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HOOKER, BRUMIT,&GOnUEB: )
JOHNJAY HOOKER, twicetheDemocraticnomineefor )
Governor,on behalfofhimselfand all otherqualified )
votersand potentialcandidatesforanyappellate )
judgeshipin 2014, )
WALTER BRUMIT, aRepublican, on behalfofhimselfand all )
otherqualifiedvoters, and othersseekingtobe heard )
beforetheJudicial PerformanceEvaluation Commission, )
ANTHONYGOnUEB,an Independentqualifiedvoter, and on )
behalfofhimselfand all otherqualifiedvotersand others )
seekingtobe heardbeforetheJudicial Performance )
Evaluation Commission, )
)
)
ApplicantsforDeclaratoryJudgment, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 13C-5012
)
)
LT. GOVERNORRON RAMSEY (5 men- 0women) )
HOUSE SPEAKER BETH HARWELL (3 men- 2women) )
(Appointingauthoritiesforthemembersofthe )
Judicial PerformanceEvaluationCommission) )
1"',1. CI [ "' lot'
.... f In
I), C.
Chair Hon. RobertL. Jones
Vice-ChairMichael E. Tant
ChristopherClem, Esq.
HenriettaGrant
J. GregoryGrisham, Esq.
Hon. RobertMontgomery,Jr.
Hon.J. MichaelSharp
Renata Soto
Joseph A. Woodruff, Esq.
(Two FemalesandSeven Males)
GeneralCounsel: David Haines, Esq.
SecretaryofStateTre Hargett
GovernorBill Haslam
AttorneyGeneral RobertCooper
)
Columbia,TN )
Franklin,TN )
Chattanooga,TN )
Knoxville,TN )
Memphis,TN )
Blountville,TN )
Cleveland,TN )
Nashville,TN )
Nashville,TN )
)
)
)
)
)
(On behalfoftheAttorneyGeneral'soffice )
All Respondentsand interestedStateOfficials )
)
)
Respondents/ Defendants. )
1
(
AMENDEDAPPLICATION FORADECLARATORYJUDGMENTANDAN INJUNCTION
'I
AN AMENDED APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND AN INJUNCTION UNDER T.C.A. 29-
14-101 et seq., and the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57, 65 regarding the unlawful appointment of
various members of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission [hereinafter known as the
Commission], under T.C.A 17-4-101 et seq., TCA 17-4-201(b)(6), and Supreme Court Rule 27, Section
2.02. In that regard Lt. Governor Ramsey appointed four men and no women to the Commission. That
action discriminates against females and violated the Rules creating the Commission and the
Commissions own Rules. The unlawful appointments and the unlawful acceptance of said
appointments by various Commissioners are in violation of the gender population approximation
requirements of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore the Applicants seek an injunction voiding said
actions under the aforesaid provisions. And, an order requiring the Respondents to respond within 10
days, and an order requiring a speedy hearing in this matter in 15 days in accordance with the original
application;
AND
an injunction prohibiting any further meetings or discussions by the Chairman or Commission
members, until the Commission is properly constituted in accordance with TCA 17-4-201(b)(6) and
Supreme Court Rule 27, 2.02, 2.03 or until a decision is rendered in this Declaratory Judgment
application;
AND
or in the alternative a Declaratory Judgment and an Injunction prohibiting any further meetings or
discussions by the Chairman or members of the Commission, as the appointments of the members of
the Commission we not lawfully made under Supreme Court Rule 27, and TCA 17-4-201(a)(1)(b)(6),
because the Rules of the Supreme Court were not approved by a resolution of both Houses of the
General Assembly, in accordance with TCA 16-3-404 and Article VI 2, providing that the General
Assembly has the authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
AND
an application for a Declaratory Judgment that the Commission be required, under Supreme Court
Rule 27, to accept in writing or otherwise submissions from Qualified Voters, and or litigants to the
Commission, challenging various Judges who seek to be Retention Elected, and a Declaratory
Judgment requiring the Commission to permit comments from qualified voters to address the
Commission orally, in person, under ARTICLE I l, 23 and ARTICLE XI 16 of the Tennessee
Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 27 Section 5;
AND
an application for Governor Bill Haslam, under his oath office and an application for Lt. Governor Ron
Ramsey and the House Speaker Beth Harwell to disclose in this matter under their oaths to support
the Constitution, under ARTICLE X l, 2, whether they publicly or privately have claimed that the
Retention Election Statute is constitutional or unconstitutional, as no public official can be authorized
to take official action in violation of their oath of office;
AND
an application for a Declaratory Judgment and an Injunction requiring that each member of the
Commission under their oaths of office make an individual declaration, in writing, as regards to the
constitutionality of the Retention Election Statute, before exercising any powers under the aforesaid
provisions.
AND
An application for Declaratory Judgment, declaring the Retention Election Statute, TCA 17-4-101 et
seq., unconstitutional because it provides for the appointment of Judges in lieu of the Election
mandated by ARTICLE VII 5, when the incumbent Judges do not seek reelection under TCA 17-4-116.
No Court has passed on the Constitutionality of that provision and since there is no severance clause
the entire Act is unconstitutional.
2
BACKGROUND
1) The Retention Election Statute TCA 17-4-101 et seq., TCA 17-4-201 et seq., and
Supreme Court Rule 27 are existing statutory and Rule provisions, in full force and effect, under which
the members of the Commission, under their oaths of office as Judges, or their attorney's oath, and or
under Article X 1, for the other members of the Commission are operating. Under said provisions the
aforementioned Defendants, Lt. Governor Ron Ramsey and Speaker Beth Harwell have made
appointments, notwithstanding both Speakers' have both publicly and privately claimed that the
Retention Election Statute is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Lt. Gov. Ramsey appointed only male
members to the Commission and Speaker Harwell joined with Lt Gov Ramsey in appointing Chairman
Jones, notwithstanding the gender imbalance. The Defendant Commission members, accepted said
appointments in violation of certain of the aforesaid provisions, requiring two female appointments to
the Commission by Lt. Governor Ron Ramsey, in violation of their Oaths of Office under ARTICLE X 1.
The Commission members thereby discriminated against the female voters of the State who are not
properly represented on the Commission and as a consequence there are seven men and two women
on the Commission in violation of TCA 17-4-201(b)(6).
2) The Commission, comprised of seven males and two females, notwithstanding the fact
that the majority of citizens of Tennessee are female, in violation of TCA 17-4-201(b)(6), has taken
certain actions in a series of meetings, conducted by Chairman Robert L. Jones, attended by all or
virtually all of the members, either in person or otherwise, of the Commission, at which meetings
various Commission members did unlawfully authorize, in violation of their oaths of office under
ARTICLE X 1, and in the instance of Lawyers, their Attorney's oath, when they issued preliminary,
favorable evaluations of twenty Judges, and unfavorable evaluations of three Judges. There are
Twenty nine appellate Judges, six Judges are retiring and consequently those Judges did not seek
evaluation.
3) Applicants for Declaratory Judgment Hooker and Brumit, attended the public meeting of
the Commission on Friday, December 6
th
2013, in an effort to advise the Commission of the self-
serving conduct, by members of the Supreme Court, in their individual and separate cases before the
court, because the Judges in those cases had an interest in the subject matter of their recusal motions
in violation of Article VI Section 11 requiring the disqualification of said Judges. All members of the
Supreme Court, involved in the Hooker and Brumit cases, declined to recuse themselves, in violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Official Oppression and Official Misconduct statutes. And,
consequently, said Judges, in the opinion of Hooker and Brumit, should not be favorably evaluated in
their pursuit of the opportunity to be Retention Elected.
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4) Furthermore, the request to be heard by the Commission to challenge the Judges in
their pursuit of retention election, was set out, in letters to the General Counsel Haines, by said
Applicants, in accordance with their constitutional rights under ARTCLE I l and ARTICLE I 23, and
ARTICLE XI 16. Notwithstanding these letters which set out why the Applicants should be heard, the
request to be heard was ruled to be out of order by the distinguished Chairman Robert L. Jones. In
addition to ruling the applicants out of order, the Chairman, under the Code of Judicial Conduct
requiring the Judges to comply with the law, must know that the Commission is sitting de facto and
not de jure. The Chairman knows that the Commission is not representative of the electorate and
therefore that the Commission sits in violation of its own rules and in disregard of the oaths of office of
the members of the Commission.
