Military Review

May 1978
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Published by
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Deputy Commandant
Colonel Edward M Bradford. Ed,tor In Chief
EDITORIAL STAFF: L,eutenant Colonel Joseph E Burlas.
AssIstant Editor. LIeutenant Colonel Rafael Martmez-
Boucher. Spanlsh-Ameflcan Editor, Lieutenant Colonel
Jamie W Walton, Features Editor
PRODUCTION STAFF Ms D''''e R Dommguel Produr;t,on fdllof Mr Jerome F
Sctoppte An and Desrgn Mr ArnO'> W Galla ..... a.,. PublicatIon Ofbcer
CIRCULATION Major A R Bundon& Manag,ng Ed,lor Sergeant F,rst Class fell"
A Aguoldr Adm,n,srri1tllle  
EX OFFICIO General Donn A. Starr'f Commdnder TraInIng and Doctnne
ComTTland L ,eulPr,ant GenNal J R Thurman Cort'!mandef CombmerJ Arms
Center Major General Homer D Sm,th Commander LogistiCS Center Malar
General Wolham l MundIe Commander Administration Center Malor General
Henry 'Vlohr Clllef US Afmy Reserlte Major General LaVern E Web91 Chief
Nar·oniJ/ Guard BUfeau Malor Glonerill Lou'S G Mpnetrey Deputy Com
mander Combmed Combat    
ACTiVE Colonel V M Robertson Jr Department of raCfiCs Colonel T E Blagg
Department of Command COlonel H r MIddleton Department of Resource
Management Colonel A A ManIon Department of Un,fled and Combined
OperatIOns Dr Ivtln J Blrrer D"ectof Graduate Degree Prog/am Dr K Jack
Bauer John F MaTTIson Chalf of Military H'Slor,; Colonel Carl Acree Nat,onaf
Guard Bureau Mt Ao" Roo! Oll,ce of the ChIef Army Reserve COlonel Vv S
Bayer Comb,ned .Ilrm.s Combat Development Acr,vrty Malor Vv J Chantelau
Adm,n'stTat,on Center L.eutenant Colonel K 5 Cropsey CombIned .Illms
Traln,ng Developments Act,v,ty Mal or C W McinniS Log's(Jcs Center Colonel
Har,.,. A Healh FOlcPs Command
Military Review
by General Donn A. Starry. US Army
by Lieutenant Colonel James B. Channon. US Army
by Captam John F. Rybicki. US Army
NO 5
by Wmg Commander Maharaj K Chopra. Indian Atr Force. Retired
by Colonel John C. Gazlay. US Army
by Brigadier General Edwm F. Black. US Army. Rettred
and S T Cohen
by Lieutenant Colonel Frank C. Allen. US Army
by Lieutenant Colonel Joel E. L. Roberts. US Army
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Military Review
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Military Review
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort leavenworth, Kansas 66027
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Established to recognize outstandmg US Army leaders Who have served at Fort Leavenworth' and who have
made a significant contribution
Colonel Arthur Lockwood Wagner 5 May 1978
Arthur L. Wagner was considered one of the foremost military strategists and writers of his
time. The recorded hIstory of the Army school system contains abundant evidence of the results
of his years of devoted service as military theonst and committed educator
He was born on 16 March 1853 in the small village of Ottawa In southern Illinois and graduated
from the US Mlhtary Academy in 1875. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 6th
Infantry, Wagner was assigned to the Indian frontier from 1876 to 188!. He served with his
regiment in the Dakotas, Montana, Colorado and Utah in the Sioux and Ute campaigns.
In 1882, Wagner was assigned as professor of military science and tactics at East Florida
Seminary where he penned his prize-winning essay "The Mlhtary NecessIties of the United
States and the Best Provision. for Meeting Them." The essay brought Wagner deserved
recognition and sparked some needed reforms.
He was assigned to Fort Leavenworth as an Instructor In the Department of Military Art,
School for Application of Infantry and Cavalry, in November 1886. He remained at the school
for II years and, according to Colonel W. A. Ganoe, author of "The History of the United
States Army," became the Sylvanus Thayer of the general service schools. Wagner was an adept
instructor and authored many mlhtary writings which for years remamed the keystone of
instructional material at Fort Leavenworth.
In April 1897, he was assigned as chief of the War bepartment Division of Information. By this
time, his reputation for excellence and achievement had become WIdespread. At the outbreak of
the Spanish-American War, he was shuttled from one trouble spot to another in an effort to
place him, as a leading authority on tactics, in the best position to help influence the outcome of
the war.
After serving on the Army staff, he became adjutant general of the Department of Dakota and
then spent two years in the Philippines. Upon hIS return, Wagner served as adjutant general,
Department of the Lakes, in Chicago until November 1903 when he returned to Fort
Leavenworth as assistant commandant. However, in January 1904, he was called to Washington
to become the director of the Army War College. He was serving in this capacity when he died
in June 1905.
DOD 314
,_   j ~ I KOLLE D
15 FEB 78
If the American soldier is going to fight and win on tomorrow's battle-
field, leadership and training must be sergeants' business. The new
Soldiers' Manual, Skill Qualification Tests and Army Training and
Evaluation Programs are designed to improve training and soldier skills,
but, unless the NCO corps takes the lead in conducting training, the
system will not work. Training develops both leader and soldier skills,
and today's NCO is a trainer in peacetime and a small unit leader in
combat. From the first-lin" supervisor to the sergeant major, each NCO
must be proficient in his own area and those of his subordinates, be able
to teach job skills, test proficiency and evaluate the results. This is the
challen!(e of "ser!(eants' business."
General Donn A. Starry, US Army
ITH the proliferation of ~ s   lists, Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs)
and Army Training and Evaluation Programs in the Army training
system, there has been a significant change in the responsibility for
individual training of our soldiers. That change, the need for it and its
effect on the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps is what I call
serpeants' business.
lhls article IS a condensed version at an address made by General Starry on 3 November 1977 at
the US Army Sergeants Malor Academy, Fort Bliss, tex
In order to explain what sergeants' business is, and why it is
important, we must look back a bit. For some years, armor branch has
used Frederick Remington's painting of the cavalry soldier as a symbol.
To some, he represents the traditions of the old cavalry. To many others,
he symbolizes the Army noncommissioned officer corps. Almost everyone
calls him "Old Bill." In Mr. Remington's eyes, he epitomized the old line
sergeant of cavalry. I would like to talk about that sergeant-not the man
himself, but of his image as the highly professional NCO-and what has
happened to him in our Army since I joined it as a second lieutenant in
My first platoon sergeant was always very respectful toward me, but it
was clear to me that his job, as he saw it, was to train his platoon leader.
He was not alone; our entire battalion was composed of sergeants like
him. They had fought World War II as sergeants, and some of them had
even been officers. They had survived lots of rigorous training for war,
and then war itself-most had done very well.
Every tank commander in the first platoon I commanded had been a
tank platoon sergeant in the war. Every platoon sergeant in our battalion
took the attitude that it was his job to make sure his lieutenant was the
best platoon leader in the battalion. There was a competition among
platoon sergeants as to who had the most proficient lieutenant.
They had the same attitude about individual training of soldiers in
their platoons. They never wasted a minute that could be used to train the
soldiers, whether on ranges or in garrison. Every occasion was a teaching
opportunity that could be used to improve soldiers' skills. It was the most
-effective training situation I have ever seen.
Now, for the most part, our sergeants are not doing that sort of work
anymore, and 1, for one, wonder why. What happened? Looking back, the
story might go like this.
As World War II opened, we had a corps of very well-trained NCOs.
They became the cadre for training the new NCOs-the draftees who
General Donn A Starry tS commander, US Army
Tramlllg and Doctrme Command. He recewed a B.S. from
the USMA. an MS. from George Washmgton Unwerslty
and IS a graduate of the USACGSC, the Armed Forces
Staff College and the Army War College. He has served as
dzrector of the OperatLOns Dzrectorate In the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Mdltary OperatIOns, commanded
the I Ith Armored Cavalry RegIment during one of three
tours in Vletnam and was commander of V Corps, US
Army. Europe, prior to becoming TRADOC commander,
became sergeants as our Army expanded. They imparted to the new
NCOs the best of what they themselves had learned about NCO responsi-
bilities. The prewar   served in the war as platoon sergeants or as
acting platoon leaders if they did not get a commission. They were the
leaders of our small units during the war. I believe that NCO system
pretty much survived through the Korean War.
When I commanded a battalion in the early 1960s, we still had many
sergeants like that. Not quite as many as before, but the system was not
so far gone that we could not reconstruct it with a little training for the
sergeants. It was pretty satisfactory as I recollect it. The long years of
Vietnam wiped that system out and dissipated the experience of our
noncommissioned officer corps-especially at the junior levels. Promo-
tions, 20-year retirements and many other factors combined to make it
happen. And so we find ourselves today having to rebuild our NCO corps,
particularly at the E5, E6 and E7 levels. We may never recreate those wise
old sergeants of the 1940s and 1950s. We may never have that much
longtime experience again. But somehow we must regain enough of the
kind of thing they were doing, for their officers as well as for their
soldiers, to restore the high professional quality of the noncommissioned
officer corps.
Associated with this is another problem. Sergeants frequently say that
NCO authority has been taken away, but no one has removed any NCO
responsibilities. Sergeants are supposed to be doing the same things, and
even more of those things than ever before, yet they have not been given
the authority to do them. That mayor may not be true. If the sergeants all
believe it is true, then that pretty much makes it so.
The sergeants' problem is aggravated by the fact that, several years
ago, permissiveness overtook us, just as it did a large segment of our
society. We relaxed our standards, and, in an Army, that can be fatal.
One of the unforeseen outcomes of this relaxation waf> that we also let
slide the requirement for good, hard training and constant repetition of'
critical skills-the kind of training sergeants do. The result has been that
we have created too many situations in which soldiers feel they are not
being challenged. Put simply, many soldiers are just plain bored. The
solution to soldier boredom is essentially sergeants' business.
During the last year or so, the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command conducted a survey, a part of which looked at time utilization
by Els through E4s-idle time during the day. Of the total population
surveyed, half said they spent·a half or more of every day doing nothing,
at least as they perceived it. The problem is not what you or I think they
are doing; the problem is what they think they are doing. In the survey,
75 percent of the respondents from grades El through 06 said that
meaningful training for the soldier is our biggest problem. meaningful
training for the soldier as the soldier perceives it. not as you and I might
perceive it.
It is essential that we make maximum effective use of soldier time.
There are several reasons for this. First is the quality of modern weapons.
Tanks today are at least four or five times as effective as th!!y were in
World War II; artillery today is 10 times as effective as in World War II.
All that has happened gradually. in an evolutionary way. over a period of
years. Quality has brought with it considerable sophistication, so it takes
more time and effort to train soldiers to use today's equipment. Quality
makes the leader/trainer challenge much greater.
E1-E4 Time Utilization
The second fact of modern battle has to do with quantity. On a modern
battlefield, there will be large quantities of weapons in the main battle,
such quantities as have never been seen in one place before. It is likely to
be a very, very busy place. Fighting there takes a lot of getting ready-
Inherent in that quantity of weapons is great variety, such variety
that it is quite apparent no single weapon system can cope with the
problem. It is   ~ n   to take a little bit of every thing-a closely knit, well-
integrated combmed arms team. Team training, therefore, is much more
important than ever before.
The high levels of electronic warfare on the modern battlefield will
make command and control difficult. The leader's job will be harder
because it will be more difficult for him to communicate with those with
whom he has to talk to get on with the battle. Good, sound training is the
only thing that can keep an outfit moving-doing its job when command
control is difficult.
Modern air defenses will make the air over the battlefield a much more in which to operate. On the ground, the battlefield will be
dense with obstacles, of one kind or another-perhaps just blown up
equipment, perhaps antitank ditches or mines, more likely both. All this
portends a very difficult environment. It poses some real training
Training problems and responsibilities for training differ at every level
of command. Generals assign missions and resources and provide broad
goals. Colonels and lieutenant colonels decide what is to be done, allocate
time, set priorities, provide support, train and coach the trainers, conduct
and evaluate unit training. Captains and lieutenants decide how the
training is to be done, conduct unit training and evaluate individual
training. The sergeants-the NCO chain of command-prepare, conduct
and evaluate individual training, Noncommissioned officers are thus at
the heart of the Army training system, for individual training is the
primary responsibility of the NCO corps, It is what I call sergeants'
So, what is sergeants' business? Let us start with the squad leader,
se(,tion leader or the crew chief-the first-line supervisor. The first-line
supervisor's job is to make sure the soldiers who work for him in his crew,
section, squad, fire team or in his office are proficient in the tasks for
which they are responsible ;lccording to the Soldiers' Manual definition of
those tasks. For example, in an infantry unit, the first-line supervisor is
responsible for the proficiency of his soldiers at skill levelland 2 as
specified in the task list in the 11 Bravo Soldiers' Manual.
Now, how does the first-line supervisor maintain the proficiency of his
soldiers? From the Soldiers' Manual, he gets the task list, the standards of
performance and the conditions under which the tasks must be per-
formed. Then, the first-line supervisor looks for opportunities to check
that his men are proficient in their tasks and makes sure they practice the
tasks often enough to maintain proficiency. That also means the first-line
supervisor must be proficient in those skills himself-proficient enough to
do two things: first, to teach soldiers those tasks and, second, to evaluate
their performance. Not every first· line supervisor is proficient enough at
skill levelland 2 tasks to train his soldiers and evaluate them, and that
is a problem for the platoon sergeant, first sergeant and the sergeant
It is the responsibility of the command sergeant major in the battalion,
the first sergeant in the compa.ny and the platoon sergeants-all of them
together-to understand how much each first-line supervisor knows about
each skill his soldiers are supposed to know. Can he train them? Can he
evaluate them? There is still another job for the platoon sergeant. He
must know whether or not his E6s are proficient at skill level 3. That
means the platoon sergeant must himRelf be proficient at skill level 3,
proficient enough to make sure he can check the E6s and can teach them
the job if they do not know it well.
What does the first sergeant do? He checks the whole company, but he
is responsible primarily for proficiency of his platoon sergeants at skill
level 4. Do they know skills at levels I, 2 and 3 well enough to teach the
soldiers, and well enough to check the soldiers to see if they know? Do
they themselves maintain proficiency at skililevel4? The same is true for
the sergeant major and the first sergeants. That is the way the system is
supposed to work, and, if it works that way, two things will probably be
necessary: One, there will have to be some instruction for the first-line
supervisors and probably for the platoon Rergeants, and, two, the first
sergeants themselves may need some instruction.
For this instruction, a formal program-and a course in methods of
instruction with details on podiums, pointers, screens and slides-is not
necessary. Sergeants must learn to train soldiers under all sorts of
conditions-in the rain, at night, when people are cold and tired and
scared. What sergeants do is build in the soldiers enough confidence in
their ability to do their job under any circumstances so' that they will do it
under pressure-when they are frightened. They must teach soldiers in
the motor pool, at breaks during training, on the range, during concurrent
training, in the barracks. They must do it when nothing else is going on.
They must use the time of all soldiers profitably and use it doing
something the soldiers see as useful. If it relates to tasks in the Soldiers'
Manual, tasks the soldier knows he is likely to be tested on when skill
qualification testing comes along, that is a motivator in itself.
As training responsibilities change somewhat at each level of the NCO
chain, there is a difference in what training is conducted at each level. At
the first sergeant, platoon sergeant level, it is much more troop-leading
than skill-oriented, but, down the chain, the balance begins to shift more
tn pure skill training. At sqmld leader and fire team leader lewl, the
emphasis is almost solely on skill training. That makes sense. Here is the
first line of supervision. The whole system is built on the first-line
supervisor, but it is organized and supervised by the command sergeant
major. He is the one who oversees sergeants' business. Therefore, the
command sergeant major is not an administrator, he is a trainer.
The Skill Qualification Test is the formal check of individual training.
The SQT is just a way of checking whether or not we have done our job-
measured not against the next company or next battalion, but against a
set of standards common to the whole Army. It is important to say this
because war is such a difficult business that training for it cannot just be
"graded on the curve." The outcome of battle certainly is not graded on
the curve-someone wins, someone loses-the stakes are high, and so the
standards for training must be high and clearly set forth and understood
by everyone.
Therefore, we cannot let the SQT become something for which we stop
and stand the whole unit down once every so often. If we do that, we have
defeated the whole purpose of the Soldiers' Manual-SQT system, and the
whole thing will be no better than the old military occupation specialty
(MOS) test. We started Soldiers' Manuals by saying that the MOS test
approach was not the right way to do it. When the SQT task list comes
out, some preparation is appropriate. But, if our training programs are
well-designed, a long period of- immersion in SQT subjects will not be
We can avoid that by integrating Soldiers' Manual tasks into
everyday training. The command sergeant major and the first sergeants
together draw out of the NCO training and individual training in their
unit enough evirlence for whether or not they need time on the training
schedule to train. Then, they must go to the company, battery, troop,
battalion and squadron commanders and say:
Boss, we have to have some time. We need some practice in this or that
skill or this group of skills. To do that we need a range, and in order to go
to a range we need time and bullets. Can we do that?
And on the advice of his NCOs about individual training needs in the
unit, the commander   within the context of all the other
requirements, training identified by his sergeants. That is sergeants'
Like any art, the craft of battle requires proper tools, good crafts-
manship and a little inspiration. In this case, the proper tools are good
weapons, sound tactics and effective organization. Although these differ a
bit from army to army, there is'little to be gained by anyone, or any
combination, of them against a .corresponding combination in the
enemy's bag. In other words, systems, tactics and organization are about
What makes the difference in battle? It is the excellence of the
craftsmanship and the combined inspiration of soldiers and leaders. It is
the excellence of the training, the quality of the leaders and the courage of
the soldiers. Of the courage of the soldiers, there is no doubt. The problem
is to get that courage harnessed in usable fashion and put to work on the
battlefield. That is a problem for leaders. May I further suggest that the
day of the instant hero is gone-the time when charisma alone can be
made to suffice for technical skill and excellence in battle is past.
Certainly, this is so when one considers the number of competent leaders
who will be requir€d to win in modern war. A few may be charismatic in
addition to being technically competent; many, many more will not.
Therefore, the leader problem is likewise a training problem. Quality
leadership comes from sound training of leaders.
Sergeants are leaders. Sergeants' business is leadership. Therefore, the
sergeants must be trained as leaders-not as administrators. The cement
that bonds together good weapons, sound tactics and effective organiza·
tions into winning battle teams is training. Training develops excellence
in the skills of leaders and soldiers, to the end that they have both the
capability to fight the tough battles and win, and the conviction that they
_can and must fight hard and well, and that, if they do, and have a little
luck, they will win against all odds.
Lieutenant Colonel James B. Channon, US Army
The complexity of the 1990's environment requires an of-
ficer corps capable of functioning on an intellectual and
technical plain equal to that of his civilian counterparts.
Both the generalist and the specialist must have well-honed
skills as technocrats and as social engineers sensitive to the
human aspects and capabilities of those who work for them.
The future emphasis in the Army school system must be on
managing skill practice in war fighting and management not
in teaching "information."
N ORDER to design a training and
education system for the future. we
should look at what reqUirements Will be
placed upon the officers who must
operate In that future environment One
purpose of thiS article Will be to structure
that environment . Another and most
ambitious attempt will be to try to
forecast those problem-solving skills
necessary for our officers to operate. In
that environment Finally, some
promising instructional approaches will
be Illustrated so that our training and
education community can begin to
structure programs to prepare the officer
corps for that future. Not much has been
written about the future that translates
into specific skills.
