringed.
(2) The SecondAmendmentto the United StatesConstitutionprotectsthe rights of
individuals,includingthosewho arenot membersof a militia or engagedin military serviceor
training,to keepandbearaÍns.
(3) Lawsuitshavebeencommencedagainstmanufacturers, distributors,dealers,and importers
of fîrearmsthat operateas designedandintended,which seekmoneydamagesand otherrelief for
the harmcausedby the misuseof firearmsby third parties,includingcriminals.
(a) Themanufacture,importation,possession,sale,anduseof firearmsand ammunitionin the
United Statesareheavilyregulatedby Federal,State,andlocal laws. SuchFederallaws includethe
Gun ControlAct of 1968,the NationalFirearmsAct, andthe Arms Export Control Act.
in the United Statesthat areengagedin interstateand foreign commerce
(5) Businesses
throughthe lawful design,manufacture,marketing,distribution,importation,or saleto the public of
firearmsor ammunitionproductsthat havebeenshippedor transportedin interstateor foreign

commercearenot, andshouldnot, be liable for the harmcausedby thosewho criminallyor
unlawfully misuse{trearmproductsor ammunitionprod.ucts that functionasdesignedandintended.
(6) Thepossibilityof imposingliability on an entireindustryfor harmthat is solelycausedby
othersis an abuseof the legalsystem,erodespublic confidencein our Nation'slaws,threatens the
diminutionof a basicconstitutionalright andcivil liberty, invitesthe disassemblyand
destabilizationof otherindustriesandeconomicsectorslawfully competing [**20961 in thefree
enterprisesystemof the United States,andconstitutesan uffeasonableburdenon interstateand
foreign commerceof the United States.
(7) The liability actionscommencedor contemplated by the FederalGovernment,States,
municipalities,andprivateinterestgroupsandothersarebasedon theorieswithout foundationin
hundredsof yearsof the commonlaw andjurisprudenceof the United Statesanddo not representa
bonafide expansionof the commonlaw. The possiblesustainingof theseactionsby a maverick
judicial officer or petitjury would expandcivil liability ina mannernevercontemplated by the
framersof the Constitution,by Congress,or by the legislaturesof the severalStates.Suchan
expansionof liability would constitutea deprivationof the rights,privileges,and immunities
guaranteed to a citizenof the United Statesunderthe FourteenthAmendmentto the UnitedStates
(8) The liability actionscommencedor contemplated by the FederalGovernment,States,
municipalities,privateinterestgroupsandothersattemptto usethejudicial branchto circumvent
the Legislativebranchof governmentto regulateinterstateandforeigncoÍrmercethrough
judgmentsandjudicial decreestherebythreateningthe Separationof Powersdoctrineand
weakeningandunderminingimportantprinciplesof federalism,Statesovereigntyandcomity
betweenthe sisterStates.
(b) Purposes.--The
purposesof this Act areasfollows:
(1) To prohibit causesof actionagainstmanufacturers,distributors,dealers,andimportersof
firearmsor ammunition products, for the harm solelycausedby the
andtheir tradeassociations,
criminal or unlawfulmisuseof firearmproductsor ammunitionproductsby otherswhenthe
productfunctionedas designedand intended.
(2) To preservea citizen'saccessto a supplyof firearmsandammunitionfor all lawful
purposes,includinghunting,self-defense, collecting,andcompetitiveor recreationalshooting.
(3) To guaranteea citizen'srights,privileges,andimmunities,as appliedto the States,under
the FourteenthAmendmentto the United StatesConstitution,pursuantto section5 of that
burdenson interstateand
(a) To preventthe useof suchlawsuitsto imposeunreasonable
foreign cofirmerce.
(5) To protectthe right, underthe First Amendmentto the Constitution,of manufacturers,
distributors,dealers,and importersof firearmsor ammunitionproducts,and tradeassociations, to
speak freely,to assemble peaceably, and to petitionthe for
Government a redress of their
(6) To preserveandprotectthe Separationof Powersdoctrineand importantprinciplesof
federalism,Statesovereigntyand comity betweensisterStates.
Page 3

i#i üiÍ"i'å,i,,,
(7) To exercisecongressional
powerunderarticleIV, sectionI (the Full FaithandCredit
Clause)of theUnitedStatesConstitution.
(a) In General.--Aqualifiedcivil liability actionmay not be broughtin anyFederalor State
I**20971 (b) Dismissalof PendingActions.--Aqualifiedcivil liability actionthat is pending
on the dateof enactmentof this Act shallbe immediatelydismissedby the court in which the action
wasbroughtor is currentlypending.
[*41 sEC.4. <]5 USC7903>DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Engagedin the business.--The term "engagedin the business"hasthe meaninggiventhat
' j term in section921(a)(21)of title 18,UnitedStatesCode,and,asappliedto a sellerof ammunition,
meansa personwho devotestime, attention,andlaborto the saleof ammunitionasa regularcourse
of tradeor businesswith the principal objectiveof livelihoodandprofit throughthe saleor
distributionof ammunition.
(2) Manufacturer.--The term "manufacturer"
means,with respectto a qualifiedproduct,a
personwho is engagedin the businessof manufacturingthe productin interstateor foreign
coÍtmerceandwho is licensedto engagein businessas sucha manufacturerunderchapter44 of
title 18,UnitedStatesCode.
(3) Person.--The term "person"meansanyindividual,corporation,company,association,
firm, partnership,society,joint stockcompany,or any otherentity, includingany governmental
(4) Qualifiedproduct.--The term "qualifiedproduct"meansa firearm(asdefinedin
. subparagraph (A) or (B) of section921(a)(3)of title 18,UnítedStatesCode),includingany antique
'. ,j firearm(asdefinedin section92I(a)(I6) of suchtitle), or ammunition(as definedin section
921(a)(I7)(A)of suchtitle), or a componentpart of a firearmor ammunition,that hasbeenshipped
or transportedin interstateor foreigncoÍtmerce.
(5) Qualifiedcivil liability action.--
(A) In general.--Theterm "qualifiedcivil liability action" meansa civil actionor proceeding
or an administrativeproceedingbroughtby anypersonagainsta manufactureror sellerof a
qualifiedproduct,or a tradeassociation,for damages, punitive damages,injunctiveor declaratory
relief abatement,restitution,fines,or penalties,or otherrelief, resultingfrom the criminal or
unlawful misuseof a qualifiedproductby thepersonor a third party,but shallnot include--
(i) an actionbroughtagainsta transferorconvictedundersection924(h)of title 18,United
StatesCode,or a comparableor identicalStatefelony law, by aparty directly harmedby the
conductof which the transfereeis so convicted:
(ii) an actionbroughtagainsta sellerfor negligententrustmentor negligenceper se;

i 3#å'.'å,1',
(iii) an actionin which a manufacturer
or sellerof a qualifiedproductknowingly violateda
Stateor Federalstatuteapplicableto the saleor marketingof the product,andthe violationwasa
proximatecauseof the harmfor which relief is sought,including-
(I) any casein which themanufactureror sellerknowinglymadeany falseentryin, or
failed to makeappropriateentryin, anyrecordrequired [**20981 to be kept underFederalor State
law with respectto the qualifiedproduct,or aided,abetted,or conspiredwith any personin making
any falseor fictitious oral or written statementwith respectto anyfactmaterialto the lawfulnessof
the saleor otherdispositionof a qualifiedproduct;or
(II) any casein which the manufactureror selleraided,abetted,or conspiredwith any
otherpersonto sell or otherwisedisposeof a qualif,redproduct,knowing,or havingreasonable
causeto believe,that the actualbuyerof the qualifiedproductwasprohibitedfrom possessing or
receivinga firearmor ammunitionundersubsection(g) or (n) of section922 of títle 18,United
(iv) an actionfor breachof contractor warrantyin connectionwith the purchaseof the
(v) an actionfor death,physicalinjuriesor propertydamageresultingdirectly from a defect
in designor manufactureof theproduct,whenusedasintendedor in a reasonablyforeseeable
manner,exceptthat wherethe dischargeof the productwascausedby a volitional actthat
constituteda criminal offense,thensuchact shallbe consideredthe soleproximatecauseof any
resultingdeath,personalinjuriesor properfydamage;or
(vi) an actionor proceedingcommencedby the AttorneyGeneralto enforcethe provisions
of chapter44 of title 18or chapter53 of title26,United StatesCode.
(B) Negligententrustment.--As
usedin subparagraph (AXiÐ, the term "negligent
entrustment"meansthe supplyingof a qualifiedproductby a sellerfor useby anotherpersonwhen
the sellerknows,or reasonablyshouldknow, the personto whom theproductis suppliedis likely
to, anddoes,usethe productin a mannerinvolving unreasonable risk of physicalinjury to the
personor others.
(C) Rule of construction.--The exceptionsenumeratedunderclauses(i) through(v) of
subparagraph shallbe construedso asnot to be in conflict,andno provision of this Act shallbe
construedto createa public or privatecauseof actionor remedy.
in this Act shallbe construedto limit the right of a
(D) Minor child exception.--Nothing
personunder 17 yearsof ageto recoverdamagesauthorizedunderFederalor Statelaw in a civil
underclauses(i) through(v) of subparagraph
actionthat meets1 of the requirements (A).
(6) Seller.--The term "seller"means,with respectto a qualifiedproduct--
(A) an importer(as definedinsectton921(a)(9)of títle l,8,UnitedStatesCode)who is
engagedin the businessas suchan importerin interstateor foreigncoÍrmerceand [**20991 who is
licensedto engagein businessassuchan importerunderchapter44 of title 18, United StatesCode;
(B) a dealer(as definedinsectíon921(a)(II) of title 18,UnítedStatesCode)who is engaged
in the businessas sucha dealerin interstateor foreigncoûrmerceandwho is licensedto engagein
businessassucha dealerunderchapter44 of title 18,United St¿tesCode;or
Page 5

