This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts

for publication in the IEEE ICC 2011 proceedings

Measuring and Analyzing WiMAX Security and QoS in Testbed Experiments
Perumalraja Rengaraju, Chung-Horng Lung
Department of Systems and Computer Engineering Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada {rpraja, chlung}@sce.carleton.ca

Anand Srinivasan
EION Inc. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada anand@eion.com compatibility and interoperability with the legacy systems. The PHY layer functions are specific to physical transmit receive functions and wireless channel types. The MAC layer functions are divided into three sublayers: MAC convergence sublayer for data plane functions such as packet processing and etc.; MAC common part sublayer for MAC control functions; and security sublayer to provide the strong security for both network and users. The MAC security sublayer specifies the security functionalities and its implementations. The security sublayer supports are to: (i) authenticate the user when the user enters into the network, (ii) authorize the user, if the user has provisioned by the network service provider, and then (iii) provide the necessary encryption support for the key transfer and data traffic [4]. An overview of security functions defined in the standards is discussed in section II. Even though the IEEE 802.16 standards provide well defined security architecture, some security issues still exist due to unauthenticated / unencrypted MAC control messages. Many existing research efforts suggest solutions for each security threats based on public key management (PKM) protocol and some of ISPs have tried IPSec in practice for the implementation perspective. The default security mechanism provided by the layer-3 virtual private networks (VPNs) is IPSec. But IPSec often affects the QoS performance, since the 40-byte IPSec header in each packet consumes additional bandwidth. While providing strong security for an access network with IPSec, the existing QoS support should not be affected. Similar studies have been conducted only in simulations [7-8]. Actual experiments and measurements are essential for practitioners and researchers for better analysis. In this paper, the QoS parameters such as subscriber station (SS) connectivity time, throughput, frame loss and latency are evaluated with testbed experiments for both standard IEEE 802.16d WiMAX MAC layer security and IPSec on top of MAC security. Based on the test results, the security level, scalability and QoS support of each scheme is analyzed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the standard IEEE 802.16d WiMAX MAC layer security. Section III describes the existing security issues in the current WiMAX networks and their solutions from the related works. Testbed experiments and the results are demonstrated IV. Security level, scalability and QoS support of each scheme is analyzed in section V. The last section VI is the conclusion.

Abstract—Providing strong security is necessary for any wireless access networks. The latest broadband access network implementations are based on WiMAX and LTE, since they support high data rate and mobility. The WiMAX network has well structured QoS mechanisms and security architecture to support all kinds of fixed, mobile and multihop network users. Even though the existing fixed WiMAX network has well defined security architecture, it has many security issues like rouge Base Station (BS), Denial of Service (DoS) and etc. The rouge BS issue was solved in mobile WiMAX network, but the other security issues in fixed WiMAX network and the issues related to mobility like handover latency issues still exist. Most of the existing security issues in fixed and mobile WiMAX networks are solved in the upcoming international mobile telecommunication (IMT) Advanced WiMAX network. But there are still some security issues due to high mobility support and advanced Medium Access Control (MAC) functionalities. On the other hand, Internet service providers may use the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) for their wireless access due to its popularity in wired network. But IPSec usually will affect the QoS performance, since the IPSec header in each packet consumes additional bandwidth. Little research based on real experiments has been reported comparing WiMAX standard security and IPSec. In this paper, the security supported by the standards and IPSec for fixed WiMAX network is evaluated using testbed experiments. From the experimental results and existing research efforts, the security level and QoS support of theoretical and practical security schemes are analyzed. Keywords-IEEE 802.16, WiMAX, Security, IPSec

I.