The 1990 Environment
There are some pessimists and there
are some optimists. Because the military
is a primary insurance policy for the
United States, It is important to consider
the pessimists seriously. After all, this
country, because of its affluence and
development, has much to lose. So, just
as we have developed our tactical
doctrine with the "worst case" enemy rn
mind, our look at the future should
consider seriously the "worst case"
conditions forwarded by those pessimists
for our total environment. Here is one
view of our world·
This is the marketplace which the
United States must visIt to shop for its
needs: a shrill, clamorous, excitable
locale filled with the shouts of the
population explosion, energy crisIs,
hunger, global pol/utlon, resource
exhaustion and resource dependencies,
trade balances and trade defIcits, the rtch
nations and the poor, imperialism,
neocolontalism, world hegemony,
expropriatIOn. economic nationaltsm,
modernization, development, the
Oklahoma land-rush for the seabed and
martne resources, cancerous cities, and
dying-off species. It IS a place marked by
an odd aggregation of slogans, demands
and trends: of unforeseen consequences,
unexpected developments and
unanticipated demands: of meandering
cause-and-effect chains: of unmet
expectations and dIsappointments; of
backfiring solutions and punctured
theories, of anachronistic beliefs and
outdated dogmas: and of greed,
selfishness and pride. 1
These words of a military strategist
may be difficult to translate into Army
requirements. But Colonel Robert Leider,
the author of this forecasted
environment. would suggest that,
because the military and its objectives
are so completely Intertwined with the
other fundamental areas of internatIOnal
strategy, the military could well expect to
be faced with requirements like these:
• What is the division eqUIvalent of a
delIberately precipitated energy crtsis?
• How many wings must be kept
operational to prevent a foreign supplIer
from unilaterally tearing up a contract for
one with harsher terms?
• How many ships must be sent to
sea to deter the new, unusual
approaches to war-assassinations,
kldnappmgs, hljackings, letter bombs,
poison emptted into a water supply,
germs dusted over crops, moisture drawn
from the atmosphere, or a city held in
ransom by nuclear terrorists?
• How much force is required to stop
a nation from committmg an ecological
folly which could turn Into a wider
ObViously, the scope of the skills
needed by senior military decisIOn makers
of the future must be unquestionably
broad and senSitive to the dynamiCs of
international survival Not only are the
intentions of our allies and enemies
Lieutenant Colonel James B Channon IS
With the Dlfectorate of Education and CUfflC-
ulum Affa"s. USACGSC He received a B A In
fme arts and an M A In behaVioral communtca·
lions from the University of Kentucky and an
M MAS from the USACGSC He has served In
Infantry and mtelftgence pOSItIOns In the United
States, Vietnam and Germany HIS article
"Work. ·Settmgs A Focus for the Future
Command and General Staff College" appeared
In the May 7976 MIlitary ReView.
abroad a matter for concern, but. In fact.
our own Internal publics must be
considered as a potential fqrce to be
reckoned with
A Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. that
convened in 1970, concerned itself with
this question:
Among the most sigmllcant of the
environmental factors impinging on
Defense management. are the changing
attitudes and opimons of the Untted
States public. These heavily Influence all
aspects of management, but particularly
such matters as weapons development
and procurement; budgetary planning;
personnel acquisition, retentIOn and
tramlng, external research and
development; contracting flexibility; and a
large range of mternal management

The picture begins to get complex. But
some skills areas are being defined here.
That Insurance policy, we called the
Army, must be as comprehensive, as It
has ever been. It should be able to defend
conventionally, exercise limited power
abroad and even be around for that day
when, Internally, it must be applied to
keep the peace. Our senior
decIsIOn makers Will be under more
pressure than ever to be the intellectual
and technical equal of the CIVilian
decIsion making strata With whom they
must deal. Notice the large array of
nontactlcal skills suggested. They are
Those who write about the future
seem to expand this hOrizon of
complexity In two directions. In one
direction, technology seems to be pulling
for the specialist as we get more and
more Into the bUSiness of hardware, ItS
development, procurement afJd
sustenance. On the other side of that
hOrizon, others contend that a new level
of people awareness must be present In
all managers to contend with that new
kind of public affluent society produces.
The panel defines it as "a larg.e range of
Internal management problems."
Organizational Implications
That range of problems involves the
Army as an organization. The US Army
Combat Developments Command report.
Man and the 1990 Environment.
suggests the following picture for our
c,ommand structures In the future:
The command structure will become
less rigid as more knowledge is required
for declsionmaking. Autocratic leadership
and arbitrary decisions will become less
effective. Managerial skills will become
increaSingly important, particularly
personnel placement. Leaders will need a
working knowledge of human behavior
and motivation. The leader's
responSibility to Integrate the personal
needs of his men with the military
requirements of his organization will
become increasingly vital in the next
Almost all research harps on the great
explosion of knowledge required for
declslonmakmg In some greater detail.
thiS same report breaks down future
trends and leadership in terms of these
speCifiC attributes:
• To 'make it' professionally and to
be respected by professional colleagues
will become an increasingly important
characteflstic of leadership.
• Leadership (especially executive
leadership) will take more responsibility
for creatmg a cJlmate that provides the
security to Identify with the adaptive
process without fear of losing status
• Leadership will require the leader
to possess better interpersonal skills in
order to cultivate the talents of others.
• Leadership will demand the
creative use of one's own personality.
This is particularly important for
to understand, for, like physicians, they
are just as capable of spreading as curing
• Good leadership will require the
ability to motivate people toward social
participation rather than Isolation.
• Leadership will demand intellectual
insight and sensitivity to stimulate people
to strive for excellence, to adapt to new
enV/fonments and to use leisure time
effectively to raise Intellectual
• Officers, In the Military Services, of
understanding, courage and vision at all
levels, Will be needed in situations of
sensitivity and compleXity.
• The new officer in 1990 will and
Figure 1
should have more skills of persuasion. of
politicking, of popularity seeking, while
still being able to keep the respect and
confidence of his subordinates, peers and
So, as we continue our assessment, 1t
becomes OPVIOUS that our mission
remams that of keeping the peace and
that we be able to project our power both
abroad and at home. We must work on
an equal status With our peers in
government, In Industry and in business.
Our level of awareness In managing
people must become more sensitive
While, at the same time, our technical
expertise at managmg fighting systems
must grow on: an equal plain Figure 1
reflects the additional requirements
antiCipated. The Interpersonal skills just
listed are clumped under organizational
effectiveness as a category.
FOR 1990s
Generalists and Specialists
The precedent for the specialist has
been established. and he must be
managed carefully But it is patently clear
thal our senior declslonmakers. called
generalists. are specialists of their own
kind. Therefore. the diversity of their
career development must be managed as
carefully as the more singular track
expected for our speCialist. The cntical
and comprehenSive skills reqUired dUring
war to employ modern battlefield
systems optimally and during peacetime
to train and maintain the force IS a
speCialty In itself R Buckmlnster Fuller.
the noted futurist. had this to say about
the speCialist
In the great design of the universe had
God Wished man to be a specialist, man
would have been designed with one eye
and a microscope attached to it which he
could not unfasten. All the living species
except human beings are specialists. The
bird can fly beautifully but cannot take its
wings off after landing and therefore
can't walk very well. The fish can't walk
at all. But man can put on his gills and
swim and he can put on his wings and fly
and then take them off and not be
encumbered With them when he is' not
uSing them. He is in the middle of all
!tvlng species. He is the most generally
adaptable but only by virtue of his one
unique faculty-his mind. Many
creatures have brains. Human minds
discover pure abstract generalized
principles and employ those prinCiples in
the appropnate special cases. Thus has
evolutIOn made humans the most uni-
versally adaptable, in contradistinction to
specialization, by endOWing them with
these metaph ysical, weightless invisible
capabilities to employ and realize special
case uses of the generalized
Fuller has given us an important clue
to our potential as humans. Not only
might we lose our focus on our primary
mission, which is to fight, but we also
may spread ourselves technically so thin
that our ability to think and solve
problems will suffer. It is so tempting for
our Institutions and schools to include an
ever greater array of subjects to be
mastered. while the obvious cost of that
broadening is to r.educe the time
available for the students to practice
solVing problems. It is that problem-
solving skill that is a1 the root of man's
So, how do we become more
technically profiCient and yet more able
to deal with people? Fred Polak In his
book, The Image of the Future, says:
There is little doubt that a new
managerial caste is developing which is
providing leadership in key places in
government, industry and political
parties. These managers are the
prototypes of the social engineer,
The word social engineer seems
contradictory. But it synthesizes those
extremes in the trends we have
discussed. On the one hand, each
manager must be more senSitive to the
human capabilities of those who work for
him while, on the other, be just as
technically proficient with the weapon
systems he must manage. He is both
generalist and specialist. He has a
broader base of knowledge and yet IS
required to have an even more practiced
ability to solve problems. He IS oriented
on his national role as well as his
international role. He must be able to
prosecute conventional strategies as well
as more limited unconventional
approaches Things are not getting
Battlefield Skills
Discussing what skills are required of
the Army officer of the future in more
military terms, we can take much from
the book Scient;l!c- Technical Progress
and the Revolution In Military Affairs,
edited by Russian Colonel General N A
In moder" war, when a large amount
of the most diverse military equipment
will be involved in combat. the use of
mathematical methods and electronic
computers assumes most Important
significance. Mastery of the method of
mathematical analYSIS provides an
opportunity not only to fully consider the
quantitative balance of forces, but also
formulates the mathematical accuracy
and logical sequence of thought
For the purposes of rapidly acquiring
experience and gaining the habits of
quick and objective judgment of the
situation. it is essential that exercises
and military games be carried out under
a situation as close as possible to combat
and under the most diverse conditions.
A-knowledge of the patterns of the
control process and use of the most
modern technical deVices in it are one of
the most Important bases for scientific
troop leadership under modern
The taking of a sound decision
requires the ability on the part of the
commander to foresee the course of
forthcoming events. It is impoSSible to
fight Without foreSight. 'To control means
to foresee.' states the old saying.
Foresight is not the property of a
particular bent of mind. but rather the
result of profound penetration into the
essence of occurring processes and
achieVing the main thing determined by
the course of events. The ability to
foresee IS a most important quality of
thought. and it is particularly Important
for a commander.
A check on execution is a most
Important condition for the success of
organizing work. Constant and
systematic supervision of execution
provides an opportunity not only to
establish the suitability of the executor
for performing one or another task, qut
also to determine the degree of
correctness of the taken decision or the
given instructIOn.
Modern combat requires from a
commander the greatest self·control, the
ability for clear thinking, and an objective
assessment of the situation. and an
unswerving will for victory manifested in
effective actions. Without these qualities,
the commander will not be able to carry
out the set mission or achieve victory.
Soviet officers, Including their Chief of
Staff Ogarkov, have speculated about the
automated battlefield of the future They
have made clear statements that they
expect that their officers will have to
operate on not only an automated
battlefield, but one that is automated and
cybernetlca IIy controlled.
Our company commanders today are
faced With what Lomov forecasts for
tomorrow. The optimal employment of
multiple weapons systems according to
their relative strengths must be
accompilshed by quantitative analYSIS
and then sequenced and controlled
during unprecedented suppression byflre
and electronic warfare Think about the
nature of these fighting skliisl
The skillS expressed above are not
peculiar to the battlefield. To be sure,
modern management skills Include many
of those suggested by Lomov like:
• Quantitative analysis to judge
effectivenessl efficiency.
7. DECISIONMAKING ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 2
• Continuous decISion making
practIce on simulations.
• Forecasting outcomes m dynamic
• Constructmg and using models for
any control process.
• Designing evaluation measures for
all programs.
• Tenacity and rIsk-taking in
peacetime envIronment.
The Department of the Army recently
completed a study on those management
skills found common to all officers from
lieutenant to general The following
generalized skills were sifted from
management science, communicatIons
sCience and behavIoral science studies
done during the last decade. Each skIll IS
graphIcally quantified by degree of u s ~ in
Figure 2.9
This leadtc;rship matrix is felt to be an
important step forward in describing
what leaders do. Its significance lies in
Its synthesis of a vast collection of
literature, and its pragmatic applicability,
despite its theoretical characteristics to
realistic and actual situations. 10
The team that developed this set of
common managerial skIlls has Since
broken them into a series of tasks that
can be taken by training developers at
each level and used to desIgn specific
leadership lessons. These can be found
in Monograph Number 9, Organizational
Leadership Tasks for Army Leadership
Training, published by the US Army
Administration Center in May 1977.
For those who have attempted to
discover precisely what we presently do,
much less what is anticipated for the
future, you know the complexity of the
task. The AdminIstratIon Center has hit
the center of the target with the
leadership study.
With Lomov, the accent for the future
was on the technical side. We have seen
ample evidence in recent years of senior
commanders collecting small cliques of
technocrats with operations research and
systems analysIs skills. Even more
recently, the human end of the spectrum
was given its share of attention with the
adoption of the Organizational
Effectiveness (OE) program Perhaps the
OE approach was designed to balance a
management by numbers with some
management by human energy.
In the book Human Energy, John D.
Ingalls describes the traditional
management process from a human
factors perspective. The essence of his
approach is continued in Figure 3
how ne has incorporated the more
subjective features of management with
the traditional objective elements. more
recognizable to most of us.
Both the international trends and
evolving management practice seem to
reinforce one a not her. The officer of the
future must add to his management and
fighting skills a greater understanding of
the technical side of combat systems and
a greater understanding of the people
side of operations.
What Are Some Future Prototypes?
Most would agree that. If we had to
select a newcomer of the decade past,
It would be the Operations Re-
search/Systems Analysis (ORSA) pro-
totype. What other hitherto unknown
A system of management: translating managerial functions to program/project activity
Figure 3
species will be required to cope with the
accelerating dimensions of technical and
social change in the next decade?
As a practitIOner of forecasting, I shall
offer these five 0
• Change agent (systems innovation
and test specialist). This specialist would
be· aSSigned to command units at all
levels His mission wouid be to receive,
institutionalize and evaluate all new
approaches or systems. This will permit
the Army to assimilate qUickly and, If
necessary, reject change as a matter of
charter not chance This officer should be
schooled In the efflciencyl effectiveness
bUSiness at the master's level
• Systems language specialist
(symbolic and graphiC languages). This
specialist should be aSSigned to combat
development duties concerned With all
information dependent· Army systems.
HIS job would be to reduce the great
volume of data exchanged Into symboliC
and graphic language HIS schooling
should Include work In information
sCience. deSign and modern languages
He will be a hybnd to be sure
• The no man (resource
forecasting analyst). This specialist would
be on the decIsion makers staff at all
levels. He must be able to forecast the
Impact of any change on hiS com-
mander's system In terms of resource
costs He IS paid to tell the boss "no" and
then give hiS boss the necessary data to
allow that "no" to be explained up the
line. HIS schooling should include
systems dynamiCs and economics at the
master's or Ph.D. level.
• DeSigner planner (military systems
and operations deSign}. ThiS prototype
will aid the transient commanders at
higher echelons With long-range
planning He can forecast and then
clearly communicate new s y s t   ~ s
configurations. He will be paid to
conceive, pilot, budget, test and procure
phYSical and SOCial systems. He will be
aSSigned on a five-year tour baSIS to
ensure that process. He also will be a
hybrid, schooled in social systems,
deSign and life-cycle management at the
master's level or higher.
• Renaissance histOrian (combat
developer) This creature would be taken
from hiS academiC sanctuaries and put
Into combat development positions. He
will be valued for his ability to extract
unique lessons from history and abstract
them into doctrinal gems for the future.
He must be given room to think, study
and then forced to convert his Wisdom
Into modern systems concepts.
Traditional study In history coupled with
systems dynamiCS at the master's level
would be sufficient schooling.
It could be that our ORSA speCialist
could handle the "no" man job. And,
perhaps, our OE expert With a little
deSign experience could do the deSigner
planner job. The histOrians are "hiding
out" in the school system now.
One easy way to discover these new
prototypes is to assess where our system
IS bogged down now. For example, the
production of trauling manuals, television
programs and other media materials has
bogged down because the officers who
produce those materials cannot think
Visually and write creatively. Can we
expect CIVIlians to continue to do thiS for
Communications Skills
If we take a cI ue from today's youth,
we should quickly surmise that they, in
fact, process information aurally and
visually Therefore, the officer corps of
the future must be able to communicate
10 that language. With all the hubtiub
about the misuse of the English language
today, it often goes unheard that word
language is only one of a growmg.
number of languages needed 10 our
multidimensional world. I suggest that
the officer be competent in the additIOnal
followmg languag'es by 1985
• Systems language -bemg able to
sort out the critical features of any
complex process and array them
graphically with emphasIs on their
dependency, their relationship to other
features and their sequence for
• Situational language-arranging
players and systems 10 geographical
space and psychological SpaCe so that
they are able to function optimally as
mdlviduals and smoothly as groups
• Picture language-understanding
the grammar and syntax of
presentations, video programs and lesson
development 10 order to prepare a story
board communication (sequences of
pictures) of those events for the
appropriate media techniCian to execute
• Interpersonal language-
understanding the dynamics of
appearance, possessions. mannerisms
and tone of vOice as they impact on
meaning. Bemg able to conSCiously use
these dimensions to increase the
accuracy of your communications
I have merely scratched the surface
here Man-machme languages, mass
commUnication languages and the entire
nonverbal dimension also are Important.
We often hear our most effective
generals today discussed In these terms
-Once he sees somethmg, he's got
-She can read a book 10 less than an
hour, and she remembers what she
-He can hear a brlefmg and go
straight to the heart of the problem With
a single question.
-He told us about an experience 'he
had, and, suddenly, the problem was
clear to us.
-He always surrounds himself With
bright officers and comes out "smelling
like a r.ose."
So, there are skills not common to our
recognized school lessons that officers
use today Let me deSCribe some of these
not so well arllculated Skills gleaned from
John Ingalls' new book Human Energy
and my own military study;
• Focus. Some 'people can deCide
what It IS they are looking for and retain
their concentration until they have found
it. Speed reading IS not so much a
function of trammg your eyeballs to
dance down the page as it IS of decldmg
what you're gomg to read and what
you're not gomg to read. Askmg the right
question at a brlefmg IS not necessarily a
function of listening to every word but
rather deCiding ahead of time what the
real Issue IS and framing your question In
that light CondUcting an mspectlon
effectively IS not so much a function of
scrupulous attenllon to everythmg, as It
IS of knOWing where to look before your
inspection beginS
• Abstracting Understandmg a
complex problem IS one thmg Bemg able
to,reach mto another language to convey
the problem IS one kmd of abstracting.
Pullmg the key Issues out of a resource
problem and arraYing them 10 a sequence
of problem-solving actions IS another
kind of abstractmg. But the key here IS
being able to reduce complexlly to ItS key
dimenSIOns and then communicate It to
your audience 10 a language they can
• Imagmg. It used to be qUite easy to
convert problem understandmg mto a
Simple slOryllke analogy Now, because
of the complexity of the problems to be
solved, graphic models, written scenarios
and net-flow diagrams are- essential to
organize the key Ingredients In a
situation so they can be understood
Making Images IS Critical
.• Talent sensing Putting together a
team to manage a complex system
Involves selecting the right mix of speCial
skills Officers who take the time to
assess the potential of people both below
them and above them are more likely to
structure a team that can find a good
solution to a problem and have that
solution properly accepted at the next
higher echelon
What the Bundeswehr Thinks
For several years, the German
Command and Staff College has been
redefining ItS course of instruction In so
dOing. It has clearly indicated the skill
areas It IS Interested In furthering As you
read the proposal, you are struck by the
focus on problem-solving The Germans
clearly appreciate that "Information" IS
expanding and, as It supports problem-
solVing, It must be Included, but not If It
saCrifices that time spent on student-
Oriented problem-solving The focus IS on
mental skills and thelf application
An example follows of a
nonspecialized behaVioral learning
objective given In thelf briefing titled the
"Future Training of General Staff
Understanding of the mounting
complexity of the various tasks
(increasing scope, specialization and
internatIonalizatIOn of tasks);
understanding of the ensuing rapid ob-
solescence of factual knowledge
hitherto acquired and acceptance of the
need for a constant learning process.