5) Attached hereto are public statements made by Lt. Governor Ramsey on various
occasions regarding the constitutionality of the Retention Election Statute, TCA 17-4-101 et seq. and,
TCA 17-4-201 et seq. under which, Lt. Gov. Ramsey apPOinted seven men and two women, in
violation of, TCA 17-4-201(b)(6); Supreme Court Rule 27; 2.02, 2.03, and his oath of office as a
Legislator. It is incomprehensible in view of Lt. Governor Ramsey's appointments to the Commission,
but the fact is Lt. Gov. Ramsey has claimed that the Retention Election statute is "absolutely,
positively, unconstitutional," and that the "Constitution must not be ignored."
6) This application for a Declaratory Judgment and an Injunction, does not directly involve
the issues, in the Hooker vs. Haslam case presently pending before the Special Supreme Court.
However, it does involve Governor Haslam's oath, "to see the laws are faithfully executed" ARTICLE III
lO, regarding the facts that the Commission is sitting in violation of TCA 17-4-201(b)(6) and Supreme
Court Rule 27; 2.02, 2.03, regarding race and gender, and the constitutionality of TCA 17-4-101 et seq:..
ARGUMENT
1) The Retention-Election Statute which provides for the appointment of Judges by the
Governor as of Sept 1
st
,in instances where sitting Judges do not seek re-election, in lieu of an election
by the qualified voters, "on the first Thursday in August/' as is required under Article VI 3, 4 and
Article VII 4, 5, is unconstitutional. It should be well noted by Your Honor that the Retention
Election statute cancels the election of Judges mandated by said provisions. That circumstance has not
yet been ruled upon by any Tennessee Court but cannot be ignored by any person, including the
Governor, who has sworn to support the Constitution and faithfully execute the laws.
2) Furthermore, the statute provides that the Judicial Performance Evaluation members
shall be appOinted in accordance with race and gender population requirements, notwithstanding the
fact that Lt. Governor Ramsey failed to appoint a single female to the Commission when the provision
mandated that the appointment of members be in accordance with an approximation of the
population. As a consequence the Commission is imbalanced and cannot properly represent the
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qualified voters of the State of Tennessee, which destroys the purpose of the Commission. This
unlawful conduct occasions this lawsuit, which challenges the composition of the Commission because
it discriminates against the female voters of the State who are not lawfully represented on the
Commission.
3) The Chief Justice did not report the rules of the Supreme Court [Rule 27] to the General
Assembly. Notwithstanding, a report to the General Assembly is required by TCA 16-3-404, in
accordance with TCA 17-4-201(a)(1). TCA 17-4-201(a)(1) authorized the Supreme Court to make a
rule establishing the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission. The Chief Justice failed to report to
the General Assembly, notwithstanding the mandate, that all Rules must be reported by the Supreme
Court and approved by the General Assembly. That circumstance makes it obvious that any
appointments to the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission are unlawful without approval, by
Resolution of both Houses of the General Assembly.
4) Consequently, the Qualified Voters of this State are dependent upon this honorable
Court to enjoin the actions of the Commission so as to provide the Qualified Voters with the
safeguards built into the aforesaid provisions. These provisions require that applicants for Retention-
Election shall be judged by commissioners who are representative of the voting public in accordance
with the aforesaid race and gender population approximation required TCA 17-4-201(b)(6) and
Supreme Court Rule 27; 2.021 2.03.
5) In conclusion, the appointment of various members of the Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission, by Lt. Governor Ramsey and Speaker Harwell
l
in violation of the Supreme
Court Rule 27 and TCA 17-4-201(b)(6L creates an improperly constituted Commission, and
consequently all of its prior evaluations are void. Moreover, all its prior evaluations are void because
Supreme Court Rule 27 has not been approved by the General AssemblYI in direct violation TCA 16-3-
404.
RELIEF
1) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray for this
Honorable Court to issue a Declaratory Judgment determining that the Commission is improperly
constituted, in violation of the aforesaid requirements involving race and gender. Consequently, all
recommendations heretofore made by the Commission, must be held null and void as the commission
sits in violation of its own rules
l
Supreme Court Rule 271 and specific mandates of the Legislature
including TCA 17-4-201(b)(6);
2) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray that the Court
enjoin further actions or discussions by the Commission
l
and its members, until the Commission is
properly appointed
l
and hold void the preliminary recommendations it has heretofore made;
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3) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray, that this
Honorable Court will enjoin all further acts by the Commission, until the General Assembly has
approved Supreme Court Rule 27, establishing the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission in
accordance with TCA 16-3-404, and declare all actions taken by the Commission are void and declare
the Commission cannot operate until and unless Rule 27 is approved by the General Assembly:
4) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray, that the
Court will declare the Retention Election Statute unconstitutional, as it provides for the appointment
of Judges by the Governor to take effect on September 1
st
, or thereafter in situations where sitting
judges do not seek reelection. Consequently the statute violates ARTICLE VII 4 and 5 under which
elections must be held, "on the First Thursday in August beginning in 1870 and every eight years
thereafter" ;
5) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray, that this
Honorable Court in this matter will declare that all qualified voters and litigants with grievances
[redress of grievances] against any Judge subject to Retention Election be permitted to be heard by the
Commission, to challenge the conduct of any Judge under Article I 23 and Supreme Court Rule 27
Section 2.
6) The Applicants on behalf of themselves and all other qualified voters pray for any
further relief that this Honorable Court may deem appropriate to secure the rights of the qualified
voters of Tennessee and litigants under the Constitution, the Statutes, and the Rule of Law, including
an order that each of the Defendants, under their oath of office to support the Constitution, declare
and disclose, through the Attorney General, whether each of the Defendants claim that the Retention
Election Statute is constitutional or unconstitutional, as a safeguard against public officials violating
their oath of office when taking official action in violation of Official Oppression and Official
Misconduct Statutes.
7) The Applicants, on behalf of themselves, and all other qualified voters pray, that this
Honorable Court, in this matter involving the Highest Public Interest, will require the Respondents to
respond within 10 days and that a hearing be set within 15 days in accordance with the original
Application.
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Greeneville TN 37745
Phone (423)-823-0157
866 )-366-0043
ANTHONY GOITLlEB, Pro-Se
PO Box 1770
Hendersonville TN 37077
Phone (615}-824-9439
Fax (615)-262-6050
tonygottlieb@aol,com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been sent via First Class mail,
postage prepaid, email and or fax, to:
Attorney Gen.eral RobertCooper, Jr.
Attorney General for the State of Tennessee
Janet Kleinfelter
Deputy Attorney General
Public Interest Division
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, TN 37202
David Haines s q ~ General Counsel
Administrative Office of the Court
511 Union Street 6
th
Floor
Nashville, TN 37219
APPENDIX I"'"
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Tenn. Const. Art. I, 1 20 I . '''''': :" ....
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments ari flfj;,J,g
authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the ends tne-y56
n
have at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the'
such manner as they may think proper. - ,
Tenn. Const. Art. I, 19 0 C.
That the printing press shall be free to every person to examine the proceedings of the
Legislature; or of any branch or officer of the government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the
right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man
and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty. But in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of
officers, or men in public capacity, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for
libel, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other criminal cases.
Tenn. Const. Art. I, 23
That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common
good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government
for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by address of remonstrance.
Tenn. Const. Art. III, 10
He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Tenn. Const. Art. VI, 2.
The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, of whom not more than two shall reside in any
one of the grand divisions of the state. The judges shall designate one of their own number who shall
preside as chief justice. The concurrence of three of the judges shall in every case be necessary to a
decision. The jurisdiction of this court shall be appellate only, under such restrictions and regulations as
may from time to time be prescribed by law; but it may possess such other jurisdiction as is now
conferred by law on the present Supreme Court. Said court shall be held at Knoxville, Nashville and
Jackson.
Tenn. Const. Art. VI, 3
The judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of the state. The
Legislature shall have power to prescribe such rules as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
section two of this article. Every judge of the Supreme Court shall be thirty-five years of age, and shall
before his election have been a resident of the state for five years. His term of service shall be eight
years.
