Interdependence, institutions and the bala...

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Paul A.Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I, International Security, Vol. 20, no. 4 Spring 1996
Economic ties were more extensive and significant in the period before 1914 than at any time before or since, and the chief protagonists of the period, Britain and Germany, were one another's best customers. Yet Britain and Germany pursued much different foreign policies; Germany pursued an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy and Britain responded with an ambivalent "straddle policy" toward Germany that was a mix of balancing and conciliation. Many argue that such disparate behavior and the outbreak of World War I falsify the view held by many liberal theorists of international relations that high levels of economic interdependence are conducive to peace; realist critics also suggest that this affirms their position that the requisites of high politics dominate in international politics.(1) While the First World War clearly contravenes the liberal view, I argue that the realists are also wrong. Economic interdependence had a profound effect on British and German strategies in balance-of-power politics in the period leading up to August 1914, but the two pursued much different foreign policies because of the different ways their 5/27/2013

Interdependence, institutions and the bala... Page 2 of 74 domestic political institutions aggregated political and economic interests. I first make this argument theoretically, refining and synthesizing liberal and realist perspectives to explain great-power strategies since the late nineteenth century.(2) The nature of economic ties, I argue, is a critical determinant of whether societal economic interests will support or oppose a state's security goals and policies. However, domestic political institutions affect whether internationalist or domestic-oriented economic interests are politically salient and able to affect strategic decisions. Thus, economic ties and political institutions determine whether strategists have the capacity to balance against threats they perceive, and whether they might pursue expansionist goals. Moreover, I argue, these domestic mobilization processes affect the expectations that state leaders have about one another's intentions, and this has a strong effect on the international strategic interaction process between potential allies and adversaries. Thus, by affecting both the capacities of state leaders and others' expectations, economic ties and political institutions determine the strategies great powers pursue in balance-of-power politics. The next section elucidates my theory, which is then used to explain the behaviors of Britain and Germany, the pivotal actors in European balance-of-power politics in the period leading up to August 1914. The article 5/27/2013

Interdependence, institutions and the bala... Page 3 of 74 concludes by drawing out implications for international relations theory, the future of international politics, and policy. A Theory of Great Power Strategies Balance-of-power politics are important, but my theory goes beyond realist conceptions(3) and draws from liberal theory to incorporate variations in domestic economic and political structures to account for strategies. Such a refinement of balance-of-power theory is necessary because state behavior is structurally determined and thus endogenous to the realist models, and so they cannot explain deviations from equilibrium - such as the emergence of threats, the failure of states to balance, and the outbreak of war in a system where balances of power are said to recur. (4) To explain balancing behavior and the prospects for conflict, we must recognize that states can have varied preferences in similar strategic situations, and that there is uncertainty about what those preferences will be. My model thus presumes that some states will be status quo powers - great powers which would prefer not to see an upset to the territorial status quo - while others may have revisionist aspirations.(5) Some national security leaders of status quo powers will, for reasons of domestic politics, have the capacity to balance against threats they perceive, while others will not. The strategies that status quo powers pursue will, 5/27/2013

and on others' expectations of their intentions.Interdependence.. this process has depended to a significant extent on the pattern and level of economic ties in the great power system as well as whether domestic https://www.(7) I hypothesize about how firmly or weakly status quo powers respond to perceived threats(8) . Because the societal interests generated by economic links often act as powerful constraints or incentives on leaders.mtholyoke. institutions and the bala. discounted by any conciliatory policies they pursue(9) and whether aspiring revisionist powers are likely to risk aggression... Using this framework and logic.which is determined by the extent to which they balance by augmenting their capabilities and taking a confrontational position to match and deter the threat. be signals in an uncertain world that affect whether other status quo powers will balance against threats and whether aspiring revisionist powers will risk aggression. on the capacity that status quo power strategists have had to mobilize to respond to that is. Page 4 of 74 in turn. since the modernization process of the late nineteenth century.. the theory then focuses on the impact that economic ties and political institutions have on the capacity of state strategists to mobilize against threats they perceive(6) and on others' expectations. What strategies are pursued has depended. to use military force to upset the territorial status quo. and how in turn the strategies of status quo and of aspiring revisionist powers are affected. 5/27/2013 .

urbanization.. while aspiring revisionist powers will see openings for successful aggression in these MODERNIZATION AND MOBILIZATION CAPACITY Beginning in the late nineteenth century. political centralization. or because they have had https://www.. and may even impel them to pursue conciliatory policies. institutions and the bala. I predict that firm balancing behavior that deters aspiring revisionist powers depends on there being extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such ties between them and aspiring revisionist powers.. for they have often been constrained by groups that oppose a particular policy goal.. have political access.. and the rise of mass participation. Other patterns of economic ties tend to make it difficult for status quo power strategists to make credible balancing commitments. 5/27/2013 . and control valuable resources. and status quo powers must also have political institutions that give median economic interests a prominent voice. Page 5 of 74 political institutions give median economic interests a say in the political process. the great power system went through a process of modernization characterized by industrialization.Interdependence.mtholyoke. As a result. modern statesmen have not usually worked in a political vacuum or had unlimited resources at their disposal in pursuing security policies. Linkages between states and their societies thus grew tighter in most cases.

5/27/2013 .. their state's security policies. an interest in avoiding links with other countries.groups that either possess an economic stake in maintaining the trade. https://www.mtholyoke. since security policies typically entail significant economic costs and political implications... and will seek to influence.(11) First. but whether they do depends on the nature of domestic political institutions. it is important to consider whether modern strategists have the capacity to mobilize economic resources and political support from their societies.Interdependence. create and reflect the existence of vested interests .by the role played in the political process by vested interests created by international economic ties. if they are import-sensitive. economic ties. and by modern political leaders' need to be concerned with the effects of security policies on their states' economic links and economies. Page 6 of 74 to be sensitive to the consequences of costly security policies for the economy and for social welfare spending. and investments they have or. financial links. institutions and the bala. or the lack thereof. Hence. Economic ties can affect mobilization capacities in two ways .edu/acad/intrel/papa.. Vested interests are thus affected by.(10) ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THE MEDIATING IMPACT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Economic ties or their absence give rise to internationalist or domestic-oriented economic concerns that can affect the mobilization capacities of modern political leaders..

though. Since the welfare of their societies will not be strongly affected by what happens outside their state's borders.Interdependence. Both narrow interests and broader economic concerns. and so societal support for costly security policies will be lacking. If economic ties to other powers make a state highly sensitive or vulnerable to changes in others' policies. then. we would expect economic interest groups and the society at large as voters to be fairly powerful in relation to the state. Whether these economic concerns are important. Without extensive economic ties there are no such concerns with prospective adjustment costs. modern political leaders may feel constrained. depends on the nature of political institutions. This constrains state leaders in democracies to pursue policies that are largely consistent with the median preferences of vested institutions and the bala. 5/27/2013 . and thus whether security policies endanger or help preserve those links. In democracies.. In fact. modern political leaders may have to be concerned with the significant adjustment costs that would arise in their own economy should economic ties break down. Page 7 of 74 Economic links may also affect the mobilization process by their implications for the economy...mtholyoke... their societies will be inward-looking and opposed to bearing substantial costs for external security commitments and policies. may have political salience for strategists hoping to mobilize for balancing. It also impels them to be concerned with the prospective adjustment https://www.

and to be sensitive to the effects costly security policies have on their economies. when the dominant political coalition includes the internationalist economic interest groups we would expect to see as powerful in an open political system when economic ties are extensive.Interdependence. thus narrow (economic or non-economic) interest groups with disproportionate influence can capture national policy and shift it away from the preferences of median economic institutions and the bala. And in praetorian polities the institutional framework may not effectively assimilate struggles between competing groups.(12) Leaders may have similar sensibilities in some non-democracies.. therefore.mtholyoke. These states will be less predictable. or be shut out of.. and the credibility of their commitments relatively weak. In many authoritarian regimes. 5/27/2013 .(14) Leaders of status quo powers with such nondemocratic institutions will have a capacity to mobilize that will be unaffected by the nature of economic ties and associated societal interests. Page 8 of 74 costs their economies would suffer in the event of a breakdown in economic ties. for instance.(13) In other non-democracies. the leadership is quite autonomous from societal forces... those economic forces may have only a small role in. the political process. Such domestic political institutions may also account for why a great power might have and project https://www. or the domestic-oriented interest groups we would expect when ties are not extensive..

. given their stake in the international economy. 5/27/2013 ... this is a much less risky.(15) ECONOMIC TIES.mtholyoke. where the domestic political institutions of status quo powers allow median economic interests a significant voice in the process? https://www. AND EXPECTATIONS How do the economic interests generated by economic ties affect the balancing capacity of status quo power strategists and the expectations of others. BALANCING CAPACITY. and therefore more palatable. alternative than is imperialism against great powers. this accounts for why Germany pursued aggressive policies before the First World War despite being highly dependent on the international economy.. would typically be opposed to military expansionism that could risk war against great powers. if a great power's political institutions shut internationalist concerns out of the process and give prominence to domestic-oriented economic or other narrow interests. While such interests might advocate imperialism against small states to assure access (and often have). institutions and the bala. Internationalist concerns. As discussed below.. it is quite possible that an aggressive rather than pacific foreign policy will be pursued in the great power system even when that state has extensive economic ties to other great powers.Interdependence. Page 9 of 74 aggressive intentions despite being strongly tied to the international economy.

. and investments. 5/27/2013 . When a status quo power's dependence on other status quo powers is high.(16) Another reason that the capacity to balance against perceived threatening powers may be weak is that there could be a fear by both political leaders and societal actors that https://www. its strategists' capacities for making and coming through on balancing commitments can be expected to be quite strong. societal concerns reinforce the natural proclivities of national security leaders to oppose threats firmly. and so will be opposed to balancing (unless the security threat is perceived to imperil the economic links. institutions and the ba... In contrast.. One reason is that vested interests with strong economic ties to states deemed threatening powers by strategists are likely to be more reluctant to believe there is a danger. given their positive relationship. in which case societal economic interests would also have an interest in opposing the threat). therefore. ceteris the adjustment costs to a status quo power's economy will be substantial if its economic partners become victims of aggression and that market disappears. financial links.Interdependence. Page 10 of 74 As a given status quo power's dependence on other status quo powers approaches high levels.mtholyoke. Moreover. Vested interests with a stake in other status quo powers will have a strong interest in supporting security policies that protect trade.. this capacity for balancing will tend to decline as a status quo power's level of economic dependence on threatening powers increases.