,,f iJ;k3?
(C) a person engagedin the businessof selling ammunition (as defined in section
921(a)(17)(A) of title 18, United States Code) in interstateor foreign coÍrmerce at the wholesaleor
retail level.
(7) State.-- The term "State" includes each of the severalStatesof the United States,the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa,and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,and any other territory or
possessionof the United States,and any political subdivisionof any suchplace.
(8) Trade association.--The term "trade association"means--
(A) any corporation, unincorporated association,federation,businessleague,professionalor
business organizationnot organized or operated for profit and no part of the net earningsof which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholderor individual;
(B) that is an organization describedin section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 and exempt from tax under section501(a) of suchCode;and
(C) 2 or more membersof which are manufacturersor sellers of a qualified product.
(9) Unlawful misuse.-- The term "unlawfirl misuse" meansconduct that violates a statute,
ordinance,or regulationasit relatesto the useof a qualifiedproduct.
(a) <18 USC921note) ShortTitle.--Thissectionmaybe citedasthe "Child SafetyLock Act of
(b) </8 USC922note) Purposes.--The
purposesof thissectionare--
(l) to promotethe safestorageanduseof handgunsby consumers;
(2) to preventunauthorizedpersonsfrom gainingaccessto or useof a handgun,including
childrenwho may not be in possessionof a handgun;and
1'1, i (3) to avoidhinderingindustryfrom supplyingflrrearms
to law abidingcitizensfor all lawful

(c) FirearmsSafety.-
(1) Mandatorytransferof securegun storageor safetydevice.--Section922 of title 18,United
StøtesCode,is amendedby insertingat the endthe following:
"(z) SecureGun Storageor SafetyDevice.--
"(l) In general.--Exceptasprovidedunderparagraph(2),it shallbe unlawful for any licensed
importer,licensedmanufacturer,or licenseddealerto sell,deliver,or transferany handgunto any
personotherthananypersonlicensedunderthis chapter,unlessthe transfereeis providedwith a
securegun storageor safetydevice(asdefinedin section921($Q$) for that handgun.
"(2) Exceptions.-- (1) shallnot applyto--"(A)
(i) the manufacturefor, transferto, or possession
by, the United States,a departmentor
agerlcyof the United [**21001 States,a State,or a department, agency,or political subdivisionof
a State,ofa handgun;or
Page 6

"(ii) the transfer to, or possessionby, a law enforcementofficer employed by an entity
referred to in clause(i) of a handgun for law enforcementpurposes(whether on or off duty); or
"(B) the transfer to, or possessionby, aruil police offrcer employed by a rail carrier and
certified or commissionedas a police officer under the laws of a Stateof a handgun for purposesof
law enforcement(whether on or off duty);
"(C) the transfer to any person of a handgun listed as a curio or relic by the Secretary
pursuantto section921(a)(13);or
"(D) the transfer to any person of a handgun for which a securegun storageor safety device
is temporarily unavailable for the reasonsdescribedin the exceptionsstatedin section 923(e), if the
licensed manufacfurer,licensed importer, or licensed dealer delivers to the transfereewithin l0
calendar days from the date of the delivery of the handgunto the transfereea securegun storageor
safety device for the handgun.
"(3) Liability for use.----
"(A) In general.--Notwithstandingany other provision of law, a person who has lawful
possessionand control of a handgun, and who usesa securegun storageor safety device with the
handgun, shall be entitled to immunity from a qualified civil liability action.
"(B) Prospectiveactions.--A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal
or Statecourt. /

"(C) Defined term.--As used in this paragraph,the term'qualified civil liability action'--
"(i) meansa civil action brought by any person againsta person described in subparagraph
(A) for damagesresulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of the handgun by a third pafty, if--
"(I) the handgun was accessedby another personwho did not have the permission or
authonzation of the person having lawful possessionand control of the handgun to have accessto
it; and
"(II) at the time accesswas gained by the person not so authorized, the handgun had been
made inoperable by use of a securegun storageor safety device; and
"(ii) shall not include an action brought againstthe person having lawful possessionand
control of the handgun for negligent entrustmentor negligenceper se.".
(2) Civil penalties.-- Section 924 of title 18, Uníted StatesCode, is amended--
(A) in subsection(aXl), by striking "or (Ð" and inserting "(Ð, or þ)"; and
(B) bV adding at the end the following:
"þ) PenaltiesRelating To SecureGun Storageor Safety Device.--
"(1) In general.----
[**21011 "(A) Suspensionor revocationof license;civil penalties.--V/ithrespectto each
violation of section 922(z)(l) by a licensed manufacturer,licensed importer, or licensed dealer, the
Secretarymay, after notice and opportunity for hearing-
"(i) suspendfor not more than 6 months, or revoke, the license issued to the licenseeunder
this chapter that was used to conduct the firearms transfer; or

:#i 3råå0"'å
i, n,
"(ii) subjectthe licenseeto a civil penaltyin an amountequalto not morethan$ 2,500.
ortheSecretary onlvas
"(2) Administrativeremedies.--The suspensionor revocationof a licenseor the impositionof
a civil penaltyunderparagraph(1) shallnot precludeany administrativeremedythat is otherwise
availableto the Secretary.".
(3) <18 USC922note) Liability;evidence.----
(A) Liability.-Nothing in this sectionshallbe construedto--
(i) createa causeof actionagainstany Federalfirearmslicenseeor any otherpersonfor any
civil liabiliW;or
(ii) establishany standardofcare.

, ) (B) Evidence.--Notwithstanding any otherprovisionof law, evidenceregardingcompliance

or noncompliance with the amendments madeby this sectionshallnot be admissibleasevidencein
anyproceedingof any court, agerrcy, board,or otherentity,exceptwith respectto an actionrelating
to sectíon922(z)of title 18,UnitedStatesCode,asaddedby this subsection.
(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing
in this paragraphshallbe construedto bar a governmental
actionto imposea penaltyundersection92a(fl of title 18,UnitedStatesCode,for a failure to
complywith section922(z)of thattitle.
(d) <18 USC922 note>EffectiveDate.--Thissectionandthe amendments
madeby this section
shalltakeeffect 180daysafterthedateof enactmentof this Act.
(a) Unlawful Acts.--Section922(a)of title 18,UnitedStatesCode,is amendedby striking
paragraphs(7) and (8) andinsertingthe following:
' j "(7) for any personto manufactureor import aÍnor piercingammunition,unless--
"(A) the manufactureof suchammunitionis for theuseof theUnited States,any department
or agencyof the United States,any State,or any department,ageîcy,or political subdivisionof a
"(B) the manufactureof suchammunitionis for thepurposeof exportation;or
"(C) the manufactureor importationof suchammunitionis for the purposeof testingor
experimentation andhasbeenauthorizedbythe Attorney General;
"(8) for any manufactureror importerto sell or deliverarmorpiercingammunition,unless
suchsaleor delivery--
l**21021 "(A) is for the useof the United States,any departmentor agencyof the United
States,any State,or any department,a5ency,or political subdivisionof a State'
"(B) is for the purposeof exportation;or
andhasbeenauthorizedbythe Attorney
"(C) is for the purposeof testingor experimentation
Page 8