INTRODUCTION

WIMAX stands for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access. It is the technology aimed to provide broadband wireless data access over long distances [1]. It is based on IEEE 802.16 standards [1-3] and the standard defines only the physical (PHY) layer and MAC layer functionalities. The technology provides basic Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity and connection-oriented wireless communications to the end users. The initial IEEE 802.16d standard is specific to fixed and nomadic users. Based on increasing mobile user requirements and to increase the coverage region, the IEEE standard released the 802.16e and 802.16j versions. Currently, the IEEE 802.16m task group is working to support the IMTAdvanced requirements [3]. The existing security issues in mobile WiMAX networks and QoS improvements are considered in IEEE 802.16m standard and it has full backward

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B. For securing the Multicast Broadcast Service (MBS) communications.16m network has more security support.16d standard is based on PKMv1 protocol. Most of these issues have been resolved by the later version of PKMv2 protocol in the IEEE 802. Figure 1. Once the MS succeeded in ranging process. an intermediate RS can collect a number of messages from the connected MSs.16m are pretty much similar to the mobile WiMAX standard. X509 digital certificate and etc. BS has to authorize the user by an unique security association identity (SAID) using SA-TEK challenge messages.16e standard. The AAA server authenticates the device and provides the master session key (MSK) in an EAP-TTLS • • • . PKMv2 based initial ranging and connectivity is shown in Figure 1. Then ASN GW forwards PKM-REQ to AAA server over radius protocol. Both fixed and mobile WiMAX have two-component protocols: (i) an encapsulation protocol for data encryption and authentication algorithms. The Device and User Authentication using EAP provides support for credentials that are subscriber ID module (SIM). but it has many security issues like rouge BS introduction. authorization. PKM-REQ message contains the subscriber ID module or X509 certificate. GKEK is encrypted by the Key Encryption Key (KEK) which is derived from the AK of the MS. The authenticator in access network gateway (ASN GW) sends an EAP Identity request to the MS and the MS will respond to the request by sending PKM-REQ message.16m. Security Associations are static (no dynamic associations are supported). or MD5-based HMAC (Message Digest based Hashed MAC) schemes. Security in Fixed and Mobile WiMAX Networks [4] The security architecture of the IEEE 802. then encapsulate them and send it in a separate tunnel). or RSs and SSs/MSs. after downlink channel synchronization. security association (SA) and secured data transfer are shown in a shaded blocks in Figure 1. protocol. as depicted in the second shaded block in Figure 1. For each SA. Once the BS receives the RNG_REQ. The additional features are: • • The network may use either centralized or distributed security mode. Either 3-DES (Data Encryption Standard) or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is the ciphering method used for protecting all the user data over the Mobile WiMAX networks. The message flows in EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security) based authentication is shown in Figure 1. The authenticator generates AK from MSK and forwards it to the BS. AN OVERVIEW OF WIMAX NETWORK SECURITY A. Security in Multihop WiMAX Networks[2. IEEE 802. . Then it forwards MSK to the authenticator. At the same time MS also generates the same AK from MSK. initially the BS transmits the Group Key Encryption Key (GKEK) and Group Traffic Encryption Key (GTEK) to each MS via unicast messages. TEKs are derived at MS not in the BS and the encryption algorithms are AES based algorithms only.16e provides a flexible solution that supports device and user authentication between mobile station (MS) and the home connectivity service network (CSN) to solve the rouge BS issue. In response.16m network. MS will send the ranging request (RNG-REQ) message in a specified contention slots. EAP based Authentication: Authentication addresses establishing the genuine identity of the device or user wishing to join a wireless network. An establishment of a Security Zone (SZ): SZs are the set of trusted relationships between a BS and SSs/MSs. In a multihop network. The BS delivers SZ key (SZK) material encrypted by SZ key encryption key (SZKEK) to provide integrity protection of management messages in the SZ. time and power offset values in the RNG_RSP message. Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) is used to refresh those keys periodically. Authorization and SA: Once the device or the user is authenticated by the network. TEK is refreshed by the BS periodically to add further protections. the BS provides both uplink and downlink transport encryption keys (TEK) to encrypt the data.509 certificate. The Authorization Request includes MS’s X. Now the BS and MS can mutually authenticate each other using AK. Transport tunnel connections may be established between the BS and an access RS to encapsulate the payload. Initial ranging and network entry in mobile WiMAX [4] As presented in Figure 1. The subsequent steps.16j and 802. In 802.This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2011 proceedings II. it informs the frequency. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) based authentication. After the initial authentication/authorization from AAA. MAC Control messages are protected using AES-based CMAC (Cipher based Message Authentication Code).3] The basic security architecture in 802. the BS sends back an Authorization reply which contains the AK encrypted with the MS’s public key. encryption algorithms and cryptographic ID. In 802. (ii) a key management protocol (PKMv2) providing the secure distribution of keying data from the BS to the MS. a lifetime key and an SAID. but 802. it negotiates for basic capabilities in the SBC_REQ and the SBC_RSP messages. the BS reauthorizes the MS periodically Traffic Encryption and Message Protection: The MS establishes a SA for each service flow.