AbIlity and willingness to respond to
changes In hIS duties and responsibilities
by developing new procedures and struc-
tures so as to reach creative solutions to
problems. Understanding of the condi-
tions that underlIe innovation. 12
Recently, a newly appOinted manager
of the atmospheric test laboratory at
White Sands, New Mexico, came to
Leavenworth to prepare himself better
for hiS new post. It seems there was
enough concern about the slow diffusion
of new technology Into the Army that hiS
boss felt he should have a three-week
sabbatical to discover the reasons for thiS
problem We knew that training
technology was being diffused at a
painfully slow rate, but had no Idea the
same was true for fighting technology. It
may be true that progress in technology
may increase exponentially over the next
decade, but it seems that there are some
very real thresholds for how qUickly that
technology Will be embraced In the field.
More skills must be acquired on the
diffUSion of innovation and the process of
change Itself Again perhaps the
organizational effectiveness staff officer
can focus on thiS task.
Training and Education System
First, let me briefly summarize the
future skills requirements forecasted In
thiS study
• Combat skills and management
skills remain fundamental bUilding
• Technical depth will become more
Important for generalists as combat
leaders and managers and for speCialists
In their functional areas.
• Some new special skills may be
required in the resource management,
information science, diffusion of
innovation, combat development and
systems design fields.
• All officers must be literate in the
many languages and communications
skills of the time.
• All officers must   c q u i ~ e the skills
necessary to adapt to constructive
change which must become a conscious
practice rather than an expected
Having made this asse'ssment of the
types of skills our officers may need to
function acceptably in the 1990s, it
seems responsible to speculate about
how these skill areas may be reasonably
accommodated by the Army trainmg and
education system. In most cases, the
current system can accommodate the
focus just reviewed. Look at Figure 4 to
Special schools
see how training and education
approaches are matched to the require-
ments in Figure 3.
Several of the relationships need
explanation. Notice that the base of
information needed for work in all fie'lds
has been taken out of the schools and
put mto a continuing education mod.e.
This kind of information is so voluminous
and perishable that we cannot allow it to
fill the precious curriculum time in our
costly Army school system. To be sure,
data are Important to the primary task of
problem-solving and battle practice
appropriate for those schools, but it is
fast consuming all the curriculum time
while the more complex aspects of
managing and fighting soldiers go
Recently, several educational
strategies have been applied too liberally
The increasing body of information associated
with all skills above should be communicated on 8
weekly basis by speciality proponent professional
development team
Figure 4
to the Army's higher level schools To be
sure. the criterion. referenced approach,
when refined to attack the h,lgher order
thinking skills cited In this article. will
make a great contribution to the discI-
pline of lesson design. In the meantime,
It 15 leveling all courses of instruction to
their lowest common denominator-facts
and procedures To continue this trend
without modification will surely verify
one student's comment about the course
at the US Army Command and General
Staff College. "It's a mile wide and three
Inches deep"
To remove completely the natural
tendency to teach   Instead
of managing skill practice. the college IS
introducing In ItS classrooms a new
laboratory approach that engineers the
same work·settlng· and problem
orientatIOn found In the field
The Chief of Public Affairs and several
other Officer Personnel Management
System (OPMS) specialty proPQnents
have established the precedent for the
continuing education concept Each
week. every public affairs officer In the
Army receives a small mailout packet
that Includes current operational data.
career progression data and a
professional development Inclosure. ThiS
IS the best way to learn lower order skills
like facts. techniques and procedures
The Strategic Research Group at the
National War College addressed
"Educating the American Military
Officer" In 1975. One of its premier
recommendations Included the
Needed is a new systematic approach
to officer professIOnal development.
USing alternative delivery systems
presently used In the private sector, tlJe
base of (learner) attendance can be
significantly broadened. Additionally. the
reality of accelerating knowledge
obsolescence can be addressed through
continUing educatIOn. 13
My recommendation IS to present
operating information to each officer, by
specialty. on a continuing basIs and save
the precIous school cUrriculum for battle
practice and management skill practice.
In a similar light, we should consider
increasing the internship programs with
cIvilian industry In any special area too
small or technical to Justify an Army
school solution.
There IS ample evidence that the
Army understands the nature of the
problem. The Army Officer Training and
Education Review Group now convened
by the chief of staff has this paper. much
related research and a charter to
examine all foreign armies. industry and
other Ideas that higher education has to
To them. I would recommend the
scheme shown In Figure 5. Using the
time available for unit experience, Army
schooling. civilian schooling and
internships. we should pullout all the
information components. These more
perishable and time·consumlng elements
shou Id be delivered concu rrently by
OPMS speCialty proponents In small
manageable bits The school experiences
could revolve around mastenng battle
and management skills I have forecast
for our complex future
I suppose I could reread this article
and attempt to extract and list all the
specific skills suggested. But I shall leave
that task to the training developers at
each level I fully concur with the War
College Idea for a more systematic
approach to the currently workable Army
training and education system and the
continuing education Ideas necessary to
make it work. Permit me now to dampen
that initial rather desolate picture of the
future with the Inspiring epilogue In the
/ I
/ I
/ I
// I
/ I
/ I
( I
data for military.
technical and professional
functional/theoretical skills
Industry related technical skills
Pure military functional skills
Practical skills
Type skill
1985 1990
Figure 5
Victor Ferklss book. The Future of
Technological Civilization.
The partisans of humanrty know In
  bones that In a world where doom
portends. resistance and life are
identical. and the odds against the
survival of human existence can hardly
1 Robert LeIder An Old StraleglS\ Speak.s 10 the Young
M,litary Polu:y Formulation, 1916·77 Volume I p I·A·S
2 Ibid plA7
3 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Report to the PreSident and the
Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense M,litary POhcy
FormulatIOn, op Cit. P I·A·23
4 Man and the 1990 £nvlfonment US Army Combat Dpve1op-
ments Command, Fort BelvOir Va 6 July 1970 Volume I p 36
5 Ibid 6 July 1970 Volume [I. p 179 80
6 R Buckmlnster Fuller TeCl1nology and the Human En
"'Ironment The Futurists. P 301
7 F-red L Polak. The Image of the Future. Jossey Bass Inc. San
Calif 1972. p 296
8 SClentl"c TeGhmcal Progress and the Re"olullon In Mllitarl'
Affairs (A SO)llBl View), EdIted by Colonel General I'll A Lomev
Translated and published under the auspices of the US Air F-orce
be greater than those against its
creation. They sing to themselves as they
go about their tasks-merging their silent
song wIth that of every buried seed
struggling toward the sun and of the
earth as It spins around ItS star.'4
the stargate IS open
Supenntendent of DocumentS uS Government Prrnt,ng Office
Washmgton. D C 1973 pp 229 35
9 leadership Monograph Number 8 A Mattix of Organtzatlonal
Leadership DimenSIOns Departmpnt of the Army Washington D C
p S2
10 Ibid p 95
11 John 0 Ingalls HvmarJ £nergl'. Addison Wesley Publlshmg
Co Inc. Reading, Mass 1976. Figure 3 6 p 72
12 BriefIng scnpt Future Ttammg of General St8/f Olffeers
presented to the commandanT of the uS Army Command and
Genercal Staff College by hIS German counterpart In the Bundeswehr
13 EduGatlng t'he AmeflGBrJ Milltdrl' Officer Strategic Research
Group Study National War College Washmgton. D C 1975. p III
14 Victor The Future of Technological Clvlhzatlon.
George 8ralilter Inc San Diego I'll Y. 1974 Epilogue p 293
of Atomic
Captain John F. Rybicki, US Army
Currently, atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) are planned
for employment against material-type targets such as
bridges, dams and road networks. However, without modifi-
cations to the system, ADMs could be used against enemy
troops and equipment. Available in either a timer or remote-
firing option, ADMs may be used above ground, at ground
level or buried beneath the surface. By varying the depth of
burial, the commander can control the damage radii to
reduce collateral damage and safety distances for friendly
troops operating in the area.
HE purpose of this article is to
present some of the realities that
could logically rationalize the use of
atomic demolition munitions (ADMs)
as an antipersonnel weapon without
ol'trRcting from itR current use as an
engineer demolition. Points developed
here are not intended to answer all
questions involved in this concept but
are intl'nded to stimulate thought and
controversy. In response to specific
questions posed during military ap-
propriations hearings before Congress
for Fiscal Year (FY) 1975, then Sec-
retary of Defense James Schlesinger
stated that theater tactical nuclear
weapons will be employed:
... in response to an overwhelming
Warsaw Pact conventional attack
where the consequences of conven-
tional defeat are deemed more serious
than nuclear escalation. Theater
nuclear forces would be employed in
conjunction with conventional forces
within clearly perceivable limits to halt
the aggression through a dramatic
reversal of the tactical situation.
These "clearly perceivable limits"
are preplan ned nuclear weapons
packages consisting of specific
weapons and yields for use in well-
defined locations within exact time
limits. ADMs logically may be in-
cluded in these packages.
The purpose of this iCkage will be
to neutralize large ene y formations
in order to produce he "dramatic
reversal of the tactical situation." r
suggest that current nuclear weapons
employment doctrine include the use of
ADMs as a weapon. The use of ADMs
against personnel would not be any
more escalatory than would the use of
nuclear artillery or nuclear air strikes.
The use of ADMs against personnel
should not be considered revolutionary
but as another option for an already
operational tool in our efforts to win
the "first battle."
ADMs are planned for employment
against material-type targets to
destroy massive structures (that is,
bridges, darns, road networks) and
thereby reduce the enemy's maneuver
ability by creating obstacles. The use
of ADMs closely parallels that of con-
ventional explosives. The use of ADMs,
however, is exemplified by savings in
time, manpower and logistical support
Captain John F. Ryb,ck, IS the senior
mstructor. Atomic DemoLItIOn lV[umtwns
Branch, Department of Mllltary Engmeermg,
Dlrectorate of Trammg. US Army Engineer
School. Fort BelVOIr. Va. He receIVed a B S
from Clarkson College of Technology and an
M.A. from the UnIVersIty of Arkansas He
has served m Germany as ADM platoon
leader, 9th Engineer BattalIOn, and as ch,ef,
VII Corps TechnIcal Evaluation InspectIOn
Team (ADM)
and offers an increased demolition
<;,apability along with certain "bonus"
effects that can enhance obstacle effec-
tiveness and are potentially hazardous
to troops. These bonus effects include
thermal radiation which can signifi-
cantly increase damage to targets by
burning; initial and residual nuclear
radiation which can incapacitate
troops and contaminate large areas of
the battlefield; and tree blowdown
which can make by-pass of any ob-
stacle more difficult.
Each ADM in this hypothetical
family has an "on-call" remote-firing
capability that gFeatly increases the
weapon's battlefield potential. This
remote capability consists of either a
wire-firing or radio-firing option for
detonation upon command. This
system is both lightweight and man-
portable and can be rapidly prepared
for either a timer or remote-firing
option. It can be emplaced either at
ground level or below the surface, and
its effects can be varied and controlled
by selected burial depths.
Any attack from Eastern Europe
into the West would bring with it
numbers of men and equipment su-
perior to the defending NATO forces.
Estimates on present NATO versus
Warsaw Pact force strengths are nu-
merous and much debated. There are
. so many variables to consider that
detailed analysis is not a simple task.
Some widely accepted figures are
available for analysis, however. It
presen tly is estimated by the Defense
Department in its annual report to
Congress (FY 1978) that Warsaw Pact
forces would outnumber their NATO
counterparts in medium tanks by
about 4 to 1, in armored personnel
carriers (APCs) by about 3 to 2 and in ..
artillery by over 3 to 1.
Current production schedules of the
United States and the Soviet Union are
not narrowing this equipment gap. In
fact, in FY 1977, the Soviet Union
outproduced the United States in
medium tanks by 6 to I, in APCs by 3
to i and in artillery pieces by 8 to 1. In
major ground force weapons systems,
the United States has a substantial
lead over the Soviet Union in only
helicopters (3 to 2) and in tactical
nuclear warheads (2 to I).
Recently published NATO esti-
mateR suggest that, in local penetra-
tions on a European battlefield, the
Soviets may engage NATO defenders
with as many as 600 tanks across a 5-
kilometer front. That is roughly one
enemy tank every 25 feet over a front
of approximately 8 miles. Though the
Soviets would not attack in an exact
linear formation, the depth of the first
echelon attacking force could be as
little as 200 to 300 meters. This 'force
would be followed by mechanized in-
fantry and other tank formations to
exploit the penetration and mop up by-
passed NATO forces.
Such attacks undoubtedly would be
made over high-speed avenues of ap-
proach simply because the terrain
must be favorable to such a formidable
force in order for it to maneuver. In
southern West Germany where US
forces are currently assigned, major
avenues of approach for massive com-
bined arms formations are limited and
easily recognizable. These high-speed
avenues of approach are candidates for
ADM employment to impede enemy
movement by creating large craters or
other massive obstacles which would
make these approaches impassable to
a highly mechanized force. These ob-
stacles would slow the enemy's mo-
mentum and delay his formations in
large killing zones that would be sus-
ceptible to either air or artillery-
delivered nuclear or conventional
Presently, a number of nuclear
systems exist which have as their
primary mission the destruction of
enemy formations. All these systems,
however, guided and unguided rockets,
tube-launched artillery rounds and air-
delivered systems, have a delivery
error which could detract from their
overall effectiveness. Delivery error
results in larger warheads being used
to assure the desired coverage of a
target element. Larger yields increase
safety distances required for civilians
and friendly forces and may result in
undesirable collateral damage over
much larger areas. These systems are
excellent for targets of opportunity
which may appear on the battlefield
unexpectedly. But, - for high-speed
avenues of approach, It is possible to
preplan targets and "seed" an area
with munitions in anticipation of an
enemy attack without delivery error
and without allocating valuable air
and artillery assets.
Tactical air and artillery assets are
high-priority targets and extremely
vulnerable on the modern battlefield.
Artillery systems are susceptible to
hostile weapons locator systems that
can detect incoming rounds automati-
cally and direct immediate counterfire
against those positions. This, coupled
with the fact that NATO is outnum-
bered in artillery pieces by over 3 to 1,
makes it imperative that artillery be
used cautiously and selectively, espe-
cially the nuclear-capable weapons.
Highly flexible nuclear artillery must
be spared for actual enemy penetration
threats or for local counterattacks and
counterbattery fire.
(Hypothetical ADM Family)
Target element
02 10 20 50
Highway truss mod 90 230 340 530
bridge sev 40 100 140 210
Tracked military mod 70 180 260 400
vehicles-APes sev 40 110 150 210
Tracked vehicles tanks mod 50 130 180 260
Wheeled military mod 70 180 260 400
Tree blowdown
150 370 580 910
180 510 820 1300
Forest fire area Class I 410 1040 1800 3060
Class IV 230 600 1060 1910
Casualties to IP 230 410 560 710
e)(posed personnel IT 310 520 700 890
LL 460 710 950 1190
Casualties to IP 210 390 520 670
personnel In APes IT 290 490 660 830
LL 430 680 900 1120
Casualties to IP 160 320 440 560
personnel In tanks IT 240 420' 560 710
LL 370 590 790 980
2d degree burns 140 330 530 890
e)l;;posed skin
NOTES mod-moderate damage-major repairs needed to return Item to
sev   severe damage total reconstruction IS necessary before Item can
be repaired and utlhled
IP-"Immedmte permanent IncapaCitation -personnel Will become Inca
pacltated Wlthm 5 minutes death will occur In 1 to 2 days (8.000
IT -Immediate tranSient mcapacltatlon- personnel become IncapaCI
tated Within 5 minutes and remain so 30 to 45 minutes Personnel
Will partially recover but death will occur wlUlin 4 to 6 days (3 000
ll- Personnel become functionally Impaired Within 2 hours but may
respond to medical assistance before death In several weeks (650
Class I woodland htter - fine grass and broken leaves
Class IV coniferous needles and thick green leaves
Tactical air-delivered systems are
also highly vulnerable. One need only
study the devastating effect that the
Soviet-supplied Egyptian afr defense
system had on the Israeli Air Force in
the 1973 October War. The United
States can no longer count on unchal-
lenged air superiority over the battle-
field. There will surely be a fight for
control of the skies, and this fight will
have a high priority in the early allo-
cation of available aircraft. Aircraft
simply will not be available for all
close air support missions that tactical
commanders may desire, and those
that are available will face a lethal air
defense envelope over the battlefield.
Conceivably, ADMs can take up
some of this battlefield "slack" where
it is known that large mechanized
formations must advance, such as
mountain passes and defiles and
across major bridges and autobahns.
As an example, consider an enemy
attack across a 3-kilometer front down
a high-speed avenue of approach with
mechanized infantry and armored
forces. If an ADM were emplaced on
the surface and a remote firing option
were used, a commander could have
the munition detonated as the enemy
approached. A single 2-kiloton (KT)
weapon would damage enemy tanks
180 meters in all directions and APCs
out to 260 meters. This could neutralize
12 percent of the attacking armor and
17 percent of the APCs in a single
blast. Personnel in those tanks would
be susceptible to initial nuclear radi-
ation and would become immediate
casualties out to 560 meters (37 percent
of all tank crews). Personnel in APCs
would become immediate casualties out
to 660 meters or 44 percent of all
mounted mechanized infantry. These
crews would become casualties from an
initial radiation dose within minutes of
the detonation and eventually succumb
to this exposure.
Delayed casualties resulting from
this nuclear blast could reach approxi-
mately 70 percent of the entire force.
Again, these casualties would result
from a massive dose of initial nuclear
radiation, would become incapacitated
within hours and eventually would die.
Chaos and confusion would be added
as bonus effects for the defenders and
would likely present good targets to
modem antitank systems. Besides
these effects to men and equipment, a
crater approximately 30 meters in di-
ameter and 13 meters deep would be
formed at the point of detonation, and
dry fuels would be ignited over a total
area of 10.2 square kilometers. Troops
in the open would receive second-
degree skin bums up to 530 meters
from ground zero. Fallout, induced
ground radiation and fires could en-
hance the effectiveness of the obstacle.
Even greater effects could be obtained
if the system were emplaced and deto-
nated above the ground such as in an
abandoned building. Not only would
blast and thermal damage be en-
hanced, but residual radiation would
be reduced, allowing friendly troops to
operate in the affected areas sooner.
There are other points to consider.
If an ADM is to be detonated when an
enemy axis of attack is in the best
position for destruction, the executing
commander must know exactly when
to give the order to fire. This means
that he will have to "sense" the enemy
either by means of a forward observer,
the ADM assembly team itself or by
some electronic surveillance
equipment. If personnel are to be used
as the eyes of the commander in ob-
serving the enemy, a minimum safe
Attempt-Two Reinforced Motorized Infantry Battalions
Infantry Regiment) _---_
/,-- -..................
,,/' "
// "
/ \
/ \
I \
I \
I \
I \
1. Immediate casualties-tank crews 560 meters
2. Immediate casualties-APe personnel 660 meters
3. Delayed casualties-tank crews 790 meters
  ~ Delayed casualties-APe personnel 900 meters
5. Minimum safe distance-friendly personnel-warned protected 1,550 meters
distance must be observed for each
yield so that no danger from the deto-
nation occurs. This distance can vary
from 610 meters for a .2-KT weapon
detonation on the surface to 2,320
meters for a 5-KT weapon with the
observer in a protected position.
Since maximum destructive force
would be delivered to the enemy when
1,000 500 o 500 1,000
meters 1...' __ -'-__ -'-__ '--_----'
the weapon was as near the center of.
the enemy force as possible, it may be
best to have the enemy reconnaissance
and advance guard elements pass by
the weapon in order to cause maximum
damage to the main body. It also may
be desired to use 'conventional ob-
stacles such as mines and ditches to
slow the main enemy force or to bring
the main body under antitank guided
missile fire to stop it or reduce speed as
it approaches the best position for
destruction. After the detonation, re-
connaissance and advance guard ele-
ments, now cut off from the destroyed
ma)n body, can be attacked and elimi-
Such a weapon would have to be
well-camouflaged and possibly moved
off of the center of advance to lessen
the possibility of detection. If the
weapon is placed well before the ar-
rival of the enemy, camouflage should
be no problem. Our hypothetical 2-KT
ADM is 5 feet long and only 21!2 feet in
diameter with an approximate weight
of fiOO pounds. Other systems in this
family can be as small as 3 feet long
and only 15 inches in diameter with a
weight of only 100 pounds. Camou-
flaging an object this size should not
be a major undertaking.