Tenn. Const. Art. VI, 4.
The Judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other Inferior Courts, shall be elected by
the qualified voters of the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned. Every judge of such courts
shall be thirty years of age, and shall before his election, have been a resident of the state for five years,
and of the circuit or district one year. His term of service shall be eight years.
Tenn. Const. Art. VI, 11.
No judge of the Supreme or Inferior Courts shall preside on the trial of any cause in the event of
which he may be interested, or where either of the parties shall be connected with him by affinity of
consanguinity, within such degrees as may be prescribed by law, or in which he may have been of
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counsel, or in which he may have presided in any Inferior Court, except by consent of all the parties. In
case all or any of the judges of the Supreme Court shall thus be disqualified from presiding on the trial of
any cause or causes, the court or the judges thereof, shall certify the same to the governor of the state,
and he shall forthwith specially commission the requisite number of men, of law knowledge, for the trial
and determination thereof. The Legislature may by general laws make provision that special judges may
be appointed, to hold any courts the judge of which shall be unable or fail to attend or sit; or to hear any
cause in which the judge may be incompetent.
Tenn. Canst. Art. VII, 4.
The election of officers, and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this
Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the Legislature shall direct.
Tenn. Canst. Art. VII,5.
Elections for judicial and other civil officers shall be held on the first Thursday in August, one
thousand eight hundred and seventy, and forever thereafter on the first Thursday in August next
preceding the expiration of their respective terms of service. The term of each officer so elected shall be
computed from the first day of September next succeeding his election. The term of office of the
governor and other executive officers shall be computed from the fifteenth of January next after the
election of the governor. No appointment or election to fill a vacancy shall be made for a period
extending beyond the unexpired term. Every officer shall hold his office until his successor is elected or
appointed, and qualified. No special election shall be held to fill a vacancy in the office of judge or
district attorney, but a the time herein fixed for the biennial election of civil officers, and such vacancy
shall be filled at the next biennial election recurring more than thirty days after the vacancy occurs.
Tenn. Canst. Art. X, 1.
Every person who shall be chosen or appointed to any office of trust or profit under this
Constitution, or any law made in pursuance thereof, shall, before entering on the duties thereof, take an
oath to support the Constitution of this state, and of the United States, and an oath of office.
Tenn. Canst. Art. X, 2.
Each member of the Senate and House of Representatives, shall before they proceed to
business take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this state, and of the United States
and also the following oath: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as a member of this
General Assembly, I wi", in a" appointments, vote without favor, affection, partiality, or prejudice; and
that I will not propose or assent to any bill, vote or resolution, which shall appear to me injurious to the
people, or consent to any act or thing, whatever, that shall have a tendency to lessen or abridge their
rights and privileges, as declared by the Constitution of this state.
Tenn. Canst. Art. XI, 16
The declaration of rights hereto prefixed is declared to be a part of the Constitution of the state,
and shall never be violated on any pretense whatever. And to guard against transgression of the high
powers we have delegated, we declare that everything in the bill of rights contained, is excepted out of
the general powers of the government, and shall forever remain inviolate.
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Title 16 Courts
Tenn. Code Ann. 16-3-404 (2013) Effective date of rules -- Approval of rules by general assembly.
The supreme court shall fix the effective date of all its rules; provided, that the rules shall not
take effect until they have been reported to the general assembly by the chief justice at or after the
beginning of a regular session of the general assembly, but not later than February 1 during the session,
and until they have been approved by resolutions of both the house of representatives and the senate.
Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-101 et seq. (2013)
It is the declared purpose and intent of the general assembly by the passage of this chapter to:
(1) Assist the governor in finding and appointing the best qualified persons available for service
on the appellate courts of this state, and to assist the electorate of this state in electing the best
qualified persons to the courts; ...
Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-116 Judges And Chancellors -Judicial Nomination and Performance Evaluation
Failure to seek reelection -- Nomination and appointment subject to election -- Exception -- Rejection
of candidate -- Appointment.
(a) If an incumbent appellate court judge, whether appointed or elected, fails to file a
declaration of candidacy for election to an unexpired term or to a full eight-year term within the
prescribed time, or if the judge withdraws as a candidate after receiving a recommendation "for
retention" from the judicial performance evaluation commission and filing the required declaration of
candidacy, then a vacancy is created in the office upon expiration of the incumbent's term effective
September 1. In this event, the vacancy shall be filled by the governor in accordance with 17-4-112 or
17-4-113. The appointment is subject to the action of the electorate in the next regular August
election. The appointee shall file a declaration of candidacy and be voted on as provided in 17-4-114
and 17-4-115...
Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201 (2013)
Judicial performance evaluation program.
(a) (1) By rule, the supreme court shall establish a judicial performance evaluation program for
appellate court judges. The purpose of the program shall be to assist the public in evaluating the
performance of incumbent appellate court judges. The judicial performance evaluation commission,
established pursuant to subsection (b), shall perform the required evaluations. The commission shall
make a recommendation either "for retention" or "for replacement" of each appellate court judge;
provided, that the commission shall not evaluate or make any retention recommendation with regard to
any appellate judge whose term of office is abbreviated because of death, resignation or removal.
Furthermore, the commission shall not include within the final report, publicly disclosed pursuant to
subsection (c), an evaluation or retention recommendation for any appellate judge whose term of office
is abbreviated because of death, resignation or removal or who fails to timely file a declaration of
candidacy as required by 17-4-114(a) or 17-4-115(a), unless the judge is a candidate for another
office subject to evaluation under this section.
(2) If an incumbent appellate judge holds office for one (1) year or more preceding the deadline for
filing the required declaration of candidacy for either an unexpired term or a full eight-year term, then
evaluation procedures shall be based on the results of any evaluations performed throughout the
judge's service on the appellate bench, evaluation surveys, personal information contained in an
approved self-reporting form and such other comments and documents as the commission receives
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from any other reliable source. However, if an incumbent judge holds office for less than one (1) year
preceding the deadline, then evaluation procedures shall be based on personal information contained in
the self-reporting form, the judge's application to the judicial nominating commission and such other
comments and documents as the commission receives from any other reliable source.
(3) Information collected pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) shall be confidential and shall be publicly
disclosed only in the manner permitted by subsection (c). Upon request, each member of the judicial
performance evaluation commission shall be given complete access to any individual survey, form,
application, comment and document submitted, conveyed or compiled for the purpose of judicial
evaluation; however, each such member must protect the confidentiality of the information as well as
the anonymity of survey respondents.
(4) (A) At least thirty (30) days prior to the deadline for filing a declaration of candidacy required by
17-4-114(a)(1) or 17-4-115(a)(1L the judicial performance evaluation commission shall provide an
incumbent appellate judge with a draft of the commission's evaluation and shall provide the judge with
a reasonable opportunity to comment or respond either personally or in writing.
(B) As soon as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances, but not less than three (3) days
prior to the deadline for filing a declaration of candidacy required by 17-4-114(a)(2) or 17-4-
115(a)(2), the judicial performance evaluation commission shall provide an incumbent appellate judge
with a draft of the commission's evaluation and shall provide the judge with a reasonable opportunity to
comment or respond either personally or in writing.
(b) (1) The judicial performance evaluation commission shall be composed of nine (9) members.
(2) The speaker of the senate shall appoint four (4) of the members, of whom one (1) shall be a state
court judge, two (2) shall be attorney members and one (1) shall be a non-attorney. No more than two
(2) of those appointed shall reside in the same grand division.
(3) The speaker of the house of representatives shall appoint four (4) of the members, of whom one
(1) shall be a state court judge, one (1) shall be an attorney, and two (2) shall be non-attorney members.
No more than two (2) of those appointed shall reside in the same grand division.
(4) The speaker of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives shall jointly appoint one
(1) state court judge.
(5) The supreme court's evaluation procedure may permit the judicial performance evaluation
commission to perform an evaluation with less than the full membership in panels, but the full
commission shall approve the evaluation.
(6) The appointing authorities for the judicial performance evaluation commission shall make
appointments that approximate the population of the state with respect to race and gender. In
appointing attorneys to the commission, the speakers shall receive, but shall not be bound by,
recommendations from any interested person or organization.