Interdependence. Because of their transparency and domestic salience. institutions and the ba. Page 11 of 74 confrontational political-military policies could jeopardize the political foundations of economic links. and from political leaders wary about substantial economic adjustment costs if the ties were to break down as a result of confrontation.mtholyoke.. there may be a legitimate concern that confrontational policies would lead to a response that might include a severing of economic and so status quo powers are more apt to ally with one another and aspiring revisionist powers are more likely to be https://www. and thus shape the credibility of balancing commitments.(17) And because the firmness or weakness of a status quo power's behavior depends to a significant degree on the domestic support leaders have to act abroad. the response to a perceived threat is a signal to other powers that tends to reinforce initial assessments of a state's resolve. then.. international economic ties also provide information to leaders of potential allies and adversaries that shape their expectations about the capacities status quo power strategists have.. constraints on balancing may come from vested interests of a status quo power that have economic ties with perceived threatening powers.. If the threatening power has non-democratic political institutions that prevent internationalist economic interests in that state from having much of a say in the political process. For this reason too. strong balancing commitments by a status quo power will tend to be seen as sincere. 5/27/2013 .. Hence.

institutions and the ba.. though domestic political institutions may alter the process by giving prominence to actors with preferences at variance with median economic interests. This summarizes the likelihood of firm or weak responses to perceived threats by status quo powers and of aggression by aspiring revisionist powers in four idealtype worlds in which there are high or low levels of economic interdependence among status quo powers. SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES In sum.. Following on the foregoing discussion. Conversely..Interdependence..mtholyoke. and aspiring revisionist powers more optimistic about their chances for pursuing aggression without meeting firm and effective opposition. and presuming status quo powers are democracies or have other political institutions that give median economic interests a prominent voice in the we would expect the general outcomes shown in Table 1. 5/27/2013 . and between status quo and threatening powers with https://www.. weaker balancing and conciliatory policies by a status quo power will be signals that make other status quo powers more fearful that their potential ally may not come through on commitments. Page 12 of 74 deterred. the vested interests and prospective adjustment costs to economies generated by economic ties are likely to have a strong effect on the mobilization capacity of national security leaders hoping to balance against threats and on the expectations of other great powers.

mtholyoke. In such cases. if status quo powers are democracies or have other political institutions that give median economic interests a strong voice in the process. Only one of the four ideal-type worlds is predicted to have a stable balance-of-power system in which status quo powers respond firmly by balancing vigorously and peace is maintained because aspiring revisionist powers eschew aggression. Moreover. The world in which we are likely to see firm balancing behavior that deters aspiring revisionist powers is one in which there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such ties between them and aspiring revisionist powers (Cell 3 in Table 1). https://www. apparent domestic support. leaders of status quo powers will be able to play power politics actively. financial links. Hence. as societal preferences converge with those of state strategists. would be substantial. we should expect them to make both firm and credible balancing commitments. A large number of vested interests in status quo powers will have a strong interest in supporting balancing policies to help protect threatened trade. Page 13 of 74 revisionist aspirations. leaders of status quo powers will have a great capacity to mobilize for balancing. and investments.. and will be seen by other great powers as likely to come through on balancing commitments given the transparency of the stakes. 5/27/2013 . the adjustment costs to the economies of status quo powers. Hence.. institutions and the ba... if the links were to break down as a result of and lack of constraining economic interests.

edu/acad/intrel/papa. I would suggest. after 1905 the combination of FrancoRussian capabilities was no longer sufficient to deter the German threat without the help of the British.mtholyoke.and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers are more likely when economic interdependence is not strong between status quo powers (Cells 1 and 2) or when status quo powers have significant links with revisionist powers (Cells 2 and 4). In both there were significant and increasing economic ties among the allies that complemented the security motive... However.. institutions and the ba. for the development of the Franco-Russian alliance in the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905 (when actual and perceived Franco-Russian capabilities outweighed German muscle). Weak responses by status quo powers .Interdependence. 5/27/2013 . and the "long peace" of the post-1945 Cold War era. When economic https://www. the NATO alliance... and few ties with Germany (before 1905) or the Soviet Union (after 1945). This proposition helps account. The proposition also accounts for the continuation of the FrancoRussian alliance from 1906 to 1914. so it was not a credible counterweight even though it was perceived to be a tight alliance.partial balancing measures or non-alignment and conciliatory policies . and for American and west European strategy. Page 14 of 74 and aspiring revisionist powers are likely to be deterred. as the nature of economic ties remained similar to that of the preceding period.

but their interests will be less clear and thus the credibility of their external commitments to potential allies and toward potential adversaries will be low. domestic support for balancing will not be strong.. for few domestic interests have a stake in other status quo powers. and a breakdown of those economic ties will carry few adjustment costs for status quo powers' economies. institutions and the Page 15 of 74 interdependence is low among status quo powers (Cells 1 and 2). strategists will also be constrained by vested interests and by political leaders concerned with the prospect of substantial adjustment costs.mtholyoke. When a status quo power has strong economic links with states that its strategists deem threatening powers (Cells 2 and 4).Interdependence. meanwhile... And since the perceived threatening power in such a situation will be a non-democratic state in which internationalist economic interests wield little influence. https://www.. will have a greater capacity to mobilize through internal measures. Leaders of a status quo power with non-democratic political institutions in which median economic interests are locked out of the process. so an aspiring revisionist power is likely to risk aggression.. 5/27/2013 . meanwhile. for those actors will fear that confrontational political-military policies could threaten the economic links. Such societal pressures will lead to a weak response and will undercut leaders' capacities to make credible commitments. there will be constraints from vested interests who do not share the strategists' perception of aggressive intentions. quite significant economic ties. France.mtholyoke. from Adolph Hitler's ascension to power in 1933 until the September 1939 invasion of Poland. and American behavior in the 1930s. though Britain also had extensive ties with France.. As a result. Britain and Germany . that the British and French appeased Germany and balanced only weakly. French. Page 16 of 74 These propositions explain the ambivalence of British strategy toward Germany before 1914. institutions and the ba. particularly with one another. Meanwhile. 5/27/2013 ..the pivotal actors in European balance-of-power politics . meanwhile. could not ignore. and the Soviets balanced internally but negotiated a pact with the Germans. there was a situation akin to a Cell 4 scenario.. its natural ally to balance the German threat.. the weakness of British. and the United States to mobilize their societies to make firm and credible balancing commitments. the United States remained essentially isolationist until the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Before the First World War. they were constrained https://www. The breakdown of the international economy in the thirties limited the capacity of leaders of Britain. These economic links generated vested interests and adjustment-cost concerns that British strategists. Soviet. Soviet political institutions diminished his credibility as a prospective alliance partner. working in a liberal democracy. and while the totalitarian Soviet polity allowed Josef Stalin to mobilize internal resources.. and the outbreak of the two world wars. Thus we saw.

for their capabilities and real and perceived intentions were crucial to the balance of power. AustriaHungary. Applying the Theory: Britain and Germany Britain and Germany were the chief protagonists in pre1914 Europe. Germany pursued an expansionist foreign policy because its pseudodemocratic political system gave prominence to aggressive socioeconomic.Interdependence. institutions and the ba. https://www. Thus.. Germany was generally seen to pose the primary threat in the system because of its aggressive policies and military capabilities. in alliance with France and Russia. and subordinate to.mtholyoke. Britain. Economic ties also influenced German expectations about Britain in ways that helped cause the outbreak of war: Germany recognized the constraints of economic interests on British strategists and noted the mixed signals being sent by the British in the period leading up to August 1914.. was largely dependent on. and military interests. while more pacific internationalist economic interests had little say in the political process. Germany.. Page 17 of 74 from balancing firmly against the Germans and instead pursued an ambivalent policy of balancing and conciliation. and its ally.. political. was pivotal to checking aggression by Germany and 5/27/2013 . In contrast. and launched the Schlieffen Plan. German leaders had reason to believe a rapid military offensive could be successful.

a rapid military offensive on the Continent would have a strong probability of success. Page 18 of 74 France and Russia. British.(18) Moreover.mtholyoke.. 5/27/2013 .. Russian.(19) Meanwhile.. total trade (exports and imports) as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) was 38 percent for Germany. and so looked repeatedly to discern British intentions in the years leading up to the war.. did not pose an effective counterweight to the Dual Alliance after 1905. German leaders felt that if Britain were to stand aside at least initially. and German strategists perceived that British support was essential. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE BEFORE 1914 There is general agreement that.Interdependence. economic interdependence was quite high in the great power system in the period preceding the First World War. for Russia had been severely weakened by internal revolution and the Russo-Japanese War.. allied since the 1890s. 52 percent https://www. For the three biggest European powers. French and Russian leaders thus actively sought strong commitments from Britain. by enlarging the British Expeditionary Force [BEF]) as necessary to deter the Germans.e. institutions and the and British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and his fellow strategists saw a balancing policy through alliance with France and Russia and by internal mobilization (i. French. Even the revival in Russian power in the years immediately preceding the war was not enough to offset the importance of Britain's possible support. in the aggregate..

.5 percent and 83. which was decreasing..8 percent respectively in the years leading up to the war.. while British trade with Russia was only about half of what it was with Germany from 1905 to 1913.14. commodity-dealing. there was significant factor-price equalization as wholesale price levels were closely associated (so economies responded very quickly to price changes in other economies). Britain was the leading market for German exports .. the City of London produced great financial integration. 5/27/2013 . and 54 percent for France in the years leading up to World War I. earnings from invisibles such as shipping. institutions and the ba. and Lloyds of London insured much of the German merchant marine. and trade and capital flows increased at dramatic per-decade rates of 63.Interdependence. One-fifth of Germany's enormous demand for raw materials and foodstuffs was filled by the British Empire and financed by the City of London. insurance.. (20) The dyadic economic relationship between Britain and Germany was particularly strong.2 percent went to Britain in 1913 and Britain was a close second to the United States as https://www. banking. and especially overseas investments more than compensated for Page 19 of 74 for Great Britain.mtholyoke. and much of their trade was with one another Moreover. Although the British had a balance-of-payments deficit with Germany. In addition. Britain's trade with Germany was increasing in the period before World War I and it was a greater proportion of total British trade than was trade with France.

British strategists would be constrained by domestic economic interests from balancing against the German threat. institutions and the ba. These constraints would come from vested interests with stakes in the AngloGerman economic relationship and from concerns with the high adjustment costs the British economy would suffer if economic links broke down as a result of confrontational political-military policies. Finally. Although there were some rivalries and strains in the Anglo-German economic relationship. and a weak response would follow.. there was overall a high degree of complementarity and mutual benefit as Britain and Germany gained greatly from trade and financial ties.(22) Britain's ambivalent "straddle policy" in the period leading up to August 1914 is consistent with the prediction. Hence. British strategists hoping to mobilize against what they perceived to be a significant German threat would be constrained by societal economic concerns.. The policy included entente balancing with France and Russia and a response to the German naval https://www. Page 20 of 74 Germany's most important bilateral trade partner in 1913.Interdependence.. my theory predicts a weak response by Britain to the German threat. which was growing as a proportion of their GNPs up to (21) THE BRITISH SIDE Given the nature of economic ties. 5/27/2013 . both Britain and Germany were becoming increasingly dependent on trade. Working in a liberal democracy...mtholyoke.

