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J I'íARI | 2007
¡- ll NORDYKE,ET AL, No.C99-04389


.9EFH l3 v.
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.28 t4 KING, ET AL,
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15 Defendant.
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>) 18 Before the Court is DefendantsMary King, Gaile Steele,Wilma Chen,Keith Carson,Scott

1 9 Haggerty,the County of Alameda,and the County of AlamedaBoard of Supervisors'(collectively

20 "Defendants"or "County'') Motion for SummaryJudgmenton Plaintiffs' Third Amended
2 1 Complaint.t PlaintiffsRussellNordyke,SallieNordyke,doingbusinessas TS TradeShows,et al.
22 (collectively,"Nordykes" or "Plaintiffs") opposezthe motion. For the following reasons,the Court
23 GRANTS Defendants'Motion for SummaryJudgment.

25 I. FactualBackground

26 Except as otherwisenoted,the Court finds the following facts undisputed.

27 Plaintiffsbring this actionpursuantto 42 U.S.C. $ 1983,allegingthat AlamedaCounty

r D o c k e t N o1
. 29.

zDocketNo. 144.
I OrdinanceCodeSection9.l2.1203(the"Ordinance")infringeson their free speechrightsin violation

2 of the UnitedStatesandCaliforniaConstitutions.aThe groupof Plaintifß consistsof Russelland

J Sallie Nordyke, who havebeenpromoting gun showsat the AlamedaCounty Fairgrounds

4 ("Fairgrounds")since1991,as well astwelvegun showvendors,exhibitors,and patrons.The

5 exhibitorsat the show include sellersof antique(pre-1898)ftrearms,modem firearms,ammunition,
6 Old West memorabilia,and outdoor clothing. The gun showsalso hostseducationalworkshops,
7 issuegroups,and political organizations.
8 Plaintiffs' gun showsbring largenumbersof firearmsto one location. The approximate

I attendanceat one of Plaintifß' gun showsat the Fairgroundsis 4,000 people. Thesegun shows

t 0 involve the exhibition, display,and saleof firearms. rWhena gun is sold at Plaintifß' gun shows,

L 1 l both the seller and the buyer physicallyinspectthe gun to insurecorrectdocumentationof the serial
O d
(JE l 2 number,make,model, and caliber of the gun; and also to veriff that the firearm may be legally sold.
3 Ë
O tJF Plaintiffs allegethat they "have historically broughtfirearms onto . . . the AlamedaCounty
.F l3
9 0
.2þ t 4 Fairgroundsfor various symbolic and expressivepurposes." They allegethat, by prohibiting
ô ã
a 7
l ) F l 5 possessionof firearmsat the Fairgrounds,the Ordinancepreventsthem from engagingin this
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Ø Í t 6 expressiveconduct,and makesgun showsvirtually impossible.
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! f ¡ l7 On July 4, 1998,a shootingoccurredat the AlamedaCounty Fairgroundsduring the annual
- l 8 County Fair resulting in gunshotwoundsto eight people. The shootingwas not associatedwith any
l 9 of the Plaintiffsor their gun showactivitiesat the Fairgrounds.On August 1.7,l999,theCounty
20 adoptedthe Ordinanceprohibiting the possessionof firearrnson County Property,including the
2l Fairgrounds.The Ordinancerecitedthe epidemicof gunshotfatalities or injuries in the countyas

22 justification. In paficular, between1990and 1995,879homicideswere committedusingfirearms

23 and 1,647additionalvictims were hospitalizedwith gunshotinjuries in the County. The Ordinance
24 alsorecitedthe July 4, 1998shootingincident on the Fairgrounds.
26 rSection9.12.120(b)provides,
"Every personwho bringsonto or possesses
on Countypropertya firearm,loaded
or unloaded,or ammunitionfor a firearm is guilty of a misdemeanor,"(AlamedaCounty Gen. Ord. Code,ch.9.12, $
27 9.l2.l20,subd.B.)InaccordancewithDefendants'unopposedrequest,theCourtwilltakejudicial noticeoftheOrdinance.
Rabkinv.Desn,856F. Supp.543,546(N.D. Cal. 1994).
4DocketNo. 100,Third AmendedComplaint.
I The Ordinancewas subjectto certainlimitations and exceptions. County propertydid not

2 includeany"local public building" asdefinedin CaliforniaPenalCodesection17lb, subdivision

- (c). (AlamedaCountyGen.Ord. Code,ch.9 .12, $ 9.I 2. 120,suM. C.) Pursuantto an amendment

4 September28,1999,the Ordinanceexemptedfrom the prohibitionvariousclassesof persons,

5 including peaceofficers, varioustypesof securityguards,personsholding valid firearmslicenses
6 pursuantto PenalCodesection12050,and authorizedparticipants"in a motionpicture,television,
7 video, dance,or theatricalproductionor event whenthe participantlawfully usesthe firearm as part
8 of that productionor event,provided that when suchfirearm is not in the actualpossessionof the
9 authorizedparticipant,it is securedto preventunauthorizeduse." (AlamedaCounty Gen.Ord. Code,
t 0 ch.9.I2, $ 9.12.120,subd.F.) The Ordinancewouldhave,as one of its chief consequences,
È ll effect of forbidding the unsecuredpresenceof firearmsat gun shows. After passingthe Ordinance,

Q E l 2 the County soughta written plan from Plaintiffs on how Plaintiffs would conducttheir gun showsin
' oc FH 1 3 compliancewith the Ordinance.
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â ã I4 Plaintiffs subsequentlyinformed the Countythat Plaintiffs could not practicallyor profitably

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.9Þ 1 5 conducta gun show without guns. As a result of the Ordinance,Plaintiffs cancelleda gun show
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Ø 4 1 6 scheduledfor November 6 and 7, 1999. Shortly thereafter,the County releasedall Plaintiffs'
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Ì l & T 7 reserveddatesfor the year 2000 and returnedPlaintiffs' deposits. As justification, Defendantscited
;) t 8 Plaintiffs' inability to producea plan to hold gun showswithout firearms that would comply with the
l 9 Ordinance. Plaintiffs haveheld approximatelytwenty two gun shows in California since2005.
20 Othergroups,besidesPlaintiffs havebeenaffectedby the Ordinance. Specifically,during the

2l monthsof Augustand September1999,the ScottishCaledonianGames("ScottishGames")

22 contactedthe County regardingthe Ordinance'simpact on their cultural events. The ScottishGames

23 involve the possessionof rifles with blank cartridgesin connectionwith historical re-enactmentsof
24 gun battles. The County did not requirethe ScottishGamesto submit a written plan for conducting
25 their eventin compliancewith the Ordinance.
26 II. Procedural Background

27 A detailedsummaryof the proceduralhistory of this action is helpful in framing the issues

28 currentlybeforethis Court.
I Initially, Plaintiffs allegedthat the Ordinancepreventedthem from conductingtheir trade

2 show businessand violatedtheir right to free speech.To preventDefendantsfrom enforcingthe

) Ordinance,Plaintiffs soughta temporaryrestrainingorder.s After this Court deniedPlaintiffs'

4 request,Plaintiffs frled an interlocutoryappeal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, construingPlaintiffs'

5 First Amendmentclaim as a facialchallengeto the Ordinance.Nordykev. King,319 F.3d 1185,

6 11S9(9th Cir. 2003). In evaluatingPlaintiffs' claim,the Ninth Circuit notedthat gun possession

7 may qualifu as speechwhen thereis "an intent to conveya particularizedmessage,and the likelihood

I is greatthat the messagewould be understoodby thosewho viewed it." Id. (citing Spensev.