(7) To stagger the terms of judicial performance evaluation commission members, beginning July 1,
2009, the three (3) non-attorney members on the commission shall serve six-year transition terms, the
three (3) state court judges on the commission shall serve four-year transition terms, and the three (3)
attorney members on the commission shall serve two-year transition terms. At the conclusion of the
transition terms, each regular term of a commission member shall be six (6) years. A vacancy on the
commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment for the remainder of the
unexpired term.
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(8) No commission member shall serve more than two (2) terms, including any partial term.
(9) A member of the judicial performance evaluation commission is not eligible to seek an appellate
judgeship that becomes available as a result of, or related to, the commission's recommendation for
replacement of an incumbent appellate judge as set out in subsection (a).
(c) (1) The judicial performance evaluation program shall require publication and disclosure of a final
report. The final report shall not include any individual record or evaluation, but may include, for each
appellate judge, the individual final scores for the survey results. The final report shall be made available
for public inspection on the first Thursday in March preceding the regular August election. On the first
Sunday in July preceding the regular August election, the final report shall be published in a daily
newspaper of general circulation in the Tri-Cities area, Knoxville, Chattanooga, Nashville, Jackson and
Memphis. The final report for each appellate court judge may not exceed six hundred (600) words.
(2) As soon as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances, in order to assist the public in
electing the best qualified persons to the appellate courts, the commission shall cause supplemental
final reports to be published as may be necessitated by the filing of declarations of candidacy, required
by 17-4-114(a)(2) or 17-4-115(a)(2).
(d) The judicial performance evaluation program, including the public report and the ballot information,
shall apply to each appellate court judge who seeks to serve a complete term after July 1, 2009.
Tenn. Code Ann. 29-1-101 et seq (2013)
The provisions of this Code relating to injunctions, appointment of receivers, and other
extraordinary process, apply equally to equity proceedings in any court...
TCA 39-16-402. Official misconduct.
(a) A public servant commits an offense who, with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm
another, intentionally or knowingly:
(1) Commits an act relating to the servant's office or employment that constitutes an
unauthorized exercise of official power;
(2) Commits an act under color of office or employment that exceeds the servant's
official power;
(3) Refrains from performing a duty that is imposed by law or that is clearly inherent
in the nature of the public servant's office or employment;
(4) Violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or
(5) Receives any benefit not otherwise authorized by law.
(b) For purposes of subdivision (a)(2), a public servant commits an act under color of
office or employment who acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of the actual
or purported capacity.
(c) It is a defense to prosecution for this offense that the benefit involved was a trivial
benefit incidental to personal, professional or business contact, and involved no substantial risk of
undermining official impartiality.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class E felony.
(e) Charges for official misconduct may be brought only by indictment, presentment or
criminal information; provided, that nothing in this section shall deny a person from pursuing other
criminal charges by affidavit of complaint.
39-16-403. Official oppression.
(a) A public servant acting under color of office or employment commits an offense
who:
12
(1) Intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, stop, frisk,
halt, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment or lien when the public servant knows the conduct is
unlawful; or
(2) Intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right,
privilege, power or immunity, when the public servant knows the conduct is unlawful.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of office or
employment if the public servant acts, or purports to act, in an official capacity or takes advantage of
the actual or purported capacity.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class E felony.
(d) Charges for official oppression may be brought only by indictment, presentment or
criminal information; provided, that nothing in this section shall deny a person from pursuing other
criminal charges by affidavit of complaint.
SUPREME COURT Rule 6: Admission of Attorneys.
(4) Each applicant for admission shall take the following oath:
I, , do solemnly swear or affirm that I will support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, and that I will truly and honestly demean myself in the
practice of my profession to the best of my skill and abilities, so help me God.
SUPREME COURT Rule 27: Judicial Performance Evaluation Program.
Section 1. Statement of Purpose.
1.01. The work of Tennessee's appellate judges touches the lives of everyone who lives and works in
Tennessee. The quality of justice available in Tennessee's appellate courts hinges, in large measure, on
the performance of the judges who administer the system. Accordingly, the public, the bar, and the
judicial system have a vital interest in a responsive and respected appellate judiciary.
1.02. Tennessee's appellate judiciary consists of persons who strive to administer justice to the best of
their abilities and to discharge the duties of their offices impartially and efficiently. Tennessee's
appellate judges also share in common a commitment to improve their own judicial skills and to
improve the quality of justice administered by Tennessee's appellate courts.
1.03. Improving the administration of justice in Tennessee's appellate courts can best be accomplished
by instituting a program of continuous self-improvement that has the broad-based support of
Tennessee's appellate judges and attorneys and empowers the appellate judges, with the assistance of
their peers, to enhance and to broaden their own judicial skills.
1.04. The Tennessee General Assembly has enacted laws that establish a merit-based process for
selecting and retaining the members of Tennessee's three appellate courts. To promote informed
retention decisions, Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(c) requires the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission to publish reports concerning each appellate judge seeking election to an unexpired term or
election or reelection to a full eight-year term. In addition to its primary purpose of self-improvement,
the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program must provide information that will enable the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission to perform objective evaluations and to issue fair and accurate
reports concerning each appellate judge's performance.
1.05. In Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(a)(l), the Tennessee General Assembly has given the Tennessee
Supreme Court the responsibility to promulgate a rule establishing the judicial performance evaluation
program for appellate judges.
Section 2. Judicial Performance Evaluation Program.
2.01. In accordance with this Court's inherent supervisory authority over the court system and the
13
judges, and pursuant to Tenn. S. Ct. R. 11, Tenn. Code Ann. 16-3-501 and Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-
201(a)(1), there is hereby established a Judicial Performance Evaluation Program as part of the judicial
branch of state government.
2.02. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Program shall be administered by the Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission established by Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(b).
2.03. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission shall have the responsibility for the design, the
implementation, and the day-to-day operation of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program. The
Commission's decisions shall be consistent with this rule, and the Commission has no power to waive or
to modify any provision of this rule.
2.04. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission shall be administratively attached to the
Administrative Office of the Courts, but for all purposes other than administration, it shall be considered
independent of the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall
provide staff assistance to the Commission, and the Commission may, to the extent that funds are
available, retain other experts and consultants to assist with any part of its duties.
2.05. (a) All evaluations and final reports must be approved by the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission, but the Commission may, in its discretion, use panels to prepare interim or preliminary
reports or recommendations for consideration by the membership of the Commission.
(b) Five (5) members of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission shall constitute a quorum for
the transaction of any business to come before the Commission except for the final decision to
recommend the retention or replacement of an appellate judge. With regard to the recommendation to
retain or to replace an appellate judge, the quorum shall be seven (7) or more Commission members,
and the recommendation either to retain or to replace an appellate judge shall require the assent of five
(5) or more members.
(c) A Commission member who is unavoidably absent from any meeting of the Commission may
participate by teleconference or by video conference if these facilities are
reasonably available. Commission members participating by teleconference or video conference shall be
considered present for the purpose of establishing a quorum.
Section 3. Evaluation Criteria.
3.01. Appellate judges shall be evaluated based on the following specific criteria:
(A) Integrity. In addition to other appropriate performance measures, the Commission shall consider:
(1) avoidance of impropriety and appearance of impropriety;
(2) freedom from personal bias;
(3) ability to decide issues based on the law and the facts without regard to the identity of the parties or
counsel, or the popularity of the decision and without concern for or fear of criticism;
(4) impartiality of actions; and
(5) compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct contained in Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10.
(8) Knowledge and understanding of the law. In addition to other appropriate performance measures,
the Commission shall consider:
(1) understanding of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law;
(2) attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the court; and
14
(3) properapplicationofjudicialprecedentsand otherappropriatesourcesofauthority.
(C) Ability to communicate. In additiontootherappropriateperformancemeasures,theCommission
shall consider:
(1) clarityofbench rulings and otheroralcommunications;
(2) qualityofwrittenopinionswithspecificfocus on clarityand logic, andtheabilitytoexplain clearly
thefacts ofthecase andthelegal precedentsatissue; and
(3) sensitivitytotheimpactofdemeanorand othernonverbalcommunications.