. British policy was a mix of balancing and conciliation. political. it added little to the security of the Continent. the ententes were merely agreements to consult in a crisis. Britain failed to build up its army's resources or to undertake conscription.. and was unwilling to commit to sending the expeditionary force to the Continent. Page 21 of 74 challenge. Pressure groups. most see the division on foreign policy within the Liberal Party as a guns-versus-butter battle between Liberal Imperialists and Radicals.(23) My analysis of the positions and strength of Cabinet ministers on various strategic policies reveals such a distinction to be misleading. And while the naval buildup helped insure Britain's survival. I show that the hypothesized reasons for British policy are also borne out by the historical and members of Parliament whose interests were shaped in large part by economic interdependence were significant constraints on the strategists. 5/27/2013 . However. as predicted. informal warning to Germany. While many historians recognize the importance of domestic constraints. negotiating over naval. Cabinet ministers. Grey pursued mediation and only issued a private. In what follows. Britain also pursued something of a detente with the Germans. Instead. no commitments to come to the aid of France or Russia were made. institutions and the ba. All in all.Interdependence.. then. economic.. I show that several pivotal political figures became more or less https://www.mtholyoke. Moreover. And in the crisis of July 1914. and colonial matters after 1911.

it nearly fell https://www. British policy was influenced in important ways by direct pressure from economic interests in the policy-making process and by political leaders' concerns about the costs that would come to the British economy from a war. Yet Lloyd George and Churchill continued their opposition.. They made speeches throughout Britain advocating such an approach.. Page 22 of 74 hawkish over time as their ministerial positions in the Cabinet and thus their bureaucratic constituencies changed.(24) Most other ministers. meanwhile.mtholyoke.. particularly those sensitive to economic concerns. the divisions in the Cabinet were largely between the strategists and others in the Cabinet. THE NAVAL ISSUE. They sought to have the figures reduced. which would severely disrupt international economic relations. 5/27/2013 . and when the Cabinet met to discuss the Admiralty's request to build new dreadnoughts in 1909. Moreover. making them more sensitive to strategic or to international economic whom they did not see in suspicious terms and with whom they saw common interests.. as predicted given the strength of Britain's economic ties with Germany. Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George and Board of Trade President Winston Churchill vigorously opposed the estimates of naval requirements coming from the Admiralty. In 1908. 1908-09. prompting an irritated Grey to threaten resignation.Interdependence. Hence. institutions and the ba.. tended to be quite dovish. partially by seeking an agreement with Germany. and Lloyd George even attempted to negotiate in Berlin.

John Burns. and Sydney Buxton). and strong representatives of business including Lewis Harcourt. essentially between the strategists and those representing economic interests.. ENTENTE POLICY AND THE CONTINENTAL COMMITMENT..and three others (Walter Runciman.(25) Although the strategists essentially got their way on this issue. Page 23 of 74 apart.wanted only four. Yet.mtholyoke.Lloyd George. Lord Loreburn. but also with Russia. and that four more could be ordered by April 1910 if German construction appeared to make such a step necessary. the conflict surrounding it revealed a serious disquiet in the Cabinet that could not be ignored in the making of foreign policy.. while military and naval conversations had taken place with the French since 1906 and the General Staff drew up plans for a https://www. as the theory suggests. Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith got the Cabinet to agree to a compromise that four ships would be built immediately. and the battle lines were. the strategists felt it necessary from the first years of the Liberal Government that the entente with France especially. Ultimately.. the Earl of Crewe. 5/27/2013 . be made into an alliance. and Richard Haldane of the War Office . this would be a stabilizing deterrent in the international system. institutions and the ba. were in favor of building six. and John Morley . So-called "economists" in the Cabinet . The strategists . First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna. Churchill. To maintain peace on the Continent..Interdependence.Grey.

. and that the ententes with France and Russia were possible deterrents. Page 24 of 74 Continental commitment. But Grey did not pursue an alliance because a majority of the Cabinet was and relations with Russia were even more standoffish.. institutions and the ba. and its uncompromising positions in FrancoGerman negotiations prompted a tougher stand by the British Cabinet. (26) Thus. which instigated the crisis.Interdependence. "the fundamental fact of course is that the Entente is not an alliance. and economic concerns were an important reason. in the Mansion House speech to City of London financiers on https://www. Indeed.mtholyoke. as Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office remarked in January 1911. who had previously been quite pro-German.(28) The Agadir crisis of July 1911 led to a slight but temporary revision of the Anglo-French relationship.that led a majority of the Cabinet in opposing an alliance and in seeking a commitment to neutrality.."(27) That the entente was not an alliance had much to do with domestic constraints.. it was strong supporters of internationalist business and financial interests . no pledge of support was given to France. these were kept secret from the Cabinet.. Grey and his colleagues in the Foreign Office firmly believed that Britain should be committed to France in the event of war with Germany. Germany's demands on Morocco.mostly those who had opposed Grey in the 1909 dreadnought dispute . This was due in no small part to the conversions of Lloyd George and Churchill. 5/27/2013 . Lloyd George.

Grey welcomed the speech. Asquith. This conflict also led to renewed https://www. Moreover.. 1911. Lloyd George. issued a stern warning to Germany on Agadir.. so Asquith attempted to circumvent them by convening a special meeting of the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID) on August 23. 5/27/2013 . for it isolated those in the Cabinet who had previously allied with Lloyd George in opposition to balancing policies. Lloyd George and Churchill took very militant positions toward Germany. and he saw that it would have a great impact on the Germans.. to France. institutions and the ba. however. in meetings with other British officials.Interdependence. and Churchill) in November 1911 to place restrictions on British policy that precluded any commitments of military or naval intervention. even some members of the CID were not invited. and Churchill. Haldane. to determine British military and naval strategy in the event of war.. The Cabinet had not been informed of this meeting and by design no "dissenter" was including the army. for the meeting did not remain secret for long and the Cabinet voted 15-5 (the minority being Grey. five of the seven present (the others were McKenna and Sir Arthur Wilson). Haldane.(29) The domestic constraints remained. 1911. Lloyd George. Asquith.. But the continental strategy was scuttled. Grey. and they even worked to get Britain prepared for war. Page 25 of 74 July 21. argued that Britain had to send direct military aid.mtholyoke. coming as it was from the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

when he headed the Board of Education. to being a staunch defender of the figures in the 1909 Cabinet battles after becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in April 1908.(31) It is also noteworthy that McKenna went from supporting Lloyd George and Churchill in their opposition to the Admiralty's naval estimates in 1908. as my argument suggests. McKenna again took consistently dovish positions..Interdependence. and opposing Churchill on naval estimates. institutions and the ba. when McKenna was not First Lord. And while First Lord. Hence. voting for restrictions on British policy. and Haldane. he did favor support of France by other means. and on the Continental commitment. (30) On naval and entente policy. three of the chief strategists.. McKenna favored the building of dreadnoughts. 5/27/2013 . and thus not https://www. advocating conciliation of Germany. consistently sought to balance firmly against the German threat. Page 26 of 74 pressures in the Cabinet for talks with the Germans.. and particularly those heading economic and though he was not in favor of sending troops to France in the wake of Agadir. For instance..(32) Then. took quite dovish positions up to August 1914. British strategists were thus highly constrained at home by the Cabinet as predicted by the theory. Grey.mtholyoke. Asquith. and those heading security ministries took hawkish stands. after being replaced at the Admiralty in October 1911 by Churchill and moving to the Home Office. Most of the Cabinet..

(34) but his hawkishness during the Agadir crisis appears anomalous. who were nonetheless https://www. which is hardly surprising since he had worked for three years with the Germans. he was less hawkish than when he was heading the Admiralty... two considerations make his actions understandable. However. institutions and the ba.. First. to advocating conciliation with the Germans upon moving to the Board of Trade in 1910. but took consistently hawkish stands after leaving that post in February 1910 and especially as First Lord of the Admiralty from October 1911 to the war. For instance. tended to be more dovish. 5/27/2013 . where his primary constituency was trading interests. the tone of his speech suggests a sense of indignation. Hence.. Lloyd George's generally dovish behavior on naval and entente policy is consistent with what we would expect from a Treasury head.. Those who were not strategists. Page 27 of 74 as sensitive to strategic concerns. and particularly those who were in positions that made them sensitive to international economic concerns. Buxton switched from siding with Grey in the Cabinet's 1909 dreadnought dispute.(33) Churchill too was quite dovish while he was head of the Board of Trade. and particularly when as First Lord strategic concerns were of greatest importance to him. Churchill shed dovish positions for hawkish ones. when he was once Churchill's bureaucratic constituency no longer comprised internationalist economic interests.

And with a large part of German foreign trade being financed by London banks. raising serious concerns about the financial consequences of a war with Germany. For instance. a natural concern for a Chancellor of the Exchequer and one consistent with the theory. his response to the Agadir crisis represented a quite understandable shift in views. and this was temporary since Lloyd George reverted to a quite dovish stance toward the Germans not long after Agadir..(35) Hence.. an Anglo-German war might well lead to the collapse of several important London banks owed millions of pounds by German industry. and by politicians' concerns with the likely effects on the British economy of a possible war. and so depended on a stable international environment. Those effects would be profound since the City of London had been profiting enormously from the growth in the trade of foreign countries. British policy was also influenced directly by British commercial and financial interests. DIRECT PRESSURES AND ADJUSTMENT COST CONCERNS. Page 28 of 74 thoroughly uncompromising in the crisis. which would hurt the British economy badly. The strategists also learned in the CID meetings that Lloyds of London insured much of the German merchant marine and was https://www. which facilitated German acquisition of raw materials. institutions and the ba. 5/27/2013 . financial interests played a direct role in the CID meetings after Agadir. Lloyd George also saw vital British commercial interests threatened by the German provocation over Morocco...

edu/acad/intrel/papa. the mechanisms of international finance would seize up.Interdependence.. institutions and the ba. 5/27/2013 .. high prices. causing food shortages. "A deep pessimism pervaded the government's thinking about the likely domestic repercussions of the outbreak of war. Thus Grey spoke in February 1914 of how war was the worst possible thing that could happen to trade.. even if the Royal Navy was involved in the conflict.(36) British economic interests also had direct influence through the Foreign Office's Commercial Department. and in this capacity.mtholyoke.. hundreds of thousands would be thrown out of work and hungry https://www. one of the government's premises in its prewar plans was that war would disrupt trade and financial links that Britain was highly dependent on. and unemployment. Trade across the North Sea would collapse. Indeed. which worked closely with British business interests. Page 29 of 74 inclined to pay out for losses incurred in wartime. As a result.(37) Grey and other politicians were also keenly aware of the high adjustment costs a war might bring to the British economy because of the strength of Britain's international economic ties. Grey often cooperated with financial or commercial institutions and associations to insure a "fair field and no favour" for British trade and investment.. Grey became well aware that British business supported the improvement in Anglo-German political relations prior to 1914 and wanted no disturbance of the peace.