9 llashington,418 U.S. 405,410-1| (1974)). However,becausePlaintiffsdid not allegethat the

t 0 Ordinanceis directednarrowly and specificallyat expression,and becausepossessionof a gun is not

L 1 1 commonly associatedwith expression,the court held that Plaintiffs' facial challengefailed. Id. at
t t c
v . õ
T2 1190. In a footnote,the court indicatedthat its holding did not preventPlaintiffs from bringing an
* a E
' ( i, H
1 3 "as applied"challengeto the Ordinance.Id. at 1190n.3.
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T4 Plaintiffsfrled a SecondAmendedComplaint,re'castingtheir claim
Seizingon this language,
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.aJ :
1 5 as an "as applied"First Amendmentchallenge.óSpecifrcally,Plaintiffsallegedthat as appliedto
6 t E
9 0
Ø Í t 6 their useof the Fairgrounds,the Ordinanceviolated their freedomof expressionby making gun
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iaa ¡! t 7 showsimpossible. In supportof their position that gun possessionamountsto expressiveconduct,
l 8 Plaintiffs allegedthat they havehistorically brought firearmsto the Fairgroundsto: (l) serveas
I 9 mediumsof political messagesthat are inextricably intertwinedwith the actual firearm; (2)
20 emphasizethe military and historicalimportanceof guns;(3) instruct othersabout safeand
2T responsiblegun storageand handling;and (4) facilitate legal educationof the public of their rights
22 and duties as gun owners.TDefendantsmoved to dismissPlaintiffs' claim pursuantto Rule
25 sDocketNos. I and 38.

26 óPlaintiffsfiled an AmendedComplaintin November1999,which Defendantsmovedto dismiss.However,before

the Court could rule on the Motion,Plaintiffsfiled their interlocutoryappeal,After theNinth Circuit issuedits decisionand
27 the casecontinuedin this Court,Plaintiffsfiled their SecondAmendedcomplaint,superceding thc AmendedComplaintand
mootingDefendants'Motion to Dismiss.
No. 97.
1 12(bX6).8
2 This Court grantedDefendants'motion reasoningthat Plaintiffs had not adequatelyalleged

J an intent to conveya particularizedmessageby possessinggunson Countyproperty. SeeSpencev.

4 Washington4lS U.S. 405, 410-l | (1974). This Court statedthat Plaintiffs' mererecitalsof
5 "political messagesthat are inextricablyintertwinedwith the actualfirearm" fail to allegethe
6 "particularized"natureof the political messagebeing communicatedby gun possession.
7 Furthermore,given the ambiguousnatureof the alleged"political message,"it was completely
I unclearfrom the faceof the complaintthat the likelihood was greatthat this allegedmessagewould

9 be understoodby thosewho receivedit.

10 As the Ninth Circuit explained,for gun possessionto constitutespeech,there must be a
L 1 1 concreteandnecessary of the gun andthe message
relationshipbetweenthe possession being

U,E 1 2 communicated.SeeNordyke,319F.3dat 1190, In otherwords,the particulanzedmessagebeing

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' Oc FH 1 3 communicatedmust originatefrom and be closelytetheredto the actualact of gun possession.In

9 o
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A ã I 4 this case,this Court found that Plaintiffs' allegationsthat they intendedto communicatethe military
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E E 1 5 and historic importanceof guns,the legal educationof the generalpublic aboutguns,and instruct
Øz l 6 othersin safeand responsiblegun storageand handling were insufficient. Simply stated,these
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9 ¡ ! t 7 allegationslackedthe requirednexusbetweenthe communication(the particularizedmessage)and
- 1 8 the actualact of gun possession.Theseintendedcommunicationsdid not stemfrom Plaintiffs'
t 9 actualpossessionof a gun. In fact, eachof thesemessagescould have beenclearly communicated
20 without the useof a gun at all. Accordingly,this Court grantedDefendants'motion to dismiss
21, Plaintiffs' freedomof expressionclaim with leaveto amend.e
22 Plaintiffs subsequentlyfiled a Third AmendedComplaint ("TAC"¡to wherein they re-asserted

23 their as appliedFirst Amendmentclaim. In an attemptto cure the deficienciesoutlined above,

24 Plaintiffs addedparagraphs85 and S6(a)-(e)proffering specific examplesof how possessionof a
25 firearmat the gun showsconveysparticularizedmessages.(TAC, p. 33, n.5.) Defendants
tDocketNo. 92.
eDocketNo. 97.
roDocketNo. 100.
I movedto dismissthe Third AmendedComplaint.

2 This Court deniedDefendants'motion to dismissand found that althoughthe majority of the

J supplementalallegationssufferedfrom the samedeficienciesas thosein the SecondAmended

4 Complaint,Plaintiffs had sufficiently articulatedan intent to conveya particularizedmessagethat

5 would be understoodby thosewho viewed it. Specifically,Plaintiffs allegedthat their act of

6 possessinggunsat a gun show servesto conveytheir firmly-held belief that individuals shouldhave

7 a protectedright under the SecondAmendmentto beararms,that they "suppoft[] the National Rifle

8 Association's(and the Attorney General's,and the Secretaryof State's)interpretationof the Second

9 Amendment,"and that they disagreewith the Ninth Circuit's decisionholding that the Second

t 0 Amendment"offers no protectionfor the individual's right to beararms." NordykeIII,3I9 F.3d at

*, l 1 I191 (citingHiclctnanv. Block,8l F.3d98, 102(9th Cir. 1996)).

O ó
U.E I2 In denyingDefendants'motion, this Court also found that Plaintiffs sufliciently allegedthat
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l 3 therewas a greatlikelihood that observerswould understandtheir message.For example,Plaintiffs
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A P 1 4 allegedthat the attendeesof a gun show,many of whom are membersof the "gun culture," would
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. F z 1 5 readily perceivethat the individual carryingthe weaponsuppofs the view that individuals should
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T 6 havea protectedright to beararmsunderthe SecondAmendment. Thus,this Court concludedthat
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i.J t 7 Plaintiffs had sufficiently allegedthat their conduct,at leastto the extentdescribedabove,
,) l 8 constitutedspeech.
19 Defendantsneverthelessarguedthat even if Plaintifß had sufüciently pled an as appliedFirst

20 Amendmentclaim, Plaintifß' claim failedbecause:(1) the Ordinancefurthersa substantialpublic

2l interestin protectingthe safetyof personson County properly that is unrelatedto suppressing

22 speech;(2) a sufficiently importantgovemmentalinterestin regulatingnon-speechexiststhat

23 justifies the incidental limitation on Plaintiffs' First Amendmentrights; and (3) the Ordinanceis a
24 reasonabletime, place,and mannerrestriction. In respondingto Defendants'contentions,this Court
25 explainedthat such an inquiry would requirethe Court to considerfacts outsideof Plaintiffs' Third
26 AmendedComplaint exceedingthe scopeof a Rule 12(bX6)motion, and thereforewere more

1 appropriatelyraisedin a motionfor
2 Against this backdrop,the Court now examinesDefendants'motion for summaryjudgment

5 asto Plaintifß' claimsunderthe First Amendmentandthe EqualProtectionClauseof the United

4 StatesConstitution,and Plaintifß' freedomof expressionclaim underthe CaliforniaConstitution.


6 Rule 56(c) of the FederalRulesof Civil Procedureauthorizessummaryjudgment if there is

7 no genuineissueas to any materialfact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof
8 law. SeeAndersonv.LibertyLobby,lnc.,477U.5.242,247-48(1986). Themovingpartybearsthe
9 initial burdenof demonstratingthe basisfor the motion and identifuing the portionsof the pleadings,
l 0 depositions,answersto interrogatories,affidavits, and admissionson file that establishthe absence
¡- 1 l of atriableissueofmatenalfact.CelotexCorp.v.Catrett,477U.S.317,323(1986).Ifthemoving

9 F t 2 party meetsthis initial burden,the burdenthen shifts to the non-movingparty to presentspecific

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' 9Ë FY 1 3 factsshowingthat thereis a genuineissuefor trial. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(e);Celotex,477 U.S. at 324;
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a t t l 4 MatsushitaElec.Indus.Co. v. ZenithRødioCorp.,475 U.S. 574,586-87(1986). The non-movant's
hr 'Ä
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l 5 bareassertions,standingalone,are insuffrcientto createa material issueof fact and defeata motion
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cn4 1 6 for summaryjudgment. Anderson,477U.S. at247-48. An issueof fact is materialif, underthe
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*a 1 7 substantivelaw of the case,resolutionof the factual disputemight affect the case'soutcome. Id. at
l 8 248. Factualdisputesare genuineif they "properly can be resolvedin favor of either pafi." Id. at
t 9 250. Thus,a genuineissuefor trial existsif the non-movantpresentsevidencefrom which a
20 reasonablejury, viewing the evidencein the light most favorableto that party,could resolvethe
2l materialissuein his or her favor. Id. "If the evidenceis merely colorable,or is not significantly

22 probative,summaryjudgment may be granted." Id. at249-50 (internal citationsomitted).