(d) Preparation and attentiveness. In additiontootherappropriateperformancemeasures,the
Commissionshall consider:
(1)judicialtemperament,includingcourtesytoall parties and participants;and
(2) willingnesstopermiteveryperson legallyinterestedin aproceedingtobe heard, unless precluded
bylaworrules ofcourt.
(e) Service to the profession and the public. In additiontootherappropriateperformancemeasures,the
Commissionshall consider:
(1) efficientadministrationofcaseload;
(2) attendanceatand participationinjudicialand continuinglegal educationprograms;
(3) participationin organizationswhicharedevotedtoimprovingtheadministrationofjustice;
(4) effortstoensurethatthecourtis servingthepublicandthejusticesystemtothebestofits ability
and in such amanneras toinstillconfidence in thecourtsystem; and
(5) service in leadershippositionsand withintheorganizationsofthejudicialbranchofgovernment.
(f) Effectiveness in working with other judges and court personnel. In additiontootherappropriate
performancemeasures,theCommissionshall consider:
(1) exchangingideas and opinionswithotherjudgesduringthedecision-makingprocess;
(2) commentingontheworkofcolleagues;
(3) facilitatingtheperformanceoftheadministrativeresponsibilities ofotherjudges; and
(4) workingeffectivelywithcourtstaff.
Section 4.Evaluation ProcedureforAppellateJudges.
4.01.TheJudicial PerformanceEvaluation Programshall includetheregularevaluationofthe
performanceofappellatejudges.The evaluationsshall be carried outusingprofessionallyaccepted
methodstoprovideobjectiveand reliableevaluationsand toreducetheriskofunfairratings and
statisticalcomparisons. Evaluationsshall be based onsufficientdatatoensurethestatisticalreliabilityof
theevaluation information.
4.02. The Judicial PerformanceEvaluation Programforappellatejudges, in additiontobeingusedfor
self-improvementpurposes, shallalso be usedfortheevaluationrequiredofappellatejudgesseeking
electiontoan unexpiredtermorelectionorre-electiontoafulleight-yeartermunderTenn. Code Ann
17-4-201(b).
15
Section S. Evaluation Procedure for Appellate Judges for Retention Recommendations.
5.01. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission created by Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(b) shall
perform evaluations of all appellate judges seeking election to an unexpired term or relection or
reelection to a full eight (8) year term for the purpose of aiding the public in evaluating the performance
of the appellate judges in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
5.02. (a) The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission's evaluation shall be consistent with the
criteria in Section 3.01 and shall be based on the results of the evaluation surveys, on the personal
information contained in an approved self-reporting form, and on such other comments and
information as the Commission shall receive from any source.
(b) If, because of gubernatorial appointment, an appellate judge holds office less than one year before
the filing deadline of a declaration of candidacy for either an unexpired term or a full eight-year term,
and evaluation surveys are not available, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission shall conduct
an evaluation and make a retention recommendation using an approved self-reporting form, the judge's
application, and other reliable information.
5.03. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, or a panel thereof, shall conduct a public
interview with each appellate judge seeking election to an unexpired term
or re-election to a full eight-year term. The Commission's meetings and deliberations shall be public.
5.04. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission may accept, and in its discretion, may solicit
public comments concerning the performance of the appellate judges seeking election to an expired
term or election or re-election to a full eight-year term. The Commission shall provide each appellate
judge with a reasonable opportunity to respond to any information or comment received by the
Commission regarding that judge prior to the preparation of the Commission's evaluation of that judge.
5.0S. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission shall provide each appellate judge seeking
election to an unexpired term or election or re-election to a full eight-year term with a draft of its
evaluation and shall provide the appellate judge with a reasonable opportunity to comment or respond
either personally or in writing before the publication of the final report or supplemental report required
by Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(c).
5.06. The final public report or supplemental report required by Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4- 201(c) shall, at
the appellate judge's request, include the judge's response to the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission's evaluation. The judge's response, which shall be in addition to the Commission's report or
supplemental report, shall not exceed 600 words.
Section 6. Confidentiality.
6.01. Evaluations conducted as part of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program must be conducted
candidly and in strict confidence so that they may be based on reliable information and so that the areas
for improvement may be determined fairly. The disclosure of evaluation information other than in the
manner permitted by this rule or by Tenn. Code Ann. 17-4-201(c) would be counterproductive to the
goals of the performance program and would reduce the free flow of information and responses.
6.02. All records and information obtained and maintained by the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission concerning the performance of individual judges shall be strictly confidential and shall not
be disclosed except as provided by statute or this rule. The Commission shall ensure the confidentiality
of information regarding the performance of all judges and shall preserve the anonymity of all persons
who may be requested to furnish evaluation information.
16
6.03. Records and informationpertainingtotheperformanceand evaluationofjudgesshall notbe
disclosed exceptas follows:
(a) Onlytheindividualjudgebeingevaluatedand thepersonorpersonsselectedtopresentthedatato
thejudgeshall be permittedtoknowtowhichjudgeparticularinformationapplies.
(b)The Commission mayprovideaggregatestatisticalinformationthatdoes notidentifyspecificjudges
totheAdministrativeOfficeoftheCourts and theTennesseeJudicialConferenceforuse in the
developmentofjudicialeducation programs.
6.04. Except when publiclydisclosed in accordancewithSection 6.03, all information,questionnaires,
notes, memoranda,orotherdata declaredconfidential bythis ruleshall notbe admissibleas evidence,
nordiscoverablein anyactionofanykind in anycourtorbeforeanytribunal, board, agency, orpersons.
6.05. All records pertainingtoaparticularjudgemaintained bytheJudicial Performance Evaluation
Commissionshall be destroyedsix monthsafterthejudge'sdeathorretirement.The recordsshall not
be destroyed ifthejudgeappliesfororis certifiedas aseniorjudgein accordancewithTenn. CodeAnn.
17-2-302.
SUPREME COURT RulesofCivilProcedure:Rule 57: DeclaratoryJudgments.
The procedureforobtainingadeclaratoryjudgmentpursuanttoTennesseeCodeAnnotated,29-14-
101etseq.,shall be in accordancewiththeserules, andtherighttotrialbyjurymaybe demanded
underthecircumstancesand inthemannerprovidedin Rules 38and 39. Theexistenceofanother
adequateremedydoes notnecessarilyprecludeajudgmentfordeclaratoryreliefin cases whereitis
appropriate.Thecourtmayorderaspeedyhearingofan actionforadeclaratoryjudgmentand may
advance itonthecalendar.
SUPREME COURT RulesofCivil Procedure:Rule65.01:InjunctiveRelief.
Injunctivereliefmaybe obtained by (1) restrainingorder, (2) temporaryinjunction,or(3) permanent
injunctionin afinaljudgment.Arestrainingordershall onlyrestrictthedoingofan act.An injunction
may restrictormandatorilydirectthedoingofan act.
17
STH NOVEMBER 2013 TN REPORTS Interview with Lt Gov. Ron Ramsey
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-vNROSjK8s
Reporter: You hadindicatedearlierthatyouweren'tgoing to bedoingsimilarforthejudicialnomination
element.
Ramsey: ThatIwon'tberaisingmoneyforthem?
Reporter: Well...itsuggeststhat, basicallyyouweregoing to bedoingdifferentthings, Ithinkis theway
hephrasedit
Ramsey: Hal Well, IwillvoteforitbecauseIthinkthatitis betterthanitis now, butIhavebeenvery
openandupfrontaboutthefactthatIthinkthesystemwe havenowforappointingJudgesisthebest
way, butthatis notwhatis on theballot. Ido thinkthatwhatwe aredoing nowis againstthe
Constitution whereitissaystheJudgesshallbeelectedbythequalifiedvotersoftheState, theyshould
electedbythequalifiedvotersoftheState. So thatneedsto betakenout.
IfIhaddesignedthisamendmentandworkedtowardsthisamendmentitprobablywouldn'tbeexactly
likeitis rightnowIdo thinkIam giving upsomeoftheLegislativepowersto theGubernatorialpower,
butwillivoteforitin theend?Yes. BecauseIdo thinkthatwhatwe aredoing nowis unconstitutional.
Reporter: You don'tthinktheLegislaturewillhavemorepowergiven thattheycan thenrejectthe
nomineesespeciallyin somedistantday, a Democratis in theGovernor'soffice?