Where terrain demands, the system
can be buried and, as the deptn of
burial is increased, the radius of
damage decreases. As a rule of thumb,
the radius of damage is reduced by 10
meters for every meter that the system
is buried down to a depth of approxi-
mately 10 meters. If the system is to be
buried and used as an antipersonnel-
type weapon, a depth of burial in
excess of 10 meters would not be prac-
Since the damage radii can be con-
trolled by the depth of burial, the
commander is given an even greater
flexibility in his planning. With only a
limited number of yields available,
significant modifications in damage
radii can still be achieved by varying
the depths of burial. This modifying
ability can be used to reduce collateral
damage and also reduce safety dis-
tances for friendly troops operating in
the area. Preplanned targets with
predetermined yields using ADMs and
a minimum of trained personnel can
increase the comm'ander's battlefield
flexibility greatly.
With our own small numbers of
deployed forces, every concept that
could economize forces and maximize
firepower effectiveness at the front
must be considered. The ADM is a
reliable and available system that
could be used now as a weapon without
modification to the system itself. Only
a change in doctrine, thinking and
training would be needed to make the
ADM a more potent tool and take full
advantage of its total capability by
enlarging its battlefield role from
simply demolition to weapon.
Military History Symposium. The Department of History. US Air Force
Academy. announces its Eighth MIlitary History Symposium. to be held
18-20 October 1978 The tOPIC "Air Power and Warfare" was chosen to
commemorate the 75th anmversary year of the Wright brothers' flight at
Kitty Hawk. Coverage will be international In scope, ranging over the full
spectrum of 20th-Century aerial warfare Included on the program. along
with leading scholars from the United States and abroad, will be a number
of distingUished military aViators who helped shape the course of history.
For further Information about the symposium. write Majors John F. Shiner
or Russell W Mank. Department of History. US Air Force Academy, CO
Indilt's Defense Policy
and Infrastructure
Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Retired
Defense policy in a country is manifested in its ar!'ted force
and the infrastructure which supports'the armed force. The
infrastructure includes government agencies, the civil sector
and the will of the people. In India, the government owns
most of the defense-related industry: however, the civil
sector has shown its willingness and ability to support the
armed force in times of crisis with its industry, businesses,
transportation systems and manpower. Since the early
1970s, India has been emerging as a regional-power with
interests outside the subcontinent. Current goals which will
affect defense policy include increased self-reliance,
accelerated local production and modernization of the in-
dustrial complex. The process is slow, but, without a doubt,
change is underway.
EFENSE policy of a country nor,
mally materializes in two forms:
the armed force which constitutes its
cutting edge and the infrastructure
which supports the armed force. As
experience shows, the former normally
steals the show, and not without some
justification. Yet the latter is also vital.
Without it, military capability could
become ineffectual.
Indeed, the two act and react; while
policy influences infrastructure, in-
frastructure influences policy. The)"
bear mutually a close and continuing
relationship, conditioned by time and
circumstance and the dynamics. of
changing security environment. This
point is eloquently illustrated by the
dramatic and profound metamor·
phoses both policy and its props un-
dergo when a nation switches from the
state of peace to the state of war.
First, what is infrastructure? This is
hard to define precisely. It must in-
clude facilities for producing arms and
equipment and the means of supply. It
al$o must include the resources and
organizations which enable the
facilities to develop, acquire a specific
shape and have a particular statute.
There is perhaps another category of
supporting elements which form a sort
of crucible or cushion for the main
edifice, quite significant even though
not directly related to military
capability. This is a broad dimension
of infrastructure, but is necessary in
the Indian environment, remembering
that the national security of the
country rests on a much broader
support base than the visible props
would indicate.
Following this line, the in-
frastructure may be viewed in three
concentric circles. In the outermost
region would lie its rather intangible
constituents-the national will, unity,
intelligence and physical and moral
fiber of the people. In the middle would
be the ingredients quite tangible but
still of indirect concern, including, in
particular, the nation's political
machinery and economic complex.
Finally, at the core would be facilities
that equip, supply, maintain and
directly support the armed force in the
fulfillment of its combat mission.
The Crucible
While our emphasis would be on the
last aspect, a brief reference must be
made to the first two. In a large
country such as India, with 600 million
people, it is quite a problem to ap-
preciate and define what goes under
the description of national will and
caliber. Two-thirds of the population is
illiterate and could hardly comprehend
the highly complex and baffling issues
of national security. Besides, the
process of national integration is still
ongoing in India, and it is not easy to
discern a united, orchestrated voice on
major national problems.
However, some valuable indicators
are there. India has fought four major
wars since independence. The con-
clusion is unmistakable that, when the
chips are down, the people rally round
the governmen t as one man.
Cockfights and controversies are
stilled, gravity of the crisis is grasped
and, in general, the nation displays
discipline and unity. Thus, India's
defense policy takes loyalty and active
support of the people at large for
granted, which lightens the burdens
Wm/? Commander Mahara} K Chopra.
Indzan AIr Force, Rettred. 1,S a milltary cor·
respondent for the En/?hsh·lan/?uage Jndwn
newspaper. The Indian Express. and holds an
M.A. from the Indwn UnwerSlty. He IS the
author of IndIa: The Search for Power and
has been a frequent contnbutor to the
MilItary Review for the past 16 yeaTS.
and strengthens the hands of those at
the helm.
Ample manpower is another asset.
Although military service is voluntary
in India, there is no dearth of
volunteers. The problem of "draft
evasion" does not exist. Hence, defense
planners can apply rigorous standards
of recruitment and training which, in
turn, pay dividends in the shape of
high-quality fighting materiel.
Two aspects of the political en-
vironment are relevant to defense.
India has adhered to the traditions
imbibed from the British, by which
military authority is subservient to
civil authority. As a consequence, the
soldier scrupulously obeys the
politician. Whether it is peacetime or
wartime, a period of normalcy or crisis,
the armed force has stood steadfast in
a neutral position, giving its loyalty to
whosoever takes the reins of power.
India has been immune to military
coups and the upheavals and uncer-
tainties which normally trail behind a
military takeover. This factor of the
armed force being dependable at all
tim..!!s provides a vital prop to national
Also inherited from the British is
India's parliamentary form of
government. It has been a striking
feature of India's political life that its
parliament, although a hunting
ground of loudly articulated diver-
gences of all kinds, has been scrupu-
lously unanimous in upholding na-
tional defense. The armed force has
been financed, supported, lauded and
thanked with a consensus absent in
virtually every other field. While this
has won over the soldier, it has in-
spired the defense ministers in their
task of assessing security requirements
and asking for whatever material and
moral support is needed in their policy
Finally, India's economic endeavor
has several features positively
favoring defense infrastructure. The
Five-Year Development Plan and the
Five-Year Defense Plan are now
dovetailed. Resources are channeled
with due regard for defense allocations;
constraints on defense budgets arise
from scarcity of funds in general, not
from neglect.
From the beginning of development
planning, India has laid special
emphasis on certain "core"
industries-steel, heavy machinery,
electric power and oil. To these have
been added industries more
sophisticated such as electronics and
nuclear energy. India already
possesses ample raw materials of con-
siderable variety. Thus, an impressive,
multifaced industrial edifice has
sprung up as a backing to the complex
that caters for defense needs. That this
edifice has loopholes is admitted, but
there is no doubt that a broad and firm
industrial foundation for defense has
been established in the country.
Defense Policy and Arms Production
Among the constituents directly
involved in defense infrastructure, top
priority is given to the production of
arms and equipment. This has posed
some difficult problems for India's
defense planners. At the time of in-
dependence, India's arsenal consisted
of hardware almost wholly of foreign
manufacture, mostly British. The few
units set up in the country produced
nonlethal material, like clothing. Thus,
the defense production that has come
into being today is almost wholly
India's own creation from scratch. The
road traveled   ~ this connection has
been long and the journey arduous.
India can take credit for what it has
done. But there were, and are still,
serious roadblocks that must not be
The policy governing arms
manufacture has been dictated partly
by provisions in the Indian Con-
stitution and partly by circumstances.
According to the constitution, defense
is a subject wholly within the
jurisdiction of the central government,
and the two dozen states and
territories are concerned with it only to
the extent determined by the central
The entire industrial-military
complex is completely owned, con-
trolled and run by the central
authority. The principle of central
government control has been {urther
extended to exclude the private in·
dustrial sector which is only
marginally concerned with the
production of arms and ammunition.
The arms-producing factories and un-
dertakings which have come into being
are part and parcel of the defense
establishment. Within the es-
tablishment, again certain demar-
cation lines have been drawn. Con-
trary to the practice that applies in the
United States, the army, navy and air
force in India have no arms-
manufacturing responsibility or
assignment. They are consumers, not
Production is under the Ministry of
Defense which presides over what
probably is the biggest industrial
empire in the country. In running this
empire, it asks the military to for-
mulate its requirements, drafts the
services of military experts for key
positions in the arms industry and
creates cells for liaison between con-
sumers and producers. But it makes
policies, supplies finance and lays
down the administrative apparatus.
With its fingers firmly on the controls,
the center has had two definite goals in
view. To quote from the Ministry of
Defense Report:
... the main thrust of defense
production effort is towards the twin
objective of modernization of arms and
equipment and achievement of
progressive self-reliance and self-
While, in order to "buy time," India
may import design and technology
from foreign countries, the policy has
been to reduce the imports and work
toward local production. Research and
development have become of key im-
portance and have received much
Defense Factories and Undertakings
Over the years, the arms-
manufacturing complex has assumed
two distinctive forms: one is called
ordnance factories and the other
defense undertakings. The ordnance
factories are purely departmental in
character, structured like any
government concern and manned by
government officials.
There are three dozen such factories
employing nearly 100,000 personnel.
Their function is to tum out items
which fall in the broad category of
ordnance-arms, ammunition,
chemicals, metals, explosives, in-
struments, . projectiles, rockets,
vehicles, bridging equipment and
clothing. India's medium tank Vi·
jayanta is built in one of these fac·
tories. India is now practically self-
sufficient in rifles, certain types of field'
and mountain guns, light and heavy
mortars, carbines and light antiair-
craft guns. An upgraded version of a
field gun is among the current projects.
The nine defense undertakings,
employing about 100,000 men, enjoy a
greater measure of autonomy than
ordnance factories. They are account-
able annually to the public for their
output and profit and loss. They are
structured on business lines. The range
of items includes aircraft, ships, elec-
tronic equipment, specialized tools,
heavy machinery and special metals.
Of these, the largest and the most
important are Hindustan Aeronautics,
Mazagon Docks and Bharat Elec-
Hindustan Aeronautics manufac-
tures the MIG21M supersonic jet in-
terceptor, the Marut ground attack
aircraft, the Kiran basic jet trainer and
the Cheetah helicopter, plus a few
other planes for observation, training
The Mazagon Docks is India's
biggest ship-building complex. In the
field of warship construction, its
foremost activity is concerned with
Leander class frigates, half a dozen of
which have been completed. It also
constructs patrol craft and assault
boats. Extending its activity to the
civil sector, it builds passenger and
cargo ships, tankers, tugs, launches
and cranes.
Bharat Electronics is a premier
electronic unit in the country,
manufacturing communication
equipment for use by the defense serv-
ices and other departments such as
All India Radio. The electronic
equipment includes wireless
transmitters, radar and television com-
Employing 3,000 scientists and
5,000 technicians and controlling
nearly three dozen laboratories, India's
defense research organization has
become a major enterprise behind the
manufacturing effort. It is engaged in
a number of various projects but, ac-
cording to official statements, has
identified certain areas of major thrust
for the next five years. These are
missiles and rockets, aeronautics and
avionics, electronics and radar, and
naval research.
Nuclear Capability
In connection with India's arms-
building effort, mention has been made
of its nuclear capability. India
repeatedly has affirmed that it would
not make the bomb, but, as an in-
dication of the potential, a brief
reference to this aspect should be
made. The Indian atomic energy es-
tablishment is nearly 30 years old, run
by top scientists and has high-level
expertise to its credit. Two nuclear
power stations and a plant to reprocess
burned uranium that yields weapon-
grade plutonium have been set up.
Research in breeder reactor technology
is well-advanced. The progress in
rocketry and electronic guidance may
be gauged from the fact that India has
fired its own satellite. Finally, India
has carried out a nuclear explosion.
These are significant achievements,
but what the government does with
them is a matter. of policy. The present.
policy may be expressed thus: The
nuclear genie is on the threshold of
the defense infrastructure, but has
little chance of entry in the near future.
An Appraisal
How may one appraise the arms-
producing aspect of India's defense
infrastructure? No doubt it is well-
organized, comprehensive and covers a
wide field. In some respects, it is self-
sufficient. However, in an otherwise
bright picture, one notices a few dark
patches. The capability to produce
major weapons is limited. Almost all
such weapons under manufacture
belong to an old generation. None of
them could be described as 100 percent
indigenous, being the products of
collaboration with one or another
country-Britain (for tanks, frigates
and fighter bombers), the USSR (for
the MIG) and France (for missiles).
This results in dependence upon import
of some key components although their
number has been reduced.
Several factors account for the
shortcomings. The defense complex is
a reflection of the total national in-
dustrial capability which has still to
attain top-quality sophistication. The
basic weakness is said to lie in con-
ception and design. Defense research,
even though expanded, could do with a
higher priority on the score of in-
vestment. Even when expertise is
available, local production beyond a
certain stage poses serious problems of
economics. India is caught, as all coun-
tries are more or less, in the whirlpool
of rapidly advancing technology which
hastens the pace of weapons' ob-
Indian defense planners say, while
referring to the modernization of the
armed forces, that they have taken into
account the lessons derived from some
of the more recent developments-the
Arab-Israeli War, for instance. This
war threw light on the capability of
several new types of weapons. For the
first time, the antitank missiles-the
Russian Snapper, Swatter, Sagger,
RPG7V and the American TOW-
made their mark on the battlefield,
gIVIng infantry a weapon clearly
effective against the heaviest tank.
Similarly, the surface-to-air missiles-
SA3, SA6 and SA7-inflicted heavy
damage upon Israel's attacking air-
craft. Thus, while the tank or the
fighter-bomber would still be needed,
the balance has shifted against them.
India's modernization of the forces
would require some such weapons in
the not too distant future, and its
military-industrial complex would
have to be upgraded.
The upshot of this is that, for
traditional weapons as well as newly
developed major arms, the country
depends upon foreign sources. This
imposes some important constraints
upon India's defense policy. Weapons
have become very expensive, and ac-
quisition of these for a country with
limited defense budgets and unlimited
economic demands is not easy.
Besides, the good weapons are scarce,
and their supply is linked to deep,
complicated foreign policies.
The Communication System
Next to having arms is the ability
to ca'rry them. As Aristotle would say,
an ordered armed force is like an
animal, and communication lines are
its veins and arteries. Certain in-
escapable imperatives of the Indian
environment govern their character
and layout. The size of the country
with an extraordinarily varied terrain.
of steep mountains, wooded plateaus,
thick jungles, narrow coastlines and
riverine plains requires them to be
elaborate, versatile and sturdy. They
also must be geared to the location of
producing and consuming centers
which are widely dispersed within the
country. The steel complex, for in-
stance, is concentrated in the
northeast, but its products have to be
moved to defense production units 800
miles away such as Calcutta and
Then, there is the problem of
orienting the communication lines to
the more sensitive areas and focal
points in the country, a problem bound
with the pe1feption and identification
of threat to national security. Judged
by past military confrontations, the
sectors most vulnerable have been in
the Himalayan range along the border
with China and in the northwest of the
country along the border with
Pakistan. More recent considerations
are -with the seaboard facing the
northern part of the Arabian Sea
through which almost all of India's
imported oil comes.
Finally, who would provide the
transportation and communication
facilities? The armed force does have
its facilities, but these are far from
adequate and would be fully absorbed
in operational duties during wartime.
Thus, the onus of feeding the defense
establishment lies in the civil sector-
railways, roadways, civil aviation,
posts and telegraph, and radio. In no
field are defense and civil agencies so
intimately linked as in the system of
transportation and communication.
Railways are the kingpin of the
system. Without them, the services
would starve in peacetime, and little
mobilization could take place in
wm;time. They are the carriers of the
smallest as well as the biggest items
and the bulk of personnel. With nearly
40,000 miles of network, the railways
are government-owned so that, in time
of emergency, they can be put into
action quickly.
How they are dovetailed with the
military may be gleaned from the
military-railway nexus, the MILRAIL,
that functioned in the 1971 war with
Pakistan. At all echelons of the
military and the railway, parallel cells
were activated. While the army
command formulated its requirements
for troops, baggage and equipment, the
railway authorities worked out the
details for rolling stock and issued
movement instructions. The transpor-
tation of general purpose stock and
personnel did not present much dif-
ficulty, but there also was the question
of moving heavy tanks and so forth
which required special-type rolling
stock. Special new tracks had to be laid
in certain areas."
In many ways, railways became
part of the military, exposed, for in-
stance, to the same hazards in the zone
of operations. The liaison worked well,
and a high official remarked that,
~ h i l   execution of army demands w"as
expeditious enough, preparation of
reports for the highups, in fact, took
more time.
Railways have, howev'er, certain
limitations. The Indian railway gauge
system is awkward. There are half a
dozen gauge systems varying from 5
feet 6 inches to 2 feet inherited from
the British. There are more than 50
points all over the country where goods
ha ve to change from one system to
another. The effect of this was il-
lustrated in World War II when the two
gauges which had to be negotiated for
rail movement from Bengal to Assam
for the fighting in Burma caused most
embarrassing delays. The narrow
gauge means smaller rail cars and
lower speeds. And, finally, railways do
not cover the jungled or mountainous
parts of the country.
Strategic Roads
It is here that roadways become
significant. They do something more
than fill the rail gap. Several roads
have been specially. constructed to
serve strategic purposes. The center-
piece of this effort is the Indian Border
Road Organization. It is a semimil-
itary body which has done com-
mendable work in the more difficult
border regions, particularly in the
northeast-the sector where the Indian
forces met their debacle against
Chinese attack in 1962. One cause was
the poverty of surface communications
up the Himalayan slope.
Among its other achievements is
the Sikkim Road which runs up to the
Himalaya's crest in the northeast and,
in the northwest, the Hindustan-TIbet
Road which winds its way to the
border with China. In both these areas,
Indian and Chinese troops confront
each other. India's northeastern
region, once a no man's land and the
scene of insurgency for several years,
has developed a good surface com-
munication network.
India also has collaborated with
Nepal and Bhutan, two independent
strategically located states in India's
border zone in the Himalayas along
China, in building valuable surface .
links. Apart from these, several
strategic roads have been constructed
in the desert region, the theater of
Indo-Pakistani skirmishes.
In the Indian geographical en-
vironment, roadways and railways
alone could not foot the bill, a point
best illustrated by the Hindustan-TIbet
Road. Thanks to heavy snowfall,
which may form mounds 80 feet high,
it is closed during the winter months.
The only means of reaching the troops
in the Ladakh region of Kashmir is by
Air ferries, whether transport
planes or helicopters, are crucial to the
communication system in the border
regions even in peacetime. This is
mainly a responsibility of the services.
In wartime, civil aviation is harnessed
as a second line of the air com-
munication infrastructure. In all the
fighting engagements, civil aircraft
have been used to carry supplies in
support of operations, and, as in the
case of railways, liaison between the
military and airline authorities is es-
tablished promptly during the crisis.
However, there are limitations. In a
large country like India, the air
medium is indispensable for quick
travel, and it may be counter-
productive to thin out the civil fleet too
much. Besides, these aircraft are
primarily for passenger traffic with
their trappings not conducive to the
carriage of goods, and the pilots are
not trained for military tasks.