24 I. First Amendment Claim

25 A. Standing

26 Before reachingthe merits of Plaintiffs' claim, the Court must first addressthe threshold

27 issueof standing. The County contendsthat Plaintiffs may not make an as appliedchallengeto the
r r D o c k eNt o . l l 2 .
I Ordinancebecausethey did not subjectthemselvesto the regulationbeforebringing suit. Plaintiffs

2 arguethat the Ordinancemakestheir gun showsimpossibleand thereforethey havebeensufficiently

J affectedto havestanding.

4 Generally,one may not challengea rule or policy to which one "has not submittedhimself by

5 actuallyapplyingfor the desiredbenefit." Madsenv. BoiseState University,9T6 F.2d 1219,1220

6 (9th Cir. 1992);seealso United Statesv. Hugs,109 F.3d 1375, 1378(9th Cir. 1997);Gerritsenv.
(9thCir. 1993).Acentralreasonforthisrequirementisto
7 Cityof LosAngeles,994F.2d570,575
I ensurethat the challengedpolicy actuallyaffectedthe personchallengingit. SeeMadsen,976F.2d

9 atl22l-22.
10 Here,the Court finds that the Ordinancehassufficiently affectedPlaintiffs. Following this

li 1 1 Court's OrderdenyingPlaintiffs' requestfor injunctive relief, Plaintiffs cancelledan upcominggun

r \ ' :
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l 2 show due to: (1) potentialallegationsof fraud in hostinga gun show without guns;(2) Plaintiffs'
q =} T
. F U l 3 inability to producea written plan to the County for hostinga gun show without guns;and (3) the
! o
o 3
ô ã t 4 cancellationof reservationsby severalof Plaintiffs' vendorsand exhibitors. Thesecircumstances
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! z 1 5 demonstratethat the Ordinancehasalreadydirectly affectedat leastone of Plaintiffs' gun showsat
c !E
- o
-- z of Plaintiffs' inability to producea plan for
l 6 the Fairgrounds.Additionally, as a direct consequence
r ê ã
(¡) b
Ë l l 1 7 holding a gun show without guns,the County releasedall of Plaintiffs' reserueddatesat the
- 1 8 Fairgroundsfor the year 2000 and subsequentlyreturnedall depositsto Plaintifß. For thesereasons,
T 9 the Court finds that Plaintiffs' havebeenactuallyaffectedby the Ordinanceand that Plaintiffs have
20 standingto make an as appliedchallenge. SeeMadsen,976 F.2d af 1221-22;seealso UnitedStates
2l v. Baugh, I 87 F.3d 1037, 1041(9th Cir. 1999)(finding that standingexistedeventhoughthe as

22 appliedchallengersto the statutehad not appliedfor a permit).

23 B. and Free Expression
Gun Possession

24 The thresholdinquiry for the Court is whetherthe act of possessinga gun amountsto speech

25 sufficient to sustainPlaintiffs' First Amendmentclaim. In evaluatingthe claim, the Court must

26 inquire whether"[a]n intent to conveya particularizedmessage[is] present,and [whether]the
27 likelihood [is] greatthat the messagewould be understoodby those who viewed it." SeeNordykev.
28 King,3l9 F.3d1185,1189(9thCir.2003)(citing U.S.405,410-11
I (1974)). [f the possessionof a gun is expressiveconduct,the questionthen becomeswhetherthe

2 of free expression."Texasv. Johnson,4gl U.S.

County's"regulationis relatedto the suppression

J 397,403(1989). Suchregulationsthat are relatedto a governmentinterestin suppressing


4 are subjecttostrictscrutiny.Seeid.; UnitedStatesv. O'Brien,391 U.S. 367,377(1968).

) Conversely,regulationsthat are unrelatedto a governmentinterestin suppressingfree expressionare

6 subjectto a lessstringentstandard.SeeO'Brien,39l U.S. at 377.

7 Here,the County doesnot contestthat gun possessionin the contextof a gun showmay

I involve certainelementsof protectedspeech.12As the Court previouslynotedin its Orderdenying

9 Plaintifß' requestfor a preliminary injunction, the SupremeCourt haswarnedthat thereis a

1 0 "limitless variety of conductthat can be 'speech' wheneverthe conductintendstherebyto expressan

¡r 1 1 idea." O'Brien,39l U.S. at376. The protectionis not limited to the written or spokenword. A

r ì ' =
\-, tr I 2 personalso may expresshis thoughtsthrough conductin which he purposefullyengages.The
* r t
( J F
L ç
l 3 SupremeCourt hasrecognizedthat such symbolic speechor expressiveconductlies within the
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0 Ë
â Ë L4 confinesof the First Amendment'sprotectionof freespeech.See,e.g.,Brown v. Louisiana,383
u1 7
q ¡ F
9 :
1 5 U.S. 131(1966)(silentsit-in by black citizensdemonstrating library);Tinlcerv.
againsta segregated
Ñ oE
Ø 1 l 6 DesMoinesIndependentCommunitySchool Dist.,393U.S. 503 (1969)(studentswearingarmbands
O õ
+a ¡! t 7 to protestAmericanmilitary involvementin Vietnam); Schachtv. United States,398U.S. 58 (1970)
;) 1 8 (the wearing of United Statesmilitary uniforms during a dramaticperformanceto criticize American
t 9 interventionin Vietnam).
20 In light of the County's concession,and the existenceof competentevidencein the factual

2l record,the Court concludesthat there is a triable issueof a fact as to whetherPlaintiffs' gun

22 possessionin the contextof a gun show can qualiff as speechand whetherPlaintifß intendedto
23 convey a particularizedmessagethat was likely to be understoodby thosewho observedit.
r2AlsobeforetheCourtis Defendants'MotiontoSnike Plaintiffs'ExpertReportand DeclarationsofDonaldKilmer,
25 Daryl Davis,DuaneDarr,JessB. Guy, Virgil McVicker, Mike Fournier,RussellNordyke,and SallieNoryke. (DocketNo.
153.) Becausethe County has concededfor purposesof their Motion for SummaryJudgmentthat gun possession may
26 constituteexpressiveconduct,the Court finds that Plaintiffs' expertreport is not relevant. Furthermore,the Court finds that
the expertreport doesnot containany specializedknowledgeto assistthe trier offact understandthe evidence.SeeDøubert
27 v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc,509 U.S. 579,591(1993);Fed.R. Evid. 702. For thesereasons,theCourtGRANTS
Defendants'Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Expert Report. Due to the County's concession,the Court finds that the contentof
28 the remainingdeclarationsis irrelevantto the remainingissues.For this reason,the Court DENIES Defendants'Motion to
Strike, as moot.
I Specifically,Plaintiffs have offeredevidencethat their act of possessinggunsat a gun show servesto

2 expresstheir firmly-rooted beliefsthat individuals shouldhavea protectedright underthe Second

J Amendmentto beararms;that they supportthe National Rifle Association'sinterpretationof the

4 SecondAmendment;and that they object to the Ninth Circuit's decisionholding that the Second
5 Amendment"offers no protectionfor the individual'sright to beararms." Nordyke,3l9 F.3dat
6 1t9l (citing Hickmanv. Block,Sl F.3d 98,102 (9th Cir. 1996). The Courtnow tums to whether
7 the Ordinanceis relatedto the suppressionof that speech.
8 C. Is the County's Ordinance Relatedto the Suppressionof Free Expression

9 Having determinedthat the issueof whetherPlaintiffs' gun possessionis expressiveconduct

1 0 is not amenableto summaryjudgment on this record the Court now tums to evaluatewhetherthe
L ll of free expression.Nordylæ,319F.3d at I189. The
County'sOrdinanceis relatedto the suppression

