SECTION 1 – DUE PROCESS 1. G.R. No. L-1817 October 26, 1966 LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendantappellee.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal. In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1 The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. 3 The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication. 5 This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein. Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein. As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to

him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him. The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to another person prior to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant was a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the contents of Exhibit B, defendant did not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having previously lived with several other men, adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous marriage. Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish defendant's qualification to contract marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that defendant was married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited before with other men, there was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data on whether any of the contracting parties had been previously married; whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that defendant had had no previous marriage? Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez. 10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

2. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001 FACTS: O n t h e a f t e r n o o n o f J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 9 4 , M a r i a L o u r d e s M o d e s t o a n d Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquinowent to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is t h e r e t o r e c r u i t j o b a p p l i c a n t s f o r S i n g a p o r e . C a r o l d e l a P i e d r a w a s a l r e a d y briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomedand asked them to sit down. T h e y listened to the ―recruiter‖ who was then talking about t h e breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket,and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initialpayment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was ―recruiting‖ nurses for Singapore.Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio -data forms and werer e q u i r e d t o s u b m i t p i c t u r e s a n d a t r a n s c r i p t o f r e c o r d s . A f t e r t h e i n t e r v i e w , Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her thatshe was authorized to receive the money.Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call froma n u n i d e n t i f i e d w o m a n i n q u i r i n g a b o u t t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e c r u i t m e n t conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include thesurveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, ac e r t a i n M a y e t h B e l l o t i n d o s , s o t h e y c o u l d b o t h g o t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e recruitment was reportedly being undertaken . U p o n a r r i v i n g a t t h e r e p o r t e d area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be anapplicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where hew a s a b l e t o s e e a r o u n d s i x ( 6 ) p e r s o n s i n t h e s a l a . R a m o s e v e n h e a r d a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment sheh a s t o p r o v i d e i n S i n g a p o r e a n d t h e d o c u m e n t s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t s h a v e t o comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio -dataform in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the CriminalInvestigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter.A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.C o n s e q u e n t l y , C a r o l w a s c h a r g e d a n d c o n v i c t e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in l a r g e s c a l e a n d a s s a i l s , a s w e l l , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e l a w d e f i n i n g a n d penalizing said crime. First, a c c u s e d s u b m i t s t h a t A r t i c l e 1 3 ( b ) o f t h e L a b o r Code defining ―recruitment and placement‖ is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads: ART. 13. Definitions. —(a) x x x. (b) ― R e c r u i t m e n t a n d p l a c e m e n t ‖ r e f e r s t o a n y a c t o f c a n v a s s i n g , enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includesreferrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,w h e t h e r f o r p r o f i t o r n o t : P r o v i d e d , T h a t a n y p e r s o n o r e n t i t y w h i c h , i n a n y manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shallbe deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. ISSUES: (1) W h e t h e r o r n o t s e c . 1 3 ( b ) o f P . D . 4 4 2 , a s a m e n d e d , o t h e r w i s e known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated HELD: (1)

thus. The issue in Panis was whether. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considersas customary and harmless acts such as ―labor or employment referral‖(―referring‖ an applicant. and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. As said earlier. is not.where the Supreme Court ―criticized‖ the definition of ―recruitment andplacement. S h e p o i n t s o u t t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro h a n d e d o u t a p p l i c a t i o n forms and even received Lourdes Modesto‘s paymen t. a Cebuana. dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining ―recruitment and placement‖ is void forvagueness and. violates the due process clause.In support of her submission. was not. If at all. D e l a P i e d r a i n v o k e s t h e e q u a l protection clause in her defense. there was a ―clear and intentional discrimination‖ on the part of theprosecuting officials.‖ The Court ruled. The mere allegation that dela Piedra. t h e g u i l t y p a r t y i n appellant‘s eyes. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guiltyare not prosecuted. is insufficient to support a conclusion that theprosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on itsface. there must be a showing of ―clear and intentional discrimination. A p p e l l a n t i s a C e b u a n a w h i l e A l e j a n d r o i s a Zamboangueña. I t i s n o t v o i d f o r vagueness. F u r t h e r m o r e . w h i l e a Z a m b o a n g u e ñ a . D e l a P i e d r a f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c t s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e ―recruitment and placement‖ suffer from overbreadth since bymerely ―referring‖ a person for employment.But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed. and this presumption can be overcomeonly by proof to the contrary. A generallyworded statute. according to appellant. in chargingher. however. o n t h e o t h e r h a n d . t h e C o u r t w a s a b l e t o a r r i v e a t a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminallaw and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. (2) A n e n t t h e s e c o n d i s s u e . thecrime of illegal recruitment could be committed only ―whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment fora fee. a denial of the equal protection of the laws. not by mere speculation. by itself. s h e concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her ongrounds of regional origins. the Court merely bemoaned the lack of rec ords thatw o u l d h e l p s h e d l i g h t o n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o v i s o .A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit thee x e r c i s e o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m s a f f i r m a t i v e l y g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e Constitution. t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i n g o f f i c e r s regularly performed their duties. Panis. for employment to aprospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. . resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike. appellant was the onlyo n e c r i m i n a l l y c h a r g e d . is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown tobe present in it an element of intentiona l or purposeful discrimination. the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise l a n g u a g e t h a t w a s s a l v a g e d b y p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n . a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. Evidently. therefore. Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. dela Piedra invokes People vs. was charged with thec o m m i s s i o n o f a c r i m e .f r e e . D u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e t e r m s o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e m u s t b e sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct ontheir part will render them liable to its penalties.‖In the case at bar.‖ In this case. that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.For the First issue. is not a ―perfectly vague act‖ whose obscurity is evidenton its face. Section 13(b). The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. F r o m t h i s .accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. r e m a i n e d s c o t . Dela Piedra has failed to show that. T h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h r e c o r d s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . A l e j a n d r o . such as the freedom of speech or religion. when con strued to punish conduct which cannot b e constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that itf a i l s t o g i v e a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g o f t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e constitutionally permissible a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e applications of the statute. under the proviso of Article 13 (b).

Commonwealth Act No. (281 U. L-46496 February 27. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro. 25. 2.. 1938. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION. . 213 del Commonwealth. G.3. sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. the existence and functions of which are illegal. 1938.) 6. and avers: 1. termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra. respondents. 4. p. 1940 ANG TIBAY. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29. 213. and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD. on the other hand. puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro. Inc. The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that. prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero. (Sections 2 and 5. there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc. petitioner's printed memorandum. 8. 3. Que un contrato de trabajo. asi individual como colectivo. (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.. No. The respondent National Labor Union. manager and propietor. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining. y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso. 7. vs. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union. 2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril. 3. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule. que han celebrado contrato.R.) 5.S. no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. 548. for the reasons stated in his motion. majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26. con ell... dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma. Inc. represented by TORIBIO TEODORO. we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court: 1. petitioners. ya individual ya colectivamente. INC. sin tiempo fijo.. and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union. we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al.R. subject to. provided that the number of employees. (Paragraph 2. however. and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers. in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature. It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention. 46673.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute. may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose. to consider..) In fine. and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers. promulgated September 13. arising from differences as regards wages.9. matter controversy or dispute arising between. arbitration. 103. 46673. decide. 1939. In the case of Goseco vs. Ang Tibay. G. and settle any question. decision and settlement. as will appear from perusal of its organic law. It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure. Inc. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel. G. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein. ibid. and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case. the function of the Court of Industrial Relations. The petitioner. Before doing this.. (Section 4. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. 1939. without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.) It shall. in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature. hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment. and in accordance with. the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.) And in the light of this legislative policy. promulgated September 13. is more active. No. Inc. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case. and regulate the relations between them. ibid. ibid. of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants. acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant. ibid. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing. 103). which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently . It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value. (section 13. In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union. or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. section 4. we deem it necessary. R.) When directed by the President of the Philippines. shares or compensation." (Section 20. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions. investigate. Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality. or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. but may include in the award. No. we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. affirmative and dynamic. order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes. and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. Court of Industrial Relations et al. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive. (Section 5. laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty.

) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry. McCoy. 57 Law. 58 S. 1. In the language of Chief Hughes. 965. 468. a provincial fiscal. U. 74 Law. 15. No.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Ct. 45844. Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. 1129. Abilene and Southern Ry.R.S. v. 4 Cir. 773.promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case. National Labor Relations Board. Co. 22 Phil. L. report and recommendation.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties. 81 Law. v. S. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 57 S. 194 U. Commonwealth Act No. It should not. 88. however. ibid. . 220. . 304 U. or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Agustin. Ct. Ct. ed. (Consolidated Edison Co. detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced. 298 U. however.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. 93 33 S.S." (Washington.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. 187.S. 185. 142. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation. 93 F. 431. 989. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. v.. 906. 1335). 33 S. 98 F. in Morgan v.)" (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing. Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. Thompson Products." (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right. 80 law. G. but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. McCoy. Ct. ed. 44. National Labor Relations Board. XXXVI O.S. 57 Law. 147.S. Adv.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. 206. ed. National Labor Relations Board v. Louisville and Nashville R. 103. R. 1937. G. 650. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. 624. 760.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. promulgated November 29.) . 4. and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary. which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 225. 185.. without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it. supra. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. 568. a place when directly attached. 88. Ct. Ct." (Appalachian Electric Power v. Op. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing. 6 Cir. 2d 13. but the evidence must be "substantial. 83 Law. & N. ed.S. is vain. 431. ed. No. but their report and decision are only advisory. it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded. 227 U. ed. United States v. that of having something to support it is a nullity. 1288. Interstate Commerce Commission v. namely. 2 Cir. entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. ed. Co. 563. Ct. (Section 10.. 860. 97 F. Ct. Baird. national labor Relations Board. in justifiable cases before it. "the right to adduce evidence. National Labor Relations Board..S. 25. that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can. 301 U. The fact. Co. The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.) . 2d 985. 2d 758. ed. and for that purpose. 648. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. 131.. 598. (Section 9. 82 Law.. p. 227 U. 24 S..S. 56 S. 999. 59 S." (Edwards vs. 48 Law. U..

that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro. but in our case there is no such statutory authority." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations". receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision. in a national way. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. a conclusion of law. therefore. . must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy. we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. however." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc. This result. the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted. Inc.. By and large. does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union. it is sufficient to observe here that. in all controversial questions. the existence and functions of which are illegal. with instruction that it reopen the case. and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations. after considerable discussions. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather". the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate. and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A). with the right to appeal to board or commission.. and the reasons for the decision rendered. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges. So ordered. Accordingly.

MARILYNNA C. LACANILAO. TERESITA E. BACANI.: Due process of law requires notice and hearing. in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. ROSARITO A. grave misconduct. 2. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials. DIMAGMALIW. J. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO. BAGDOG. VIVAR. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. SEPTIMO. JENNIE L. REBECCA D. in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR. 29107 which affirmed the trial court‘s decision. SAMSON. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. NORMA L. gross neglect of duty. presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. among other things. EVANGELISTA. BAUTISTA. ADRIANO S. 3. NICASIO C. HERNANDEZ. DR. ANTONIO C. ALMA BELLA O. The Hon. SP No. [G. NILO ROSAS. FRAGANTE. VICTORIA S.R. who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. 4. CULTURE AND SPORTS. MA. November 28. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. MIRASOL C. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations. THE COURT OF APPEALS. petitioners. On October 18. BRAVO. MARISSA M. The right to be heard and. DECS-NCR. Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees. DECISION PANGANIBAN. ARMAND FABELLA. RUTH F. 110379. FELISA S. OCAMPO. vs. then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return -to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in talk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26. 1990. DOGWE. VILLACRUEL. CATALINA R. WILFREDO N. . Statement of the Case This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21. the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent. i[3] as follows: ―WHEREFORE. 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. to wit: 1. 1990. BALIGOD. No. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case. AURORA C. respondents. UBALDO. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. 1997] HON. in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS and DIVISION. Hearing. MARINA R. refusal to perform official duty. SEPTIMO. 1990 to October 18. SO ORDERED.4. as found by Respondent Court. ERLINDA B. RONGCALES. the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED. clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress. on the other hand. HENEDINA B. competent and impartial tribunal.‖ The Antecedent Facts The facts.CARILLO. DE LEON.R. EDITA C. VARGAS. CLARISSA T. 1990. DR. KU. ultimately. DIMAANO. are as follows: ―On September 17.

as the principal respondent. in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort. was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines. let this case be set for pre -trial conference on June 17. On June 11. 1991. the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6. On May 30. so as to expedite the proceedings hereof. 6.m. 1991. 1991. is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said date and time.5. with a warning that should he fail to show up . 1992. the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. 1991. absence without leave (AWOL) At the same time. Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers. petitioner-appellee Adriano S. on February 18. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. However. The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional Director Nilo Rosas on November 7. Valencia to intervene in the case. In the main he contended that. finding the petitioner-appellees guilty. it issued a pre-trial order which reads: ―As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez. even as it ordered the latter‘s reinstatement pending decision of their case. Accordingly. 1991. Petitioner-appellees‘ counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. June 8. charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case. They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City. counsel walked out. 1991. on March 25. 1991. The trial court granted his motion on June 3. Meanwhile. 1990 to include the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike. the Solicitor General answered the petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene. allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. however. The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its order of June 3.. DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño. the trial court set the case for hearing. 1992. Petitioner-appellees moved for a reconsideration. As he received no response from the committee. 1992 at 1:30 p. but their motion was denied on September 11. alleging that he was in the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been charged and preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cariño for the same grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the burden of proving his innocence under the committee‘s guidelines. Later. 1992. issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court‘s order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner -appellees‘ action. On August 15. counsel. 1990. Administrative hearings started on December 20. as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal. In which case. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which. the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings. 1991 and allowed him to intervene. On April 10. the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. the trial court denied them a restraining order.

The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. with Pres. knowing fully well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte. Decree No. The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. 4670 otherwise known as the ―Magna Carta for Public School Teachers‖ is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers. after consideration o f the circumstances surrounding the case. Secretary Cariño failed to appear in court on the date set. in which it stated: ―The Court is in full accord with petitioners‘ contention that Rep. 807 reveals no such intention exists. the trial court rendered a decision. Decree No. While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law. 1992. 1992. The respondents having lost their standing in Court. the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator‘s intent more clearl y than that of the general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General Act. by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners. The provision of Rep. SO ORDERED. Order No. 807. 292. while the other respondents were represented by Atty. On August 10. the trial conference was reset on June 26. A perusal of Pres. Act No. It was pointed out that Cariño was represented by Atty. while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Consequently. the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. finds such claim meritorious. it being arbitrary and violative of the teacher‘s right to due process. 1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel. Act. 807 in the composition and selection of the members of the investigating committee.‖ dated July 3. Decree No. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner. 4670 has already been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Stated otherwise. the ―Manifestation and Motion. Reno Capinpin. Cavite. 1992. The Solicitor General moved for a reconsideration. 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course. for the said Pre-Trial Conference. 9 of Rep. Act No. the court stated: ―The ―Motion For Reconsideration‖ dated July 3.‖ On July 3. the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. reiterating that Cariño could not personally come on June 26. But the Solicitor General‘s motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. he was represented by Atty. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. No. But the court just the same declared them as in default. . But the court failed to act on his motion. unless the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. Act. Decree No. Rep. Anent petitioners‘ claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation. Instead. 4670 in the case at bar. the same is not sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play. In the event that there is conflict between a special and a general law. Rep. 807 as its supplemental law. the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted. In its or der of July 15.‖ By agreement of the parties. Pres. Decree No. Due process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood. No. both of the DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. It is a dismissal without due process. The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence. the Court will not recognize any representative of his. 4670 stands. It appears too obvious that respondents simply did not want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.on said date. Jocelyn Pili. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. Reno Capinpin. Jocelyn Pili. their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. Act. the Court. 1992 because of prior commitment in Cavite. a special law. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction. No. 807 and Exec. It was explained that he had to attend a conference in Maragondon. Act No. 1992. is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law. However. hence. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

4670.A. III. premises considered.‖ These issues. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of the teachers ar e without due process. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper substitution of parties. and other benefits and emoluments which may have accrued to them during the entire period of their preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED. SO ORDERED. The Court‘s Ruling . of all the petitioners‘ back salaries. petitioners raise the following issues: ―I Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were denied due process of law. No. should govern the conduct of the investigations conducted. IV. boil down to a single question: whether private respondents were denied due process of law. II. holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the following grounds: ―I. The payment.A. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in default. III Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial court‘s decision. II Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the provision of R. bonuses. the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. otherwise known as ‗Magna Carta for Public School Teachers‘. The Issues Before us. Hence. the present petition is hereby GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of the respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE. 4670 in the composition of the investigating committee. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R. if any.‖ From this adverse decision of the trial court. all closely related. this petition for review. allowances. The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.WHEREFORE. No.‖ As mentioned earlier.