Among the defense-supporting
facilities in the civil sector, a mention
must be made of ports. India has over
200 ports in its long 3,OOO-mile
coastline. The major ones are of inter-
national status and have been
enlarged, provided with multifarious
conveniences to cater to a variety of
traffic and are well-connected with the
inland_ Some of them, like Bombay
and Vishakhapatnam, have specific
facilities for military use. From the
strategic angle, these have acquired
added importance after the oil crisis.
India imports nearly two-thirds of its
oil supplies. Most of it comes from the
Middle East and is distributed among
the refineries.
India has yet to enter an era of
extensive oil pipe line networks, but its
beginning is not without strategic
significance. An oil pipe line is under
cons.truction from the west coast to a
refinery being set up in the town of
Mathura, located centrally vis·a·vis the
sensitive northern and northwestern
sectors. Along the west coast covering
part of the Arabian Sea, India has
struck offshore oil. Sea boundaries
have not been demarcated yet, and, in
the absence of an internationally
recognized sea law, jurisdiction over
the offshore zone is likely to be dis-
puted. I
Quality Plus Quantity
Defense policy is not concerned only
with what may be described as the
quantitative elements such as military
hardware and supply systems. It also
must take quality of defense into ac-
count, a task quite challenging thanks
to the widening parameters of national
security, technical revolution and the
impact of political and social forces on
national security. In India, the areas
particularly susceptible to these forces
include interrelationships in the
defense organization, mechanism of
decisionmaking, art of management
and morale-building in the services.
The higher defense machinery in
India has the president as the supreme
commander. The defense responsibility
rests with the cabinet where its Com-
mittee on Political Affairs deals with
military matters. This committee is
assisted by the defense minister who,
in turn, has advice from secretarial
committees under him. In time of
crisis, ad hoc arrangements come into
being. One notices that the supreme
commander is only a figurehead, with
very little contact with defense or with
the force which he is supposed to
command. The cabinet does not
maintain any standing specialist body
of defense experts. And, outside it, no
institution exists such as the National
Security Council in the United States.
This system, though rather dis-
persed, has worked well during the
country's crisis periods. And yet it has
been the subject of debate. A premise is
that India's war experience has been
confined to short durations and
against an adversary distinctively in-
ferior in military power-namely,
Pakistan. The points raised are
whether a generalized system is
suitable in an era when the problems
of national security, strategy, ar-
mament, and control and direction of
. forces have become so highly com-
plicated and specialized.
At the top echelon, the military
element is represented by the Chiefs of
Staff Committee. Its function is purely
advisory, and it is just one limb of a
sizable body. What should be the role
of the chiefs of staff, considering their
high-level professional expertise? In
India, the army, navy and air force are
independent services. Is the Chiefs of
Staff Committee enough for liaison, or
must it be headed by a joint chief as in
the United States? The autonomous
character of the' services also entails
triplicated machinery at' all levels
which are likely to hamper speed and
give rise to wasteful administrative
proliferation. Critics suggest a more
streamlined, integrated and specialized
decisionmaking structure.
India has given considerable
thought to the mechanism for
collecting and correlating information,
facts and figures which normally come
under intelligence. Intelligence usually
concerns a twilight zone where foreign,
defense and internal security policies
overlap. A special concern in India
arises from its sensitive borders which
are perpetually alive. The upshot is
that a host of agencies-military, civil
and semimilitary-have come into be-
ing. One big lesson India has drawn
from its wars is that, while material is
ample, even   it is liable to be
scattered among several and
diffused in a plethora of documents
and files. The problem is not so much
of collection and accumulation as of
collation, assimilation, assessment and
evaluation. Several changes have been
made in the intelligence structure with
a view to organize, sift and com-
municate information with minimum
loss of time.
Like other countries today, India
feels the pinch of mounting defense
budgets. While its military spending is
low-only four percent of the gross
national product-the fact remains
that every year that passes demands
an extra bit into the kitty. Technical
changes and inflation are the two
important factors which keep a
running pressure on costs, and, to the
extent that both of them are world
phenomenon, national governments
have only limited control over the
matter. The governments can reduce
the pressure by turning to new
management, planning and
forecasting methods that raise the
efficiency of resource utilization and
increase the correctness of
procurement decisions. The essence of
good management is to get the best
value out of every dollar.
In following this line, India has
been striving to establish management
techniques in several key areas within
the services. The Institute of Defense
Management is a relatively recent
body set up in this connection. Liaison
is maintained with civilian specialist
institutions like the Administrative
Staff College of India. The procedures
and methods inelude work study, com-
puterization, inventory control, project
management and value engineering.
Among the projects carried out are the
cost-effectiveness of free-flight rockets,
heavy guns and bombers, and of the
use of tanks and antitank weapons in
the context of recent conflicts. India's
requirements for an Air Defense
Ground Environment System are being
met by the Tata Institute of Fun-
damental Research, a premier research
India's peculiar conditions of
service have made the government
shoulder certain additional respon-
sibilities bearing on the welfare and
morale of the soldier. A bulk of the
defense personnel have to be posted in
the border zones which are by and
large non family areas and where they
may have to spend a major part of
their tenure of service. Thus, families
and children who are left behind are
liable to be on their own for long
periods and, therefore, need assistance.
Another situation arises from the fact
that about 60,000 personnel retire from
the armed forces every year. The policy
is to keep the forces young. Most of
them are in the age group of 35 to 40
years, a period of life when family
responsibilities are at the peak.
A special organization has been set
up to take care of the problems of
isolated families, to prepare personnel
for civilian careers and arrange
employment after military service.
Centrally placed at army head-
quarters, it has branches all over the
country and has links with a network
of civilian administrative bodies,
businesses, industry and rural in-
stitutions. While in the service, per-
sonnel are given training courses
suitable for the new careers they
propose to adopt. Outside the service,
assistance is offered in the shape of
reserved posts, allotment of land and
imIllements for agriculture, loans to set
up enterprises, construction of houses
and schooling of children. The
measures adopted not only go a long
way solving a human problem, but
also enable valuable skills to be
channeled into constructive fields and
help build up a defense reservoir of
trained men.
India's defense policy and in-
frastructure are, generally speaking,
well-correlated. The stipulation is that
developments in one would be reflected
in the other. This is, in fact, happening
at present. For over two decades after
independence, this policy was almost
wholly preoccupied with the en-
vironment of the subcontinent and
adjustment of relationship with the
neighboring states. That era ended as
the 1970s opened, Pakistan broke up
and India acquired a preeminent place
in the subcontinent as well a status
befitting its position as South Asia's
largest state.
Since then, its security dimensions
have been enlarged considerably, par-
ticularly in the Indian Ocean, thanks
to its increasing offshore interests,
arms buildup in the neighboring
Middle East and lessons learned from
the more recent conflicts. The defense
infrastructure is being changed accord-
ingly. The stress is on self-reliance
and accelerated local production, ac-
quisition of superior techniques and
modernization of the industrial
complex. The process is steady but
slow. This is partly due to restraints
upon investment and difficulties of
developing the sophisticated weapon-
building expertise. Fortunately, it also
is due to a period of detente on the
subcontinent, and resources can be
directed to the civil sectors to the
maximum. Neither a dramatic shift in
defense policy nor a big breakthrough
in infrastructure may be expected. But,
. without a doubt, change is underway.
State of the Reserves. The Guard and Reserve now prOVide 54 percent of
the Army's total deployable forces; 61 percent of the Air Force's tactical
airlift aircraft, 35 percent of the' Navy's air antlsubmanne patrol
squadrons; 25 percent of the Manne diVISion-wing teams; and a lot more.
On Writing and Fighting
A Comparative
of the Process
Colonel John C. Gazlay,
US Army
There is a definite correlation between writing and fighting.
Facing an enemy who is numerically superior and who
possesses a technology equal to ours means that we must
properly combine men, materiel and intelligent tactics if we
are to win. Our doctrinal writers must provide practical
solutions to the problems that will face us on future
battlefields. Each country seems to have its own unique way
of developing and disseminating doctrine. The US method
appears adequate, liut there is still plenty of room for
improvement. By making better use of our brainpower, we
can produce more timely and readable doctrine presented in
a form which is more acceptable to the soldier in the field.
AR is not an affair of chance.
A great deal of knowledge.
study. and meditation is neces-
sary to conduct it well; and when
blows are planned whoever con-
trives them with the greatest ap·
preciation of their consequences
will have a great advantage.
Frederick the Great
The primary mission of our Army is
to prepare our forces for the defense' of
NATO. If we are committed to a war in
Central Europe. the first battles will be
fought by the forward-deployed forces
currently stationed there, with little
hope of significant reinforcement other
than tactical air forces.
The threat opposing our forces is
capable of attacking across NATO
frontiers at multiple points, preceded
by little or no warning, with large
armored and mechanized formations,
supported by massive numbers of ar-
tillery pieces and multiple·rocket
launchers, and thousands of high-
performance fighter·bombers. The
threat also has several airborne
divisions that could be employed
against objectives deep in NATO
defenses. A blitzkrieg that Hitler could
only dream of might overwhelm NATO
forces in the first battles of the nekt
Historically, our Army has been ill-
prepared to fight any war into which it
has been ordered. The early battles of
each new war have been chronicled by
bloody withdrawals and humiliating
defeats for our forces. The tide of battle
was turned and ultimate victory
achieved only after large manpower
reserves had been mobilized and in·
dustry tooled up to overwhelm with
sheer numbers, not always better
tactics and equipment, the powers that
opposed us.
We frequently have been accused of
preparing to win the last war. Our
Army's recent tactical experiences
have been in infantry-intensive
conflicts-Korea, Vietnam. What is
needed is a tactical doctrine that lifts
us out of the rice paddies and places us
on a modern armor battlefield.
Other charges that may be levied
against our previous readiness also
relate to doctrine. Our traditional field
manuals have been accused of:
• Describing how we would like
to fight rather than how we must fight .
• A preoccupation with form
rather than fundamentals.
Finally, a review of the state of the
art in weaponry reveals that modern
weapons systems have more range,
accuracy and lethality than any
Weapons we previously have en-
countered on the battlefield. Recent
conflicts in the Middle East have
demonstrated that small nations, when
equipped with modern weapons
systems, can generate unprecedented
violence and cause destruction on a
scale previously considered only within
the capability of large industrial
- These technological facts have
caused the world's military tactical
communities to ·accept two postulates
as realities:
• What can be seen can be hit;
what can be hit can be killed.
• A first battle resulting in cata-
strophic losses to one side will
probably preclude the occurrence of a
second battle.
The US Army Training and Doc-
trine ·Command (TRADOC) has.
devoted a great amount of time and
energy to studies of the tactical conse-
quences imposed by new weapons
systems. The conclusions of t h ~ s  
Colonel John C. Gazlay is deputy director,
Department of Resource Management,
USACGSC. He received a B.S. from Penn-
syivanla State Unwerszty and lS a graduate
of the USACGSC He has served zn Vietnam
and wuh the OffIce of the Deputy Ch,ef of
Staff for OperatIOns and Plans.
studies and appraisal of the criticism
directed toward previous field manuals
pointed the way' to a new series of
doctrinal literature-how' to fight
(HTF) manuals.
How to fight manuals use the
follpwing standards for production:
• They should have:
-Simple, complete language
to capture and hold reader interest.
-Crystal clear concepts that
leap out at the reader.
-illustrations, charts, graphs
to help tell the story.
-The best effort of the best
-Priority of production at
all levels.
• They should focus on:
-Vivid descriptions (sce-
narios) of how the battle is fought
rather than cataloging staff
-The threat and how to
counter the threat.
-Combined arms opera-
These standards make it clear that
authors of HTF literature must address
the requirements of a wartime fighting
Army. Their charter is to provide prac-
tical answers to the issues, not to etch
phrases or display their command of
the language. Foremost in the author's
thoughts must be:
I am writing to express, not
impress-l must relate lessons learned
from past wars to the modern
battlefield and tell our people how to
avoid the catastrophic losses that
modern weapons may impose-l must
desrribe the battle in a measure·
countermeasure dynamic-that is, if
, this enemy does this, we do that
.,' The capstone manual in the HTF
I' series is Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations. This manual establishes
the fundamentals and principles from
which all supporting HTF manuals
emanate. Its style and tone provide the
guide for all doctrinal literature.
The capstone manual represents
consensus; the Army at large par-
ticipated in the development of FM
100-5. To ensure a large degree of
universality in concepts and doctrine,
this manual also was coordinated with
the Tactical Air Command, the
Germans and the Israelis.
Preparation of doctrinal literature
for the contemporary battlefield also
must consider the perishability or
"shelf life" of that doctrine. To stabi-
lize our current doctrine and permit its
inculcation through practice, the HTF
series of manuals will include the
period when the next generation of
modern weapons will be absorbed into
the Army-for example, the XMl tank;
the MICV (mechanized infantry
combat vehicle); the Stinger; the CLGP
(cannon-launched guided projectile);
SLUF AE (surface-launched unit fuel
air explosive); the Ash-those systems
well advanced in development and
procurement. Unless there are unex-
pected weapons systems changes, or
substantial changes in the con-
figuration of our or the threats' Army,
HTF literature should provide ade-
quate guidance for the Army for an
extended period.
Another form of perishability that
usually is not perceived is that of the
influence of' personalities-the senior
tactician present. The comings and
goings of commanders are episodic;
doctrine provides the thread of con-
tinuity and perpetuates the corporate
body of knowledge.
At this juncture, the correlation
between writing and fighting snould be
readily apparent. A faceless, nameless
cadre of highly competent writers, who
have acquired a "Ph.D. in soldier,"
nurture practical solutions for battle-
field problems into the manuals that
guide our Army in preparation for, and
execution of, combat missions.
Notions of combat are constantly
changing. One notion that I thor-
oughly subscribe to is: "It is not
patriotic to die for your country, when
you can arrange for the enemy an
opportunity to die for his country."
To enhance fulfillment of this
notion, HTF literature addresses
lessons for survival that have been
learned at the cost of lives and by the
loss of materiel. A summary of these
lessons follows:
• The tank, because of its
mobility, armor protection and
firepower, is, and will remain for some
time to come, the dominant weapons
system on the battlefield. However, in
view of the accuracy, range and
lethality of other weapons systems,
tanks cannot operate alone. For this
reason, all other arms exist to assist
the maneuver of tanks over the
• Infantry, armed with light-
weight, man-portable, antitank guided
missiles (ATGMs), can defeat any tank
in the world at ranges up to 3,000
meters. Dismounted infantry is
vulnerable against the effects of all
weapons systems. When mounted in
armored personnel carriers, they are
protected against small arms fires and
shell fragments from artillery or
mortars and can maneuver with tanks.
If time precludes the surface movement
of infantry, they may be moved rapidly
to the place of decision or to threatened
areas by helicopter. Helicopters rid
infantry of the encumbrances of
terrain, provide transportation for
their ATGMs and place them on the
ground fresh for battle.
• Air defense provides the um-
brella that shields ground forces from
air attack. No army can expect to
survive unless it operates under an
eJftensive, cohesive and mobile air
defense umbrella. These weapons have
highly efficient target acquisition and
guidance systems and protect the force
against attack from low, medium and
high altitudes.
• Night vision devices, passive
and active, must be developed to a
point that maneuver is possible during
periods of darkness rather than current
limits that usually only permit the
static positioning of weapons.
• Target servicing rates-that is,
the capability to acquire, track, fire at
and destroy a large number of
targets-are too slow. Solutions to in-
crease the servicing rate for ground
forces include:
-Increase exposure time of
targets-for example, delay them with
-Add more  
example, attack helicopters, tactical
-Improve weapons effec-
tiveness-for example, precision
guided munitions.
-Improve weapons sur-
vivability-for example, place the
TOW and its crew under armor pro-
-Increase rates of fire-for
example, develop large caliber (20mm-
30mm) automatic weapons systems for
infantry fighting vehicles.
• Suppression of enemy weapons
systems is required to increase friendly
relative combat power and to maneu-
ver on the battlefield. A certain portion
of the available force must overwatch
from covered positions and place sup-
pressive fires on the enemy. Sup-
pressive means include direct and in-
direct fire weapons, smoke and
electronic warfare. Darkness and other
periods of limited visibility also
provide a form of suppression.
• Concentration at the right
place and right time increases relative
combat power. Since there are seldom
sufficient forces to be strong
everywhere, decisive concentration re-
quires the acceptance of prudent risks
at other locations.
• Cover against the effects of
direct fire weapons is required.
Protection offered by terrain must be
used to its fullest advantage. In the
defense, this applies to weapons
positions; in the offense, geometric
battle formations (line, column, wedge)
are no longer possible. Movement must
be conducted behind the mask of every
available fold in the ground. In the
absence of cover, concealed routes and
positions are sought.
• Combzned arms teamwork
provides a mutual shielding of
vulnerabilities-tanks need protection
against ATGMs, infantry needs
protection against armored vehicles,
helicopters need protection against air
defense weapons, artillery needs
protection against other artillery, air
defense weapons need protection
against artillery. Until a truly invin-
cible weapons system is  
combined arms teamwork is necessary
for survival.
• The air·land battle must be a
joint venture. Neither enterprise can
fight "their" war alone. Air forces are
required to engage targets beyond the
range of ground weapons systems,
rapidly thicken weapons density at
clitical locations and to suppress
and/or destroy enemy artillery and
antitank weapons systems so that
ground forces can maneuver. Ground
forces suppress and/or destroy enemy
air defense weapons systems with fires
and electronic warfare so that air
forces may attack ground targets.
The capstone manual, as previously
stated. represents consensus. Do the
ensuing HTF manuals also express
consensus? Before answering the
question, let's examine the process.
Preparation of the HTF series of
manuals in support of FM 100-5 is
being accomplished by the assignment
of proponency for the several manuals
to TRADOC branch centers and
schools and the Combined Arms
Center. Each author is totally im-
mersed in the process-research,
writing, illustrations, layout and
typography; an inordinate number of
demands on time and talent. The Ad-
ministrative Center and the Logistics
Center coordinate the combat service
support doctrine that the authors of
tactical manuals require. The com-
mander, CAC, has tasking authority
over all schools and centers to coordi-
nate HTF literature production.
In practice, tbe individual schools
and centers coordinate HTF manuals
directly with TRADOC Headquarters.
TRADOC intensively manages these
manuals through a small Tactical Doc-
trine Office reporting directly to the
commander, TRADOC. Coordination
between schools and centers is effected
via the mails or telephonically.
Consensus is difficult to achieve
because of the wide geographical sepa-
ration of authors and their inability to
communicate effectively on a daily,
personal basis. Parochial views can be
perpetuated because of the lack of
opportunity to subject manuscripts
frequently to face-to-face, objective
critique by' a visiting "devil's ad-
vocate." .
Another question to be answered is:
"Are HTF manuals the product of the
best efforts of the best writers in the
Army?" The HTF author is a new
breed of officer, a breed that is in short
supply-a consummate professional as
a soldier, scholar, innovator, com-
municator; rara avis. To proliferate
large doctrinal cells in each school and
center may create a "brain drain" that
is beyond our capability to support
initially with lOO-percent staffinrr of
the type officer required, and to
perpetuate as reassignments attrit the
several cells.
rs there another way to organize for
writing about fighting? Perhaps a
review of how other armies accomplish
similar tasks is appropriate:
• Soviet Union. Within the formal
organizational structure, the General
Staff serves the function of a "think
tank," looking into the future and
providing guidance for the army's
school system and other doctrinal lit-
erature proponents. The branch
schools have doctrinal cells that
prepare literature within the area of
interest of each school. Authors
staffing these cells are usually
published authors-demonstrated
The Frunze Military Academy.
roughly equivalent to the US Army
Command and General Staff College,
has supervisory and coordination
authority in regard to the doctrine
produced at the branch schools. The
academy's direct contribution to the
development of doctrine is through the
publication of student papers. Students
in the three-year tactical course, or the
four to five-year technically oriented
course, are required to submit a paper
that approaches a Ph.D. dissertation in
magnitude and quality..
Open (unclassified) literature is
widely read and used as a source of
doctrine. Throughout the Red Army,
there is a proliferation of writers who
provide many contributions to the
Soviet tactical body of knowledge. The
motivation for published works is not
solely attributable to a desire for
academic recognItIOn. There is
speculation that articles and books
become an entry in official records and
influence promotions and schooling.