In NC. Network coding (NC) technique is used in IEEE 802. an MS scans the downlink channel for synchronization. 7. TESTBED EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS The WiMAX testbed experiments consist of one IEEE 802. pollution attacks and entropy attacks. authorization. Latency and re-authentication issues during handovers: When a handover occurs. key renewal is used (using the key agreement protocol) during fast handover. where the BSODU and SSs are wireless devices and BS-IDU acts as a gateway for the BS-ODU unit. Now the rouge node sends the RNG_RSP message instead of BS with the status of RNG_REQ failed. handover latency issue can be solved by pre-authentication methods.168. 2. BS informs the MS whether the MS needs to do reauthentication with the target BS or not. In the MIP scheme. These downgrade attack and bandwidth spoofing can be solved by using the basic intelligence in the BS. III. Bandwidth spoofing may happen if the attackers send the continuous bandwidth request messages to BS. So the initial ranging process is secured and the MAC messages are encrypted. The distributed security architecture using ECDH protocol in [5] supports secured hop-by-hop authentication and tunnel mode forwarding. Mobile IP (MIP) scheme [4] and elliptic curve D-H (ECDH) protocol [5] are the possible pre-authentication methods. one indoor unit (IDU) and two Libra MAX SSs. time and power offsets. IV. AMS-ID is used for key derivation purpose and for initial and handover ranging. multiple packets are linearly or randomly combined together to generate a network coded packets. In the handover response message. But data forwarding using the tunnel mode in a distributed security architecture is a hidden problem since there is no SA between access RS and BS.16m network: No protection. This RNG-RSP vulnerability can be solved by DiffieHellman (D-H) key agreement [4. The major security issues are [4. This leads to the DoS attack. 3. In that BS and MS share their public key before RNG_REQ and RNG_RSP messages. The traffic generation / performance analysis tool used for the testbed is IXIA.This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2011 proceedings • • Three levels of MAC management message protections are supported in the 802. Instead of re-authentication. which makes bandwidth scare for original users. the attacker may act as rouge BS and it responds to the MS a RNG_REQ message or it intrudes and modifies the BS RNG_RSP message. The network which is left side of the IPSec tunnel is Left Subnet and right side is the Right subnet. In this initial ranging process. The BS and SSs connectivity setup is shown in Figure 2 and the system parameters are shown in Table I. 5. and accounting (AAA) severs are running on the BS-IDU unit. So the MS tries initial ranging again. 6.xxx network and also left side of the IPSec tunnel interfaces. The pollution attacks can be launched by injecting polluted information or modifying messages and entropy attacks can be regarded as special reply attack. which affects the delay sensitive applications. BS responds to an MS with a RNG_RSP message to nullify the frequency. Downgrade attack may happen if the intruder modifies the security level as low in the MS basic capability message. These RNG_REQ. For this issue the BS should allocate the bandwidth based on the provisioning of the MS. SECURITY ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS authentication is done with the target BS layer-3 MIP tunneling protocol. In ECDH protocol current BS passes the authentication information to the target BS with the help of public key encryption. the intermediate nodes between the sender and the receiver should be legitimate users. BS may just ignore the MS capability message if the security level is lower than a certain limit. Pollution and entropy attacks are more vulnerable in network coding techniques. 4.5].2. Then the MS moves to the initial ranging process by sending a RNG_REQ message. the MS cannot access the network.16m network for enhanced MBS. If the MS is preauthenticated by the target BS before handover. This leads to network coding issue such as node selection. In a multihop wireless network. These security issues in network coding also can be solved by ECDH protocol [5] using neighbor authentication. pre- . CMAC and Encrypted by AES-CCM.16m network DoS/Reply attacks during an MS Initial network entry: During the initial process. BS may allocate more resources. This re-authentication and key exchange procedure increase the handover time. then there is no need of device re-authentication but user authorization is still necessary. Since the 802.16d based EION’s Libra MAX BS outdoor unit (ODU).5]: 1. This issue can be solved when all the nodes between the sender and the receiver establishes the hopby-hop authentication. The standard’s distributed security architecture mode enables the hop-by-hop authentication. Both SS1 and SS2 belong to 192. A network management system (NMS) and the authentication. So the BS also uses low level security algorithm for that MS and the attacker may easily hack the system. For this issue. For configuration and management purposes one of the SSs (SS1 in Figure 1) is connected to PC through the The causes of MAC layer security issues are due to certain unencrypted MAC management messages. otherwise the intruder may hack the system and the whole system is vulnerable. RNG_ RSP and subsequent MAC messages until the establishing SA shown in Figure 1 are unencrypted messages. DoS/Reply attacks during an MS initial network entry Latency and re-authentication issues during handovers Downgrade attack and bandwidth spoofing Cryptographic algorithm computational efficiency Hop-by-hop authentication issue in a multihop network Tunnel mode data forwarding issue in a multihop network Network coding issue in a IEEE 802. the MS is re-authenticated and authorized by the target BS. If the attacker continuously sets the RNG-REQ status as failed.16m standard suggests key renewal instead of re-authentication during handovers.