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. for which they must. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. from their schools during regular school days. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law. in Jacinto vs. their right to due process has been violated. weekends or holidays -. As already observed. Rather. except Merlinda Jacinto. the petitioners here.could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.‖ More recently. and to defend one‘s rights. In short. to present witnesses and evidence in one‘s favor. be made answerable . therefore. their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education. The legislature enacted a special law.to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law. Court of Appeals. walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. however. in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity. the Court explained the schoolteachers‘ right to peaceful assembly vis-a-vis their right to mass protest: ―Moreover. Denial of Due Process At the outset. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read: ―Sec. demonstrations mass leaves. a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers‘ organization and a supervisor of the division.recess. and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. As it was. the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether. the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers‘ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman. due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent‘s legal rights. We note the Solicitor General‘s extensive disquisition that government employees do not have the right to strike. In administrative proceedings. no one -. without including the right to strike. we must stress that we are tasked only to determine whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. due process must first be observed. the Court. rules and regulations.The petition is bereft of merit. in the case of Bangalisan vs. they are prohibited from staging strikes. the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law. has recently pronounced. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time -. before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty. in order to participate in the mass protest. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations. the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. the CSC or even this Court -. In the present case. 8. Regalado: ―It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. for which they were responsible. the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services. Justice Florenz D. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize. not on the right of government workers to strike. after classes. – Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have: .not the DECS. (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel. Court of Appeals. RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. through Mr. were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. On this point.

the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. c.‖ The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670. of the charges. in its absence. Administrative Charges. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing statutes. however. these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. RA 4670 is applicable to this case. as much as possible. in its absence. therefore. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. No publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the pendency of his case. although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. Under this section. and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided. the teachers‘ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. that is.‖ Thus. as chairman. seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence. in any proceeding. all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. ―unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. where the teacher belongs. That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party. Accordingly. which was enacted later. to promote the ―terms of employment and career prospects‖ of schoolteachers. Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 4670. nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers‘ organization as its representative in said committee . adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense. the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. b. a representative of the local or. Thus. In the instant case. In the present case. the right to be informed. the right to full access to the evidence in the case. Clearly. Their function is to try to harmonize. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. The committee shall submit its findings. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law. the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include ―a representative of the local or. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that ―repeals by implication are not favored. in writing.‖ The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of the statute. any existing provincial or national teacher‘s organization‖ as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers‘ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. because ―all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation‖ and are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers‘ organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor. 9. It has not been expressly repealed by the genera l law PD 807. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers‘ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. Sec. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his organization. any existing provincial or national teacher‘s organization and a supervisor of the Division. all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education . Indeed. Contrary to petitioners‘ asseverations. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities.a. private . We disagree. and c.

Mendoza who is now a member of this Court. No. investigate him and take disciplinary action against him if warranted by his findings. Verba legis non est recedendum. can file administrative charges against a subordinate.‖ which was what the teachers did in this case by questioning the absence of a representative of a teachers organization in the investigating committee. The administrative committee considered the teachers to have waived their right to a hearing after the latter‘s co unsel walked out of the preliminary hearing. There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.D. written complaint of any other persons. In cases involving public school teachers. all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. Respondent Court of Appeals. through Mr. Sec. as chairman. There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is concerned.D. perceptively and correctly stated: ―Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded by the Civil Service Decree (P. the Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as follows: Sec. Respondent-appellants cite in support of their argument the following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P. Indeed. where the teacher belongs. [S]ec. and consultants. . or upon sworn. secondary and elementary school teachers. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. But there was no representative of a teachers organization. and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the respondent in an administrative case may ask for a ―formal investigation. in the case at bar. To the contrary. 9. the Civil Service Decree.. Justice Vicente V. or regional directors. 38. a representative of the local or. or a regional director. -xxx xxx xxx b) The heads of departments. a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or officer of equivalent rank. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. like the respondentappellant Nilo Rosas. 807): Sec. any existing provincial or national teacher‘s organization and a supervisor of the Division. Hence. Although the Civil Service Decree gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters. agencies and instrumentalities xxx shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction xxx . the fact is that such power is exercised through committees. No.respondents‘ right to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. the last t wo to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. like the DECS secretary. The committee should not have made such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers‘ counsel a copy of the guidelines. that where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full . however. neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor. 807) and that pursuant to the latter law the head of a department. The committee shall submit its findings. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for the representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. in its absence. 37.Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor. or chiefs of agencies. or head of local government. Administrative Charges.

be reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. Jr. It is not our function ―to assess and evaluate all over a gain the evidence.R. No. Hon. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void. the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide. as a consequence. which is a cornerstone of our legal system. and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of salaries. et al. in this case Secretary Cariño. allowances. Isidro Cariño. this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Carlos C. no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED. 1961. Moreover. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v.‖ It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible e rror in affirming the trial court‘s decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners. 100206.) it stated: The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon. the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. In fact. WHEREFORE. August 22. et al. testimonial and documentary.R. As in the Cariño v. G. The teachers went to court. 1991 and August 6. the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. without awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of reports and ―implied admissions‖ found the petitioners guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated May 16. the officials of the Department of Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners guilty of the charges against them. such as here. v. adduced by the parties particularly where. This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process. Ofilada case. . Ofilada. Judge Martin Villarama.access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. SO ORDERED. No. bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal.‖ Furthermore. Private respondents should. The Court dismissed the case. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its resolution in G. 1991. premises considered.

the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii). Alberto C. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP). Compas. vs. then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. henceforth.‖ These rules mandate. questioned PPA-AO No. Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. viz. HON. but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. number of years as a harbor pilot. the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. pilot associations invested in floating. that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses iv[3] and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. In view of this mandate. and ROGELIO A. 04-92. the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. Subsequently. On December 23. xii[11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. inter alia. respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association. 04-92 applied to all . and supervision of pilot s and the pilotage profession. 04-92. and age. average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot. 857 was issued revising the PPA‘s charter. recalling or annulling PPA‘s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. 1992. Presidential Decree No. which embodied the ―Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services. in his capacity as Acting Secretary. in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor. did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents‘ right to exerci se their profession and their right to due process of law? The PPA was created on July 11. No.‖ This was implemented by providing therein that ― all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only‖ and that ―all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall. along with its implementing guidelines. Garcia that ―the matter of reviewing. In fact. through Capt. petitioners. regulation. through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. and office equipment. reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.‖ On August 12. Article IV of P. On December 23. communications. 04-92 viii[7] on July 15. compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines. 1992. Pursuant to its power of control. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance v[4] that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself vi[5] to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70. unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. In its answer. 1993. 1992. in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs. ii[1] the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 iii[2] on March 21. be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. the OP.‖ Meanwhile. awards/commendations as harbor pilot. 1992. on August 31. HON. Department of Transportation and Communications. but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. 1975. every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties. 505. whose avowed policy was to ―instill effective discipline and thereby afford better pro tection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services. CORONA. as amended.5. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication. by virtue of Presidential Decree No. limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. respondents. vii[6] Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. 857. 08-92 ix[8] which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots. On March 17. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION. RENATO C. DAYAN. 1985. and it. D. Corona. In issuing Administrative Order No. JESUS B. GARCIA. 1974. the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92).: (1) Qualifying Factors: x[9] safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: xi[10] promptness in servicing vessels.

the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA‘s jurisdictional area. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda.‖ (Emphasis supplied) Finally. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and circulars. 2. was not the act of Dayan. the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year. Consequently. xiv[13] Thus. as well as the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency. but merely regulates. which merely requires the PPA to consult with ―relevant Government agencies. let alone a wrongful deprivation of. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void. respondents filed a petition for certiorari. for all intents and purposes. subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee‘s performance. . the trial court rendered the following judgment: xiii[12] ―WHEREFORE. as regards the alleged ―absence of ample prior consultation‖ before the issuance of the administrative order. Consequently. but of the PPA. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious. petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari. 93-65673. 857. the Department of Finance. and the private sector representative who. any ―withdrawal or alteration‖ of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with t he constitutional mandate of due process of law. which was merely implementing Section 6 of P. Secretary Corona opined that: ―The exercise of one‘s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of.‖ Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC.‖ On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. recognized pilotage as a profession and. 1993. before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.D. the precursor of the PPA. From this decision. whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda. No costs. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid. No. this Court hereby rules that: 1. SO ORDERED. property rights without due process.‖ The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs. due to his knowledge and expertise. mandating it ―to control. 857. In the limited context of this case. Inc. the Department of Public Works and Highways. 04-92. for all the foregoing. the property rights of those affected thereby. which was docketed as Civil Case No. or interferenc e with. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with. No. the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).harbor pilots and. Circulars and Orders. regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district. Carnation Philippines. Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P. was appointed by the President to the Board. prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages. Circulars and Orders. As may be noted. a property right under Callanta v. respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No.D. 3. abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots. and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. therefore. On September 6.

it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. xviii[17] the facts show that the MARINA. When one speaks of due process of law. xxiii[22] . not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced. As a general rule. Licensure is ―the granting of lic ense especially to practice a profession. and that ―PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid. It is here where PPA-AO No. or interfer ence with. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard. just like other professions. viz. Thus. namely. without such license. petitioners correctly argued that. the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession. a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. 1993. would be illegal. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the ―due process clause‖ of the Constitution.‖ In the case at bar. two conditions must concur. is fair. as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process. may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. such as issuing rules and regulations. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Fortunately. the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be ―withdrawn or shortened‖ by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions. reasonable. a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v.After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties.xx[19] Upon the other hand. decision that ―(t)he exercise of one‘s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of. fail to persuade. the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. Hon. or property without due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order. respondents questioned PPA-AO No. Their arguments on this score.‖ It is also ―the system of granti ng licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards. ―which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots‘ examinations. notice and hearing. that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.‖ xxi[20] He merely expressed the opinion that ―(i)n the limited context of this case. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17. procedural due process ―refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced . however. liberty. 04-92 no less than four times xvii[16] before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. however. for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. property rights without due process. PPA -AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with.‖ xxii[21] A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents‘ right against deprivation of property without due process of law.xix[18] Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard. In essence. Pilotage. let alone a wrongful deprivation of. No person shall be deprived of life.: SECTION 1.‖ As will be presently demonstrated .‖ was not consulted .‖ In order to fall within the aegis of this provision. the instant petition must be denied. xvi[15] where it declared that ―(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous. but merely regulates. Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. x x x. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby ―relevant government agencies‖ and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. Consequently. this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek recons ideration of the action or ruling complained of. and just. the property rights of t hose affected thereby.‖ xv[14] PPA-AO No. Exevea. was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Moreover. an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.‖ while substantive due process ―requires that the law itself.

train and practice for at least a year. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. after all. disciplining and removal of harbor pilots . namely. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan. (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot. the use of the term ―renewal. be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities. (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year. Since it adds nothing new or substantial. it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. The trial court‘s finding of animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth . Under the new issuance. henceforth. 04-92. Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. performance evaluation. inter alia. and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny. In the past. appointment. Thus. 04-92 must be struck down. WHEREFORE. therefore. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a ―rigid evaluation of performance‖ which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. In any event. (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work. they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. 03-85. an unnecessary enactment. unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. The Court notes that PPA-AO No.matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. including cases which have reached this Court. that given for pilots. they would have a license which they could use until their retirement. SO ORDERED. cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. before a person can be a harbor pilot. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6.‖ Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. in Civil Case No. This is a vested right. Hence. power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. 04-92 is a ―surplusage‖ xxiv[23] and. which is still operational. that here (sic) in this jurisdiction.‖ and ―(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall. In a real sense. 04-92. not one but five examinations. No pronouncement as to costs. train and practice for at least a year. and finally. ―(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only.Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession. respondents‘ insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the ―Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services. each followed by actual training and practice. they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking. .‖ It is this pre -evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 1993. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. of course. for the qualification. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. he must pass five (5) government professional examinations. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No.‖ It provides. (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. PPA-AO No.‖ It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. Finally. In the absence of proof to the contrary. the court a quo observed: ―Petitioners (herein respondents) contend. they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.

ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR. ILOILO CITY. and WHEREAS. 1984. 1 The petitioner . vs. respondents. THE STATION COMMANDER. (SGD. do hereby promulgate the following: SECTION 1. to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit. WHEREAS. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. FERDINAND E. CRUZ. when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo. Ramon A. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos. petitioner. Gonzales for petitioner. The said executive order reads in full as follows: WHEREAS. Done in the City of Manila. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth. THEREFORE. MARCOS. and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President Republic of the Philippines The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13. it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation. RESTITUTO YNOT. SECTION 2. in the year of Our Lord. NOW. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government. in the case of carabaos. BAROTAC NUEVO. for violation of the above measure.6. 626-A. REGION IV. sex. J. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age. physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. no carabao regardless of age. by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution. I. Executive Order No. in the case of carabeef. this 25th day of October. the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY. it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead. President of the Philippines. Iloilo.: The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. nineteen hundred and eighty. INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment. That is an entirely different matter. 6. " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time. he could. revise. indeed. to relieve the abscess. paraphrasing another distinguished jurist. we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process. as constitutional. On the contrary. as the law or rules of court may provide. this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned." 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. among others. 2 The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. In the case of the due process clause. since they could no longer be produced. all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. they should probe the issue more deeply. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and. In fact. and heavily. or loss of favor. orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. as raise by the petitioner. promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. however. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. however. this Court did not. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then. the case of Pesigan v." final judgments and orders of lower courts in. and so sustained. ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. In doing so. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. as contended by the Solicitor General. reverse. for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional.sued for recovery. then "will be the time to make the hammer fall. Judicial power authorizes this. and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12. Nevertheless. subject only to review by the highest tribunal.000. After considering the merits of the case. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action. 626-A. or popular censure. 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed.* 3 which upheld the trial court. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order.00. if there be a clear showing of their invalidity. a proposal to . issue decrees. the petitioner has reason. they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation. in order to meet the exigency. For the nonce. and of the need to declare them so. Stated otherwise. we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. That is the Ideal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review. and when the exercise is demanded. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench. especially this Court. 4 While also involving the same executive order. ordered the confiscation of the bond. to question the validity of the executive order. Indeed.

faced by the awesome power of the State. for example. in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. We have consistently declared that every person. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation. is entitled to "the law of the land. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. for example. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing. which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Obviously." 11 Thus. 17 In such instances. there are a number of admitted exceptions. would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. like a mad dog on the loose. the insolence of power. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal. The conclusive presumption. an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. like some provisions of the fundamental law. the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other. Instead. one side is only one-half of the question. would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. as a ringing reminder to all rulers. Aware of this. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended. to compel his return to the country he has fled. in repressive regimes. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the . but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. or worst of all. out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance. as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se.S. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause. contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. benevolent or base. on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless. may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. 10 The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. when confronted by the stern visage of the law. is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance." 12 When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land. the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who. to be sure. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages. Laurel. as it were. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. He was sustained by the body. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U. generally speaking. This was felt necessary because due process is not. they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. that every person." which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case. Pornographic materials. previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. as unto the bow the arrow. Supreme Court. Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights. 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns. enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise. who forcefully argued against it. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites. The closed mind has no place in the open society. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which.