. business and financial leaders in Germany and Britain respectively. Grey.mtholyoke. and so had to undertake discussions. 5/27/2013 . Cabinet opposition inspired by economic interests impelled Grey to try to reach an understanding with Germany.. they made overtures to the members of the Cabinet who were most likely to be favorable to conciliation with Germany. In January 1912 the Germans requested from the British a promise of "benevolent neutrality" should one of them become involved in a war. Joseph Pease. and the permanent officials of the Foreign Office were opposed to making a binding promise of neutrality and saw in the German request a plot to disrupt the entente. and Lord Loreburn . Page 30 of 74 mobs would riot in the streets and perhaps try to force the government to make a premature peace.were pressing for a neutrality clause.Lloyd and many of them . However. Harcourt. McKenna. institutions and the ba.."(38) THE HALDANE MISSION.. Grey could not resist so much pressure from his colleagues. who feared the economic consequences of an Anglo-German war. so Haldane was sent to negotiate on naval and colonial questions in February 1912. According to Grey.(40) The power of economic interests in bringing about the mission was noted and resented by diplomats and https://www.(39) The first moves leading to the mission came from Albert Ballin and Ernest Cassel. Grey found himself faced with a majority of the Cabinet pushing for negotiations. Asquith.

a German publicist. influence upon international diplomatic negotiations. even though it fell short of the German proposal." And his colleague Arthur Nicolson echoed the point: "I also entirely agree with the concluding paragraph in Count Reventlow's article. Page 31 of 74 Foreign Office officials.."(41) The negotiations did not. the Germans remained steadfast in demanding unconditional neutrality. economic interests had impelled the strategists to make a reply to the German request that went far beyond what Grey and his advisers wanted to give. Nonetheless. and Goschen reported that Reventlow concluded in essence: "There can be no possible doubt but that the relations between European countries would be clearer. One notable example of this surrounded a memorandum written by George Goschen. and negotiations broke down.. Crowe wrote in the minutes. more straightforward and above-board if the Jewish financial element could be altogether excluded from exercising any direct. Though Haldane was quite accommodating. about an article written by Count Reventlow." To this. (42) https://www. institutions and the ba. above all. but I share the view expressed in the concluding paragraph.Interdependence.mtholyoke. Britain's ambassador to Germany. or even indirect. and.. "I do not often agree with Count Reventlow. Reventlow's article discussed how these Anglo-German negotiations were initiated by Ballin and Cassell... lead to an agreement. 5/27/2013 .

.. however." Harcourt was also able to organize those in the Cabinet in favor of a detente against the Foreign Office and so was able to reach an agreement in August 1913 which gave Germany a larger share of the Portuguese colonies.Interdependence. was seeking increases for 1914-15 that would far exceed the demands of 1913-14. . Naval expenditure was again a contentious issue for the Cabinet toward the end of 1913. of which not even this office has any information.mtholyoke... and he was met with https://www. Harcourt. a condition Germany refused to accept. The First Lord of the Admiralty. Harcourt's own private negotiations . It was never formally signed. for the Foreign Office insisted on publication of the agreement. British conciliation of the Germans was inspired by economic forces outside the control of the Foreign Office and was far more extensive than the strategists hoped to see. . Economic interests also had a significant impact on negotiations begun in late 1911 with Germany on the future partition of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. then. prompting Crowe to comment sarcastically about "Mr.(43) THE NAVAL ISSUE. but Grey again had the last word on critical details. Page 32 of 74 THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES. 1913-14. institutions and the ba. Churchill. 5/27/2013 . and the Foreign Office had only partial control of this matter. British business interests motivated discussions on the Portuguese colonies. As with the Haldane Mission. The head of the Colonial Office.. pursued the negotiations largely independently from the Foreign Office and often at cross purposes to

who sought to reduce the size of the was now their chief advocate as First Lord. institutions and the ba. who had allied with Churchill in the early battles over naval estimates. Page 33 of 74 opposition from Lloyd George and many in the Cabinet including Hobhouse. Churchill declared he was not bound by this promise. Asquith took Churchill's side and warned Lloyd George that a general election would ensue if he came through on his threat to resign over the matter. and Pease .(44) After doing battle publicly. and about 100 members of parliament protested the increased navy estimates as well. Most of these Cabinet members also lobbied for Churchill's resignation in December 1913 and January 1914.(45) We see on this issue that Churchill. 5/27/2013 .. and Lloyd George rallied those in the Cabinet opposed to Churchill and made further noises about ousting the First Lord. Samuel. Such efforts were to no avail. Simon. though Churchill did call for some modest cuts in response. was leading the strong opposition to the demands of his https://www. who had once opposed naval increases as Board of Trade head. Lloyd George backed down and the others opposing Churchill also acquiesced. Lloyd George and Churchill met privately with Asquith in January 1914. But a few days later. Runciman.mtholyoke. And Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George.Interdependence.. McKenna... getting only a concession from Churchill that there would be reductions in 1915-16.. Beauchamp.

Interdependence, institutions and the ba... Page 34 of 74 long-time friend. Hence, Churchill and Lloyd George pursued hawkish or dovish concerns depending on whether their ministerial positions made them sensitive to strategic or to economic interests. THE JULY CRISIS. In July 1914 and up to August 2, British strategists pursued conciliation, were slow to adopt balancing policies, and did little to attempt deterrence. Upon learning of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on July 24, Grey twice proposed mediation and a four-power conference, and although he did issue an informal warning on July 29 through Germany's Ambassador Karl Lichnowsky, this was a private rather than public threat. The Cabinet, meanwhile, would not agree to commit on the question of Belgian neutrality unless all five signatory powers to the 1839 Treaty did so. The Cabinet also decided, on August 1, against sending the BEF to the Continent. Grey thus had to tell his French counterpart Paul Cambon, "France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we are not now in a position to promise."(46) Grey could not send an unambiguous warning to Germany nor give an assurance to France because of Cabinet constraints. He and the other chief strategists Churchill, Asquith, and Haldane - as well as Crewe of the India Office, wanted to do more to support France, but the rest of the Cabinet was opposed to intervention. One of the reasons that Cabinet ministers were 5/27/2013

Interdependence, institutions and the ba... Page 35 of 74 constraining Grey was that they were sensitive to the City of London's strong opposition to war. There were, too, grave concerns with adjustment costs, for financial chaos in late July was such that even Grey was thinking that Britain might have to stay out as "the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit" and to avert the total collapse of world trade. Hence, Grey did not believe he had sufficient domestic support for issuing an ultimatum to Germany or for supporting France.(47) It was not until August 2 that the British Cabinet took the first step toward intervention, deciding that violation of Belgian neutrality was cause for going to war. And when Germany issued an ultimatum to Belgium and declared war on France on August 3, Britain mobilized its army and the Cabinet responded with an ultimatum to Berlin. Germany's invasion of Belgium the following day brought a British declaration of war at midnight, and two days later the Cabinet agreed to send the BEF to France. Cabinet members could be persuaded after August 2 because a German occupation of the Belgian and French coasts would pose a significant threat to the security of the British Isles. It was this prospect that had led to the conversion of the Cabinet and loosened the constraints that had prevented the strategists from balancing firmly and possibly deterring the Germans.(48) THE GERMAN SIDE 5/27/2013

Interdependence, institutions and the ba... Page 36 of 74 I argue that if non-democratic political institutions shut median economic interests out of the political process, then internationalists will not be a constraint on their governments even when their state's international economic links are extensive. It is for this reason that Germany; despite being dependent on the international economy; would have had aggressive intentions. The theory also leads us to expect that German leaders would see interdependence as generating constraints on British strategists, and that this would give the Germans optimistic expectations about British intentions and the prospects for a successful military offensive on the Continent. I show that Germany's pseudo-democratic political structure gave prominence to aggressive socioeconomic, political, and military forces, some of whom perceived economic interdependence to entail pernicious effects, while pacific internationalist economic interests were marginalized in the political process. As a result, expansionist goals and policies intended in part to alter the nature of economic links and reduce German vulnerability were adopted. However, Germany did not act without awareness of Britain's potential role as the pivotal balancer. This caused German leaders to attempt to determine, and even influence, British intentions. In doing so, Germany recognized that there were significant domestic constraints on British strategists emanating from international economic concerns, and saw mixed 5/27/2013

direct taxes.mtholyoke. it had no power to unseat government ministers.Interdependence. There was. including a popularly elected house. However... legislative power favored the Bundesrat. 5/27/2013 . and its interests were largely those of the Junkers. and the approval of the kaiser and chancellor. which had the power to initiate bills and to block bills or amendments coming from the Reichstag. tariffs. and the budget required legislative approval. the kaiser had great authority over foreign affairs. This was important since the Prussian government had ascendancy in the Bundesrat under the Constitution of 1871. so the executive branch was not simply free to do what it wanted on foreign economic and military procurement policies."(50) Although there was a legislature.(49) A PSEUDO-DEMOCRACY. though elections to the Reichstag were by https://www. however Laws needed a majority in both the Reichstag and the Bundesrat.. institutions and the ba.(51) Moreover. From the 1870s to 1914 Germany's political structure was "an autocratic monarchy with a few parliamentary trimmings.. Hence. to go into effect. including the right to wage war and supreme command of the armed forces.. consequently. Hence. the Reichstag. the Reich government often had to reach agreements that were consonant with those agrarian interests. The legislature was not Moreover. Page 37 of 74 signals coming from Britain. perceived to be a reasonable chance that British strategists would be unable to thwart the Schlieffen Plan. the landed aristocracy. who were selected by the kaiser.

and they reflected trade-offs by the https://www. the "Government interfered notoriously in local campaigns. (53) THE BISMARCKIAN ERA. For that reason they had to form coalitions with other groups to pursue their goals. As a pass tariff legislation that could redress shortages in the government's coffers. When the Depression of 1873 led to a crisis in state revenues. and chancellor either could not be realized or were doomed to failure. 5/27/2013 .. the undemocratic Bundesrat had an unlimited power of dissolution. were prominent. and in favor of expansionist policies. then. while internationalist concerns were largely shut out of the political system. interests opposed to democratization and free trade.. and coalitions that did not include the interests of the Junkers. and the electoral districts were increasingly malapportioned against the urban interest. Thus German foreign policy was quite aggressive from the 1871 Constitution to 1914. a governmental structure that gave prominence to the Junkers and to the kaiser and chancellor.mtholyoke.the "marriage of iron and rye" . Page 38 of 74 universal adult male suffrage."(52) It was.Interdependence.. They could not simply rule as they wished. but they had effective veto power.. kaiser. The first tariffs came in 1879 on iron and finished industrial goods and institutions and the ba. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck successfully brokered an alliance between industrialists and farmers .