The following periodicals are the prin-
cipal open publications:
-Red Star (daily all-services
-Mdltary Herald (monthly
ground forces magazine). .
-Antiaircraft Defense Herald
(monthly magazine) .
-Rear and Supply Journal
. (monthly combat service support
-Military Medicine Journal
(monthly magazine).
-Technical and Armament
Journal (monthly magazine).
All literature cited, except the Red
Star, are army publications.
This literature does nO.t ap-
proximate US branch school
publications-that is, all articles are
officially endorsed by the Red Army.
These Soviet publications are fre·
quently used as a vehicle tp orchestrate
"debates" carefully. Debates are in-
itiated with articles by junior officers-
for example, when should infantry
dismount the BMP in the attack? New
articles are subjected to a series of
replies from officers of increasing rank.
Once the "debate" has run its full
course, the commander in chief of the
Soviet Ground Forces will draw con-
clusions and announce a doctrinal
Another source of doctrine is found
in closed (classified) literature, the
principal document being Military
Thought. This periodical is distributed
down to regimental commanders.
Hardcover, publishing house,
author· attributed publications form the
bulk of the open Soviet field
literature-for example, Sidorenko, The
Offensive (A Soviet View). Rather than
publish FMs in the traditional US
style, Soviet doctrine is contained in
these handbooks.
All Soviet doctrine is subjected to
testing in simulations, command post
exercises and field training exercises.
It is here that new doctrine and tactics
are practiced and refined.
A final observation relates to Soviet
contemporary tactical experience. A
small number of Soviet advisers have
observed modern combat during client
or customer wars. However, the Red
Army's most recent tactical experience
was during the Great Patriotic War
(World War lI). Much of their doctrinal
literature draws on combat experiences
from this war for examples of "how
to." .
Soviet tacticians have a wealth of
doctrinal literature for study and
practice. It springs from many and
diverse sources. True consensus? The
will of the senior tactician?
• France. Broad requirements for
doctrinal literature emanate from the
Ministry of Defense. Long-range
defense plans are developed by the
ministry's Center of Prospective
Evaluation. These plans identify re-
quirements for the separate services to
develop new doctrine, materiel and
The army chief of staff reviews
ground force requirements and for--
mulates guidance for the army staff's
Office of Studies. This office appoints
special committees of experienced of-
ficers to study the problem and prepare
manuscripts. These committees are
chaired by general officers and are
composed of five to eight senior officers
from high-level staffs, service schools
and units appropriate to the study. The
chairman assembles the group and
tasks all members to study the
problem, or he may assign individual
proponency for portions of the   ­
quirement. Once tasked, committee
members return to their duty station to
study the problem and formulate
recommendations. At the discretion of
the chairman, the committee meets at
30 to 60-day frequencies to discuss pro-
posals and reach agreement. The com-
pleted manuscript is forwarded to the
Office of Studies for review. The chief
of staff is the approving authority for
publication of such documents.
Each branch has an inspector
general (IG), usually in the grade of
lieutenant general, who reports to the
chief of staff on the readiness and the
capability of his units to fight. The
nature of this charter provides insights
into requirements for bat-
talion/regimental tactical organization
and doctrine. As such, IGs are respon-
sible for HTF literature within their
Preparation of HTF literature is
accomplished by committees appointed
by the IG. These committees are
chaired by general officers, the other
members having experience as com-
manders or executive and staff officers
at the echelons being studied. The
organization and operation of these
branch-oriented committees are similar
to those previously described for com-
mittees appointed by the Office of
Branch schools prepare in-
stitutional literature addressing
company and platoon training, tactics
and organization. School publications
considered appropriate for conversion
to lower echelon field manuals are
reviewed by committees appointed by
the branch IG. The results of these
studies are forwarded to the Office of
Studies for final review.
Selected groups of students at the
War College (lfcoie de Guerre) may be
tasked by the chief of staff to formulate
the combined arms doctrinal
literature-for example, The Effects of
Urbanization on Land Combat. When
completed, these studies are forwarded
directly to the Office of Studies to be
assembled in final form.
Layout, illustration and printing
are usually accomplished by the
Library of the Army (Printing Office).
However, it is not unusual for lower
echelon manuals to be printed at a
proponent branch school.
Doctrine in the French Army is
usually the product of special com-
mittees. These committees are dis-
solved once their task is accomplished.
Continuity and institutional memory
are difficult to maintain under such a
system. The Office of Studies in the
army staff reviews completed studies
for doctrinal consistency and es-
tablishes the style for all manuals. The
practice of chairing committees with
general officers may ensure
"agreement," but whether this
agreement is true consensus is un-
• United Kingdom. The
development of doctrine in the British
Army is conventional in inception,
unique in execution. The Ministry of'
Defence in concert with' the Joint
Chiefs of Staff organization develops
general guidelines for the services.
These guidelines are on parallel
tracks-combat developments, ad-
dressing tactical, organization ana
doctrinal developments in current, 5 to
lO-year and lO-years-beyond planning
programs; fiscal guidelines based on 1
to 5-year and 5 to lO-year forecasts.
Strategic instructions from the
Ministry of Defence are defined in
three areas-two specific and one
general-the United Kingdom
(meaning the British Isles), the NATO
area and "the rest of the world."
Upon receipt of strategic direction,
the army chief of staff tasks the vice
chief of the General Staff with es-
tablishing the army's position. The
principal, but by no means sole,
operators in this process are the Direc-
torate of Military Operations (DMO)
and the Directorate of. Army Staff
Duties. These directorates receive input
from other General Staff policy
branches covering manning levels,
trammg, procurement, logistic im-
plications, and so forth. These two
offices correlate this information and
produce a corporate paper that
provides general instructions for the
army at large.' Throughout this
process, coordination between staff
directorates is accomplished through
the Army Board, the General Staffs
executive authority.
The joint paper is ci;culated to
principal army commanders in the
form of proposals for organization and
tactics. These proposals are compared
within each geographic area in
relation to units/weapons systems
currently assigned, or scheduled to
reinforce; the nature of the threat;
topography within the area of
operations; the mission. This analysis
provides the basis for modification of
the proposal where necessary. These
comments are submitted to the General
Staff for review. When appropriate, the
Army Board will direct the submitting
headquarters to conduct field tests of
their proposals. The' conclusions of
such tests provide the information for
a decision by the Army Board.
The process described above
permits corps commanders to write the
doctrine for their divisions, division
commanders to write the doctrine for
their subordinate brigade· level for-
mations which, in turn, train their
battalions. Doctrine for platoons and
companies is developed at the ap·
propriate branch schools under the
direction of the DMO in accordance
with comments from the field and after
verification by the Army Operational
Analysis Staff (war gaming).
Doctrine for special operations and
environmental extremes-for example,
airborne, jungle-is developed by the
special troop units/special schools. The
Ministry of Defence is the monitoring
agency for the development of such
The Staff College at Camberley is
charged with the development of the
general instructions for combined arms
combat. The Royal College of Defence
Studies does not participate in the
doctrinal process; rather, politico-
military and strategic matters are
studied there.
The United Kingdom's system is
highly individual and permits great
latitude. The tailoring of general
guidelines to conform to geographical
exigencies is indeed consensus, albeit
local. The small size of the British
Army and the nature of its com·
mitments, at home and abroad,
demand such a system.
• Federal Republic of Germany.
The development of tactical doctrine
follows a highly stylized course in the
West German Army. This institutional
approach permits a sharp focus at the
onset of each literature project.
Development is initiated by the
federal government with provision of
political guidelines to the Armed
Forces Staff. This document causes the
development of a military-strategic
concept. The concept is passed to the
separate services for development of
their mission. The army staff analyzes
its mission statements and formulates
a concept of the army. This concept
identifies those new doctrines that are
required to execute the mission.
To develop the "capstone" and
general manuals, the army chief of
staff appoints a special group of of-
ficers with representation from corps
commanders through platoon leaders
and all branch school commandants.
Working from their charter, this group
develops fundamep.tal doctrine and
principles. They meet regularly with
the chief of staff for an in-process
review (IPR). These IPRs resolve
differing opinions and terminate with
conclusions and decisions by the chief
of staff.
Once published, the "capstone" and
general manuals serve as the basis for
the development of the supporting
brigade, battalion and lower echelon
manuals. These manuals are managed
intensively by the Army Office within,
the army staff. The Army Office is
equivalent to TRADOC with tasking
authority over the branch schools. The
Army Office ensures coordination
between branch schools where an ex-
change of expertise is needed.
Each branch school has a Training
and Troop Testing Directorate for the
development of doctrinal literature.
These directorates are staffed by
highly experiebced senior (lieutenant
colonel!colonel) officers. As the branch
literature is being developed, the
authors use the table of organization
and equipment (TOE) battalions
assigned to their school for extensive
field testing of new tactics and
techniques. The refinement of months
of writing and fighting (school TOE
battalion) produces the final
The writing process in either cate-
gory of manuala-"capstone"/general,
brigade/battalion-culminates in ap-
proval by the army chief of staff. At
this -point, manuscripts are managed
by the army staff, specifically Direc-
torate III 6. This group of specialists
decides on layout, illustrations, color,
type and other technical con-
siderations. Printing and distribution
also are accomplished by this direc-
torate. .
Doctrine in the West German Army
is the best product of the best authors.
They are provided definitive guidance
and sufficient ~ i m   to prepare their
manuscripts. Consensus is achieved
through the structure of the special
groups for "capstone" and general
manuals and by the cooperation
among schools affected by the AJ'!Ily
Office during preparation of brigade/
battalion manuals.
In . order to guide the Army in
training or in combat, doctrint" must
• What usually works.
• What is believed by more than
half of the Army at large.
• What is practiced by the Army
in the field.
• What is taught in schools.
To accomplish these purposes, the
following checklist might serve doc-
trinal proponents well:
• Total inquiry within insti-
tutional memory?
• Best effort of the best writers?
• Consensus?
• Reasonable longevity ("shelf
• Perpetuate the corporate body
of knowledge?
The Soviet system for doctrinal
literature production probably ac-
complishes all the previously stated
purposes except consensus. The ap-
pointment and subsequent dissolution
of committees in the French Army does
not permit the formation of a doctrinal
cadre who act as custodians of the
army's institutional memory. The
British approach, with its license for
modification by senior commanders,
does not represent consensus, nor does
it perpetuate the corporate body of
knowledge. It appears that the West
German method has more fidelity to
the previously stated tenets for what
doctrine is and what it must ac-
The current system withi"n
TRADOC lacks the specificity of the
West German process, both in initial
guidance to proponents and during
execution at the schools -and centers
that prepare doctrinal literature. The
demands placed on the TRADOC
author-comprehensive subject matter
expertise; supervision of illustrations;
participation in layout, typography
and final proofing-exceed the com-
petence of most authors and consume
inordinate amounts of time.
r submit that economy of scale in
the TRADOC system for doctrinal
literature preparation requires the
following revisions:
• More detail in the guidance
provided literature proponents,
Guidance should include the politico-
military context, fiscal and logistic
constraints, type forces available,
nature of the threat, the target
audience of the publication and a time-
decremented production schedule. This
attention to detail would go' far in
eliminating the frequent false starts
endemic to the current system.
• A periodic exchange of visits
between proponent schools and centers
for face-to-face dialogues among
authors. This baring of the soul, and
manuscripts, could be a catharsis that
contributes to objectivity in individual
man uscri pts.
• Separation of the process into
two functional areas: manuscript prep-
aration by authors, and a marriage of
manuscripts and the technical process
at regional production centers. This
scheme would permit authors to devote
their full attention to manuscript prep-
aration and coordination_ Regional
production centers would provide an
opportunity to pool the best edittJrs,
illustrators and layout specialists un-
der the direction of a visual com-
municator responsible for packaging
the manuscript.
Authors would forward manuscripts
to their supporting production center in
accordance with the time-decremented
schedule. After the visual com-
municator has read the manuscript,
the author would visit the production
center to answer questions in regard to
context and to discuss the proposed
visual reinforcement of his manuscript.
Thereafter, the author would make
periodic visits to ensure that the visual
translation of the text is correct, that
current equipment is portrayed and
that illustrations do not alter or violate
the thrust of the manuscript.
There is a correlation between
writing and fighting. If we are con-
vinced that, in future conflicts, we will
be opposed by a numerically superior
enemy whose technology is equal to
ours, then the outcome of the first
battle, and subsequent battles, must be
a decision in our favor. Victory belongs
to that side which properly combines
men, materiel and intelligent tactics. It
is the mission of the doctrinal writers
to provide practical solutions to the
problems that will confront our Army
on future battlefields.
A government is the murderer
of its citizens which sends them to
the field uninformed and un-
taught, where they are to meet
men of the same age and strength,
mechanized by education and dis-
ciplined for battle. I cannot
withhold my denunciation of its
wickedness and folly.
General Henry Lee
("Light-Horse Harry")
Brigadier General Edwin F. Black, US Army, Retired
S. T. Cohen
The neutron bomb or. more precisely. enhanced radiation
weaponry is not new. First tested successfully in 1963. ER
weapons receiut'd low priority. thus their em erNe nee in the
1970s. The fusion (ER) weapons are more efficient. cleaner
and permit lower yield taetical use than fission weapons. To
foreC'iose the option of usinN taetieal ER weapons in defense
of NA TO would be a Nraue error. To believe that Souiet
s('ientists are not deuelopinN a similar-type weapon would
be a more serious mistake. If Western Europe were to take
eivil defense aNainst taNieal nuclear weapons seriously.
civilian casualties eould be redueed to a minimum and
eollateral damaNe controlled. ER weapons will add an option
to NA TO's eapability to defend Wester" Europe in a "short
u1ur" scenario.
HORT warning; shortness of will;
short war.
As 1977 drew to a close, these were
the key problems confronting the
NATO planners. Senators Nunn and
Bartlett brought them forcefully to the
attention of the US Senate early last
year.' They were prompted to do this
by Lieutenant General Hollingsworth's
frank "short war" analysis. This report
warns of the Warsaw Pact's capability
to launch a sudden, massive armored
assault in Central Europe designed to
reach the channel ports and win a
quick victory before NATO reserves
could be mobilized and deployed.
General Hollingsworth postulates a
surprise Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg by 54
to 58 divisions, half of them crack
Soviet units. Using one of the pact's
regular training exercises as cover, or
even moving out of their barracks from
a "standing start," NATO would be
fortunate to receive 48 hours' warning.
This conclusion is supported by an
independent study by the Belgian
general, Close. It contrasts sharply
with Pentagon planning studies which
presuppose that the pact would have to
mobilize some 90 divisions fairly close
to the Western German border before
launching a full·scale attack. To po·
sition such large forces for an assault
would require about 30 days. Assuming
it would take a week for these prepara-
tions to be conftrmed by NATO intelli-
gence, brought to the attention of the
political authorities and to produce a
multinational decision to initiate de-
fensive actions, this leaves some 23
days for NATO to mobilize to meet the
threat. The short warning problem
shrinks 23 days to 2 or even less.
Shortness of will is a perennial
weakness of the West. It is reflected in
budget decisions whieh relegate de-
fense to secondary priority; in prag-
matic policies which place short-term
self-interests ahead of long-term ad-
herence to national principles; in the
wishful belief that Soviet policies and
thought processes are mirror-image
reflections of our own. All this adds up
to a reluctance to face the facts and
make the necessary defense prepara-
tions. Result: Slow reaction capability
to meet the short warning situation.
Within the United States, this
shortness of will was brought' out in
the press reports on Presidential
Review Memorandum 10 (PRM 10)
which appeared in early August.
were never refuted in substance by the
White House or the Department of
Defense. According to these reports,
the PRM 10 was approved by the
Senior Coordinating Council of the
National Security Council on 29 July
1977. Its purpose was to bring Pres-
ident Carter up to date on the NATO
defense situation.
PRM 10 outlines a new "stalemate
strategy" based on holding a defense
line along the Weser and Lech Rivers.
By thus proposing to give up one-third
of West Germany without serious re-
sistance, it justifies not asking the
Congress for higher levels of defense
spending. The latter, it argues, might
not only provoke Moscow, but would
create political problems for the pres-
ident at home. The memorandum sug- -
gests that, by falling back, the onus of
the attack would be placed squarely on
the Soviets. leaving them to face "the
political consequences of their ag-
gression." These consequences would
be adverse world opinion, UN disap-
proval and perhaps even US mobili-
When considering the various op-
tions open to the president, the memo-
randum recommends in favor of the
"most anodyne," or painless, choice in
terms of domestic impact. Greater re-
liance is to be placed on political ac·
tions that could help forestall a
Russian attack. According to the press,
what was proposed was a more vigor-
ous pursuit of arms control initiative's
by the United States. coupled with a:
... broad program of US economic
assistance to the USSR in trade,
credits, foods, and technology, thereby
Brzgad'er General EdWin F.   l a e k ~ US
Army, Retired, recewed an M.A {rom George
Washzngton UnIVersity and lS a graduate of
the NatIOnal War College. He has been d,-
rector, InternatIOnal Busmess Development,
LTV CvrporatlOn, and. subsequently, director,
Industnal Depelopment, .for the government
of Amf'ncan Samoa.
lowering political tpnsions and re-
ducing the risk of war.
The authors of PRM 10 apparently
believe that such a policy would be
easier to sell to the American public
than a program calling for the sus-
tained self-discipline required to
maintain deterrence over the long pull.
Since the creation of NATO, its
defense has relied primarily on deter-
rence. This, in turn, depends on the
credibility of NATO's prompt and
forward response to any attack across
its frontiers. NATO's response capabil-
ities are threefold: conventional,
strategic nuclear and tactical nuclear.
The credibility of an effective con-
ventional response is in question today
because of the imbalance of forces
which so heavily favor the Communist
side. This has given the Warsaw Pact
the power to launch an assault de-
signed to win a short war. It has re-
emphasized NATO's problems: the
shortage of warning and the shortage
of will.
The credibility of any nuclear re-
sponse, be it strategic or tactical, is in
serious question today. The sheer mo-
mentum of ongoing Russian programs
for their nuclear offensive forces has
produced important quantitative and
qualitative improvements which have
already undermined the value of Amer-
ica's nuclear retaliatory capability as
a deterrent to an attack on NATO. It is
being eroded even further J:>y the
growing effectiveness of the Soviet
civil defense system which, according
to studies by US experts at Oak Ridge,
has made the United States 10 times as
vulnerable to an intercontinental
nuclear exchange as the USSR,3
When the United States signed the
Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 1972
and dismantled our Safeguard·
program, over 100 million American
citizens became hostages against any
direct nuclear conflict with the Soviet
Union. As far as most realistic Eu-
ropeans are concerned, this created a
new strategic/political situation which
has, in effect, "decoupled" the Ameri-
can nuC'!ear retaliatory force from the
defense of NATO.
NATO's tactical nuclear response
has its own low level of credibility. The
principal reasons for this are: the vul-
nerability of our 7,000 tactical nuclear
weapons which are locked up in some
100 well-identified storage sites; the
complicated procedures required for
their release to the troops in case of
enemy attack; our desire to limit col-
lateral damage in Western Europe; and
our doctrinaire belief that we must
maintain a "firebreak" between con-
ventional and nuclear war.
It is the Warsaw Pact's prepon-
derance in armored forces which em-
S. T Cohen. a nuclear weapons analyst.
has been aSbDczated wah tactIcal nuclear
u'eapon lS5lLf?S smce 1951. He has consulted
on nuclear u'eapon development and polley
lssues with the Defense Department and the
Los Alamos and Lwrrmore Laboratortes. In
19611. he det'eloped the techntcal mthtary
concept of enhanced radiatIOn warheads.
phasizes the dangers of the short warn-
ing/short war situation. Of the Soviet
Union's inventory of main battle
tanks-including its latest T72 model-
15,700 are deployed in Eastern Europe.
