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G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010 JUSTINA M. MANIEBO, Petitioner, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents. FACTS: Justina M. Maniebo was issued a promotional appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she appeared to posses the qualifications for the position. But when the CSC Regional Office No. IV verified her name against the Masterlist of Eligibles, she was found out to have actually failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only 60%. She was then charged with possessing of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty after having indicated in her Personal Data Sheet that she had passed the CSC (professional) examination with a rating of 74.01%. ISSUES: Whether the CSC committed grave error in not considering good faith on the report of the petitioner in the determination of the appealed decision; Whether the CSC was correct in imposing the penalty of dismissal in view of the circumstances obtaining in the case; Whether the court of appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the petitioner for review for failure to attached certified copy of the annexes when the rules and jurisprudence do not require that all annexes attached to the petition should be certified; and Whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition based on alleged technicality which was not sanctioned by jurisprudence. HELD: Under Rule 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 197, dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense. The use of a false certificate constitutes an act of dishonesty under Civil Service rules and the act of making a false statement in the personal data sheet renders a person administratively liable for falsification. Petitioner in her motion for reconsideration had failed to submit the required certified copies of the material portions with the prescribed period of 10 days due to failure to turn over said

copies to her counsel because of far distance of her home in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro to the office of her counsel in Fairview, Quezon City. Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or at that questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice. Petitioner has no basis in her contention that she could still be deemed to have acquired eligibility by operation of law under the terms of R.A. No. 6850, a law granting civil service eligibility to employees efficiently serving the Government for at least seven years; that she was already a civil service eligible as of February 8, 1990, the date of approval of the law, and was no longer dismiss from the civil service by then; and any defect in her appointment as a permanent government employee was cured by her acquisition of eligibility in 1990. R.A. No. 6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very beginning for being based on a false representation of eligibility, like that of the petitioner. A contrary construction of the statute will, in effect, reward dishonesty.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, Petitioner, vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, Respondents. FACTS: Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. No marriage came, hence an action for breach of promise to marry. ISSUE: Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case? HELD: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Now, if someone promises or agrees to marry his or her lover, and at the last minute backs out on the promise, will it constitute as an actionable wrong? The answer is no. but one can sue for recovery of actual damages, like wedding expenses, therefore legally; a demand for specific performance is simply out of the question-being tantamount to involuntary servitude. Our laws do not provide for specific reliefs for cases arising purely from a breach of ones promise to marry another. Although, there was supposed to be a chapter on breach of promise to marry proposed by the Code Commission but it was deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently because of lessons from other countries, that action readily lends itself to abuse bu

designing women and unscrupulous men (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949, 2352). However, the Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages not so much on the breach of promise but of the fraud or deceit and the consequent pain and humiliation suffered. This is pursuant to Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.