Furthermore." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos. 626-A. Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. is hemmed in by the police power.promotion of the general welfare. which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows: To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public. require such interference." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price. as distinguished from those of a particular class. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. Executive Order No. we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao. that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. 626. as a member of society. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit. as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing . A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. In the light of the tests mentioned above. even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. viz.. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive. or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food. as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption. . far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit. we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement. We note that to strengthen the original measure. 19 where a law regulating the registration. physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. 626. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden. the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. that the interests of the public generally. The individual. Even so. The conviction was affirmed. and he appealed to the Supreme Court. as expressed in one of its Whereases. we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally. first. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims. prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State. tempted either by greed of momentary gain.. indeed. the government would have been remiss. which were then badly needed by farmers.. sex. providing that "no carabao regardless of age. again following the above-cited doctrine. that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. and second. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output. cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly. if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them. The original measure was issued for the reason. amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. as the poor man's tractor. to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners. has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. From what has been said. that there be a lawful method. so to speak. so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership. Toribio. it must appear. and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Its reach is virtually limitless. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. 18 By reason of its function. its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.

Their options are apparently boundless. or better still. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice. Obviously. the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment. finally. 21 Executive Order No. if condition it is. with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. and even corruption. worse. and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. however." (Emphasis supplied. the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12. There is. which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty.00. retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse. In the case before us. in the case of carabaos. Angeles. also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion . Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard. on top of all this. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed. In the instant case. As for the carabeef. There is none. not to be flippant dead meat. The executive order defined the prohibition. as forfeited to the government. a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. Definitely." in short. we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and. which was carried out forthright. the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice. which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as. is unduly oppressive. as we held in Pesigan v. We also mark. In the Toribio Case. with no less difficulty in one province than in another. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. so says executive order. Under the challenged measure. to be meted out by the executive authorities. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit. 626-A is penal in nature. they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit. it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. considering that they can be killed anywhere. we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing. and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared. any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited. the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported. in the case of carabeef. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment. the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise. Considering that. usually the police only.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. significantly. to wit. there is here a "roving commission. and in their own exclusive discretion.000. To sum up then. to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused." a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. However. no such trial is prescribed. the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander. and only after trial and conviction of the accused. Perhaps so. the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. by the measure itself.

ALBERTO ROMULO. HON. prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction by a taxpayer and registered voter challenging the constitutionality of Section 198 (d) in relation to Sections 262. and it was his obligation. WHEREFORE. 7. HON. in his capacity as Central Bank Governor.‖ the Court takes judicial notice of the continuing concern over the pernicious practice of multiple or flying voting which subverts the electoral process. the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution. This is a petition for certiorari. in fact. all they do is embellish and impress. The Solicitor General duly filed Continent and the petitioner a Reply. respondents. and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights. as a member of the police. the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence. SO ORDERED. and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society. this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections. The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them. it has been experience. We commend him for his spirit. to enforce it. Considering the pleadings filed and the arguments raised therein: Considering further the Philippine milieu and recalling the Holmes aphorism that ―The life of the law has not been logic. TEOFISTO GUINGONA. must be a promise of protection. Without the present challenge. Even the trial court. as weapons. HON. VICTOR MACALINCAG. petitioner. JAIME ONGPIN. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. and HON. Executive Order No. to declare the executive order unconstitutional and. AGCAOILI. allowed without protest. No costs. in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit. Rights are but weapons on the wall if. in his capacity as Treasurer. we hereby declare Executive Order No. Rights. 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the indelible marking of the forefinger as requisite or condition to the exercise of suffrage and insofar as it penalizes failure to comply or refusal to submit to said requisite. . would have been perpetrated. They become truly meaningful. if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. in his capacity as Minister of Finance. HON.in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. being a mere subordinate of the President. for all their superior authority. We agree with the respondent court. FERNANDEZ. The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. FEDERICO R. like expensive tapestry. HON. vs. For these reasons. to question the order we now annul. that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. It would have been impertinent of him. in his capacity as Minister of the Budget. however. The law was at that time presumptively valid. for all its obviousness. RAMON FELIPE. refuse to execute it. 626-A unconstitutional. on his own responsibility alone. JOSE B. Except as affirmed above.

105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness. KARL CAESAR R. BLAS. ELPEDIO M. REGALADO. college or university. CATAPANG. or any . petitioner. NORMAN A." to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. respondent. and (3) that the petitioner‘s objection to having his forefinger marked and the long-term remedies he suggests to counter flying voting must yield to the greater. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION. review material.R. Professional Regulation Commission." The records shows the following undisputed facts: On or about October 6. (2) that the petitioner seeks to substitute his judgment through this Court in place of that of the legislature on the wisdom of the appropriation of public funds for the purchase of silver nitrate and commassie blue to be used in said marking of the forefinger during the election as a safeguard against multiple or flying voting. the Court resolved to DISMISS this petition for want of merit. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class. et al. ALMAZAN. receiving handout materials. or shall receive any hand-out. 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. REGUYAL. Branch 32 in Civil Case No. RAYMOND S. MESINA. 8. herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. conference or the like conducted by. JOCELYN P. LUPANGCO. Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes. vs. tips. Lupangco. JR. ERNESTOC. ALEXANDER R. 1987. 10598. vs. briefing. palpable and plain showing that the statute complained of violates the constitution by encroaching on his dignity as a human person.. or any tip from any school. or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13. which is a human right guaranteed to the totality of electors who are the sovereign people. Considering moreover that in prescribing ways of safeguarding the integrity of the ballot the state may adopt appropriate and reasonable measures regulating the electoral process such as the marking of the forefinger of voters to prevent multiple voting Considering finally that (1) the petitioner has failed to make a clear. JEROME O. SP No. 1986. ENRICO V. immediate and compelling public interest to safeguard the integrity of the right of suffrage. RIMANDO. * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21. WHEREFORE.Considering furthermore that the will of the sovereign people expressed through suffrage is a human right guaranteed by the constitution and by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Philippines is a party. MANGKAL. ARCEGA. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. in CA-G. LUPO L.

on November 10. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21. 1987. this petition. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. 1986. all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year. 1 III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. Not satisfied therewith. Branch XXXII. 8. filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them. Thus it held — That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question. stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Mendoza. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The Court of Appeals. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case. Luna. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 105. the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13. and co-equal bodies have no power to control each 3 other or interfere with each other's acts. 1987. lecturer. Art. Inc. 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 1986.review center or the like or any reviewer. 4 which cites Pineda vs. to wit: WHEREFORE. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. On October 16. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing. instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. respondent PRC. herein petitioners. the two being co-equal bodies. To strenghten its position. . a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution. vs. In an Order of October 21. 2 Hence. finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21. No cost in this instance. in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. SO ORDERED. 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.

each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. Civil Case No. creating the Professional Regulation Commission. the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission.. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 223. with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission. now the Regional Trial Court. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. 902-A. On the contrary. creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission. should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Upon the other hand. 902-A. Luna.e. 83. The following rulings buttress this conclusion: The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government. In Medalla vs. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. As alraedy mentioned. as amended by Republic Act No. it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous. 86-37950. that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. the separation of powers into three co-equal departments. the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission. within the Commission itself.We rule in favor of the petitioner. it is not . vs. i. The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. Lantin. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice. there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. the executives. there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. 7 What is clear from Presidential Decree No. to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned. Consequently. In Pineda vs. Likewise. which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional. then. in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on. 635. the legislative and the judicial. Inc. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling.. Sayo. We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission. there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. the appropriate remedy take is first.

and the courts seek only to interpret. 93.) In San Miguel Corporation vs. it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. . but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself. contends that under Section 9. Respondent PRC. as amended) .. Br. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend. CFI of Lanao del Norte. in the form of injunction. We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. In view of the foregoing.to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts." In resolving the issue. Avelino. paragraph 3 of B. issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission. We held: . Blg. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. Republic Act 296. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of 12 pecuniary estimation (Sec. 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered. 11 is another case in point. a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because. Jurisdiction. 44. (Emphasis supplied. Republic vs. We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. Here. "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. dated February 5. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief. As in this case. . in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law. with certain exceptions.. 105. A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative 10 officers.P. allegedly. II. reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx . 129. The legality of his acts are under judicial review. The said law provides: SEC. should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. . 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. . on the other hand. 1968. Presiding Judge. apply or implement it (the law). 9. not because the Executive is inferior to the courts. which prohibits.

the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. instrumentalities. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9. rulings and decisions. of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Ferrer. judgments. not the Court of First Instance. it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court. orders. What is contemplated by the term "final orders. the provisions of this Act. Hence. as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. Blg. In short. except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts. discretion. boards or commissions. decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. 15 In this case. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force. paragraph 3 of B. privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. (Emphasis supplied. as a basis for their official action. or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws. The contention is devoid of merit. hold hearings. In Black's Law Dictionary. 129. the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of .) xxx xxx xxx We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued.. far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party.P.(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. or ascertain the existence of facts. and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. orders." 16 As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase. or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. decisions. quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action. and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. and draw conclusions from them. We said: We are however. resolutions. etc. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. To expound thereon. final awards. which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions. quasijudicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights.

Anent the posture of the Central Bank. "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts.Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections. hence. 129.. it is only said Court." 19 that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. argued that under Section 9. or receive any hand-out. for the very first time. Furthermore. paragraph 3 of B. such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial . If shown to bear no reasonable . conference or the like. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.P. Thus: The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate. 17 (Emphasis supplied." However. no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order. In view of the foregoing. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. Being nonjudicial in character. instructor. Blg. boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC. To be valid. 18 Here.. it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to 20 the IAC. it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class. collge or university. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations. or any tip from any school. and hence.. review material. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. We made the following pronouncement: The contention is utterly devoid of merit. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. Of course. We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. petitioner Central Bank. official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . or any review center or the like or any reviewer. . orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 21 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction. the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.. On its face. Central Bank of the Philippines. briefing.) One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. lecturer. like respondent in this case.

the enforcement of Resolution No. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court: The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. or riddled with corruption. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others. 22 Resolution No. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. 24 regarding academic freedom to wit: . then so be it. Another evident objection to Resolution No. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. The Faculty Admission Committee. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his 23 capacities. and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary. it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. then they must be held to be invalid. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued. then licenses should be suspended or revoked. impractical. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. 223. Needless to say. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. Loyola School of Theology. review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students.. as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss. . At this juncture.

No costs.. and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD. INC.. 9.private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of . sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. Plaintiffs. vs.In the light of the above. SERAFIN R.). 52276 and in Special Civil Action No." Private respondent. The controversy arose from the order of defendant. CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL. J. Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines. the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.. is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry.. in Civil Case No.) INC. and MILK INDUSTRIES. INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products. General Milk Company (Phil. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE." and those of private respondent. Civil Case No. Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein. Pardo for petitioners. Inc. as Commissioner of Internal Revenue. under the brand "Dutch Baby. CUEVAS. Sycip. in Civil Case No. 52383 both of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Milk Industries Inc. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. VERA. Consolidated Philippines Inc. INC. DE CASTRO. Manalo & Feliciano for private respondents. 52276 private respondents herein. Antonio and Solicitor Bernardo P. SP No.: This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision rendered by respondent judge. of which all the other private respondents are members. respondents.. Luna. Salazar. are engaged in the manufacture. Branch IV. Solicitor General Felix Q. This decision is immediately executory.R. SO ORDERED. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. HON. petitioner. under the brand "Liberty. requiring plaintiffs. MISAEL P. The products of private respondent.

No. from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part. No. is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction. respectively.S. judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. the Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco. with common facts and issues being also involved therein. on the other hand. Upon agreement of the parties.S. 52276. Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I. 1 with Fair Trade Board for misleading advertisement. filed FTB I. 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related with each other. and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision against the plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled milk products. 52276: . Section 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows: Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. and omitting to mark the immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. on the merits. — All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form. the complaint filed include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient to Identify their filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk. 1962. 52276 and Special Civil Action No. etc. Civil Case No. mislabeling and/or misbranding. Antonio R. and in all the language in which such containers are marked. 52276. 1963. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: Wherefore. On July 25. 1963 restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words. The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16. with the words. "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age. I . 52383." or with other equivalent words. the respondent court issued its decision. The Board proceeded to hear the complaint until it received the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance on March 19.plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Among other things. sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers. "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words of similar import. The facts of this special civil action show that on December 7. 1969. however. the respondent court in the meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the absence of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme Court. Special Civil Action No. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines. On April 16. both in their individual capacities and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine Association of Nutrition. " as directed by the above quoted provision of Law. pending the final determination of the case. de Joya vs. Civil Case No." pending final determination of Civil Case No. it resumed action on them until their final disposition therein. 1971. 1 In view thereof. entitled "Antonio R.

(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant. By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177. and In Special Civil Action No. Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision. The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by implication. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF FOOD LAWS IS ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION. AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720. II. or a penal sanction.21. it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. and Section 177. 344. Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. Rollo). However. or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the petitioners of their filled milk products and declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent Board on said complaints. together with Section 141 (which imposed a Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. or employees from requiring plaintiffs to print on the labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age" or words with equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and without authority in law. TION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION. Section 169 was enacted in 1939. Annex A of the complaint. 20. the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE. without a tax purpose. NOT THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. 1961. 1962. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. by Section 1 of Republic Act No. the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar . its agents or employees from continuing in the investigation of the complaints against petitioners docketed as FTB I." In other words. No. dated November 12. AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING. 4-5. and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance. would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk. 463. (pp. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. MISLABELLING AND/OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC.S. AND THAT COMMISSIONER NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE PROPER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. assigning the following errors: I. in whatever form. 2. Moreover. III. (pp. From the above decision of the respondent court. from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part. Annex G of the complaint. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section. the order of said defendant dated September 28. his agents. 52383: (b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board. Rollo).

The Municipality of Pagbilao et. whether or not condensed. is any milk. to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk. vs. L14264. therefore. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.. al. 29 SCRA 617. Rollo). The enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents only but not against other persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the laws. Tan." The difference. Being so. al. 2 SCRA 103). April 30. dried. No. ed. constitute a deprivation of property without due. on the other hand. ENFAMIL. SMA. powdered. Commissioner of Customs. as admitted by the petitioner. 45. evaporated concentrated. dessicated. therefore. the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. 58. the fatty part has been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. 1961. wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. R. 44. it being a product distinct from those specified in the said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been replaced with coconut oil and Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p. Filled milk. et. Hopkins. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347. distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC. There would seem.30 L. OLAC." (p. Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects. illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk. This Court is. . nutritious. would similarly offend against the Constitution. September 30. 356. Rollo). likewise. induced to the belief that filled milk is suitable for nourishment for infants of all ages. Grapilon vs. BREMIL. the fatty part has been removed while in the latter. This opinion bolsters the Court's stand as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. 118 U. to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages. Rollo) and that "up to the present." skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed.S. G. 1963. The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not come within the purview of Section 169. vs. 1969.rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. equally enforced. in effect. between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former. 220). L-19337. Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection. in which. Yick Wo vs. May 30. 7 SCRA 887. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. for the law. the declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would. According to the "Definitions. process of law. Standards of Purity. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight. The Petitioners themselves admitted that: "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe. Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and not as against manufacturers.

As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit:
... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).

Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720 provides:
Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the rules and regulations, to hold hearings and conduct investigations relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate processes of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator, recommending food and drug standards for adoption. Said Board shall also perform such additional functions, properly within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug Administrator. Section 26. ... xxx xxx xxx (c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by the Board of Food and Drug Inspection which shall submit recommendation to the Food and Drug Administrator. (d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the correctness of the finding or charge in question. (e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drug Administrator of such character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted against the offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Justice through the Secretary of Health, together with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which the charge is based.

(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he believes that public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.

The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only cause overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en toto. No costs. SO ORDERED.

10. METROPOLITAN

TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT, petitioner,

vs. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 at Manila, and DANTE S. DAVID, respondents. Dante S. David for and in his own behalf as private respondent.

CRUZ, J.: We deal here with a practice known to many motorists in Metro Manila: the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. This was challenged by the private respondent in the regional trial court of Manila, which held the practice unlawful. The petitioner is now before us, urging reversal of the decision for grave abuse of discretion. The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10, 1989, by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on August 14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction were held on August 18, 23, and 25, 1989. The writ was granted on this last date. The parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on

the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. The parties then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision. In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act. On the allegation that the practice was "the root cause of graft and corruption or at the very least the equivalent of street racket among defendant's deployed agents," His Honor made the following pointed observations:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to say, that if the arbitrary and capricious detachment and confiscation of vehicles plates illegally parked and unattended as in the act complained of in the instant case, the image of the man clothed in a traffic or police uniform will be greatly impaired if not cursed with disrespect on the part of those who have suffered at his hands. Worse, he will cease (if he had not already ceased) to be the law-abiding, courageous and valiant protector of a citizen of the Republic that he is meant to be, and instead his real oppressor and enemy, thereby fortifying the contemporaneous public perception that he is a dyed-in-the-wool extortionist if not 1 an unmitigated chiseler.

It bears noting that this petition should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court on decisions of the regional trial courts involving questions of law. However, in view of the importance of the issue raised, we have decided to take cognizance thereof under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so we can address and resolve the question directly. Upon the filing of this petition, we issued a temporary restraining order dated February 6, 1990, to prevent enforcement of the said decision until further orders from this Court. Thereafter, we required a comment from the private respondent, to which the petitioner filed a reply as also directed. The petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only. The two measures may be enforced together because implied repeals are not favored and, furthermore, to look at them another way, LOI 43 is the special law dealing only with illegal parking while PD 1605 is the general law dealing with all other kinds of traffic violations. The special law must of course prevail over the general law. The petitioner also deplores the above-quoted remarks of the trial judge, pointing out that the parties had agreed to limit the issue to whether there was a statutory basis for the act complained of. And even assuming that abuses have been committed in the enforcement of LOI 43, the remedy is not to disregard it or consider it revoked but to prosecute the guilty parties.

Providing Penalties. the private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605. PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to Traffic Management. he claims that removal and confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation. As for his allegation that the challenged practice is a source of graft. with the following pertinent provisions: Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them. 1972. In its reply.In his comment. there is no unlawful taking under the due process clause. the license plate is not property in the constitutional sense. including illegal parking. 1. ordinances. etc. and pertinently provides: Section 1. the petitioner faults the private respondent for belatedly raising the constitutionality of LOI 43. which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic violations. The petitioner also takes issue with the contention that it is PD 1605 that should be considered the special law because of its limited territorial application. rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience. towed and impounded at the expense of the owner. LOI 43. 2. he maintains that it was not improper to discuss it in his memorandum because it was pertinent to the central issue under consideration. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws. the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Hence. being merely the identification of the vehicle. Repeal of LOI 43 on that ground would run counter to the legislative intention as it is in fact in Metro Manila that the problem of illegal parking is most acute. the registry plates of the vehicles shall be confiscated and the owner's certificate of registration cancelled. streets and sidewalks. and for Other Purposes) was issued. the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke . (Emphasis supplied). shall immediately be removed by their owners/users. For the second and subsequent offenses. suggesting faintly that this should not be permitted. and its "temporary confiscation" does not deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle itself. also by President Marcos. the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of public convenience. otherwise said vehicles shall be dealt with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Finally. In any case. on November 21. it maintains. entitled Measures to Effect a Continuing Flow of Transportation on Streets and Highways. was issued on November 28. For his purpose. He agrees that the special law prevails over the general law but maintains it is PD 1605 that is the special law because it is applicable only on Metro Manila and LOI 43 that is the general law because it was intended to operate throughout the country. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked vehicle shall be removed. user or claimant. 1978.

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed. ordinances. ." The petitioner has not pointed to any such additional sanctions. The petitioner stresses that under the decree. or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. P50. for their records update. ordinances. decrees. Moreover. That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads." and one of such laws is LOI 43. rules and regulations. rules and regulations. a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense.00 for the first offense.such license or certificate. whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee. "the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation over such violations and punishment thereof are (hereby) transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Violations of traffic laws. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. xxx xxx xxx Section 3. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned.00 for the third offense. city or municipal court. the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court. If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation. xxx xxx xxx Section 8. the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed. all laws. orders. committed within a twelvemonth period. although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators. streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties.00 for the second offense. as the case may be. shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10. and a revocation of the driver' license for the fifth offense: Provided. (Emphasis supplied). his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. The penalties prescribed by the LOI are therefore deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties therein specified. In case of traffic violations. relying instead on its argument that the applicable authority for the questioned act is LOI 43. P20.

While it is true that the license plate is strictly speaking not a property right. if true. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule. LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles. "The first means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something. The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no parking area (although this is disputed by him). the penalty of confiscation would still not be justified as it has not been alleged. for the first offense. as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. In the case of the private respondent. or other similar cause. be invalid. that the illegal parking was a second or subsequent offense. The LOI goes against the vehicle itself.i•t•c-aüsl The act. That is why. the penalty shall be confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of the certificate of registration petition. but only because it has stalled. presumably due to his failure to repair it. Due process is a guaranty against . is a traffic violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The object of the measure is to ensure that only motor vehicles in good condition may use the public streets. In fact. 2 LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles "that stall on the streets and highways' and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. The second or subsequent offense cannot be simply pronounced by the traffic authorities without hearing and without proof. and this is effected by confiscating the license plates and canceling the certificates of registration of those vehicles that are not roadworthy. even if LOI 43 were applicable. The obstruction is not deliberate. Indeed. unless the owner concedes this point. The purpose of the LOI evidently is to discipline the motorist into keeping his vehicle in good condition before going out into the streets so as not to cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks down and blocks other vehicles. i. It is worth noting that it is not the driver's license that is confiscated and canceled when the vehicle stalls on a public street. it does not follow that it may be removed or confiscated without lawful cause. it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.e. Confiscation of the registry plate without a judicial finding that the offense charge is a second or subsequent one would. including temporary rest. the stalled vehicle is immediately towed at the owner's expense to clear the street of the traffic obstruction.It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction. Where it appears that the owner has not learned from his first experience because the vehicle has stalled again. That circumstance must be established at a trial before a court of justice where the vehicle owner shall have a right to be heard in his defense. The applicable law is PD 1605.. those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect. which is an altogether different offense. Contrary to the common impression. much less shown. punctured tires. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic. lack of gasoline. even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either.

on the basis of its own impressions on the matter. 3 We can rule no less in the case before us. we do not have . the offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second. We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD 1605. which clearly provides that "in case of traffic violations. What is clear to the Court is that the difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the license plate of the offending vehicle because the petitioner has not shown that this penalty is authorized by a valid law or ordinance. Assuming that this issue was indeed not properly raised at the trial.all forms of official arbitrariness. And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605. The petitioner complains that the respondent judge did not confine himself to the issue agreed upon by the parties and made gratuitous accusations that were not only irrelevant but virtually condemned the whole traffic force as corrupt. Under the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree. The former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a no-parking area. (even) the driver's license shall not be confiscated. holding that no one could take the law into his own hands. On the contrary. whichever is considered the special law either because of its subject or its territorial application." let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. This Court is not isolated from the mainstream of society and secluded in a world of its own. no less importantly. As it has not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and. unconcerned with the daily lives of the rest of the nation. It is claimed that the removal of the license plates of illegally parked motor vehicles in Metro Manila has become a veritable gold mine for some police officers. The purpose of the LOI is to discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break down while that of the decree is to penalize the driver for his defiance of the traffic laws. every official must act by and within the authority of a valid law and cannot justify the lack of it on the pretext alone of good intentions. that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time. This explains why the sanctions are different. This Court acknowledged his praiseworthy purpose but just the same annulled his unauthorized act. It is recalled that more than seventy years ago. If at all. But that problem is not addressed to the courts. confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. it is for the legislative and administrative authorities to solve. the Court is nevertheless not inhibited from considering it in this proceeding. To be sure. the mayor of Manila deported one hundred seventy prostitutes to Davao for the protection of the morals and health of the city. and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles. We recognize the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon an illegally parked and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve a citation on the offending driver who is nowhere in sight. the members of this Court mix with the people and know their problems and complaints. And among these are the alleged abuses of the police in connection with the issue now before us.

like attendance at a traffic seminar. especially because of the persistence of these charges. The widespread report is that civilian "agents. remove these license plates from illegally parked vehicles and later discreetly suggest to the owners that these may be retrieved for an unofficial fee. . particularly in Metro Manila. The owners. SO ORDERED. it is said. The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic laws.hard.00. as a reminder that must be made. An inquiry is in our view indicated. provable facts at hand but only vague and unsubstantiated rumors that could be no more than malicious and invented charges. No official receipt is issued. the petition is DISMISSED. The Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it stigmatizing the entire police force on the basis of these unsubstantiated charges. payment is usually made and the license plate returned at a private rendezvous. but the Court feels just the same that serious steps should be taken. depending on the type of vehicle. that such efforts must be authorized by a valid law." mostly street urchins under the control and direction of certain policemen. these accusations have become too prevalent and apparently too persuasive that they cannot be simply swept under the rug. We realize the seriousness of our traffic problems. which must clearly define the offenses proscribed and as clearly specify the penalties prescribed. This ranges from P50. which is subject to a different penalty. 1990. Everything is done quietly. But it does believe and stress that the proper authorities should take official notice of these reports instead of blandly dismissing them as mere canards that do not deserve their attention and concern. The old adage that where there's smoke there's fire is not necessarily true and can hardly be the rationale of a judicial conclusion. The temporary restraining order dated February 6.00 to P200. If the owner agrees. But we must add. to determine the source of the smoke. and commend the earnest efforts of the police to effect a smoother flow of vehicles in the public thoroughfares for the comfort and convenience of the people. WHEREFORE. is LIFTED. Nevertheless. prefer this kind of fast settlement to the inconvenience of an official proceeding that may entail not only the payment of a higher fine but also other administrative impositions. The challenged decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in so far as it enjoins confiscation of the private respondent's license plate for alleged deliberate illegal parking.

MORAN. CAYAT. L-45987 May 5. being a member of the non-Christian tribes. 1639 read: SEC. was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. in the City of Baguio. Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant. the accused. plaintiff-appellee. 1937. Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. Mountain Province. vs. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No.R. beer. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a nonChristian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven. and within the jurisdiction of this court. have in his possession. Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee. receive. one bottle of A-1-1 gin. acquire. The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: . Benguet. the following information was filed against him: That on or about the 25th day of January. upon conviction thereof. 2 and 3). except as provided in section one hereof. Cayat. to buy. 1939 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. he admitted all the facts alleged in the information. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall. 1639 (secs. other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a nonChristian tribe. Cayat.EQUAL PROTECTION 1. other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act. On appeal of the Court of First Instance. 2. Commonwealth of the Philippines. defendant-appellant. in the discretion of the court. the above-named accused. a native of Baguio. No. J. G. or intoxicating liquors of any kind. an intoxicating liquor.: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. unlawfully. and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial. ale. wine. The case is now before this court on appeal. and illegally receive. but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. 3. SEC. and have in his possession and under his control or custody. did then and there willfully. At the trial. 1639. or drink any ardent spirits.

to facilitate. Throughout the Spanish regime." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy. Since then and up to the present. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation. quoted in Rubi vs. surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and communications. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned. therefore. . 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony. 1900. and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment. Such tribal government should. and in the different laws of the Indies. in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws. 39 Phil. 1887. (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. It is. the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior. and. the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity. the Legislature has passed Act No. even the right of suffrage." (See. As early as 1551. 714. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. be subjected to wise and firm regulation. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present. constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs. without undue or petty interference. 660. the benefits of public education have to them been extended. more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity. their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life.) To this end." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines. Act No. 14. Jan. Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes. and more lately.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. and not to mar. 253. said: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands. Provincial Board of Mindoro.." any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government." the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience. however. it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.

" is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. to the geographical area. 55 Law. Provincial Board of Mindoro. in a way. but upon the degree of civilization and culture.S. ale. the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence. for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. supra. 61. 209. that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. 660." (Rubi vs. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions. (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law. not to religious belief. 133 N. to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. ed. Gaz . have in his possession.. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. receive. as counsel for appellant asserts.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony ." On the contrary. supra. or drink any ardent spirits. Provincial Board of Mindoro. 37 Off. or intoxicating liquors of any kind. Provincial Board of Mindoro. but. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers. not merely imaginary or whimsical. Finally. Vera and Cu Unjieng. other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act. The classification rests on real and substantial. Lindsley vs. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage.. and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers. wine. cited with approval in Rubi vs..W. It has been the sad experience of the past. to constitute due process of law. notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. distinctions. as the observations of the lower court disclose. usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.. beer." as counsel to the appellant asserts. thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.) Act No. more directly. Besides. and. 187. is not an argument against the equality of its application. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture. The Act was not predicated. cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.. Due Process of Law p. 1639 satisfies these requirements. 371. 220 U. 39 Phil. Rubi vs. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. (McGehee. People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. The prohibition "to buy. Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only. that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes...It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification. to be reasonable.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable.

Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. if there is. 104.) Thus. the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. there are now lawyers. And. vs. is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and. 1049. with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.S. unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. vs. 113 U. 20 Phil. all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law." As a matter of fact. and that they are "a virile. and we hold it does exist. 167)." On the contrary. If the power exists..S. (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed. 218 U.. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. Ago Chi. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. 442). ed. 302: 54 Law. affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court. the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. morals. are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world.with the general powers of the legislative department of the government. is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government. or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U. and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it. no equality in education.. in fact. then. if in the application of the law. or when the property constitutes corpus delicti. 1639.... the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer. But as there can be no true equality before the law. education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state. as above stated. 12 Phil. 10 Phil. 163. to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. the same must be upheld. a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing. eventually." as appellant's attorney impressively avers. The law. (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation. to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress. (U. Any measure intended to promote the health. develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. is a legitimate exercise of the police power. up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme. does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race. by appropriate measures. Act No. the wisdom of the policy adopted. It is indeed gratifying that the nonChristian tribes "far from retrograding. Surla. Connolly. The private interests of such . It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. peace. Ling Su Fan.S. doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law. the government has endeavored.S. and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. as in the instant case (Moreno vs. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons. 27). 439.

in CA-GR SP No. with costs against appellant. petitioners. and ISAGANI M. a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. In short.‖ Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges.. The Facts On March 13. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).: The constitutional right to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order. Subic Special Economic Zone. 2. Mass. CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. Morong and Hermosa. -. 24 law.. ZAMBALES. Congress. 37788. Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose. vs. COURT OF APPEALS. 1996. Province of Zambales. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE. The Case Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. with the approval of the President. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY. 97-A (EO 97-A). TIU. the lands occupied by the . vs. and Resolutionxxvi[2] dated November 13. The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration. issued pursuant to law. Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Judgment is affirmed. Boston Beer Co. 97 U. 1996. granting tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the ―secured area‖ of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such ―fenced-in‖ territory. TEOFISTO T. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations.S. there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic. DECISION PANGANIBAN. as follows: ―SEC. 25. ed. HON.Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic. 989). 12. respondents.xxvii[3] The challenged Decision upheld the constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. CONRADO L. MONTELIBANO JR. JUNGCO. according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No... JUAN T. 1992. seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals‘ Decisionxxv[1] promulgated on August 29. J. passed into law RA 7227 entitled ―An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses. GUINGONA JR.

local and national. through the Monetary Board. commercial. there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic. ―(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation. Thereafter. ―(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act. rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding. the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter. each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. ―In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone. gold. and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas. three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government. In addition. ―(e) The Central Bank. into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone. the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining. and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa. capital and equipment. hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments. industrial. ―(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange. as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials. ―The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies: ―(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code. . and other factors. ―(c) The provision of existing laws. In lieu of paying taxes. the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein. exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines. shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area.Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced. Province of Bataan. securities and future shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone. and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended. no taxes. However. covered. shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone.

the President issued Executive Order No.‖ On June 10.1. however. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials. Consumption items. Removal of raw materials. Ramos issued Executive Order No. viz. as certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives thus: ―Section 1. On All Other Taxes. 7160. capital goods.A. must be consumed within the Secured Area. whether by business enterprises or resident individuals. ―The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof. Except for these items.‖ Nine days after. equipment.In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties).: ―Section 1.Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials. his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. 1993. all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R. On Import Taxes and Duties -. ―Section 2. 1993. -. 97 (EO 97).000). The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses.―(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone]. the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. 97-A (EO 97-A). then President Fidel V. are subject to taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws. specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. on June 19. No. equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. ―(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. 7227. capital goods. and ―(i) Except as herein provided. except as may be provided herein‖ . and consumer items tax and duty-free. They shall have the freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own security and fire-fighting forces. importations of other goods into the SSEZ.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Respondent Court held that ―there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227.. 532 was issued by President Ramos. ―Senator Shahani. Mr. ‗COVERING THE DESIGNATED PORTIONS OR CERTAIN PORTIONS OF OLONGAPO CITY. ―Senator Paterno. as amended. SUBIC AND DINALUPIHAN‖ to make it clear that it is not supposed to cover the entire area of all of these territories.‘‖ The appellate court concluded that such being the case. 1995. Mr. xxx. the ‗Secured Area‘ is precise and well-defined as ‗xxx the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced. 1994. My first question is the extent of the economic zone.. The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the ―secured area‖ and not to include the ―entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law. In other words. this provision can be expanded since. we should say. Incidentally. Only portions. So. M]y question is: Is it the intention that the entire of Olongapo City.‘ ―Probably.‘ which says: ‗THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO PROCLAIM. pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. apparently. on February 1. The Chair would want to invite the attention of the Sponsor and Senator Paterno to letter ‗C. the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. 1-95. the Municipality of Subic and the Municipality of Dinalupihan will be covered by the special economic zone or only portions thereof? ―Senator Shahani. 1995. DELINEATE AND SPECIFY THE METES AND BOUNDS OF OTHER SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES WHICH MAY BE CREATED IN THE CLARK MILITARY RESERVATIONS AND ITS EXTENSIONS. I believe that it is important to delineate or make sure that the delineation will be quite precise[. President. where the actual operations of the free port will take place. ―The President. Since this will be a free port. while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227. the intention is that what is referred to in Olongapo as Metro Olongapo is not by itself ipso jure already a special economic zone. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone. the Gentleman is proposing that the words ‗CERTAIN AREAS‘ .On October 26.‖ It relied on the following deliberations in the Senate: ―Senator Paterno. So. In both. this Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. President. . petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional. In a Resolution dated June 27. I see. Proclamation No. covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America. Thank you. in effect. pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No.

in contravention of the equal protection guarantee. without reasonable or valid standards.‖ It ruled that ―EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227]. some authority must declare which portions of the same shall be the economic zone. according to them. (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales. However. we find real and substantive distinctions .A. Specifically the issue is whether the provisions of Executive Order No. That is correct. the validity of EO 97-A. On the other hand.‖xxviii[4] The Court‘s Ruling The petitionxxix[5] is bereft of merit. on behalf of respondents. pursuant to its ―avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest.―Senator Paterno. Mr. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Yes.‖ Disagreeing. petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo. ―The President. The Issue Petitioners submit the following issue for the resolution of the Court: ―[W]hether or not Executive Order No. President. Someone. EO 97-A. the solicitor general defends. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause. We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. 97-A confining the application of R. Rather. It has effectively discriminated against them. Main Issue: The Constitutionality of EO 97-A Citing Section 12 of RA 7227. petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not. neither is it discriminatory. Is it the intention of the author that it is the President of the Philippines who will make such delineation? ―Senator Shahani. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present ―fenced-in former Subic Naval Base‖ only. and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.‖ The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature.

Hernandezxxxii[8] said: ―The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege. O‘Donnell Transmitter Station. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.‖ To undertake the above objectives. . prepare and implement a comprehensive and detailed development plan embodying a list of projects including but not limited to those provided in the Legislative-Executive Bases Council (LEBC) framework plan for the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions consistent with ecological and environmental standards. if it applies alike to all persons within such class. thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. must (1) rest on substantial distinctions.xxx[6] The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. the law avows this policy: ―SEC. Obviously. but is subject to reasonable classification. From the very title itself. Declaration of Policies.‖ Classification.between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base. -. (3) not be limited to existing conditions only. the ―lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement‖ are its object. to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps. Thus. 2.xxxiii[9] We first determine the purpose of the law.xxxi[7] Explaining the nature of the equal protection guarantee. It does not demand absolute equality among residents. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute. it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. some of whose relevant defined purposes are: ―(b) To adopt. to be valid. into other productive uses to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general. and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station). Wallace Air Station. the Court in Ichong v. (2) be germane to the purpose of the law. and to apply said funds as provided herein for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America. as amended. and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.It is hereby declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station. the same law created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority.

‖ Further. Even more important.xxxvii[13] As long as there are actual and material differences between territories. commercial. Additionally. which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy.‖xxxvi[12] Certainly. it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the ―secured area. Among such enticements are:xxxv[11] (1) a separate customs territory within the zone. in creating the SSEZ. at this time the business activities outside the ―secured area‖ are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law. possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. germane to the purposes of the law. ―The intent of a statute is the law. On the other hand. only local. anyone. financial and investment center. (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone. hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called ―secured area‖ and the present business operators outside the area. . The classification is. they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos. in the second. And as the legal maxim goes. industrial. the law declared it a policy to develop the zone into a ―self-sustaining.―(c) To encourage the active participation of the private sector in transforming the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into other productive uses. therefore. the objective is to establish a ―self-sustaining. then. (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance. In the first. particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. In furtherance of such objective. And of course. the economic impact will be national. and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors. both local and foreign. the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. there is no violation of the constitutional clause.‖xxxiv[10] From the above provisions of the law. Why the seeming bias for big investors? Undeniably. As laid down in RA 7227. definitely none of such magnitude. it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. On the one hand. There is. we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. including the petitioners. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone. (4) no foreign exchange control. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. to prevent ―fraudulent importation of merchandise‖ or smuggling. as the Court of Appeals pointed out.‖ which is already fenced off. (2) tax-and-duty-free importations. industrial.

vs. Lastly. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. SO ORDERED. HON. being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law. on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose. are not categorized further. Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to . financial and investment center‖ in the area. it was based. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment. All told. both in privileges granted and in obligations required. rather. beside the point. respondents. To repeat. capricious or unfounded. J.commercial. be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it. DR. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. HON. for short). INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE). That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is. LEONARDO A. 3. of course. We agree.. CRESENCIANO B. the Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. petitioner. Instead. the local-hires of private respondent School.: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad. Inc. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila. and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL. they are all similarly treated. Costs against petitioners. therefore. WHEREFORE. mostly Filipinos. That is the principle we uphold today. the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the ―secured area. INC. There will.1[1] To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment. DECISION KAPUNAN.‖ The residents. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable. (the School. cry discrimination.

from Philippine or other nationalities. he or she is deemed a foreign-hire... allowance for the education of one's children.Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? 2[2] Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines. These include housing.. . adequate insurance against illness and death.. The School explains: A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country. Because of a limited tenure. effective means of transportation. except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.. such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment... leave his family and friends. and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator.. taxes. and home leave travel allowance. the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires... The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire: a. classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad.. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family. the faculty member is classified as a local hire. otherwise. namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure... shipping costs. but this time in a foreign land.. Accordingly. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.. the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land..What is one's domicile? b. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure. transportation.Where is one's home economy? c.To which country does one owe economic allegiance? d.

5[5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires: The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all. contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. On June 10.6[6] . numbering 38 in all. who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. regardless of race. as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit. On September 7. 1996. there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. the DOLE Acting Secretary. 1995. Truth to tell.3[3] When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995. issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members. eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19. with nationalities other than Filipino. "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"4[4] of the School. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court. 1997. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. petitioner International School Alliance of Educators. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. This issue. Trajano. Crescenciano B.

A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. To our mind. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS). We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market. under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice. we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires. the difference in their salaries. A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows: All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad.The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates: The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. Appendix C of said CBA further provides: The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. hence. We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment contract. these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees. To apply parity therefore. among the student population. the former . The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures. Furthermore. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. Verily.

10[10] i.e.11[11] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School. The Constitution8[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity.7[7] We cannot agree.9[9] likewise proscribes discrimination. which springs from general principles of law." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person.. Social. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. based on the test of what is reasonable.13[13] the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial . "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.12[12] the International Covenant on Economic. and Cultural Rights. give everyone his due. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. economic. and observe honesty and good faith. and political inequalities. [to] act with justice.enjoying only a limited tenure." International law. reduce social. the general principles of fairness and justice. General principles of law include principles of equity.

In the workplace. has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital. The Constitution17[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work. race or creed.but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities. through its Constitution.the factory.Discrimination.all embody the general principle against discrimination.15[15] the Convention (No. the very antithesis of fairness and justice." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace . The Constitution18[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all. inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. the Labor Code19[19] provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex.20[20] . closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State." Similarly. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation16[16] . the office or the field .14[14] the Convention against Discrimination in Education. The Philippines.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer has discriminated against that employee. That would be adding insult to injury. which ensure. as a minimum.Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind. in particular: a.Discrimination.. the International Covenant on Economic.Remuneration which provides all workers. Social.22[22] This rule applies to the School. with equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications. its "international character" notwithstanding. in Article 7 thereof. for example. and Cultural Rights. Article 135. under similar conditions. supra. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank. x x x.. it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men. provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. should be paid similar salaries. skill. the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. prohibits and penalizes21[21] the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. effort and responsibility.23[23] The Court finds this argument a little cavalier... ... Notably. it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work. with: i. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest. particularly in terms of wages.. is frowned upon by the Labor Code.

shipping costs. which they perform under similar working conditions. National Labor Relations Commission. it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires.The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden." In Songco v. the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. taxes and home leave travel allowances. such as housing. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities.) While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires. the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services.27[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts." the pay of the Roman soldier." Similarly."25[25] "to afford labor full protection." or more fancifully from "sal. has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. (Emphasis supplied.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed. For the same reason. therefore. transportation."26[26] The State. collective bargaining . The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires. "Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.24[24] we said that: "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Whether it be derived from "salarium. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.

shipping costs. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires. or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule). Foreign-hires have limited tenure. (3) prior collective bargaining history. comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and.28[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy. courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. and (4) similarity of employment status. that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the localhires. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires.30[30] The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. local-hires enjoy security of tenure. (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest. consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. These benefits. such as substantial similarity of work and duties. and home leave travel allowance. however."29[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine). foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. are reasonably related to their status as . We agree. transportation. A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer. does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. taxes. certainly.agreements included. such as housing. we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. In this case. must yield to the common good. 31[31] It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining.

contrary to Condition Number 11 of the Order of Probation. Soriano instead filed on 12 January 1994 an Application for probation. Provincial State Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a Motion to Cancel Probation. Toledano"). Toledano ("Hon. The RTC granted probation for a period of three to six years in an Order dated 8 March 1994. and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. While Soriano opposed this motion.: The present petition arises out of the same set of facts as that in the case of Soriano v. Zambales. four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional. and convicted him of the crime of Homicide. 1997. In a D E C I S I O N dated 7 December 1993. WHEREFORE.5 Despite such receipt. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. but ordered Soriano to submit within ten (10) days from notice his program of payment of the civil liability. prompting the Zambales Parole and Probation Office to ask the RTC to require explanation from Soriano why he had not complied with this latest RTC Order. A copy of the Order dated 20 June 1994 was received by Soriano‘s counsel on 23 June 1994. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. Court of Appeals. petitioner. respondents. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10. DECISION TINGA. On 15 August 1994. Among the several terms and conditions of probation was that Soriano indemnify the heirs of Dalusong in the amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P98.2 found petitioner Ronald Soriano ("Soriano") liable for the death of Isidrino Dalusong ("Dalusong"). SO ORDERED. The RTC.560. vs. RONALD SORIANO.4 On 26 April 1994. the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Iba. J. the Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a Comment recommending that Soriano be allowed to continue with his probation but be required to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence. are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.560. who sentenced Soriano to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years. COURT OF APPEALS. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.00). The Decision was penned by Judge Rodolfo V.3 Eschewing an appeal. no program of payment was submitted by Soriano.00). 1996 and March 19. the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. as ordered by the RTC. directing Soriano to explain within ten . denied the Motion to Cancel Probation. on the ground that Soriano had failed to indemnify the heirs of Dalusong in the amount of Ninety Eight Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P98. in an Order dated 20 June 1994.1 which the Court decided in 1999. Branch 69. 4.foreign-hires. the RTC issued an Order.

On 11 September 1996. These circumstances.(10) days why he should not be held in contempt of Court for failure to comply with the 20 June 1994 Order.R. S. the RTC issued an Order dated 4 October 1994. The RTC noted that Soriano had apparently no intention of submitting a program of payment or eventually complying with his civil obligation to the heirs of Dalusong.8 An Order dated 17 October 1994 was promulgated by the RTC. and it is well settled that notice to . No. and incapable of figuring out any feasible program of payment. 35550. No. 17595. hence the directives revoking probation and ordering Soriano to serve his original sentence remained unaffected. directing that the original records pertaining to the contempt charge be forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Judge Toledano committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner in contempt of court and in revoking the probation order. ordering the detention of Soriano for ten (10) days for contempt of court. There was no question that counsel for Soriano had.P. Soriano and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs. belying the claim of his financial hardship. Toledano did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner in contempt of court and in revoking the order of probation. alleging that he had not personally received a copy of the 20 June 1994 Order. the appeal filed by Soriano pertaining to the contempt charge was docketed as CA G. Soriano filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. S. specifically appealing the contempt of court judgment" against him. ruling that Hon. alleging that Hon. No.7 Soriano filed a Notice of Appeal dated 12 October 1994. Soriano timely challenged this decision before this Court. and further directing him to submit his program of payment also within ten (10) days. the RTC noted that an order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof was not appealable. Soriano filed a "Motion for Reconsideration". the purposes which the probation law sought to achieve. revoking the 8 March 1994 Order granting probation. On 29 October 1995. Instead of complying with this latest Order.10 The petition was docketed as C. 35550 and raffled to the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals. Soon thereafter. were indicative of Soriano‘s lack of repentance or predisposition to rehabilitate or reform.R.A. 17595. and ordering that Soriano serve the sentence originally imposed. 123936. the Court of Appeals Tenth Division emphasized that Soriano was declared in contempt of court not because he was not financially capable of paying his civil liability.11 It dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The appeal was raffled to the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. C.R.P. C.A.R. In the meantime. according to the RTC. dependent on his parents for support of his family. the Court of Appeals Tenth Division denied the appeal in CA G. No. via a Petition for Review that was docketed as G. but because of his contumacious failure to comply with the RTC Orders dated 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994.R.9 In the same Order. received a copy of the 20 June 1994 Order requiring Soriano to submit his program of payment. On 26 October 1994.12 In its D E C I S I O N. No. He also manifested therein that he was unemployed. the Court of Appeals Eighth Division promulgated its decision in C. despite the fact that his counsel acknowledged its receipt on 23 June 1994. The RTC also took note of the fact that Soriano was able to hire two private counsels in his behalf.6 Unsatisfied with this explanation. on 23 June 1994.

