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Mediterranean Historical Review
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Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (1821–31)
Lucien J. Frary
a a

Department of History , Rider University , Lawrenceville , New Jersey

To cite this article: Lucien J. Frary (2013): Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (1821–31), Mediterranean Historical Review, 28:1, 46-65 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2013.782671

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Mediterranean Historical Review, 2013 Vol. 28, No. 1, 46–65, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518967.2013.782671

Russian consuls and the Greek war of independence (1821 –31)
Lucien J. Frary*
Rider University, Department of History, Lawrenceville, New Jersey Russian consular dispatches contain vivid descriptions of life in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Balkans. Besides war and diplomacy, Russian archival materials provide historians with insight on nationalism, religion, and society. The long-lasting struggle for Greek independence (1821 – 31) created unprecedented challenges for Russian officials in Ottoman domains. Tsarist envoys played a mediating role in issues over territories, prisoners of war, religious conversions, and refugee relief. In the context of Russian –Ottoman nineteenth-century relations, this article shows that Russian agents worked to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians and promote commercial, cultural, and political connections. It reveals the sometimes contradictory nature of tsarist policy, based on legitimism and reactionary conservatism, yet supportive of movements for independence among Orthodox Christians. Keywords: Eastern Question; Greece; Ottoman Empire; Russia; Balkans

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Manuscripts and archives from Russian consulates in the Ottoman Balkans broaden our perspective on the history of the Eastern Question (the dilemma of what to do with the resilient Ottoman Empire) in the first half of the nineteenth century. Largely untapped sources from consular posts such as Thessaloniki (Angelo Mustoxidi), the Aegean archipelago (Ioannis Vlassopoulos), northern Greece (Ioannis Paparrigopoulos), and Patras (Ioannis Kallogerakis) present abundant firsthand testimony on the Greek revolt, the problems inherent in Ottoman society, and the rivalries among European powers in the Near East.1 The testimonies of Russian consuls provide rich snapshots of the turmoil of the times. Communications, registers, personal letters, pamphlets, newspaper clippings, and other official and private documents (in a variety of languages) provide multi-faceted reflections on a diverse range of ethnic and religious issues, adding depth to what is often portrayed as a military and diplomatic affair. By relating anecdotes, travel impressions and personal encounters, the copious correspondence of Russian consuls casts fitful beams of light upon conditions within the Ottoman Empire, and provides historians with a treasure-trove for the study of the Eastern Question. Russian diplomatic activity in the Balkans and Near East was first established during the reign of Peter the Great (1696 – 1725). By the early decades of the nineteenth century, Saint Petersburg had created many contacts in the main commercial and political centres of the Ottoman Empire. The responsibilities of Russian consular agents were wideranging. Daily duties included the inspection of passports and regulation of commerce, the maintenance of naval registers, and the collection of data on military affairs. Less frequently, consuls were expected to intervene when Orthodox Christians, Russian ´ ge ´ s, and merchants were treated unfairly. Consular files contain unique records on prote judicial procedures and social practices in cases involving Muslims and Christians. Perhaps the most vexing (but also advantageous) consular task concerned the functioning of the capitulation and berats (deeds of protection) systems. The notorious

*Email: lfrary@rider.edu
q 2013 Taylor & Francis

and offer intimate insights into lifestyles and practices that often escaped the purview of Western envoys. the Russian agents could be very hostile to Turks and Albanians. Their writings illuminate the hopes and dreams. Common Orthodoxy meant common culture. concerted attacks by Turks on Greeks or by Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 .3 Talented individuals were invited to Saint Petersburg. on many occasions Saint Petersburg was willing to intervene. and the greater Orthodox world. Greek Russian agents witnessed dramatic events. In February. who spoke in the name of the tsar. The religious connection between Russia and the Orthodox people of the Balkans served as a strong binding element. An examination of Russian entanglements in near-eastern affairs illuminates the dual character of tsarist policy. and left vibrant ´ s reporting their encounters. the dashing Russian general Alexander Ypsilantis and a small force of volunteers marched into Moldavia and proclaimed independence from Ottoman rule. Russia’s Orthodox sentiments were extremely important in a society where religion had traditionally defined divisions in the state and dictated the culture of each division. In March. The numerous movements were not coordinated. Consular narratives are also excellent sources on Russian Orientalism. and political ´ ge ´ s (holders of berats) privileges. their Greek homeland.5 Deep-seated sympathy for Orthodoxy meant that the extensive coverage of the sectarian violence by Russian envoys tended to portray the Greeks in a positive light.7 It demonstrates that Russia aimed to maintain commerce and friendship with the Ottoman Empire. the raising of a Greek flag and the swearing-in of armed men took place in important towns and villages throughout the Peloponnese. along the Danube. where they received an education and government salary before returning to Levantine posts as accredited Russian officials. In April. while categorically condemning revolutionary disorders and nationalist insurrections against ‘legitimate’ sovereigns. safeguard the rights of Orthodox Christians. communique hazards and hardships of transitional regions along the Ottoman periphery. interacted with eminent personalities. which aimed to secure a special position among the Orthodox Christians. and Saint Petersburg’s practice of employing Greeks reinforced the image of Russia as the ultimate liberator and the great benefactor. They exhibit the nuanced sympathies of the native. Russian consuls detailed the confused religious realities that constituted the core of the Greek-Ottoman confrontation. they even showed sympathy to Muslim leaders. Whereas the Russian Foreign Ministry professed an attitude of neutrality towards the Greek revolt. Archbishop Germanos called for insurrection in Patras and other leaders soon assembled. In the Peloponnesus and the mainland. By the nineteenth century. the employment of Greeks at consular posts in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean had become a special Russian tradition. and develop contacts in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.6 This article focuses on Russia and the last phase of the Greek revolution based on hitherto neglected Russian consular documents.4 Russian subjects of Greek ancestry constructed a proud sense of identity based on allegiance to the tsar.2 The right to hire talented Ottoman subjects as prote enhanced Russian contacts with the local elite and provided information from remote locations. The Greek revolution broke out in a variety of different places in February as well as March 1821. judicial. a subject of recent interest among historians. Yet they were not biased against all Muslims. according to the traditional account.Mediterranean Historical Review 47 capitulation system granted European powers special commercial. Promoting Russian interests and ambitions proved satisfying to these Greeks. however. Witnesses of numerous attacks by the non-Orthodox. As prominent representatives of Orthodox Christianity. and the offensive launched by Ypsilantis was soon crushed.

15 The Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) that ended the war confirmed Russian privileges in the Danubian principalities and opened the Dardanelles to commercial vessels. and the Ionian Islands.12 Political independence and confessional status became fluid in this area of unrest. naval barrages. Mustodixi’s experience qualified him well for a busy trading hub like Thessaloniki. the London Conference sanctioned Greek independence. During the following ´ to the Russian mission in years.14 In September 1827. and Saint Petersburg revived consular stations in Ottoman lands and sent a variety of missions to Greece.16 The peace settlement facilitated trade and created opportunities for determined individuals with knowledge of languages and commerce. The decisive moment came at the Battle of Navarino in October 1827. Ypsilantis’s ill-fated revolt in the Danubian principalities created one of the most intense diplomatic exchanges in the history of the Eastern Question.9 Subjects of concern included piracy. he visited Trieste. disorganized and prone to infighting. often came near to complete defeat. Mustoxidi joined the Russian flotilla in the Mediterranean under the command of Vice-Admiral Login Heyden. the emphasis is on British and Greek sources. and instances of sectarian violence. Matvei Minchaki (Minciaky) served ´ d’affaires of the Russian embassy. banditry.8 The period from Navarino to the assassination of President Ioannis Kapodistrias in 1831 underscores the violence that characterized the Greek –Ottoman clash and illuminates the process of transition from empire to nation state. and Malta as the attache Turin. ambiguous confessional ties. An educated polyglot native of the Ionian Islands. and hand-to-hand skirmishes is vividly described. Naples. After months of negotiations in 1821. the Morea. an act formalizing the break in Russian – Ottoman relations. boundary disputes. In 1825. Venice. When the Russian-Ottoman War (1828 – 29) began. He arrived in August 1830 aboard the Russian brig Telemakh. the Foreign Ministry sent Alexandr as the charge Ribop’er (Ribeaupierre) as the primary plenipotentiary (he became ambassador in 1826) to the Sublime Porte. he resumed his functions as the vice consul at the Dardanelles.J. Angelo Mustoxidi enjoyed a fruitful career as a Russian envoy in the Ottoman Empire for more than 40 years. There were many victories and defeats of the revolutionaries at sea as well. when a coalition of European warships annihilated the Ottoman fleet and stranded thousands of the sultan’s troops in hostile territory. with instructions to supervise various matters in Russian– Ottoman and Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 . The storming of fortresses. The intervention of the European great powers proved crucial in resolving the OttomanGreek encounter. Thessaloniki files present first-hand evidence of the flexible communal identities.11 In 1828. Reprisals against rebel fugitives and the prolonged occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia by Ottoman troops led to the departure of the Russian envoy to the Sublime Porte. Ribop’er and Minchaki wrote copious memoranda on the Greek revolution based on intelligence from agents throughout the Aegean.13 While serving as the Russian vice consul at the Dardanelles during the diplomatic showdown in the summer of 1821. Among the studies of this period. and shifting political loyalties characteristic of borderland communities in transition. Mustoxidi and his family departed in perilous circumstances. the Ottoman Divan refused to accept a Russian ultimatum regarding the treatment of Orthodox Christians. Frary Greeks on Turks lasted for the next decade. The Greeks. The Russian envoys possessed high responsibilities.10 In the following years. although Russian consuls reported directly and regularly about a wide range of issues.48 L. mountain ambushes. Grigorii Stroganov. Eyewitness reports from the bustling city port of Thessaloniki provide vivid snapshots of the embattled lands of the Ottoman East during the final years of the Greek revolution. and their interventions affected the lives of thousands.

Late in 1830. including two officers. as prisoners in Trikala. and left the men to their fate. three had fled. They had married local women and had no desire to return to Russia. The two who remained in Trikala (Garasim and Iakov) ‘now insist on being called Hussein and Mustafa’. and find a suitable agent among the local elite. His first dispatch describes ‘a theatre of war and horrors replete with tortured and imprisoned Christians (reaya). These six men were not war captives but in fact deserters from the Russian army. educated merchant . French. Russian vice consul Ivan Kallogerakis was among the first authorized by the Foreign Ministry to communicate directly with the independent Greek state. Mustoxidi’s gift for languages and his native familiarity enabled him to establish contacts with informants throughout Rumelia (the southern Ottoman region of the Balkans) and develop close relations with the Turkish elite. A specific duty concerned the whereabouts of soldiers missing from the recent Russian –Ottoman war. In vain I tried to reassure them than they had nothing to fear from their Turkish governors. According to Bogdanov. the perplexed dragoman decided not to force the matter. safeguarding the rights of Orthodox and Muslim refugees. The consulate in Thessaloniki was among several points in the central battle zones where tsarist agents reported on the complexities of the Greek-Ottoman encounter. and the complete absence of commerce and agricultural activity due to the massacres committed by Ottoman troops’. Days later in Trikala. Garasim Grigoriev. In Patras. and adjudicating in disputes that might cause violence between Ottoman Turkey and the Greek state. these ‘bad subjects’ (named Pavel. The Russian vice consul’s first forays into the messy realities of the Ottoman East brought unforeseen challenges. a Thessalian town about 100 miles south-east of the sancak (sub-province) capital of Ioannina in central Epirus. Mustoxidi indicated that he had informed the grand vizier of the mission.19 Bogdanov (a graduate of the School of Oriental Languages in Saint Petersburg and competent in Turkish. war-torn terrain. His tasks included overseeing Russian commerce with the Ottoman Empire. Ivan. Bogdanov wrote: In vain I employed all methods of persuasion to convince them to abandon this foreign soil. Mustoxidi ordered his dragoman (interpreter) Sergei Bogdanov to travel to Ioannina and meet with the Turkish Pasha Mehmed Res  id. Grigorii. make reclamations for Russian merchants.18 In December 1830. and the other two had become members of the community and enjoyed life in Trikala. A prosperous. Bogdanov held a short meeting with the pasha’s representative. however. Yet all my efforts failed before a firm conviction that they would not repent as Muslims. villages reduced to cinders. and Italian) was relieved that his travelling companion (a Greek named Georgios) had found them shelter in Katerini. Andrei. In the end. and none was an officer.20 Reaching Ioannina in early January. and Iakov Nikolaev) had embraced Islam. arrange for the deliverance of Christian slaves. Bogdanov was to obtain buyurldi (invitations) from the pasha. Bogdanov witnessed dozens of human heads on pikes along the roadside.Mediterranean Historical Review 49 Ottoman –Greek relations.21 Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 The Ottoman authorities were willing to enforce the Russian request and secure the safe passage of the supposed captives. a few hours outside Thessaloniki. One of them had died months ago. In a letter to Nikita Panin. who gave him letters guaranteeing safe travel and the right to obtain the release of the four prisoners. The acceptance of Islam by Hussein and Mustafa reflects the fluctuating situation on the margins of the Ottoman Empire during the turbulent 1820s. Bogdanov learned that six Russian soldiers had at one time resided in the town.17 After a physically demanding journey through brigand-infested. he learned through his informers that the Turkish authorities were holding four Russian soldiers. a town in central Macedonia. the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina.

and slaughterhouse.000) under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt (the son of Muhammad Ali). including doctors. if only due to its happy and charming physical situation. Greek. ‘entangled by so many foreign adventurers. and the vivid memories of recent times cannot but cause shivers. orchards. and much else) promised to benefit merchants. the Corinthian currant (popular among the British who use the little berries in scones. the Russian plenipotentiary in Aegina. which produce the beautiful fruit of Corinth. speculators. Although his enthusiasm later mellowed. columns.’ observed Kallogerakis. his dispatches (filed several times a month in French. and skippers.29 although Kallogerakis lamented that the long and destructive conflict had dealt devastating blows to the orchards and farms: A mournful and majestic silence reigns all around. France. A vexing problem concerned the large contingent of Arab and Egyptian troops (at one time as many as 50. Patras and their new conditions. and by this you will acquire new titles of the benevolence of the Foreign Ministry’. hospital. averred Kallogerakis: ‘The public places. and commerce and commented on its history and antiquities.’33 Violence and uncertainty characterized life in the Morea. prison.25 His first communique demography. Mark Bulgari. Kallogerakis had the task of promoting Russian interests in the Ionian Islands. and straight roads all well aligned gave the external appearance of a European city’. Frary Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 with roots in Odessa. merchants. that had been terrorizing the Morea and trouncing the divided Greek forces since 1824. health conditions. Rather than Nafplion. He intervened in the affairs of Russian merchants. Kallogerakis and his large family adjusted well to the people of ´ s describe the region’s topography. The depopulation. He urged the Russian Foreign Ministry to pressure the Ottoman authorities to recall the Arab-Egyptian . Of interest to historians on a wide range of issues.24 Arriving in October 1828.34 Kallogerakis claimed that.50 L. Christmas cake. The absence of agriculture and labour in these beautiful lands that in the past were the roof of so many people! Pray the vineyards.28 The region’s main cash crop. mincemeat. and the Levant. while highlighting the loyalty of the Greeks to the tsar. Epirus. and the Morea. Russian.’ Kallogerakis warned. and emphasized the potential for economic and cultural development. Kallogerakis wrote. sailors. a sort of wandering Russian agent in the Archipelago. Patras and its environs would be among ‘the best and strongest in free Greece’.26 The Russian consul visited farms. ‘must rival in beauty the most attractive city in Italy. and politicians. the de facto centre of authority.27 boasted that ‘les Patre When the Greek state was created. the Adriatic Gulf. the Gulf of Corinth. Kallogerakis favoured Patras for its suitability for regulating trade between Malta. industry. the location of the capital remained undecided. the solitude. and men without faith. and artisan establishments throughout the Peloponnesus and the Gulf of Corinth and established contacts with local Greeks. lawyers. any Greek action north of Corinth was impossible. Kallogerakis praised the advantages of the city port and its resources. Kallogerakis ´ ens were the best Greeks around’. as the Greek government struggled to survive.J. ‘I display myself in all affairs as a zealous co-religionist who sincerely admires the government for its virtuous and humane principles. and a lower new town with squares.’32 In order to present a positive message to the people.30 ‘Patras. as long as these soldiers remained in the Morea. have been miraculously spared the destruction of the barbarians and the sorrows of numerous campaigns. and Italian) include exchanges with Ivan Vlassopoulos. ‘Yet these days are fraught with troubles. a government building. ordered him to ‘employ your zeal to protect the commercial interests of Russian subjects. wide streets.22 In November 1828. the Ionian Islands. and the status of Russian subjects.23 Kallogerakis reported from Patras on shipping.’31 The city itself consisted of two parts: an elevated old town with a fortress.

the Russian vice consul praised his energetic and authoritative manner. and supplies. Kallogerakis facilitated the efforts of the French forces in the region to occupy the Morea. as lieutenant plenipotentiary to oversee operations in the north. but Ottoman forces held firm in the castle.’42 Although firmly committed to the Greek cause.48 Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 .47 Whereas Western observers generally condemned Agostino. ignoring the authority of generals Church and Demetrios Ypsilantis.41 The Greek armies next turned their attention to the acropolis at Nafpaktos (Lepanto). Meanwhile. Kallogerakis compared the Greek campaign to the valiant experience of Russia in 1812. Uncertain about the loyalty of the generals and the discipline of the army. In March. he wrote moving descriptions of the flight of Muslim families and the assault on refugees by brigands.44 The final battles in western Greece underscore the challenges facing the government. across the Gulf of Corinth. To hasten their departure. It is tenacious.45 According to Kallogerakis. but Kallogerakis supported the centralizing tendencies and pro-Russian sympathies of the president’s brother: ‘The troops under the orders of the lieutenant plenipotentiary steadfastly and faithfully occupy the important parts of Thermopoly and Boundounitsa. his emotional report gushes with Greek heroism and celebrates ‘the triumph over tyranny’: ‘prayers are being chanted in all the churches and the people of Patras rejoice in the streets’.39 In March.000 would suffice to open the doors of nearby Preveza. Agostino.000 Turkish tallaris. Kallogerakis condemned the blockaders’ mutinous spirit and vindictiveness. Agostino took direction of the Nafpaktos siege. Kallogerakis declared. He also encouraged the government to create roads and hospitals and he opened the consulate (his home) to French generals.43 In early 1829. President Kapodistrias was beginning his second year in power. Agostino inspired confidence among the Greek palikaria (brave young men).37 One week later Kallogerakis learned that the Albanian portion of the garrison was ready to evacuate for the sum of 6. ‘who are able to endure with greater steadfastness all the horrors of a siege.36 In January 1829. was under blockade. he hoped that neither side would suffer longer. he received word from his agent in Mytika (the headquarters of the Greek army under the British General Sir Richard Church) that the Turkish-held city of Vonitsa. Kapodistrias sent his brother.’46 The formal demonstration of the presence of the Greek government in western Greece.40 When the citadel finally fell. thanks to the actions of Count Kapodistrias. and that another 30. despite its probable future importance. which they besieged by land and bombarded by sea.’ wrote Kallogerakis. Agostino opened the door to criticism. The Albanian irregulars departed. Kallogerakis claimed that the Turks inside the fortress were eating their horses.35 The final battles for fortresses in western Greece in 1828 –29 underscore the tenacity which years of bloodshed had inspired the adversaries. Claiming to be a ‘faithful son of the fatherland’. By overstepping these two popular generals. and the Turkish commander refused to surrender without orders from the capital. created auspicious circumstances: ‘never before since the outbreak of the revolution had there been an epoch more favourable to the Hellenes to advance their armies into Epirus and push their conquests all the way to Ioannina’.Mediterranean Historical Review 51 expedition and send a squadron to Navarino Bay as a show of strength. rations. The Ottoman garrison suffered a fate similar to the one in Vonitsa. Kallogerakis was exasperated that the Greek captains ordered the burning of the town. with far-reaching authority to control pay. ‘There is no other nation like the Turks. Boeotia and Livadia are free from the presence of Ottomans. and the Ottoman leader was bound to capitulate at any moment.38 Greek troops occupied the spot in December.

the pasha awarded Paparrigopoulos two splendid stallions. Paparrigopoulos engaged in direct discussions with joint Turkish– Greek committees. the struggle for the citadel continued for weeks. ‘The liberation of lands by the Greeks. His verbal skills (he spoke Turkish. Kallogerakis claimed the Greeks owed their success to their religious fervour. and determined leadership.52 Since the garrison majority at Nafpaktos consisted of ‘Turks from Constantinople and Anatolia’. Finally. ‘the anarchy that still prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the numerical superiority of the Greek forces from being available’. For his efforts in finalizing the negotiations.56 How far the Greeks aimed to push their territorial claims into Ottoman lands was a matter of some perplexity to Russian agents.’ extolled Kallogerakis. and then into Thessaly. although his talent engendered the jealousy of the other European consuls. The pasha suggested an immediate end to hostilities and insisted upon the right to send a courier to Ioannina to ask for further orders. whom he singled out as a balanced and intelligent individual. ‘would mean an imminent end to the suffering of thousands of Orthodox Christians. the Ottoman commander remained resolute. in April. The power vacuum provided the Greeks with an excellent opportunity for expansion into Boeotia and Phocis. Kallogerakis reported that the besieged ‘Turks’ refused to give up without orders from the military leadership in Istanbul.J. the successful campaigns in Rumelia enabled the Greek government to incorporate valuable territory into the Greek state. Russian. he persuaded the Turkish commanders to depart peacefully. as rumours circulated of potential horrors against Christians if it was left under Ottoman control. Led by the British Captain Frank Hastings.’ Critical of the Turkish-Albanian soldiers’ level of courage. The city had not been in Greek hands since Byzantine times. while reining in the ambitions of Greek captains. The Turkish-Albanian population inside began to show signs of despair as the Greek ship Karteria made a prolonged assault on the coastline and Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 .49 Unfortunately. Frary During the Russian –Ottoman war.51 A practised diplomat with an intimate knowledge of local society and politics. but negotiations under the guidance of Paparrigopoulos continued. He became a key mediator in deciding the fate of the fortresses still under Ottoman command.53 Fortunately. By the summer of 1829. ardent patriotism. Messolonghi was among the last major outposts of Turkish power in the western mainland. one of the great Greek veterans in Russian service (the dragoman of the vice consulate in Patras before the outbreak of the Greek revolt). Not without considerable effort.50 Ivan Paparrigopoulos.54 Despite days of cannon bombardment and a desperate lack of supplies. French. He nearly singlehandedly negotiated a peaceful solution to several crises. The site of the legendary yet tragic Greek resistance (and the death of Lord Byron). although historians have under-appreciated his accomplishments.55 Thus a Russian agent of Greek extraction was the crucial link ending a long and bitter struggle. and the shores of the Gulf of Corinth were now firmly under Greek control. as well as Greek. Ottoman governor Mehmed Res  id Pasha was forced to leave mainland Greece and Epirus without troops.52 L. Paparrigopoulos’s ‘judicious intervention’ and the desperation of the garrison persuaded the ‘Turks’ to cooperate. according to the Scottish historian George Finlay. Paparrigopoulos negotiated the surrender in exchange for amnesty and guaranteed safe passage to Ottoman territory. and Italian) and experience made him a particularly suitable emissary. Greek forces laid siege to the fortress by the end of April. Agostino (backed by a force of 3000 troops of the line) rejected this proposition. the town was an irresistible target for independence. was another important tsarist envoy in newly independent Greece. He owed at least some of his success to Agostino.

the Greeks had overwhelmed their enemies and conquered the last fortresses of the mainland. At this point. President Kapodistrias’s centralizing tendencies generated resentment among the military chieftains. and this prevented bloodshed.59 According to the agreement. an incalculable number of Turks undertook an exodus from the land where they had lived and prospered for centuries. The Greek leaders warned that any future remonstrance on this or other matters would indicate breech of the agreement. many of the Greek irregulars grew restive as their government failed to live up to its promises. Consular reports contain vivid. although by November the movement had died down and the irregular troops surrendered. that the ‘irregular Hellenic troops stationed at Nafpaktos began by chasing all troops of the line and artillery from their posts. he criticized the captains for incompetence. Predictably.63 Weeks passed and the mutinous garrisons began to suffer from a lack of supplies.’62 In response. The government tried to foment dissension between the various insurgent captains. Paparrigopoulos offered his services to resolve the encounter. who elected representatives. retention of ranks and munitions. Kallogerakis wrote: My pen falls from my hands from trying to expose all of the horrors and cruelties that the Albanians commit in the district of Zaghori (near Ioannina) that is composed of forty villages of only Christians. Paparrigopoulos’s efforts resulted in a peace treaty signed on 2 May 1829. the violation of virgins as young as twelve. where they post their black and red banners. Once again.Mediterranean Historical Review 53 the nearby fortress at Anatoliko. the religious factor was never far from the minds of the adversaries: clause six of the peace agreement negotiated by Paparrigopoulos stipulated that the Turks were to hand over to Greek families all children under the age of four. Kallogerakis wrote to Panin. and his choice of personnel remained consistently unlucky. Havoc. gruesome tales of massacres of Christians by renegade Albanians. even if they were Muslim. hostilities continued as Albanians revolted against their Turkish commanders. Overall. and the commandant of the citadel invited the Russian agent to his headquarters to discuss an armistice. the Greek government asked for 20 days to raise the funds. Other horrible acts are committed with impunity. Unrest in Epirus raged as Russian agents took hasty measures to ensure the livelihood of Christians. Once the noncombatants evacuated. the Greek government’s inability to collect revenue and command allegiance rekindled the fires of protest. Paparrigopoulos led the negotiations. Turkish civilians inside the fort were free to leave with their movable property at the expense of the Greek government. In June 1829. In the wake of nearly 10 years of constant warfare. pillage. where. and displayed general prudence. A good example of the president’s unpopular behaviour was his decision to visit the disgruntled Greek camps. The insurgents demand their outstanding pay.58 After numerous meetings.64 By the end of 1829. mutilations and tortures in boiling water are inflicted on the bodies of the unfortunates who are forced to give up their gold and jewels.65 Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 Kallogerakis lamented of the need to rely on intelligence from unofficial sources and called for the posting of Russian agents in Preveza and Ioannina. Kallogerakis expressed sympathy for the rebels. Such a peaceful resolution contrasts with the violent exchanges along the Greek –Ottoman border in later years. In Thessaloniki. Yet he feared the tide of rebellion would swell and recommended paying the troops (‘national heroes’). composed lists of grievances. . the Russian representative in Argos. which centred on payment.60 As conditions appeared to become calmer.57 Once again. They have seized all the batteries of the fortress. and a subsidy for food. the treaty promised Ottoman troops safe passage overland with their animals.61 Clamours for back pay and allowances for food inspired mutinies among the Greek troops in Nafpaktos and Messolonghi. instead of making concessions. Further north.

President Kapodistrias was bitterly disappointed about the decision to keep the islands of Crete and Samos under Ottoman rule. since Ibrahim Pasha and his army had withdrawn. Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 . refugees. At Nafpaktos. Since the Greek government had no funds with which to meet their demands. while the fate of the Ottoman Empire hung in the balance. ‘Fortunately. One troublesome question concerned the Turks’ demand for an indemnity.67 When the Greek – Ottoman war came to an end. and sent vivid letters regarding the potential dangers to Christians.000 pounds sterling to the Greek government in 1829. religious foundations (waqfs). The Peloponnesus. whereas the British leadership favoured a truncated state consisting of the Peloponnesus and Cyclades Islands. which had a Greek majority. The debate was outside the control of the Kapodistrian government. Albanian unrest deserves emphasis. the positions that the Greeks occupy in the north of the continent don’t call for new efforts or new conquests to maintain. the boundaries of the new state and the extent of its sovereignty remained unsettled. He warned of the weakness of the Porte’s authority. Russian diplomacy aimed towards a viable frontier that would induce peaceful relations. convents.72 Unfortunately for Greek patriots. Rather. an understudied subject that illuminates the development of Balkan nationalisms and the destabilization of Ottoman society. Once the sultan submitted to the ´ d’affaires to Greece. which separated them from the Turkish commanders. women and children slaves who have escaped massacre and wish to become naturalized citizens in Greece’. Frary Mustoxidi seconded the appeal for a Russian agent in Epirus and Albania. for it weakened Ottoman fighting power and divided local authorities.54 L. and Christian slaves. and captains and their troops frequently changed sides in the middle of a campaign. Russian reports indicate that the Albanians retained their own unique esprit de corps. the London Conference (which consisted of the French and Russian ambassadors as well as the British foreign secretary) determined these issues. was assured. The legal rights of Muslim Turks. naturally. much remained undecided on the mainland.J. Saint Petersburg contributed 50. The degree to which Albanians were friends or foes of the Sublime Porte was never clear.71 Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode did his best to guarantee the livelihood of Christians.’69 The boundary settlement did not satisfy everybody. consumed the attention of the Russian consular staff. the Albanian portion of the garrison was the first to surrender (in exchange for an indemnity). Russian pressure helped the Greek state retain hard-won territories. Although not entirely successful. Mark Bulgari. which encompassed family inheritance. While a vital component of the sultan’s striking force. By 1830. was convinced that it negotiations. plus the island of Evvia. who were forced to abandon territories that had been in their possession for centuries. the Russian charge was Russia’s special ability to convince the Ottoman Porte that had led to the establishment of strong Greek borders. and made plans to educate hundreds of young Greeks in Russian military academies.70 He repeatedly lobbied Saint Petersburg. Ottoman troops rode roughshod over regions along the demarcation line in the summer of 1830. later diplomatic negotiations reduced the northern frontier to a line running from Aspropotamos to Volos. underscoring the precariousness and unpredictability of the sultan’s multi-ethnic armies. They who worked diligently to disentangle this thorny problem. the Albanians could be fickle if left unpaid or exposed to undue risks. thus leaving predominantly Greek-speaking regions within the sultan’s territory. and described the plight of ‘numerous deserters. mosques.66 A common theme in the Russian consular reports is the unrest in Albanian territories. for example.68 A turning point occurred in March 1829. when the Allied Powers agreed to assign to Greece northern borders extending on a line from Volos to Arta.

and employed Alexander Vlassopoulos (the son of the veteran Russian agent) as his dragoman. and accused him of appropriating a large portion (up to ten per cent) of the profits when selling waqfs. attention turned to the north. and Galaxidi. mosques.79 By the spring of 1831.74 The Russian consul also blamed Hadji-Ismail for sanctioning a host of disorders in Attica: ‘The fraudulent and deceptive system that he continuously follows makes him appear odious among Greeks and Turks alike.82 In the summer of 1831. He intervened personally when Turks and Albanians physically beat Christian locals at midday in the middle of the market. Religion and Politics equally impose upon me the need to interfere in this affair. is considerable. where Paparrigopoulos reported that the Turks were ‘committing outrageous acts against the Christian inhabitants of Evvia’.76 Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 Paparrigopoulos went so far as to write directly to the Greek president to garner support for the protection of Christians and their churches. Muslim Turks were still in control of the Acropolis in Athens. As the Russian consul. and continued to resist resettlement. as Hadji-Ismail continued to ignore the law. Paparrigopoulos claimed to have protected the lives of more than 6000 Christians still under Ottoman authority in Attica. claiming he was using ‘all measures in my power to put an end to the trouble’. but the effect it produces on the hearts of inhabitants. Paparrigopoulos facilitated the evacuation of Greek families. and composed extensive reports on the internal affairs of the Ottoman borderlands. Paparrigopoulos complained bitterly: The Turks continue to put their horses and other livestock in the few churches which remain. corresponded regularly with Kapodistrias. One of his primary tasks was to determine the indemnities due to Turks for evacuated properties.81 Meanwhile. He petitioned Omer Pasha (the commander of the island). as a sign of the benevolent interest of our August Master [Nicholas I]. He recommended that the Greek government issue strict orders to captains of irregular forces to prevent a conflict.Mediterranean Historical Review 55 Meanwhile. The cost is only twenty tallaris. due to the present circumstances. for corruption and avarice.78 Sectarian clashes characterize these tense months of transition in the marginal regions. In the autumn of 1831. troops on both sides of the border returned to their positions after several tense days. Hadji-Ismail Bey.83 While sanctioning Paparrigopoulos’s efforts and encouraging him to continue. Paparrigopoulos’s hard-nosed persistence prompted Omer Pasha to do his duty and respect Christians. I have demanded that the serasker [commander-inchief] immediately evacuate all the churches. he openly criticized the Ottoman governor of Attica.84 As the Russian delegation in Constantinople pressured the grand vizier. Paparrigopoulos wrote from Athens: ‘The Turkish authorities and the Turks in general are taken by the idea. Thanks to his intervention.80 He sent agents to Nafpaktos.’75 The Greek commission petitioned for Russian protection. especially since the Christian inhabitants of the city are profoundly affected by this act done on their places of prayer. Frustrated from the beginning.73 Paparrigopoulos (who established residence as the Russian consul in Attica and Evvia in 1831) proved himself an astute observer. he repeatedly complained to Apolonarii Butenev. Amfissa. Receiving alarming news that the lives of Christians were in peril in Elefsina (Eleusis). he was able to ensure their evacuation.77 He informed Panin: I give good people money to help encourage them to get busy restoring the desolated churches. about his substantial property losses since the outbreak of the revolt. After meeting with Hadji-Ismail. the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. that Attica . which was still under Ottoman control. and territories owned by Turkish families. the Russian Foreign Ministry feared that a general uprising would place the destiny of the country in jeopardy and expose its frontiers to an Ottoman invasion.

In the ‘interests of humanity and religion’. Paparrigopoulos. Rikman.94 The case of the Turkish girl and the Russian converts to Islam are just two of the many fascinating stories contained in consular reports during the Greek revolution. asking to take custody of her. who. After some debate. The response was that the slaves were the legal private property of their owners. a Greek priest in Athens took possession of a two-year-old Turkish girl. a participant in the negotiations. and Mustoxidi received scores of letters from the Greek government and common people asking for intervention.92 During the revolt. during the opening days of hostilities in 1821. ‘elegantly clad in gold jewellery and sumptuous attire’. Paparrigopoulos. Hundreds of Greeks fled to the mountains. the Russian state and society reacted with determination. starting on his sad departure from Attica.56 L.’88 In response to Greek petitions.90 An important portion of Russian –Ottoman relations during the 1820s concerns the lives of Christians taken as slaves by Ottoman soldiers. A sense of nostalgia exudes from an anecdote about a Turk. turns a last time to gaze on the Piraeus: ‘Overcome with emotion. the Ottoman authorities decided to ask the girl where she wished to live. “Sweetest fatherland!” he cried. and the girl was shipped off to an orphanage on Aegina’. Russian Ambassador Ribop’er protested to the highest Ottoman authorities. who still resided in the town.J. The various echelons of the Russian empire engaged in a nationwide relief effort. Russian consuls compiled detailed lists of captives’ names. especially since ten years of successive devastation had left many areas barren.’85 Ties to the land were strongly emotional. He complained that the military exercises in Rumelia resulted in bloodshed. when conditions had stabilized. Vlassopoulos. whole families had been relocated from the mainland and islands to places as far as eastern Anatolia and Bulgaria. The [Turkish] commanders themselves permitted insults and acts of violence against innocent Christians. learned of her presence and petitioned Mehmed Res  id. location at the time of capture. Frary and Evvia will be divvied up in their favour. appeared in front of the mixed commission and a large crowd eight days later. Paparrigopoulos concluded: ‘the Turks did not dare complain. In sum. Ten years later. Mustoxidi sent letters of protest to the Ottoman government. and status inside Ottoman territory. pillaging and killing without any regard. the upshot was unfavourable for the captives and their families. The girl’s father. and their writings detail the growth of parties and clientele networks. “I am leaving you. the commission resolved to allow her to live with her father for a term of eight days. The girl. after which she could make up her own mind. When a body of Greek representatives complained. and kissed the ground from which he and his fathers had drawn their life.89 Mustoxidi provided his own funds to cover the exodus. As the only independent Orthodox nation in the world. After a long correspondence. According to the Russian consular record. The commission asked her a series of questions (some of which Paparrigopoulos posed personally). His negotiations with Mehmed Res  id permitted several hundred families to settle in the Greek kingdom. financial issues and health Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 .91 Kallogerakis. ‘where they were chased by Turks who caused huge disorders. including the massacre of Greek captains and their families. he prostrated himself. the girl declared that ‘she only wanted to live with the Christians’. the priest returned to Athens with the youngster. who remained slaves of the sultan. Russian consuls helped set the groundwork for political and economic development.87 Instances of the maltreatment of Christians appear in the dispatches of Mustoxidi in Thessaloniki. and shall never see you again!”’86 Both sides suffered from religious and ethnic persecution and forced resettlement.93 An incident involving a young Turkish girl during Paparrigopoulos’s tenure in Athens provides an interesting image of the times. helped organize a mixed Greek-Turkish commission to decide her fate. Ribop’er.

Arsh. Priakhin. the dynamics of great power diplomacy. All the documents referred to in this essay come from the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiskoi Imperii (Archive of Foreign Policy of Imperial Russia. They played pivotal roles in the greater scheme of nineteenth-century international relations. specifically collections 133 (Kantseliariia MID). the construction of identities. yet were willing to resort to aggressive measures when their demands went unmet. Grecheskaia natsiia. Gabriel Katakazi (a Greek from Constantinople).). Beset with conflicting tensions. Selected Russian archival reports during these years are published in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Pappas. They offer insight into the functioning of Ottoman politics. Nikolopoulos. ‘The Age of Reforms’. and they could pronounce harsh indictments of their coreligionists. Prousis. International Relations and the Levant. van den Boogert and Fleet.95 Russian consular writings enhance our understanding of the historical development of Russian ties to the Christian East. idem. idem. Papoulidis. The document’s place of composition and date (the Julian calendar used by Russia followed 12 days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century). Often working in concert with their British and French counterparts. hereafter AVPRI). Russian agents encountered unexpected challenges based on the religious and legal status of Christians in regions on the margins of empire and independence. file (d. ‘Capitulations and Western ´ gime des Trade’. Homsy.Mediterranean Historical Review 57 Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 standards. Lambros Katsonis. Genton. idem. The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System. Puryear. is followed by the archival reference. The first ambassador to Greece. Lisovoi. Les capitulations. Greki v Rossiia. British Consular Reports. Greek-Russian agents played moderating roles by counselling caution and conciliation. Muratidi. Both Greeks and Turks urged Russian officials to rectify their grievances. Prousis. Land and Revolution. ‘K ‘From Agathangelos’. Greki-admiraly i generaly. Grecheskaia natsiia. 2. For each source. see Batalden. family relations. Eldem. AVPRI holdings are listed in Budnik. Russian policy-makers aimed for the pacification of the region. Notes 1. Ioann Kapodistriia. including collection (f. The assassination of President Kapodistrias in October 1831 provided a further need for strong avenues of influence. I cite the exact archival reference. Greki v istorii Rossii. 165/2 (Afiny-missiia). see Quataert. and the formation of nation states. The Ottoman Capitulations. ´ ge ´ s. Greeks in Russian service perpetuated the image of Russia as the supreme guardian of the Christian East. Petrunina. 159 (Formuliarnye spiski). Greek-Russian commentators might have made harsh judgements about Ottoman rule. Katsiardi-Hering. as fathers found openings in Russian service for their sons and grandsons. but they addressed certain realities that were undeniable to other observers. As intermediaries. arrived late in 1832..). Lisovoi. Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii. Catherine II’s Greek Prelate.). see van den Boogert. Religion. idem. see also Kontogiannis. widows gained pensions.. 3. and confessional status. De la juridiction. although the tsarist officials resisted claims that went beyond legal contracts. Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Essad. and daughters became educated. Russian Society. . ‘Mythos kai Istoria’. and page (l. ‘A voprosu o deiatel’nosti grekov’. McGrew. Eteristskoe dvizhenie. On the prote The Russian practice of employing Greeks became a family affair. Thanks to cordial relations with the local population and effective interaction with Greek and Turkish officials (according to particular assumptions and customs). Recent monographs based on AVPRI materials include Gerd. They worked to reconcile messy quarrels about personal property. Konstantinopol’ i Peterburg. On the social and economic setting. ` propos de l’œuvre des employe ´ s grecs’. Greeks in Russian Military Service. Russkoe dukhovnoe i politicheskoe prisutstvie. Du re capitulations ottomans. Identity and Empire. Petrunina. idem. idem. Oi prostatevomenoi.). Albaniia i Epir. ‘50 let na sluzhbe Rossii’. On Greeks in Russian service. While working to protect Christian lives and properties. Bruess. On the capitulations. index (op. 180 (Posol’stvo v Konstantinopole). Vneshniaia Politika Rossii (hereafter VPR). Russian consuls proved persuasive thanks to their unique talents.

describes naval operations. Frary. 147–222. Do i posle Navarina. utilize Philhellenes. Brower and Lazzerini. Svoronos. 107– 52. Histoire diplomatique de la Gre ` ce. Aksan. ibid. Vakalopoulos. L. Marchesini). 159. AVPRI. 8. AVPRI. Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 9. AVPRI. 34 –5. 343– 63. On the Kapodistrian period. 203– 26. 2343. Lord Strangford. Mytilini and Syros (S. Zante. 513/1. 133. Antonio Sandrini. Russian agents reported from Aegina (Ivan Vlassopoulos). Petropulos. Politics and Statecraft. See. ll. Taki. Anzhelo Arsen’evich’. Mustoxidi to Emperor Nikolai. Anderson. Daly. Frye. The Greek War of Independence. ‘Orientalism on the Margins’. Thessaloniki. and the Greek Revolution. 272– 3 (VPR. 133. 1: 398– 465. Russian relations with Thessaloniki began in the eighteenth century. Dakin. Mykonos (Pietro Kordia). British records are featured in Dontas. Robert).1828. 270– 1. draw on Greek archives. d. National and (Anti-) Imperial’. Selected material from the writings of Minchaki and Ribop’er are published in VPR. I periodos tis anarhias. Epirus. Prousis. 1295 (1831). Russia’s Orient. 102. 11. Frary. Driault and Lhe French reports. On the Greek revolt and the Russian-Ottoman encounter. idem. 17. Samos (G. d. see Wrigley. vol. Naval Wars. l. f. Tinos (Ivan Dzhani). d. Fleming. Histoire diplomatique de la Gre ` ce introduce French British Embassy. By the nineteenth century. 12441 (1827). and elsewhere.1821. British Consular Reports. Foreign Office archives are described in Prevelakis and Kalliataki. The Last Phase. Svilarch). op. AVPRI. ‘Delo ob uchrezhdenii konsul’stv’. The Greek Struggle. ‘European. 4. 9. 2962– 4). 15. On the Greek revolt and the Ionian Islands. Capodistria. 37 – 8. l. covers the war using records in the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voeno-istoricheskii arvhiv (RGVIA). ll. 15. 468. 507. Santorini (B. 325– 51. 15: 271– 2). Politics and Statecraft. Tolz. Grecheskaia natsiia. Toussimis. 10. 27. described the elation of the Greek population at the arrival of the Russian frigate Elena after the battle: ‘the crowds of islanders who welcomed the Russian frigate incurred the indignation and the jealousy of the British authorities’ (who maintained a protectorate of the Ionian Islands): Sandrini to Nesselrode. Liakhov. AVPRI. 132– 3. d. Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the ´ ritier. British Intelligence. vol. Sandrini left a fresh description of the battle: Sandrini to Nesselrode. 7185 (1821). Raftopoulos).10. 1.09. 154– 9. vols 13 – 16. 274– 425. Sheremet. 13. Russian Orientalism. the sancak (sub-province) of Thessaloniki was a valuable centre of Russian commercial. l. see VPR. Corfu (S. The Diplomatic Significance and ‘The Ionian Islands’. Lord Strangford. Turtsiia i Adrianopol’skii mir examines the peace treaty. 133.58 4. 468. 238– 312. 8. On Russian participation at Navarino. 16. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye. ‘Mustoksitsi. . Dakin. see Andrienko. ‘Oriental Studies’. Brewer. f.05. 12. Bitis. op. see Woodhouse. Russian Seapower. ‘Russian Interests’. Mustoxidi to Rikman. Ali Pasha. Vakalopoulos.10. 468. Svoronos). Le commerce de Salonique.1827. Istoria. Ottoman Wars.1831. 14. Russkie predstaviteli. 14. 78 (1829). Dakin. AVPRI. Kaldis. f. 3. Russian– Ottoman Relations. op. Teplov. op.P. ‘I Thessaloniki’. Russkaia armiia i flot.07. op. British and American ´ ritier. Navarin. General accounts of the period include Finlay. Photiadis. God navarinskoi kampanii. ‘Navarinskaia bitva’. idem. d. 176– 8. f. 180. 12. f. Mustoxidi to Nesselrode. 13: 113– 9. 523–33. op. 507. Padua. 664. John Capodistrias. d. Corfu. f. 9 – 21. Naxos (K. Navarino (P. Zakynthos (Anton Sandrini). 8. 165/2. op. ll. 10. Petropoulos. Russia and the Eastern Question. AVPRI. 7.02. f. 165/2. Frary Accounts of British officials are reproduced in Prousis.L. Driault and Lhe foreign ministry files. 159. 1. idem. Papadopoulou. Liakhov. d. Petrunina. Prevelakis and Gardikas-Katsiadakis. His two sons served for the Russian Foreign Ministry (see AVPRI. op. John Capodistrias. religious. 203– 10. 6. 203– 26. Cyprus (Mario Santi).. Bronevskii. Papazoglou. Russian commercial agent in Zakynthos (Zante). Bogdanovich. 5. provides the Ottoman view. Russian Society. 2: 195– 289. f. Russkaia armiia i flot.J. ‘Russian Interests’. I epanastasi tou eikosiena. and military enterprise.1827. Salonika. See. Venice. 163 (1831).1827. I epanastasi stin dytiki sterea Ellada. 224– 7. Rykachev. 637– 48. 162– 8. Mustoxidi’s well-known brother Andreas (a historian and later Greek minister of education) also served at the Russian post in Turin. Mustoxidi to Kapodistrias. History. d. ‘Angelos Moustoxydis’. Popandopoulo). 464. Mazower. 7429 (1827). Zante.

Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 180. 1 – 2.1829.. ‘Tri glavy’.02. Capodistrias. Ibrahim and his army. On Vlassopoulos. Ottoman Wars. 22 –3. idem. 517/1. l. 165/2.04. AVPRI. Patras. The Last Phase.. 221–7. AVPRI. 97 – 8. op. 72 (1829). op.01. See Kallogerakis to Ribop’er.1829. AVPRI. AVPRI.1829.1829. 17. 34. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. op. 348– 9. 12. Woodhouse.02.1830. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. op. 31. 507. 165/2. Thessaloniki. the one man capable of ensuring that the Greeks enjoyed at least de facto occupation of Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 . see ‘Vlasopulo. 50. 12.05. f. 507. 43.05. ibid. 247– 57. 112– 59. see Andrews. f.01. See ‘Bulgari. ibid. f. 28. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. f.01. Patras. 57. 30. 72 (1829). d. 165/2. 72 (1829).12. 165/2. 97.03. 33. Patras. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 29.1829. 72 (1829).01. 135 (1830). 8. 39. Kremmydas. 135– 9. the climate. d. l. 180. l. 8: 109– 15. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. Patras.01. op. 507. l. see Lazares. op. l.05. Dontas. AVPRI. l. The Military in Greek Politics.1829. AVPRI. l. op. 9. 147– 9. AVPRI. Finlay. 3. Bogdanov to Mustodixi.1830. 165/2. 507. Castles of the Morea.04. 507. Patras.04. On the activities of the Egyptian navy. 48. 210. Albaniia i Epir. Patras. l.04.1828. 310. 507. Arsh. op.1830. f. 223.1829. l. 26. ibid.. f. f. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 17. Kallogerakis’s service file is contained in AVPRI. 11 – 16. Patras. op. l. 30. 35. Driault and Lhe Kallogerakis to Bulgari. The name ‘currant’ derives from a hybrid Anglo-French expression. l.1829. 37. ll. d. ll. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 126– 35.. l. Brewer.1829. The Greek War 9. Finlay. f.1831. Bulgari was of Greek heritage and served as the Russian plenipotentiary to Greece from 1828 to 1829. 36 – 7. Patras. 69. 159. AVPRI. ll. 165/2. 146. 439. 1: 13 –53. Histoire diplomatique. f. d. d. 5. 28. 1228 (1830). f. 507. Bulgari to Kallogerakis. f.01. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. On the Vonitsa campaigns and the activities of Church.01.12. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 13. 38. d. 1. Dakin. 464. l. 32. On Patras during this period. Vakalopoulos. Rossiia i Gretsiia. 21. see Aksan. 165/2. 28. l. 18. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 165/2. 386. claims Agostino’s ‘assertive folly led to the resignation of Sir Richard Church. ll. Patras. ll. AVPRI. 24.. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 41. Nafplion. I. Dontas. 165/2. d.1829. Katarina. 16. 6. ‘O Souvenirs de la More gallikos stratos stin Peloponniso’. 237. ibid. op. 190. Patras. AVPRI. 30. Bulgari to Kallogerakis. Politiki istoria tis Patras. 154 (1831). 497.03. 1228 (1830). 464. Patras. 9. 276. l. 507. f. 10. 180. f. Douin. d.N. 321– 2. 2. Patras. Patras.1829.02. 9.’. Sergei Ivanovich’. Kallogerakis to Rikman. 66. l.1829. 26 – 7.01. 42. 27. d. 154 (1831).. For fortress details. 21– 2. 165/2. d. l. 135. ibid. ibid. Bogdanov to Mustoxidi. 165/2. AVPRI. 159. 21. 48. and Smyrna. AVPRI. op. 293– ` res fre ´ gates.. 36. f. 180. l. l. op. ibid. Woodhouse. Mangeart. Poros. op.. 5. of Independence.01. 165/2. 159. AVPRI. 29. 1. d. History. 72 (1829). ibid. f.01. ibid. 22. op. Patras. d. AVPRI. 5. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 2: 47 – 83. Mustoxidi to Panin. 72 (1829). AVPRI. 1. Les premie ´ ritier. Kallogerakis to Bulgari.. d. 165/2..01.1829. Istoria tou neou ellenismou.1829.Mediterranean Historical Review 18. d. 517/1. and sanitary conditions and begged for transfer to Crete. 281. Kallogerakis to Rikman. 507. 1296 (1832). 1592. ibid. 20. ´ dition de Cre ` te et de la More ´ e. d.1829. f. 159. ibid. ll. Mark Nikolaevich’. L’expe ´ e. A copy of the letter is contained in AVPRI..1829. Patras. 332– 3. 435– 59.10.. The dragoman’s service record is contained in ‘Bogdanov. 240. Later he complained of an insufficient salary. 26. 1295 (1831). 72 (1829). Kallogerakis to Bulgari. AVPRI.1829. see Vakalopoulos.. Patras. 9. l. 8: 109– 115. Patras. Patras. Veremis. op.1829. f. ibid. 12. 507. d. Kapodistriaki Patra. ll. 28. 693. 18. 12 – 22.1830. op. op. ibid.. Accounts of the French forces include Driault. f. ibid. History. The Greek Struggle. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. Woodhouse. 18. Patras. 234– 46. op. 40. 517/1. 46. 44. l. 464.03. 285– 7.11. 213. d. Patras. 517/1. 23. 163 (1831). 45. 18.. 47. 25. Istoria. Kallogerakis to Panin. Kallogerakis to Bulgari.03. 1: 409– 19. AVPRI. 26.1829. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. d. 507. 4. op.1829. 230– 5. Stanislavskaia. 15. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 5. 59 25. 17. 1. ‘raisin de Courantz’. f. l. ll.1829. Patras. 12. d.1829. 65 – 6. 464. 507. AVPRI. ll.1829. Patras.01. The Greek War of Independence. Kallogerakis to Vlassopoulos. 19. 22. d. Patras. f. op. Patras. op.1831. Capodistria. AVPRI.1831. Mel’nitskii. Aegina. 83 (1829). d. The Last Phase. l.04. ibid. Patras. f. Chios. 2: 207. Kallogerakis to Bulgari.

315– 6. and Mehmed Res  id Pasha is contained in AVPRI. 49. On the rising opposition. Finlay. 66.1829. 507. 507. Dakin. 165/2.04. See Riasanovsky. notes that Paparrigopoulos. l. 180. 299. Paparrigopoulos to Kallogerakis. 51 – 98. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. ll. d. ‘Mountain Warriors’. Fleming. d. AVPRI.. ibid. Vakalopoulos. op. 212–3. 276– 7. l. 67. Philips. 63 – 4. The Muslim Bonaparte. 163 (1831). Epitomi tis istorias. d. 347. Mehmed Res  id Pasha left Ioannina and was awarded the rank of grand vizier. ‘O Philikos Ioannis Paparrigopoulos’. 100– 2. see Woodhouse. History. 315– 8. An exception is William Meyer. the British consul at Preveza. 165/2. John Capodistrias. 68. 32 – 73. 517/1. d. 165/2.. l. ll. Patras. Albaniia i Epir. op. f. 55. 159. 2. op. AVPRI. d. 50. 303– 6. Capodistrias. 464. ibid. 135 (1830). AVPRI. Finlay. The Last Phase. 3. An extensive correspondence between Paparrigopoulos. Arsh.’ AVPRI. Arsh. f. Vakalopoulos. See Bulgari to Ribop’er. 3: 85 –90. British Consular Reports. Nicholas I. Kallogerakis to Panin. 8: 115– 22. Dontas. Aksan. Thessaloniki. The Last Phase. 220– 1. 58. Istoria. 51. ll. Capodistria. 15. Skiotis. 120– 48. Greki v Rossii. 20 – 7. Patras. 72 (1829). See also. op. This attitude coincides neatly with the tsarist policy of Official Nationality. Argos. 1794.. 165/2. The treaty is available in Kallogerakis to Bulgari. In the summer of 1831. Patras.05. See also. 517/1. 223. d. 267. 435– 87. I epanastasi. 126– 42. 507.1829. Patras. 61. Patras. 353. On Meyer. The main literature includes Peppa. ‘The Greek Revolution’.05. ll. Pappas. 128– 30. ascribed the relatively harmonious peace-making process to Paparrigopoulos. f. Ioannis Kapodistrias. op. Philips.1830. 265. AVPRI. Dakin. op. 237– 41. ‘Albanians and “Mountain Bandits”’. Kallogerakis to Panin. 81 –2. Nikopoulos. 204– 5. Skendi. The Greek Struggle. The Origins of Russian Education. who had studied a rude diplomacy in the school of Ali Pasha’. Mustoxidi to Ribop’er. 276. Neoelliniki politiki istoria. Skiotis. . 2: 207. f.1829. the two men made an excursion deep into Ottoman territory in order to persuade Grand Vizier Mehmed Res  id Pasha to protect hundreds of Greek families and captives taken during the rebellion. 72 (1829). Finlay. The Albanian National Awakening. Goudas. 1: 102– 9. with whom Paparrigopoulos worked closely. 71. ‘The Greek Revolution’. Dontas. ‘Paparigopulo. Crisis of the Ottoman Empire. 507. The contemporary Phrantzi. l.. labels Agostino as ‘really little better than a fool’ and a ‘miserable creature’. Kandiloros. refers to him as ‘only a Russian Commissioner’. Lane-Poole. History. Reid. 65. 325.1829. Greeks in Russian Military Service. underscores his pivotal role and longstanding relationship with the Turkish leaders. 57.. ibid. See Paparrigopoulos’s service file. Woodhouse. op. d. Kallogerakis to Panin. 507. Crawley. ll. f. With the conclusion of hostilities. 72 (1829). ibid. Papadopoulou. Istoria. AVPRI. ll. 233– 5. introduces the wealth of Russian archival material on Albania.J. The Questions of Greek Independence. 2: 206. 294– 5. I. enjoyed the confidence and respect of the Ottoman authorities. 29. d. 263. the puny nonentity who happened to be the brother of John Capodistrias’. Greek historians have been more generous. Vioi paralliloi. 62. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. 301 – 3. Albaniia i Epir. 165/2. f. f. 507. 17. ‘well known among Turkish educated men in the area’. . 54. writes. 59.1829.1829. Kallogerakis to Bulgari.06.1829. I diplomatiki drasis.05. 474.K. Fleming. History. 12. 507. 65 –85. ll. I Philiki Etaireia. Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 52.03. 17. 13.1830. 56. op. Sphyroeras. Finlay. 9.1829. see Prousis. d. 188–9. describes Paparrigopoulos as ‘a wily Greek . 72 (1829). The War of Greek Independence.06. Patras. 58. Agostino ‘can only be described as a contemptible fool .05. The War of Greek Independence.1829. AVPRI. Sir Richard Church. 12. 2565. 2: 207. ll. Woodhouse.11. Kallogerakis to Bulgari. idem. 13. Patras. Panin replaced Bulgari in June 1829. 53. Anscombe. 10. 5: 203– 48. The Greek Struggle.10. Rikman. 165/2. 1294 (1830). 2: 207. Whittaker. 63. 2. ll. . Patras. 64. Patras. f. 60. f.1829. Petridis. . Tounta-Phergadi. 165/2.1829. Frary the disputed areas’. d. Kallogerakis to Bulgari.04. 180.04. 351. Patras. AVPRI.60 L. 8: 120. op. f. 72 (1829). d. l. ibid. Patras. 229. AVPRI.05. describes Agostino in highly negative terms and accuses President Kapodistrias of alienating the people by his proclivity for compatriots ‘of the same semi-Venetian Corfiot aristocracy’. . History. Ottoman Wars.. O Ioannis Kapodistrias. Capodistria. Skiotis. Kallogerakis to Panin. Meyer.

d. d. 159.02. Woodhouse.1831. 180. AVPRI. On the Muslim population. ibid.1831.D. 9. d. AVPRI. 2623. Mustoxidi to Panin.. Athens. 473– 4. Dontas.02.04. AVPRI. 81. 16. 143– 4. op. 77. see ibid. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. AVPRI. ` ce’. 507. f. Erdem. 165/2. 24. 517/1. 23. Toledano. op. ‘L’attitude de la Russie face a Bulgari to Nesselrode. AVPRI. For the copious communication on this affair. Evvia. Frary received his Ph. 165/2. l. 74. Vinogradov. Rikman to Nesselrode. n. and is now Associate Professor of History at Rider University. 93. d. op.03. l. 500–7. 2343. from the University of Minnesota. f. 469. Nafplion.1831. 61 –2. ll. ‘Perepiska s grafom Kapodistria (1829)’.. 306– 15. see AVPRI. Nafplion. 133. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. 91. Brewer. 92. ibid.1831. 4–5. 180. 23. The Russian state reimbursed him 25. February/March 1831.. 18. ibid. d. 180. d. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. 180. 2627. Downloaded by [lucien frary] at 01:06 15 June 2013 78. See ‘Mustoksitsi. f. ll.1831. d. 7. Panin to Nesselrode. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias. 48. Death and Exile. Prosphyges kai prosphygikon zitima. Panin reprimanded Paparrigopoulos for ‘engaging in formal correspondence and sharing personal opinions with President Kapodistrias’. 180. ibid. 145–6. 2614 (1824 – 7). 1799 (1830). d. 47. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. Paparrigopoulos to Rikman. idem. f. Ottomans and Turks. 507. 75 –6. 517/1. The Greek Revolution.1830. 469. f. 507. 90. d. 507. op. ll.02. 234 (1831). 517/1. AVPRI. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. 87. Ribeaupierre to Panin. f. Studies of Ottoman slavery include Toledano. 70. ibid. 88. Notes on contributor Lucien J. 464. 165/2. 7. 1796 (1830). 133. 469. AVPRI. op. Russian . 342. op. 5. 503–10. 140– 2. 163 (1831).. d. AVPRI. 17.10. See. 1295 (1831). Athens. ll. 343– 6. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. 89. 73.000 Turkish piasters for his work to save Greek families. 517/1. 14 – 5. Brewer. d. Panin to Paparrigopoulos. AVPRI. Philips. 517/1. d. 197–8. 154 (1831).1831. 517/1. Evvia. 133. Athens. Athens. For material on the Russian negotiations (more than 6000 manuscript ` ce a ` pages). 76. see AVPRI. AVPRI.02. The War of Greek Independence. f. 71. f. op. inventories.. AVPRI. Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders. various memoranda and aperc  us. 84. ibid. op.d. ibid. op. Woodhouse. 346–8. Londres’. ‘Les discussions sur la Gre ` la question de l’inde ´ pendance grecque’.1830. Capodiastria.1831. Argos. op. Kapodistrias to Nesselrode. 11. f. f.10.01. d. 507. Between Empire. 1799 (1831). l. 167– 71. see ‘Divers papiers concernant la Gre f.03. Panin to Paparrigopoulos.. 517/1. op. Paparrigopoulos to Kapodistrias. The Ottoman Slave Trade. 1796 (1830). d. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. ll. Slavery and Abolition. ibid. Buyukdere. 29. op. op. 86. Athens. l. 180. Crawley. 154 (1831). The Question of Greek Independence. 6. Nafplion. op. 45. see Vakalopoulos. d.02. 80. 79.. ibid. op. l.. 24. which contains 500 pages of statistics. The Greek War.. f. Aegina.Mediterranean Historical Review 61 69. 85.. f. ll. 6.05. 163 (1831).1831. 21. Although impressed by his zeal and sagacity. f. f. Nafplion. ll.. 18. Anzhelo Arsen’evich’. d. 1794 (1829). 517/1. 2: 245-6. Fisher. 12.. 165/2. Finlay.08. d. 69.. 348– 59. The Last Phase. AVPRI. Mustoxidi to Rikman. 75.02.04. 40 –52. Capodistia. d.04. Athens. AVPRI. 95. Slavery in the Ottoman ´ vid and Fodor.1829. 14. For Greek supplications and lists of captives. Athens. Da Russians. 58 – 9. 12960– 7. 180. 32. see AVPRI. 180. Thessaloniki. f. Russian minister Rikman was among many witnesses of the assassination. ll. Athens.1831. 133. 94. 21 – 6. Badem. l. Athens.1831. 180. f. l. tables. The Ottoman Crimean War. ll. History.1831. AVPRI. AVPRI. op. Paparrigopoulos to Butenev. see McCarthy. ll. 23. op. 5. 8 – 9. Athens.1831. February/March 1831. 29. AVPRI. 21 – 3. On the question of refugees. 468. l. For an assortment of supplications from families and the Russian response. 72. ll. 28 – 9. ll. f. 11.05. 165/2. d. 82. ll. op. The Greek War of Independence. Thessaloniki. ll. 83. ll.1831. op. f. 517/1.1829. Paparrigopoulos to Panin. ibid.1831. Vacalopoulos. 45.03. 154 (1831). for a petition from Greek captains addressed to Mustoxidi. He is the author of articles and reviews in Russian Review.

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