i#i 3f¡#"'å,
(b) Penalties.--Section
924(c)of títle i,8,UnitedStatesCode,is amendedby addingat the end
the following:
"(5) Exceptto the extentthata greaterminimum sentence is otherwiseprovidedunderthis
subsection,or by any otherprovisionof law, any personwho,duringand in relationto any crimeof
violenceor drug traffickingcrime(includinga crime of violenceor drugtrafficking crimethat
providesfor an enhanced punishmentif committedby theuseof a deadlyor dangerousweaponor
device)for which the personmay be prosecutedin a courtof theUnited States,usesor carries
afinorpiercingammunition,or who, in furtheranceof any suchcrime,possesses annorpiercing
ammunition,shall,in additionto the punishment providedfor suchcrime of violenceor drug
trafficking crime or convictionunderthis section--
"(A) be sentenced
to a termof imprisonmentof not lessthan 15years;and
"(B) if deathresultsfrom the useof suchammunition--
"(i) if the killing is murder(asdefinedin section1111),bepunishedby deathor sentenced
a term of imprisonmentfor anyterm of yearsor for life; and
(asdefinedin sectionIlI2), be punishedasprovidedin
"(ii) if the killing is manslaughter
(c) StudyandReport.-
(1) Study.--The AttorneyGeneralshall conducta studyto determinewhethera uniform
standardfor the testingof projectilesagainstBody Armor is feasible.
(2) Issuesto be studied.--The studyconductedunderparagraph(1) shall include--
(A) variationsin performance that arerelatedto the lengthof the barrelof the handgunor
center-firerifle from which theprojectileis fired; and
(B) the amountof powderusedto propelthe projectile.
(3) Report.--Not laterthan 2yearsafter the dateof enactmentof this Act, the Attorney
Generalshall submita reportcontainingthe resultsof the studyconductedunderthis subsectionto-

(A) the chairmanandrankingmemberof the Committeeon the Judiciaryof the Senate;and

[**21031 (B) the chairmanandrankingmemberof the Committeeon the Judiciaryof the
Houseof Representatives.



( )

Page 1
Cal PenCode$ 12071.4


Copyright(c) 2006by MatthewBender& Company,Inc.
a memberof the LexisNexisGroup.
All rights reserved.

xx* THROUGH2006CH. 161.APPROVED812g106

Part4. Preventionof CrimesandApprehension of Criminals
Title2. Controlof Deadly'Weapons
Chapterl. Firearms
Article 4. Licensesto Sell Firearms


Cal Pen Code$ 1207L4(2006)

S 12071.4.Gun ShowEnforcementand SecurityAct

(a) This sectionshallbe known,andmay be citedas,the Gun ShowEnforcementand Security

Act of 2000.
(b) All gun showor eventvendorsshall certiff in writing to the producerthat they:
(1) Will not display,possess,or offer for saleany firearms,knives,or weaponsfor which
possessionor saleis prohibited.
\'. r'l (2) Acknowledgethat they areresponsiblefor knowingandcomplyingwith all applicable
federal,state,and local lawsdealingwith the possession
andtransferof firearms.
(3) Will not engagein activitiesthat incite or encourage
(4) Will processall transfersof firearmsthroughlicensedfirearmsdealersasrequiredby state
(5) Will veri$r that all firearmsin their possession
at the showor eventwill be unloaded,and
that the firearmswill be securedin a mannerthat preventsthemfrom being operatedexceptfor
brief periodswhenthe mechanicalconditionof a firearmis beingdemonstrated to a prospective
(6) Havecompliedwith the requirementsof subdivision(e).
(7) V/ill not displayor possess
black powder,or offer it for sale.
(c) All firearmstransfersat the gun showor eventshallbe in accordancewith applicablestate
cal Pencode g l2o7l.4

(d) Except for purposesof showing ammunition to a prospective buyer, ammunition at a gun
show or event may be displayed only in closed original factory boxes or other closed containers.
(e) Prior to the commencementof a gun show or event, each vendor shall provide to the
producer all of the following information relative to the vendor, the vendor's employees,and other
persons,compensatedor not, who will be working or otherwise providing servicesto the public at
the vendor'sdisplay spaceif firearms manufacturedafter December 31, 1898,will be offered for
(1) His or her completename.
(2) His or her driver's license or state-issuedidentification card number.
(3) His or her date of birth.
The producer shall keep the information at the show's or event's onsite headquartersfor the
duration of the show or event, and at the producer'sregular place of businessfor two weeks after
the conclusion of the show or event, and shall make the information available upon requestto any
sworn peaceofficer for purposesof the officer's official law enforcement duties.
(f) Vendors and employeesof vendors shall wear name tags indicating first and last name.
(g) No person at a gan show or event, other than security personnel or s\ryornpeaceofficers,
shall possessat the sametime both a firearm and ammunition that is designedto be fired in the
firearm. Vendors having those items at the show for sale or exhibition are exempt from this
(h) No member of the public who is under the age of 18 years shall be admitted to, or be
permitted to remain at, a gan show or event unless accompaniedby aparcntor legal guardian. Any
member of the public who is under the age of 18 shall be accompaniedby his or her parent,
grandparent,or legal guardian while at the show or event.
(i) Personsother than show or event security personnel,s\ryornpeace officers, or vendors, who
bring firearms onto the gun show or event premisesshall sign in ink the tag or sticker that is
{ . 1 attachedto the firearm prior to being allowed admittanceto the show or event, as provided for in

C) All firearms carried onto the premisesof a gun show or event by membersof the public shall
be checked,cleared of any ammunition, securedin a manner that prevents them from being
operated,and an identification tag or sticker shall be attachedto the firearm, prior to the person
being allowed admittance to the show. The identification tag or sticker shall statethat all firearms
transfers between private parties at the show or event shall be conducted through a licensed dealer
in accordancewith applicable state and federal laws. The person possessingthe firearm shall
complete the following information on the tag before it is attachedto the firearm:
(1) The gun owner's signature.
(2) The gun owner's printed name.
(3) The identification number from the gun owner's government-issuedphoto identification.
(k) All personspossessingfirearms at the gun show or event shall have in his or her immediate
possession,government-issuedphoto identification, and display it upon request, to any security
officer, or any peace officer.
Cal PenCode$ 12071.4

(l) Unlessotherwisespecified,a first violationof this sectionis an infraction.Any secondor

subsequent violation is a misdemeanor. Any personwho commitsan actwhich he or sheknowsto
be a violationof this sectionis guilty of a misdemeanor for a first offense.

AddedStats1999ch247 $ 3 (AB 295).


Pt.4,Tit.2 Note
.\ Pt.4, Tit. 2, Ch. 1 Note
Pt.4, Tit. 2, Ch.l, Art. 4 Note

l l
l ' )

Page I
386F. Supp.2d I84, *; 2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**



businessas AMEIUCAN SPORTSMAN, Plaintiffs, -vs- GOVERNOR




386 F. Supp.2d 184; 2005 U.S. Díst.LEXIS 20200


DISPOSITION: [**1] Defendants'motion (# 11)to dismiss,or for judgmenton pleadings

grantedin part, deniedin part,andplaintiffs'Rule I2(c) cross-motion for "partialsünmary
judgment"andan injunction(# 18)grantedin part, deniedin part.

COUNSEL: For Plaintiffs: ScottGarretson,Esq.,Rochester,NY.

¡ ' i,
For Defendants:CharlesD. Steinman,A.A.G., New York StateAttorneyGeneral'sOffice,
Departmentof Law, Rochester,NY.

JUDGES: CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA,United StatesDistrict Judge.


Plaintifß are challengingastatuteenactedby the New York Legislaturepertainingto the saleof
gunsandthe creationof a St¿tedatabase for gunssold in New York. Beforethe Court are
defendants' motion for judgmenton the pleadings,or motionto dismiss,pursuantto FederalRules
of Civil ProcedureI 2(c) andI 2(b), andplaintiffs' cross-motion,alsopursuantto Rule I 2(Q, for
386F. Supp.2d t84,*;2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

"partialsummaryjudgment"andinjunctiverelief. For the reasonsstatedbelow,the Courtpartially

grantsandpartially deniesboth motions.
The issuesraisedin theparties'applications[**2] canbe resolvedat thisjunctureby
examinationof the complaintandreferencedstatute.As to the identityof theplaintiffs,the
eomplaint,filed on April 23,2004,assertsthat the Shooter'sCommitteeon Political Education,Inc.
("SCOPE")is a New York not-for-profitcorporationdevotedto preservingthe legalpossession and
useof handguns,rifles andshotguns.It identifiesKennethMathison("Mathison")asa New York
taxpayerandpresidentof SCOPE.It statesthat CamillusSportsman's Club, Inc. ("Camillus")is a
Delawarenot-for-prof,rtcorporationlocatedin OnondagaCounty,New York. Plaintiff Yates
CountyFederationof ConservationClubs("Yates")is statedto be an unincorporated association of
nine conservationclubsandsportingorganizations nl locatedin YatesCounty,New York with a
principalplaceof businessin the Town of Dundee.Finally, the complaintidentifiesplaintiff
LeadloaderArms, Inc., doing businessasAmericanSportsman("Leadloader"),asa New York
corporationwith a principalplaceof businessin MonroeCounty,New York. The defendants are
[*1871 variousNew York Stateofficials,includingthe GovernorandAttorney General.

nl The memberclubslistedin the complaintare:the BaningtonRifle Club,thelzaac

WaltonLeague(BranchportChapter),the YatesCountySportsman's Association,Seneca
LakeDuck HuntersAssociation,Himrod Field andStreamConservationClub, Inc.,
BranchportRod andGun Club,Inc., GrapeCountryCoonHuntersAssociation,the Keuka
Lake Renegades,andthe MiddlesexConservationClub,Inc.