Fortunately for the West, US
nuclear scientists have developed what
are' technically known as enhanced
radiation (ER) weapons, capable of
countering this armored threat without
unacceptable levels of collateral
damage. In public media, they have
been referred to as "neutron bombs."
As far as our European allies are
concerned, in August 1977 NATO's
secretary general, Mr. Joseph Luns,
stated publicly that NATO needs and
wants these new weapons.
In a recent
letter to Congress, President Carter
noted the need for modernization of the
NATO tactical nuclear stockpile, incor-
porating ER technology into the family
of tactical nuclear weapons available
for the defense of Western Europe.
Just what are these ER weapons?
How can they contribute to the defense
of NATO? These are fair questions.
But the emotional coverage given by
the press to the "neutron bomb" issue
has been wide of the mark factually. It
has served to confuse rather than
clarify the important defense role of
this new technology.
The general public does not realize
that tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
are not new. They were first deployed
in Western Europe in the mid-1950s. A
NATO planning exercise, Carte
Blanche, held in June 1955, examined
the consequences of a tactical nuclear
war in the NATO theater. As the name
implies, there were no limitations im-
posed on the planners as far as the use
of TNWs were concerned.
Based on the technology and the
high yield of the weapons inventory
available 22 years ago, the hypo-
thetical results of this command post
exercise were sobering. The exercise
scenario involved the dropping of 335
nuclear bombs in support of the battle-
field action during a period of less than
three days. In bringing the initial
enemy attack to a halt, 268 of these
bombs fell on West German soil. Calcu-
lated German civilian casualties were
five times greater than those sustained
during the Allied bombings of World
War II. As a result, the scientists were
sent back to their drawing boards.
Their new mission: Make the stockpile
more discriminate, lower yield and
The big breakthrough came when
nuclear technology graduated from
fission to fusion. The former makes use
of isotopes of uranium and plutonium
at the high end of the periodic table;
the latter, elements with low molecular
weight such as isotopes of hydrogen.
This development made it possible not
only to produce superbombs of the
thermonuclear variety, but to make
weapons which would leave behind
very little radioactive contamination.
In addition, it became possible to en-
hanee the output of prompt nuclear
radiation which could be used very
effectively for antipersonnel purposes.
In scientific terms, the ER reaction
releases 80 percent of its yield in the
form of very high-energy neutrons,
whereas, by contrast, the fission
process releases only 5 percent.
The scientists soon realized that
new technology could, in time, alter the
character of nuclear weapons. Theoret-
ically, there was no reason why these
weapons could not be made small as
well as large, tactical as well as
strategic. More importantly, they could
be made "clean," almost free of re-
sidual radiation. In addition, if the
. prompt radiation were maximized,
they would produce casualties. at
ranges considerably greater than those.
caused by blast and heat. These con-
siderations led to the development of
the enhanced radiation weapon which,
it turned out, was very effective when
the yield was 1 kiloton or less.
This low yield allowed the weapons
engineers to think in terms of war-
heads which would produce virtually
no significant collateral damage from
blast and heat, would be clean and of
small yield (in the kiloton and subkilo-
ton class). Combined with the more
recent order of magnitude increases in
missile accuracy and guidance tech-
niques. they could provide a highly
selective, discriminate battlefield
When the advantage of being able
to confine the blast damage and radi-
ation aftereffects to even smaller, care-
fully predetermined targets was recog-
nized, the Livermore Laboratory of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
was instructed to take priority action
to exploit these new nuclear capabil-
ities. -Dr. Libby, a Nobel laureate who
was an AEC commissioner at the time,
was instrumental in the decision to
assign a high priority to enhanced
radiation research.
At about the same time, Secretary
of Defense Thomas Gates and the
member:s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were informed of these important ER
weapun developments. Of all the serv-
ices, the Navy took the lead in recog-
nizing their potential, particularly for
use in close support of carrier/am-
phibious task forces when projecting
military power onto hostile shores.
The first military version of a
"neutron bomb" was tested success-
fully in the spring of 1963. However,
efforts to incorporate this device as a
warhead for tactical nuclear delivery
systems received minimal support over
the next dozen years. One reason these
ER weapons were put on the "back
burner" was this: After President Eis-
enhower left office, the Kennedy ad-
ministration decided that NATO
should place primary reliance on con-
ventional forces to defend Western
Europe. Tactical nuclear response was
held to be unduly risky. Consequently,
tactical nuclear weapon modernization
stagnated, leading James Schlesinger
to comment in 1967 that:
The government has refrained from
making certain investments in the
capabilities of low-level nuclear
warfare, not only because of the ex-
pense, but because the creation of such
options might tempt us to go through
the 'firebreak.'5
The assumption long held by many
American policymakers that a US
president would be less likely to cross
the "firebreak" from conventional to
nuclear war if tactical nuclear weapons
did not exist is, of course, unrealistic
because they do exist. For some years
now, NATO has held a substantial
stqckpile of very low-yield (subkiloton)
battlefield nuclear weapons whose em-
ployment could be conducted in a
highly discriminate fashion. Fur-
thermore, this American assumption is
not shared by Soviet military planners.
In their published doctrine for the
employment of nuclear weapons, they
have told us repeatedly that "the path
for the advance of the troops will be
cleared by nuclear weapons."
Nor is it the current thinking of the
NATO council of ministers who, in
May 1975, outlined the alliance's de-
fense policy as:
... calling for a balanced force
structure of interdependent strategic
nuclear, theatre, [tactical] nuclear and
conventional force capabilities. Each
element of this Triad performs a
unique role; in combination they
provide mutual support and rem-
To assure the defense of NATO, the
central problem today is how to stop
the initial assault of the Warsaw Pact
armored forces.
Without mentioning ER weapons in
their January 1977 report, Senators
Nunn and Bartlett emphasized that:
In the long term, the quantum jump
in NATO firepower necessary to
counter the new Soviet threat can be
obtained only by accelerated exploi-
tation of ongoing technological ad-
vances in munition-s and delivery
The ER weapon offers the best hope
of neutralizing this preponderance of
Warsaw Pact armor without massive
civilian casualities and without laying
waste to Europe. Far from being a
weapon system designed, as the press
has seen fi t to put it, "to kill people
without damaging buildings," they
provide a highly flexible, selective and
effective antitank defense. They are
major improvements over the current
tactical fission weapons in NATO's
For their part, the Soviets have not
overlooked the military applications of
prompt nuclear radiation from low-
yield tactical weapons. They fully ap-
preciate that this radiation can easily
pass through tanks' protective steel to
knock out the tank crew. In an authori-
tative manual nn antitank warfare
published in 1972, two senior Red
Army tank experts wrote: "In per-
forming the mission of destroying ar-
mored units on the field of battle, it is
expedient to destroy the tank crews in
and outside the tanks."7 They empha-
sized that the effective kill area of low-
yield fission explosions is from 9 to 16
times larger for incapacitating crews
than for destroying tanks. By compar-
ison, the effective area for incapaci-
tating tank crews with ER weapons is
roughly 100 times larger than the area
within which the tanks themselves
would be destroyed.
The nature of tactical nuclear
weapons has changed greatly since
Exercise Carte Blanche. At that time,
most battlefield nuclear weapons were
configured as bombs to be dropped
from close support aircraft. Because of
the relatively large bombing errors in
1955 and the nature of the target
system used then, weapon yields were
generally in tens of kilotons. Today's
stockpile, however. contains a very
substantial component of low-yield
warheads. By 1974, the secretary of
defense was able to testify that the
average yield of the NATO stockpile
was less than 4 kilotons. Most of the
battlefield delivery systems-artillery
shells, the Lance missile and fighter-
bomber aircraft-could be set to yields
in the subkiloton range. Therefore. it
would be incorrect to say that NATO
does not now have a discriminate
battlefield nuclear option.
However. with the addition of ER
weapons. both the effectiveness of the
NATO stockpile against Russian
armor and its degree of discrimination
will increase considerably. Those im-
provements are illustrated in Figure L
Figure 1. weapon effects. and Figure
2. comparing the application of ER and
fission weapons under rural and urban
warfare conditions. illustrate how ER
warheads can be used both effectively
1 KT
1 KT
10 KT
Radius of Effects (Meters)
Tank Crew Tank Urban
incapacitation destruction destruction
from radiation trom blast from blast
350 150 500
700 120 400
700 350 1,200
Comparison of 1 KT ER and 10 KT Fission Weapons
Urban destruction-1 KT ER
Attack of Tank Unit in Field
Urban destruction-
  ( ' ~ O O
Tank unit in field
Urban area
Urban destruction-1 KT ER
&.. \ Enemy radiation kill-
b '"''
Attack of Enemy in Urban Aroas
Figure 2
and discriminately under conditions
where fission weapons cannot. In par-
ticular, it is this smaller blast radius
that makes it possible to achieve the
"separation of effects" characteristic of
the ER weapon. By simply raising the
burst height to an appropriate level,
blast damage can be eliminated. As a
result, a degree of effectiveness and
flexibility far in excess of present tac-
tical fission weapons is achieved.
Returning to the Warsaw Pact side
of the equation, a paramonnt opera-
tional objective will be speed-to break
the defenders' will and ability to resist
as quickly as possible. Elimination of
population would not be a primary
goal; it is not even listed as a Soviet
targeting objective. The attacker's
spearhead will be his. armored and
mechanized units. In classical fashion,
these will press ahead at maximum
speed, by-passing   and
other defenses, lunging forward to
seize their objectives deep in the NATO
rear areas. Therefore, it will be to the
attacker's advantage to avoid the
creation of physical obstacles, particu-
larly urban rubble, which might
impede his advance. For this reason,
even though the Soviets have publicly
attacked the United States over the
neutron bomb, privately they may
have developed and stockpiled it.
In a strategic nuclear war, civilians
in cities are one of the obvious target
systems-hostages or bargaining chips
in the great game of nuclear poker.
But, in a tactical nuclear struggle over
Western Europe, they would not be
specifically targeted. Thus, the situ-
ation could be vastly different provided
appropriate civil defense measures are
taken. .
Under circumstances where both
attacker and defender may use ER
weapons, or even low-yield fission
weapons, a modest program of civil
defense will go a long way toward
minimizing civilian casualties. In a
fast-moving armored assault, where
prompt radiation effects are likely to
dominate the battlefield, the most
simple civil defense expedient would be
to pile roughly 2 feet of earth-filled
sandbags on top of all structures con-
sidered suitable for civilian shelters.
This will provide protection against
levels of prompt radiation expected
during low-yield tactical nuclear con-
flict. It offers a potential of reducing
civilian casualties by as much as 75
percent for low-yield fission weapons
and close to 100 percent for ER
weapons. The casualties from low-yield
fission weapons will be caused pri-
marily by blast which cannot be
avoided as it can be for ER weapons.
Were Western Europe to take civil
defense against tactical nuclear
weapons seriously, and construct
shelters for the civilian population on
the scale of Germany's effort in World
War II, a highly effective protective
system could be achieved for a modest
per capita investment. This action,
coupled with a modern, low-yield ER
NATO stockpile, would put new mean-
ing and credibility into the NATO
tactical deterrent.
This seems to have been the basis
for President Carter's decision to move
ahead with the enhanced radiation
weapons program. Even before he an-
nounced his final decision, he observed
that, in the defense of NATO:
... the capability for 'discrete appli-
cation of force which ER weapons may
provide presents, at least in this sense,
an attractive option. The ER weapons,
then, would be designed to enhance
deterrence; but if deterrence fails, to
satisfy a dual criteria: First, to en-
hance NATO's capability to inflect
significant military damage on the
aggressor. Second, to mlnlmizr
damage and casualties to individuals
not in the immediate target area, in-
cluding friendly troops and civilians.
One final remark on the "neutron
bomb" is in order. Many NATO de-
fense studies have rested mainly on the
premise that NATO will be the first to
use nuclear weapons to blunt a suc-
cessful Warsaw Pact conventional
attack. That ER warheads represent a
more credible response to such an
attack is certainly the case, but what is
far from clear at present is where or
when NATO's political leadership (in-
cluding the US president) will sanction
the use of any nuclear weapons. As
President Carter has stated, the exist-
ence of ER weapons will not make his
decision on the release of tactical
nuclear weapons to NATO any less
On the other hand, there is nothing
in Soviet military writings to show
that the Warsaw Pact forces will be so
obliging as to yield the first use of
TNWs to te NATO forces. Should the
Soviet preemptive nuclear doctrine
prevail during an attack on NATO,
any mental agony on the part of the
president over nuclear release will
become academic. He will have little'
choice but to do so. However, what
may not be academic is the very real
agony of releasing the present
stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in
the event of a Warsaw Pact attack
when its large-scale use may result in
the devastation of the NATO countries
we are trying to defend.
It is to avoid such a situation that
the neutron bomb becomes so im-
portant. Just having it available in
Western Europe could make the dif-
ference between victory and defeat.
1 NA 70 and the New SOviet Threat Repor1 on Senator Sam Nunn
and Senator Dewe ... F Bartletl to thp Committee on Armed   e r v ~ e s
US Spnate Wa!>,ngton 0 C 24 Januar,; 1977
2 Rowland E ....ans and Robert Novak, Conceding Defeat ,n
Europe The Washmgton Post August 1977
3 Foreword b\l Fov 0 KOhler In Dr Leon Goura, War Sufvwa/ln
SOviet Strategy USSR C'Vil Defense. Center for Advanced Interna
tiona I Studies Unl\,erS'I'; of Miami Washington 0 C 1976
4 Reported In The EconomIst J September 1977
5 James A Schlesmgpr Organizational Structures and
Planning Issues In Defense EconomiCS Edited by Roland McKean
Columb a Unl ... ers'f ..... Press N Y 1967
7 Malor General G B'r ..... ukO ... (lnd Colonel G Melnlko\l Afltlrank
Warfare Progress Publ,catIOns Moscow USSR 1972
Army Warrant Officer/Enlisted Aviator Study. The Department of the
Army has turned down a proposal for usmg enlisted aViators as pilots and
deCided to upgrade the current warrant officer aviation program.
The major concl uSlon of the recently completed warrant officer and
enlisted aViator study was that the enlisted aViator proposal was
undeSirable because of morale. acceptance. Increased attrition and higher
At the same time. the Army study called for expanding the flYing
warrant officer corps m five areas
• Increased promotion to CWO-3 and CWO-4.
• Institution of a formal training program for new warrant officers
• Increased service obligation for flight trammg
• Increased crew staffing based on aircraft type, Unit and mission.
• Intensified management and undergraduate tramlng of Army
aViators In mission-type aircraft (attack. cargo. utility, scout) -AFPS
via After Tito:
The Soviet
Tito. Yugoslavia's 86-year-old keystone, cannot go on
forever. What after Tito? Tito looks to the Collective State
Presidency, the Yugoslav Communist Party and the military
to ensure his nation's survival. The Soviets view Yugoslavia
as a thorn but are unlikely to intervene militarily. Such
might jeopardize detente and upset Western Communist
Parties. Further, they cann'ot be assured of a quick military
solution due to Yugoslavia's "total national defense"
concept. They may try to woo the new leadership and hope
for improved relations without resorting to the use of force.
Lieutenant   o l ~ n e l Frank C. Allen, US Army
N RECENT years, there has been a old. Nonetheless, and in spite of popular
great deal of speculation as to what Yugoslav folk stories to the contrary,
will happen in Yugoslavia after Tito Tito will not be around to guide
dies or becomes unable to lead. There are Yugosla v destinies forever. While the
thosE' who feel that Yugoslavia as we country may endure his passing, his
know it will not long survive Tito's death could result in the most serious
death. These people sometimes crisis in Europe since the end of World
emphasize their case by pointing out War II. There is no question that Tito's
that, in Yugoslavia, there are six departure will result in a struggle for
l republics, five nationalities, four power and change in Yugoslavia from
languages, three religions, two both internal and external forces .
. alphabets and only one Yugoslav-Tito, The internal threat to Yugoslavia
'and that he turns 86 years of age this after Tito is complex but well-defined.
month and will soon be gone. The purpose of this article primarily is to
However, political adversaries focus on the external threat, specifically
waiting for Tito's death take no solace in the threat from the Soviet Union. Since
the fact that he continues to work 16- the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia,
hour days, travels widely and appears in Belgrade has made it clear that the main
good health. They may also bemoan th'e threat to its independence was the
fact that his mother lived to be 104 years USSR.
Why do the Soviets want to bring
Yugoslavia more under their control,
and how do they see this happening?
What has Tito done to ensure contin uity
in his country after his death? How'
likely is a Soviet-led invasion of
Yugoslavia? These are some of the more
vital questions which must be answered
if one is to assess the seriousness of the
Soviet threat to a post-Tito Yugoslavia.
In examining why the Soviets want
to bring Yugoslavia under their control,
, one cannot overestimate the ideological
damage the Yugoslav example has done
to the Kremlin. Since 1948 when Tito
broke with Stalin and began leading
Yugoslavia on a "separate path to
Socialism," Tito, more than any other
individual, has destroyed Moscow's idea
of Communist unity under the direction
of the Kremlin. Soviet leaders since 1948
have lived with the fear that the
Yugoslav example was a cancer that
could well spread to other East Euro-
pean countries, and it did. How much of
an effect did the Yugoslav example have
on Hungary in 1956, on Czechoslovakia
in 1968 or on Rumania's independent
attitude today? As far as the Soviets are
cone-erned, there was and is a definite
In recent years, most notably at last
year's European Communist Party
Conference in East Berlin, a number of
leading West European Communist
Parties espoused Tito's concept of in-
dependence from Moscow. Certainly, as
long as Tito is active, the Soviets can
expect little change in the major role he
plays in keeping alive the idea that all
Communist Parties are equal. From the
Kremlin's point of view, this is a test
that will not be put to rest until Tito is.
Ideology aside, the Soviets have clear
military and strategic reasons for want-
ing to bring Belgrade into the Soviet
bloc. First, there is Yugoslavia's
strategic location bisecting the southem
region of NATO. The military im-
plications here are obvious if the War-
saw Pact could count on Yugoslav forces
and facilities. Then, there are the
Adriatic bases for the Soviet Mediterra-
nean Fleet-bases which on an
even greater significance now that
Soviet ships have been denied access to
Egyptian ports. On the air side, Soviet
access to Yugoslav airfields would not
only increase the threat to NATO, but
would facilitate any future Soviet
endeavors in Africa. In this respect, the
Soviets would hope that a pro-Moscow
Yugoslavia with its close ties with
African and Arab countries would be of
great assistance in bettering Soviet
relations with Third World countries.
Few question the fact that the
Soviets would like to bring the
Yugoslavs back into the Soviet camp.
Militarily, they would welcome
Yugoslavia's entry into the Warsaw
Lieutenant Colonel Frank C Allen is
professor of mllttary SClence at Northern
Michigan Unwerslty. Marquette. M,ch He
recelved an M.A. In Soviet and Slavic area
studies from the UnlVerslty of Kansas and IS a
waduate of the USACGSC and the US Army
InsMute for Advanced Russzan and East
European Studzes m Garmlsch, Germany. He is
a foreIgn area specwlist whose field IS the
SOUlet UnIon and Eastern Europe and has
served with Headquarters. Allzed Forces.
Central Europe
\. ... , ,"', r--
"" \.-....
  ",-,, ___ ... J.r ###BOT_TEXT###quot; ... ", Belgrade
Pact. Economically, they would hope to
bring them into the COMECON (Coun·
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance);
currently, the Yugoslavs have about an
equal amount of trade with COMECON
and Western countries. Short of this, the
Soviets would, at the minimum, want to
seE' a very pro-Moscow, anti-Western
leadership in Belgrade. It is clear that,
long as 1'ito is in command, the
Soviets will not get either wish. But
what if Tito were to die soon? What
strategy would the Soviets be most
likely to employ in order to further their
goals? What would the Kremlin hope to
see occur in the confusion following
Tito's death?
The Soviets' primary hope is that
internal dissent will tear the country
apart and leave the leadership in
Belgrade helpless. Since the creation of
present-day Yugoslavia at the end of
World War I, strong currents of ethnic
extremism always have been a threat to
... --....