U E 1 2 partiesas an initial matter,disputethe standardof review that guidesthe Court's analysisof the
9 =
' ( iJYE t 3 impact of the Ordinanceupon Plaintiffs' right of free expression.Plaintiffs maintain that the
9 o
.2 .p t 4 assertedgovernmentalinterestof the Ordinance,as appliedto them, is relatedto the suppressionof
â g
o 7 o'strictscrutiny"
. F Y l 5 their free speechand thereforethe Court should examinethe Ordinanceunderthe
- =
g o
cnl t 6 standardset forth in Johnson. SeeJohnson, 491U.S. at 403. Defendantsarguethat the Ordinanceis
6 €
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f l f e t 7 not relatedto the suppressionofspeechand thereforethe lessstrict content-neutralstandardset forth
Ð l 8 inO'Brienapplies.SeeO'Brien,39l U.S. at 376-77.Havingoutlinedtheparties'respective
l 9 positions,the Court proceedsto ar:rrlyzethesecases,in the contextof the curent record,to determine
20 the applicablesøndardof review which govemsthe Court's evaluationof the Ordinanceat issue.
2l 1. Texasv. Johnson

22 InTexas v. Johnson,theSupremeCourt held that a Texasstatutecriminalizingthe

23 desecrationof veneratedobjects,including the United Statesflag, was unconstitutionalas appliedto

24 an individual, Johnson,who had set fire to a flag during a political demonstration.Johnson,49l
25 U.S. at 420. The Texasstatuteprovidedthat "[a] personcommits an offenseif he intentionallyor
26 knowingly desecrates[a] nationalflag," where "desecrate"meantto "deface,damage,or otherwise
27 physicallymistreatin a way that the actor knows will seriouslyoffend one or more personslikely to
28 observeor discoverhis action." Id. at 400 (citing Tex. PenalCodeAnn. $ 42.09 ( I 989). The Court

I first held that Johnson'sflag-burningwas "conduct 'sufficiently imbuedwith elementsof
2 communication'to implicatethe First Amendment."Id. at406 (citationomitted). The Court
J rejectedthe State'scontentionfor the applicationof the lessstringentstandardannouncedin

4 O'Brien. Id. at 406. The Couf reasonedthat the State'sassertedinterest"in preservingthe flag asa
) of free
symbolof nationhoodandnationalunity," was an interest"related'to the suppression

the State'sconcernwith protectingthe flag's symbolicmeaningwas implicated

6 expression"'because
somemessage."Id. at 410. The Court
7 "only whena person'streatmentof the flag communicates
I statedthat sucha restrictionwill be subjectto "the most exactingscrutiny. " Id. at 412 (citing Boos

9 v. Barry,485 U.S. 312,321(1988)). Sucha level of scrutinyrequiresthe Stateactor"to showthat

l 0 the regulationis necessaryto seryea compelling stateinterestand that it is narrowly drawn to
li ll achievethat end." Boos,485U.S. at32l (citationsomitted).
r \ ' =
v F t2 2. United Statesv. O'Brien
* r È
.cEJ H
T l3 In UnitedStatesv. O'Brien,the SupremeCourtheldthat when "'speech'and
t r o
v 2e
A l 4 elementsare combinedin the samecourseof conduct,a sufficiently important governmentalinterest
- Ë9
t2 =
(¡) ç l 5 in regulatingthe nonspeechelementcanjustify incidentallimitations on First Amendment
i - Y
ú1 zo l 6 freedoms."O'Brien,3g1 U.S. at376. O'Brien involveda challengeto a federalstatutemakingit
O õ
:. fe l 7 illegal to "forge[], alter[], knowingly destroy[],knowingly mutilatc[], or in any manncrchange[]any
? )' Id. at 370 (citing 1965Amendmentto $ 12(b)(3)of the Universal
1 8 [SelectiveServicecertificates]
t 9 Military Training and ServioeAct). The SupremeCourt stated,
20 'Wethink it clear that a governmentregulationis sufficientlyjustified
[] if it is within the constitutionalpower of the Government;[2] if it
2l furthersan impofant or substantialgovernmentalinterest;[3] if the
governmentalinterestis unrelatedto the suppressionof free
22 expression;and [4] ifthe incidental restrictionon allegedFirst
Amendmentfreedomsis no greaterthan is essentialto the furtherance
23 of that interest.

24 Id. at377. In finding that the statutemet eachof theserequirements,the Court reasonedthat because
25 of the Government'ssubstantialinterestin assuringthe continuingavailability of issuedSelective
26 Servicecertificates,becausethe statutewas an appropriatelynanow meansof protectingthis interest
27 and condemnedonly the independentnoncommunicativeimpact of conductwithin its reach,and
28 becausethe noncommunicativeimpact of the act of burning a registrationcertificatefrustratedthe

I Govemment'sinterest,a sufficient govemmentalinterestwas shownto justiff the defendant's

2 conviction. Id. at382.

J In this case,the Court finds that the O'Brien test providesthe appropriatestandardof review

4 of the Ordinance. Unlike the State'sinterestin Johnson,the County hasan interestunrelatedto the
5 suppressionof free expression.In Johnson,the Texasstatutefocusedon the communicativeaspect
6 of the actor's conductby prohibiting desecrationof the flag in a way that the actor knew would
7 seriouslyoffendone or morepersonslikely to observeor discoverhis action. Johnson,49l U.S. at
8 400. There,the State'sassertedinterestedin preservationof the flag as a symbol of nationalunity
9 was an interestdirectly relatedto the suppressionof the actor's free expressionand communicative
1 0 conduct. Id. at 410. Here,the County's interestis not in suppressingPlaintiffs' messagesabout

¡r 1 1 guns. The interestthat fueledthe promulgationof the Ordinanceat issueis the preventionof
O 6
r \ '= 1 2 violenceand the preservationof safetyon county property. Thus, in direct contrastto the State's
v F
! =
e 3
' F l / 1 3 interestin Johnson,the County's interestis unrelatedto the communicativeaspectof the conductat
l J o
.28 t 4 issue. Becauseof thesedifferences,this Court finds the Johnsonstrict scrutiny standard
o 2
o ç
. F ä 1 5 inappropriatefor the analysisof this case. Instead,the Court will apply the four-part O'Brien test.
6 t E
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cnl l6 3. O'Bríen As Applied to Plainúiffs
' Ë 5
o õ
9 f r T7 The County contendsthat the Ordinancesatisfiesthe O'Brien test and that there areno
- l 8 factual issuesthat precludea grant of summaryjudgment on this record. According to the County,
1,9 there is an importantgovernmentalinterestin seekingto ensurepublic safetyon county property,and
20 that the governmentalinterestis unrelatedto the suppressionof Plaintiffs' free expression.The
2l County assertsthat the incidentalrestiction on Plaintiffs' ability to conducttheir gun shows,in the

22 precisemannerPlaintiffs wish, is no greaterthan is essentialto the furtheranceof the County's

23 content-neutralinterest. In response,Plaintiffs insist that the isolatedstatementsof a particular
24 county legislatorevincea content-basedlegislativemotive behindthe Ordinance. Plaintiffs posit
2 5 that such impropermotive and the absenceof a sufficient goverrunentalinterestprecludethe
26 Ordinancefrom satisffing the O'Brien test. The Court now turns to the Ordinanceas appliedto
27 Plaintiffs underthe four-part O'Bríen test.

I ^, Constitutional Power of Government

2 The first prong of the O'Brien testrequiresthe regulationat issueto be within the
J constitutionalpowerof the govemment.O'Brien,3gl U.S. at377. This Courtpreviouslyconcluded

4 that the Ordinancesatisfredthe first elementof the O'Brien test in the contextof a facial challenge.
5 (Order DenyingPlaintiffs' Motion for TemporaryRestrainingOrder and PreliminaryInjunction, at !f.
6 7-9.) Here,Plaintiffs argue,without any substantiveexplanation,that the California Supreme
7 Court's decisionin Nordylæv. King,Z1 Cal. 4th 875 (2002) demandsa different result. The Couf
I disagrees.The promulgationof the Ordinanceis certainly within the constitutionalpowersof the

9 County. Plaintiffs have failed to identiff any triable issuesof fact that could result in a different
1 0 conclusion.
¡- ll b. SubstantialGovernmentInterest
g d
U F t2 The secondprong of the O'Brien test requiresthat the regulationfurther a substantial
r E
' 9c FH l 3 govemmentinterest.O'Brien,391 U.S. at377. In applyingthe secondstepof the O'Brien test,the
i J e
s h E
l 4 SupremeCourt employsa balancingtest,askingwhetherthe allegedgovemmentalinterestis
a 2
g E l 5 suffrcientlysubstantialto justiff the resultantimpact on free expression.See,e.g.,Membersof the
d oE
Ø 4 for Vincent,466U.S. 789 (1984). In ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for a
t 6 City Councilv. Taxpayers
' Ë 5
O õ
+¡ te t 7 preliminary injunction, this Court previouslyconcludedthat the Ordinancesatisfredthe second
1 8 elementof the O'Brien test in the contextof a facial challenge. Now, Plaintiffs arguethat "as
t 9 applied" to gun showsat the Fairgrounds,the Ordinancefails to further a substantialgovernment
20 interest. The Court disagreeswith Plaintiffs and finds that the Ordinancedoesfurther a substantial
2l govemmentinterestas appliedto them.

22 In supportof meetingtheir initial burden,the County points to its findings that during the

23 first five yearsof the 1990sin AlamedaCounty therewere 879 homicidescommittedusing firearms,
24 and an additional 7,647victims were hospitalizedwith gunshotinjuries. AlamedaCounty Gen. Ord.
25 Code,ch.9.12,$ 9.12.120,subd.A. The Countyalsofound that firearmswerethe leadingcauseof
26 deathamongpeoplebetweenthe agesof fifteen and twenty four in AlamedaCounty and that
27 betweenJuly 1, 1996and June30, 1997, 136juveniles were arrestedin Oaklandfor gun-related
28 offenses. Id. The July 4, 1998shootingat the Fairgroundsfurther evidencesthat the Ordinance

I furthersa substantialinterestin promotingpublic safetyon county property,and especiallyat the

2 Fairgrounds.As a result of the County's showing,the burdenshifts to Plaintiffs to presentspecific

J factsshowingthat thereis a genuineissuefor tial. Celotex,477 U.S. at 324; MatsushitaEIec.

4 Indus.Co., 586-87.

) Plaintiffs arguethat the County doesnot havea substantialinterestas appliedto Plaintiffs'

6 gun shows. Specifically,Plaintiffs point to the County's admissionthat thereis no evidenceof any
7 violent criminal activity occurringat any of Plaintiffs' guns shows. However,Plaintiffs cite no
I specificfactsindicating that the County's findings on gun violencewithin the countywere

9 inaccurate.SeeClarkv. City of Lakewood,zsgF.3d 996, l0l5 (9th Cir. 2001)(finding that city may
1 0 haveimproperlyrelied upon certainevidencein passingordinance,thereforea genuineissueof
L l 1 materialfact existedwhetherthe regulationfurthereda significant governmentinterest). Similarly,
O €
U E t 2 Plaintiffs cite no specific facts rebuttingthe County's interestin promotingpublic safetyon county
{ J =
9 F
. - ( J 1 3 property. As a result, Plaintiffs havefailed to presentevidenceestablishingthe existenceof a triable
Q 6
â ã l 4 issueof materialfact. Therefore,the Court finds as a matterof law that the County'spublic safety
gv 2 E
1 5 interestis sufficiently substantialto justiff the resultantimpact on Plaintiffs' free expressionand
6 ¡o E
Ø 4 t 6 thussatisfiesthe secondpart of the O'Brientest.
E f
o õ
I f ! t7 c. Ordinance's Relationshipto the Suppressionof Free Expression
- 18 The third elementof the O'Brien test requiresthe governmentalinterestbe unrelatedto the

of freeexpression.O'Brien,3gl U.S. at377. Plaintiffsarguethat the Ordinanceis

t 9 suppression
20 relatedto the suppressionof free speechbecause:(1) the County's underlyinglegislativeintent in
2l promulgatingthe Ordinancewas to prohibit gun shows;and (2) the Ordinanceincludesan exception

eventsand is thereforecontent-based.In response,the County arguesthat

22 for entertainment-related
23 its underlyinglegislativeintent is not proper for the Court to considerand that an examinationof the
24 Ordinance'sexception,in its entirety,demonstratesthat the Ordinanceis content-neutral.The Court
25 will addressPlaintiffs'two argumentsbelow.
26 First, regardingthe County's underlyinglegislativeintent, Plaintifß arguethat the County's

27 public safetyinterestis a pretextualjustification. In supportof their argumentPlaintiffs point to a

28 statementmadeby a memberof the CountyBoard of Supervisors,Mary King ("King").

I Specifically,on May 20,1999,King senta memorandumto CountyCounselrequestingcounselto

2 researchaway to prohibit gun showson county property. However,the SupremeCourt has

J counseledagainstconsiderationof allegedillicit legislativemotive in determininga statute's

4 constitutionality.O'Brien,391 U.S. at 383. A court may not strikedown an otherwiseconstitutional

5 statuteon the basisof an allegedillicit legislativemotive. Id. As the Court specifïcallystatedin

6 O'Brien,

7 Inquiriesinto congressionalmotives or purposesare a hazardous

matter. Whenthe issueis simply the interpretationof legislation,the
I Court will look to statementsby legislatorsfor guidanceas to the
purposeof the legislature,becausethe benefit to sound
9 ilecision-makingìnthis circumstanceis thoughtsufficient to risk the
possibility of misreadingCongress'purpose. It is entirely a different
t0 matterwhen we areaskédto vbid a itatute that is, underwell-settled
criteria, constitutionalon its face, on the basisof what fewer than a
¡r ll handful of Congressmensaid aboutit. What motivatesone legislator
to make a speechabouta statuteis not necessarilywhat motivates
U E t2 scoresof othersto enactit, and the stakesare sufficiently high for us to
9 E eschewguesswork.We declineto void essentiallyonfhegroundthat
'Fe - t',î 13 it is unw-iselegislationwhich Congresshad the undoubtedpow€r to
Ø 8
O enactand whiõh could be reenactedin its exactform if the sameor
t4 anotherlegislatormadea "wiser" speechaboutit.
- Ëg

o =
r r : - l 5 Id. at 383-84. Despitethe SupremeCourt's guidanceto the contrary,Plaintiffs cite to four casesin
d E
Ð o
Ø 1 t 6 supportof their contentionthat this Court should considerKing's statement.However,the authority
Ë 5
o f!õ
t¡ t 7 relied upon by Plaintiffs doesnot supportthe propositionthat this Court may considerKing's
,) l 8 statementin determiningwhetherthe County's interestis relatedto the suppressionof free
t 9 expression.
20 Plaintiffs cite UnitedStatesv. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990). ln Eichman,the Supreme

2l Court foundthatthe Flag ProtectionAct of 1989,18 U.S.C.$ 700,was inconsistentwith the First

22 Amendment.Eichman,496U.S. at 319. In doing so,the Courtreasonedthat althoughthe Act

23 contained"no explicit content-basedlimitation, it [was] neverthelessclear that the Government's
24 assertedinterest[was] 'relatedto the suppression
of free expression."'Id. at 315 (citingJohnson,

25 491 U.S. at 410). In analyzingthe government'sinterest,the Court did not look to statementsmade
26 by legislators,but insteadthe Court examined"the preciselanguageof the Act's prohibitions,
27 [which] confirm[ed] Congress'interestin the communicativeimpact of flag desecration."Id. at3l7.
28 Therefore,Eichmandoesnot supportPlaintiffs' argumentthat it is proper to considerKing's

I statements.