The first four causesof actionin the complaintpertainto New YorkGeneralBustnessLaw
sections895,896and897,all enactedasArticle 39-DD-Saleof Firearms,Rifles,or Shotguns at
GunShows (McKinney 2000).L.2000,c. 189,$ 5, eff. Aug. 8, 2000.Thosestatutesstatein
relevantpart as follows:

$ 895.Definitions
For the pu{posesof this article:

l. "Gun show" meansan eventsponsored, whetherfor profit or not, by an individual,

national,stateor local organization,associationor otherentity devotedto the
collection,competitiveuse,sportinguse,or any otherlegaluseof firearms,rifles or
shotguns,or an eventat which (a) twentypercentor moreof the total numberof
exhibitorsare firearmexhibitorsor (b) ten or morefirearmexhibitorsareparticipating
or (c) atotal of twenty-fiveor morepistolsor revolversareofferedfor saleor transfer
or (d) atotal of frfty or morefirearms,rifles or shotgunsareofferedfor saleor transfer.
The term gun showshallincludeany building, structureor facility wherefirearms,
rifles or shotgunsareofferedfor saleor transferandany groundsusedin connection
with the event. [**4]
386F. Supp.2d 184,*; 2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

ç 896.Operationof a gun show

1. A gun showoperatorshall:

(a) at all timesduring suchshowconspicuously postandmaintainsignsstating"A

NationalInstantCriminal BackgroundCheckmustbe completedprior to all firearm
salesor transfers,includingsalesor transfersof rifles or shotguns".Signsmustbe
postedat all entrancesto the gun show,at all placeswhereadmissionticketsto the gun
showaresoldandnot lessthanfour additionallocationswithin the groundsof the gun

(b) notiff all firearmexhibitorsin writing thatanationalinstantcriminalbackground

checkmustbe completedprior to all firearmsalesor transfers,includingsalesor
transfersof rifles or shotguns;and

(c) provideaccessat the gun showto a firearmdealerlicensedunderfederallaw who is

authorizedto performa nationalinstantcriminalbackgroundcheckwherethe selleror
transferorof a fltrearm,rifle or shotgunis not authorizedto conductsucha checkbV (i)
requiringfirearmexhibitorswho arefirearmdealerslicensedunderfederallaw and
who areauthorizedto conducta nationalinstantcriminalbackgroundcheckto provide
sucha checkat costor (ii) designating[**51 a specificlocationat the gun showwhere
a f,trearmdealerlicensedunderfederallaw who is authorizedto conducta national
instantcriminalbackgroundcheckwill be presentto performsucha checkat cost.Any
firearmdealerlicensedunderfederallaw who performsa nationalinstantcriminal
backgroundcheckpursuantto this paragraphshallprovidethe selleror transferorof the
firearm,rifle or shotgunwith a copy of theUnited SøtesDepartmentof Treasury,
Bureauof Alcohol, TobaccoandFirearmsFormATF F 4473 andsuchdealershall
maintainsuchform andmakesuchform availablefor inspectionby law enforcement
agenciesfor a periodof ten yearsthereafter.

2. Wheneverthe attorneygeneralshallbelievefrom evidencesatisfactoryto him or her

thata gun showoperatorhasviolatedany of the provisionsof this section,the attorney
generalmay bring an actionor specialproceedingin the supremecourt for ajudgment
enjoiningthe continuanceof suchviolationandfor a civil penaltyin an amountnot to
exceedten thousanddollars.If it shallappearto the satisfactionof the courtor [*1881
justice that the defendanthasviolatedanyprovisionsof this section,no proof shall
[**6] be requiredthat anypersonhasbeeninjuredtherebynor that the defendant
intentionallyviolatedsuchprovision.In suchactionpreliminaryrelief may be granted
underarticlesixty-threeof the civil practicelaw andrules.In connectionwith any such
proposedapplication,the attorneygeneralis authorizedto takeproof, issuesubpoenas
andadministeroathsin the mannerprovidedin the civil practicelaw andrules.

ç 897. Saleof a firearm,rifle or shotgunat a gun show

l. A nationalinstantcriminalbackgroundcheckshallbe conductedandno person
shallsell or transfera frearm, rifle or shotgunat a gn show,exceptin accordance
with theprovisionsof 18 U.S.C.922(t).
3g6 F. Supp.2d 184,*;2005u.s. Dist. LEXIS 20200,**

2' No personshalloffer or agreeto sell or transfera firearm,

rifle or shotgunto another
personat a gun showandtransferor deliversuchfirearm,
rifle or shotgunto such
personor personactingon his or her behalfthereafter
ata locationo*rer thanthe gun
showfor the purposeof evadingor avoidingcompliancewith
Ig U.S.C.g22(t).
3' Any personwho knowinglyviolatesany of theprovisions
of this sectionshallbe
guilty of a classA misdemeanor
[**7] p,rnirhubl.asprovidedfor in thepenallaw.

N.Y. Genl.Bus.Law S S S9S(I),g96, g97(McKinney,s2000).

Plaintifß areconcernedwith two majoraspectsof these
statutes.First,plaintiffs claim that ,,gun
show"is definedso broadly that itpoteniiattyãn.orrrpurres
all event.
suchaspig roastsandpolitical rallies.second,plaintifß
abouta relatedstatutoryprovisionconcerningtle creation
of a statedatabase for gunssold in New
York, known asthe combinedBallistic Identlficationsfstem
(,,coBIS,,).seeN.y. Genl.Bus.Law g
396-ff,N'Y' Comp'CodesR. & Regs.tit. g, 472.7
ç Q0:0Ð.Màthisonclaimstharby anachinghis
namepermanentlyto a gun hepurchases, CoBISinvadeshis privacy,unái"a¿toaderallegesthat
whenit receivesnon-complianiweaponsfor sale,it will have
to incriminateitself by turningthose
weaponsover to the policepursuantto the CoBISregulations.
The first four causesof actionin the
complaintpertainto the definitionof "gun show,"unätn.
remainingtwo causesof actionto CoBIS.
Fírst Four CøusesoÍ [**gl Actíon
In theFirst causeofaction, plaintifß claim thatNew York
GeneralBusinessLaw section g95,,is
capableof sweepingand improperinterpretation
[andthat] it violates theDue processclauseof the
FourteenthAmendmenl. " (Compl.p45.t
In the Secondcauseof action,plaintiffs assertthatNew york
GeneralBusinessLaw section
895(I) "infringesupon constitutionallyprotected privacy interestsbecauseit purportsto regulate
conductof conservationmembettuttdthoreattenäingeíent,
sponsoredby theplaintiffs which is
purelyprivatein natureandwhich bearsno relationsñip
to any substantialinterestof the stateof
New York." (Compl.p47.)
The Third causeof actionalsopertainsto New YorkGeneral
BusinessLaw section g95, and.
allegesthat,"if thepurposeof [theìtatute]in so far asit designates ,events,sponsored
devotedto the collection,competitiveuse,sportinguse,or any by,þersons]
otherlegaluseof firearms,rifles or
shotguns'as a'gun show,'isto declareanyassembly ofgun ownersanywherefor anypurposea
'gun show,'it
is overbroadandinfringes.uponthe right
1**gl of freespeech,right to lawfully
assemble, andthe righltg peacefullypetitiõngrrutu.r-t..d
Biil of Righls."(Compl.p49.) [*1891 by thäFirsltAmendmentofthe

The Fourthcauseof actionstatesthat, "GeneralBusinessLaw

Sectìonsgg5,g96, andg97
imposes[sic] specialobligationsuponassociations of gun ownersandpersonsinterestedin gun
ownershipimposeduponno other'event'sponsored by"anyotherassociationof like minded
persons'It violatesequalprotectionof the law becausãit
servesno compellingor substantialstate
interestby seekingto regulateþrivatesales'ofgunsat'events,totally
unrelatedto the saleor
distributionof gunson the basisof the thoughtJandbeliefsof those
ïho ,porrrorthoseevents.,,