while excluding interests that favored free trade and democratization in the late 1870s and 1880s. Following Bismarck's resignation in 1890 there was a brief interruption in this trend of increased protectionism and military expansion. 5/27/2013 . However.mtholyoke. and forged compromise between. The election of 1890 resulted in the defeat of National Liberals and Conservatives. therefore could and did pursue trade agreements that reduced tariffs. from these policies. and gains for Social Democrats and Progressives who were opposed to protectionism. Industry benefited. This led to an imperialist bent in German foreign policy as Bismarck and others began to elucidate arguments about the need for economic self-sufficiency and a powerful military. Hence. institutions and the ba..(54) THE CAPRIVI INTERLUDE. iron and rye.. Page 39 of 74 Junkers and by heavy industry. Leo von Caprivi. Bismarck's Wilhelm put his support behind the agrarians and in 1894 Caprivi was forced out https://www. and the policies led to a temporary split in the iron-rye coalition.Interdependence. for each wanted protection for themselves but not in the other sector. And by the late 1880s Germany began a significant military build-up.. for it had developed a comparative advantage in the international economy by the 1890s. the executive branch united with. with Social Democratic gains in the 1893 elections. passing the Army Bill in 1887 and increasing foreign and defense expenditures nearly 100 percent from 1885 to 1890. by and large.

which would lead to self-sufficiency and greater levels of industrialization. Chancellor Bernhard von Billow. were. well-positioned under the German governmental structure to broker compromise between industry and agriculture in pursuit of their world policy. 5/27/2013 ."(55) THE PURSUIT OF WELTPOLITIK AND MITTELEUROPA. and 1900 led to a massive buildup of the navy. Weltpolitik. and the 1902 Tariff Act made German grain among the most strongly protected in the world.. beginning in 1900.Interdependence.. institutions and the ba. like Bismarck. Protectionism and militarism returned to center stage as the naval bills of 1897. They also had a belief that Germany would have to reduce its economic vulnerability and promote its growth by transforming economic relationships on the Continent through a customs union it would dominate. 1898. The naval expenditures meant orders for heavy industry's factories. These pieces of legislation reflected a revival of the marriage of iron and rye. This expansionist power policy sought to enhance Germany's international role by gaining access to overseas markets and raw materials. Page 40 of 74 "by the cabals of the Junkers and the intrigues of the court camarilla.(56) These developments were due to the fact that the kaiser and. who had no use for an enlarged navy since they dominated the army and had autarkic economic interests.mtholyoke. went along in exchange for the agricultural tariffs. known as https://www.. and the

and lobbied for. was not a coherent set of interests." and its limitations point up the difficulties that internationalist interests had in the German polity. and Industry in 1909 to oppose protective tariffs and to avoid a trade war.mtholyoke. export industry. Trade.. These groups formed the Hansa League of Commerce. the Hansa League was the product and then the victim of the "marriage of iron and rye... Billow. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg.. 5/27/2013 . led to continued or increased tariffs over the next several years and to a dramatic growth in defense expenditures from the 1890s on. These Weltpolitik and Mitteleuropa visions and the coalition forged by Wilhelm. institutions and the ba. In particular. and Billow's replacement as of 1909. Germany could gain a measure of control over its economic destiny and augment its political power relative to other great powers. most economic interest groups were in favor of one aspect or another of the combined https://www. encompassing a wide array of groups. But this alliance against the fight. strong economic links and better relations with other powers. In these ways. Page 41 of 74 Mitteleuropa. especially those on the Continent..Interdependence.(57) The importance of political structure in determining such an outcome becomes clearer when one recognizes that many sectors in Germany disapproved of the tenor of German policy. the banks.(58) Nevertheless. and finished goods industry profited from. and it was sabotaged from within by heavy industry.

They differed on the approach that Germany's foreign policy should have in pursuing these objectives. In the agrarians and heavy industrialists were generally in favor of higher tariffs and more aggressive policies.. The bankers. albeit for different reasons. First. protection enabled firms in heavy industry to charge oligopolistic https://www. good relations with Britain were a prerequisite for these groups.. meanwhile. Bankers saw Germany as unprepared for war financially. for several reasons. Finally.(59) In contrast. institutions and the ba. so it had an interest in allying with the Junkers on anti-Socialist legislation. Heavy industry. Page 42 of 74 Mitteleuropa-colonial goals.. heavy industry was receiving side-payments in the form of orders for the fleet buildup. and so they and their economic and political allies advocated peaceful approaches to altering the nature of their country's economic ties. accounted for 22 percent of German exports in 1913 but was allied with the Junkers on protectionism. with large fixed costs and domestic oligopolies (but more competitive international markets).mtholyoke. finished goods industry. The agrarians had protectionist preferences since they saw themselves at a comparative disadvantage relative to Hungary and to colonial states.wanted colonial possessions to fulfill raw material needs and they thought the customs union could improve the Continent's economic system. Second.Interdependence. heavy industry was highly labor intensive. and export sector those groups which benefited most from economic ties . 5/27/2013 . Yet they also had a relatively pacific outlook.

Page 43 of 74 prices and cover their fixed costs at home. who expressed pessimism about financial difficulties. Unlike the bankers. military expenditures jumped dramatically. and the https://www. allowing them to sell overseas at their marginal cost instead of their average cost.(60) The more aggressive posture carried the day because the distribution of power in the German political system heavily favored the military.. Germany pursued an expansionist foreign policy despite its economic dependence on other great powers because its pseudo-democratic institutional structure gave prominence to forces that saw economic interdependence to have pernicious effects and expansionist policies as beneficial.Interdependence.(61) All in all.. Germany's political system gave the kaiser. and this might entail war.. with much of the increase coming in the army as the Junkers successfully sought to bolster their positions in the German political system with greater expenditures on the army they Both agrarians and heavy industrialists.3 billion marks in 1911 to 2 billion marks in 1913. and heavy industry. institutions and the ba. these groups were confident of Germany's ability to pay for war and felt that a compromise policy with Britain was merely wishful thinking. meanwhile. chancellors.mtholyoke. increasing from about 1. Junkers. felt that maintaining German economic autonomy required Germany to alter the nature of economic ties by having a measure of political control. As they won out politically.. 5/27/2013 .

Tirpitz was initially concerned about getting through the "danger zone". that is. Page 44 of 74 Junkers so much power that winning coalitions tended to form around their interests.(62) Germany had somewhat optimistic expectations on this score because of strong Anglo-German economic ties. While German foreign policy was aggressive. German expectations of British intentions were crucial to strategy and were influenced by economic ties. Germany thus perceived Britain to be a potential friend. 5/27/2013 . or at least not necessarily an enemy. while economic interests advocating closer international economic ties and a more pacific foreign policy had little say in German politics. although the fleet buildup was a deliberate challenge to Britain's supremacy on the high seas. Hence. German political leaders also made attempts to get Britain to agree to neutrality.Interdependence. institutions and the ba. it was not reckless or out of control.. AGGRESSIVE BUT NOT RECKLESS: THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPECTATIONS AND STRATEGIC INTERACTION. for they felt the critical issue was whether Britain might stand on the sidelines long enough for the Schlieffen Plan to achieve success. building the fleet without provoking Britain or Russia until Germany had enough ships to be on a par with them.. German leaders recognized for many years that Britain was the pivotal actor in balance-of-power politics. in discussing his plan to establish a "United States of https://www.

Lichnowsky. and so Britain would probably stand aside. Hence. 5/27/2013 .mtholyoke. Mittel-europa). and those expectations were reinforced by the detente that emerged between Britain and Germany beginning in 1911. institutions and the ba. felt Britain had a high opinion of Germany and that there was not a desire to fight Germany because "our joint interests are too Germany's beliefs about Britain's intentions were influenced by a recognition of economic constraints.." would be foolish to oppose Germany militarily and endanger those ties. therefore. and thought that the British would not be unsympathetic to the idea.(63) Indeed. Page 45 of 74 Europe against America" (i."(64) And Grey noted after the war that the Germans apparently could not understand why Britain did mobilize against them given the economic ties. "a nation of shopkeepers.. the prevailing view was that the economic relationship was largely complementary and that Britain. Moreover.e. by 1912 Bethmann https://www. since this was a series of ambiguous signals sent by the British.. War. Kaiser Wilhelm pointed to the good relations he had with King George V and the City of London.Interdependence. would be disastrous to English commerce and industry. many in Germany thought. the German ambassador... our economic ties too close and too important and the material losses of even a victorious war too considerable. while some factions spoke in terms of an Anglo-German trade rivalry and saw that Britain could cut Germany off from colonies and trade.

First.(66) THE JULY CRISIS.. so seriously that he tried unsuccessfully to get Austria to reverse course and implement a "Halt in Belgrade. private warning of July 29 (relayed through Lichnowsky). After all. having seen constraints on Grey and British conciliatory behavior for years prior to and in the July crisis. HOW much the Germans believed during the July crisis that Britain might not intervene on the Continent. Some would take issue with this argument by noting that Bethmann took Grey's informal. is a matter of some debate. even if Russia and France got involved as a result.. Page 46 of 74 saw the entente as having largely faded away. Bethmann was already attempting to pursue a more restrained policy in response to Russia's partial mobilization. institutions and the ba. German leaders thus saw the British as quite dovish in the handful of years leading up to the war.. and the detente boosted German hopes for British neutrality.(70) Second. 5/27/2013 . and how long they thought British intervention would take."(68) Indeed. the Germans had at least some confidence in their assessments of British intentions. the British Cabinet was unwilling until August 2 to commit even on the issue of https://www. German leaders had good reason to believe they could achieve their expansionist (67) Nonetheless."(69) At least three replies can be made to this.mtholyoke.Interdependence.. war between Austria and Serbia was unlikely to bring British intervention.. and this was "the critical link in the escalation of all stages of the crisis.