No. in his present petition. the Court expressly stated that the only issue for resolution in that case was "whether or not the revocation of petitioner‘s probation is lawful and proper. Soriano‘s appropriate remedy from the judgment of contempt was an appeal to the proper court.R. the Court dismissed the petition. the question of whether the RTC validly revoked Soriano‘s probation. Since the Court has already disposed of. and not the special civil action of certiorari. Toledano committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Soriano in contempt. Soriano‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.19 This contention has merit. notwithstanding that Soriano also argued in his petition therein that Hon. No. Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following requisites prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed.R.15 On 4 March 1999. and that no hearing was conducted as to the contempt charge. No. and the rulings rendered therein are now for resolution in this Decision. That same Order afforded Soriano the opportunity to comment on the charge. Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.22 The RTC did notify Soriano in writing of the charge of indirect contempt. which Soriano . this latter petition is now the subject of this ruling. In its 4 March 1999 D E C I S I O N in G.R. 128938.counsel is notice to the party himself. as it consists of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court. 123936. as he could have at the very least filed a manifestation with the Court that he was not yet in a position to settle the obligation.13 Nor did Soriano‘s supposed financial incapacity excuse him from not complying with the RTC Orders. No. After Soriano‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Soriano. Docketed as G. and in revoking the probation order for failure to satisfy the civil liability to the heirs of the victim.17 and the judgment in G. which could not have similarly attacked the judgment of contempt. The proceedings arising from that appeal. Under Section 11.14 he filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. Soriano argues herein that there must be prior notice and hearing before he could be held liable for indirect contempt. argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was a deliberate refusal on his part to comply with its Orders dated 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994. as in criminal cases. this Court rendered judgment in G. holding that the revocation of Soriano‘s probation was lawful and proper. by way of the 15 August 1994 Order. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt.20 The contempt charged against Soriano is properly classified as indirect contempt. The revocation of probation was properly assailed by Soriano through a special civil action of certiorari. 123936. Soriano correctly availed of the proper remedy from the contempt judgment by filing his Notice of Appeal on 12 October 1994."18 It was correct of the Court to have limited the issue in that manner.16 In its D E C I S I O N.R.21 Section 3. (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and (c) to be heard by himself or counsel. the sole question now before us is whether or not the RTC erred in declaring Soriano in contempt. 123936 became final on 15 June 1999. with finality.

derived as it was without any comprehensive evaluation of the arguments or of the evidence. However.24 With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of the court. A hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. Soriano‘s claim was that he had no knowledge of the Order requiring him to submit the program of payment. Aquilisan:23 On the proceedings for indirect contempt against the petitioner. no hearing was ever set or held. It can be argued that Soriano has essentially been afforded the right to be heard. The contemner is assured of his or her day in court. This is a defense that is susceptible to ratification by testimonial evidence at the very least. If the contemner is served a notice of hearing. then that is a different matter. as he did comment on the charge of indirect contempt against him. In Soriano‘s case. for they have distinct object and purpose. as no hearing was ever conducted by the RTC on the charge of contempt. and at the same time serves as notice of said charge. it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted. xxx Section 3. . As the Court ruled in Balasabas v. to have his day in court and present witnesses in his behalf xxx. petitioner was denied his right to notice of hearing. Hon. Such finding. any liberal construction of the rules governing contempt proceedings should favor the accused. cannot be sanctioned by this Court and should be overturned. be considered as a notice of hearing itself. Rule 71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt charge after notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect contempt.27 Thus. The two notices are different. However. but fails to appear anyway. the RTC adjudged him guilty based on the bare assertions contained in the pleading he filed in response to the show cause order which is the 15 August 1994 Order of the RTC. since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge. However. to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed. an order requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation constitutes the written charge for indirect contempt. the third requisite laid down in Rule 71 was not complied with. including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court itself. the grave error of the respondent judge is manifest when. Soriano should have been afforded the chance to prove his side by presenting evidence in his behalf in open court. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner.25 The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. such notice cannot by all means.26 The modes of procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those used in criminal prosecutions. if he so desires.essentially did through his Motion for Reconsideration. As adverted to earlier. Instead. under the circumstances disclosed in the records. or at least explain his side or substantiate his defense through any opportunity which the RTC could have provided him. Yet. conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. the RTC denied Soriano the opportunity to adduce evidence in his behalf through a hearing.

The practical effects of this ruling may seem negligible considering the relative gravity of the ruling against Soriano in G.R. No. 123936. Yet, it is still important for this Court to reiterate that contempt proceedings, particularly for indirect contempt, take on the character of criminal proceedings. Judges are enjoined to extend to an alleged contemner the same rights accorded to an accused. WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted. The Order dated 4 October 1994 is set aside insofar as it declared petitioner Ronald Soriano in contempt of court. SO ORDERED.

5 AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T.

ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RAMOS, PANCHO M. RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA, AZUCENA C. FALCON, MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V. RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VILLARDO A. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A. GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR., GEMMA L. BANARES, PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH R. MELON, MAGDALENA M. LAO, MARINA GERONA, FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C. CONCHA, YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO, FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ESTERNON, MILAGROS M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY, PRICILLA P. GOLFO, ELISEA M. HIERCO, TERESITA L. DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA, JR., NIMFA M. LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V. ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVANDO, VIOLETA M. ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME FEROLINO, LEONIDES P. COMIA, MILAGROS E. GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA CRUZ, ROMULO A. FAZ, LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G. FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROTONI, TITA FOJA, NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING, ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCION H. PARRENO, SERAFIN L. OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO, ROSELLER C. GAPULAO, GLICERIO B. LAURENTE, BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M. PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON, INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS, GENE BE BARTE, FLORENCIA Z. MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA, PEDRO S. LUNA, CARMELITA P. LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN, ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B. ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA, LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADELREY, ARNULFO Y. FAJILAN, MARLON P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO, MICHAEL D. CASTILLO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, ARSENIO T. GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A. PENAMANTE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M. ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNIO, FIDEL V.

PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL MORO, JUSTINO R. DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZOL, ROMEO D. DELGADO, ERLINDA P. MAGSINO, VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO, NORMA A. DEQUINA, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA, MELECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE, HELEN M. CUENTO-BUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORALES, RISALINA C. GONZALES, ROSARIO CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L. MALADAGA, MAXIMO A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A. RODELAS, CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE R. FRANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN, LIGAYA S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN, MARCELA DE LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY ABLES, ADELA E. FABERES, ALICIA P. BALDOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M. LACAMENTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA DIMALANTA, ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN, AMELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERICO ONATE, JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M. CABARIOS, JR., NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIME G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA, ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L. PINEDA, LUCILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B. LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M. DAVID, LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA. LUZ A. BASILIO, NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMMANUEL E. IGNACIO, RAMON S. ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS, HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDA C. ZAPATA, IMELDA R. MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE, JOSEPHINE GALANG, FLORINDA R. MADULID, MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY, PRESENTACION A. PALOM, ANTONIO B. ANCHETA, MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C. CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL, LINDA D. SANDOVAL, MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MAGPAYO V. ABESAMIS, BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS, CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ, JESUS E. ALICANTE, FEDERICO SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZMAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO, JOVEN HERMOGENES, RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZANA, ERNESTO Q. TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C. ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, JULITA V. PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CONSOLACION N. LABOG, ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO GALLARDO, CARMENCITA M. ONGEO, CAMILO L. SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E. APOSTOL, CLOTILDE C. CANETE, ALEJANDRO B. DEL AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES, PETRONIO N. PIANGCO, JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RODOLFO C.

NATAN, JAIME B. MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T. JENOVEVA, VEDASTO B. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. DE LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L. J. PEPITO, LUCILA S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, JOCELYN KL. LIBUT, REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARIO A. TRASMONTE, REYNALDO O. MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO, IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUAN A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE, ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M. BEDIANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B. BOCO, JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE, BENITO A. MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE C. APURA-VALDEMORO, CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. FORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO S. OLMEDO, IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO, ARTURO L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L. ASUERO, PIO T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MILAGROS P. LAMBINO, ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA, RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A. MOSCARE, CONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA, BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTONIO O. TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. MAGBUTAY, NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B. LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS, RAFAEL A. PAYOD, MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T. CRUZ, VIRGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R. DELOS REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J. MABANGUE, PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO D. JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TORRE, JR., LETICIA R. MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO L. PEDRAZA, SALVACION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON, EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, NATIVIDAD E. PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETERIO Z. ABOCEJO, DEMETRIA O. COROLLO, MARIA S. OBEN, ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S. RODILLA, MARCIAL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON, EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, ARSENIA GARCIA, HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY, SAMUEL ORALLO, AMELIA OLORES, CANDIDO URBANO, LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN, PAQUITO SORIANO, GERMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C. ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA LEGASPI, TOMAS ABELLA, JR., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL BAUTISTA, LORNA PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGANZA, PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA, JR., JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSARIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL, GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA BANEZ, VERONICA TABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ, JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL ROSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN CLAVERIA, ESTRELLA RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189.: At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order." By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law. Thereafter. 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. 1996. Reassignment of Election Officers. who are either City or Municipal Election Officers. has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district. contending that: I SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. Ramos on June 11. II . . J. the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos.DECISION PURISIMA. 8189 VIOLATES THE ‘EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE’ ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. RA 8189 was enacted on June 10. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996". 44. 97-000232[1] and 97-061033[2] for the implementation thereof. either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto. the COMELEC issued several directives34[3] reassigning the petitioners. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. to different stations. Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions. Any election officer who.

IV SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity. and VI SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional. SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI. Phil. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELEC’S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME. The petition is barren of merit. there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack. . SECTION 26(1). The classification must rest on substantial distinctions. Petitioners’ contentions revolve on the pivotal issue. V SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF. III SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS. DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The "equal protection clause" o f the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI. and therefore. and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.

The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law. Araneta. This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. 3. In Lutz vs. election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. Verily. in this case. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.2. large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.not merely assigned . Moreover.36[5] it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of ‘all or none’". under Section 3(n) of RA 8189. As held in Sta. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. Lopez. to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. 35[4] After a careful study. and 4. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials. However. Maria vs.37[6] "xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed . it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof.to a .

the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But. Untenable is petitioners’ contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. 2. and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint. that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof". The objectives of Section 26(1). Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. are: 1. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. As a matter of fact. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made. of the subjects of legislation that are being . But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws. xxx" (italics supplied) The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General. Section 44 even strengthens the COMELEC’s power of appointment. the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. and 3. is equally untenable. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information. Petitioners’ contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation. where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees.particular station. as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. To fairly apprise the people. In fact.

ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION.whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2). the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve. fully index or catalogue. In this regard.39[8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. which provides for the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the .considered.41[10] As regards the issue raised by petitioners . and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. the presumption is in favor of its validity.40[9] In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled. PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR. as in this case. language of such precision as to mirror. petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.38[7] Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where. all the contents and the minute details therein. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS." Section 44.

rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare. vs. Marcial G. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae. 1180 . Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip. Emiliano R. fundamental and far-reaching in significance.42[11] WHEREFORE. No pronouncement as to costs. and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. Ozaeta. The enactment poses questions of due process. into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien. LABRADOR. 1180. and MARCELINO SARMIENTO. Navarro as Amicus Curiae. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer. and positive nationalistic impulse. Salazar and Associates for petitioner. petitioner. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment? II. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. Secretary of Finance. Admittedly springing from a deep. in general This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment. militant. ICHONG. Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance. that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. It also poses an important issue of fact. in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents. SO ORDERED. police power and equal protection of the laws. the petition is DISMISSED. by Republic Act No. the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.: I. 6. The case and issue.Constitution. and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand. Through it. respondents. City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. JAIME HERNANDEZ. LAO H. Quisumbing. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae. J. so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. City Treasurer of Manila. and within the field of economy it regulates. corporations and partnerships adversely affected.

Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto Petitioner.Republic Act No. for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act. (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. In answer. 1180. partnerships. (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. and against associations. brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional. who are allowed to continue to engaged therein. (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons. from enforcing its provisions. and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons. and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin. and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die. giving. and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business. The police power. No. their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5. to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him. but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons. — There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. IV. commerce and industry. (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States. or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines. the nature of the business. (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15. which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved a. (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses. from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization. contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law . (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession. control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade. (4) as regards hereditary succession. unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law. 1954. among other matters. the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of . particularly city and municipal treasurers. III. (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. not citizens of the Philippines. (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed. only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired.

— The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution: SECTION 1. It does not demand absolute equality among residents. it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Constitutional Limitations. (Article III. Otherwise stated. as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature. and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes. and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. 226. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself. what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. Phil. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State. it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental. are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application. 220. It is not intended to prohibit legislation. as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world. of color. L.) . b. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. ed. — The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege.) c.reaching in scope. the most essential. It has been said the police power is so far . without regard to any differences of race.(1) No person shall be deprived of life. (2 Cooley. 30. Hopkins. or of nationality. 824-825. so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare.the ultimate issue involved. Constitution) These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies. What is the scope of police power. that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless. if it applies alike to all persons within such class. Limitations on police power. albeit preliminary. equal protection clause. and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved. it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival. which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. insistent and illimitable. The. liberty or property without due process of law. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. (Yick Wo vs.

or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used. or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. V. and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. Is there public interest. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common. there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. as old as society itself. there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. which from the immemorial has always been open to residents. provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. — . Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved. provided there is due process of law. courts. we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law. On the other hand. color or citizenship. that the legislature. Moreover. trade or occupation. is it not unreasonable. in the first place. of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power. for that would mean license and anarchy. the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. shall it be said. courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy. is reason. which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State. is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents. what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked. Properly related. is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity. for that would be tyranny. Economic problems sought to be remedied With the above considerations in mind. a. the aliens. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The test or standard. The conflict. — Now. a public purpose. from engaging therein. as always. irrespective of race. liberty and property. So the State can deprive persons of life. — The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom. therefore. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty. as its title indicates. And if distinction and classification has been made. have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. e. patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. They have done so early where there has been a clear. The balancing is the essence or. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation. There can be no absolute power. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. The due process clause. and persons may be classified into classes and groups. although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right.d. whoever exercise it. in this matter of equitable balancing.

Under modern conditions and standards of living. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins. textiles. and the patience and forbearance of a slave. the dealer's importance is enhanced. but he laughs these off without murmur. insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face. b. now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. Food and other essentials. drugs. and he forgets and forgives. hardware. but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn. — There is a general feeling on the part of the public. even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The alien retailer's trait. because thru him the infinite variety of articles. Alleged alien control and dominance. the retailer comes as essential as the producer. garlic. as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful. a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence. c. his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete. groceries. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. clothing. of course. to the operator of a department store or. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined. He has cloths to sell. it is charged that the law is merely the . Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body. The community takes note of him. therefore. the Facomas and the Acefa. almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. — The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). the dealer.In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce. and scores of other goods and articles. in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear. He has shown in this trade. Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages. thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance. the Namarco. The retailer. the dealer comes into existence. is unknown. goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. flour. food in all its increasing forms. industry without limit. Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. He even pioneers. from the lowly peddler. in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions. sugar. and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. Derogatory epithets are hurled at him. but he heeds them not. in another. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce. such as lumber. He ministers to the resident's daily needs. the vinegar. which appears to be true to fact. the fish. the owner of a small sari-sari store. the salt. about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric. the spices needed for the daily cooking. There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community.