it is evident that the IPSec consumes significant more time for IPSec connection and SS connectivity latency is higher (~67% for SS1 and 100% for SS2). 7Mhz bandwidth IXIA 1500 bytes Pkt.3. 5Mbps UL and 5Mbps DL is configured for both the SSs.2. Parameter Components Compliance Frequency Specifications Performance Analyzer IXIA Frame specification IPSec TABLE II.0/24 IPSec.5Mbps. The frame losses in IPSec scheme increases as the link capacity increases. Figure 4 shows the end-to-end frame loss performance with respect to the total link capacities of the two SSs.2. Size.status verification (command execution) /sub/lm_scripts # ipsec eroute 0 192.3.168. So the IPSec solution does not seem suitable for mobile WiMAX networks.6 in BS-IDU. IPSec handshake messages .This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2011 proceedings switch. it is clear that the IXIA end-to-end throughput of IPSec security scheme is less than that of the MAC layer security scheme for the same capacity.214 leftsubnet= 192.16d 3. Average delay/latency experienced by the traffic for different link capacity is shown in Figure 5. For mobile networks. MS needs to be re-authenticated and authorized for existing service flows. the IPSec security scheme has much more packet losses (> 3 times of the MAC layer security scheme).2. From the results. For 20Mbps provisioning. The IPSec configurations.2.168.168. there are small drops in frames due to 10-byte MAC layer overhead.168.200 Rightsubnet= 192. The standard’s MAC layer security has PKMv1 based authentication and 3-DES (data encryption standard) encryption algorithm for data security.5Ghz operating freq. additional overhead in layer-3 and layer-2 headers increases the payload size before entering into the wireless interfaces.2.0/24 Figure 3 shows the throughput (in Mbps) of the system for both security schemes. Since the system capacity (BS) is close to 19Mbps. which may affect the quality of experience (QoE) of the application. Once the SSs establish the connectivity with the BS ODU. IXIA endto-end throughput will not increase beyond ~18. 2. The packet drop increases in both schemes when the input traffic exceeds the practical system capacity of ~18. The QoS performance metrics used in the experiments are SS connectivity latency.168.168. 2. Delay experienced in the IPSec security scheme is also much higher (~100% for > 10Mbps) than that of the MAC layer security scheme. the IPSec tunnel has to be broken with the current BS and re-established with the target BS during handoff.0/24 => tun0x1002@192. handshake messages. From the results.168.168. traffic is transmitted for the total provisioned wireless capacity and the receiving traffic is also noted. BS-IDU and SSs IEEE 802. expecting MR3 108 "my_conn" #1: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3. This 40-byte overhead in IPSec tunnel and 10byte MAC