Germany's actions reflected a reasonable assessment that Britain might be neutral at least long enough for the Schlieffen Plan to work... and this would have posed a clear threat to Britain itself. it is probably spurious. to the extent there is a relationship between Grey's warning and Bethmann's attempt at restraining the Austrians. The British government had not committed to oppose Germany as of the first of August.(73) Conclusion and Implications The relationship between economic interdependence and war has long been an important theoretical and empirical question. for Germany came close to success with its offensive.. Page 47 of 74 Belgian neutrality. Hence.Interdependence.(71) This German assessment of Britain was not a misperception of intentions. Bethmann would not have pursued the threatening policy toward Belgium that he did days after receiving Grey's warning since the threat to the British Isles that came from a possible occupation of the Belgian and French coasts would be the action most likely to convert the British government. 5/27/2013 . and it is at the heart of many https://www. institutions and the ba. if the warning did have a significant effect.. and since the Germans had also seen the domestic constraints on British strategists and ambivalent signals for years before as well as during the July and most importantly. Third.(72) And German leaders were not terribly far off in this calculation.

Page 48 of 74 debates among realist and liberal scholars in international relations. along with the ambiguous signals being sent by institutions and the ba. and these. and kaiser ..mtholyoke.Interdependence. 5/27/2013 . and by discussing how political institutions can mediate the impact of economic interests.(74) The empirical evidence on this crucial case shows that economic ties played a profound role in balance-of-power politics before 1914. but suggests that an integration of the two perspectives is appropriate. rye. German leaders thus had somewhat optimistic expectations that Britain might stand on the sidelines long enough for a rapid military offensive to work. It was also shown that Germany's pseudo-democratic political structure gave prominence to the coalition of iron. military. affected German officials' assessments of British intentions.actors who had expansionist goals and saw economic ties to entail pernicious effects that could be mitigated only by https://www. This study finds both schools of thought to be wrong in their conclusions about the effects of economic ties in the international system.. The theory advanced here refines and synthesizes liberal conceptions and realist balance-of-power theory in elucidating how economic interdependence affects state leaders' mobilization capacities and expectations about others' intentions. Economic ties generated domestic constraints on British strategists attempting to mobilize to oppose Germany.

For this reason. the theory suggests that an unstable balance-of-power system is quite possible.Interdependence. If we see a collapse of the international economy like that of the 1930s. this article demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that economic links are an integral part of high institutions and the ba. for they affect the capacity state leaders have at home to play power politics abroad. THE FUTURE AND POLICY Whether economic interdependence will have a pacifying effect in the great power system now that the bipolar Cold War era has waned depends on the pattern and level of economic ties. in contrast to the tendency to see international economic ties as either derivative of security factors or simply a matter of low politics.. https://www. Thus.. and their ability to project credible balancing commitments.. which will limit their capacity to mobilize and will undercut their ability to make credible commitments. Page 49 of 74 transforming the nature of economic links with aggressive policies . for leaders will be constrained by domesticoriented concerns. The emergence of a Hitlerian threat is unlikely to be met by a stabilizing counterbalancing effort. just as in the thirties.. 5/27/2013 .while more pacific internationalist economic concerns had little say in the political process.. Germany had revisionist aspirations despite having extensive ties in the international economy.mtholyoke.

The transition to democracy is far from complete and certain in Russia. the great powers that are highly integrated into the world economy . https://www.Interdependence.g. If Russia becomes part of the international economy without. While there are some democratic institutions.. having made a transition to fullfledged democratic institutions. a resurgent Russia). Page 50 of 74 If economic interdependence remains strong. the democratic great powers are likely to be able to forge a firm and credible balancing posture.. e. which have high salience through democratic political institutions. economic ties could have a negative effect... Moreover. however. since democratic leaders would be able to mobilize support to protect their economic stakes. Great Britain.are all democracies.the United States.mtholyoke. France. At present. as well as the nature of the political institutions of those great powers that are part of the international economy. Germany. as in the years preceding World War I. History shows that states in this phase are more and Japan .(75) and the situation in Russia today is also eerily similar to that of Wilhelmine Germany.. The analysis here suggests that none of these powers is likely to adopt aggressive postures in the international arena. institutions and the ba. 5/27/2013 . for their strategists will be constrained by internationalist economic interests and political leaders' adjustment cost concerns. if a threat does emerge from a great power outside this international economy (from. the peacefulness of the international system depends on the pattern of ties..

edu/acad/intrel/papa. authoritarian features. To do otherwise risks revisiting 1914..and those against chiefly agrarian interests and the military-industrial complex. While it is essential that Russia be brought into the international economy to see a transition to a stable market democracy. The balance of power between these groups now and into the foreseeable future is unclear and depends in part on the development of Russian political institutions. https://www. Western democratic leaders may find themselves constrained by domestic economic interests just as Britain was before the First World War. the West must do so with great care.Interdependence. there is a battle between economic groups seeking integration with the West the energy and banking sectors .. Page 51 of 74 there are also many anti-democratic. It should carefully design economic concessions and interactions that will support internationalists and democratizing forces within Russia.(76) There is thus no assurance that economic integration would have pacifying consequences on Russian foreign policy because internationalists might not have much of a restraining influence in the domestic arena in the future. And if that happens. Meanwhile. without creating ties in the West that would be too politically costly to break should the nationalists win domestic political battles and promote aggressive foreign policies that need to be balanced against.. and has a nationalist appeal. institutions and the ba. which includes steelmakers and workers...mtholyoke. 5/27/2013 .

1979). Waltz. Barbara Morris. and Stephen Van Evera. 5-56. 15. and participants at a seminar of the Princeton University Research Program in International Security for very helpful discussions.. Lars Skalnes.. 16. Richard Rosecrance... No. 5/27/2013 . and Kenneth N.mtholyoke. I also gratefully acknowledge the Committee on Research of the UCSD Academic Senate for funding archival research in Britain. Theory of International Politics (Reading. 39-73. and Amy Cressey and Hung Tran for research assistance. pp. "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security. Richard Rosecrane. For the liberal view. David D'Lugo. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books. Vol. Robert Pahre. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation for generous financial support.Interdependence." International Security. Piper Hodson-Pierson. 1 (Summer 1990). 3 (Winter 1990/91). Ronald Rogowski. "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War. Page 52 of 74 I thank Jack Hirshleifer. pp. 15. but see also Robert Jervis. I assume full responsibility for all errors and shortcomings.. For the realist view. chapter 7. see esp. Risa Brooks. Philip Roeder. pp. and anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments." International John J. 3 (Winter 1991/92). see for example. Mearsheimer. Vol. No. 1986). 1. 7-57. https://www. Vol. No.: Addison-Wesley. Mass. institutions and the ba. Arthur Stein.

A longer and slightly different version of this theory. Kaplan. Papayoanou. Hans J.. and Barry Buzan. Theory of International Politics. Mansfield.mtholyoke. 597-624." International Organization. Adversaries. 1994). Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton. "Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power. Page 53 of 74 2. Edward Vose Gulick. institutions and the ba. unpublished manuscripts. but all essentially argue that states tend to oppose threatening powers in the international system and that this balancing behavior is conducive to international stability as aspiring revisionist states will be prevented or deterred from achieving or pursuing their expansionist goals. Allies.. "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case.Interdependence. Morton A. Power. 1994). with applications to the other historical cases and periods since the late nineteenth century discussed briefly in this article. There are many variants of realist balance-of-power theory. and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press.. See Morgenthau. 3.." and Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power. Trade. 5/27/2013 . 1957).. Other recent interpretations of the relationship between international economic and security factors include Joanne Gowa. or because states will be socialized to the system's balancing dynamic. Edward D. Vol. 1955). Politics Among Nations: https://www. can be found in Paul A. 38. System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons. pp. and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press. No. 4 (Autumn 1984).

: Cornell University Press. p. No.Interdependence. see also Jack Snyder. My intention is to avoid a definition of threat perceptions that would make the theory potentially tautologous and non-falsifiable. for great powers will also be deeply concerned about threats in the geographically proximate system since an upset to the balance can quickly endanger their security. pp. Note also that threats need not be projected toward individual status quo powers to be significant. 1 (Summer 1994). For an argument about how realist conceptions cannot explain why threats emerge and why countries develop revisionist aspirations. The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca. 4. see Stephen M.. Page 54 of 74 The Struggle for Power and Peace. See Morgenthau.. Note that I am concerned only with the perceptions of strategists (or national security leaders). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca. pp. On the need for making such a distinction. 3rd ed. 19. see also Randall L. On threat perception.. 1987). Walt. (New York: Alfred A." International Security.. 5. Knopf. 7. Vol.Y. institutions and the ba. N. 6. The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: https://www. Schweller. 169. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. Politics Among Nations. 1991). I am using here a logic found in Robert Jervis. 11.mtholyoke.. 1960). 5/27/2013 .: Cornell University Press. 22. 72-107.Y.

and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past. they would by definition no longer be status quo powers. 8.. "Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods. No. Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers. The Origins of Alliances). 2 (January 1967). 5/27/2013 . institutions and the ba.. No. 9.mtholyoke. Bandwagoning . but typically including some mix even where one policy dominates. for if status quo powers were to take sides with threatening powers.. Vol. For a review of that literature. not a choice in this Banks. pp. 1989) and in signaling game theory. Luard sees policies as ranging from conciliation to deterrence. 490-526. Vol. The distinction I am making between firm and weak responses differs from the popular balancingbandwagoning analogy in the literature (see Walt. Reiter notes that between balancing and bandwagoning is a choice of neutrality that often gets overlooked in the realist framework." World Politics. and/or forceful public declarations to https://www. Page 55 of 74 Columbia University Press Morningside Edition.alignment or alliance with the source of danger ." World Politics. See also Dan Reiter. Signaling Games in Political Science (Chur. 19.Interdependence. see Jeffrey S. Status quo powers will be seen as responding firmly to the extent they undertake a vigorous internal mobilization of resources. a strong commitment to a defense pact. 1991). "Learning. 167-189. 46. pp. 4 (July 1994).. My continuum is similar to that of Evan Luard.