Page 5
386F. Supp.2d 184,*; 2005U.S.Dist.LE)ilS 20200,**

Ffrth and Sírth Cøusesof Actíon

The Fifth causeof actionis labeledas "MATHISON - TAXPAYER'SFIFTH CAUSE OF
ACTION," andallegesthat asa New York taxpayer,Mathisondesiresto purchasea handgun,but
statesthat, "pursuantto the CoBISregulations,datarelatingto his purchase,includinghis name,
address,andotherpersonalinformation,will be enteredinto a permanentdatabasekept and
maintainedby the Stateof New York under[**10] the authorityandat the directionof the New
York StatePolice[and]asa result,his namewill becomepermanentlyattachedto a handgunwhich,
if stolen,couldultimatelybecomeimplicatedin a crime.Upon informationandbelief, no such
permanentconnectionto a handgunwould becomepart of his recordin connectionwith a handgun
listeduponhis pistol permitunderNew York's currentpistol permitlaws."As a result,Mathison
"sseksprotectionin connectionwith the useof tax dollarsfor the purposeof violating privacy
rights guaranteed by the United StatesConstitutionwhereno compellingstateinterestor rational
basisexiststo placehis namein an index of gun ownersheld by theNew York StatePolice."
In the Sixth causeof action,LeadloaderallegesthatNew York's COBISregulations,createthe
risk that Leadloadercouldbe chargedwith a misdemeanor if it "shouldreceivea noncompliant
handgunandfail to processit in a timely manner."(Compl.P60.)Further,Leadloaderstatesin this
causeof actionthat,"in orderto rendersuchhandgunscompliant,plaintiff Leadloaderwould have
to testiff againsthimself[sic] by submittingsuchnoncompliantguns[**111 to the New York State
Policefor processing[andthat] sucha statutoryschemeviolatesthe protectionsagainstselÊ
incriminationaffordedby theFifth Amendmentto theBill of Rightsof the UnttedStates
Constitution. " (Compl. PP6l -62.)

Pløíntffi ' Prayerfor Relíef

Plaintiffs seekthe following relief:

As to the First, Second,Third, andFourthCausesof Action, declaratoryjudgmentthat

the disputedportionof GeneralBusinessLaw 895(1)is both facially unconstitutional
andunconstitutional asappliedinsofarasit violatestheDue ProcessClauseof the
FourteenthAmendmenr andis unconstitutionallyvague,that it violatesthe
constitutionalright to privacy, that it violatesFirstAmendmentrights of speech,
assemblyandpetition,andthat the statuteviolatestheequalprotectíonclauseof the
FourteenthAmendmenl, And further,asto theFirst, Second,Third, andFourth causes
of actionthat the defendantAttorney Generalbe permanentlyenjoinedfrom enforcing
the disputedportionof GBL 895(I). And asto the Fifth and Sixth Causesof Action, a
permanentinjunctiondirectingthe defendantGovernorof the StateofNew York and
defendantCommissioner[**12] of the StatePoliceto ceasespendingtaxpayerfunds
[*1901 relatedto or in connectionwith the so-calledCoBISsystem.

( 16.)

Rule 12(b)(6) & (c) Standørd

386 F. Supp.2d t84,*; 2005U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20200,**

To prevailon a motion for dismissalunderRule 12, defendantmustshowthat plaintiff can

proveno setof factsin supportof his claim that would entitlehim to relief. SeeH.J. Inc. v.
NorthwestBell Telephone Co.,492 U.S.229,249,106L. Ed. 2d 195,109S. Ct. 2893(1989);see
also 2 JamesWm. Moore et al., Moore'sFederalPracticeS I2.34Ul [aJ (MatthewBender3d ed.).
"In consideringa motionto dismissfor failureto statea claimunderFed. R. Cív.P. I2þ)@), a
district courtmustlimit itself to factsstatedin the complaintor in documentsattachedto the
complaintasexhibitsor incorporatedin the complaintby reference."Kramer v- TímeVlarner,Inc.,
937F.2d 767,773(2d Cír.I99I).The Courtmustview thecomplaint,anddrawall reasonable
inferences,in the light most favorableto the non-movingparty.Id.;seealso 2 JamesV/m. Mooreet
aI.,Moore'sFederalPractíceS 12.34[**131 tl]tb] (MatthewBender3d ed.)(courtmustaccept
plaintiffs factualallegationsastrue).Underthe modernrulesof pleading,a plaintiff needonly
provide "a shortandplain st¿tementof the claim showingthat thepleaderis entitledto relief,"Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),and "all pleadingsshallbe so construedasto do substantialjustice,"Fed.R. Ctv.
P. 8(f).On a Rule I2(b)(6) motion,the issuebeforethe Court"is not whethera plaintiff will
ultimatelyprevail,but whetherthe claimantis entitledto offer evidenceto supportthe claim."
VillagerPond,Inc. v. Townof Darien, 56 F.3d 375,378 (2d Cir. Iggï).
The testfor evaluatingaI2(c) motionfor judgmenton thepleadingsis the sameasthat
applicableto a motionto dismissunderFederalRule of Civil ProcedureI2(b)(6).Irish Lesbianand
Gay Organizationv. Giuliani, 143F.3d 638,644 (2d Cir. I99S). "Judgmenton the pleadingsis
appropriatewherematerialfactsareundisputedandwhereajudgmenton the meritsis possible
merelyby consideringthe contentsof the pleadings.[**141 " Sellersv. M.C. Floor Crafters,Inc.,
842 F.2d 639,642 (2d Cir. 1988).

judgmentunderRule 56, thoughplaintiffs have
No litigant in this lawsuithasrequested
mentionedsummaryjudgmentin their attorney'saffidavit,attachedto their Notice of Motion for
judgmentunderRule I 2. No parfy hassubmittedthe requiredstatementof factspursuantto Western
Dtstrict of New YorkLocal Rule of Civil Procedure56.1.As the rule states,"failure to submitsuch
a statementmay constitutegroundsfor denialof the motion."Nevertheless, if the Courtwereto
considermattersoutsidethe pleadings,it could,suasponte,convertthe presentmotions,which
were broughtunderRule 12,to motionsfor summaryjudgment,with noticeto both sidesandan
opportunityto presentfurtherevidence.The Court determinesin its discretion,however,not to
convertthesemotionson the pleadingsto onesfor summaryjudgmentat this time.
As mentionedabove,both partieshavemovedunderFederalRule of Cívil ProcedureI2(c) for
judgmenton thepleadings,anddefendants havealsomovedunderRule l**l5l I2þ)þ), for
dismissal.Thus,the Court will consideronly the complaintandthe mattersattachedto it for
purposesof its Rule I2 analysis.
Plaintiffs haveallegedthat the statutorydefinitionof "gun show" is unconstitutionallyvague,
overbroad,violativeof the Due Processclause,givestoo muchdiscretion [*19U to police and
violatesplaintifß'rights to free speech,assemblyandpetition.

"Gun Show" DeJìnítíonNot Vøgue

386F. Supp.2d,184,*; 2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

Plaintiffs'First causeof actionclaimsthat the statuteis so vagueasto be violativeof theDue

ProcessClauseof theFourteenthAmendmenl.The Court disagrees. "It is settledthat the fair-
warningrequirementembodiedin theDue ProcessClauseprohibitsthe Statesfrom holdingan
individual'criminallyresponsiblefor conductwhich he couldnot reasonablyunderstandto be
proscribed;"Rosev. Locke,423 U.S.48, 49, 46 L. Ed. 2d 185,96 S. Ct. 243 (1975)(quotingUnited
Statesv. Hatiss, 347 U.S.612,617,98 L. Ed. 989,74S. Ct. 808(1954)).The Court doesnot agree
that the statuteis vague.
GeneralBusinessLaw sectíon895(I) def,rnes a gun showaseither "an eventsponsored, whether
for profit or not, by an individual,national,stateor local organization,association[**161 or other
entitydevotedto the collection,competitiveuse,sportinguse,or any otherlegaluseof firearms,
rifles or shotguns"or "aneventat which (a) twentypercentor moreof the total numberof
exhibitorsarefirearmexhibitorsor (b) ten or morefirearmexhibitorsareparticipatingor (c) a total
of twenty-fiveor morepistolsor revolversareofferedfor saleor transferor (d) atotal of fifty or
morefirearms,rifles or shotgunsareofferedfor saleor transfer."
While the secondportionof the "gun show" definitionclearlydefinesobjectivecriteriaby
which to measurewhetherthe eventis consideredby the statutea gun show,the first portion does
not. However,this doesnot renderthat aspectof the definitionof "gun show"vague.To the
contrary,an eventsponsored by plaintiffs at which no gun salestakeplacecould,by the plain
meaningof the termsusedin the statute,be construedby theNew York AttorneyGeneralto be a
"gun show."This is importantto plaintifß sincegun showstriggerthe requirementsof section896,
which includesthe requirementto postsignsandmakea federallicenseddealeravailableto run
nationalinstantcriminalbackgroundchecks. [**171 Of course,if no gun salestakeplaceat the
sponsoredevent,thenthe requirements of sectíon896 wouldbe inapplicable.Plaintiffs'concernis
that apig roastsponsoredby themcouldbe deemedby the statuteto be a gun show,requiringthe
postingof signsandavailabilityof criminalbackgroundchecks,if any informaldiscussion
pertainingto the purchaseof a firearmtakesplaceat the sponsoredevent,andis then consummated
by a laterprivatesale.(SeeCompl.P44.)
Defendantsrespondthat sincethe statuteis in an Article entitled,"Saleof FireaÍns, Rifles,or
Shotgunsat Gun Shows,"thereis no possibilityof mistakinga pig roastfor a gun showunderthe
termsof the statute.However,defendants cite no limiting Statecourt opinionto that effect.See
Smíth v. Goguen,415 U.S. 566 at 573,39 Ed. 2d 605,94 S. Ct. 1242.As the SupremeCourtheld
in a caseconstruinga city anti-noiseordinance,

It is a basicprincipleof dueprocessthat an enactmentis void for vaguenessif its

prohibitionsarenot clearlydefined.Vaguelaws offendseveralimportantvalues.First,
becausewe assumethat manis freeto steerbetweenlawful andunlawful conduct,we
insist that laws give the personof ordinary[**181 intelligencea reasonable
opportunityto know what is prohibited,so that he may act accordingly.Vaguelaws
may trap the innocentby not providingfair warning.Second,if arbitraryand
discriminatoryenforcementis to be prevented,lawsmustprovideexplicit standardsfor
thosewho applythem.A vaguelaw impermissiblydelegatesbasicpolicy mattersto
policemen,judges,andjuries for resolutionon an ad hoc and subjectivebasis,with the
attendantdangersof arbitraryanddiscriminatoryapplication.Third, but related,
I*1921 wherea vaguestatute'abut(s)upon sensitiveareasof basicFirst Amendment
386F. Supp.2d,184,*; 2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

freedoms,'it'operatesto inhibitthe exerciseof (those)freedoms.'Uncertain meanings

inevitablyleadcitizensto "steerfar wider of the unlawful zorte'.. . thanif the
boundariesof the forbiddenareaswereclearlvmarked."

Graynedv. City of Roclcford,408 U.S.104,108-09,33 L. Ed. 2d 222,92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)

(footnotesandinternalcitationsomitted).Herethe Court agreeswith plaintiffs'position.It is indeed
conceivablethat plaintiffs couldsponsora pig roastat which two individualsdiscussthe private
saleof a gun, andthe saleis laterconsummated, andthatplaintifß couldthen [**191 be foundin
violation of the statutefor not havingfollowedthe requirements imposedby section896 on gm
showoperators.That sectiongivesthe AttorneyGeneralgreatdiscretion:

Wheneverthe attorneygeneralshallbelievefrom evidencesatisfactoryto him or her

thata gun showoperatorhasviolatedany of the provisionsof this section,the attorney
. -r generalmay bring an actionor specialproceedingin the supremecourt for a judgment
enjoiningthe continuanceof suchviolation and for a civil penaltyin an amountnot to
exceedten thousanddollars...

N.Y. Gen'L.Bus.Law S 896(2).On this point, in supportof its determination,

the Court refersto
defensecounsel'sexchangewith the Courtat oral argument:

The Court:If I'm at the pancakebreakfastsponsored by a gun club andI sayto you,
gee,I heardyou havethis nifty gun,that it is for sale.Yeah,it's in the trunk here.Why
wouldn't thatapply?

DefenseCounsel:At the risk of taxing the Court'spatience,becausewe say it doesn't.

1.. ) Becausewe arenot goingto prosecuté(seeÐcivil actionsor enforcementunderthat
situation.In our wisdom,we havereviewedthe legislature,[**201 the title and
concludedthesecriteriasetforth by Mr. Nocenti12 applyandI'm sorry if the Court
feelsthat procedurallythatis beyondthe scopeof what it canconsider,but I think it's
importantto considerthat.

(RealTime Transcriptof Oral Argument(Jul. 7, 2005).)With duerespectto the defense,it is not

thewisdom of the AttorneyGeneralthat controls,but theplain text of the statute.

n2itldr.Nocenti,Counselto the New York AttorneyGeneral,filed an affidavit in support

of defendants'motion.

Additionally, citing to Brotherhoodof R.R. Trainmenv. Baltimore& O. R. Co., 331 U.S. 5l,9,
528-29,9I L. Ed. 1646,67 S. Ct. 1387(1947),defendantsarguethat the Court must construethe
meaningof the definition by consideringthe title of the statuteaswell as the statuteitself. Id. n3
Defendantsmaintainthat, in the Attorney General'sopinion,whenviewedin contextwith thetitle,
386 F. Supp.2d 184,*;2005U.S. Disr.LEXIS 20200,**

"the law regulatesonly eventssponsored by gutt organizations wheregunsaredisplayedfor saleor

wherearrangementsl**2ll for thesaleof saìdweaponsare made."(Defs.'Mem.of Law at 5
(emphasisadded).)However,Brotherhoodof R.R.Trainmenincludedthe following language
pertainingto a court'suseof the headingor title of a statuteto interpretits provisions:

[*1931 But headingsandtitles arenot meantto taketheplaceof the detailed

provisionsof the text.Nor arethey necessarilydesignedto be a referenceguideor a
synopsis.IVherethe text is complicatedandprolific, headingsandtitles cando no
morethanindicatethe provisionsin a mostgeneralmanner;to attemptto referto each
specificprovisionwould oftenbe ungainlyaswell asuseless.As a result,mattersin the
text which deviatefrom thosefalling within the generalpatternare frequently
unreflectedin the headingsandtitles. Factorsof this typehaveled to the wise rule that
the title of a statuteandthe headingof a sectioncannotlimit the plain meaningof the
text. UnitedStatesv. Físher,6 U.S. 358,2 Cranch 358,386,2 L.Ed. 304; Cornellv.
Coyne,192 U.S.418, 430,48 L. Ed. 504,24 S. Ct. 383,T.D. 757;StrathearnS.S.Co. v.
Dtllon, 252 U.S.348,354, 64L. Ed. 607,40 S. Ct.350. For interpretativepuq)oses,
they areof useonly when I**221 they shedlight on someambiguousword or phrase.
They arebut tools availablefor theresolutionof a doubt.But they cannotundoor limit
that which the text makesplain.

Brotherhoodof R.R. Traínmen,331 528-29.Defendantsalsocite to Connecticutex rel.

Blumenthalv. U.S.Dept. of Interior, 228F.3d S2 (2d Cír. 2000)in supportof their position.
However,in that case,the SecondCircuit wrote, "the shortanswerto the plaintifß'argumentis that
our relianceis not on the title of $ 1754,but ratheron the structureof the statute."Id. at 89.
Finally,defendants cite to U.S.v. Roemer,514F.2d 1377,;,380(2d Cir. 1975),in whichthe Second
Circuit stated,"the basicprincipleof statutoryconstruction... givesprecedence, in the eventof
irreconcilableconflict, to wordsin the body of a provisionoverthosein the caption."

n3 Defendantsmaketwo otherargumentsin addition:(1) the official positionof the

AttorneyGeneralof New York is that the gun salestatuteappliesonly to eventswhereguns
areopenlydisplayedfor sale,and(2) the legislativehistoryin the bill jacket supportsthis
interpretationaswell. However,the first positionwould requirethe Court to go outsidethe
pleadingsand defendants'second positionis onethat requireslegal expertisenormally
unavailableto the ordinarycittzentryingto determinewhethera statute'sproscriptionsapply
to him.

The statuteis not vague.Quitethe contrary,the statuteis clearin its plain language.Any event
sponsored by a gun club would constitutea gun showunderthe definition of the statute.
Consequently, defendants'motion to dismissthe First causeof action(claiming a violation of the
Due ProcessClauseof the FourteenthAmendmenlon the groundsof vagueness), mustbe granted.

Ríght of Prívacy
2d 184,*;2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS20200,
386F. Supp. **

Plaintiffs claim in their Secondcauseof action thatsection Sg5(1) violates their right to privacy,
"becauseit purports to regulate conduct of conservationmembersand those attending events
sponsoredby the plaintiffs which is purely private in nature and which bearsno relationship to any
substantialinterest of the Stateof New York." (Compl. P47.) The Court disagrees.
The Constitution does not contain any right of privacy. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 47
L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. I i,55(1976).In Paul, the SupremeCourt summarizedthe "zones of
privacy" recognized by SupremeCourt caselaw:

While thereis no "right of privacy" foundin any specif,rc

guaranteeof the Constitution,
the Courthasrecognizedthat"zonesof privacy" may be createdby morespecific
constitutional[**241 guarantees andtherebyimposelimits upongovernmentpower.
seeRoev. úTade,410 u.s. I13, 152-153,35 L. Ed. 2d I4T, 93 s. ct. 705(1973).
Respondent's case,however,comeswithin noneof theseareas.He doesnot seekto
suppressevidenceseizedin the courseof an unreasonable search.SeeKatz v. [Jnited
states,389U.S.347, 351,Ig L. Ed. 2d 576,gg S. Ct. 507 (1967);Terryv. Ohío,3g2
U.S.I, 8-9, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889,88 S. Ct. IS6S (1965).And our other"right of privacy"
cases,while defyingcategoricaldescription,dealgenerallywith substantiveaspectsof
theFourteenthAmendment.InRoethe Courtpointedout that the personalrights
[*1941 found in this guarantee of personalprivacy mustbe limited to thosewhich are
"fundamental"or "implicit in the conceptof orderedliberty" asdescribedinPalko v.
Connectícut,302 U.S.319,325,82 L. Ed. 288,58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).The activiries
detailedasbeingwithin this definitionwereonesvery differentfrom that for which
respondentclaimsconstitutionalprotection[--] mattersrelatingto marriage,
procreation,contraception, family relationships,andchild rearingandeducation.In
thcscareasit hasbeenheldthat therearelimitationson the States'powerto
substantivelyregulateconduct. [**251

Paul, 424 712-7I3.In an earliercase,involving a questionpresentedby an appellant

pertainingto his "right to privacy" in a public telephonebooth,the Court wrote:

theFourth Amendmenlcannotbe translatedinto a generalconstifutional"right to

privacy." That Amendmentprotectsindividualprivacy againstcertainkinds of
governmentalintrusion,but its protectionsgo further,andoftenhavenothingto do
with privacy at all. Otherprovisionsof the Constitutionprotectpersonalprivacy from
otherforms of governmentalinvasion.But the protectionof a person'sgeneralright to
privacy--hisright to be let aloneby otherpeople--is,like the protectionof his property
and of his very life, left largelyto the law of the individual States.

Katz v. UnitedStates,389 U.S.347, 350-51,19L. Ed. 2d 576,88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).Plaintiffs have
citedno casein which a "right to privacy" hasbeendevelopedfrom the SecondAmendment,norhas
theCourt'sresearchrevealedanypertinentcaseon this point. Moreover,as the SupremeCourthas
clearlystated,"all casesthat haveconsideredthe issueshaveuniversallyheld that theSecond
386F.Supp.2d,184,*; **

Amendmentto the United States[**26] Constitution expressesa limitation that is applicable to the
Congressand the National Governmentonly and has no application to the States."Fresno Rifle and
Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, I4I7 (8.D. Cal. 1990).Having determined
that section 895(I) does not violate plaintiffs'privacy rights, the Court grants defendants'motion to
dismissthe Secondcauseof action.

"Gun Show" DeJínítion Overbroød

Plaintiffs Third causeof action alleges that section 595(I) is so broad that it essentially declares
any assemblyof gun owners for any purpose a "gun show" and infringes on plaintiffs' right to
lawfully assemble,right to free speechand right to petition the government.The Court agreesthat
the statuteis overbroad.

It haslong beenrecognizedthat theFirst Amendmentneedsbreathingspaceandthat

statutesattemptingto restrictor burdenthe exerciseof First Amendmentrights mustbe
narrowlydrawnandrepresenta consideredlegislativejudgmentthat a particularmode
of expressionhasto give way to othercompellingneedsof society.Herndonv. Lowry,
301U.5.242,258,81 L. Ed. 1066,57S. Ct.732(Ig3T);sheltonv. Tucker,364 U.S.
479, 488,5 L. Ed. 2d 231,8I S. Ct. 247 (1960);l**271 Graynedv.Cítyof Roclcford,
408 U.S.[]04J, at I I6-117,33 L. Ed. 2d 222,92 S. Ct. 2294[(1972)).

Broadrickv. Oklahoma,4I3 U.S. 601,6I I-612, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830,93 S. Ct. 2g0S(1973)."Facial

overbreadthhasnot beeninvokedwhena limiting constructionhasbeenor could be placedon the
challengedstatute."Broadrickv. Oklahoma,413 U.S.601,613,37 L. Ed. 2d 830,93 S. Ct. 2908
(1973).The SupremeCourtwrote that to invalidatea statestatutethatregulatesharmful,or
constitutionallyunprotectedconduct,"the overbreadthof a stafutemustnot only be real, but
substantialaswell, judgedin relationto the statute'splainly legitimatesleep." Broadrick v.
Okløhoma, 413 U.S.601,615, [*195137 L. Ed. 2d 830,93 S. Ct. 2905(1973)."Wherea sratute's
literal scope,unaidedby a narrowingstatecourt interpretation,is capableof reachingexpression
shelteredby the First Amendment, the doctrinedemandsa greaterdegreeof specificitythan in other
contexts."Smíthv. Goguen,415 U.S.566,573, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605,94 S. Ct. 1242(1974)(footnote

Overbreadthattackshave... beenallowedwherethe Courtthoughtrights of association

were ensnaredin statuteswhich,by their broadsu/eep,might resultin burdening
innocentassociations. [**28] SeeKeyishianv.Boardof Regents,385U.S. 589,I7 L.
Ed. 2d 629,87 S. CL 675 (1967);UnitedStatesv. Robel, 389U.S. 258,19 L. Ed. 2d
508,88 S. Ct. 419 (1967);Apthekerv. Secretaryof State,378 U.S.500, I2 L. Ed. 2d
992, 84 S. Ct. 1659(1964);Sheltonv. Tucker,supra[364 U.S.479 (1960)J.Facial
overbreadthclaimshavealsobeenentertainedwherestatutes,by their terms,purportto
regulatethe time, place,andmannerof expressiveor communicativeconduct,see
Graynedv. City of Roclçford,supra,[404 U.S.I04J at I ]4-I2I []972J; Cameronv.
Johnson,390 U.S.[61(J, at 617-619,20 L. Ed. 2d 182,88S. Ct. 1335[(1965)];
Zwickler v. Koota, 389U.S.241,249-250,l9 L. Ed. 2d 444,88 S. Ct. 391 (1967);
386F. Supp. 2d.184,*;2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

Thornhillv. Alabama,310 u.s. 88,84 L. Ed. 1093,60s. ct. 736(1940),andwhere

suchconducthasrequiredoffrcial approvalunderlawsthat delegatedstandardless
discretionarypowerto local functionaries,resultingin virtually unreviewableprior
restraintson FirstAmendmenr rights.SeeShuttlesworth v. Birmingham,394 U.S.147,
22 L. Ed. 2d 162,89 S. Ct. 935(1969);Coxv. Louisiana,379 U.S.536, 553-558, I3 L.
Ed. 2d 471,85 S. Ct. 453 (1965);Kunz v. New york, 340 U.S.290,95 L. Ed. 2g0, TI S.
Ct. 312 (1951);Lovellv. Grffin, 303 U.S.444,82 L. Ed. 949,58 S. Ct. 666(1938).

Broadrickv.Oklahoma,413 U.5.601,612-613,37 L. Ed.2d 830,93S. Ct.290S(1973).As the

SupremeCourtwrote in Keyishianv. Board of Regents,385U.S. 589,602, I7 L. Ed. 2d 629,87 S.
Ct. 675(1967)(quotingSheltonv.Tucker,364 U.5.479,488,5L. Ed.2d 231,81S. Ct.247),"'even
thoughthe governmental purposebe legitimateandsubstantial,
that purposecannotbe pursuedby
meansthat broadlystifle fundamentalpersonallibertieswhenthe endcanbe morenarrowly
As indicatedabove,the Courtdeterminesthat theplain meaningof the first clauseof section
895(I) definesany gatheringof a gun club to be a "gun show."Sincethe Court is unaidedby a
narrowingStatecourt interpretation,it is not persuaded by defendants'argument that by relying on
the title of Article 39-DD, the first clauseof sectíon595(I) canbe interpretedin a mannerthat
passesconstitutionalmuster.Here,unaidedby a narrowingStatecourt interpretation,the Court
finds that the first clausein the definitionof a "gun show" inNew YorkGeneralBusinessLaw
section895(I) is overbroadandinfringeson the gun club plaintiffs'constitutionallyprotectedrights
to free speech,assemblyandpetition. [**30] Therefore,the Courtgrantsplaintiffs'motion for
judgmenton the pleadingswith respectto the Third causeof action.