layer overhead increases the frame losses for IPSec security scheme. it initiates IPSec connection with the BS-IDU. Even though the IXIA traffic and wireless link capacity is the same. and connection establishment status are shown in Table II.214' pluto[874]: "my_conn" #1: transition from state STATE_MAIN_I3 to state STATE_MAIN_I4 pluto[874]: "my_conn" #1: STATE_MAIN_I4: ISAKMP SA established { auth=OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY cipher=oakley_3des_cbc_192 prf=oakley_md5 group=modp15 36} IPSec connection .Console (serial port) output at SS 1 pluto[874]: "my_conn" #1: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3.168. The provisioning of wireless link capacity is configured in AAA server.0/24 -> 192. In case of mobile WiMAX networks.3.168. Wireless connectivity is established by wireless radio frequency (RF) cables with 60dB attenuators instead of wireless medium. The difference in throughput performance is due to additional overhead of 40 bytes IPSec header for each frame. Since 40-byte IPSec header is added to each frame at BS-IDU for DL traffic and at the SS for UL traffic before entering into the IPSec tunnel.5Mbps. Ethernet cables are used to connect the devices other than wireless interface. The layer-3 IPSec tunnel was enabled from the SSs to BS-IDU units.2. SS CONNECTIVITY TIME Connection latency SS1 = 6 Sec and SS2 = 6 Sec SS1 = 10 Sec and SS2 = 12 Sec Security scheme WiMAX MAC security Both MAC layer and IPSec security Figure 2.168.0/24 right=192.214 The security schemes used in the experiments are standard WiMAX MAC security and layer-3 pre-shared key IPSec on the top of the MAC layer security.3. the average delay experienced by the IPSec scheme is very high. Testbed setup – Connection diagram TABLE I.214 leftsubnet= 192. On the other hand.3. TABLE III.2. Because the . frame loss and latency.conf file in BS-IDU interfaces="ipsec0=eth0" left=192. throughput. Provisioning of uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) wireless link of both the SSs in AAA server is varied from 0 to 20Mbps (~ the theoretical limit for 7 Mhz bandwidth).200 Rightsubnet= 192.4 in SSs IPSEC CONFIGURATION AND STATUS VERIFICATION IPSec. Table 3 shows the SS connectivity time with the standard MAC layer security and IPSec.168.conf file in SS Inter faces="ipsec0=ofdm" left=192. SYSTEM PARAMETERS Value LibraMAX BS-ODU. This increase in delay is due to the processing time for IPSec encryption and additional queuing delay at SSs and BS. expecting MR3 pluto[874]: "my_conn" #1: Main mode peer ID is ID_IPV4_ADDR: '192. TCP packet Openswan ver. For the standard MAC layer security scheme.0/24 right=192. MS connectivity latency is one of the main QoS requirements during handover time. Using IXIA. The BS and SSs are operating in a static routing mode. When the wireless link capacity reaches the maximum value of 20Mbps.