.03 41.. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.... when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings...32 9........161.658.181...459 422 10.927..761..156..239 11..659 213.602 60..671 200.692 1.. Between the constitutional convention year (1935). which put down the figures in black and white..356 118.402 60. is not an element of control... 1947: Filipino .30 467.... 1949: Filipino . and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954).. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration....901 53. Chinese .090 55.630.89 462..701...333 33..51 38.239 51.38 294.49 4. The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade..924 32.218 354 8...155..20 1.05 No.98 148..995........813.451.774 106. Alienage.... Chinese .134 .21 4.....514.01 106...96 1.260 65.. as witness the following tables: Assets Year and Retailers Nationality 1941: Filipino .....946 13. 1948: (Census) Filipino .667 29. Chinese .187.631 213.323. Others ..675 67....138 15.47 113.....74 44.56 205.. it is said..Establishments Pesos Per cent Distribution Gross Sales Pesos Per cent Distribution .532..646 40....82 174. also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible... official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade.264 12...342.348...168 57.107 208..894.29 111. 113.......05 279. Others .087 93..227 3..20 13..583.... Others .

.......878 7.364 45...878 7.. Others ...............078...633 9.............707 24..........248 125......052 36.....39 10......................................09 466.... 1948: (Census) Filipino 1....691 8.....056. Chinese .749 2.... Others .... 1951: Filipino . 16.......620 17......36 1...72 392............ Others ..025 61..................878 4..... Others .17 119.325........934 13..... Chinese ......481.......516 14.............415 1..223...336 486 12..429 134.....384 2..........60 404.................Chinese .31 7.281 Item Assets (Pesos) Gross Sales (Pesos) .. 1947: Filipino ....06 87 AVERAGE ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT Year and Retailer's Nationality 1941: Filipino ...058.919 1........................365 35.053...07 46..........327 53....352 224..645.................875 3......614............707 24.303 347 8....414..111 1... Chinese .......

...905 33............ By Year and Nationality of Owners........ that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers........... buys and sells six to seven times more.....737 7............916 24........ As observed by respondents................ d...152 20... Chinese .................... alien participation has steadily increased during the years..398 23. pp......... the alien invests more capital................................................... pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade.. while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors..... of course. Alien control and threat...... It is true......... Numbers in retailers...... subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention...................... whose capital is necessarily small...... The same official report.................................. Chinese ...877 7......707 24..... 1949: Filipino ........686 (Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments......824 3........................ but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.878 7...... Others ....207 22... The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales....... Benchmark: 1948 Census..707 24. Others ....... 18-19 of Answer..... Chinese .807 4...... credit. Others .. the native investment is thinly spread....... issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics........ do not imply superiority................. 1951: Filipino ..... Department of Commerce and Industry....... price and supply... and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital........... 1......069 24.707 24........) The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships.. and gains much more... — ........... remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises.... here.....033 1..........

Moreover. they fear the dangers coming from alien control. 10th ed. With ample capital. so our newspapers. — But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone. largely inexperienced. that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. find alien domination and control to be a fact. 1. p. . therefore. Phil. political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. timid and hesitant. We. . approved on July 18. and a similar resolution. approved on March 20. 1953. . unity of purpose and action and thorough organization. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law. of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen. it is but of recent formation and hence. . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. . Filipino businessmen.. which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. he says: But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain. has to step in and assume the initiative. . commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco. and fears. Nationals. manufacturers and producers believe so.. the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market. which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist. the government as the instrumentality of the national will. The Framing of the Philippine Constitution. alien predominance and control. 662-663. that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices. Political Law by Sinco. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. if not the leadership. in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution. and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute. quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.It is this domination and control. p. 1954. there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. 476. Under such conditions. a reality proved by official statistics. 10th ed. Witness thereto is Resolution No. in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom." (II Aruego. and they express sentiments of economic independence. The man in the street also believes. of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers.) Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. 114). and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens. and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community. that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade. producers and consumers alike can be placed . Political Law.) That was twenty-two years ago. (Phil. e. Thus . and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting.

prejudice or discrimination. or its consumers. action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices. cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand. that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities. While the national holds his life. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals. — We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility. becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article. that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices. the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes. especially on foods and essential commodities. to free the nation from the economic . or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. The present dominance of the alien retailer. Hence. but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people. f. Republic Act No. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives. his person and his property subject to the needs of his country. This is easily illustrated. like corn and rice. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article. which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice. especially in the big centers of population. that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands. the producers or importers of the prescribed article. It is a fact within judicial notice. eliminating it from their stocks. thru their authorized representatives. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes. in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. that they have violated price control laws. therefore.completely at their mercy. 1168). that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public. smuggled goods and money into and out of the land. control laws and the like. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed. find the article suddenly out of circulation. indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices. 9. and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. violated import and export prohibitions. or its consumers. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws. The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State. offering the new one as a substitute. what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens. creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions. in derision and contempt of lawful authority. authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions. because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits.

To this we answer. — The next question that now poses solution is. he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other. his stay here is for personal convenience. thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens. as already pointed out above. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual. and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its . The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country. their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices. The Equal Protection Limitation a. show the existence of real and actual. Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above. the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals. but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. or of that spirit of regard. which practices. The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution. Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. is neither illegitimate nor immoral. radical as it may seem. and all persons of one class are treated alike. and indisputably falls within the scope of police power. which are actual and real. that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public. The faster he makes his pile.situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly. nay of the national security itself. their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests. it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. we admit. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. b. real and reasonable. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. VI. His aim or purpose of stay. — The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens. positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation. but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution.

are universally restraining acts. 136. 55 L." c. and forms part of an extensive system. and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated. The act. but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard. "1. because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States. 2. in fact. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion. vs. in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. — The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws. we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto: . . Natividad. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. Natural Carbonic Fas Co.. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited. acts licensing gaming houses. as. thus denying the right to aliens. . retailers of spirituous liquors. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. in legislation. 369. is distinctly of that character. etc. and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.. in this instance. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue.legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution. we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. as follows: "Licensing acts. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power. 4. it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. where the validity of Act No. In substance. 3. (1911). Broadly speaking. Ogden. 40 Phil. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety. I. and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. 9 Wheat. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis. . or because in practice it results in some inequality. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary. When the classification in such a law is called in question. the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. . if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. ed. the object of which is to encourage American shipping. for example. It is not to give the vessel an American character. and therefore is purely arbitrary.

In Asakura vs. or even the convenience of the community. for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare. Jur. and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. attitude. to become a citizen of the United States. May. Clarke vs. Hana. 92 L. therefore. card room. but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric". E. In Takahashi vs. In Bloomfield vs.A. 340 (Oregon.that the license is granted. 1479 (1947). hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker. and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong. the U. 115 (1926). was held valid. dance hall. 1902). 210 P. 81 N. In Templar vs. in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine. 1912). invalid. which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is. Deckebach. because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration. City of Seattle. 99 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts. 309 (Ohio. that this whole system is projected. 71 L. the health. 274 U. is not an infringement of constitutional rights.) In Commonwealth vs. 129 (Ohio. or a deliberate purpose to discriminate. and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. ed. 1058 (Michigan. and because there is no public interest .S.W. Van Winkle. 1914). but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification. that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. Fish and Game Commission. a statute which prevented certain persons. or in hospitality. The case of State vs. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited. the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Carrol. L. 468-469. psychology and loyalty. 124 N. Broadly speaking. from engaging in the traffic of liquors.R. But it is to confer on her American privileges.. or has declared his intention. 297 F. the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest. but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals. In Ohio ex rel. Michigan State Board of Examiners. 1924). 151 (Minnesota. 1915 P. 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. good order and happiness of the community. 30 (Washington. was found not to be the result of race hatred. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests. S. as contra distinguished from foreign. a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void." The rule in general is as follows: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. knowledge. So also in Anton vs. billiard. and was not. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. 1907). That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. pool. ed. 90 N. as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise. and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. E. 1922). a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers.. (2 Am. State. and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners. among them aliens. 392. a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void.

and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued.in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances. 257 (Pennsylvania. It may be judicially known. a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void. thus: . the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English. and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems. because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws. that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law. and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud. and usages that our own people have. 340. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. 70 L. 165 (Maine. 1900).. because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed. and the facts make them so. 1059 (1925). especially in times of crisis and emergency. but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born. . whose allegiance is first to their own country. Furthermore. was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee. In State vs. — It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. d. is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. Montgomery. Authorities contra explained. 47 A. ed. In Fraser vs. 342. 1897). therefore. two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. 297 F. or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility. was declared invalid. Van Winkle. and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. Spanish or any other local dialect. However. Hopkins. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary. however. As we already have said. to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Trinidad. . McConway & Tarley Co. The real reason for the decision. 82 Fed. In Yu Cong Eng vs. customs. In Yick Wo vs. a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age. aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact. . 30 L. have not the same inspiration for the public weal. nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. The case at bar is radically different. so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. as those . except in so far as it enhances their profit. unreasonable or capricious. nor are they as well disposed toward the United States. but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary. nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy.

It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that: . the test of the limitation. The Due Process of Law Limitation. and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. 957. when it is declared by the legislature. first. . . . . or. Steele. and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. . . for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable. . Sec. and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . is unnecessary. Jur. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. . and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects. xxx xxx xxx . 388. demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable. . and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. ed. . 38 L. xxx xxx xxx So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare. a. . . 302. 940. . VII.who by citizenship. are a part of the government itself. Reasonability. the requirements of due process are satisfied. that the interests of the public generally. Further enlargement. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification. . .) Another authority states the principle thus: . as has often been held. determination by legislature decisive. must not be for the annoyance of a particular class. — We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . arbitrary or capricious. 950. New York. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public. as distinguished from those of a particular class.. it was also held: . . . . .) In the case of Lawton vs. . (Nebbia vs. it must appear. . (11 Am. . to override it. 385. 78 L. And the guaranty of due process. Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense. ed. . 1:1).1074-1075. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy. and must not be unduly oppressive.

thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices. therefore. one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved. oppressive. But the Legislature has found. but this. or is an arbitrary. The real question at issue.e. tranquility and welfare. Jur. i. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. it has been so engaged by him. safety. 104 ALR. b.) Judged by this test. is or is not constitutional. comfort. that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. State Board of Embalming. who have no profound devotion to our free institutions. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective. is not that posed by petitioner. which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary. without substantial relation to the health. which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances.. ordinary occupation. . that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien. as we have also found and indicated. vs. and who have no permanent . passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business. Petitioner's argument considered. that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. 395. that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner. by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. morals.e. and general welfare of the public. 1080-1081. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic. The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill. disputed legislation. Arbitrary capricious. Prata Undertaking Co. fixes this test of constitutionality: In determining whether a given act of the Legislature. taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear.require such interference.. to free national economy from alien control and dominance. one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men. 389. i. without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise. — Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common. pp. which later was enacted into law: This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. . and capricious use of that power. must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. . and second.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id. and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

stake in our people's welfare. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others. — The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination. invalid and unconstitutional? . On the precise issue now before us." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.) It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. it is provided that "no franchise. If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people. The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival. is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. Mr. then economic independence is none the less legitimate. thru the exercise of the police power. they expressly made their voice clear. Thus they declared the their Resolution: That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade. certificate. Araneta. we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority. and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego. Thus in the preamble. The Framing of the Philippine Constitution. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. will be at the mercy of other people. they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. All aspects of our life. quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner. In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose. we are not really the masters of our destiny. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable. but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination. even our national security. their freedom and liberty. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people. c. or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines. a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights. development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV. especially if not of their own race or country.

it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment. p. Furthermore. the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process. In the deliberations of the Court on this case. that there is no need for the legislation. therefore. if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature. some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare. Beside. they do not import invalidity. and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. Statutory Construction. attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself. and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law. What the above provision prohibits is duplicity. Sec. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. Alleged defect in the title of the law A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition". the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet. that there may be general breakdown. through adequate measures. as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation. etc. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative. that adequate replacement is problematical. — A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant. which reads: No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. fully justified. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives. how reasonable the Legislature has been. and every presumption is in favor of its validity. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law. that there would be repercussions from foreigners. 1707. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI. is not its reasonableness. VIII. the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. its aims and purposes. scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland. 297. that is. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. d. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature. nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. but its unreasonableness. that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition. which terms express . Provisions of law not unreasonable.The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is.

The Law of the United . it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland. such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title. the nature and scope of its provisions. It cannot be claimed.) The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill. quoted in p. which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act. Morton. IX. be overruled. therefore. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. City of Wabash. (Williams vs. therefore. Statutory Construction. p. See. especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice. 162 So. 306. quoted in page 41 of Answer. the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition". 4803." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated. 7. that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. 182 La. The use of the term "regulate". (Sweet vs. the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. 718. so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit". 42 of Answer.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law. quoted in p.) Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale. 887. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. action and study of the legislators or of the public. One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes. State. The objection must therefore.. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit. 42 of Answer. 41 Ind. and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. Furthermore. the sale of intoxicating liquors. etc. Under the title of an act to "regulate". In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law. 345. (State vs. the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors.the two main purposes and objectives of the law.) The word "regulate" is of broad import. there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. 48 Ind. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation. is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen. there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. 308.

thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature. with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. 39. and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected. . and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted. 58 L. pp. such as Norway and Denmark. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. p.) X. 29-32). they are beyond our power and jurisdiction. 539. because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. S. and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18. 258. that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature.Nations." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty. Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. however. except those of the United States. that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State. and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade. Fed. with costs against petitioner. are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. Pennsylvania. Thompson. ed. nor the due process of law clause. 1951 ed. the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. Our legal duty. 260). 257. Conclusion Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. The petition is hereby denied. who are granted special rights by the Constitution. vs.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law. 4. The Petition alleges that petitioner. and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN. a qualified voter. a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. petitioners. JR. Iloilo. who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30. Romeo B. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions: .5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him. MELENCIO-HERRERA. ROMEO B. Patricio Dumlao. Igot. Petitioner. Jr. seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.7. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.. respondent. which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. and who shall have been 6. Alfredo Salapantan. petitioners igot and Salapantan. Gonzales for petitioners Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. vs. PATRICIO DUMLAO. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws. 1980. therefore. is a taxpayer. J: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners. Raul M. as such. 51. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated. Petitioner. and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and." For their part. and a resident of San Miguel. Jr. 52. and 53 for being unconstitutional. class legislation. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. is also a taxpayer.. IGOT.