" World Politics. nonalignment (i. Page 56 of 74 counterbalance threats. Morse. 1980). Vol. (Glenview. Interdependence and Externalization." World Politics. 3 (April 1970). 371-392. 1976). Michael Barnett.. pp.Interdependence. Nye. ed. Robert O. 529-562.e. Jr. 4 (July 1990). Edward L. 22. refusing to ally with others or to pursue confrontational policies). limited arms buildups (as opposed to an augmentation of capabilities to match the threats faced).. Vol. 5/27/2013 .. 1989). Foresman and Company. 12. pp.. 27. Albert O. Weaker responses include entente commitments. No.mtholyoke. No.. Lamborn. repr. Keohane and Joseph S. 125146. and the pursuit of conciliatory policies such as appeasement. or the signing of neutrality or nonaggression pacts. 1967-1977. 2 (June 1983). 10. "Power and the Politics of Extraction. Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press. institutions and the ba." International Studies Quarterly. such as https://www. Alan C. Boston and London: Scott. "High Politics Is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy. Vol. detente. pp. secret treaties. "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization. and Morse. 42. Hirschman. This argument is consistent with the premises of theoretical work on democracies and war. 2d ed. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Illinois.. 11..

mtholyoke. No. Theory of International Politics.Interdependence. pp. "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe. 5/27/2013 . 14. Lake. 15. No. pp. Vol. Vol. 191-226. and David A. No. North." Journal of Modern History. 5-41." International Studies Quarterly. pp." American Political Science Review." American Political Science Review. 86.. 1151-1169.. 4 (December 1986). 46 (June 1974). pp. 130-134. 1 (March 1992). 14. "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War. No. Page 57 of 74 Michael W. North. Jack Snyder. chapter 7. 21. No. Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: Freeman. Alternative explanations for why a dependent state might be aggressive focus on states' vulnerability to the severance of economic ties. Vol... 81. See Nazli Choucri and Robert C. Doyle. 1975). Vol. and Jack Hirshleifer. pp. 4 (December 1977). "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict. institutions and the ba. 2 (May 1991). Waltz.." International Security. I find none of these arguments persuasive in looking at great power https://www. 569-591. 4 (Spring 1990). pp. "Liberalism and World Politics." AEA Papers and Proceedings Vol. Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth century and perhaps present-day China are examples of nondemocratic states in which internationalist economic interests wield a great deal of power. 24-37. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. and Snyder. Myths of Empire. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity. See Michael Gordon. Vol. 80. Robert C.

Vol.mtholyoke. 20. pp. Vol. for they do not demonstrate that economic interest groups or state leaders would risk war against other great powers. its implications are not the only considerations leaders are faced with. "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914. what decisions they are willing to risk domestically will also be a source of uncertainty... Marc Trachtenberg. 120-150. See also Dale C.Interdependence. Russia was seen to still be several years away from being a concern. Copeland. and though status quo power leaders may be constrained. No. 15. 4 (Spring 1996). No. Indeed. It is in turn also likely that aspiring revisionist powers will try to avoid projecting aggressive designs that threaten economic ties with those status quo powers that they hope will keep out of balance-ofpower politics. While there were some concerns in Germany about a growing Russia. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." International Security." International Security. Note that while interdependence is an important constraint. Note also that in 1913 the Franco-Russian alliance could not match Austro-German capabilities.. 17.. pp. preferring to blame the start of a war on Russia. but with British https://www. institutions and the ba. 5/27/2013 . shows that German leaders did not feel a need to make a preemptive first strike and restrained themselves from making the first move.. Page 58 of 74 relationships. 16. 18. 3 (Winter 1990/91).

Interdependence. institutions and the ba. U. Keith M. 1 (Summer 1984). Waltz. pp. chapters 2-3. Steiner. British Strategy and War Aims. . No. pp.mtholyoke. 20. Theory of International Politics. 1977). 1911. "The First World War and the International Power System. The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy. 19. "The balance of power . . . ." In the minutes to British Foreign Office (FO) Political Correspondence. Richard Rosecrance. Shlomit Lacqueur. 2-3. 87-88. and Paul M. Public Record Office (PRO). 1914-1916 (London: Allen & Unwin. May 14. and John https://www. See also Steiner. Wallace 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . Kennedy. consists of a balance of force. Page 59 of 74 capabilities added to those of the French and Russians. 1986). actual or latent. Great Britain would definitely upset the balance the day she signed away the right to use force against any particular State in the position held by Germany at present. 1985).. 48-53." International Security.. 5/27/2013 .. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 9. chapters 3-4. FO 371/1123 No.K. 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See Zara Steiner. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. p. 21 (Tables 8 and 9). 19. pp.. 101. Wilson.. 1969). 94. pp. 212. 18222. the Triple Entente clearly counterbalanced the Dual Alliance. Eyre Crowe of the Foreign Office wrote in 1911. David French. Alan Alexandroff. Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan. Vol. John Kroll.

15.R." International Organization. pp. 1980). 1870-1945: Eight Studies (London: Fontana Paperbacks. Katzenstein. 3 (Winter 1990/91). No. Vol. "Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations. Vol. institutions and the ba. No. pp. pp.. p. 307. 2 (Fall 1986). Mitchell." International Security." International Security. Sagan. 416. Vol.J. For the statistics. 1911-1914. 11. "1914 Revisited: Allies. Scott D. 411. No. 1860-1914 (London and Atlantic Highlands. and Sean M. 3 (Summer 1977). Their work and this article challenge the conventional argument that the https://www. and Choices in July 1914. pp. Paul Kennedy. Vol. 526. 1983). Peter J.: The Ashfield Press. Page 60 of 74 Stocker. Strategy and Diplomacy. 573. "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization. 304. 22. 151-175. "International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and Recent Changes. European Historical Statistics. Vol. see B.. 1975). and Kennedy. pp. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism.. 29.mtholyoke. pp. 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press. See Jack S. 294-295. 151-186. 121-150. my argument supplements the view that stresses the failure of Britain to attempt deterrence of Germany as an important factor explaining the war.. in explaining why Britain pursued the policy it did. "Preferences. 21. 1024. 425471. and Instability. pp. No. Lynn-Jones.Interdependence. 2 (Fall 1986). Note that. and in the abridged edition (1978). 93-95. Levy. Constraints. pp.. N. 11." International Security. 4 (Autumn 1975). 5/27/2013 . 31. No.

rampant unchecked militarists.: Cornell University pp. institutions and the ba. 3 vols. ed. "The Foreign Secretary. and misperceptions. 1977).. Parliament and the Parties. Bernstein.C. Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England (Boston: Allen & Unwin.. makes a similar point in discussing divisions within the British Cabinet. George L. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca. also sees the splits in the Cabinet as not so straightforward. Wilson. 1 (Summer 1984). 1986).. 58-107. Page 61 of 74 war was a consequence of a spiral dynamic rooted in factors such as perceptions of offense-dominance.F. 1970). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little. (London: 1952-57). N.mtholyoke. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. Work in that vein includes Luigi Albertini. tight alliances. See.." in F.H. L. On the importance of bureaucratic affiliation and policy positions. Origins of the First World War (New York: Norton. see Graham Allison. 9. Turner. The Policy of the Entente..Interdependence. for example. The Origins of the War of 1914.G. The Guns of August (New York: 1962). Although I draw on the bureaucratic politics approach https://www. p. 23.." International Security. 1984). Brown.Y. 1971). K. Barbara Tuchman. 24. Snyder. pp. Jack L. 3-21. Hinsley. No. Robbins. the Cabinet. and Stephen Van Evera. Vol. 5/27/2013 . 168. British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Page 62 of 74 here." Foreign Policy. Michael Ekstein. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism. "Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914. the Cabinet. pp. 5/27/2013 .mtholyoke. 25.. 7 (Summer 1972). The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy.. Kennedy. 26. 1993). pp. 127. Vol. Robbins." in A. 1971). 129. for it is not clear what many bureaucratic agency heads' interests would be on British foreign policy. such a model cannot explain the behavior.. 6.. Raymond James Sontag. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca. 132. 3 (1971).: Cornell University Press. pp. "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland). 1933). "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914. institutions and the ba. European Diplomatic History. Sontag.P." in Rosecrance and Stein. Taylor. "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional 'Fitness'. 113. https://www. writes.. 129-132.Interdependence. 120. Michael Lawrence Dockrill. 184-185. pp. the prime minister) in determining the balance of power among bureaucratic interests. 1871-1932 (New York: Century. European Diplomatic History. pp. David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski. pp. 9-13. Steiner." pp. "The Foreign Secretary. p. 108. No. as Stephen Krasner. eds. No. 89-90.. moreover. it matters who has the ear of the president (in this case. Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (New York: Atheneum. 159-179. 5-9. 458-459. N. And they were built. pp. Parliament and the Parties. 89.J. ed.Y.." The Journal of Contemporary History.

Wilson. 29." in Hinsley. p. The Policy of the Entente. 27-29. pp. "The Foreign Secretary. Robbins. Quoted in K. 15-16. 125-126. 135136. Wilson. institutions and the ba. pp. pp. 32.mtholyoke. Steiner..A. Hamilton. Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England. Page 63 of 74 Steiner.." pp. 182-185. "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914. Parliament and the Parties. 182-186. chapter 3. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. 30. 324. 14-15. Bernstein.. pp. https://www. Wilson. 35-41. Wilson. Bernstein. pp. Robbins. David French. The Policy of the Entente. 16. 5/27/2013 . chapter 3." pp. 35-41. 1911-1914. ed. 18. "Great Britain and France. The Policy of the Entente. 123-125. "Great Britain and France." pp. Hamilton. 16-20. pp. French. "The Foreign Secretary. pp. Dockrill. pp. The Policy of the Entente. the Cabinet. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 187-188.. 27. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 1911-1914. 20." p. 325. the Cabinet. 28. British Economic and Strategic Planning. Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England. 27. British Economic and Strategic Planning. p. pp.. Steiner. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England. British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Bernstein. Steiner.. 1905-1915 (London: George Allen & Unwin.Interdependence. 1982). p. Parliament and the Parties.

Ibid. less so to Britain's survival. The reason is that Britain's navy was seen as a key to its very survival. 125-6. institutions and the ba. 37. Hence. Expansion of the army was important to preserving peace on the Continent. 62. one might ask why Haldane supported dreadnought construction. 93-95. 34. Steiner. Kennedy. 33. 35." pp. p. 15-31. 32. See Ross J. as most accounts emphasize. Hoffman.. However. Robbins. p. PRO.. French. 1875-1914 (New York: Russell & Russell. Page 64 of 74 31. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry. 278-279. the Press and Pressure Groups. Lloyd George's concerns were partly budgetary. British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. "Public Opinion.S. Dockrill. Given McKenna's concerns to guard the Admiralty and his lack of support for the army. pp. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. pp.mtholyoke. ed. pp. British Strategy and War Aims. To be sure. 1964)..G. pp. https://www. Strategy and Diplomacy. budgetary concerns could not explain Lloyd George's opposition to the alliance. Britain). "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914." in Hinsley.. reduced balancing costs for Britain. by increasing military K. making the entente into an alliance would have.Interdependence. 89. 36. 5.. 5/27/2013 . CAB 16/18A (Cabinet Records.

mtholyoke. and documents in the Foreign Office Commercial Series FO 368.Interdependence. The Policy of the Entente. pp. British Economic and Strategic Planning." in Hinsley. 85.. 38." p. Fischer. 40. p. Steiner. reflected a conflation of the two groups that was then a common attitude in Britain as well as Germany.. See also Wiemann. institutions and the ba. 26-29. ed. French. p. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 17863. "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914. https://www. FO 371/1371 ed. 5/27/2013 . It is clear from the context of the Reventlow article and the responses cited that the concerns were with the "financial element. Sontag. The Policy of the Entente. Page 65 of 74 87-88.. as Reventlow did. pp. British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Referring to the "financial element" as Jewish. 41. pp. R. Wilson. 76-77." not its supposed domination by Jews.T." p. PRO. British Foreign Office Political Correspondence. 18. 26." in Taylor. War of Illusions.. 1911-1914. "Great Britain and Germany. 29. 127.. Langhorne. 140-142. "The Foreign Secretary. "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914. 288-289. European Diplomatic History. the Cabinet. pp. Lloyd George.. Robbins. Friedrich Wilhelm Wiemann. PRO. pp. Wilson. 73. 124. 39. p. 73. Parliament and the Parties. 18..