Ramsey: You couldlookat itthatway...... butseerightnowasSpeaker, speakingpersonallyaboutthis, I
geteightnominationsto theJudicial NominatingCommittee, theSpeakeroftheHouse getseight
nominationsso we helpcontroloratleastsetanactsin placethethreenamesaresentto thegovernor.
Andso, I'll behonest, I'llbeveryhappywith thatto makesurethatwe havegoodconservativejudges
thatwantto interpretthelawandnotmakethelawandIthinkthatifwe listen to thejudgesthatcome
throughourJudicial NominatingCommission thelastcoupleofyearsin particular, in thelastyearin
particular, Ithinkthey'vebeenverygood, qualifiedpeople. Andbefore, whilewe'reonthatsubject, the
other... theselectioncommissionthatwastherebeforethenominatingcommissionactuallyplayed
gameswith this, we allknowthis, thatJimmyNaifeh wouldpickouttheonehewantedandsendone
goodoneandtwobadones. AndIdon'tdo thatandI sendthemthreegoodones. For examplewhen
thelastAppellateCourtwasthereornextto lastnowIsuppose, Mike Falk wason thatpanelbutthere
werethreeortwootherpeoplewithhimandheendedup notgetting there. So we sentthreegood
peopleto theGovernoreverytime.
Reporter: IfTennessee votersrejecttheconstitutionalamendmentonjudicialselection wouldyou
supportanylegislationlike thatwouldmakeitthelawofthelandwhentheConstitutionsaysthatjudges
needtheSupremeCourtandAppellateCourtjudgesneedtobeelected?
Ramsey: You know, as I'vesaidbeforeI've gonethroughastatewideelection, Iknowwhatittakesto
run thosecampaigns, reallyallyou'redoingisraising moneythewholetime, that'snotsomethingthatI
feelthejudgesneedto do, so Idon'tthinkthat'sthebestwayofdoingit. Ithinkifthatwouldfailonthe
ballotI'd worktowardanotherwayof makingwhatwe'redoingnowconstitutional.
Reporter: The constitutionalamendmentsortof leavesopen whetherthereshouldbeajudicial
evaluationcommissionthatjustsaysretentionelectionsuhandthat'sin winddownnow, do you
anticipaterenewing that?
18
Ramsey: I do. I think that's something I'd really want to do when we come back in. Of course the
governor renewed it but just by executive order.
Reporter: No, no that's the nominating commission.
Ramsey: ... evaluation commission. I'm sorry I was not listening closely.
Reporter: But I will admit, I was going to ask the other one too.
Ramsey: Okay...
Laughing. ...
Ramsey: I was not listening closely. We were talking about this. So I'm sorry. You got the jpeg ... I
think both ought to be reinstituted but it'll be done in a different fashion. Even though I think for the first
time in the history of the performance evaluation commission they'd just reject three candidates that
they felt weren't doing their job. That's what they're supposed to be doing. And I understand there's a
campaign now maybe put one of those others back on. And I don't agree with that. Why was he not
good week before last and then they get ten phone calls and suddenly he's good again? And so, just do
your job, evaluate logically and fairly as they think they did when they went through there and don't let
political pressure force you to put somebody back.
Reporter: When you say that you would like to see all three of those judges depart?
Ramsey: Yeah, yes . . .absolutely. Because I mean they know if the performance evaluation commission
says they aren't doing their job, let me assure they are doing their job. Cause it takes a lot for them to
say no. As a matter offact I think that these are the first three that were rejected in the history of the
performance evaluation commission. So yes I'd like tosee all three of them . ..um, weill don't want to
say, let's put it this way, if they don't resign then they'd be in a contested election and if I had the
opportunity to vote for them I would vote no.
Reporter: On the nominating commission when you said that we sent up quality nominations did you
lobby the commission to send up particular people?
Ramsey: There are times that I talked to my commissioners that and said that I think that these are
qualified people and make up your own mind. Yes, I mean I would . ...I'd be less than honest if I didn't
call and say I served with Mike Falk, a good honest guy, hard working legislator, a great guy, I think he'd
make a great judge. Rob Montgomery in my area, has been friends of mine literally since high school,
talk about a great guy and a good honest family man, great judge, yes. If they would ask my opinion I
will tell them even sometimes when they didn't ask my opinion, yes I would tell them. Honestly I didn't
get a vote, but I wasn't bashful about telling somebody when I thought they were a good judge. I don't
see anything wrong with that. And in both cases, well Mike Falk makes two times, but the judge agreed
with me. And I do think honestly that the first time around the Appellate Court you don't start in the
major leagues and Mike had never been a lower court judge, I think he would have been an excellent
Appellate Court judge when you look at the qualifications of the three that went up, the governor made
the right choice there too.
19
TranscriptexcerptStaceyCampfieldInterviewwithLt. GovernorRon Ramseyregardingjudicial
retention/electionanditsconstitutionality
Posted:www.youtube.com
August 12th 2009
Campfield:
Obviously there is a move on topopularly elect instead ...
Do you support the people being able tovote popularly elected Supreme Court Justices, not a yes / no
vote but Joe Smith is running against Ben Smith, You know whoever, you know
Do you support popularly electing Supreme Court justices?
Ramsey:
Iwillbe honest, Ihavegonebackandforthon this.
Right now, ifyou noticedIam leadingthechargetochangethewaywedothis. It'sbeen alloverthe
newspapersthelastweekortwo.It'seven beingcalledtheRamsey plan. Becausethewayweare doing
itrightnowis absolutelywrong.
This willtake mejustafewminutestoexplainthis. Itis kind oftwoseparate issues. Issue numberone.
Howdowe appointavacancyofSupremeCourtJusticeorifan AppellateCourtJustice resigns orretires
orremovesfrom office?
Underthecurrentsystem,wehavewhat'scalled theJudicialSelection Commission. Seventeen
attorneys,wellactuallyfifteenoutofseventeen let's be accurateaboutit. Fifteen outofseventeen
attorneyssiton apanel. Ifyouwanttogoyou havetoapplytothis panel, aselfperpetuatingboard,
whodecideswhotheirnextmemberis. I'vehad toappointthese, Iknow.
And then,theysend upalistofthreetothegovernormeetbehind closed doorsand dothat.Iam
adamantlyopposedtothat.
For120yearstheGovernorgottopickwhoeverhe wantedtogo on duringavacancy. Butwhen
Winfield Dunngotelected backin 1971theycameupwiththisJudicialSelection Commission.
Thatsays seventeenattorneys knowbetterthanthepeopleofStateofTennesseethatelectedthe
Governor. Iam adamantlyopposedtothat. Nowthat'stheissue ofhowyou putonan appointment.
Nowwhatdoyou dofromthere?
And Ican say IhavestruggledwiththisIhave prayed aboutthisand Ihavethoughtaboutthisand things
changedfrom 1870to2009.
Do wereallywantSupremeCourtJusticerunningin contested electionswhereyou havetoraise millions
ofdollarsand tobe honestwhowins?Imean, Iwantconservativejudgesonthebench. Now,trial
lawyers have provenand Ihavetriedtostudythisissuethattheywillfundthese. Because, ittakes
millionsofdollarstorun astatewideelections.
So, in myopiniontheidealsituation is wedoawaywiththeJudicialSelection Commission. Hopefully,
electan Republican Governornexttimegetsomeconservativejudgesin there.
Then we'regoingtoputupaconstitutionalamendment.ButthereisonethingIabsolutelypositively
believethatwhatwearedoingrightnowis unconstitutional.
20

Our constitution says quote. Be IIJudges shall elected by the qualified voters of the state. II They are
not. NowIn 1973ourStateSupremeCourt, in adecision,thatin myopiniontheywrotetheback page of
thedecisionfirstthenfiguredouthowtofill itin and makeitwork.They have declaredthatthis
retentionballotis Constitutional. Man,if you can say that Stacey, you can say anything's
Constitutional. Elected by the qualified voters of the state, how much plainer does it get?