.. 2009. IEEE Press 2009. pp 1999-2003.16m TGm“IEEE 802.16 Wireless Networks” Proc. This paper presents results from testbed experiments which is both practically and theoretically important for further analysis and comparison..16d security scheme. IEEE 802. But it still will not support for high mobility scenarios. on Science and Tech. Since both the security and QoS are important for upcoming WiMAX networks. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH not support mobility. IPSec is combined with MIP along with some modifications [6]. IEEE Vehicular Tech. WiMAX networks have well defined QoS architecture and security mechanisms defined by the IEEE 802. 80216m-08-0034r1”. 2003. Canada. pp 85-90. latency & frame loss perform.16 -2009 “IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks Part 16: Air Interface for Broadband Wireless Access Systems”. pp 439-444. Frame Loss Performance ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SECURITY SCHEMES IPSec on the top WiMAX MAC Very high. On the other hand. of the 58th IEEE VTC Conf. However. ECDH protocol eliminates all MAC layer security issues in the network and may give similar QoS performance of existing WiMAX MAC layer security. IEEE Press 2009. Throughput and latency are close to theoretical. Issue 1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project is funded by EION Wireless and Ontario Centres of Excellence (OCE). P Rengaraju. Initial connectivity latency is similar and handover latency is lower than IEEE 802. Barka E and et al. on Privacy. “Impact of IPSec on the Performance of the IEEE 802. Throughput Performance TABLE IV.This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE ICC 2011 proceedings Throughput Performance 20 18 700 MAC Security scheme IPSec Security scheme 600 MAC Security scheme IPSec Security scheme Frame Loss Performance 200 180 160 140 MAC Security scheme IPSec Security scheme Latency Performance O u tp u t U L + D L tr a ffic in M b ps 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 2 Num ber of Fram es L ost 400 300 200 100 0 0 L a te n c y in m se c 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 500 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Input UL+DL traffic in Mbps(UL=DL) Input UL+DL traffic in Mbps(UL=DL) Input UL+DL traffic in Mbps(UL=DL) Figure 3. it provides strong security Same as IEEE 802. Byoung-Jo K.54-61. Similar to that of the IEEE 802. It leads to some major security threats which are defined in Section III. 2010. and Sec. IEEE Press 2009.16j -2009 “IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks Part 16: Air Interface for Broadband Wireless Access Systems Amendment 1: Multiple Relay Specification”. Latency and frame losses are high Figure 5. Srinivasan S “Simple Mobility Support for IPsec Tunnel Mode” Proc. Minimum frame losses ECDH implementation at MAC layer Similar to standard’s security support It eliminates all MAC control security threats..16m System Description Document.. Criterion Security for data Security for MAC control messages Initial and handover connectivity latency Throughput. IEEE 802. Proc. VI. Mob. no articles have reported actual experiments on or real measurements of the overhead of IPSec.16d security scheme. Nazaryan L and et al. C-H. Security and Trust. Even though IPSec provides strong data security using IPSec tunnels for both wired and wireless networks. ISPs have tried IPSec tunnels for fixed WiMAX networks on top of the basic MAC layer security. The EDCH scheme needs more research for real time testing and evaluations. Lung and A.Srinivasan " Design of Distributed Security Architecture for Multihop WiMAX Networks” Proc. [2] In this paper.Srinivasan " An Analysis on mobile WiMAX Security". which is summarized in Table IV.16d standard security scheme V. “IPSec Provisioning in WiMAX Networks”. Throughput is slightly reduced. of New Tech. C-H. Figure 4. the QoS measures of both the standard WiMAX MAC layer security and IPSec are evaluated using testbed experiments. of IEEE Toronto Int'l Conf. Apart from that. Both initial and handover latency time are same and the latency is ~ 5 Sec. pp. From the practical perspective. some researchers illustrate their solutions using the ECDH protocol. From the theoretical aspect.. for Humanity. But it has some security issues due to unencrypted / unauthenticated MAC messages. we compared and analyzed the performance of these three security schemes. modified IPSec may be combined with mobile IP (MIP) to support the mobility. P Rengaraju.16 standards. Mag. Based on the existing research. Since IPSec tunnels are very difficult to break. ANALYSIS OF WIMAX SECURITY SCHEMES Three security schemes are considered for this analysis: WiMAX MAC layer security defined by the standards and IPSec security on top of MAC layer security from practical implementations and from theoretical studies of ECDH protocol proposed at the MAC layer. of 8th Annual Conf.2008. Lung and A. REFERENCES [1] IEEE 802. it is known that its QoS performance will be affected due to the overhead. Latency Performance WiMAX security compliance to standards High Some MAC control messages are unencrypted. For mobility support. It also suffers the same security threats defined in Section III Both initial and handover latency are high. 2010. IPSec security scheme does not eliminate any of the WiMAX MAC level security issues and also does [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .