PHILIPPINEASSOCIATIONOF SERVICEEXPORTERS,INC. petitioner, vs. HON.RUBEND. TORRES , as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.

SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. G.R. No. 101279 August6, 1992 SYLLABUS 1. ADMINISTRATIVELAW; ADMINISTRATIVEBODIES; VESTUREOF QUASI LEGISLATIVEAND QUASI JUDICIALPOWERS . — The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice." 2. LABOR LAW; OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; DOLE AND POEA CIRCULARS; POWER TO RESTRICT ANDREGULATEINVOLVESA GRANTOF POLICEPOWER . — It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218). 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INVALID FOR LACK OF PROPER PUBLICATION AND FILING IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONALADMINISTRATIVEREGISTER . — Nevertheless, the DOLE and POEA circulars are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. DE CI S I ON GRIÑOAQUINO,J p: This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers. PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. "In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. "In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis. "For compliance." (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.) Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. "Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong. "Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy: "I. Creation of a Joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU). "An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment: "The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned: "1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies "2. Manpower Pooling "3. Worker Training and Briefing "4. Processing and Deployment "5. Welfare Programs. "II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or Principals. "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong. "xxx xxx xxx "X. Interim Arrangement

"All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU. "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong Kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool. "For strict compliance of all concerned." (pp. 31-35, Rollo.) On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. "TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong. "Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only. "Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation with the POEA. "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed. "Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool. "For strict compliance of all concerned." (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.) On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: 1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. "Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title." (Italics ours.)

) 2. Rollo. they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid. More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. DOLE Administrative Order No. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty: "'3. then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Labor Code. vs. first and foremost. 15. Said Administrative Order [i. .). From the National Seamen Board. 62. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers. 20. promote. . . Payawal. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. aptly observed: " . The Solicitor General. unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes. and control with due regard for the interests. . of the public. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment. 24 SCRA 898). 177 SCRA 72. foster. on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . locally and overseas.)" (p. To "restrict" means "to confine." (p." (Art. 79). 17. Rollo. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them. is broad and far-ranging for: 1. other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong.' (Art. and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Court of Appeals. 13.On the other hand. Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect. limit or stop" (p. Maceren. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers. the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA. and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the `mechanisms' that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. preserve. . . 180 SCRA 218). . italics supplied).' (Art. . Inc. the POEA took over: "2. . 13. Labor Code. 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board.e. Alcuaz.) The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. 79 SCRA 450). Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty: "'2.. which was created by Executive Order No. in his Comment. 797 on May 1. In fine. the National Seamen Board.) 3. . Labor Code.

. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book. Chapter 2. "xxx xxx xxx " . 5. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. LLjur . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. as amended. Tuvera. 447. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby 'temporarily suspended effective July 1. 146 SCRA 446 that: " . Filing. they are legally invalid. safety and welfare. Chapter 2.' "The alleged takeover is limited in scope. Effectivity. Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4. . Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. ."Said administrative issuances. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987." (Emphasis supplied." (Underscoring supplied. [They are] reasonable.) "Art. Chapter 2. three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: "Art. defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law. or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health. the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. Rules and Regulations. is affected with public interest. if not to end. . The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons." (p. and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. 1991. 2. Labor Code. we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees. travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center." (pp. as it is conducted today. Nevertheless. Rollo. since the recruitment and deployment business.) "Section 4. valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution. . .). "xxx xxx xxx "The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure." (Civil Code.) Section 3. . the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only. unless it is otherwise provided.) Once more. 62-65. intended to curtail.

WHEREFORE. Medialdea. need not be published. Padilla. 30 and 37." (p. 448. 448. Series of 1991. C . The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. Series of 1991. Narvasa. Jr."Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Gutierrez. and POEA Memorandum Circular Nos. by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. Feliciano. Romero.. Bidin." (p.. 16.. SO ORDERED. concur. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. that is.) "We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. JJ . Davide.. Jr . Nocon and Bellosillo.J . Cruz. the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.) For lack of proper publication. . the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. Regalado.

JOSE BRILLANTES. G. MA.— The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. . THE PROPERREGULATIONOF A PROFESSION. No. ID. — In any case. 3. ID. EXERCISETHEREOFENJOYSA PRESUMEDVALIDITY UNLESSIT IS SHOWNTHAT IT DOESNOT ENHANCETHE PUBLICWELFAREOR WAS EXERCISEDARBITRARILYOR UNREASONABLY. WHERETHE LIBERTYCURTAILEDAFFECTSAT MOSTTHE RIGHTTO PROPERTY..R. 708. in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. 120095 August5. . — Thus. According to the maxim. [1919]) wrote: "The police power of the State. respondents.THE PERMISSIBLESCOPEOF REGULATORYMEASURESIS MUCHWIDER . INC. 'is a power coexistensive with self-protection. in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. then Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. BUSINESSOR TRADEIS A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF. HON.JMMPROMOTIONANDMANAGEMENT.. NIEVES CONFESOR.. it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. the preservation of the State. petitioners.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort." one court has said . no right is absolute.. POLICE POWER. particularly its ARB requirement. and KARY INTERNATIONAL. in the early case of Rubi v.." Carried onward by the current of legislature. it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order.. ID. INHERENTPOWERSOF THE STATE." 2. provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. POLITICALLAW. 660. vs. police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.. ID. — Nevertheless. calling business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions. Provincial Board of Mindoro (89 Phil.. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity. ID. Justice Malcolm. HON. ID.. FELICISIMO JOSON. 4. ID. the public health and welfare and public morals.INC. the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion. ID. Describing the nature and scope of the police power. as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property." this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state. 1996 SYLLABUS 1. COURTOF APPEALS . HON. the permissible scope of regulatory measures is . and the proper regulation of a profession.NATUREAND SCOPE . does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.. sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.CALLING. safety and welfare of society.. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs. ID.

the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection.certainly much wider. MERELY REQUIRES THAT ALL PERSONS BE TREATED ALIKE UNDER LIKE CONDITIONS . the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong." Equally important. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ID. and always. Locally. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. As this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon. A profession. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution. Drilon.MUST YIELD TO THE STATE'S POLICE POWER . while desirable. ID. 6. under the mantle of the police power. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice. ELUCIDATED. the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. — Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our work-force. DE CI S I ON KAPUNAN. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. . We have held. decent. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. while away from home. trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. concerns all members of the class. time and again.. . a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. personally and economically. 5.J p: . — It is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.. Under these circumstances. ID. local or overseas. — The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. into every contract is read provisions of existing law. in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers: what concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all. BILL OF RIGHTS. THE STATE SHALL AFFORD FULL PROTECTION TO LABOR. the promotion of full employment. NONIMPAIRMENTOF OBLIGATIONSOF CONTRACTS. just. but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. It does not require absolute equality. must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. we held that "(t)he non-impairment clause of the Constitution . and applies equally to present and future conditions. vs. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters. the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. STATE POLICIES. 7.. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law. and humane. Inc. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.

" Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders. 95-72750. 3. JMM Promotion and Management. providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who. FETMOP. testing. the Secretary of Labor. 3-E. which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.. . 1995. was moved to October 1. subsequently issued Department Order No. On February 2. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training. In Civil No. a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. on January 6. issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. 2. the government. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. 1994. on January 27. In its place. 28 creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC). testing. Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations. The ban was. 2) abridged existing contracts for employment. 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders. 1994. Upon request of the industry. and Kary International. the Department of Labor. By contending that the right to overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution. providing for additional guidelines on the training. however. through the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Inc. Thereafter. 3-A. Department Order No. to life liberty and property. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances: 1. 3-F. pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement. following the EIAC's recommendation. . herein petitioners. former President Corazon C. 1994. certification and deployment of performing artists. shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test. 3-B. Inc. Department Order No. issued Department Order No. The factual antecedents are undisputed. which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February. principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel.This limits of government regulation under the State's police power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy. likewise. rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom. averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right . originally scheduled for April 1. implementation of the process. testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. certification and deployment of the former. and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. unlike new artists. Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991. providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600. 1992. Department Order No. which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training. the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP). training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB). 4. petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test. . Department Order No. filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case.

" Carried onward by the current of legislature. It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend." Thus. on February 21. . The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. 36713 dismissed the same. the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. 1995. women composed slightly close to half of those deployed. According to the National Statistics Office." one court has said . 6 the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson." 2 this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state. the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power. We agree. better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions. its ARB requirement. safety and welfare of society. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years. A through review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. . particularly. Provincial Board of Mindoro wrote: "The police power of the State. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs. and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad. we . as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.R. On appeal from the trial court's Order. in the early case of Rubi v. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order. a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers. in CA G. the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion. Justice Malcolm. this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450.However. police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good." Even then. worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort. it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order. provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. lured by higher salaries. In 1984. 'is a power coextensive with selfprotection. constituting 47% between 19871991. SP No. respondent court. but also of the fact that most of our women. Describing the nature and scope of the police power. exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991.

Significantly. drugged and forced into prostitution). Worse. and after consultations with. a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters. the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters. establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC). ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their employment contracts. 1993. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by. 3. however. testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. the welfare of Filipino performing artists. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory. the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such.O. As to the other provisions of Department Order No. some of our women have been forced into prostitution. They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. we see nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D. D. illegal or exploitative practices. 1. Clearly. the affected sectors and . attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. even rape and various forms of torture. on January 6. a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground. eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation. petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC. issued the assailed orders. selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions. the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. immoral. 3-C). Moreover. 3 questioned by petitioners. however. and following the deaths of a number of these women. Parenthetically. as the respondent court noted. where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based. 3-E). 28. The ARB requirement goes one step further. which called for guidelines on screening. by any stretch of the imagination. this should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills.noted that "[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers. a minimum salary scale (D. the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists." Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten. In spite of these measures. As the Solicitor General observed. Thus. confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action. 1994. or the requirement for registration of returning performers. here or abroad. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high-risk" destinations. No. even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.O. Acting on the recommendations of the said body. none of these issuances appear to us. after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes. the Secretary of Labor.O.

organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. A profession. the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce. while away from home. they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for Japan and other destinations. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. . the promotion of full employment. the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. local or overseas. and the proper regulation of a profession. personally and economically. The basic constitutional statement on labor. apart from the State's police power. sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. the public health and welfare and public morals. because. no right is absolute. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution. the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor. nevertheless. of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. In any event. the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection. business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions. At this Court explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. According to the maxim. without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth. abridge the right of our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process. Nevertheless. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice. trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. Drilon. under the mantle of the police power. having previously been accredited. in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers: What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all. decent. and humane. 18. just. Obviously. the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.non-government organizations. the preservation of the State." protected by the due process clause. We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot. while desirable. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. calling. On the whole. We find this contention untenable. More emphatically. their accreditation became a "property right. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances. In any case. local and overseas. where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property. it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.

JJ . finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed. we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution . A last point. and applies equally to present and future conditions. . Drilon. These orders. Finally. Jr. further the Constitutional mandate requiring government to protect our workforce. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. We have held. the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. In the case at bar. Vitug and Hermosisima. but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. vs. Bellosillo. particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. petition is hereby DENIED. concur. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters. the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control. . The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. We do not agree. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution." Equally important. Padilla. concerns all members of the class..Locally. and always. WHEREFORE. a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare. but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad. into every contract is read provisions of existing law. Inc. . we stressed hereinbefore. The tragic incidents must somehow stop. SO ORDERED. time and again.. the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality. must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.

115889. it stands to reason that where there is no claimant. 952). The AIFC International is a personality separate and distinct from AIFC. said petition having been subsequent to the revocation of the original AIFC's certificate of registration. Evidently then.SECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSION. such a proceeding is clearly within the ambit of the GTEB's powers. 114711 could not have been any one other than this same "re-registered" AIFC. 115889 is the AIFC which was "reregistered" on the above date. 1997. 114711.R. there can be no claim. 1997. petitioner. POWERSGRANTEDBY EXECUTIVEORDER NO. — Semantics notwithstanding. respondents. For this reason. 1990 Order of the SEC. COMMERCIALLAW. After all. subparagraph (h) . No. — It appears that subsequent to the revocation of AIFC's certificate of registration.CERTIFICATEOF REGISTRATION ONCE REVOKED SHALL NOT CONFER THE SAME LEGAL PERSONALITY UPON "REREGISTRATION". 537 (AS AMENDED BY E. No. 2. No.. No.). more specifically. and GARMENTS and TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD (GTEB) . AS093-008101-A under the name and style: AIFC International Fashion Corporation.O. In the same manner. No.] GARMENTSand TEXTILEEXPORTBOARD(GTEB). AIFC registered anew with the SEC. INC. SYLLABUS 1. February13. NO. 92-50 was instituted by Glorious Sun for the purpose of securing the cancellation of EQs then alleged by it as being illegally held by AIFC. it cannot be denied that GTEB Case No. It has not applied for and is thus equally devoid of any personality to lay claim on the export allocations subject of said petition. AIFC no longer exists. we cannot grant to AIFC International Fashion Corporation the personality to pursue the petition in G.R. petitioner. No. 1993 under SEC Reg. In view of the May 20.[G. 1993. or on October 14. respondents. For all legal intents and purposes. "the certificate of registration issued to American Inter-Fashion Corporation on October 14. the power granted to it by Section 3. this time under SEC Reg.] AMERICANINTERFASHIONCORPORATION . GARMENTAND TEXTILEEXPORTBOARD(GTEB). the AIFC which the GTEB refers to in its petition in G. It is obvious that the "re-registered" AIFC does not possess the legal personality necessary for it to prosecute these petitions.R. the AIFC which filed the petition in G. and it may no longer claim to be entitled to the export allocations subject of these petitions. February13.CASEAT BAR . GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING (PHILS. it likewise cannot be denied that. No. [G.R.R.CORPORATION. the original AIFC's certificate of registration having been revoked with finality by virtue of our resolutions referred to in our above-quoted 11 August 1993 Resolution. This being the case. 114711. vs. as Glorious Sun correctly observes. AS093-008101-A" was revoked. vs. ID. COURTOF APPEALSand AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION.

Executive Order No. as a bureau. (Ateneo de Manila vs. 4. AS AN AGENCY ATTACHED TO THE MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY HAS IN ITS FAVOR THE PRESUMPTION THAT IT HAS REGULARLY PERFORMED ITS OFFICIAL DUTIES . the same must have sufficient basis in fact. ID. no undue prejudice can be caused by the non-issuance of a showcause order. office or agency attached to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This is also but in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. REMEDIALLAW. by the courts. said presumption of regularity must be upheld. Inc. Anent AIFC's claim that it was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence in GTEB Case No. if not finality. as an administrative agency. (Section 5 of Article III. The GTEB.JR. 3. that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government involving the exercise of judgment and findings of fact. In fact. for so long as this goal is achieved. No. — Most recently. 913). vs. In the absence of clear facts to rebut the same. 537 (as amended by E. Luke's Medical Center. Sec. the GTEB. Sibonghanoy. Torres.of Executive Order No. including those which are quasi-judicial in nature. ID. ID.. J p: The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" of Government administrative agencies has herein come into play.. 952) to "cancel or suspend quota allocations. 23 SCRA 35). in St. because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Lamaroza. may even motu propio charge violators of "Trade and Industry Laws. — It is apparent from the rule cited by AIFC (Rule IV. 145 SCRA 105)" DE CI S I ON HERMOSISIMA. by the courts. we reiterated that: "It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief. . 223 SCRA 779 [June 29. 1. Consequently. GTEB Procedural Rules) that the same was aimed primarily at ensuring that if any action is to be filed against a respondent." in case of violations of its rules and regulations." and thereafter proceed with a formal investigation. — "Courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.. JURISDICTION. albeit through some other means. 1993]. if not finality. ID. Should courts of justice interfere with their purely administrative and discretionary functions and have supervisory powers over their proceedings and actions involving the exercise of judgment and findings of fact? Verily." 5. has in its favor the presumption that it has regularly performed its official duties. repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. THE COURTS HAVE NO SUPERVISORYPOWER OVER PROCEEDINGSAND ACTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVEDEPARTMENTS .. A party cannot invoke jurisdiction at one time and reject it at another in the same controversy to suit its interests and convenience.. 110 SCRA 447. as correctly pointed out by Glorious Sun.O. export authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses or disqualify the firm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board. we find such claim unworthy of belief. CA.MAY NOT BE INVOKEDAT ONE TIME AND REJECTAT ANOTHER IN THE SAME CONTROVERSY . The court frowns upon and does not tolerate the undesirable practice of some litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when favorable to them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse (Tajonera vs. citing Tijam vs. the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect. 92-50. over matters falling under their jurisdiction. we have repeatedly held that administrative agencies are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect.

R. 1990. This fact was not denied by the respondents. On May 23. 92422 and entitled American Inter-Fashion Corporation vs. affirmed the decision of the Office of the President remanding the case for further proceedings to the GTEB (supra. 115889). Glorious Sun. . 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Its export quotas were thereafter given to two newly-formed corporations — the De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil) and the herein petitioner American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). 1987. 1991. Glorious Sun was charged before the GTEB in OSC No. allegedly. GTEB and Glorious Sun. AIFC thereafter appealed to the SEC en . 426). 1994 Decision and the March 22. on September 7. in connection with its importations in 1983. and other related frauds. These corporations were joint ventures of Hongkong investors and majority stockholders of Glorious Sun on one hand and. were ordered consolidated. This was docketed as SEC-AC No. . These petitions. vs.R. . On April 27. 413 & 414 [1991]). a corporation organized under Philippine Laws sometime in 1977. American Inter-Fashion . Office of the President. filed an appeal with the Office of the President. after finding that '. which. . No. and was found guilty of. Glorious Sun continues to claim its rights over the aforementioned EQ. 84-B-1 with.R. set aside the GTEB decision adverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties (supra). the original incorporators of AIFC were awarded the initial export quota (EQ) allocation by virtue of the resolution of the Garments & Export Textile Board (GTEB) dated July 30. the EQs of Glorious Sun as well as its license to operate a bonded manufacturing warehouse were cancelled and its stockholders and officers were disqualified from engaging in garment exports. p. misdeclaration of values of its imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting. 197 SCRA 409. 1989. Glorious Sun filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition to Declare the Forfeiture of the Registration of AIFC on June 16. Office of the President. AIFC was able to maintain its EQ from 1984 up to the time of the filing of this petition (except for a brief period between 1986 and 1989 when AIFC was placed under sequestration) by continuously exporting or shipping out at least 95% of its current allocation as required by the rules and regulations of the GTEB. 1984. In the meantime. the Supreme Court. On May 24. was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner [Glorious Sun]'. 31596 (G. Antecedent facts to set us on a proper perspective are those lucidly set out by the Court of Appeals: "Petitioner American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC) was a corporation organized under Philippine Laws engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting garments. 1994 (G. one member of the family and one crony of President Marcos on the other (American Inter-Fashion Corp. No. the PED ordered the revocation of AIFC's registration on the ground of 'fraud'. 1984.In this connection. With the establishment of a new government in 1986. was a recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from the GTEB. 319. Up for our resolution likewise is the petition for Certiorari filed by the American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC) against the GTEB Resolution of June 21. the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) filed the herein petition for Certiorari from the January 21. Prior to its incorporation. 114711). being interrelated. As a result. Glorious Sun. in turn. No.R. 1991 and July 2. Before AIFC's incorporation. The cancelled EQs of Glorious Sun which were given to AIFC pertains to those under Cat 347/8 equivalent to 113. Pending its appeal to the Office of the President. SP No. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in a petition docketed as G.341-3 dozens which are the subject of dispute between GTEB and petitioner.

1993 and on July 1. upon motion duly made and seconded. 1992. but the latter upheld the revocation on May 22. 107742. 92-2. 1992. That pending final decision/resolution of the Supreme Court in the case of American Inter-Fashion Corp.5 Pendency of AIFC's appeal with the Court of Appeals filed on September 25. 84-B-1 concerning Glorious Sun's alleged violations and frauds. The disqualification of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in the garments export business is hereby lifted. 347/8: After a thorough discussion on the matter and.4 May 22. BE IT RESOLVED. for the following reasons: '. it was — RESOLVED. after further proceedings were conducted in OSC No. 1992. on the other hand. 1. . 1. 1992-SEC. en banc. the Petition for Review filed by AIFC before this Court docketed as CAG. The Board hereby awards to Glorious Sun the cancelled EQs of De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation as follows: 1. for the release of its 1993 Initial EQ/CEA entitlements under Cat.3 The pending case with SEC (SEC-AC319) filed by Glorious Sun for cancellation of AIFC's corporate registration. refused by the GTEB in a resolution dated January 11. upheld the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration with finality. 1992. This case has not yet been resolved by GTEB. 3. This request was. 78). dated November 7. and 4. be. dated September 11. Incidentally.839 dozens 1.R. Rollo. 1. 1992. (AIFC) vs. GTEB Case No. 2. However. 1. on August 20. The bonded manufacturing warehouse license of Glorious Sun shall be restored subject to the condition that it shall within a reasonable period of time. to study and attend to the request of AIFC pertaining to the release of its export quotas which shall submit its findings/comments and recommendation on the matter to the Board in its next meeting. The instant case is hereby terminated with prejudice. en banc Resolution cancelling AIFC's registration.587 pieces 5. Glorious Sun also filed on September 21. however. (NOTE): Because: 1. No. comply with the requirements for the operation of a BMW. This denial was upheld by the Supreme Court (3rd Division) in a Petition for Review docketed as G. AIFC's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on February 17. AIFC. prior to the Supreme Court denial of its petition for review of the cancellation of its registration. 1992. Meanwhile.2 Cat 2 Canada = 123. as it is hereby resolved: 1. pending study by the Committee created under GTEB Office Order No. and superseded by Office Order No.' (Comments. 92-1. as it is hereby DEFERRED.2 AIF vigorously contests Glorious Sun's claim for restoration. with regard to subject . 1993. No. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration of AIFC was also denied by the SEC on September 16. under existing rules.banc. 1992. 1992. relative to the request of American Inter-Fashion Corp. regulations and policies.1 US Cat 347/348= 63. 92-50 for the cancellation of the subject quotas allotted to AIFC and for restoration of the same to Glorious Sun. . On September 30. is not in a position to restore the balance of the cancelled quotas. the request of AIFC for release of its 1993 Initial EQ/CEA entitlements under Cat.1 Subject quota is currently being performed by AIF. the Supreme Court. SEC. p. The Board. 29017 was denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 347/8. the GTEB adopted a resolution which reads as follows: 'NOW THEREFORE. on the ground that AIF has already acquired vested rights over the quota. requested the GTEB to release its EQ allocation for 1993.R. 1993.

and seeking to stop the cancellation of its certificate of registration. Said resolution further made provisions for the petitioner's goods which are ready for shipment by stating in the questioned resolution that 'with regard to subject firm's goods ready for shipment.R. 1992 which ordered the revocation of AIFC's certificate of registration. suspended or cancelled the petitioner's Export Quota but merely deferred its release to the petitioner pending the resolution of certain matters.R. Despite the Supreme Court's final decision upholding the cancellation of AIFC's certificate of registration. 326). the instant petition. it can participate in the REA flexibility when the same is offered to enable them to fulfill their commitments. . a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the GTEB to release the petitioner's 1993 initial export quotas.' (Annex A. docketed as G. filed another Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court docketed as SC-G. and for the immediate release of the regular EQ of AIFC for 1993. enjoining the GTEB and all persons acting under them from implementing the resolution of the respondent GTEB.' The above-quoted resolution was the subject of the petition filed by AIFC before the respondent Judge after GTEB refused to lift said order. 1993. . prayed for the annulment of GTEB's aforementioned order. . 110771. it can participate in the EQ allocation (flexibility) when the same is offered to enable them to fulfill their commitments. No. 1992 on the ground that the questioned decision of the SEC `is the same decision assailed in a petition for review on certiorari filed with [the Supreme Court] on 23 November 1992 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. for the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the implementation of said order. This case which was docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. in view of all the foregoing. 107742. the petitioner's prayer for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions are hereby DENIED. 107742) was denied and a motion for reconsideration of said denial was denied with finality in the resolution of the Court en banc. A temporary restraining order (Annex D) was thereafter issued by respondent Judge on April 13. p. 1993. This petition (G. on May 3. GTEB filed a Motion to Dismiss and also moved to quash the abovementioned temporary restraining order. enjoining GTEB from implementing its questioned order and from otherwise delaying the release of AIFC's EQ entitlement for 1993. Rollo.R. No. 23-24) AIFC's subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (Annex D). is the fact that it has provided for temporary measures which allows the petitioner to ship its products which are ready for shipment in order not to unduly cause damage to the petitioner. Thereafter. dated 01 July 1993' (Annex A to Respondent's Memorandum. No.firm's goods ready for shipment. 1993. Records show that the petition (in G. On April 20. No. Thus it is clear that the respondent GTEB has not as of this time. As a further indication that the GTEB has not suspended the petitioner's export quota. xxx xxx xxx It is clear from the express terms of the questioned Resolution of the respondent Garments & Textile Export Board that the petitioner's export quota has not been 'suspended' as claimed by the petitioner but was merely 'deferred' pending a study of certain matters by the committee created by GTEB.R. suspending the petitioner's export quota entitlement for 1993 and. the latter. 110771) was denied by the Supreme Court on August 11. Rollo. against SEC and Glorious Sun. on July 13. WHEREFORE. 93-1173 for Certiorari. the respondent Judge issued one of the Orders herein questioned which reads as follows: 'For resolution is the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary prohibitory injunction . pp. assailing the SEC decision dated May 22. Hence. 1993.

5 Million. 221. p.. 122 of the Corporation Code. to cause the appointment of trustees for the purpose of the liquidation of AIFC under Sec. 220. AIFC was awarded by the GTEB a REA-Flexibility quota of exactly the same category and amount as that which is the subject of this petition the release of which was deferred by the GTEB. the Hongkong group claims to have discovered that without their knowledge the Campa group organized and registered a partnership called American Inter-fashion Ltd. the AIFC-International. Incidentally. The resolution was allegedly not implemented. The GTEB also allowed AIFC to continue importing raw materials 'to service the balance of its REA-Flex quota' (Annex C.R. Co. They alleged in their petition that they voted against the resolution adopted by AIFC which increased the corporation's capital stock from P2 Million to P60 Million. p. No. Rollo. Co. AIFC had allegedly performed on the REA-Flex quota since January 1993 up to the present (Annex B to Respondent's Memorandum). the SEC had issued a restraining order on August 31. (Annex B. Furthermore. Rollo). 326). This was done by the GTEB allegedly so as not to prejudice AIFC's export commitments pending any action on its request for the release of its 1993 EQs. 1993. instead. Claiming that these acts of establishing the two business entities violated their rights as minority stockholders of AIFC. It seems that Yeung Chun Kam. 110771 is still pending resolution by the Supreme Court. is that the latter may be subject to restoration for the next quota year depending on performance of and compliance while the former is only good for one-time use and may not be carried over to the next quota year (Respondent's Memorandum. p. 08-93-4546 seeking to restrain the transfer and conveyance of AIFC's assets to AIFCInternational and American Inter-Fashion Ltd. American Inter-Fashion Crop. required petitioner to amend its petition to include AIFC-International Fashion Corporation (hereinafter. Rollo).. 1993 enjoining AIFC or any of its agents from transferring and conveying its assets to AIFC-International or any other subsidiary of AIFC (Annex A. Yeung Chun Ho. The Hongkong group allegedly disagreed with and voted against the resolution since they wanted the additional paid-up capital to be entirely in cash with all the stockholders infusing new money. Yeung Chun Ho. and Archie Chan vs. which resolved that the authorized capital stock be paid-up with the advances of the Campa Group representing 63% of the subscription of the capital stock of AIFC. as well as another subsidiary. the difference between the REA-Flex quota and the regular quota entitlement.. In the meantime.Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in G. p. 167. Yeung Chun Kam and Archie Chan filed SEC Case No. 0893-4546 filed by Yeung Chun Kam. this Court in the instant petition and through the former Seventeenth Division. and to order AIFC to provide Yeung Chun Kam and company copies of its financial statements from 1989 to 1993 and . AIFC-International) as co-petitioner considering AIFC's manifestation that it underwent a business reorganization which resulted in the establishment of AIFCInternational as its wholly-owned subsidiary and the transfer to the latter of AIFC's regular export allocation with the GTEB (p. and which also resolved that the corporation's creditors-stockholders would be given the right to subscribe to the authorized capital stocks by converting their advances to the Corporation into equity. 17). Rollo). 16. Respondents' Memorandum. On September 10. Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan are among the stockholders of petitioner AIFC known as the 'Hongkong Investors' who allegedly own an aggregate thirty-three percent (33%) of the total subscription of AIFC's capital stock of P2. p.. The restraining order was issued in connection with SEC Case No. Respondent GTEB objected to AIFC's motion to join AIFC-International as co-petitioner because the latter allegedly does not have any interest in the case at bar.

it is clear that the respondent GTEB has not as of this time. 1993. dated November 17. SEC. be. .' Thus. on the alleged ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In the said petition AIFC sought to annul. Motion to Quash or Recall the Temporary Restraining Order. This case is still pending before the SEC.). Motion to Dismiss the Instant Petition and 2. 222 to 235). 1993." On April 13. suspended or cancelled the petitioner's Export Quota but merely deferred its release to the petitioner pending the resolution of certain matters. AIFC filed a petition for certiorari. pp." On or about 19 April 1993. Branch 138. entitled "American InterFashion Corporation. the trial court denied AIFC's application for the issuance of the writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. 93-1173 (Annex "D" of GTEB's petition). 1993 Order 5 state: "It is clear from the express terms of the questioned Resolution of the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board that the petitioner's export quota has not been 'suspended' as claimed by the petitioner but was only 'Deferred' pending a study of certain matters by the committee created by GTEB." This motion was opposed by AIFC. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against GTEB pending hearing on AIFC's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. the request of AIFC for release of its 1993 Initial EQ/CEA entitlements under Cat. 347/8) for the reasons therein stated. The pertinent portions of the May 3. Respondent" docketed as Civil Case No. (Glorious Sun) filed an "Urgent 1) Motion for Leave to Intervene and File Answer as Respondent-Intervenor and 2) Motion to Quash or Recall Temporary Restraining Order. 1993. As a further indication that the GTEB has not suspended the petitioner's export quota. as it is hereby DEFERRED pending study by the Committee created under GTEB Office Order No." On April 29. it can participate in the REA flexibility when the same is offered to enable them to fulfill their commitments. is the fact that it has provided for temporary measures which allows the petitioner to ship its products which are ready for shipment in order not to unduly cause damage to the petitioner. with regard to subject firm's goods ready for shipment. GTEB filed its "1. 1993 deferring AIFC's request for the release of its 1993 EQs (Initial EQ/CEA entitlements under Cat. Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing (Phils. On April 24. and superseded by Office Order No. In its Order dated May 3. the GTEB's Resolution dated January 11. 92-1. 1993. dated September 11. However. there were triggered by the controversy of the parties herein innumerable pleadings and interminable complaints: On April 7. that pending final decision/resolution of the Supreme Court on the case of American Inter-Fashion Corp. 347/8. Inc. 92-2. Garments and Textile Export Board.to render an accounting of its operations during the said years (Rollo. (AIFC) vs. 1992. 1992. Said resolution further made provisions for the petitioner's goods which are ready for shipment by stating in the questioned resolution that 'with regard to subject firm's goods ready for shipment. GTEB filed its "Motion to Resolve Motion to Dismiss Prior to Hearing of the Petition for Injunction. to study and attend to the request of AIFC pertaining to the release of its export quotas which shall submit its findings/comments and recommendation on the matter to the Board in its next meeting. it can participate in the REA flexibility when the same is offered to enable them to fulfill their commitments. prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 against the GTEB with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. 1993." As can be seen. v. Said Resolution provided in part: "RESOLVED. Petitioner.

1993." On February 11. 31596) where it prayed that the May 3. 1993 and May 25. on or about August 26.R. AIFC filed a "Manifestation" where it alleged that in July 1993.R. the GTEB filed a "Motion For Reconsideration" 14 of the 21 January 1994 Decision. After the GTEB filed its "Comments" on the petition in CA-G. 6 the trial court denied AIFC's motion for reconsideration of the May 3. the said subsidiary may be joined as a co-petitioner in CA-G. 1993 Orders be set aside and a writ of mandamus be issued directing the GTEB to release AIFC's EQs for 1993. AIFC and AIFC International filed a "Motion For Issuance Of Writ Of Mandamus" asking that a writ of mandamus be issued to compel the GTEB to release EQs for 1993 to AIFC. the instant petition is GRANTED and the Orders of the respondent Judge dated May 3. No. motions to intervene as well as motions for reconsideration of the said Decision were filed by Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co. As a result thereof. 1993 and May 25. 1994.WHEREFORE. the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision subject of GTEB's petition in G. 1993 are hereby annulled and set aside with no pronouncement as to costs. Subsequent to the above. 1994. . annulling the trial court's Orders of May 3. AIFC filed a "Motion" where it prayed that AIFC International Fashion Corporation be joined as a co-petitioner. 110771 denying with finality AIFC's motion for reconsideration of the August 11. 1993. (Phils. 1994. AIFC (and AIFC International) filed a "Reply" to the Comments of GTEB. 31596. AIFC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus from the aforementioned Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. Shortly thereafter. 1994 Decision had granted the petition. AIFC further alleged that its regular export quota allocation with the GTEB was transferred to the aforesaid subsidiary. the AIFC International Fashion Corporation. Thereafter. upon being directed by the Court of Appeals to amend its petition to include "AIFC International Fashion Corporation" as co-petitioner. SP No. it underwent a business reorganization which resulted in the establishment of a wholly-owned subsidiary. in view of all the foregoing.) Inc. 1993." Through its Order dated May 25. as well as other additional pleadings (including an "Addendum To Respondent's Memorandum" filed by the GTEB for purposes of informing the Court of Appeals of this Court's September 22. AIFC filed an amended petition. and affirmed the revocation of AIFC's certificate of corporate registration). SP No.. for which reason. SP No. 1993 Resolution issued in G. After hearing the oral arguments of the GTEB and AIFC.R. No. or on January 21. and after receiving their respective memoranda. 114711 in favor of AIFC and AIFC International. 1993 Order. 1993 in this wise: "WHEREFORE. Thereafter. on September 14.R. 1993 and May 25. 1993 Resolution dismissing the said petition. the petitioner's prayer for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions are hereby DENIED. Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan).R. on the ground that the Court of Appeals in its January 21. 931173 (docketed as CA-G. On or about January 31. 1993. 31596 on August 1. and by the minority stockholders of AIFC (Yeung Chun Kam.

On February 15. WHEREFORE. 114711. 2. Rule 65. GTEB's motion for reconsideration is also DENIED as well as the Motions for Intervention filed by Glorious Sun. What the decision discussed was petitioner's act of transferring the interest and assets of the former AIFC to its transferee. Rosales. Rules of Court) unless there are strong considerations to allow such intervention. Yeung Chun Ho. The decision to annul the orders in question was called for in view of the grave abuse of discretion exercised both by GTEB and the lower court in refusing to release petitioner's 1993 allocations despite the fact that it was clearly entitled to such release. (2) the motions for intervention filed by Glorious Sun. In view of the denial of the Motions to intervene filed by Glorious Sun. 1994. 1994. of its judicial functions and not to determine the respective rights and interests of the parties in the subject matter of the litigation. Rule 12. On March 22. and company. et al. Moreover. We wish to make it clear that this Court is not intruding in." GTEB thus filed its petition in G. there is no reason for us to discuss their motions for reconsideration. The decision never granted such right to the transferee since we know that this issue is solely within the jurisdiction of the GTEB. This petition is therefore not the proper forum for the discussion of the respective rights either or Glorious Sun or Yeung Chun Kam. petitioner's Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus is DENIED. nor was it called upon to rule upon. We never ordered the GTEB to release the 1993 allocation to AIFC. As regards the Motions to Intervene filed by Glorious Sun and Yeung Chun Kam and company. And regarding the interests of Yeung Chun Kam and company vis-a-vis those of AIFC's. intervention is generally allowed only before or during trial (Sec. the same should be properly ventilated in another appropriate proceeding. Intervention is not an independent action but is auxiliary and supplemental to existing litigation (Clareza vs. where it prayed: . Our decision herein did not concern itself with. the powers and functions of the GTEB. This is well within the jurisdiction of this Court which has the authority to check the abuses which may have been committed by any officer. nor are we adjudicating upon ourselves. Yeung Chun Kam. the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution 17 denying (1) AIFC and AIFC International's motion for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. and Archie Chan. 1. the GTEB filed its "Opposition To Petitioners' Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus. we find said motions improper. Whether or not Glorious Sun is entitled to quota allocations is an issue which could be properly raised before the GTEB. No. Neither are we ordering the GTEB to release or grant export quota allocations to the transferee of AIFC's 1993 EQ allocations. premises considered. and Yeung Chun Kam. Yeung Chun Kam and company.. The office of a petition for certiorari is only to check abuses or excesses in the exercise by a tribunal. and (3) GTEB's motion for reconsideration. 2 SCRA 455). The more pertinent portions of said Resolution read: "It bears stressing that the subject matter of the petition as well as of the decision sought to be reconsidered was only the 1993 allocation.R. We do not consider this as an adjudication of GTEB functions. any future allocations the grant or release of which is the prerogative of the GTEB in accordance with law. board or officer. board or tribunal exercising judicial functions (Sec. Rules of Court). since the lapse of the year 1993 had rendered this issue moot and academic. None exists in this case.

affording the Appellant an opportunity (a) of full disclosure of all the evidence and/or GTEB records relative to the charges in the Show Cause Order dated February 14.R. premises considered. Subsequently. b. 1984."WHEREFORE. on the basis of trumped-up charges of misdeclaration of importations. The pertinent portion of the Resolution denying said motions are hereunder quoted. plant. cancelling the export quotas and export authorizations of Glorious Sun. 1984. In said GTEB petition. on the other hand. maintain or revise its decision in this case. 92-50 are in turn summed up in the succeeding paragraphs of Glorious Sun's "Comment on Petition with Memorandum" dated August 1. on the basis of said evidence and records. Case No. AIFC had no personality at the time of the award on August 1. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads thus: 'WHEREFORE. The Board will likewise endorse the case to the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force for further investigation and prosecution and will request the Bureau of Customs to seal the firm's bonded manufacturing warehouse and to conduct an inventory of the contents thereof. Case No. to wit: . Thereafter. the Board finds that the Respondent firm violated its rules and regulations on importations and hereby imposes the following administrative penalties: 1. upon its incorporation. On September 7. the Office of the President. the GTEB. included as stockholders persons who were at the time disqualified from engaging in the garments export business.' 10. 1984 as it was not yet a corporation.' 9. Glorious Sun appealed the said Decision to the office of the President. which evidence/records must be properly identified and their due execution and existence duly established by appropriate competent witnesses. on February 20. 115889. and c. AIFC. 1984 pursuant to its April 27. 1990. nullified the Decision of the GTEB in the succeeding manner: 'WHEREFORE. it is respectfully prayed that the 21 January 1994 Decision and 22 March 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (except insofar as the latter correctly denied AIFC and AIFC International Fashion Corporation's 'Motion For Issuance Of Writ Of Mandamus') BE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. in O. Cancellation of Export Quotas and Export Authorizations of the firm and disqualification of the firm and the major stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports. 2. still has no in-house production capacity as it has continued not owning any factory. No. 1992. did not have its own in-house production capacity. or even a single sewing machine. and on 01 August 1984 illegally awarded part thereof to AIFC. and more specifically because: "a. expanded its previous decision. on May 22. is an offshoot of the petition filed by Glorious Sun with the GTEB on 21 September 1992. nor can it show any lease agreement for the use of any manufacturing facilities. OSC 84-B-1. the case is hereby remanded to the Garments and Textile Export Board for further proceedings. 3781. its incorporation having been effected only on September 6. the certificate of registration of AIFC was revoked by order of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the ground that the same was secured through fraud. 1989 decision. 1995: "8. rules and regulations of the GTEB. AIFC. in this connection." The events leading to the filing of GTEB Case No. Cancellation of the firm's license to operate a bonded manufacturing warehouse. 1984 Decision in Adm. and that instead a Resolution be issued DISMISSING the petition in CA-G. AIFC. to this date. issued a Decision in Adm. 1989. after which the Board may. be cancelled and returned to Glorious Sun. Case No. on the alleged ground that AIFC was not qualified to the said awards under the policies. 1984. and (b) of rebutting the same evidence/records through the presentation of additional evidence.P. in this connection. SP No. acting on Motions for Reconsideration of its September 7.R. at the time of the award on August 1. the Office of the President. On 27 April 1984." AIFC's petition in G. 31596 in its entirety for being moot and academic and/or for lack of merit. OSC 84-B-1. 19 Glorious Sun prayed that the export quotas which the GTEB had earlier awarded to AIFC on August 1.

et al. a void judgment or order is in legal effect no Judgment or order. 1984 neither vests nor divests any rights. Collector of Internal Revenue.000. CA. PLDT. the GTEB may be said to have 'acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion' (Barranza vs. 1984 had already become final and that Glorious Sun abandoned its right when it elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari.. For. 722). 132 SCRA 690. What right then could Glorious Sun have abandoned when. as explicitly shown by the resolution promulgated on June 4. 1984 decision was rendered by the GTEB in flagrant violation of Glorious Sun's right to due process. Jr. . the private respondent had been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. Moya. 'inexistent' (Free Telephone Workers Union vs. citing Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. From it no rights can be obtained. Office of the President (197 SCRA 409 [1991]). the said decision is null and void (Bacus vs. In said case. Court of Appeals. we stated: 'In the case at bar. 14 SCRA 358. Nicolas.00 but also the livelihood of some 700. Campos. which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process. the said April 27. No. the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. 888-889) and. 47 Phil. 504). . supra) and consequently for want of jurisdiction (Barranza vs. it neither binds nor bars anyone. Collector of Internal Revenue. Indeed. Free Employees and Workers Assn. Moya. Garments and Textile Export Board. in the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations.000 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families. 120 SCRA 881. etc. 1991 and another Resolution dated July 2. . 533. the record clearly manifests that in cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the private respondent's constitutional right to due process. the parties attempting to enforce (such void judgment) may be responsible as 'trespassers' (Comia vs. neither binds nor bars anyone?' 11. Nicolas. (Emphasis supplied). however. 717. therefore. Inc." We disagree. and Gomez vs. Comia vs. vs. 784-787) as if it was not rendered at all. Hence. 685. supra. 29 SCRA 492. 503-504. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void (Paredes vs. Ople. rendered as it was in violation of the due process clause (Bacus vs. 61 SCRA 525. at p. Ongpin (141 SCRA 437 [1986]). Ople. supra. citing Chavez vs. ruled that the export quota allocations of Glorious Sun had evolved into some form of property right. the GTEB decision of April 27. Ongpin (Ibid). 14 SCRA 781. docketed as G. Being worthless. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit.000. supra). the Supreme Court. Consequently. 363-364). Concepcion. Jr. 710. Campos. 1991 in American InterFashion Corporation v. as illustrated by the aforecited authorities. Thus. 46). insisted by the movants that the GTEB decision of April 27. the same decision can 'never become final' (Manila Railroad Company vs. 399) and is. quoting Chavez vs. "Glorious Sun Fashion Garments and Textile Manufacturing Company (Philippines). these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80. The Decision of the Office of the President was in turn upheld by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated May 23.R. 67180. therefore. In effect the private respondent's export quota allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another. much less executory (Planas vs.'It is. Before the cancellation in 1984. By it no rights are divested. As succinctly held by the Supreme Court: 'In this jurisdiction. Thus. Thus: 'Contrary to the petitioner's posture. 160 SCRA 43. [FEWA] vs. 3 SCRA 395. 1984 by the Supreme Court in the said case and as found by this Office in the decision presently sought to be reconsidered. . 24 SCRA 663. the void and inexistent GTEB decision of April 27. supra). being null and void. 1984 'is not a decision in contemplation of law' (Planas vs.

comply with the requirements for the operations of a BMW. Case No. b) The disqualification of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in the garments export business is hereby lifted. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation. Finally. 1992. 15. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB. while Glorious Sun presented additional evidence in support of its position. 4. On August 20. e) The Board. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. and d) The Board hereby awards to Glorious Sun the canceled EQs of De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation as follows: 1. 2 Canada-123. restoring part of the export quota allocations of Glorious Sun. American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the Malacañang decision. Instead.587 pcs. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. It will be noted that the Board restored to Glorious Sun the portion of the export quotas illegally taken away from Glorious Sun and given to DE Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation . this arrangement was rendered necessary by the fact that AIFC was never a proper party to. Glorious Sun assented to the execution of a compromise agreement primarily on the basis of an understanding with the GTEB that insofar as the balance of the export quotas due to Glorious Sun was concerned (which quotas AIFC was illegally and obstinately holding on to).P. 2. and in view of this dearth of evidence against Glorious Sun. BE IT RESOLVED.The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. 13. as it is hereby resolved that: a) The instant case is hereby terminated with prejudice. present any evidence relative to the charges in the show Cause Order dated 14 February 1984. the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. and pursuant to the directive embodied in the said O. 1984 decision. Incidentally. 12. 347/348-63. US Cat. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads: 'NOW THEREFORE. Office of the President. GTEB Resolution dated August 20. The findings are supported by the records. 14. as it could not. Cat. c) The bonded manufacturing warehouse license of Glorious Sun shall be restored subject to the condition that it shall within a reasonable period of time. the GTEB did not. 197 SCRA 409 [1991])'. xxx xxx xxx PREMISES CONSIDERED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. under existing rules. However. regulations and policies. Glorious Sun would be allowed to initiate separate proceedings for the recovery thereof against AIFC. the case was remanded to the GTEB for further proceedings. is not in a position to restore the balance of the cancelled quotas' (p. 1992). the GTEB encouraged the latter to enter into a compromise agreement.839 dzs. OSC 84-B-1. The questioned decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED (American Inter-Fashion Corporation v. the GTEB finally dismissed the complaint against Glorious Sun which formed the basis for the April 27. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. After the aforementioned Decision of the Office of the President was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Decision. and had no personality to participate in Adm.

21 On June 21. for application therefor. 17." 23 ." Consequently. the Hearing Officer submitted his Report with the recommendation that AIFC's export quotas be revoked/cancelled and the same be returned or awarded to Glorious Sun subject to GTEB rules and regulations on performance and forfeiture. 3. as well as to compel the latter to restore the cancelled export authorizations which AIFC claims it is entitled to. On June 21. On August 3. the GTEB appointed a committee to prepare a Report. But. 22 the entirety whereof reads as follows: "RESOLVED. That AIFC's motion to dismiss be denied for lack of any merit. That said export quotas and export authorizations of AIFC be reverted to the allocable balance (open basket) which shall be made available to other garment manufacturers. 2. 3. entitled Glorious Sun vs. AIFC filed a motion to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. AIFC filed its petition in G. That the petition of Glorious Sun to be restored the export allocations which were awarded to AIFC be denied. Glorious Sun filed GTEB Case No. the same having been already taken back by the Board by cancellation. instead of approving the Report of the Hearing Officer assigned to hear the case and who conducted the proceedings. the GTEB issued a Resolution adopting and approving in toto the Report and Recommendation. or in grave abuse of discretion. 115889. 1993. No. The Committee submitted its Report and Recommendation under date of May 10. in toto. 92-50. with respect to the balance of the export quotas illegally taken away from Glorious Sun still being stubbornly illegally held on to by AIFC. That the petition of Glorious Sun to be restored the export quota allocations which were awarded to AIFC be denied. That AIFC's motion to dismiss be denied for lack of merit. 1994 Resolution of the GTEB.R. as contained in Annex 'C'.(DSA). 92-50 for the cancellation of the quotas illegally awarded to AIFC and for the restoration of the said quotas to Glorious Sun. including Glorious Sun. 16. on 6 July 1994. that the findings and recommendation of the Committee on Administrative Case No. That the said export quotas and export authorizations of AIFC be reverted to the allocable balance which shall be made available to other garment manufacturers. additional steps became necessary for the recovery thereof. 1992. 2. for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. That the export quotas and export authorizations awarded to AIFC be cancelled. the Board hereby RESOLVES: 1. AIFC filed the instant petition to annul the above-quoted June 21. as they are hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED. for application therefor. No. on September 21. However. 92-0. and 4. be. 4. and (b) have respondent GTEB commanded to restore or release petitioner AIFC's regular export quota entitlement for 1994. 115889. wit: 1. as stated above. AIFC.' 19. 92-50. including Glorious Sun. 18. Accordingly. 1994.R. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: 'THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED. That the export quotas and export authorizations awarded to AIFC be cancelled." After Glorious Sun presented evidence in support of its petition in GTEB Case No. where it sought to: "(a) annul and set aside the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board's (GTEB's) resolution dated 21 June 1994 in GTEB Case No. 1994. 1994. the GTEB issued its resolution subject of AIFC's petition in G.

R.. 1994 whereby it withdrew the aforesaid "Motion for Outright Dismissal of the Petition (with Opposition to Motion to Consolidate). 1994 on Consolidation. 1994.R." However. No. on September 7. No. 1994 Resolution insofar as it ordered AIF's petition in G. 114711. No. . after praying for time for the filing thereof. 1994 Resolution: (1) requiring the respondents in G. 1994 within which to file motion to dismiss petition and opposition to the motion to consolidate. AIFC filed a motion to consolidate the said petition with GTEB's petition in G. On July 20. and not to file a motion to dismiss.R. 114711. No.R. 115889 to comment on the petition. 114711 for the outright dismissal of the case with opposition to the motion to consolidate.R." On the other hand. pursuant to Our above directive. and (2) comment on the petition with motion for the issuance of a show cause order filed by private respondent American Inter-Fashion Corporation in G.R." Thereafter. this should have read petitioner] to file a REPLY within ten (10) days from notice hereof to the comment on the petition filed by American Inter-Fashion Corporation. 115889 for first and second extensions totalling fifteen (15) days from July 13. 1994. 114711. the GTEB. and (2) granting AIFC's motion to consolidate. Accordingly. (c) NOTE the: (1) urgent motion of petitioner in G. In view of Our July 20. and (e) NOTE the manifestation dated August 12. (2) AIFC failed to exhaust administrative remedies. prior to the filing of Glorious Sun's aforesaid "Motion for Reconsideration. (d) require the petitioners [N.Simultaneous with the filing of its petition. 114711. No. 1994 within which to file comment on the petition for review on certiorari. 1994 with the First Division of this Court. Glorious Sun filed a "Manifestation" on August 15. No. 1994 by Atty.R. (b) GRANT the motions of: (1) private respondent American Inter-Fashion corporation: (aa) for a fourth (final) extension of five (5) days from July 23.R. and (3) AIFC is guilty of forum-shopping. Glorious Sun filed a "Motion for Reconsideration 24 with Motion to Suspend Period to File Comment. its "Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings Until After Resolution by Second Division of Motion for Reconsideration of Order of July 20. filed its Reply to AIFC's Comment in G. where it sought the dismissal of said petition on the grounds that (1) AIFC has no personality to file the petition. Glorious Sun filed. 1994.R. No. 115889 to resolve application for temporary restraining order or injunction. No. 115889. No.B. 115889 through its manifestation dated August 11. and (bb) to admit comment on the petition in G. and (2) motion to consolidate these cases was granted by the Second Division on July 20. this should have read 'Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing'] in G. we issued our Resolution in the above-numbered cases. in G. manifesting his withdrawal as counsel for petitioner Garments and Textile Export Board in G. No. etc.R. Benjamin D. No. 115889 consolidated with the GTEB's petition in G.B." or on September 5. Glorious Sun filed on September 22. 114711 but require aforesaid counsel to SUBMIT the conformity of his client within five (5) days from notice hereof.R. a "Motion for Outright Dismissal of the Petition (with Opposition to Motion to Consolidate)". 1994.R. de Asis. 115889. No. it appearing that the: (1) motion for outright dismissal with opposition to the motion to consolidate was withdrawn by private respondent Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing in G." At the same time it made manifest its intention to file a motion for reconsideration of the same July 20. 1994. and (2) American Inter-Fashion Corporation [N. No. where we resolved to: "(a) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the motions filed by: (1) Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing in G.R.

also with the Third Division of this Court. 3. the pertinent portions whereof reads: "Considering the allegations contained. dated March 2. 1995. its "Comment (Re: Petitioner's Urgent Motions: [1] to Resolve Application for Injunction." The latter motion was filed with the Third Division of this Court." Thereafter. Glorious Sun filed. Subsequent thereto. Glorious Sun held off the filing of its comment to the petition until said motions were resolved by the Honorable Court. filed with the Second Division of this Court an "Urgent Motion to Resolve Application for Injunction.' pending resolution by the Honorable Court of the consolidation incident. however. 114711. it should be mentioned that contrary to the 05 April 1995 Resolution of the Honorable Court. in the meantime. or on 22 September 1994. dated March 14. No. within twenty (20) days from notice. Glorious Sun included in said motion for reconsideration a 'Motion to Suspend Period to File Comment. . as well as the respective comments of the private respondents thereon and the replies of petitioner to said comments. On the other hand. filed by counsel for petitioner. 1995. we issued a resolution. been assigned.R. 4.AIFC. and (2) the urgent motion to restore status quo ante. as far back as 05 September 1994. 1994 on Consolidation. 1995 Urgent Motion to Resolve) with Motion for Summary Dismissal and Motion to Cite Petitioner for Direct Contempt (For Violation of SC Revised Circular 28-91). To this day." On April 3. At the outset. 1995." which pleading included the succeeding explanatory remarks: "1. In response to these urgent motions. on August 4. On 07 September 1994. filed by counsel for petitioner American Inter-Fashion Corporation. Glorious Sun has not yet filed its comment to American Inter-Fashion Corporation's (AIFC's) petition in the above-numbered case. 1995." Subsequent to the filing of the above pleadings. Glorious Sun filed its "Comment on Petition with Memorandum. and [2] to Restore Status Quo Ante)" where it argued that: "I. no resolution has as yet been rendered by the Honorable Court relative to the abovestated motions. In view of the filing of the aforementioned motions. 114711. Glorious Sun filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of this Honorable Court which consolidated the instant petition with the petition of the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) in G. II. by merely noting the same. as petitioner in G.R." which it followed up with an "Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante. 2. In any event. there being absolutely no showing that petitioner is clearly entitled to injunctive relief. The Court further Resolved: xxx xxx xxx (b) to NOTE: (1) the urgent motion to resolve application for injunction. the Court Resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition. the instant motions should nevertheless be denied. and to require the parties to FILE their respective MEMORANDA in both cases. had already acted upon petitioner's urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or injunction. The First Division of this Honorable Court. the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petitions for review on certiorari. No." to which Glorious Sun replied through a pleading denominated as "Manifestation (Re: Petitioner's March 30. Glorious Sun filed a 'Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings Until After Resolution by Second Division of Motion for Reconsideration of Order of July 20. both American Inter-Fashion Corporation and the GTEB filed their respective Memoranda. AIFC filed yet another "Urgent Motion to Resolve. to whom the above-numbered petitions had.

AIFC makes the following assignment of errors in its petition: "The GTEB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Glorious Sun's action against AIFC for 'recovery' of property. No. SP No. The respondent Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to hold that the 11 January 1993 Resolution issued by GTEB was valid and in the proper exercise of its administrative discretion and jurisdiction. Glorious Sun filed a "Manifestation. the GTEB made the following assignment of errors: "I. 31596 did not state a cause of action against GTEB. No. We surmise that the comment being referred to by the Honorable Court as having been filed by Glorious Sun is that which the latter filed in connection with AIFC's Urgent Motions (1) to Resolve Application for Injunction. No." ." A "Motion for Leave to Intervene and Submit Manifestation" 33 in the above-entitled cases was subsequently filed by Messrs. for short) with SEC Reg. cannot avoid liquidation by reason of the revocation of its franchise and it cannot also be allowed to continue its business by virtue of its so-called 're-registration. 1996." Glorious Sun prayed." On the other hand.R.R. whose corporate registration had been ordered revoked. II. The respondent Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to hold that the petition in CAG. SP No. Glorious Sun is filing the instant pleading which it prays be treated as its comment and memorandum. IV. among others. 12236). American Inter-Fashion Corporation (SEC Reg. Be that as it may. What was actually approved in said meeting was the 'registration of a new corporation' and that it was not the intention of this Commission to approve the re-registration of the old AIFC." whereby it informed this Court of the May 20." In the same "Manifestation. 1996 Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 6. AS093008101-A without prejudice to the registration of a new corporation. 1993 under SEC Reg. AS093-008101-A reveal that said corporation was formed for the purpose of re-registering American Inter-Fashion Corporation (the old AIFC) with SEC Reg. Thereafter. 31596. SP No.5. 1985 and that the same appear to have been approved by the Commission en banc in its Commission meeting held on October 14. American Inter-Fashion Corporation filed its "Counter Manifestation (To Glorious Sun's Manifestation dated July 15. 1993. No. Order recalling American InterFashion Corporation's certificate of registration.’ Viewed in this light. III. citing as ground therefor the above-quoted SEC.R. for the dismissal of the aboveentitled petitions." to which Glorious Sun responded by way of its "Reply (Re: Counter-Manifestation). 31596 was rendered moot and academic in its entirety by the mere passage of the year 1993. The respondent Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to rule that the petition in CAG. and (2) to Restore Status Quo Ante. On July 19. 31596 for lack of merit. SP No. 1996). Yeung Chun Kam and Yeung Chun Ho. who purport to be the Hongkong investors referred to by American Inter-Fashion Corporation in its 23 June 1995 Memorandum. this Commission en banc hereby RECALLS the certificate of registration issued to American Inter-Fashion Corporation on October 14. V.R. 114711. The respondent Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to rule that it had no jurisdiction over the petition in CA-G. The respondent Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing to deny and/or to dismiss the petition in CA-G. the entirety whereof reads thus: "The articles of incorporation of American Inter-Fashion Corporation (the new AIFC. 12236 registered with the SEC on July 16." In G.R.

1990. the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed late (last day to file petition was on September 19.R. contrary to the treasurer's affidavit that the subscription of P2. may AIFC still engage in business and claim entitlement to the export allocations subject of these petitions? 2.00 of the P2.00 supposed payment on subscription." this Court en banc upheld the resolutions of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in PED Case No.. 1992. 1992. On September 25. But on September 30. thus. 1992. petition was filed six [6] days late). No. thus affirming the Court of Appeals' assailed resolution of September 30. On July 1. et al. PED issued an amended resolution this time revoking the said certificate on the basis of its ruling that 'there was in effect no payment of at least P1.000. On November 23.R. entitled "American Inter-Fashion Corporation v. A copy of which was received by petitioner on 25 May 1992. 1992. 1992. Considering that AIFC's Certificate of Registration had been effectively revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 22. in issuing the assailed Resolutions. in its decisions of 22 May 1992.500. however. afford AIFC the right to due process? 4. 107742 assailing the resolution of the Court of Appeals in said CA-G. 1993. 29017. 1992. Did the GTEB. Acting on petitioner's appeal (docketed as Sec-AC No.00 was fully paid and the payment had been fully received. on the basis of Glorious Sun's assertions that AIFC committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing said certificate of registration." THEISSUES 1. the SEC affirmed the same. Court of Appeals. after we had likewise effectively upheld the very same resolutions in an earlier petition filed by AIFC. petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G. 1993 the . 29017. 110711. 319.R. On January 13. 319) from the said resolutions of PED. Does the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) have the power and authority to grant or cancel export quotas or authorizations? 3. copy of which order was received by petitioner's counsel on September 18. et al. No.657.000. In G. 1992 (three [3] SEC commissioners concurred. Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was referred to the Court en banc. on 24 May 1990." 40 "The GTEB's cancellation of AIFC's EQs is a confiscation of property without due process of law.R No.R."In any case. 110711. the GTEB's issuance of a resolution deciding the action on its 'merits' without hearing AIFC's evidence is a violation of AIFC's right to due process. on the ground that the appellate court committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition in CA-G. SP No. we recounted the factual circumstances pertinent to the revocation of AIFC's certificate of registration in the succeeding manner: "The complaint was assigned for investigation and hearing to SEC's Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED). Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the SEC in the latter's order dated September 16." In said G. two [2] dissented).500. petitioner filed a petition for review (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) with this Court. SP No. SP No.' In PED's resolution of 15 October 1990. 29017.R.000. but petition was filed only on September 25. and questioning the SEC decision of 22 May 1992 in SEC-AC No. PED issued a resolution recommending the revocation of petitioner's SEC certificate of registration. entitled "American Inter-Fashion Corporation v. 87-0321 revoking AIFC's certificate of registration. I This is not the first time that we have been asked to resolve an issue relative to AIFC's corporate personality. docketed as G. On 14 May 1990. this Court (Third Division) denied AIFC's petition. 1992. petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

The present petition was filed on July 13. 1992. We must all be reminded of the settled rule that once a judgment has become final. 29017. it was held that ninety (90) days from notice of the questioned order/decision is a reasonable period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. not even by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.e. By the resolution of this Court en banc. vs. G. are no longer open to debate and/or adjudication. CA. petitioner can no longer assail the same SEC resolution. petitioner had availed of the remedy of appeal by certiorari. appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. This would subvert the long established public policy that litigations must come to an end at one time or other. Thus.R No. and the SEC's resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration was received by petitioner on September 18. 107742 is final. 1993. petition was filed late with the Court of Appeals because petitioner's counsel Atty. 107742). As earlier said the denial of the petition in G. 186 SCRA 417). June 8.R No. Ceniza of Sycip Law got seriously ill) was not a valid excuse and not a compelling reason to reconsider the Court's resolution of January 13. 1993. said period of ten (10) months is no longer a 'reasonable period' within which a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed. 78917. i. denying its petition for review (G.' In the subsequent case of Philsec Workers' Union vs. Undoubtedly.R. 319. assailing the same PED resolutions and SEC decision assailed in G. Settled is the rule that a special civil action of certiorari (under Rule 65) is not a substitute for a lost appeal (Bank of America. since petitioner had already lost its privilege to question the SEC resolution dated May 22. Hon. the petitioner's privilege (or opportunity) to question the SEC decision dated May 22. In the present petition. the issues raised anew regarding the again assailed decision of SEC.R.. 101734). SP No. A contrary rule would swamp this Court with petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 after an appeal is lost under Rule 45 of the Rules. 1993 rendered in SEC-AC No. Romeo A. No. dated May 22. 1992. almost ten (10) months had lapsed. 1993. From September 18. . rendered in G. Hence. 107742 (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules). 1992. 1992. As earlier noted. 107742. 1992 to July 13. was received by petitioner's counsel on May 25.R. No. 1992. 107742. the issues raised therein should be laid to rest. in SEC-AC No. no time frame being provided in the Rules within which such petition has to be filed. G. 1993. substantially and even principally the same issues and subject matter are raised and involved in the present petition (filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court) and those in the petition in G. In Reas vs. 1990. Young (Resolution dated 22 January 1992.Court en banc denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration and held that the reason given by petitioner's counsel for late filing of its petition (i. Petitioner's counsel has filed the present petition (filed on 13 July 1993) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.R No.R. But even granting ex gratia arguendo that petitioner can still avail itself of the remedy of a special civil action of certiorari (under Rule 65) said remedy should be availed of within a reasonable period from the date of receipt of the assailed order/decision.R No. In said G. dated July 1. we held that 'a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is required to be filed within a reasonable period. 319 was lost when the Court sitting en banc denied with finality the motion of petitioner to reconsider this Court's resolution of 13 January 1993. et al. 107742 (filed under Rule 45 of the Rules). this time on the ground that they were issued or rendered without jurisdiction..e. Bonife. No.R No. the assailed decision of the respondent SEC dated May 22.

.R. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. AS093-008101-A under the name and style: AIFC International Fashion Corporation. administration and regulation thereof. and in view likewise of this lack of legal personality. AS093-008101-A" was revoked. . said petition having been filed subsequent to the revocation of the original AIFC's certificate of registration. In the same manner. It has not applied for and is thus equally devoid of any personality to lay claim on the export allocations subject of said petition. PSC. as amended. jurisdiction and discretion to grant and disapprove export allocations such as export quotas. On the other hand. and it may no longer claim to be entitled to the export allocations subject of these petitions.R No. or on October 14. In fine. we cannot grant to AIFC International Fashion Corporation the personality to pursue the petition in G. 114711.ACCORDINGLY. we would be justified in annulling the January 26. the AIFC which the GTEB refers to in its petition in G. II In support of its assertion that it is "the sole entity possessed with the power. . this time under SEC Reg. its petition in G. are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body. so much so that its findings as to the latter would ordinarily deserve the respect of the courts. 115889 is rendered dismissible. the present petition is DISMISSED." the GTEB makes reference to Executive Order No. the original AIFC's certificate of registration having been revoked with finality by virtue of our resolutions referred to in our above-quoted 11 August 1993 Resolution. 114711 could not have been any one other than this same "re-registered" AIFC. . and inasmuch as GTEB Case No. 114711. and in dismissing the said petition. the GTEB has no jurisdiction over said case. Evidently then. 1994 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG. 115889 is the AIFC which was "re-registered" on the above date." AIFC. and the fact that among the functions of the GTEB therein enumerated are "the approval of export allocations.R SP No. . including its implementing rules and regulations. there can be no claim. as well as the monitoring. It is obvious that the "re-registered" AIFC does not possess the legal personality necessary for it to prosecute these petitions. it stands to reason that where there is no claimant. 31596. specifically Section 3 thereof. AIFC registered anew with the SEC. 48 To reinforce its argument. if only for AIFC's lack of legal personality to maintain its claim relative to the export allocations subject of these petitions. No. 92-50 is such an action between private litigants. 537. After all. on the other hand. In view of the May 20. 1990 Order of the SEC. argues that inasmuch as none of the powers specified in Executive Order 537. the GTEB further argues that being "a highly specialized administrative agency endowed with regulatory and quasi-judicial powers .R. 1994 and March 22. 1993 under SEC Reg. . For this reason.R No. nor any specific jurisdiction to hear and decide actions. 1993. "the certificate of registration issued to American Inter-Fashion Corporation on October 14. as prayed for by the GTEB in G." 46 Citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. v. For all legal intents and purposes. as the term is understood under Section 1. we held: "Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies . No." . gives the GTEB any judicial powers. it enjoys the fundamental presumption that it has the technical expertise and mastery over such specialized matters.R No. AIFC cites our ruling in Globe Wireless Ltd. In said case. No. AIFC no longer exists. the AIFC which filed the petition in G. and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . No. The AIFC International is a personality separate and distinct from AIFC." It appears that subsequent to the revocation of AIFC's certificate of registration.

O. if only on the basis of the above-quoted provision. it is at once evident that the power to adjudicate on the question of the AIFC's entitlement to the subject EQs is 'necessarily implied' from the Board's power to 'cancel or suspend quota allocations. including a procedure where a Board Council. we respectfully submit. Thus it argues: "48.O.' was likewise issued.O. however. as his sense of justice dictates. 913. in addition to the above. E. or Committee takes part as a body. and vice versa. Thus.s) relative to the functions of the GTEB easily reveals as much. — (a) Whenever the Minister has verified that violation/s of 'Trade and Industry Laws' has/have been committed. (h). or consider the penalties imposed by the other as already sufficient. it is beyond dispute that the GTEB has the jurisdiction to act and rule on Glorious Sun's Petition for the cancellation and restoration to it of the quotas illegally awarded to AIFC. cancel or suspend quota allocations. If he opts for the latter. 537 and 823 it is provided: 'SEC.' 52. that in deciding the case the Minister or the judge. export authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses or disqualify the firm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board. which E.' 50. (d) The minister shall have the same power to punish direct and indirect contempts granted to superior courts under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and the power to issue subpoena duces tecum. and thereafter proceed with a formal investigation. Nos. The imposition of administrative penalties in the formal investigation is without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in the criminal action and/or judgment in the civil action. Council. Glorious Sun joins the GTEB in the latter's assertion that it is the GTEB which has the jurisdiction to act and rule on Glorious Sun's petition for the cancellation and restoration to it of the quotas awarded to AIFC. The Minister shall decide the case within thirty working days from the time the formal investigation was terminated. the approval of such Board. No. 5. Authority. independent of the corresponding criminal or civil action for the said violation/s. he may motu proprio charge said violator/s.' . Formal investigation. the Minister shall have the option of selecting that procedure and penalties or the procedure and penalties provided in this Executive Order.O. reads: SEC. (b) The Minister may proceed to hear and determine the violation in the absence of any party who has been served with notice to appear in the hearing. Section 3 subparagraphs (a). Provided. 537 [on the powers and functions of the Board] is hereby amended to read as follows: xxx xxx xxx (h) In case of violations of its rules and regulations. entitled 'Strengthening the Rule-Making and Adjudicatory Powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry in Order to Further Protect Consumers. 49. No. (e) When the 'trade and industry law' violated provides for its own administrative procedure and penalties. Section 5 of Article III of the above-numbered E. export authorizations and licenses. Authority.For its part. A simple reference to the pertinent provisions of the various Executive Orders (E. Thus. Contrary to AIFC's assertions. and (i) of Executive Order No.' xxx xxx xxx 51. However. . . 952. (c) The Minister shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case speedily and objectively without regard to technicalities of law or procedure and strict rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity. made the GTEB's power to adjudicate on the question of the AIFC's entitlement to the subject EQs more than just being merely 'necessarily implied. Under E. or Committee of the Minister's decision shall not be necessary. as the case may be.. shall consider the decision of the other and impose further penalties. .O. and even in the face of the criteria set forth in Globe. which amended E. 1.O.

" In fact." 51 After examining the arguments raised by all parties concerned. it likewise cannot be denied that. AIFC categorically declared in its "Motion to Dismiss. a proceeding which is undoubtedly within the ambit of the Board's powers." in case of violations of its rules and regulations. we must take judicial notice of the fact that AIFC. In this connection. 537. In light of the above. 952) to "cancel or suspend quota allocations. 54. Emphasis supplied). that Glorious Sun stood to benefit from such cancellation was merely incidental to said proceeding. PSC.O. Semantics notwithstanding. to wit: "Courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions. office or agency. such a proceeding is clearly within the ambit of the GTEB's powers." and that "(u)nder the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' The GTEB is one such bureau. Article I. we find the arguments of the GTEB and Glorious Sun to be impressed with merit. was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations. On the basis of the provisions of law cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun. vests upon defendant GTEB exclusive jurisdiction to grant export quota allocations. in cases involving the same controversy as that in the above-entitled petitions. AIFC relied upon the very principles cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun in the above-entitled petitions in support of their argument that it is the GTEB which has jurisdiction over the export allocations subject of said petitions. 92-50 is an action by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a right. the power granted to it by Section 3 subparagraph (h) of Executive Order No. unit or committee by whatever name which is placed under or attached to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Section 1. or any other office. 93-138 53 that "Executive Order No. or at the very least. v. This being the case. and not to the regular courts. as amended by Executive Order Nos. export authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses or disqualify the firm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board. It will be remembered that said GTEB case was initiated principally for the purpose of securing the cancellation of EQs being illegally held onto by AIFC. 537 (as amended by E." Civil Case No. In addition. it is noteworthy that in said motion to dismiss. The above-quoted provisions are very significant in light of the definition of the 'Ministry' as the Ministry of Trade and Industry 'and/or any of its bureaus. offices. more specifically. AIFC's reliance on our ruling in Globe Wireless Ltd. which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations. 913. AIFC's statement to the effect that GTEB Case No. has recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the GTEB to award or cancel export allocations to deserving entities. 92-50 was instituted by Glorious Sun for the purpose of securing the cancellation of EQs then alleged by it as being illegally held by AIFC. or attached agencies. is beyond cavil. No. belongs solely to the GTEB. that the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity's entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB.O. as Glorious Sun correctly observes. the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their findings . is not entirely accurate. is clearly misplaced. E. only defendant GTEB has the authority to award/cancel export quotas. 823 and 952. that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government involving the exercise of judgment and findings of fact.53. because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. it cannot be denied that GTEB Case No. and accordingly hold that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export allocations subject of the above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or export authorizations).

at pp. Most recently. Order No. no undue prejudice can be caused by the non-issuance of a show-cause order." and thereafter proceed with a formal investigation. 952 [1984]). Luke's Medical Center. 1994 Resolution of the GTEB which AIFC assails in its petition in G. the same must have sufficient basis in fact. under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Insofar as the supposed failure of the GTEB to issue a show cause order to AIFC is concerned." Having already invoked the jurisdiction of the GTEB in earlier actions involving the same controversy as that before us. Order No. It is apparent from the rule cited by AIFC that the same was aimed primarily at ensuring that if any action is to be filed against a respondent. AIFC cannot now be heard to question that same jurisdiction simply because it was unable to obtain the reliefs prayed for by it from the GTEB. repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. This power. for so long as this goal is achieved. 823 [1982] and Exec. 14-15). we reiterated such warning: "It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief. has been granted not to the courts but to the GTEB. we find no merit to this contention. CA. this Court cannot at this time take cognizance of the Complaint (Supra. Inc. Sibonghanoy. 92-50. 92-50. 64010 in this wise: "As stated above. We have warned against such a practice on more than one occasion in the past. office or agency attached to the Ministry of Trade and Industry." III As to the allegations of AIFC that it was deprived of due process. as correctly pointed out by Glorious Sun. (Ateneo de Manila v. if not finality. has in its favor the presumption that it has regularly performed its official duties. Torres. we hold that the GTEB committed no grave abuse of discretion in instituting an action against AIFC on the basis of the allegations in Glorious Sun's petition in GTEB Case No. Order No. as amended by Exec.R No. The Court frowns upon and does not tolerate the undesirable practice of some litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when favorable to them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse (Tajonera v. 23 SCRA 35). as a bureau. export authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses and/or to disqualify the firm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board (Section 3[h]. albeit through some other means. 145 SCRA 105)" AIFC reiterated this stance in its "Motion to Dismiss" in Civil Case No. In fact. as an administrative agency. this Court cannot grant the reliefs sought in the Complaint without first deciding that AIFC is not entitled to EQs. by the courts. 537 [1979]. [to] cancel or suspend quota allocations. We disagree. Anent AIFC's claim that it was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence in GTEB Case No. The GTEB. v. and that. A party cannot invoke jurisdiction at one time and reject it at another in the same controversy to suit its interests and convenience.' And even assuming for argument that it is indeed vested with original jurisdiction to cancel EQs.of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect. the GTEB. it is AIFC's contention that the GTEB issued said resolution without giving AIFC the opportunity to be heard and without receiving its evidence in any form. the EQs now in AIFC's name should be cancelled. Consequently. Exec. we find such claim unworthy of belief. 115889. 110 SCRA 447. in St. in effect. may even motu proprio charge violators of "Trade and Industry Laws. which is vested with jurisdiction — '[i]n case of violations of its rules and regulations. Lamaroza. including those which . citing Tijam v. With respect to the June 21. however.

JJ. G. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. Padilla. Said CA-G. 92-50. 31596 is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE (except insofar as it denied AIFC and AIFC International Fashion Corporation's "Motion for Issuance of Writ of Mandamus"). said presumption of regularity must be upheld.R SP No. vs. it actually took advantage of this opportunity by presenting documentary evidence. if any reservation was made by AIFC in its "Sur Rejoinder (Re: Motion to Dismiss). This is also but in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction." More importantly. and not the regular courts. 83354 April 25. as correctly pointed out by Glorious Sun. GTEB's petition is GRANTED. AIFC having lost the legal personality to prosecute the same. On the other hand. after examining the "Motion to Dismiss" filed by AIFC in GTEB Case No. an assertion which AIFC most notably failed to refute.are quasi-judicial in nature. 92-50. 115889 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. AN EXERCISEOF TRIAL COURT'SDISCRETION . there being ample basis in the records therefor. THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALS . No. contrary to AIFC's claims. REMEDIAL LAW. WHEREFORE. DENIAL OF.. as well as for being moot and academic. which has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export allocations subject to these petitions. we find nothing therein to indicate that AIFC reserved its right to present evidence in said GTEB case. CIVIL PROCEDURE. LEONMATEOand ANA VILORIA MATEO. SO ORDERED. what is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. In the absence of clear facts to rebut the same. the former not having taken advantage of the opportunity afforded to it to present evidence in its behalf. et al. nor the Court of Appeals. As we have declared time and again." attached to AIFC's petition as Annex "E. (2) It is the GTEB. 1994 Decision and March 22. Vitug and Kapunan. took no part due to relationship to one of the parties. 31596 is likewise ordered annulled and set aside. No. J. 1991 SYLLABUS 1. 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. — The petitioners assail the decision of the respondent .R.. concur. and (3) AIFC's right to due process was in no wise violated by the GTEB. petitioners. it is apparent that not only was AIFC afforded the opportunity to present evidence. AIFC's petition in G. Thus. 63 That AIFC was afforded this opportunity is beyond question. as asserted by Glorious Sun.R. SP No. From what has been discussed the following conclusions are made: (1) AIFC no longer has the legal personality to prosecute the above-entitled petitions and may therefore no longer claim entitlement to the export allocations subject of these petitions.R. Bellosillo. We are inclined to give credence instead to Glorious Sun's assertions relative to AIFC's presentation of evidence in GTEB Case No." this was limited to the reservation "to raise the question of jurisdiction. and the assailed January 21.

in a prescribed manner. ID. On the other hand. 4.— A petition for mandamus lies "when any tribunal. ID. a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment.. We explained: .e.. ID. As we held in De Jesus v. — In Symaco vs. — The petitioners do not dispute the fact that the Petition for Relief from Judgment was not filed with the trial court within the reglementary period. . PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office." As the Court en banc recently held in Cruz vs. ID. ID..MINISTERIALDUTYOF TRIALCOURTTO APPROVENOTICEOF APPEAL .. The refusal of the trial court. corporation. ABSENCE OF ONE OF TWO PERIODSBARS FILING OF PETITIONFOR RELIEF. we had the occasion to clearly distinguish between a ministerial duty and a discretionary duty. 1987. and there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .appellate court confirming the trial court's denial of both their Petition for Relief from Judgment and the notice of appeal.. to be entitled to a Petition for Relief from Judgment. ID. Aquino. the granting thereof can not be compelled by mandamus. ID. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. — We agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve the notice of appeal. ID.. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." Indeed. . 6. The absence of one of the two said periods which are concurring elements precludes the petitioners from availing of the Petition for Relief from Judgment.. 1987 when the petition in question was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 9.MANDAMUS. . 1987. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts. . ID. SPECIALCIVIL ACTION. Although the petition was filed within six (6) months. is appealable and may not be corrected through the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. It cannot compel the exercise of discretion one way or the other. — In this instance. 7. REQUISITES. it was not within sixty (60) days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment. Major General Montano. "mandamus is a remedy available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. upon the propriety of the act done. the remedy available to the petitioners is to appeal the denial of their Petition for Relief from Judgment. mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. ID. therefore. CIVIL PROCEDURE.. It must be observed that the petitioners had filed within the prescribed period a notice of appeal on December 1. Domingo. 5. but only after 107 days. there is no question that the same involved the exercise of discretion by the trial court and. REMEDYIN CASEOF DENIALIS APPEAL . to accept the said notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus. trust. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed. Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. 3. must not only show excusable negligence but must . in obedience to the mandate of legal authority. . such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. therefore. As regards the denial of the Petition for Relief from Judgment. being final. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MINISTERIAL DUTY AND DISCRETIONARY DUTY.. 2. — The petitioners. i. APPEAL. without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment. . an order denying a petition for relief. within sixty (60) days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment in question and not more than six (6) months after such judgment was entered. or station... . a copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 27. or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. ID.. ID..

or after the lapse of 107 days from the time the petitioners received the said decision adverse to them. judgment is hereby rendered: Ordering the defendants to vacate Lot No. plaintiffs in the court a quo. the decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE.J p: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated April 26.000. 1987. Still and all. Magsaysay. 1987. covered by T. on March 31. and to pay the costs. Davao del Sur." After protracted proceedings which lasted for almost nine years. the deputy sheriff issued a "Sheriff's Notice of Sale" and a "Levy on Execution and/or Attachment" on May 18. but since no appeal from this judgment had been filed within the reglementary period. A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioners. 9309 in the name of plaintiff Julia Mateo. in the same cause. 1987.likewise assert the facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action. the deputy sheriff attested in his delivery receipt the actual reconveyance of the land in question to the private respondents. the private respondents. 9309 in the name of private respondent (then plaintiff) "Julia Mateo. and praying that the same be set aside. DE CI S I ON SARMIENTO. 1987. 1978. the private respondents (then plaintiffs) instituted an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership with damages against the petitioners (then defendants). to pay the plaintiffs P4. Psd-211682. situated in Calamagoy. 3 rendered a decision dated March 21. The antecedent facts are as follows: On November 9. 1987. the trial court denied the said Petition for Relief from Judgment as well as the motion to reconsider the denial of the petitioners' notice of appeal on the grounds that there was no excusable negligence to warrant relief from judgment and that the petition failed to show a valid and sufficient cause of action. married to Francisco del Rosario. or up to April 15. Upon the issuance on May 13. for the income from the property that the plaintiffs failed to receive due to the refusal of the defendants to return the same to them. alleging excusable negligence in their failure to appeal the said decision. On November 9. Magsaysay. commencing in the year 1978 until they shall have vacated the land. 1987. 1987.T. 1987. . we see no reason to depart from the wellgrounded conclusion of the respondent appellate court finding the appeal not meritorious for failure to establish both foregoing requisites. Davao del Sur. they filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment in the same trial court.00 per year. which was unopposed.C. the same became final and executory. the Regional Trial Court of Digos.000. 5072-A-2. On June 8. filed a motion for execution of the said final judgment and the trial court granted the same. married to Francisco del Rosario. No. 1988 of the respondent Court of Appeals denying the petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction filed by the petitioners. considering the evidence adduced by the petitioners.00 for and as attorney's fees. of a twohectare piece of land situated in Calamagoy. to pay the plaintiffs P2. defendants in the trial court. On July 16. On April 20. which land is covered by Transfer Certification of Title No. 1987 of a writ of execution. Davao del Sur. after proper hearing.

and if it is. As regards the denial of the Petition for Relief from Judgment. whether or not the appeal of the petitioners is meritorious. without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment. in obedience to the mandate of legal authority. and there is no plain. there is no question that the same involved the exercise of discretion by the trial court and therefore. . On the other hand. In their Petition. board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. In Symaco vs. As adverted to at the outset. or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. this recourse. article IV. of the Constitution of the Philippines. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. trust. That the respondents violated section 2. That the instant petition is a concrete and specific example of a violation of section one. Hence. mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. the respondent appellate court denied the said Petition for Mandamus in a decision dated April 26. corporation.The petitioners elevated the case to the respondent appellate court on a Petition for Mandamus alleging that the denial of their appeal was unwarranted and that the granting of the notice of appeal was a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. The petition is not meritorious. . such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. . the granting thereof can not be compelled by mandamus. or station. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts. xxx xxx xxx Applying the foregoing distinctions. upon the propriety of the act done. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed. Aquino. It cannot compel the exercise of discretion one way or the other. Central to the controversy are the issues of whether or not the approval of a notice of appeal by the trial judge is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. A petition for mandamus lies "when any tribunal." Indeed. Major General Montano. 1988. the petitioners submit the following assignment of errors: 1." As the Court en banc recently held in Cruz vs. a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. in a prescribed manner. We explained xxx xxx xxx Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. . 10 we had the occasion to clearly distinguish between a ministerial duty and a discretionary duty. we agree with the observations made by the respondent appellate court when it stated thus: xxx xxx xxx . 2. . The petitioners assails the decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court's denial of both their Petition for Relief from Judgment and the notice of appeal. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . "mandamus is a remedy available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.

In this instance. the remedy available to the petitioners is to appeal the denial of their Petition for Relief from Judgment. And the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on any of the grounds mentioned by said rules. mistake or excusable negligence is present to warrant the granting of the relief prayed for. and in the course thereof. to remand the instant case to the respondent appellate court for a review of its merits would be an exercise in futility. is appealable and may not be corrected through the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.e. This is clearly an exercise of power or authority which cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus. Domingo. (Diy vs. within sixty (60) days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment in question and not more than six (6) months after such judgment was entered.. 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petitioners. but only after 107 days. The absence of one of the two said periods which are concurring elements precludes the petitioners from availing of the Petition for Relief from Judgment. a party may also assail the judgment on the merits. Specifically.In the present case. Still and all. 13 an order denying a petition for relief. The Petition for Relief From Judgment granted by Section 2 of Rule 38. we agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve the notice of appeal. being final. in exercising its discretionary authority. therefore. does not confer on petitioner the right to appeal which had been lost. mistake or excusable negligence. par. a copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 27. accident. to be entitled to a Petition for Relief from Judgment. 1987. Section 2. 38 Phil. petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period. The trial court. i. In its questioned decision. namely: fraud. xxx xxx xxx Furthermore. 1987. requires an exercise of judgment and discretion by the judge. The refusal of the trial court. And the writ of mandamus can not be issued and is not available to control the discretion of the judge or compel him to decide a case in a particular way. Thus: xxx xxx xxx . we see no reason to depart from the well-grounded conclusion of the respondent appellate court finding the appeal not meritorious for failure to establish both foregoing requisites. upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law. must not only show excusable negligence but must likewise assert the facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action. Hence. Crossfield. states: A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal. the petitioners do not dispute the fact that the Petition for Relief from Judgment was not filed with the trial court within the reglementary period. It must be observed that the petitioners had filed within the prescribed period a notice of appeal on December 1. denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment on a finding that petitioners had no meritorious defense and that the failure to perfect the appeal on time was not due to excusable negligence. accident. 1987 when the petition in question was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 9. 12 Although the petition was filed within six (6) months. to accept the said notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus. The determination of whether the element of fraud. considering the evidence adduced by the petitioners. 934). Be that as it may. the respondent appellate court nonetheless ruled on the merits of the present controversy which we find to be adequately supported by the evidence on record. it was not within sixty (60) days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment. As we held in De Jesus v. in part.

. . . As it is known to them that their case was pending decision, a little diligence, a little exercise of prudence, a little attention here and there, a little haste made slowly ought to have alerted and urged them to see their lawyer about their pending case before leaving for Manila. At the very least, to leave instructions to their lawyer on what to do should the decision be adverse to them. But they did not. The decision was rendered on March 21, 1987. By the records their lawyer received it on March 31, 1987. They left on April 1, 1987. There was time enough to save their case. Indeed, had they seen their lawyer before they left they would have known that a decision adverse to them had been rendered. Or, having left instructions, their lawyer could have appealed. Negligence, to be EXCUSABLE, must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The affidavit of Lina Mateo, Leon Mateo and Virgilio Gomintong which are attached to the petition to show excusable negligence are too apt. They invite serious doubt. Consider that Virgilio Gomintong, a distant neighbor, knew of the arrival of the petitioners on April 25, 1987. It is obvious that he learned of it only from a member of petitioners' household. It followed that Lina Mateo, a daughter who lives with her parents, knew of it. Why then would she (Lina Mateo) leave for North Cotabato on April 24, 1987 for a vacation when her parents were supposed to arrive on April 25, 1987 and leave the task of meeting her parents to Virgilio who is not even a relative? Her alleged return to Calamagoy on May 19, 1987 appears to this Court to be so carefully tailored to fit the events. It has been said that evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible witness; it must be believable in itself and must conform to observable human behaviour. Moreover, despite the testimony of Virgilio Gomintong, it is reasonable to believe that only Leon Mateo left for Manila, no ticket having been presented to show that petitioner Ana Viloria Mateo also made the trip." (Rollo, pp. 16-17). We agree with the trial court's findings that the negligence is not excusable to justify the granting of a relief from the judgment, ordering the defendants (petitioners) to vacate the premises. xxx xxx xxx Moreover, as the respondent court correctly observed, the petitioners did not present any valid and sufficient cause of action to justify any relief from judgment. Correctly the Court of Appeals ruled: xxx xxx xxx . . . Petitioners' defense rests mainly on their allegation of "continuous possession for 15 years". This is not a valid defense as against the plaintiffs' rights over the property or owner with an indefeasible title. The land in question is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9309 in the name of plaintiff Julia Mateo, married to Francisco del Rosario. There can be no claim of rights based on 15 years continuous possession if the land is registered under the Torrens System in the name of another because the latter's rights are indefeasible as against the whole world. The transfer certificate of title issued to the plaintiff is on February 21, 1956, bringing the land under the operation of the Torrens System, confers on the plaintiffs an imprescriptible title over such land after the lapse of one year from issuance thereof. xxx xxx xxx Indeed, the respondent court did not commit any reversible error. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. Cost against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. LORENZOM. TAÑADAand DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs. MARIANO JESUS CUENCO , FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO, in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents. G.R. No. L-10520

February28, 1957 SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; NATUREOF TRIBUNAL . — Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the letter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139; Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.) 2. ID.; ID.; MEANINGOF "POLITICALQUESTION"; CASE AT BAR. — The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government (16 C. J. S., 413). It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In the case at bar, the question for determination is whether the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination *** of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith. Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. 3. ID.; ID.; MAIN OBJECTIONIN PROVIDING THE ESTABLISHMENTOR ELECTORALTRIBUNALS .— The main objective of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. 4. ID.; ID.; MOST VITAL FEATUREOF ELECTORALTRIBUNALS . — The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the largest and the second largest number of votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. 5. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED FOR SELECTION OF MEMBERS; COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDUREMANDATORY.— The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justice of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution for the selection of members of the Electoral

Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 6. ID.; ID.; PRESENT SITUATION NOT FORESEENBY FRAMERSOF THE CONSTITUTION; SPIRIT OF THE LAW PREVAILS OVER ITS LETTER . — While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be limited to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members it must be conceded that the present composition of the Senate, wherein twenty-three (23) of its members belong to one party and one (1) member belongs to another, was not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. 7. ID,; ID.; ID.; MODERATINGROLE OF JUSTICESOF THE SUPREMECOURT. — If the Nacionalista Party would be allowed to nominate five (5) members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal instead of three (3), it would have the absolute majority, since there would be one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three (3) members of the Supreme Court, and hence, the philosophy underlying the Constitution would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed, and, what is worse, the decisive moderating role of the Justice of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 8. ID.; ID.; RELIANCE BY THE CONSTITUTION UPON THE METHOD OF SELECTION ESTABLISHED THEREIN. — When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties referred to in the Constitution, the latter thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. The delegates to the Convention did not ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly with the composition of the Electorals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake of the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. 9. ID.; ID,; ID.; WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INTENDED FOR ONE'S BENEFIT — Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit," particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty" the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371) The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the commonweal, and it has been held that "where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). 10. ID.; ACTSOF CONGRESS;AUTHORITYOF COURTSTO PASSUPONTHE CONSTITUTIONALITY .— The provision in the Constitution vesting the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of act of Congress. Since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive there can be no reason

upon his recommendation of said respondents. the courts have.. Macario Peralta. was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate. to Senator Cuenco. The reason is that the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions. CONFLICTBETWEENSPIRITANDLETTEROF A STATUTE. whenever the conducting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof. In fact. upon nomination of Senator Primicias. and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. while that which is within the letter. now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. ID. DOCTRINE OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. WHEN APPLICABLE. 1956. but. Recto. except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. as technical . Cuenco and Francisco A.. and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof. which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. J. Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian — who had. also. said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada. at the general elections held in November. Where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear. in said election — in Senate Electoral Case No. and President of the Citizens Party.J p: Petitioner Lorenzo M. in its session of February 22. Francisco Rodrigo. the duty to do so. 11. the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. DE CI S I ON CONCEPCION. Enrique Magalona. on behalf of the Citizens Party. the election of these Senators-elect — who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate — was contested by petitioner Macapagal. and that. not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue. run for the Senate. Subsequently. together with Camilo Osias. Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias. the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof. Pedro Sabido. — As a general rule.J. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts even in a doubtful case. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. chose Senators Jose P. but. S. were proclaimed elected. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. but not within the spirit of a statute. the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano. on behalf of the Nacionalista Party. 71-72) 12. Quintin Paredes. Then. on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount consideration of public policy. Laurel. 1955. — As a general rule of statutory construction.S. a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. it may be rejected (16 C. whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal. as technical assistant and private secretary. Geronima Pecson.why the validity of an act of one of said Houses like that of any other branch of the Government. Subsequently. The Senate. a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. in which Pacita Madrigal Warns. Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales. 4. (82 C. it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application. and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong. Hence if in the judgment of the court. Claro M. is not within the statute. the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. 613). upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias.. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines. also. respectively. Lorenzo Sumulong. may not be determined in the proper actions.

and one (1) Senator — namely. pending this action. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate. are unlawful and void. . and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. Tañada — belonging to the Citizens Party. restraining them from continuing to usurp. Petitioners allege that on February 22. judgment be rendered ousting respondents Mariano J. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private . petitioner. Delgado." Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction permanent. Catalina Cayetano. and the Senate. as well as Fernando Hipolito. the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged . instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party. thereafter. After hearing. Section 11 of the Constitution". had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation . Catalina Cayetano. Tañada. Catalina Cayetano. Soon. consequently. the appointments of respondents. together with three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. and in violation of the Constitution. as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal. in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado. by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor". Alfredo Cruz. in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. respectively to Senator Delgado. . "2. Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado.assistant and private secretary. intrude into and/or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. . Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully. Francisco A. as alleged members thereof. Francisco A. intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal". as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. 1956. and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than three (3) Senators upon nomination of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. Catalina Cayetano. in choosing these respondents. usurping. Alfredo Cruz. Delgado. and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz. which is the rival party of the Liberal Party. Catalina Cayetano. Upon petitioners' filing of a bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court. with costs against the respondents. both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. herein. in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. except insofar as it questions the legality and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado. and upon his recommendation. to which the petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Cayetano. of Article VI. and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondents Alfredo Cruz. a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. that. Cuenco. 4 belong. as well as at present. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Serapio and Reyes. and said Alfredo Cruz. as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado — who caused said appointments to be made — as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Cuenco. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes." Petitioners pray that: "1. Senator Lorenzo M.above. . Cruz.

but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion..called "judicial supremacy". there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses. since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same thing as the performance of the act. upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate. since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress. this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission . allege. Respondents. under the Constitution. to determine whether the powers thus possessed have been validly exercised. Chief Accountant. this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. and it does not seek to compel the latter. Quezon (46 Phil. To begin with. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondents refutes their own pretense. Vol. the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. Yet. 462..) The case of Suanes vs. 244. unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. and (b) that the petition states no cause of action. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.. 221. authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal.. and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum". As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say. by way of special and affirmative defenses. pp." We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. although the Senate has. 81 Phil. and approved by the Executive.. either directly or indirectly. Gaz. and on the other hand. I. 818. emphasis supplied. that: (a) this Court is without power. may not be determined in the proper actions. because said petitioner is in estoppel. despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines. Thus. Again. like that of any other branch of the Government. and because the present action is not the proper remedy. Harvard Law Review." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein. In performing the latter function. Avelino (77 Phil. Electoral Commission. 83) and Vera vs. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attempted by either an executive official or the legislative. 46 Off. by whom certain powers shall be exercised. they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the government. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof. on the one hand. the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. (Angara vs.secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition.) Secondly. 139. despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. Suanes vs. likewise. And. to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. under the Constitution. in the exercise of the so. 192) — relied upon by the respondents — this is not an action against the Senate. 39. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. 224. because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators". "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. 63 Phil.

such question being a political one. Cuenco (83 Phil. Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof. Senator Primicias. upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Hence. 81. The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on Appointments. Electoral Commission. In this connection. 654). it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein. that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people — which is not a fact. is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised. but. In the Mabanag case. but clearly. as a precedent. the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization. but. supra). by our resolutions in Avelino vs. upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate.. however. We are not called upon. impliedly. the courts have. to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate Electoral Tribunal — could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators. The issue. could possibly be entertained is. but an appeal to public opinion. 1) and Cabili vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. In fact. Senator Tañada replied: . 1956). which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 17). Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionalista Senators and the latter declined the nomination. Francisco (88 Phil. which is a political question. in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is. it being conceded. either by the Nacionalista Party." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared. 'to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. The weight of this decision. or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate. therefore. the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments. February 21.under the original Constitution. not the present action. has been weakened.. on the floor of the Senate. on February 21. not one justiciable in nature. whether the case at bar raises merely a political question. The issue before us is whether the Senate — after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. This was decided in the negative. 1956.. not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue. Besides. likewise. the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. invoked by respondents." one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. over the objection of said Citizens Party. Avelino (supra). Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. therefore. respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum. (Angara vs. in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. in point. and annulled certain acts of the Executive as incompatible with the fundamental law. in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate. to use petitioner Tañada's own words. During the discussions in the Senate. sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter. also. to pass upon an identical or similar question. the duty to do so. in the case at bar.

' But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez. because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. together with the consequences that flow therefrom.S. D. 72 App. has said one day. In this connection.) To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum. Of course. Elizalde. however. we can appeal to public opinion. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions. emphasis supplied. notwithstanding. discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute. p. you will lose. 2d 29." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States. one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice. 108.. as Senator Rodriguez. Mr. E. vs. therefore. separately or together.) This statement did not refer to the nomination. 3. Where. within these limits. President. 565.. 339. Vol. 1326. but. they do permit the departments. and these determinations. nor to determine what matters fall within its scope. "As distinguished from the judicial. of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. p.) . President. Mr. emphasis supplied. "It is not easy. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. and the election." (16 C. the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected. emphasis supplied. 413. also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. Senator. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Mr. At any rate. therefore. Sevilla vs. that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution. but that does not mean. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions. by the Senate. said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was made." (Congressional Record. 125 Ohio St. the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. Indeed. but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers. to define the phrase 'political question'. I may lose. except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. 491. C. by Senator Primicias. our President. 112 F. Vol." As already adverted to. which under the constitution.J. 'If you take this matter to the Supreme Court. or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by statute. the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy."There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now. from which we quote: "It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary. III. to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court. Lozier. The courts. 182 N. the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. our President here. see. may not be traversed in the courts.

or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith. 25 L. it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed. under the Constitution. Cunningham. is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. If this is correct. the term "political question" connotes. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable.W. in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra). A. 32 Pac. but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. C. to 'the end that the government may be one of laws and not men' — words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document. . of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. not primarily because they are of a political nature. upon nomination by Senator Primicias — a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate — on behalf of its Committee on Rules. 69 Fed. In other words. we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him. What is generally meant. Rep. and not judicial. 19 L. a question of policy. C. . 50 Kan. 561. as well as through the executive or the Legislature. 143. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. Green vs. 417. free from judicial control. 411. . 497. emphasis supplied. See State vs. 948.Thus. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final. . Here. is necessary. 90. xxx xxx xxx ". The recognition of this principle. acting through the courts. of a particular measure. contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . namely. The courts have no judicial control over such matters. 30 L. regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. 37 N. A. and hence. 16. The question thus raised is a fundamental one. but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. . This is not a political question. Tuttle. 42 Am. and not judicial. R. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people. not legality. A. unknown except in Great Britain and America. but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled. 683. One department is just as representative as the other. and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. when it is said that a question is political. in legal parlance. not merely because they involve political question. 81 Wis. E. is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity. The Court said: "At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political. 852. 516. R. so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. by the Senate. 151 Ill. A. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. St. 470. Mills. the nature of political question was considered carefully. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. 51 L. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. In Re Gunn. with discretionary power to act. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N. R. A. it refers to "those questions which. 41. Fletcher vs. R. is null and void.) In short." (pp. 155. 220. what it means in ordinary parlance. 408). 519.

Rosales and Laurel. emphasis supplied. Senator Tañada — on which Senators Paredes. After some discussion. Then. expressed their views (Do. 330." (Emphasis supplied. Zulueta.. 338. two or three to the Electoral Tribunal. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs. valid and lawful? Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution.) It appears that on February 22. pp. which. but. should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. but. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate. . and. as well as at present. to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. pp. 354.) It is. pp. 1956. who is." (16 C. . the president of said party. .. whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights . also. 328-329). also. Pelaez. as the case may be. as well as the other Senators already mentioned. said issues were debated upon more extensively. returns. Moreover. 336. Cea. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. referring to those who. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute. be given the privilege to nominate . In the session of the Senate held on February 21. being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal. Sumulong. our opinion that we have. II. Lim. and qualifications of their respective Members. III. therefore. 369). already. 360-364. so that. Thus. "the President of the Citizens Party. the duty. 1956. not to the Nacionalista Party — of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members — but to the Citizens Party. in which Senators Primicias. 349.. . not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada. the Senate adjourned until the next morning. 329. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. and Rodrigo took part. by the Senate. with Senator Sumulong. Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate. February 22. do. namely. Senator Tañada. who shall be chosen by each House. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. also. 332-333. reads: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. not only jurisdiction. where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation.. Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada. namely. 339. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives.. . 350. according to the provision above-quoted. J. Vol. do. particularly. maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate. and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal. three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. pp. pursuant to the Constitution. 345. 343). himself. although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one. as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. 439. he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do. the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty-three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party. a new issue was raised — whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman. .. do. has such authority.. as members of the Electoral Tribunal. 1956 (Do. the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party." in his discretion.". . S.

nominated. as the case may be". Senator Tañada stated: "On behalf of the Citizens Party. do. Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. on behalf of the Nacionalista Party. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three. the Citizens Party.. Mr. and such party is. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen. are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority. the minority party in this Body. SENATOR TAÑADA. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution. on motion of Senator Laurel. Senator Primicias. Caballero de Rizal. must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.) Los que no lo esten digan. Senators Laurel. Respondents allege." six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. after the nomination by said party. EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. admittedly. as members of said Tribunal. Tañada." (Congressional Record for the Senate. Senators Delgado and Cuenco. "SENATOR SUMULONG. the other Senators. I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body. at 7:40 p. of Senators Laurel. 377. with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do.) Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado — who belong to the Nacionalista Party — as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Mr. pp. I also wish to record my objection to the last nominations. however.358. (Varios Senodores: Si. and the election by the Senate.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral. italics supplied. and that is Senator Lorenzo M. who shall be members thereof. is mandatory.) Queda aprobada. Mr. When session was resumed at 8:10 p.. Thereupon. 364. . m. President. that when — after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party. the meeting was suspended. President. si. and the Senate elected." that. "SENATOR SUMULONG. to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal. p." What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate. So. a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. Lopez and Primicias. he thereby "waived his right to nominate two more Senators. to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents. III. Then. the Committee on Rules of the Senate — and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate — I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco. 1956. 375).. Subsequently. digan. this nomination was approved by the House." Without any objection. and their election by the Senate. m. "SENATOR TAÑADA. that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine (9) members. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. no (Silencio. Vol. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor. for. 377). on behalf of the minority party. Caballero de Quezon. not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22. Lopez and Primicias. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal — Senator Tañada nominated himself only. President.. Senator Primicias stood up and said: "Now. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.

329-330). accordingly. . is not that right? And if this is so. he should be given this as a matter of right. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal . p. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party . therefore. emphasis supplied. as Citizens Party Senator. referring to Senator Tañada: ".. ." (Id. And whether we like it or not. . . emphasis supplied.. . p. . and. . not as a matter of privilege. .. . that when Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953 it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time. id. . be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal.. and these respondents were chosen by the Senate. he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition. . id. has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate. . 332.) The foregoing statements and the fact that. thereafter. there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place. and that. not a fusion. and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party. Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body. that. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. . that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the Nacionalista. At the outset.. Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution. 360. is valid and lawful. and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party. . Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege".. Alfredo Cruz. it will be recalled that the proceedings for the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon. .) Similarly. pp. is the reality of the actual situation — that he is not a Nacionalista now. that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition.. id. he belongs to the minority. We have to bear in mind. relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. stating: "At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing Senate. . and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party. . and said petitioner actually nominated himself . p. Party. Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada." which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. and the appointment of their corespondents. that. . the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes." (Id. the President of the Citizens Party. . Then Senator Lim intervened. III. emphasis supplied. said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law." adding that: ".." (Id.when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado. who remarked. and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. he subsequently "parted ways with" said party. . his situation .) The debate was closed by Senator Laurel. 376. . . Catalina Cayetano. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion. Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege" to nominate. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution.

even in a doubtful case. 1939. while. returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department. unless it has been uniform . As a consequence. 7172."on behalf of the Citizens Party." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions". when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election. the minority party in this Body" — not only without any objection whatsoever. as a distinguished citizen and public official. therein used. "except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. Indeed. is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1. as integral portions of one and the same thought. so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. refute respondents' pretense. Dr. "if in the judgment of the court. says: "The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections. italics supplied. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this . and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall". Moreover. said opinion has little. and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection." Hence. S. Referring. it may be rejected. now. Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Aruego. and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered. . Regardless of the respect due its author. with the approval of the Senate — leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party. "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear. for the "practical construction of a Constitution is of little. if any. . "as a general rule. it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight. The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondents herein is that. to the contention of respondents herein. More important still. J." (16 C." 6 Again. a member of said Convention. and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall".. weight in the solution of the question before this Court. the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention. and back up the theory of petitioners herein. but.. said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution.) The aforementioned opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a "uniform" application of the view therein adopted. Jose M. there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. which is clear. as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House. it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election. if any. What is more. also. returns. as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals. therefore. a contemporaneous or practical . . . contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. and that. represented by Senator Tañada. respondents have not even tried to show — and we cannot conceive — why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal.

I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines. that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases. and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.determination. was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices. in its session of February 22. and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House. 257-258. who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution. there were so many injustices committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. "The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. "It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system. p. Vol. pp. III. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system. p. and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact . Vol. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the decision in the election protest." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego. following the practice in some countries.) Senator Laurel. emphasis supplied. Thus. "Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention. the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies.) This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. and three from the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members may represent the party. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes. for in a great number of cases. Senator Sumulong declared: ". said: ". For when it comes to a party." (Congressional Record for the Senate. the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them. and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate. emphasis supplied. I. you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was. Vol. . like England and Canada. President. there were so many abuses. . emphasis supplied. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests. like that case involving Senator Mabanag. 361. . expressed himself as follows: "Now. 1956. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats. Mr. and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case. returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election. a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives.) Senator Paredes. returns and qualifications of its members. . because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority. So the election. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not. party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. 351. III. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members. with reference to the protests or contests relating to the election.

'But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most. purely political as has been observed in the past. 'I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. if there would be any fundamental disagreement. emphasis supplied. I repeat that the best guarantee lies in the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of . it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. .that was. among other things. would also be members of the same. 376. the best guarantee which we shall have. the best guarantee.. then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power." (Congressional Record for the Senate. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest. gentlemen. a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. Hence. Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above. is the intervention of the three justices. many have complained against. that in practice that has not given good results. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority. under the proposed constitutional provision. . it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. In the last analysis. what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well. as a check upon the two parties.) It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed. the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. I say again. we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority. Vol. the actuations of the three justices. And I understand. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices. Aruego states: "The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of party lines because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who. Dr. III. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions. the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States. p. or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties. and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions. and that is the intervention of three justices. the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases . We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate. for the fact that the laws will not be applied improperly or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully. If that is the case. I repeat. there is already a condition. we have in this case. I repeat. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission. for the administration of justice to the parties. Many have criticized. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words: "I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party. of this election protest.

Si y no.) The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Tal como esta el draft. pp.the majority but also by three members of the minority. the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom 'ultimate justice of the people. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 168-169. they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. Delegates Conejero and Roxas said: "El Sr. pp.' (Abraham Lincoln. (Pp. Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese. as hereinabove stated. emphasis supplied. and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. however. ROXAS. he asserted: "The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos. Electoral Commission. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta constituido en esa forma. a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created. Antes de votarse la enmienda. ROXAS. no cree su Señoria que este equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo? "El Sr. first. in Angara vs.. they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego. Speaking for this Court. Con mucho gusto. Creo que si. CONEJERO. With this end in view. was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. PRESIDENTE. CONEJERO. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents.) As a matter of fact. 261-263. as the longfelt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention. sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo. upon the approval of the Constitution. March 4. All that can be said now is that. many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress. 174-175. When. of an Electoral Commission. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation. with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court. the plan. during the deliberations of the convention. Vol. y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema. 1861. supra. CONEJERO. quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete. was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of . therefore. "El Sr.) It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment. to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. dando tres miembros a la mayoria. returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. "El Sr. podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo? "El Sr. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. 139). I. Que dice el Comite? "El Sr. ROXAS.) "From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members. emphasis supplied. to an independent and impartial tribunal. "El Sr. porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo. To be sure." (Angara vs. First Inaugural Address.

" (Id. in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress. . This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. . Vol. were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal. that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal. so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. 330. . They knew that even Senators like us are not angels. so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases. in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party lines.) Upon further interpellation. so that in case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as judges should result in disappointment.) Senator Sabido replied: "That is so. p. and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties. by virtue of their judicial offices. and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal. still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. III. . It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. Senator Sabido — who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the "privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate — agrees with it. I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power.) Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. . The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions. will have no partisan motives to serve. emphasis supplied. III. . Vol.election contests affecting members of the law making body." (Congressional Record for the Senate." (Congressional Record for the Senate. p. That is the ideal situation. 349. the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded not by the Congressmen or Senators who are members of the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who. either protestants or protestees.. . emphasis supplied.. not to protect the protestants or the protestees. . In other words. In fact. . As Senator Sumulong inquired: ". that we are human beings. But the framers of the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. and the party having the second largest number of votes. 330. namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes. two devices were resorted to. His words were: ". xxx xxx xxx "My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartiality and independence in its decision. Senator Sabido said: ". To achieve this purpose. and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to . p. and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality.

emphasis supplied. and a statute is regarded as directory where no substantial rights depend on it. for the purpose of this decision. . pp. It is patent. without construing the statute as mandatory. 348-9. 526) and that "As a general rule of statutory construction. the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof . to the Electoral Tribunals. hence. It is not necessary. . 330. its object. and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes.) So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals. that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate — and. its nature. Consideration must be given to the entire statute. where the law is free and clear from ambiguity. said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose". when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation. Sabido. 337. S. but not within the spirit of a statute. as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance. 370. and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. . However. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required. 350.. 362-363. J. the language of a statute. On the other hand. may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction." (82 C. no injury can . The legislative intent must he obtained from all the surrounding circumstances. or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper. and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other. 613. orderly. 364." (Congressional Record for the Senate. and prompt conduct of business. but. 362-3. as of every other question of statutory construction. pp. Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. Now then. however. is not within the statute. Vol. S. J. it is generally regarded as directory. and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. and "spirit of the Constitution". 365-366. 355. when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent. 351. . 376).) "There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. to determine whether the parties having the largest. as representative of the Citizens Party — to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim. 358. number of votes in each House may nominate. the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. in the determination of this question. and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction. In the words of the members of the present Senate. unless followed by words of absolute prohibition. III.favor either protestant or protestee. while that which is within the letter. such construction should be given. and. and the second largest. or is a mere matter of form. and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. of Senator Tañada. Accordingly. but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof. . however mandatory in form. pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate. that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein. those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. .

he would worsen the already disadvantageous position. but upon the principle involved. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way. the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.result from ignoring it. 26. shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding. or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercised.) What has been said above. the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established. but. only said member of the Citizens Party. Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators. members. Indeed. in said Tribunal. is mandatory. (Id. emphasis supplied. relative to the conditions antecedent to. 359. integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. to matters of substance. and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution. and. he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based. otherwise. What is worst. On the other hand.467. 463. Vol. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Hence. Senator Tañada felt he should nominate. 354. As a matter of fact. or when same antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power. to seven (7). the statute must be regarded as mandatory.. for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court. and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done. This does not imply that the honesty. of the Citizens Party. the spirit of the law prevails over its letter. Obviously. who are members of said Tribunals. compliance with said procedure is mandatory. the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal. in the case at bar. the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out. Upon the other hand. Furthermore. pp. instead of nine (9). in lieu thereof. three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. 329. which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. and concomitant with. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. regardless of the individual . as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein. Words and Phrases. therein. 342. numerically handicapped. also. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to. what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House. pp. because. with the Justices of the Supreme Court. holding the resulting balance of power. that is. 869-874. and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed. pp. 349. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed.) (See. Vol. III. 375). vis-a-vis the majority party. the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution. with substantially the same result. reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals. when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination. for the Senate Electoral Tribunal. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal. The same is. it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate. and when a fair interpretation of a statute. not upon their character. if the same were sanctioned. thus. by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset.

368-371). this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. Jur. particularly. In connection. and. 33. there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect. . even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegates to the Convention. who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents.qualities of those chosen therefor. and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion. J. S. they could not. sometimes. ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. supra. . 34.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority." (Emphasis supplied. there might be no objection to the statement. As above stated. (11 Am.. for example. as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor. it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest. and did not. all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. 874). But if electoral protests are filed by candidate of the minority party. the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. such a check is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court.) The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. 25-28. Besides. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country. those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice: "Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents. xxx xxx xxx "In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939. the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. Let us suppose. with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals. 765. we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power in the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines. even those tending "to secure his personal liberty". When there are no electoral protests filed by the minority party. they believed that. Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit". I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. which Senator . all lawyers of great note. The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal. and it has been held that "where a statute is founded on public policy. Most respectfully. that in the Senate.) In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the Assembly. (See pp. the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears". for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal. the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party. particularly those meant for the protection of his property. it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. pp. In the senatorial election to fill the remaining 8 seats. xxx xxx xxx ". it did not appear that there were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court.

. sec. Catalina Cayetano. about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias. It is so ordered. who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. as members of said Tribunal. cited by respondents. In the case at bar. distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. in a litigation arising out of such declaration. however. with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or. enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. Again. act or omissions. 68 [a].Tañada did not have. may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein. He. they were appointed by its Chairman. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. are null and void ab initio. said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. the legality of which he later on assailed. that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be. intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz. Without special pronouncement as to costs. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. 3. as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz. 4 thereof. that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal. the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution. as they are hereby. and the election of said respondents by the Senate. and to act upon such belief. Chief Accountant (supra). act or omission. pp. At any rate. by his declaration. and there is every reason to believe that it will. that neither these three (3) Senators. the selection of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body. Catalina Cayetano. the case of Zandueta vs. 495). Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Vol. specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. we hold that the Senate may not elect. is not in point. 615). the petition is dismissed. presumably. hereafter. we are not prepared to hold. nor any of them. the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate. De la Costa (66 Phil. take appropriate measures. The rule on estoppel is that "whenever a party has. Lastly. not of law. in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned. 490. judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. likewise.. he cannot. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment. petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. that their appointments were null and void. as held in Suanes vs. pursuant to the Rules thereof. Rules of Court). conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of the decision in the case at bar. Wherefore. Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. In view of the foregoing. Again. In the case at bar. be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 68. those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution. the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact. On the contrary. With the qualification stated above. that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal.

SeparateOpinions PARAS. J. dissenting: In 1939. (Aruego.J. and that (2) of the six members to be chosen by the National Assembly. The Framing of the Phil. 260-261). it is evident that the intention of the framers of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. 271-272). the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be 'six members chosen by the National Assembly. I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral Commission shall be composed of 'three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes. . Reyes. and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. "Examining the history of the constitutional provision. concur. Const. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan considerations. L. three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes. and of six members chosen by the National Assembly. When for lack of a minority . pp. and of six members chosen by the National Assembly.' "You state that 'as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party. three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party having the second largest number of votes.. in which you request my opinion as 'to the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution': 'There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. Reyes. JJ. Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes. Secretary of Justice Jose A.. The Framing of the Phil. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of voter. 1939. and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego. the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved. the President. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion: "Sir: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24. it is impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Assembly. But as finally adopted by the Convention. Const.C.Bengzon. and three justices of the Supreme Court .. "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission.. three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes. "From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision. and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. A. B.' "The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. .. and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. pp. Montemayor. Padilla. Bautista Angelo. thru the office of His Excellency. and Felix. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission.

with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. however. "To summarize. I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly adopted in 1940. "'A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation. considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question.representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be exercised. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. with six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme Court. and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court. 1939. the Electoral Commission was formally organized.) If there was any doubt on the matter. so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time. the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of Justice." the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the . especially when the election of any member of the minority party is protected. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion. Section 11. "It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests." (Article VI. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly. fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been intended. Constitutional provisions must always have a consistent application. there being no other party entitled to such nomination. as the case may be. "In other words." Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1. of the Constitution. 659). three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in adopting it as it is. the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly. Inasmuch. it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others. three from the Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral Commission. Jur. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. the changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the convention. who shall be chosen by each House.

and the Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices.Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of Congress. and not by the party or parties.. in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election. "As a general proposition. to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal. three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. Article VI of the Constitution. the Senate was justified. the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. Indeed. The constitutional provision. this would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines. in obedience to the constitutional mandate. checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices. concurs. otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and six others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice. returns. Endencia. as does everybody. as the case may be." (Section II. even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the second largest of votes. to choose — as it did — said two Members. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house. and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. is mandatory in character and that this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen. such a construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat. the framers of the Constitution — not insensitive to some such argument — still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence. LABRADOR.. the latter may nominate less than three or none at all.) I hold that the above provision. to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their merits. who shall be chosen by each House. integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them. dissenting : I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor. I vote to dismiss the petition. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. that its character is such as .J. Under the theory of the petitioners. and qualifications of their respective Members. there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Upon the other hand. Tañada of the Citizens Party. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members. J. If not absurd. just as any other constitutional provision.

has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other members. that which fixes membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected.. in the hands of said member of the minority. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason. I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege. And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority.to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. can be reconciled. 3. a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. contrary to the constitutional provision. Sutherland Statutory Construction. the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate. Vol. more in consonance not only with the constitutional provision as a whole. i.. as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate. While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in. that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal. so in effect this right or prerogative is lodged. In the fourth place. Petition dismissed as regards respondents Cruz. the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista Party. In the second place. p. involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy. The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision. it denies to the Senate the power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it. In the first place. a provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal principles. this is not the occasion for it to do so. 84. Senators Cuenco and Delgado not having been duly elected as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver. for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate. 5807. namely. Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make them both effective. . a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members. And the very principles of our institutions." (Sec. it would make the supposedly procedural provision. it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine. superior to and paramount over the power of election. when a constitutional mandate is ignored. to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments. are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it . but with the dictates of reason. which is lodged in the whole Senate itself. Cayetano. the Senate may not elect said two other members. This holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. Serapio and Reyes. the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce.e. So by the ruling of the majority.) The majority holds that as Senator Tañada. . the membership of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. In the third place. are not entitled to act as such. .

in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. vs. 79253 March1. the public petitioner could. both would not be liable therefor. 2. This was a procedural lapse. and NELIA T. Corollarily. the court could render a valid judgment upon the same. MONTOYA. join in the case only by intervening therein.LACKOF CAUSEOF ACTIONIN CASEAT BAR. ID. admitting the facts alleged in the complaint. and no action may be maintained thereon. MOTIONTO DISMISS. REMEDIALLAW. No. It merely recites state immunity on the part of the public petitioner and immunity on the part of Bradford the reason that the act imputed to her was done in the performance of her official functions. Of course. REYES . — Despite the fact that public petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. resulting in damage or injury to the former. The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is whether or not. if not a downright improper legal tack. A motion to dismiss on . because of the principle of state immunity. may be allowed only upon a prior motion for leave with notice to all the parties in the action. 224-87. 1993 . such intervention.R. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. HON. because of its voluntary appearance. SYLLABUS 1. the public petitioner must be deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. A PROCEDURALLAPSE . as Presiding Judge of Branch 22. The upshot of this contention is actually lack of cause of action — a specific ground for dismissal under the aforesaid Rule — because assuming arguendo that Montoya's rights had been violated by the public petitioner and Bradford.INTERVENTIONOF PUBLICPETITIONERWITHOUTLEAVEOF COURT. Montoya could have also impleaded the public petitioner as an additional defendant by amending the complaint if she so believed that the latter is an indispensable or necessary party..UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICAand MAXINE BRADFORD. Since the trial court entertained the motion to dismiss and the subsequent pleadings filed by the public petitioner and Bradford. ID. Since it was not impleaded as an original party. it may be deemed to have allowed the public petitioner to intervene. Regional Trial Court of Cavite. LUIS R. it nevertheless joined Bradford in the motion to dismiss — on the theory that the suit was in effect against it — without. however. G. on its own volition.. petitioners. — Motion does not specify any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Section 1.CIVIL PROCEDURE. first having obtained leave of court to intervene therein. respondents.

OPTION OF THE COURT IN DECIDING THEREOF. a court may grant. for the protection of his rights. deny.CASEAT BAR . et al. allow amendments to the pleadings or defer the hearing and determination of the same if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable. we declared: "It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines." And in the case of United States of America. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. DOCTRINEOF STATEIMMUNITY. is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. vs. (174 SCRA 214 [1989]) we held that: ". it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that. unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State. (182 SCRA 644 [1990]). is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.EXCEPTIONS.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them.. et al. Aligaen. et al. et al.. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same. etc. in Animos. — In deciding a motion to dismiss. POLITICALLAW.. . 4. thus: ". Court of Appeals. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. ID. It must be noted. said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein. while the trial court concluded that "the grounds and arguments interposed for the dismissal" are not "indubitable. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. . however. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. ." Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. In the instant case.. 3. ID. In the same tenor. The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. What the trial court should have done was to defer the resolution on the motion instead of denying it for lack of merit. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent. while claiming to act for the State... that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. vs. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications. et al. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office. vs. ante.the ground of failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts. etc. ." it denied the motion for lack of merit. Guinto. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. et al. under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have. — The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff. ID. . CASE AT BAR." Also. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

S. for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. does not interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. She is married to one Edgardo H. ACTIONS. EXCEPTION ." DE CI S I ON DAVIDE. petitioners' motion to dismiss the said case and granted the private respondent's motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the U. and while she was already at the parking area.(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.) checker at the U. It reads: '1.. ID. Petitioner Maxine Bradford.. The judgment then rendered against her on 10 September 1987 after the ex-parte reception of the evidence for the private respondent and before this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order on 7 December 1987 cannot be impugned.5. The said resolution denied.S. commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower Court. 224-87. "It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari. CIVIL PROCEDURE. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Likewise sought to be set aside is the writ of attachment subsequently issued by the RTC on 28 July 1987. docketed as Civil Case No. was employed as an identification (I.D. — even on the claim of diplomatic immunity — which Bradford does not in fact pretend to have in the instant case as she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG — this Court ruled: "Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. — Since Bradford did not file her Answer within the reglementary period. Montoya filed on 7 May 1987 a complaint 1 with the Regional Trial Court of her place of residence — Cavite — against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. hereinafter referred to as Montoya. Petitioners would have Us annul and set aside. Montoya. is an American citizen who. California. hereinafter referred to as Bradford. 224-87. . The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. Cavite. Navy and stationed in San Francisco. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of : . for lack of merit. the Resolution of 17 July 1987 of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite in Civil Case No. The pleadings disclose the following material operative facts: Private respondent. 224-87 and subsequently raffled off to Branch 22 at Imus. The filing of the instant petition and the knowledge thereof by the trial court did not prevent the latter from proceeding with Civil Case No.JR. where she had purchasing privileges. REMEDIAL LAW. As a consequence of an incident which occurred on 22 January 1987 whereby her body and belongings were searched after she had bought some items from the retail store of the NEX JUSMAG. at the time material to this case. The complaint. J p: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NOT INTERRUPTEDBY PENDENCYOF SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION ABSENT WRIT OF INJUNCTION RESTRAINING IT." 6. is likewise an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG headquarters. the trial court correctly declared her in default upon motion of the private respondent. . alleges the following material operative facts: xxx xxx xxx .

00 as exemplary damages and reasonable attorney's fees plus the costs of the suit. approached plaintiff and informed her that she needed to search her bags. she. to protest the search but she was informed by the defendant that the search is to be made on all Jusmag employees that day. 1987 in a letter addressed to Mr. 5. 7.000. also through the law firm of Luna. That on January 22.00. plaintiff checked the records and discovered that she was the only one whose person and belonging was (sic) searched that day contrary to defendant's allegation as set forth in par.M. That since the act could not have been motivated by other (sic) reason than racial discrimination in our own land. That considering the above. Mrs. R. exemplary damages in the amount of P100. That the search was thereafter made on the person. That plaintiff went to defendant. 8. The first was filed through Atty. together with the government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the public petitioner).L. after working as the duty ID checker from 7:45 to 11:45 A. Miguel Famularcano. 1987 made by other Filipino Jusmag employees. who asked for a 20day extension from 28 May 1987. Bradford had up to 1 July 1987 to file her Answer. however. 14. upon the instruction of the store manager. a Motion to Dismiss based on the following grounds: . Jr. That having found nothing irregular on her person and belongings.000. Yong Kennedy. plaintiff is entitled to be compensated by way of moral damages in the amount of P500. Roynon on January 27. filed through the law firm of Luna. a photocopy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX "A" and made integral (sic) part hereof. she filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file her Answer which were both granted by the trial court. 11. a photocopy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX "B" and made integral (sic) part hereof.000. 1987. 5 hereof and as evidenced by the memorandum dated January 30." She then prayed for judgment ordering Bradford to pay her P500. a check with Navy Exchange Security Manager. That to serve as a deterrent to those inclined to follow the oppressive act of the defendant. but no action was undertaken by the said officer. 13. Yong Kennedy in the presence of the defendant and numerous curious onlookers. car and bags of the plaintiff by Mrs. plaintiff was allowed to leave the premises.00 as moral damages. The second. Instead of doing so.000. Maxine Bradford. That plaintiff knows of no circumstances sufficient to trigger suspicion of a wrongdoing on her part but on the other hand. Ms. the act constitute (sic) a blow to our national pride and dignity which has caused the plaintiff a feeling of anger for which she suffers sleepless nights and wounded feelings.L. is aware of the propensity of defendant to lay suspicion on Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Sison and Manas. 10. In response thereto. 9. 4. P100. filed on 25 June 1987. plaintiff went shopping and left the store at 12:00 noon of that day.. 1987 was made and she was informed by Mr."3. R. Roynon that it is a matter of policy that customers and employees of NEX Jusmag are not searched outside the store unless there is a very strong evidence of a wrongdoing. That plaintiff formally protested the illegal search on February 14. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Bradford on 13 May 1987. 12. sought a 15-day extension from 17 June 1987 4 Thus. shoplifting and such other wrongdoings and has exposed her to contempt and ridicule which has caused her undue embarrassment and indignity.00 should also be awarded. Sison and Manas. That on the way to her car while already outside the store. 15. also an ID checker. That feeling aggrieved. 6. That moreover. who was then outside the store talking to some men.. That the illegal search on the person and belongings of the plaintiff in front of many people has subjected the plaintiff to speculations of theft. Roynon.

S. composed of an Army. installations would be illusory and academic unless the latter has effective command and control over such facilities and over American personnel. is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947. Montoya filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss alleging therein that the grounds proffered in the latter are bereft of merit because (a) Bradford. and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority. and of funds to be used for the latter's welfare and recreation. Navy and Air Group.S. such as Bradford. Such rights. On 14 July 1987. 5500. "it is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights. To do so would constitute a violation of the military bases agreement. such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. functions and responsibilities of a unit of the United States Navy. in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers." In support of the motion. cash and equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint. the petitioners claimed that JUSMAG. They further claimed that the Navy Exchange (NAVEX). use and operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof. Its headquarters in Quezon City is considered a temporary installation under the provisions of Article XXI of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. employees."1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America.S." JUSMAG maintains. power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment. employees. is considered essential for the performance of governmental functions. Thereunder. unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority. Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment on the ground that Bradford was about to depart from the country and was in the process of removing and/or disposing of her properties with intent to defraud her creditors. . Baer vs. equipment and material. and 2) Defendant. Ruiz 9 were invoked to support these claims. Tizon 8 and United States of America vs. Its mission is to provide a convenient and reliable source. Moreover. had been established under the Philippine-United States Military Assistance Agreement entered into on 21 March 1947 to implement the United States' program of rendering military assistance to the Philippines. (b) having exceeded her authority. On 6 July 1987. the rights.1. had committed an improper. an instrumentality of the U. Quezon City. power and authority within the bases can only be exercised by the United States through the officers and officials of its armed forces. as amended. Maxine Bradford. relating as it does to the mission. cannot then be allowed. equipment and material. Government. 7 Thus. Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal. as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG. Military Bases. Montoya's complaint. Bradford's order to have purchases of all employees checked on 22 January 1987 was made in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG. a Navy Exchange referred to as the NEX-JUSMAG. powers and authority granted by the Philippine government to the United States within the U. at the lowest practicable cost. (c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U. of articles and services required for the well-being of Navy personnel. Checking of purchases at the NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect and safeguard merchandise. at its Quezon City headquarters." The 1979 amendment of the Military Bases Agreement made it clear that the United States shall have "the use of certain facilities and areas within the bases and shall have effective command and control over such facilities and over United States personnel.

The writ of attachment was issued on that same date.On 16 July 1987. for failure to file an answer. this Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition.000. The motion for preliminary attachment is granted in the interest of justice. entitling her to moral and exemplary damages against the defendant. 224-87 'for lack of merit. a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint. In the meantime. petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which the latter denied in its Order of 21 August 1987.' For the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America. Instead of filing a motion to reconsider the last two (2) orders. or an answer — insofar as Bradford is concerned — both the latter and the public petitioner filed on 6 August 1987 the instant petition to annul and set aside the above Resolution of 17 July 1987 and the writ of attachment issued pursuant thereto. On 12 August 1987. On 19 August 1987. Hence. the trial court set Civil Case No. 224-87. On 17 July 1987. She thus took the witness stand and presented Mrs. public petitioner and Bradford filed a reply to Montoya's opposition and an opposition to the motion for preliminary attachment. 224-87 and Montoya was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. impaired and undermined the plaintiff's liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. 13 the trial court 14 resolved both the motion to dismiss and the motion for preliminary attachment in this wise: "On the motion to dismiss. Missy Yu as her witnesses. the trial court rendered its decision 23 in Civil Case No. Bradford was declared in default in Civil Case No." On 5 August 1987.00. under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947. they allege that: "10. the dispositive portion of which reads: "Prescinding from the foregoing. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. upon the plaintiff's filing of a bond in the sum of P50. the trial court issued on 28 July 1987 an Order decreeing the issuance of a writ of attachment and directing the sheriff to serve the writ immediately at the expense of the private respondent. 224-87 for pre-trial and trial on 27 August 1987 at 9:30 a. as amended. Nam Thi Moore and Mrs. . while its copetitioner was immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at the headquarters of JUSMAG. The search has unduly subjected the plaintiff to intense humiliation and indignities and had consequently ridiculed and embarrassed publicly said plaintiff so gravely and immeasurably. On 10 September 1987. the grounds and arguments interposed for the dismissal of this case are determined to be not indubitable. the motion is denied for lack of merit.m. As grounds therefor. it is hereby determined that the unreasonable search on the plaintiff's person and bag caused (sic) done recklessly and oppressively by the defendant. however. violated." Upon Montoya's filing of the required bond.

it had nevertheless resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. 224-87. On 27 October 1987.00 for exemplary damages and P50. . moreover. a Manifestation and Motion reciting the foregoing incidents obtaining before the trial court and praying that their petition for a restraining order be resolved. 22487. judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant Maxine Bradford assessing the latter to pay unto the former the sums of P300. 224-87 is in effect a suit against the public petitioner. A copy thereof was received by Bradford on 21 October 1987. Petitioners filed their Memorandum on 8 February 1989 while private respondent filed her Memorandum on 14 November 1990. Montoya filed before the trial court a motion for the execution of the Decision of 10 September 1987 which petitioners opposed on the ground that although this Court had not yet issued in this case a temporary restraining order. the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution. since no motion for reconsideration or appeal had been interposed by Bradford challenging the 10 September 1987 Decision which she had received on 21 September 1987. this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. P100.000.000. after the private respondent filed a Rejoinder to the Consolidated Reply to the Comments filed by the petitioners. Consequently. Montoya filed her Comment with Opposition to the Petition for Restraining Order. SO ORDERED. the petitioners filed on 4 December 1987. this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order "ENJOINING the respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Pasig. Respondent Judge had earlier filed his own Comment to the petition on 14 September 1987. Navy Exchange of JUSMAG pursuant to the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. Metro Manila. respondent Judge issued on 14 October 1987 an order directing that an entry of final judgment be made. and the Writs of Attachment and Execution issued in Civil Case No.S. 1987.000.WHEREFORE. In the meantime. On that same date. as amended. enforcement of a writ of execution may lead to regrettable incidents and unnecessarily complicate the situation in view of the public petitioner's position on the issue of the immunity of its employees. It was further averred that execution thereof would cause Bradford grave injury. No costs.00 for moral damages. it was also prayed that the trial court be enjoined from continuing with Civil Case No.00 for actual expenses and attorney's fees. We noted this pleading in the Resolution of 23 September 1987. a foreign sovereign immune from suit which has not given consent to such suit and (b) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her in the performance of her official functions as manager of the U. On 7 December 1987." Bradford received a copy of the decision on 21 September 1987. In its Resolution of 11 November 1987." On 28 November 1988. she and the public petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Restraining Order which sought to have the trial court's decision vacated and to prevent the execution of the same. Also on 14 October 1987. from enforcing the Decision dated September 10. The kernel issue presented in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (a) the complaint in Civil Case No.

S. And even assuming arguendo that Bradford is performing governmental functions. and (c) the acts complained of do not fall under those offenses where the U. A careful review of the records of this case and a judicious scrutiny of the arguments of both parties yield nothing but the weakness of the petitioners' stand. such intervention. Such officer or employee alone is answerable for any liability arising therefrom and may thus be proceeded against in his personal capacity.S. (b) Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG which provides that only the Chief of the Military Advisory Group and not more than six (6) other senior members thereof designated by him will be accorded diplomatic immunity. first having obtained leave of court to intervene therein. Of course. outside the territorial control of the U. We shall first consider some procedural matters. the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. it nevertheless joined Bradford in the motion to dismiss — on the theory that the suit was in effect against it — without. especially tortious and criminal acts. on its own volition. 224-87. join in the case only by intervening therein. While this can be easily demonstrated. may be allowed only upon a prior motion for leave with notice to all the parties in the action. Quezon City. On the other hand. outside the JUSMAG store and. but also the manner in which the same was conducted as well as the fact of discrimination against Filipino employees. are his private acts and may not be considered as acts of the State. she would still remain outside the coverage of the doctrine of state immunity since the act complained of is ultra vires or outside the scope of her authority. Montoya maintains that at the very least. immunity will lie only if such act or omission is found to be lawful. This was a procedural lapse." Moreover. if not a downright improper legal tack. should have been exercised with restraint and should have been in accordance with the guidelines and procedures laid down by the cited "NAVRESALEACT. it is asserted. Montoya could have .Aside from maintaining the affirmative view. Despite the fact that public petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. in other words. To rule otherwise would render the Philippine courts powerless as they may be easily divested of their jurisdiction upon the mere invocation of this principle of immunity from suit. Montoya submits that Bradford is not covered by the protective mantle of the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit as the latter is a mere civilian employee of JUSMAG performing non-governmental and proprietary functions. the concept of immunity would be meaningless as inquiry into the lawlessness or illegality of the act or omission would first have to be made before considering the question of immunity. Military Bases in the Philippines. It is claimed that the application of the immunity doctrine does not turn upon the lawlessness of the act or omission attributable to the foreign national for if this were the case. Philippine courts may inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether petitioner Bradford is immune from suit or exempt from Philippine jurisdiction. Finally. the public petitioner and Bradford even go further by asserting that even if the latter's act were ultra vires. she would still be immune from suit for the rule that public officers or employees may be sued in their personal capacity for ultra vires and tortious acts is "domestic law" and not applicable in International Law. Bradford's authority to order a search. therefore. Since it was not impleaded as an original party. as amended by the Mendez-Blair Notes of 10 August 1965). the public petitioner could. ultra vires acts of a public officer or employee. What is being questioned is not the fact of search alone. however. has been given the right to exercise its jurisdiction (per Article 13 of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement. Subic Inst. Montoya further argues that both the acts and person of Bradford are not exempt from the Philippine courts' jurisdiction because (a) the search was conducted in a parking lot at Scout Borromeo.

By their motion to dismiss. it is beyond doubt that Montoya's cause of action is premised on the theory that the acts complained of were committed by Bradford not only outside the scope of her authority — or more specifically. The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. whether the trial court should have deferred resolution on or denied outright the motion to dismiss for lack of merit is no longer pertinent or relevant. Thus. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. admitting the facts alleged in the complaint. a court may grant. Moreover. The upshot of this contention is actually lack of cause of action — a specific ground for dismissal under the aforesaid Rule — because assuming arguendo that Montoya's rights had been violated by the public petitioner and Bradford. outside the NEX-JUSMAG — particularly. in her private capacity — but also outside the territory where she exercises such authority. making their recourse to this Court via the instant petition inevitable. because of its voluntary appearance. It is averred that the said search was directed only against Montoya. while the trial court concluded that "the grounds and arguments interposed for the dismissal" are not "indubitable. the public petitioner and Bradford were not expected to accept the verdict. In the instant case. it may be deemed to have allowed the public petitioner to intervene. allow amendments to the pleadings or defer the hearing and determination of the same if the ground alleged does not appear to be indubitable. both would not be liable therefor. Since the trial court entertained the motion to dismiss and the subsequent pleadings filed by the public petitioner and Bradford. It merely recites state immunity on the part of the public petitioner and immunity on the part of Bradford the reason that the act imputed to her was done in the performance of her official functions. and no action may be maintained thereon. deny. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is whether or not. that is.also impleaded the public petitioner as an additional defendant by amending the complaint if she so believed that the latter is an indispensable or necessary party. public petitioner and Bradford are deemed to have hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint which support this theory. the court could render a valid judgment upon the same. the public petitioner must be deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. because of the principle of state immunity. at the parking area which has not been shown to form part of the facility of which she was the manager. The complaint in Civil Case No. the said motion does not specify any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Section 1. In deciding a motion to dismiss. What the trial court should have done was to defer the resolution on the motion instead of denying it for lack of merit. 224-87 is for damages arising from what Montoya describes as an "illegal search" on her "person and belongings" conducted outside the JUSMAG premises in front of many people and upon the orders of Bradford. Corollarily. In any event. resulting in damage or injury to the former. Court of Appeals. whatever may or should have been done. Howsoever viewed. thus: . in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. who has the propensity for laying suspicion on Filipinos for theft or shoplifting." it denied the motion for lack of merit.

et al. Tizon etc. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith. In the case of Baer. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them. etc. does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity.. that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications. is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II. he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff. . etc. for the protection of his rights. or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents. . vs. however. unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. .. whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. Petitioner.' Also. as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have. . however. in Animos. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. vs.' The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. It must be noted. of the 1987 Constitution. et al. it was ruled that: 'There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury. et al. et al. . It has no application. . It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. section 2.. it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that. and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts. In the same tenor. vs. we held that: ' . Section 3. Aligaen. now expressed in Article XVI. while claiming to act for the State. et al.. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner."I. or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity. is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

.. the trial court correctly declared her in default upon motion of the private respondent. Since Bradford did not file her Answer within the reglementary period. this Court observed: "There is no question. vs.S. arises — are American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? Pursuing the question further." Since it is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. Bradford's purported non-suability on the ground of state immunity is then a defense which may be pleaded in the answer and proven at the trial." (Emphasis supplied) There can be no doubt that on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. Guinto. Rarang 50 and Minucher vs. In the case of United States of America. It reads: '1. even on the claim of diplomatic immunity — which Bradford does not in fact pretend to have in the instant case as she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG — this Court ruled: "Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. Montoya has a sufficient and viable cause of action. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit. The judgment then rendered against her on 10 September 1987 after the ex-parte reception of the evidence for the private respondent and before this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order on 7 December 1987 cannot be impugned. et al. In the former." In the latter. this Court reiterated this exception. Under the rule that U. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. and authority to the United States under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts? Our answer is No. we declared: "It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. 224-87. In the recent cases of Williams vs. the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. The question.The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. however. does the grant of rights. "It is elementary that the . ante. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of : xxx xxx xxx (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. etc. therefore. therefore. then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. Court of Appeals. that the two (2) petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. The filing of the instant petition and the knowledge thereof by the trial court did not prevent the latter from proceeding with Civil Case No. It is to be noted. et al. power. said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein.

. does not interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. did not take part. Bellosillo. concur.. C .. and Campos. . Quiason. the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Jr. Nocon." WHEREFORE. Narvasa. Feliciano. Melo. J . commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower Court. LLjur Costs against petitioner Bradford.J . Romero. Griño-Aquino. Padilla. is on terminal leave... J . Regalado.. The Temporary Restraining Order of 7 December 1987 is hereby LIFTED. Bidin. Cruz. Jr. JJ .mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari. Gutierrez. SO ORDERED.