. "Detente and Deterrence. "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914. "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914.. Fischer. the Cabinet.. War of Illusions. British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. 5/27/2013 .edu/acad/intrel/papa. Robbins.Interdependence." pp. 18481918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. ed. 24-25. Dockrill. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. Wiemann." p. Bernstein. European Diplomatic History. pp. On this history. 80-86. 225-235. European Diplomatic History.J." pp. Parliament and the Parties." in Hinsley. "David Lloyd George and Foreign Policy Before 1914.. institutions and the ba. Taylor." pp. 44. 21. pp. Robbins." p. 75-76.." pp. see Steiner. Robbins. 46. pp. Parliament and the Parties." pp. "Lloyd George and the Struggle for the Navy Estimates of 1914. "The Foreign Secretary the Cabinet. 45. pp. 43. 169-170.. 502504. Lynn-Jones.P. p. 28-29. Langhorne. Michael G. "Great Britain and Germany.mtholyoke. Wiemann. Parliament and the Parties. Quoted in Sontag. 1954). 20-21. The Policy of the Entente. pp. Page 66 of 74 42. 404-406. 18. 47. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe. the Cabinet. 125-127." p. 19111914. A. 25. Dockrill. "The Foreign Secretary." pp. "The Foreign Secretary. 124-130. "The Sarajevo Crisis. Liberalism and https://www. pp. 200. Wilson. Ekstein and Zara Steiner. 308-11. Sontag.

Page 67 of 74 Liberal Politics in Edwardian England. Levy. 55. particularly vis-a-vis Britain. p. Myths of Empire. p. Steiner. 200201. "1914 Revisited. No. p. French. 48.. Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton. including notably Board of Trade head Burns." and Snyder. Sagan... European Diplomatic History. pp. "Preferences. economic. "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War. and social structures. institutions and the ba. Constraints." pp.mtholyoke. Vol. are largely correct in pointing to political economic factors as sources of German policies." pp. Ekstein and Steiner. British Economic and Strategic Planning. Sontag.. 169-170." Journal of Modern History. "Germany and the Origins of the First World War. This contributes to the important debate on German motivations sparked by Fritz Fischer." p. but they do not identify sufficient conditions for German behavior. 3 (September https://www. 49.. Kaiser. 1961/1967). 87.Interdependence. 1975). 5/27/2013 . 169. 407-409. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. Two members resigned over the change in British policy. and Fischer argued that Germany was primarily responsible for the First World War and that the sources of its policies could be found in its domestic political. which was also influenced by international-level strategic interaction calculations. On the Fischer controversy. 193. War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914 (New York: Norton. and Choices. "Sarajevo Crisis. see David E. 230. I argue that Fischer and others. such as Gordon. 1943/1989). However. 1975).. Berghahn. 1973). pp. Martin's Press. pp. Ronald Rogowski. Denver. Moses. 5/27/2013 . institutions and the ba. there is a crucially important difference between us. 50. 442-474. and the Authoritarian Coalition in Germany After 1879.. Bread and Democracy in Germany (Ithaca. pp. 9-11. whereas he characterizes the political institutions as cartelized. 53.mtholyoke. Alexander Gerschenkron. I have pointed to these pseudo-democratic features as crucial. I disagree with this argument because concentrated interests do not necessarily have expansionist aims https://www.. Page 68 of 74 1983). applies to Wilhelmine Germany. 9..Y. Snyder. 51. p. makes a coalitional argument similar to mine in contending that logrolling is a function of the "distribution of power and interests in the society and on the character of its political institutions. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. N. For Snyder. and John A. 25. cartelization is what is important because it gives prominence to concentrated interests which tend to logroll to pursue expansion and militarism. Colorado. p. Rye. 1982. V." paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.. 52..: Cornell University Press.Interdependence. 18. Ibid. 10-11. September 1-5. Myths of Empire. The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London: George Prior.R. "Iron." an argument he. p.

No. Gerschenkron. pp. For heavy industry. The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order. 1978).. 56. pp.mtholyoke. protection helped them because it would force makers of manufactured goods to buy at home. Eckart Kehr. pp. The Junkers needed high agricultural tariffs. Page 69 of 74 (and many in Wilhelmine Germany did not). 292. Gerschenkron. 119. "International Trade. Bread and Democracy. 2 (Autumn 1977). Domestic Coalitions. Gerschenkron. p. pp. Vol. Peter Gourevitch.. 42-47. 20. and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896. 1991). David Calleo. Rye.. Gourevitch. institutions and the ba. pp. 55.Interdependence. and Foreign https://www. and Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman. "International Trade." p." pp. Bread and Democracy. Alan C. 49-57. Lamborn. What is important is what types of concentrated interests have prominence under a particular set of political institutions. 52-63. so a cartelized system will not necessarily give rise to such a foreign policy." Journal of Interdisciplinary History. Bread and Democracy. 2-23. 82-83. 8. "Iron. and the Authoritarian Coalition. Militarism.. The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain.. 54. 1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Other sectors in agriculture and industry were less protectionist or more in favor of free trade. for they were at a comparative disadvantage in the world economy. 285-290. Economic Interest. 5/27/2013 . Rogowski. not whether there is cartelization.

58-61. 1977). 33-35. "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional 'Fitness'. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism. The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815 (New York: G. Kehr. 203. p. 22-25. 22-25. German Foreign Policy. chapters 3-4. pp. Ibid. by Gordon A. 57. by Grete Heinz (Berkeley: University of California Press.E Taylor. 140.P. 11-12.. pp. 48-50. 40. Kennedy The Rise of the Anglo-German Fischer.. Calleo. chapter 2. 79. 119-120. trans. 298-302. Lamborn. 235. 265. 234." pp. ed. and Intro. https://www. Fischer. 1871-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Fischer. Kennedy. pp. p. The German Problem Reconsidered. 260.Interdependence. The Price of Power. chapters 8-9. 1946/1979). 137-138. pp. institutions and the ba. D'Lugo and Rogowski. Page 70 of 74 Policy: Essays on German History.mtholyoke. 237. 1976). pp. 140. 61. A. 121. Bread and Democracy. 60. 55. 59. 135. German Foreign Policy.. 363. pp. Militarism. pp. chapter 13. 58. I am grateful to Robert Pahre and Ronald Rogowski for their discussions and insights on heavy industry's preferences. War of Illusions. Putnam. War of Illusions. Craig. p. Gerschenkron.. War of Illusions. 79-81. 20. and Foreign Policy. Immanuel Geiss. 231-236. Geiss. chapters 8-9. 5/27/2013 . p.J. 199. 134. Economic Interest.

174-175. 475. 55-56. 397. War of Illusions." pp. Levy's argument in "Correspondence. Sontag.mtholyoke. and in "Correspondence. 68.. pp. p. See. pp. https://www. pp. Sontag. and Choices. 64. Hoffman." p. 63.. 193. Fischer. 198.Interdependence. pp. 69. Fischer. 275-276." pp. Trachtenberg. institutions and the ba. in particular. Page 71 of 74 62." p. p. 70. pp." International Security. 189-203. 124. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry. 5/27/2013 . War of Illusions. 66. 142. 140. Fischer. European Diplomatic History. See. Vol. No. European Diplomatic History. 16. European Diplomatic History. 1 (Summer 1991). the exchange between Jack Levy and Marc Trachtenberg in "Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis. 170-171. 142-143. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry. Levy. pp. Sontag. Fischer. "Preferences. Constraints. for example. 50. 174-175.. Fischer.. 142-143. 137-138. 65. "1914 Revisited. 136. pp. 273-276. War of Illusions. pp. Sagan. Hoffman. War of Illusions. 163." p. War of pp. 189-190. 67. "The Meaning of Mobilization..

164. points out. but all believed Britain was dovish to a point. "Preferences. "The Meaning of Mobilization." p. says Bethmann was "generally confident" of British neutrality." https://www. Levy. 21. The kaiser and Foreign Minister Gottlieb Jagow were convinced that Britain would stand aside. "The First World War and the International Power System." pp. 137.Interdependence. institutions and the ba." There is little difference between Levy's and Trachtenberg's positions. See similar points made by Trachtenberg in "Correspondence." p. "1914 Revisited. To be sure. 135. Constraints. 163-183. that Bethmann was "not sure that Britain would stay out. Their positions are consistent with mine. while Bethmann was less certain.mtholyoke. 170-171.." pp. Trachtenberg.. while Trachtenberg. Sagan. "1914 Revisited." p. 199. 167-169. and Sagan. Constraints. and Choices. "Preferences.." pp. 73. Page 72 of 74 71. "the Allies were failing to win the war even after two or three years of fighting . contends there is little evidence to support this and writes in "Correspondence. there were different views within the German government regarding the possibility of British neutrality. 5/27/2013 ." pp. 199-200. Levy.and by 1917 were indeed in some danger of losing it." p. and Choices. "The Meaning of Mobilization." p. for both see Bethmann as somewhat uncertain about whether Britain would stand aside temporarily and believe that this influenced his decision. 72..

3 (May/June 1995)." Washington Post. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Alexei see James Alt and Michael Gilligan. 2. and he completed a draft of this article while a Faculty Fellow of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation during the 1994-95 academic year.mtholyoke." The Journal of Political Philosophy. March 26." Foreign Policy. Vol. https://www. 1995." p." Foreign Affairs. Peter Reddaway. institutions and the ba. No. Also stressing the importance of how interdependence is translated is Jervis. A1 and A28. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity. No. 93 (Winter 1993). Page 73 of 74 74. p. "Letter from Eurasia: Russia and Americar The Honeymoon's Over. "Democratization and War. Vol. 1995. "Political Elites Vie for Power In Russian Quasi-Democracy. pp.. 79-97. 165-192. Vol. pp. Papayoanou is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California. pp. "Yeltsin's American Apologists. pp." Washington Post. Pushkov. February 22. San Diego. A19. Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions. Fred Hiatt. 49. "The Future of World Politics. 2 (June 1994).. On the importance of studying both political institutions and political economic interests. but he focuses more on perceptions and potential perceptual biases rather than the impact of domestic political processes.. 5/27/2013 . Paul A. 76-90. 74. 75. 76..

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