The election shall be held on January 30. 1980. XIIC of the Constitution. Election of certain Local Officials — . nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act. (Batas Pambansa. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause. Art. Sec. 51) Sec. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6. on one hand said . et als. hence. (Batas Pambansa Blg. all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years. from any form of harassment and discrimination.. there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.. The procedural Aspect At the outset. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29. insurrection.. 4. it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities. 1979 and terminate on January 28. including acts amounting to subversion. 1980. also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC. Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution. (Batas Pambansa Big. Jr.. For one. XII-C of the Constitution. on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. 52) Section 6. or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact. as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. ( ibid. which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. COMELEC et als.) In addition to the above-cited provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. Blg. I . . Section 1. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. . Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.Sec 7.. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso. 4.. it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. rebellion or other similar crimes. petitioners Igot and Salapantan. . No. vs.. traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. 53. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition... 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. Comelec. Vera 65 Phil. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. however. namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:. a hypothetical issue. Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. Yet. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions: 1) xxx 2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections. Proper party. there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review. Any decision.petitioners lgot and Salapantan. XII-C. in the interest of orderly procedure. (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. to have filed separate suits. which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract. and in effect. on the other. or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. quoted earlier. has fallen far short of the other three criteria. for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads: "Section 2. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2. and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. 56 [1937]). B. 52. order. 82 SCRA 30. which provides: Section 11. that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings. . For another. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter. which is. XII-C. a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. This Petition. as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. Art. Actual case and controversy. A. It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with.

they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. vs. there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers. Even then.The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained. 7. that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. and sections 4. and 6 BP Blg. or will sustain. Inc. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). In the absence of any litigate interest.. et als. 392 U. direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. supra). Besides. the institution of a taxpayer's suit. it has been held: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute. In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan. per se is no assurance of judicial review.. it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State. Gimenez. Cohen. it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds.. upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds. 52. It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit. citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. it was only during the hearing. the general rule is that not only persons individually affected. As held by this Court in Tan vs. has been relaxed in Pascual vs. 18 SCRA 300 [1966])." which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. (Philippine Constitution Association.. 110 Phil. 51. 331 [1960]. the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys. Secretary of Public Works.S. Gimenez. above stated. sec. In the same vein. speaking through our present Chief Justice. and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. therefore. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).. but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may. nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Vera. this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. not in their Petition. or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. thus: . namely. 83 [1960]). (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay. 331 [1960]). Yet. the statutory provisions questioned in this case. concededly. nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. et als. . by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 1. However. laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. While. BP Blg. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]). Vera..

Coming now to the case of retirees. Vera.C. employees 65 years of age. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968])." We have already stated that. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]). Thus. respondent's Comment).. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify . as the Solicitor General has intimated. Again upon the authority of People vs. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent. In respect of election to provincial. They are actually without cause of action.e. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]). We have resolved. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence. might or might not be a reasonable classification although. "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. For purposes of public service. to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. Vera. however. one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. 15. city. On the other hand. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. or municipal positions. i. the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. there can also be retirees from government service at ages. to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office. have been validly classified differently from younger employees. For one thing. Edu vs. and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed. Unavoidability of constitutional question. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. II. The substantive viewpoint. if applicable to everyone. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement. a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations. say below 65. by the standards set forth in People vs. while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. and in Gonzalez vs. the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter.

retirees. who has retired from a provincial. it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable. Lastly.. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. as provided for in the challenged provision. in the case of a 65-year old elective local official. The first provides: a. 1942. But. In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned. The Constitution of the Philippines. citing Cooper vs. may be divided in two parts. Telfair 4 Dall 14. 52. it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. as in this case. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact . quoted in full earlier. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Salas. 547). What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times. vs. of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality. 65 Phil. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board.. who is not a retiree. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute. aged 65. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. 1977 ed. The need for new blood assumes relevance. Inchong etc. there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired. and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. et al. 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 56 [1933]). COMELEC. The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. he would like to assume again. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions. Rafael v. Dodd. p. but. There is an additional consideration. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law.. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present. it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando. 21 SCRA 336 [1967]. 3rd ed. 82 SCRA 55 [1978]. and which they challenge. 18 SCRA 606 [1966]. city or municipal office. Cases on Constitutional Law." and that Courts will not . aged 65. Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 1155 [1957]).. 56). Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera. not a doubtful and equivocal breach. for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one. which. by virtue of a change of mind. In fine. the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. Comelec.

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact". yet. Being infected with constitutional infirmity. 44. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections. it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV. Said paragraph reads: SEC. will thereby be avoided. Special disqualification. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. is not synonymous with guilt. It condemns before one is fully heard. as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. for being . section 19. a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. may be rebutted. WHEREFORE. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence. We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case. city or municipal official. An accusation. Additionally. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof. in all criminal prosecutions. In ultimate effect. according to the fundamental law." (People vs. Explicit is the constitutional provision that.. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". 4. and therefore. 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. is hereby declared null and void. who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected. a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. Revised Penal Code). Furthermore. shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto. to the extreme detriment of a person charged. except as to the degree of proof. supra). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence..set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case. 1973 Constitution). as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 52 which can stand by itself. no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts. time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Vera. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies. any retired elective provincial.

Such an answer. TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy Commissioner.violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. JR. SO ORDERED. "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. Chairman. 8 The facts as alleged were admitted but not the allegations which to their mind are "mere arguments. SAME CASE SA DUE PROCESS VERA VS CUEVAS 9. FERNANDO. SISON. 7 The Court. required respondents to file an answer within 10 days from notice.: The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. therefore. vs. Deputy Commissioner.J. ANTERO M." 10 The prayer is for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Acting Commissioner. RUBEN B. was filed on May 28. Bureau of Internal Revenue.. 4 He characterizes the above sction as arbitrary amounting to class legislation. Commissioner on Audit. 1982. (b) taxable net income. oppressive and capricious in character 5 For petitioner. (f) adjusted gross income." 9 The answer then affirmed: "Batas Pambansa Big. and other winnings. prizes. opinions or conclusions on the part of the petitioner. 1982. C. respondents. the truth [for them] being those stated [in their] Special and Affirmative Defenses. A. The Solicitor General for respondents. in a resolution of January 26. The authorities and cases cited while correctly quoted or paraghraph do not support petitioner's stand. FRANCISCO TANTUICO. after two extensions were granted the Office of the Solicitor General. VIRATA. (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements. ROMULO VILLA. 8. petitioner. The assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Bureau of Internal Revenue. (c) royalties. and CESAR E. (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership. 135 is a valid exercise of the State's power to tax. Antero Sison for petitioner and for his own behalf. Minister of Budget. . there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses 6 of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. ANCHETA. which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income. 2 Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof. Bureau of Internal Revenue. Minister of Finance. MANUEL ALBA.

Absent such a showing. 4. an inherent prerogative. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that were the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked. 1. of course. To praphrase a recent decision. all petitioner does. Justice Frankfurter could rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. both the due process and equal protection clauses inay properly be invoked." 14 In a separate opinion in Graves v. In any case therefore where it can be demonstrated that the challenged statutory provision — as petitioner here alleges — fails to abide by its command. The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. considering that they arc not fixed rules but rather broad standards. The power to tax moreover. does not suffice.This Court finds such a plea more than justified. It is the strongest of all the powers of of government. then this Court must so declare and adjudge it null. The power to tax. there would -be truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy. The petition must be dismissed. as here. This Court then is left with no choice. The reason was so clearly set forth by retired Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally. The Constitution as the fundamental law overrides any legislative or executive. unfortunate remark characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric [attributable to] the intellectual fashion of the times following] a free use of absolutes. taxes being the lifeblood of the government. Justice Holmess pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits. he has not made out a case. to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. the presumption of validity must prevail. to borrow from Justice Malcolm. their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. New York. 12 2. has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions." 11 Hence the need for more revenues." 16 This is merely to emphasize that it is riot and there cannot be such a constitutional mandate. 3. The injury thus is centered on the question of whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm. 18 . It is the source of the bulk of public funds. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider scope. He alleges arbitrariness. The Constitution sets forth such limits . if it were otherwise." 13 It is. to be admitted that for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined." 17 So it is in the Philippines. act that runs counter to it. A mere allegation. There are restrictions. Adversely affecting as it does properly rights. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void or its face. there is a need for of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. "is an attribute of sovereignty. 15 Justice Frankfurter. after referring to it as an 1.' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the laws. or is not for a public purpose. because this is hardly attainable. The equal protection clause is. It did not arise until nine years later." 27 The problem of classification did not present itself in that case. in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable. address to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. 25 decided in 1940. Araneta. Now for equal protection. or at the very least. it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation. discrimination that finds no support in reason. in a leading case of Lutz V. both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Reyes. or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. B and C. but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties. 22 this Court. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. There is. or. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state.5.B. however." 24 This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v. 19 6. whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility. It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. As a matter of fact. through Justice J. when the Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at . wisdom. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. " 26 He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner. it is subject to attack on due process grounds. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges. inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity.L. those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.'" 23 7. According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be uniform and equitable. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the view that classification if rational in character is allowable. They do not relate to abstract units A.' and laws are not abstract propositions. Yatco. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumtances which if not Identical are analogous. as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. the conditions not being different. of course. That would be a clear abuse of power." 20 That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the lice power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that the governmental act assailed. went so far as to hold "at any rate.

Taxpayers may be classified into different categories.: . therefore. . Victorio S. what misled petitioner is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. Davao City. J. As there is practically no overhead expense. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. Further on this point. discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. 28 As clarified by Justice Tuason. considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision.the same rate. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income. respondents. in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen. KAPUNAN. Nothing can be clearer. petitioner. Apparently." 30 8. and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification. the. 10. equal protection. vs. Advincula for petitioner. ISHMAEL HIMAGAN. To repeat. 31 (2) the force of controlling doctrines on due process. Costs against petitioner. 9. these taxpayers are e not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. where "the differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform. Br. 135. . firms and corporations placed in similar situation." 29 There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons. 11. it. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. RTC. On the other hand. there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. WHEREFORE... than that the petition is without merit. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO. the petition is dismissed.

47. Provided. 4 and Layno v. that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and. Branch 11. Jr. a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan. also.A. which shall be subject to continuous trial. Sandiganbayan. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). he is covered by the Civil Service Law. the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated . Davao City. on our ruling in Deloso v. 7 Hence. R. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. 5 In his order dated December 14. Davao City. 91.Petitioner. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police. denied. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. considering that while the first sentence of Sec. That when the delay in the disposition of the . 1993 6 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R. is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days. There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more.D. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree. likewise. was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar. which provides: Sec. On October 11. 3 relying on Section 42 of P. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated". In dispute however. We find the petition devoid of merit. under Sec. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. Sandiganbayan. particularly Sec. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation . 6975. petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension. 6975. 91 of RA 6975 which reads: Sec. which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days. the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. on September 16. — When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee. the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47. shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused. 1992. the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service. 42. 807 of the Civil Service Decree. otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case. 1993.A. thus: Sec.

9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial. 47 of R. Nonetheless. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. The two can stand independently of each other. plain and free from ambiguity. We disagree. Certainly. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 10 Second. 91 of R. the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and. as here. 42 of PD 807.A.A. 47 of R. to criminal 8 or civil liability. he is not without a remedy. 6975 is clear. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days". "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days. The language of the first sentence of Sec. The first refers to the period of suspension.A. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.case is due to the fault. First. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence. the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment. negligence or petition of the respondent. Petitioner misapplies Sec. What is more. rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case.A. He further asserts that the requirements in Sec. there is nothing in R. the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. Sec. in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant. not in criminal cases. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case. Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. prohibition or mandamus. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.A. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. 47 of R.A. the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari. . should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. 6975.

there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. He was elected precisely to do so. Third. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Moreover. contrary . If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. Thus: 2. There is likewise an equal protection question. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. Should he be convicted by final judgment. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated. that is.A. 13 of R.A. is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Nor is he the only victim. as in this instance. For even if thereafter he were acquitted. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice.A. In that sense. Clearly. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. in effect. 3. for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President. 3019 (1060). was preventively suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under R. A preventive suspension may be justified. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. shall be suspended from office. can be preventively suspended indefinitely. the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga. Executive Secretary. the duly elected mayor of Lianga. Its continuance. if there be a criminal action. he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. 3019 reads as follows: Suspension and loss of benefits. he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which. the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.A. 1983. unlike R. he has been unable to. In the case of Layno. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can. be proceeded against administratively or. 6975. As of October 26. in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. of course. Sec. be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing. criminally. Hon. His term of office does not expire until 1986." It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. Surigao del Sur. any of them could. preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. For misfeasance or malfeasance. 3019 (1060). however. he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. his culpability must be established. In either case. but if he is acquitted. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6995 provides differently. facing administrative charges. Surigao del Sur. there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court. to paraphrase Justice Cardozo.

the jurisdiction.A. Okay. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. The case of Deloso. Ah. 47 of R. In case they are charged with crimes. the preventive suspension should be lifted. Nothing else should be read into the law. Not so in the instant case. such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. the previous one is administrative. no. be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing. The law is clear. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R." It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R. the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension. Ano. if it is charged with a crime. the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as provincial governor. Now.to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law. likewise.A. GONZALES. in violation of the Constitution. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. . ZAMORA. the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. MACEDA). ZAMORA. To do so would be 11 to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. As previously emphasized. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Clearly then. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. the meaning of Section 47 of R. the courts mismo ang magsasabing . REP. 6975. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension. applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection. faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno. regular courts. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). The jurisdiction if there is robbery. In this particular case. ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this all about? REP. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. This Court. MACEDA). . nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial. SEN. also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.A.A. No. their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the . We quote: So other than that in that particular section. 12 Fourth. his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect.

Grave felonies ito e. PIMENTEL. Hindi. . pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme. The trial must be done within ninety days. Anyway. . sometimes ten years pa nga e. xxx xxx xxx SEN. SEN. hindi magandang tingnan e. REP. hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e. Not only that. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao. PIMENTEL. REP. GUTANG. Okay. Page 29 — Preventive Suspension." REP. ZAMORA. REP. PIMENTEL. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. MACEDA). So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses. ganoon ba and ." Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. ALBANO. okay na. but the case must be terminated within a period.penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more. . let us just assume that a case can be. SAGUISAG. SEN. Hindi. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. . dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e. PIMENTEL. SEN. but maybe we should mandate. ZAMORA. Six years and one day or more. okay. Where are we now Mr. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial. GUTANG.? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. Rene? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Chairman. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court. REP. the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated. GONZALES. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e. Ibig sabihin. REP. . ALBANO. SEN. SEN. PIMENTEL. . SEN. . . and ibig kong sabihin. MACEDA). Ha? REP. Twenty days. can run to six years bago ma-terminate. Continuous hearing. ALBANO. as Rene pointed out. Anong page iyan.

iyon na nga. PIMENTEL.SEN. xxx xxx xxx . No. One solution. treason. REP. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking. SEN. Chairman. No. Ang point ni Ernie. we will shorten it up in a case like this. Mr. but as a standard procedure. REP. aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon. No. PIMENTEL. Yes. SAGUISAG. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days. Then you can legislate. ANGARA. but at least. that's really only the directory . All of these. because you can legislate at least. Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the law? SEN. (SEN. but is that a constitutional provision? Is it? REP. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. We are really keen on having it quick. ALBANO. SEN. PIMENTEL. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension. PIMENTEL. No. THE CHAIRMAN. looks exactly the same thing. robbery. ALBANO. SEN. ANGARA. ZAMORA. SEN. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more. rape. MACEDA). MACEDA). well. REP. the preventive suspension is only ninety days. but. we are looking at some solution to a particular situation. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan. . REP. Correct. so it must be already a grave felony. PIMENTEL. swift. . The case filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. Chairman. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. correct. SEN. Swift justice. MACEDA). of murder. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year from the time . let's say. . PIMENTEL. Mr. . SEN. I know. SEN. because this particular provision is for criminal cases. ALBANO.

Okay. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike. . . MACEDA). we can use the Veloso case. that's what I am saying. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. Okay. . "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . SEN. ANGARA. . The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. SEN. . please. . the equal protection clause . 14 Thus. under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. . as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. ALBANO. ANGARA. MACEDA).REP. . . . No. MACEDA). so let's study that. for policeman. So just on the National Police Commission . . So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police 13 Commission. . The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated. . Recognizing the existence of real differences among men. his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed." whatever we agree. but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. that's too short. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. So let us study what kind of language could be done along that line. What I mean to say is. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. .A. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending. What Rene is just trying to say is. The feeling here is. he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated. the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. preventive suspension.

18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. . A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable.does not absolutely forbid classifications. ACCORDINGLY. such as the one which exists in the instant case. 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions. 16 applies to all members of the same class. 15 is germane to the purpose of the law. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences. the petition is hereby DISMISSED. capricious nor unfounded. SO ORDERED.