Equøl Protectíon
In their Fourthcauseof action,plaintiffs allegethatNew YorkGeneralBusinessLaw sections
895,896 and897 violatetheir rightsto equalprotectionof the laws.They arguethat the statutes
makeany assemblyof a gun club a "gun show,"subjectto the requirementsandpenaltiesof section
896,whereas a similarassemblyof an organization not describedinsection895(I)wouldnot be
subjectto [*196] thoserequirements or penalties.The Courtagrees.
As the SupremeCourt explainedinMassachusetts Bd. of Retirementv. Murgia, 427 U.S.307,
49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976),its decisionin"san AntonioSchoolDistríct v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S.I, 16, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278(1973),reaffirmedthat EqualProtectionanalysis
requiresstrict scrutinyof a legislativeclassificationonly whenthe classificationimpermissibly
interfereswith the exerciseof a fundamentalright or operatesto the peculiardisadvantage of a
suspectclass."Mass.Bd. of Retírement,427 312 (footnoteomitted).The rights guaranteed
[n*3ll by theFírst Amendmentarefundamental.Id. at 312 n.3 (citing Wílliamsv. Rhodes,393
U.S.23, 2I L. Ed. 2d 24, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968)).To justiff treatingall gun club assemblies
as "gun
shows,"New York must showthat the unequaltreatmentis "premisedupon somecompellingstate
interest."SanAntoníoSch. Dist.,4I I I6 (citationomitted).Becausethe Courthasnot
convertedthe Federal Rule of Cívil ProcedureI2(c) motionto one for summaryjudgment, and
sincethe issuecannotbe decidedsolelyon the allegationscontainedin the pleadings,the Court
deniesjudgmentto eithersideunderRuIeI2(c) on this causeof action,and additionallydenies
defendants'application for dismissalunderRuleI2þ)@).
386F. Supp.2dt84,*;2005
U.S.Disr.LEXIS 20200,**

CoBIS Statute
In the Fifth causeof action, Mathison raisesthree theories under which he claims the CoBIS
statuteis unconstitutional: first, that his name will be permanently associatedwith a particular
handgun,thereby violating his right to privacy; second, thattaxpayer money will be used to fund
this violation; and third, that "no compelling stateinterest or rational basis exists to place his name
[**32] in an index of gun ownersheld by the New York StatePolice." (Compl. PP54-5S.)
Although Mathison alludes to a constitutional right to privacy, as fully discussedabove, at l4,he
cites no particular provision of the Constitution guaranteeingthat right. Since he has no foundation
for bringing a constitutional privacy claim, his secondtheory is also without support.
Further, his challenge to the stafuteon the basis of "no compelling stateinterest,or rational
basis," cannot be resolved without referenceto matters outside the pleadings. (Compl. PP54-58)
However, the Court notes that an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies to
enactmentsof the Legislature, WestCoast Hotel Co. v. Patísh, 300 U.S. 379, 397-98, 8I L. Ed.
703, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937), and the term "rational basis" requires only that somerational lawmaker
could logically believe that the limitation could serve a legitimate public purposethat transcendsthe
harm to the individuals effected by the statute,City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Líving Ctr., 473 tl.S.
432, 452, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1955) (Stevens,J. concurring). In that regard, the Court
further notes that in determining that a rational relationship exists [**331 betweenthe conduct and
the object of the statute,a lawmaker is free to rely not only on his own experiencesand the
evidencerevealedas a result of his direct investigation, but also upon the experiencesof other
localities which have confronted the sameproblem at an earlier time. City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters,475 U.S. 41, 50-52, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1956). Finally, the Court notes that
the "rational basis" test does not allow review by a court of the wisdom of a particular piece of
legislation, nor of the likelihood that the legislation will achieve the ends sought by the legislative
body. SeeN.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. I, I0I L. Ed. 2d I, 108S. Ct. 2225
(1988);Exxon Corp. [*1971 v. Governorof Md., 437 U.S. I17, 57 L. Ed. 2d 91,98 S. Ct. 2207
(1978);RochesterGas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn.,7I N.Y.2d 313,520 N.E.2d 528,525
In any event,aspreviouslyindicated,here,in orderto ascertainthe rationalbasisfor the section
895(I), the Courtwould necessarilyhaveto seekinformationoutsidethe pleadings.The Court,in
its discretion,choosesnot to do so.Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(c).
Therefore,asto the Fifth causeof action,[**341 the Court grantsdefendants'application
judgment,asto Mathison'sfirst two theoriesof liability. However,the Courtdeniesjudgmentto
eithersideon Mathison'stheorythat "no compellingstateinterestor rationalbasisexiststo place
his namein an indexof gun ownersheld by theNew York StatePolice."(Compl.PP54-58.)
The Court now turnsits considerationto the Sixth causeof action.Leadloaderarguesthat it
couldbe chargedwith a misdemeanor if it shouldreceivea noncomplianthandgunand fail to
processit in a timely manner,andadditionally,thatthe statutecompelsit to testiff againstitself by
bringinga handgunto the Statepolice evenif the statutorytime limits havepassed.Simply put,
Leadloader's argumentis analogousto statingthat if oneviolatesthe law, onemight be subjectto
sanction.The Court finds Leadloader'spositionto be without merit. Further,on the issueof
compelledselÊincrimination,the Courtnotesthat the regulationsinterpretingthe CoBIS statute
permitthe gun dealerto returna non-complyingfirearmto the manufacturerratherthan turn it into
the Statepolice.N.Y. Comp.CodesR. & Regs.tit. 9, S a72.5(a)(3)(i)(2003).The [**351 Courr
386F. Supp.2d 184,*; 2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20200,**

determines that defendants have shown Leadloader can prove no set of facts in support of his claims
underthe Sixth causeof actionthat would entitlethemto relief.
Defendants'motion(# I l) to dismiss,or for judgmenton thepleadings,is grantedin part,
deniedin part,andplaintiffs' Rule I2(c) cross-motionfor "partialsummaryjudgment"andan
injunction(# 18)is grantedin part,deniedin part. Accordingly,it is hereby
ORDERED,thatjudgmentbe enteredfor plaintiffs on the Third causeof actionasit pertainsto
the following languagein New YorkGeneralBusinessLaw section895(1),

an eventsponsored, whetherfor profit or not, by an individual,national,stateor local

organization,associationor otherentity devotedto the collection,competitiveuse,
sportinguse,or any otherlegaluseof firearms,rifles or shotguns,

which the Court determinesis unconstitutional

asan overbroadrestrictionon plaintiff gun clubs'
First Amendmentrights to free speech,assemblyandpetition; andit is further
ORDERED,that defendantsareenjoinedfrom enforcingthe following clauseof New York
GeneralBusinessLaw section895(1)[**361 :

an eventsponsored, whetherfor profit or not, by an individual,national,stateor local

organization,associationor otherentity devotedto the collection,competitiveuse,
sportinguse,or any otherlegaluseof firearms,rifles or shotguns;

andit is further
ORDERED,thatjudgmentbe enteredfor defendantson plaintiffs'First causeof action
(claiminga violation of theDue ProcessClauseof theFourteenthAmendment);andit is further
i\i )
ORDERED,thatjudgmentbe enteredfor defendantson plaintiffs' Secondcauseof action
(claiminga violation of the right to privacy);andit is further
[*1981 ORDERED,that bothplaintiffs'anddefendants'motions for judgmenton plaintiffs
Fourthcauseof action(claimingan EqualProtectionviolation) aredenied;andit is further
ORDERED,thatjudgmentbe enteredfor defendantson plaintiffs'first two theoriesof liability
underthe Fifth causeof action(Matheson's taxpayerclaim,but that asto plaintifß'third theoryof
liability underthe Fifth causeof action(no compellingstateinterestor rationalbasis)both
plaintiffs'and defendants'motions for judgmentare denied;and it is further
ORDERED,thatjudgmentbe entered[**371 for defendantson plaintiffs Sixth causeof action
(Leadloader's CoBISclaims).

United StatesDistrict Judge