So whatdowedo?We putaConstitutionalamendmenttothepeople.That'swhatIam doing,
promotingrightnowIdon'tknowhowfarweregettingwiththis. Because oftheHouse,tobe honest, I
can pass itin theSenate.This is goingtobetheissue in thenextfewweeks intheLegislature in my
opinion.So, weputaConstitutional amendmentuptothe peopleand changeafewthingsin that
Constitutionalamendment.
Numberone:
Assumingthatitdoesn'tpass, ifdoesn'tpass toallowthepeopletovoteand westill havetheretention
ballotweregoingtaketheirtermsfrom8years backto4years. Because, thatwayifthataJudge makes
somecrazydecisionyou don'thavetowaitseven maybe7yearstovotethemoutofoffice. Insteadof
yes/noon theballotIprefertohave retain/reject.Thattells peoplewhattheyare reallyreallydoing.
Nowthere'sgoingtobe somethat'sgoingsay, "votethisconstitutionalamendmentdown."That makes
whatwe'redoingConstitutionaltherefore,wepopularlyelectJudges Ican understandthatsideofitI
reallycan.
But Ihavesetand studied aboutthisandthoughtaboutthis,this is whatIhave deliberatedmorethan
anythingelse in theLegislaturethisyearand Ihavecometotheconclusionthatwedon'tnecessarily
wantSupremeCourtJustices runningstatewidein expensivecontestedelections. ButIthink
thatconservatives lose on thatbuttogowithaconstitutionalamendmentthatI'd have.
Thatwillcuttheirtermsbackto4yearand have retain/rejecton theballotas Isaythis is notsomething
you can explain intwominutes. Itis atough issue. Itis atough,tough issue.
And Idon'thaveaproblemwithpeoplesayingweneed topopularlyelectjudges. ButIam goingtotell
you, lookatwhatyou'redoing?Whatis yourgoalwhatis yourgoal?
Imean, doyou wanttogetconservativejudges elected,orjusttheprincipleofthings, becauseyou lose
on theprincipleofthings. ButIdobelievefromthebottomofmyheartthatwegotelected,Staceyyou
gotelected, I got elected, held up your right hand that I am going to uphold the Constitution of the
State of Tennessee and I can't in good conscience sit there and do this knowing in my opinion it's
unconstitutional.
You can haveadozen attorneyswalkin hereand arguethatitis
Simply, because theSupremeCourtsaid itwas and Igetthatside ofit. ButtheSupremeCourtdidn'tdo
it, by the ways itwas a special panel thatthey appointed. Once again this is an issue I am passionate
about. Because this you and Iboth knowthatjudges. You and Ican pass any lawwewanttoand it'd be
what we think is the best law in the world and it'd go to ajudge and they'dstrike it down so. The
judicial branch is justas importantas theLegislative and executive branch.
21

John Jay Hooker
115 Woodmont Blvd
Nashville TN 37205
V.615-269-6558
c. 615-479-6531
johnjayhooker@hpeprint.com
December 4,2013
David Haines, Esq. corrected letter
General Counsel Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission
E-mail: DHaines@tncourts.gov,
David .haines@tncourts,com
Dear Mr Haines:
I am writing to request that you advise all the members of the judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission that as a litigant in the case of, In Re: John Jay Hooker, before the Supreme Court, I would
like to have an opportunity to personally appear before the Commission on Friday December 6th or
anytime thereafter before the Commission makes its final evaluation at a time convenient to the
Commission here or at any other location, regarding whether or not the Supreme Court Judges should
be Retention-Elected. Respectfully, I believe that I and other citizens who have grievances towards
various judges, for various reasons, have a constitutional right to be heard under Article I 1, Article I
23, Article XI 16, (see addendum), to reform the Government.
In my opinion the members of the Supreme Court should not be Retention-Elected as a
consequence of the decision in the aforesaid case. Based on my personal knowledge under my
attorney's oath I want to inform the commission that the five members of the Supreme Court, in my
case, in accordance with the Commission's evaluation criteria, set out in Supreme Court Rule 27 3.01
showed a lack of integrity, were guilty of impropriety, personal bias, and did not decide the case based
on the law and the facts. They were not impartial and they did not comply with the Code of judicial
Conduct, regarding a Judge's duty to recuse if an objective person would question the impartiality of
the Judge, Supreme Court Rule 1 O-Rule 2.11 (a), Disqualification.
The objection that I have regarding all five members of the Supreme Court, who declined to
"disqualify" themselves in the, In Re: Hooker, case is based on the fact that the members of the Court
had an "interest" in the subject matter of a Motion in that case. Nonetheless, the members of the Court
declined to "disqualify" themselves under Article VI 11 and therefore acted without jurisdiction. While
they denied my Motion to disqualify for their own benefit, in In Re: Hooker, claiming that a litigant
cannot challenge the manner by which Judges are elected, the Court reversed itself on that issue in the
case of John Jay Hooker vs. Governor Haslam pending before the Special Supreme Court.
Under our Constitution, every litigant is entitled to "Due Process of Law" and this litigant was
deprived of "Due Process of Law," because the Members of the Court were manifestly "prejudiced"
against this lawyer, (they unlawfully suspended my law license for 30 days), because of my long efforts
in the Courts, before the Legislature and in public forums, sometimes, reported in various newspapers, to
get the Retention-Election Statute declared "unconstitutional"
I sought relief in the public interest on behalf of the qualified voters of the State or district,
because the Retention-Election Statute provides for the "appointment" of Judges by the Governor
when the Constitution specifically provides that "Judges shall be elected by the qualified voters."
May I suggest that the file in the, In Re: Hooker case should be procured by the Commission.
The file will reveal the totality of my claims. My claim includes the fact that the Court put down an order
prohibiting me from filing any further papers in that case, which order is still effective as of this day
22
12-04-2013JJH toDavid Haines&JPEC
and therefore Irequestthe Commission to askthe Clerk ofthe Appellate Court, Mr. Michael Catalano to
have the file made available to the Commission. The order depriving this litigant of the right to file
papers in that case was and is blatantly unconstitutional. Furthermore, that Order was put down for
the benefitofthe Membersofthe Court, andforthe purposeofharmingthis lawyer. Consequently, that
Order deprived this litigant ofmy constitutional rightto access to an open court, (see attached letter
from the Clerk).
That action violated the Official Misconduct statute, for which technically the Judges were
subjectto criminal liability. Simply putthe membersoftheSupremeCourt, who decided mycase, were
guilty ofan abuseofpowerfortheirown benefit, in an effortto deprivethis lawyerofmy Constitutional
right to request said Judges to disqualify themselves. The fact is these Judges declined to do so
becausetheywere prejudiced against me for my efforts to remove them office. Furthermore, these self
serving Judgesdeclined to do so in orderto keepthis lawyerfrom challenging the constitutionality ofthe
Act underwhichtheywereappointed.
However, subsequentlythe membersoftheCourtin the case ofJohnJayHookervs. Governor
Haslam, did recusethemselves on the basisthatthey had an interestin the subjectmatterofthe case,
which interestwas the same interest, the Judges had when they declined to disqualifythemselves in
the disciplinary case. The result was, they suspended this lawyer's law license in, In Re: Hooker, when
under the decision in the Hooker vs. Haslam case, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to do so.
That conduct proves said Judges should not be Retention elected, and should be put in situation where
they haveto answerin public, in acontestedelection,which is theessenceofselfgovernment.
The reason Iaskthe Commission to procurethe file, In Re: Hooker, is that Ihave received the
attached letter this week, from the Clerk, which reflects that the members of the Court have again
violated my constitutional rights to file amotion in that case, in an effortforthis lawyerto bring the file to
this Commission. Judges have no rightto prohibitany litigantfrom filing papersin an effortto supportthe
Constitution. Hopefully, the Commission will make a publicinquiryofthe Judges as to why, when they
could appear to be prejudiced against this lawyer, when they had an interest in the subject matter of
the case, did they suspend my law license and deprive me of my Constitutional right to contest it, by
filing furtherpapers in thatcase.
Thankyou sir, in advance, for requesting the Commission to give me an opportunityto be heard
in accordance with the constitutional rights ofthose who desireto seek redress ofgrievances under
Article I23. Iwould like do so on Friday December6
th
ifpossible, or in the alternative thereafter at the
convenienceoftheCommission atanylocationoftheCommission'schoice.