2 The Court finds the remainingauthority cited by Plaintiffs regardingthe proprietyof King's
J statementsdoesnot supporttheir position either. SeeMembersof City Council v. Taxpayersfor

4 Víncent,466U.S. 789,804(1984)(rejectingplaintiff s asappliedFirst Amendmentchallengeand

f finding that a municipal ordinancebanningthe postingof signson public propertywas content

6 neutraland thereforeconstitutionalunderan O'Bríen analysis);Perry Educ.Ass'n v. Local

7 Educator'sAss'n,460 U.S. 37,44-49(1983)(frndingthat a schooldistrict'spreferentialaccessto its
8 interschoolmail systemwas not unconstitutionalunderthe First Amendmentbecausethe systemwas
9 not a public forum);Niemotkov. Maryland,340 US. 268,271-73(1951)(holdingJehovah's
t 0 Witnessesdefendants'convictionswere in violation of their rights to equal protectionof the law in
ï l 1 exerciseof their freedomsof speechand religion protectedby the First and FourteenthAmendments

U F l 2 wheredefendants'only basisfor arrestwas that defendantswere using public park for Bible talks
'( i¿vF l 3 without a permit). The Court finds that it is not properto considerKing's statements.Accordingly,
.a.a O
1 4 the Court finds that King's statementsdo not raisea triable issueof fact with respectto the third
-A ãE
g =E 1 5 O'Brien factor.
6 l E
! o
CAl t6 Turning to Plaintiffs' secondargument,regardingthe Ordinance'sexceptionfor
E 5
o frð
ùa events,Plaintiffs claim that the timing and existenceof the exception
t 7 entertainment-related
Ð 1 8 demonstatesthat the Ordinanceis relatedto the suppressionof Plaintiffs' free expression.
t 9 However,as the County points out, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the exceptionis groundedin any
20 disagreementwith any messagePlaintiffs conveyby possessingfirearms. Additionally, the
2 1 exceptioncontainsthe unqualifiedword, "event," that preseruesthe possibility that any numberof
22 eventscan satisff the exceptionprovided that the firearmsare securedwhen not in the actual
23 possessionof the participant,including Plaintiffs' gun shows.r3As the record indicates,the County
24 hasallowed "events," other than "motion picture, television,video, danceand theatricalproductions"
25 wherethe authorizedparticipantshavepossessedfirearms,and thosefirearmshavebeensecured
26 when not in the actualpossessionof the participant. (PickeringDecl., at 1 13.) Plaintiffs offer no
ItAdmittedly,Plaintiffswould not be permittedto allow the attendeesto actuallypossessthe firearmswhile on
28 countyproperty. However,the Ordinance'sexceptiondoesnot proscribethe sale,exhibition,or discussionof firearmson
county property.

I specific probativeevidenceestablishingthat as appliedto Plaintiffs, the Ordinance'sexceptionfor

2 entertainment-related
eventsis content-based.Nothing on the face of the statute,or its applicationin

3 the factual recordof this case,indicatesthat the County's interestis relatedto suppressionof
4 Plaintifß' First Amendmentrights of freeexpression.Thus,the Court finds that as a matterof law,
5 the County's Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, is unrelatedto the suppressionof free expression.
6 For thesereasons,the Court finds that the Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, satisfiesthe

7 third part of the O'Brien test.

I d. Narrowly Tailored

9 The fourth elementof the O'Brien test requiresthe incidentalreshiction on allegedFirst

1 0 Amendmentfreedomsbe no greaterthan is essentialto the furtheranceof that interest. The County

L l 1 arguesthat the Ordinancedoesnot restrict speech,and evenif it does,the Ordinanceis narrowly

( J É l 2 tailored to achievethe important governmentinterestof protectingpublic safety. Plaintiffs counter,
' Oi YF t 3 that the existing statelaws intendedto punish criminal useof firearmsare a sufÏicient lesser
f o
o e
^ ! t t 4 restrictivemeansof controlling weaponsat the Fairgrounds.
f-f .X
t h i
15 This Court haspreviouslyaddressedthe issueof whetherthe Ordinanceis narrowlytailored
- o
Ø 4 1 6 in its order denyingPlaintiffs' requestfor a preliminary injunction. In examiningPlaintifß' facial
€ f
o õ
! | l 1 7 challengeto the Ordinance,this Court notedthat "severalpotentially lessonerousalternatives. . . are
Ð 1 8 specificallypreemptedby statelaw."r4 Currently,in examiningPlaintifß' as appliedchallenge,
1 9 Plaintiffs are similarly unableto identify any factualdisputeregardinga non-preemptedless
20 reshictive alternative.As Defendantsconectly point out, it is not appropriatefor a court to consider
2l the Ordinance'scunent successin preventinggun-relatedcrime. SeeClarkv. Comm.for Creative

22 Non-Violence,468U.S. 288, 296-97(1984)(statingthat the validity of a regulationneednot be

23 judged solely by referenceto the demonstrationat hand in rejectingplaintiffs' as appliedchallengeto
24 regulationprohibitingsleepingovemightin a federalpark); Wardv. RockAgainstRacism,4g1U.S.
25 781, 801 (1989)(stating"the validity of the regulationdependson the relationit bearsto the overall
26 problem the govemmentseeksto correct,not on the extentto which it furthersthe government's
27 interestsin an individual case.");One World OneFamily Now v. City and County of Honolulu,T6
No. 53.

I F.3d 1009,1013(9th Cir. 1996)(citing llard, statingthat the validity of an ordinancebanningsales

2 of message-bearing
T-shirts on city streetsdid not dependon the extentto which it furtheredthe
J city's interestwith regardto plaintiffs' sales,but dependedon the extentto which it furtheredthe

4 city's overall goal of protectingpublic safety). Similarly, the Court cannotconsiderPlaintiffs'

5 commercialinterestin examiningthe restrictivescopeof the Ordinance.SeeSpokaneArcade,Inc. v.
6 City of Spokøne,75F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Plaintiffs' statedpurposesfor their gun showsdemonsüatesthat the Ordinanceis no more

8 restrictivethan necessary.Plaintiffs list l5 primary purposesfor their gun shows:

9 [] To obtain political information regardingmy ConstitutionalRights,
including but not limited to the right to keepand bearfirearm!; [2] To
l0 assemblewith other individuals and organizationsto discussthe issues
and pendinglegislationthat effect my ConstitutionalRights, including
Ë 1 1 but not limited to, my right to own, possess,and tradefirearms; [3] To
obtain the latestinfoima-tionreeardiirethe safe,responsibleand lau¡ful
O € r^
u.E t¿ ownershipand storageof firearirs; [4J To obtainthe latestinformation
9 = regardingthe firearmsindustry,with specificreferenceto
.P8 13 deîelopñents in technologya-nãsafety;[5] to purchaseand/orsell
acl E firearms,firearm accessories, ammunition,safetydevicesand gun
- , :E
t4 safes;[6] To petition political candidates,both thoseelectedand
o 2 cunently campaigning,on issuesof governmentpolicy; [7] To obtain
E E I ) information frompolitical candidates,both thosein office and
6 t oE
campaigning,on issuesof govemmentpolicy; [8] To obtain and/or
cn| 16 offei for salehistorical and philosophicalinformation from
e(¡)f organizationssympathetictõ, but nõt directly inv_olved,.with firearms
õ ,-
L ll issues;[9] To ribtaln information and engagein the tade of_stampsand
coins; [10] To obtain information and engagein the trade of knives;
Þ 1 8 [11] To obtain information and engagein the tradeof antiquesand/or
òthèr collectibles;[2] To obtain iñformation and engagein the trade
t9 of historicaland military memorabilia;[13] To obtaininformationand
engagein the tradeof political souvenirssuchas:buttons,bumper-
20 stiõkérs,t-shirts,bookõand signs;Ia] To circulateand signpetitions
for stateand local initiatives;[and] [5] To engagein the fellowship
2l and affiliation of like-minded individuals in a market-placeof ideas
and products,and to enjoy our commonculture and collective heritage.
23 (TAC,,!J59(a) through(o).) As the Countypointsout, eachof thesepurposesmay be fulfrlled
24 without the actualpresenceof a firearm. The only putativepu{posefor which the presenceof a
25 firearm is most likely preferableis the saleof a firearm. However,nothing in the Ordinance
26 prohibits sucha sale. Although replicas,pictures,or other representationsof fireanns may not have
27 the sameimpact as an actualfirearm, the potentialhazzardsofthousandsof peoplewielding ftrearms
28 togetheron county propertyjustifies the resulting burdenimposedby the Ordinance. Wasakv.

I Super.Court of Ca|.,329 F.3d683,691 (9th Cir. 2003)(findingthat a municipalordinancethat

2 resultedin the prohibition of "wooden bull hooks" was narrowlytailored anddid not offend animal
J rights demonstrator'sFirst Amendmentrights, in part becausereplicasand picturescould be used.)

4 Plaintiffs havenot cited to, or proffered, any evidenceto suggestthat the Ordinanceis not

5 narrowly tailored to the County's interestin preventinggun-relatedcrime on county property. For

6 thesereasons,the Court finds that there is no triable issueof fact asto whetherthe Ordinanceis
7 narrowly tailored to the County's interests. The Ordinancethereforesatisfiesthe fourth prong of the
I O'Brientest.

9 For thesereasons,the Court hnds that the Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, satisfieseach

1 0 part of the O'Brien test. The Court thereforeGRANTS Defendants'motion for summaryjudgment
Ð 1 1 as to Plaintiffs' First Amendmentclaim.

'F 12 D. Time, Place,and Manner Restriction

! g
' 9i 3F 13 The County arguesthat evenassumingthe Ordinancehasan impact on speech,it is
7t) É
A ; 1 4 neverthelessvalid as a reasonabletime, place, and mannerrestriction. Plaintiffs contendthat the
- Ë
€ 9 l 5 Ordinanceis not a restriction,but insteada prohibition that fails underthe test set forth inCity of
- g

rt1 z lnc.,475 U.S. 41 (1986).

t 6 Rentonv. PlaytimeTheaters
o õ
- I ¡ . l7 The Court finds that the Ordinanceis a valid time, place,and mannerrestriction. The test
- l 8 appliedfor time, place,and mannerrestrictionsdiffers from the O'Brien test. ,SeeClark v.
U.S.288,298(1984);Heffronv.Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna
t 9 CommunityforCreativeNon-Violence,468
1nc.,452U.S. 640,649-654(1931). In orderto be a valid time, place,andmanner
20 Consciousness,
2 l restriction,the regulation:(1) must not be basedupon the contentof speech;(2) must servea
22 significant governmentinterest;and (3) must leaveopenamplealtemativechannelsfor
23 communicationof information. Heffron,452 U.S. at 649-654(citationsomitted).
24 InClark,the SupremeCourt agreedwith the districtcourt's decisionin grantingsummary

25 judgmentin favor of the government'sregulation. Clark,468 U.S. at297-98. The Courtuphelda

26 regulation,that when appliedto the plaintiffdemonstrators,prohibitedthem from actually sleeping
27 in a park where they had constructed"tent cities" nearthe White Houseto call attentionto the plight
28 of the homeless.Id. at289. First, the Court found that the regulationwas contentneutralbecauseit

I was not appliedto regulatethe plaintiffs' message.Id. at295. Second,the Court found the

2 regulationserveda significantgovernmentinterestof maintainingparksin an attractivecondition,

J availablefor all to use. Id. at296. Lastly, the Court found that eventhoughthe plaintiffs could not

4 actuallysleepin the park, the regulationpreserv€dother avenuesof communicatingthe plaintifß'

5 message.Id. at295. The Court notedthat the regulationdid not preventplaintiffs from leavingtheir
6 symbolictentsintact. Id.; seealso Hffion,452 U.S. at 2568(holdingthat regulationprohibiting
7 saleor distribution on fair groundsof any merchandiseexceptfrom fixed locationswas a valid time,
I place,and mannerrestriction).

9 Here,the Ordinancemeetseachof the requirementsof a valid time, place,and manner

1 0 restriction. First, the Court hasalreadyfound the Ordinanceis contentneutralas appliedto

tr lt Plaintiffs. Second,the Ordinancefurthersa significantcounty interestin reducingthe risk of

t)Ê t 2 shootingsand gun violenceon Countyproperty. Furthermore,in examiningthe County's interest,as

! E
.eEFY l 3 appliedto the Plaintiffs' gun shows,the Court finds that curtailing the possessionof guns on county
! o
o Ë
A l 4 propeúy hasa naturaland probableaffect of limiting the risk of overall shootingsand gun violence
- Ëg
ø =
g E l 5 on Countyproperty.SeeClark,468 U.S. at297 (notingthat "it is evidentfrom our casesthat the
6 o?
Ø 4 l 6 validity of [the] regulationneednot bejudged solely by referenceto the demonstrationat hand").
o õ
! l r t 7 Finally, the Ordinanceleavesample alternatechamels for the communicationof Plaintiffs' message.
Ð l 8 The Ordinancedoesnot limit discussionaboutguns or gun relatedissueson county property. See
t 9 Vlasak,3zg F.3d at 691(statingthat the First Amendmentdoesnot requirethe govemmentto allow
20 plaintiffs to engagein the particularmethodof communicationwhich plaintiffs believe to be most
2 1 effective). Similarly, the Ordinancedoesnot prohibit possessionof guns on private propertywithin
22 the County. Furthermore,as the County points out, the evidencein the recordindicatesthat
23 Plaintiffs have had over twenty two gun showsin California since2005. Plaintiffs have ample
24 alternatechannelsavailablefor communicationof their gun-relatedmessages.As a result, the
25 County hasestablishedthe absenceof a triable issueof material fact.
26 In response,Plaintiffs cite to no evidencein the recordto suggestthereis a triable issueof

27 fact regardingany of the factorsusedto evaluatethe validity of a time, place,and mannerrestriction.

28 Plaintiffs' citation to City of Rentonis similarly unavailing. City of Renton dealtwith the analysisof

I the city's zoning ordinanceprohibiting adult theatersfrom locatingwithin 1,000feet of any

2 residentialzoneand the secondaryeffectsof adult theaterson the surroundingcommunity. City of

J Renton,475U.S. at 930-3l. In City of Renton,the SupremeCourtheldthat the zoningordinance

4 wasa valid time, place,andmannerrestriction.Id. at932-33.

5 Therefore,the Court finds thereis no basis,on this record,to establisha triable issueof fact

6 asto whetherthe Ordinanceis a valid time, place,and mannerrestriction. For thesereasons,the

7 Court finds the Ordinanceto be a valid time, place,and mannerrestrictionas appliedto Plaintiffs.
8 II. Equal Protection Claim

9 The County insiststhat Plaintiffs cannotmaintain an equalprotectionclaim becausePlaintiffs

1 0 cannotshow that the Ordinanceis appliedin a discriminatorymanneror imposesdifferent burdens

L 1 l on different classesof people. Plaintiffs counterthat the timing of the Ordinance'sexceptionwas

U E 1 2 discriminatory,that the Ordinance'sexceptionis discriminatoryon its face,and that the Ordinanceas

' eË- H
î l 3 appliedtreatsPlaintifß in a disparatemannercomparedthe ScottishGamesand Outdoor Sportsman
t a o
a i ¡ I 4 Shows. Plaintiffs contendthat their disparatetreatmentis an equalprotectionviolation of their
r-r N
go =E l 5 fundamentalright to free speech.
cn4 T6 The first stepin equalprotectionanalysisis to demonstratea govemmentalclassification.
o õ
9 f & t 7 Country ClassicDairies, Inc. v. Stateof Montana, Dep't of CommerceMilkControl Bureau,847
l 8 F.2d593,596 (9th Cir. 1988). To accomplishthis, a plaintiff canshowthat the law is appliedin a
I 9 discriminatorymanneror imposesdifferent burdenson different classesof people. Christy v. Hodel,
for a plaintiff to identiff a "similarly situated"
20 857F.2d t324,I33l (9th Cir. 19SS).It is necessary
2l classagainstwhich the plaintiffls classcan be compared.Attorney Generalv. Irish People,lnc.,684

22 F.2d928,946 (D.C. Cir. 1982)("Discriminationcarurotexist in a vacuum;it can be found only in

23 the unequaltreatmentof peoplein similar circumstances")."The goal of identiffing a similarly
24 situatedclass[ ] is to isolatethe factor allegedlysubjectto impermissiblediscrimination." United
25 Statesv. Aguilar,883 F.2d 662,706(9th Cir. 1989).
26 The next stepis to determinethe applicablelevel of scrutiny for the classification. Country

27 ClassicDairies,847 F.2d at 596. A legislativeclassificationwill be subjectedto strictjudicial

28 scrutiny if it employsa "suspect"classor if it classifiesin such away as to impair the exerciseof a

I right. Hodel,857F.2dat l33l (citingClarkv. Jeter,486U.S. 456,461(1988)

? ("Classificationsbasedon race or nationalorigin, and classificationsaffectingfundamentalrights,

J are given the most exactingscrutiny.") (citationsomitted)). However, "where the law classifies

4 personson a non-suspectbasisfor the exerciseof libertieswhich are not fundamentalconstitutional

5 rights," the law will be upheld if it rationally relatesto a legitimategovemmentalobjective. Hodel,
6 857F.2dat l33l (citing Dandridgev. Ililliams, 397 U.S. 471,485,(1970)). The Courtnow
7 determineswhetherthere existsa relevantclassificationon this record,and if so, the appropriate
8 level of scrutinyto apply to the classification.
9 A. Classification

10 Plaintiffs arguethat the Ordinance'sexceptiontreatsthem differently than it treatsthe

t 1 l ScottishGamesand the Outdoor SportsmanShows. The County arguesthat Plaintiffs arenot
r \ ' =
\ J t r
T2 "similarly situated"to the ScottishGames,the OutdoorSportsmanShows,or any other group
9 =
' (i JHF l 3 invokingthe Ordinance'sexceptionfor authorizedparticipants"in a motionpicture,television,
¡ r o
^F Ëç T 4 video, dance,or theatricalproductionor eventwhen the participantlawfully usesthe firearm as part
o =
O YF 1 5 of that productionor event,providedthat when suchfirearm is not in the actualpossessionof the
6 t E
- o
Ø 1 t 6 authorizedparticipant,it is securedto preventunauthorizeduse." (AlamedaCounty Gen. Ord. Code,
E(¡) €
È) l& t 7 ch.9.12,ç 9.l2.l20,subd.F.)
Ð l8 However,the Court neednot reachthe classificationissuebecause,as describedbelow, even

1 9 if Plaintiffs have successfullyestablisheda classification,the appropriatestandardof review would

20 be rationalbasis. As more fully describedbelow, becausethis Court finds that the Ordinanceand its
2l exceptionis rationally relatedto a legitimategovernmentinterest,Plaintiff s equalprotectionclaim

22 necessarily

23 B. Fundamental Rights

24 Plaintiffs' equalprotectionargumentfails becausethe Ordinanceand its exceptionsurvive

25 rationalbasisscrutiny. Plaintiffs' argumenthereis directedtoward securingreview underthe

26 standardof strict scrutiny,on the groundthat the Ordinanceand its exceptionimplicate Plaintiffs'
27 First Amendmentrights. That contentionhasbeendisposedof in the First Amendmentdiscussion
28 above. SeeJonesIntercable of SanDiego, Inc. v. City of Chula Vista,8OF.3d 320,327 (9th Cir.

I 1996)(finding that the regulationwas contentneutralandthereforedid not trigger strict scrutiny
undereitherthe First Amendmentor the Equal ProtectionClause.)(citationsomitted). Whenthe
J regulationat issuedoesnot violate the individual's exerciseof a fundamentalright, the regulation

4 needonly surviverationalbasisreviewfor equalprotectionpurposes.SeeJohnsonv. Robinson,4l5

5 U.S. 361,375 n.l4 (1974)("Unquestionably,
the freeexerciseof religion is a fundamental

6 constitutionalright. However,since. . . the Act doesnot violateappellee'sright of freeexerciseof

7 religion, we haveno occasionto apply to the challengedclassification[for equalprotection
8 purposes]a standardof scrutiny süicter than the traditionalrational-basistest"). Above,the Court
9 hasalreadyfound that the Ordinanceand its exception,as appliedto Plaintiffs, doesnot violate their
l 0 fundamentalright of free speechunderthe First Amendment. In doing so the Court determinedthat
L 1 t the Ordinanceand its exception,as appliedto Plaintiffs, furthereda substantialgovemmentinterest.
z \ ' =
v.5 l2 Accordingly, the Court also finds that the Ordinanceand its exception,as appliedto
U =
.cE) FY t 3 Plaintifß, is rationally relatedto a legitimategovernmentinterest. As notedpreviously,the County's
J j o
.A 2q 8 t 4 interestis to ensurepublic safetyon county property. In supportof this interest,the Countypoints to
H .!:
.C9E E8 l 5 its findingsthat duringthe first five yearsof the 1990sin AlamedaCountytherewere879 homicides
€ o
Ø 4 1 6 committedusing firearms,and an additional1,647victims were hospitalizedwittr gunshotinjuries.
f Ë 5
o ã
I l¡.
l 7 AlamedaCountyGen.Ord. Code, ch.9.72, $ 9.12.120,subd.A. The Countyalsofoundthat
- 1 8 firearmswere the leadingcauseof deathamongpeoplebetweenthe agesof fifteen and twenty four
1 9 in AlamedaCountyandthat betweenJuly 1, 1996andJune30, 1997,l3íjuveniles werearrestedin
20 Oaklandfor gun-relatedoffenses. Id. As fuither evidenceof their govemmentalinterest,the County
2l citesto the July 4, 1998shootingat the Fairgrounds.The Ordinanceis rationally relatedto the

22 County's interestsbecauseit placesrestrictionson the particularindividuals who may lawfully

23 possessa firearm on county property. The Ordinance'sexceptionis rationally relatedto the
24 County's interestsbecauseit allows for firearm possessionin certaincircumstanceswherethe
2 5 individual in possessionis a peaceofficer or other "authorizedparticipant" in an "event." (Alameda
26 CountyGen.Ord. Code, ch.9.12,$ 9.12.120,subd.F.) Becausethe Ordinanceand its exception
2 7 havea rational basisto the County's public safetyconcerns,and do not otherwiseoffend Plaintiffs'
28 fundamentalrights, Plaintifß' equalprotectionclaim fails.

I For thesereasons,the Court finds that the Ordinance,on its face and as appliedto Plaintiffs,

2 doesnot violate the Equal Protectionclause. The Court thereforeGRANTS Defendants'motion for
J summaryjudgment asto Plaintiffs' Equal Protectionclaim.

4 III. StateLaw Claim

) In addition to Plaintiffs' First Amendmentand Equal Protectionclaims underthe United

6 StatesConstitution,Plaintiffs also allegea freedomof expressioncauseof action underthe

7 CaliforniaConstitution.(TAC, n72.) Defendantscontendthat this Court shoulddeclineto exercise
jurisdictionover Plaintiffs'remainingstatelaw causeof action.
8 supplemental
9 As long as the complaintsetsforth a claim "arising under" federallaw, the district court may

l 0 adjudicatestatelaw claimsthat aretransactionallyrelatedto the federalclaim. See28 U.S.C. $

: ll 1367(a).The fact that the court rules againstplaintiffand dismissesthe federalclaim prior to trial

r \ '=
\/,E l 2 doesnot automaticallyoust the court of supplementaljurisdiction. ^SeeJudgeWilliam W. Schwarzer
9 =
T q
\J t 3 et al.,Federal Civil ProcedureBeþre Trial $ 2:145.2(2006). The dismissalis a factor for the court
¡ ) o
. A Ë
ò8, t 4 to considerin decidingwhetherto declineto exerciseits supplementaljurisdiction. A court has
v ä
F t 5 discretionto retain the supplementalstatelaw claim and grantrelief thereon. 28 U.S.C. $
6 E
9 0
rr1 7
o see(lnitedMine Workersv. Gibbs,383U.S. 775,728(1966);Bradyv. Brown,5l F.3d
1 6 1367(cX3);
E 5
o ä jurisdiction whereany of
! f t l 7 810,816 (9th Cir. 1995). The court may declineto exercisesupplemental
- 1 8 the following factorsexist: (l) the statelaw claim involvesa novel or complex issueof statelaw; (2)
l 9 the statelaw claim subsøntiallypredominatesover the claim on which the court's original
20 jurisdiction is based;(3) the districtcourt hasdismissedthe claimson which its originaljurisdiction
2l was based;or (4) "in exceptionalcircumstances,thereare other compelling reasonsfor declining

22 jurisdiction."28 U.S.C.$ 1367(c)(l)-(4).

23 Here, Plaintiffs havefailed to even allegewhich portionsof the California Constitutionare

24 implicatedundertheir claim. Additionally, the Court hasdismissedPlaintiffs' claims upon which

25 original jurisdiction was based. For thesereasons,the Court finds Plaintiffs' California
26 constitutionalclaims more appropriatelylitigated in statecourt.
28 t//


2 For the foregoingreasons,the Court GRANTS Defendants'Motion for SummaryJudgment

J as to Plaintiffs' First Amendmentand Equal ProtectionClaims that were basedon the United States

4 Constitution. The Court declinesto exercisesupplementaljurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining

) statelaw causeof action.

l 0 Dated:March 31.2007 ¿¡,ui--r^\
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