So thatIcan complywith theform usuallyemployed bytheevaluation process, please send me
a copy of the survey form that others who have responded to inquiries by the Commission have
received. Incidentally, notwithstandingthefactthat Ihad the aforesaid case beforethe SupremeCourt, I
did not receive any inquiry from the commission to which I could have responded setting out my
complaint.
Permitmeto saywith greatsincerity, undermyattorney'soaththat Ihave afirm beliefthatthe
all members ofthe regular Supreme Court are "notfit" to be retention elected because they abused
theirpowerfortheirown benefitand to harm alawyerthatthey are prejudicedagainstfor challenging
theirjurisdictionand themannerbywhichtheywereappointedand subsequentlyretention-elected.
Thanksforyourassistance: /s/JohnJayHooker
cc: Distributedtothe Press and tothe RegularMembersofthe SupremeCourt
Lt. GovernorRon Ramsey/Speaker8eth Harwell
23
12-04-2013JJH to David Haines & JPEC corrected letter
Addendum
ARTICLE I.
Declaration of Rights
Section 1. That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of those ends they have at all times, an
unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think
proper.
Section 23. That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good, to
instruct their representatives, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of
grievances, or other proper purposes, by address of remonstrance.
ARTICLE VI
Section 11. No judge of the Supreme or Inferior Courts shall preside on the trial of any cause in the event of which
he may be interested, or where either of the parties shall be connected with him by affinity of consanguinity, within
such degrees as may be prescribed by law, or in which he may have been of counsel , or in which he may have
presided in any Inferior Court, except by consent of all the parties. In case all or any of the judges of the Supreme
Court shall thus be disqualified from presiding on the trial of any cause or causes, the court or the judges thereof,
shall certify the same to the governor of the state, and he shall forthwith specially commission the requisite number
of men, of law knowledge, for the trial and determination thereof. The Legislature may by general laws make
provision that special judges may be appointed, to hold any courts the judge of which shall be unable or fail to
attend or sit; or to hear any cause in which the judge may be incompetent.
ARTICLE XI
Section 16. The declaration of rights hereto prefixed is declared to be a part of the Constitution of the state, and
shall never be violated on any pretense whatever. And to guard against transgression of the high powers we have
delegated, we declare that everything in the bill of rights contained, is excepted
out of the general powers of the government, and shall forever remain inviolate.
TN Supreme Court Rules
Rule 27 Section 3. Evaluation Criteria
3.01. Appellate judges shall be evaluated based on the following specific criteria:
(A) Integrity. In addition to other appropriate performance measures, the Commission shall consider:
(1) avoidance of impropriety and appearance of impropriety;
(2) freedom from personal bias;
(3) ability to decide issues based on the law and the facts without regard to the identity of the parties or
counsel, or the popularity of the decision and without concern for or fear of criticism;
(4) impartiality of actions; and
(5) compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct contained in Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10.
Supreme Court Rule: 1 O-Rule 2.11 (a) Disqualification A Judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the Judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ...
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OII'1L' r. 0,
SUPREME CUIJR!'
CLERK Or: THE COtJRTS
COUIHOF ApPEAL.S
STxrEOF 'l'EN:-fESSEE
;\IICIIAELW CATALANO
COURT Or: CRIMINAL ApPL.'\I.S
November27, 2013
JohnJay Hooker
115 vVoodmont Blvd.
Apt. 622
Nashville, TN 37205
Re: inreJohnJayHooker
M2009-01498-SC-OT-cV
DearMr. Hooker:
This Ictteris to confirm that you requested to eithercheckoutto you orprovideto t h ~
.Judicial Pert<:)l'mance Evaluation Commission the original file ofthe "appellatecourt filings'" in
the above-styled case. As1indicatedto you, onceacase is closed,a motion mllsr be made to
checkoutaclosed file. Ifllrther remindedy O ~ thatthe Suprenlc Courton July21. 2010 entered
un order in the above-styledcasestatingthat"theAppellateCourtClerk is directedto declineany
further filings in thisInatterby the Respondent:' rhave been instructedthat if you \\:ish to
submit amotionto checkoutthisclosedfile. it will be lodged wjth the Court for adetermination
as to whetherthe 111otion will be filed and acted upon.
Finally, ifyou wish for this Office to copy the tile orany portion thereof. we \vill do so at
acost 0[$1.00perpagepursuantto T.C.A. ~ 8-21-501.
Michael W. Catalano
Appellate CourtClerk
CHIEFDEPUTYCLERKS:
JOANNE NEWSOME.EASTERNDIVISION LISAMARSH.1vllDDLE DIV1StON SUSANTURNER,WESTERN DIVISION
SUPREME COURTBUilDING SUPREME COURT BUILDING SUPREMECOURT BUILDING
POBOX444 401 SEVENTHAVENUENORTH POBOX009
KNOXVILLE TN 37902 NASHVILLE, fN37219 1407 JACKSON TN 383010,)09
(423) 594-6700 (615) 2531 470 (901) 423-5840
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November 27, 2013
Mr. David Haines
Generai Council
Administrative Office of the Courts
Nashville City Center, Suite 600
511 Union Street
Nashville, TN 37219
Phone: (615) 741-2687
Fax: (61S) 741-6285
E-mail: david.haines@tncourts.gov
Dear Mr. Haines:
t am writing to you as the general counsel ofthe Tennessee Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission.
I would like to be heard in person and be permitted to submit papers regarding the fitness of the
members of the Supreme Court to be recommended for retention election by the commission.
I would like to attend the meeting on Friday December 6th at which time I would also like to have the
opportunity to appear concerning both the performance of each of the Supreme Court Judges who took
part in a matter I had before the Supreme Court and to address the unconstitutional position of the
commission. Specifically, I feel that the members ofthe Supreme Court should not be recommended for
Retention-Election by the commission.
In my case, the members of the court refused to accept and admit their disqualification;
notwithstanding my Constitutional Right under Article VI, Section 11 to seek their disqualification on the
basis that they IImay be interested" and in fact were and are interested, in whether or not the retention
election statute is unconstitutional, as I claim that it is.
In essence, my claim is that the members of the Supreme Court were constitutionally "disqualified" in
my case as the result of the fact that I challenged the manner in which they had been elected, claiming
that the Retention Election Statute is which situation iIIegitimates their jurisdiction.
However; unfortunately, the members of the Supreme Court declined to accept the fact that because
they lido in fact have an interest in the subject matter of my motion", that they were and are objectively
"disqualified", Their violation of the timeless prindples of recusal and disqualification, which principles
rightfully described in our states constitution requird their certification to our governor of their
objective disqualification as no man, not even a sitting member of our states supreme court, can be a
judge in their own case; sadly, they declined to do so, violating this time honored principle, our states
constitution, and consequently their sWorn oaths of office.
26
I feel it myduty on behalf of myself and other litigants who have been likewise mistreated by the
Supreme Court tosay to this commission that for the same reason that the Lieutenant Governor and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, who together or individually appointed each of your
commissions, that I am convinced, as are they, that the retention election statute, which statute
substitutes an appointment by the Governor for an election by the people, is unconstitutional.
Therefore; there can be no lawful appointments to aJudicial Performance Evaluation Commission with
any authority to say who canor who cannot beretention elected, as the Retention Elections Statute,
which stqtute violates th.e constitution; gives rise, unconstitutionally; regardless of each members
honorable intentions, to the usurpations of this committee of the citizens right to vote for all of their
judges in contested elections as required by the plain language of our constitution.
The fact is; the qualified voters of this state and/or of the districts of this state are entitled to vote in a
popular election for all of their Judges under Article VI, sections 3 and 4. Therefore; I feel I have a duty
in an effort to "reform" the government, under article section 1, to seek redress of grievances and I
have a right under Article II Section 23to seek relief asa voter, from the members ofthis commission as
I desire to vote,asdo other citizens, in a popular election for these or other constitutionally qualified
judges in August of 2014;therefore, avoiding these continued abuses of Tennessee's citizens due
process and voting rights.
I look forward to the opportunity to address your committee in person.


Afriend of theConstitution
30East Ct.
Greeneville, TN 37745
Ph: 423-823-0157
Fax:866-366-0043
waltbrumit@aol.com
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