1 --, J
I ','
I Monte-negro .. J
I' 0511111hon ...
the country's unity. Croatians,
Slovenes, Serbs, Montenegrins and
Macedonians have long struggled and
fought among one another in an attempt
to maintain their own separate iden-
tities. The future of this state of
Southern Slavs, which rose out of the
ruins of the Hapsburg and Ottoman
Empires, has been uncertain from the
There are currently two different
movements within Yugoslavia which,
in the aftermath of 1'ito's death, pose a
major threat to the unity of the country.
The movement which one hears the
least about today but which poses the
greatest danger consists of a number of
internal separatist groups. These are
movements within the various republics
which favor more autonomy for their
particular region and nationality. It is a
question of regional rivalry based on
economics, social interests and politics.
The most potentially explosive situa-
tion is the one existing between the
Croatians and the Serbians. Dissidence
in the Croatian Republic in the late
1960s and early 1970s came close to
throwing the country into chaos.! Only
the personal intervention of Tito
restored a degree of order. Regional
differences continue to boil beneath the
surface, and the Soviets will move to
exploit them by playing off one national
group against another if the occasion
The second movement which poses a
threat to Yugoslavia's internal unity is
the so-called "Cominformist Move-
ment." This movement, which is
strongest in the Republic of
Montenegro, contends that it was wrong
for Yugoslavia to break away from the
USSR as it did in 1948. The Cominform-
ists advocate a "new" Yugoslav Com-
munist Party with loyalty to Moscow.
And, although the Kremlin has denied
lending support to the movement, there
is little doubt that it has done so. Groups
of Yugoslav emigres active in the
movement have been identified in
Prague and in Kiev. Both groups appear
to have the support of their Czech and
SovIet hosts.
While the Cominformists are few in
number, perhaps several thousand, they
pose a threat to Yugoslav unity primari-
ly because they are closely linked with
the Soviet Union despite Soviet
assurances to the contrary. In the
confusion which will follow Tito's death,
the Soviets are hopeful that these pro-
Moscow Communists will be able to
gain key positions and perhaps be in a
position to seek outside Soviet "frater-
nal assistance" in restoring order to a
divided country.
Tito, perhaps more than anyone, is
a ware of both the in temal threat and the
threat to' his country's nonaligned
status after his death. In recent years, he
has devoted much of his time to prepar-
ing Yugoslavia for his death in. the
hopes that Yugoslav unity and in-
dependence will survive once he is gone.
In May 1974, Tito established a nine-
member Collective State Presidency as
the "highest organ of leadership." As
long as he survives, he is the "First
President" of this select group. The
other eight members of the collective
represent the six republics and two
autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia.
The vice presidency rotates among these
eight men on a yearly basis. Upon Tito's
death, the vice president will become
president, and, from then on, the
presidency will rotate on an annual
basis among the eight. Tito has in-
stituted other changes in the past few
years, but none illustrate Yugoslavia's
main problem more clearly than this
attempt to institutionalize the interests
of the very diverse national groups in
one united country.
Being a realist, Tito knows that a
collective presidency by itself will not be
enough to hold his country together
after his death. For this reason, he has
taken measures to strengthen the two
bodies which will be primarily responsi-
ble for preserving Yugoslav
independence-the party and the
The Yugoslav Communist Party
plays the key role in all aspects of the
country's life. At the national level, the
party, under the guidance of Chairman
Tito, dictates policies of state. At the
local level, party secretaries, acting on
behalf of a centralized party structure,
wield the most authority. Upon Tito's
death, the leadership in the party is
likely to be taken over by Stane Dolanc,
a 52-year-old Slovene who currently is
the executive cLlmmittee secretary, and,
to a great extent, is in charge of the day-
to-day affairs of running the party. In
recent years, Tito, in an attempt to
rebuild the central authbrity of the
party, has weeded out those local party
leaders who have shown evidence of so-
called "nationalist deviation." At the
s ~ m   time, he has given a greater
political role to the military which now
is represented in the highest party
levels. Such actions are designed to
ensure that, if a crisis does develop, the
party will be a unified force.
The Yugoslav military deterrent to
external aggression is a unique one and
is based on a concept of "total national
defense." This, in effect, involves every
Yugoslav citizen in the defense of his
country. There are two primary com-
ponents of the Yugoslav defense system:
the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and
the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF).
Realizing that the nine infantry
divisions and 300 combat aircraft2 of the
YPA would be unable to long withstand
a determined Soviet attack, the
Yugoslavs, in the afterIllath of the 1968
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
complemented their regular forces with
the TDF, formed by the various
republics. Organized into divisions,
brigades, battalions and lower level
units, the TDF has a peacetime strength
of one million and, in time of crisis, can
mobilize rapidly to a strength of some
three million. Small units are trained
primarily in the defense of the area in
which they live, while larger units such
as brigades and divisions have been
assigned missions on a republic level.
The force is composed of both ground
and air defense units and receives the
same up-to-date weapons and equip-
ment as that on hand in the YPA. All
units receive extensive training in
partisan warfare. In recent years, a
series of joint YPA/TDF annual exer-
cises have been carried out successfully
in the various republics to test the
operability of the Yugoslav concept of
total national defense.
The Yugoslav defense is based on an
initial defense of the country's borders
by regular YP A forces for a period long
Territorial defense
personnel with SA 7
air defense missile
enough to allow total mobilization,
perhaps only a day or two. After this
brief conventional defense, the
Yugoslavs would rely primarily on
partisan warfare staged from selected
mountainous areas. This concept takes
into account the realities of the situa-
tion,. the geography of the country and
World War II experience;'
Last year, when Brezhnev visited
Belgrade and made the mistake of
jokingly declaring that the Soviet wolf
had no intention of destroying Little
Red Riding Hood in the form of
Yugoslavia, there was no laughter in
Belgrade. The Yugoslav press quickly
reminded Brezhnev that Yugoslavia
was no Red Riding Hood but, rather, an
independent country determined to stay
that way. The Yugoslavs have been
saying for so long and so often that they
will fight with everything they have if
invaded that few question their sinceri-
ty on the matter, and that includes the
A Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia
Tilo and Brezhnev
after Tito or in the foreseeable future is
most unlikely. Two reasons stand u ~   n
particular. First, such an invasion
would jeopardize the whole concept of
detente, something the current Soviet
regime needs. This would include the
damage such an invasion would do to
the relationship between the USSR and
the Western Communist Parties, parties
which began to view their relationship
with Moscow in a different light after
the 1968 Czech invasion. Second, and
perhaps of equal importance, the
Soviets could not be as certain of a quick
. military solution in Yugoslavia such as
they were in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
What is far more likely is that, in the
period after Tito, the Soviets will closely
monitor the situation and look for ways
to expand their influence with the new
Yugoslav leadership. One would expect
to see offers of increased military and
economic assistance and more or less a
continuation of the current relation-
ship between Moscow and Belgrade.
However, under certain conditions, a
Soviet-led invasion of Yugoslavia can-
not be ruled out entirely. If severe
internal disorder were to break out after
Tito's death and the party and armed
forces began to fight among themselves
to the extent that there was no possibili-
ty of a unified defense against outside
aggression, the Soviets could be tempted
to intervene. They also could be tempted
if the new Yugoslav leadership moved
its political orientation entirely toward
the West and against the USSR.
While there are some in the West and
perhaps Moscow as well who feel that
complete chaos and an inability to
defend against outside aggression will
prevail in Yugoslavia after Tito. this is
unlikely. In the first weeks and months
after Tito, it is the very threat of outside
aggression-that is, Soviet
aggression-which will tend to unify
the Yugoslavs, particularly the party
and the military. The second possibility
seems equally remote-that is,
Yugoslavia turning to the West and
cutting all ties with the Soviets. There is
no reason to believe the Yugoslavs
would entertain such an idea, and, even
if they did, they would not take such an
action knowing that it could force Soviet
Still, as unlikely as it is, a Soviet-led
invasion could occur if the Kremlin
misinterpreted Yugoslav aims or the
Yugoslav capability for unity and
defense. If an invasion did take place,
the Soviets would involve forces from as
many other Warsaw Pact countries as
possible, probably all except Rumania.
They would want to attack with a force
of sufficient size to neutralize
Yugoslavia quickly. Western experts
have assessed that as many as' 44
Warsa w Pact divisions cou ld be
employed in such an attack.'
The Soviets, however, realize the
difficulties of such an operation. They
are not ignorant of the fact that, during
World War II, the Yugoslavs tied up
some' 50 German divisions at a time
when they were fighting one another as
well as the German occupation. It is
probable that any future Soviet inva-
sion would meet determined resistance
far superior to that which the Germans
Soviet planners looking at the type of
defense they would face in Yugoslavia, a
country 75 percent of which is covered
by mountains, must realize that such a
conflict could well result in a long-
drawn-out operation. One needs to add
here that, while Soviet strategy has
never failed to take advantage of a given
situation, it has never been too adven-
turesome either. The Soviets stand to
lose far more than they would gain if an
aggression against Yugoslavia went
In the final analysis, after Tito dies
the Soviets probably will wait and see
what develops. To the extent that they
can manipulate certain individuals and
movements within Yugoslavia, they
will do so-but probably without signifi-
cant effect. They will, at the same time,
attempt to curry favor with the new
regime and hope for an improvement
in a relationship which has been a con-
stant source of worry and
1 John (' Cdmpbell,' ins('{"untv and f'nOpE'ratlOn YUgOS]D ....l£l
and the Balkan .... ' FOr('l{;n A/falT!:>, Jul)- 1973, p 77fo
2 For mUrt' dt,tmi on thE' YUj!osla", concept of total nntlOnal
dE'fE'lIbf', seC' A RossJohnson . Yugm,ia'o Tutal NatJnnai Defense, '
MdItnr" Rf't wu" Dt'('cmb<'r 1973 p.'lO
i • The AliJances dnd Europe" Thl' Mdltar)l Balanc(', 1976
/977 l'h(' InternatIOnal Institute fur Stroteglc StudH's, London,
Eng IlJ7F. r ,m
1 Dr i\Hl   "YugO!>bVHl'S Oef{'nsf' The of
Pnlltlr<;" In[('rnatlOnal DC/f'nw Relief< Octobl'r 1976, p 73:1
Lieutenant Colonel Joel E. L. Roberts. US Army
More and more women are being assigned to TOE units-a
traditional male domain. Male commanders are not trained
to cope with this sudden influx, and there are too few
experienced female officers and senior NCOs available to
assist the commander in dealing with the problems that
arise. However, once the commander respects the fact that
men and women are different, he also can expect the same
professional standards and work performance from all his
soldiers-male and female. The female soldier can be a
definite asset if given a chance and understood. Isn't it time
we did?
y CREDENTIALS to write about
women in the Army are purely
circumstantial and based on the fact
that III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas,
have more enlisted women than any
other installation. The 13th Corps
Support Command (COSCOM) has
more women than any other major
command within the corps. Not
surprisingly, the 553d Supply and
Service Battalion (General Support)
.(Forward) which I commanded for 19
months has more enlisted women than
any other table of organization and
equipment (TOE) unit in the corps.
When I assumed command, the
553d, with a strength of 1,100, had a
relatively small number of enlisted
women and one woman officer. Five
months later, we still had one woman
officer-and 256 enlisted women! Since
then, the women in the battalion
fluctuated from a high of 32 percent
and stabilized at about 25 percent.
Thus. my command sergeant major,
execu ti ve officer. company
commanders, first sergeants. staff-the
entire chain of command-had to
adjust to a work force in which every
fourth soldier was a woman.
A significant portion of the
battalion work force has been, is and
will continue to be enlisted women.
Therefore, the topic-women in the
Army-is not a theoretical discussion
to me or to the members of the
Since no two supply and service
battalions are structured alike, a brief
description of how the battalion is
organized will help place the work·
setting in perspective.
What does this corps supply and
service battalion do on a daily basis?
Two years ago, it had the
responsibility for establishing a
Reserve component site for summer
training at North Fort Hood,
principally the 49th Armored Division,
Texas National Guard. It had no other
full·scale real·world mission except the
ammullltlOn company's annual
participation in Re{orger.
Now what does it do? The best way
to show that is to review an extract of
the III Corps and Fort Hood weekly
Presently. the 553d is responsible
for the installation Class I troop issue
subsistence activity; a Class II, IV and
VII direct support unit and installation
general support unit; Class III bulk
and retail supply; Class V ammunition
supply point, salvage yard and holding
area; and a Class IX general support
unit and installation general support
direct exchange point. Additionally,
watpr purification, laundry, bath and
bakery services are provided corps
units as required. In short, the
battalion carries the full brunt of
supply and service support for the 1st
Cavalry and 2d Armored Divisions. the
6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade and
other COSCOM and nondivisional
units. The 664th Ammunition
Company participated in Re{arger '77.
With that sort of real-world
logistical support day in and day out.
25 percent of the work force is of vital
importance. In order to accomplish
assigned missions. you must have the
full contribution of every soldier
available to you. Concurrent with the
challenges associated with assuming
these missions. we also had the
opportunities offered by
implementation of the company
administration at battalion level
I have described a period of massive
change. an evolution of untrained
IAcutenant Colonel Joel E. L. Roberts IS
u'lth the Department of Resource
ManaKement. USACGSC. He recewed an
A B from MIddlebury College. an MBA.
from tire Unll'erslty of Alahama and is a
waduate of the L'SACG8C. He has sen'ed In
Germany, VIetnam and Korea, and as
commander of the 553d Supply and ServLce
BattallOlI (General Support.) (Forward). 13th
Corps Support Command. Fort Hood. rex
553d Supply and Service Battalion
(General Support) (Forward)
553d S&S
I (GS)
• • •

I (OS)
combat service support troops from an
"ash-to-trash" environment to a full·
blown supply and service battalion.
Everyone in the work force suddenly
must perform the full range of their
military occupational specialty (MOS),
together with the added shock of the
company losing its Standard
Installation/Division Personnel
System and legal clerk, the property
book and supply sergeant, and
organizational maintenance expertise
to the battalion staff-and, at the same
time, assimilating and integrating
more than 200 enlisted women. These
sudden, dramatic changes called for a
reassessment of conventional wisdom
as it applied to women in TOE units.
What are some of the things the
enllsted women are doing these days?
In addition to the administration,
communication and food service
(Convl Ammo)
565 SUP
I Repair parts
specialties, they are a significant
factor in such "nontraditional"
specialties as ammunition and
petroleum handlers, rough terrain
forklift and crane operators, mechanics
and repair parts and subsistence
supply specialists.
What are some of the lessons we all
learned as we found ourselves in this
situation? These are applicable to all of
us, whether policymakers or mission·
oriented performers in the field.
• No seasoned female officers are
available to help a male commander at
battalion level. I had a brand new
feIl\ale lieutenant then, and I had
seven second and first lieutenants
when I ended my tour. None were
captains and candidates for command
of any of the companies in the
battalion .
• No seasoned female
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are
available to assist at middle level
management. One forklift operator
(62M20) was a Stripes for Skill
Specialist 5 who had five months in
the Army. Five enlisted women were
E-5s, none above that level.
• There was no warning of the
impending avalanche of enlisted
women straight from advanced
individual training (AIT) in grade E-2;
a totally male chain of command was
caught flat· footed and found very
quickly that we had our hands full.
• 'There were no concise, specific
rules of engagement spelling out the
"dOR and don'ts" of billeting, field
duty, latrine requirements, and so on
as they pertain to enlisted women.
• Very quickly, we found ourselves
in trouble! We had a male chain of
command afraid of their enlisted
women. We had enlisted women afraid
of their chain of command. In short,
we had both men and women
adjustment problems.
Our first reaction was neither
rational nor professional. I found,
much to my horror, that my company
commanders were recommending to
me, and I was approving, virtually
every request from an enlisted woman
to leave the Army by way of Chapter 5,
Army Regulation (AR) 635-200,
Enlisted Personnel-the e1{peditious
discharge program-with an honorable
discharge and all benefits. The
principal reason? She could not adjust
to life in a TOE unit, three-quarters of
whose members were men, and because
my commanders and their
subordinates could not adjust to the
one-quarter of their command that
were women.
• After the initial excitement, when
we had the inevitable giggling under
control, we were able to get the
situation under control. I have distilled
our e1{perience since then into what I
term the principal myths and
misconceptions concerning men and
women in large numbers in the same
TOE units. There are those areas
which caused both me and . my
company commanders, as well as my
superiors, the biggest headaches. The
five areas of prime concern and tension
• Stereotypes.
• Psychological invisibility.
• Familiarization.
• Institutional sexism.
• Societal ambivalence.
Each of these topics gives rise to a
number of myths and misconceptions
with which any commander must be
prepared to deal. Unless and until he
or she is cognizant of them, and has a
plan for dealing with them, that
commander will experience dissonance
within the unit, and may well face
serious problems in both morale and
mission performance.
For example, consider stereotypes.
These are common, repeated endlessly
within .the unit and gain an air of
respectability through constant
repetition. Each of them has at its base
a small grain of truth, although largely
unfounded. The challenge to the chain
of command is to discern the facts in
each case and, through command
information, counseling and any other
avenue available, seek to set the record
straight with specific facts and a
balanced picture of that subject with
respect to both men and women within
the unit. Some of the most common
stereotypes found within the unit are:
• "Women soldiers can't physically
do their jobs."
• "Women soldiers come into the
Army to find a husband, get their
benefits, get over, make easy money
and get out."
• "Women are for childbearing and
should stay at home where they're
• Women soldiers are either gay or
The myth that women soldiers
cannot physically do their jobs
originated from the fact that female
ammunition specialists-55Bs-could
not lift 8-inch shells. In point of fact,
there are very few men who can lift
those shells! The point of the matter is
that no one is re-examining, in detail,
AR 611-201, Enlisted Career
Management Fields and Military
Occupational Specialties, to redefine
the precise, specific tasks required of a
55B, or any other MOS in which we
find men and women. As we define,
specifically, the tasks expected of each
MOS, we will discover there are men
who cannot perform the full range of
their MOS satisfactorily.
The last stereotype-"women
soldiers are either gay or prostitutes"-
stems from the fact that both
categories were represented within the
unit. When you pursue it, and find the
facts, you discover that,
proportionately, there are as many
male homosexuals and pimps as there
are lesbians and prostitutes. The
challenge is to keep the unit under
control while you identify, isolate and
rid the Army of both males and
females in these ca,tegories.
The stereotypes must be dealt with.
It requires the commander find the
facts, relate them to life in the unit and
require members of the chain of
command to discuss the subject, in
proper perspective, with all members of
the unit.
Another category took me a long
time to discover and is insidious in
nature. I call it psychological
invisibility. How does it manifest itself
in the unit? It is reflected in the
number of enlisted women referred for
professional counseling through
mental health channels, in open-door
counseling of individual soldiers and
in correspondence from the folks at
home. What are the symptoms that
reflect its presence within the unit?
These are some of the most prevalent
• First sergeant addresses company
as "you guys."
• "Men, I want you to do this .... "
• "0. K .• you guys, we're going to
have a G.!. party tonight."
• "You need help. Mary? Go see the
battalion CSM-I got too many
soldiers with real problems."
• "That time of the month again!?
O. K., skip sick call and guard mount-
I'll find a real soldier."
• "All you guys that want to play
on the company softball team-be
there at 1700."
This is a very real problem' that
needs definition early in the
introduction of women into a unit. An
enormous number of women were sent
to mental health because of serious
adjustment problems. You can imagine
a first sergeant, with as many years as
he has in the Army, finding it
extremely difficult to remember he has
a mixed work force. The enlisted
woman simply does not exist in the
daily life of the unit. They have no
identity; they feel unwanted; they are
caged at battalion level where they are
cen trally housed; their standing
operating procedures are the same as
those for their male counterpart. The
male supervisor is hesitant to inspect
the woman and her quarters; thus, he
does not enforce the standards, and
they feel a caste apart.
The next one is probably the one
that leads to the greatest heartburn on
any given day, particularly with
respect to the middle level
noncommissioned and the junior
warrant and commissioned officers.
This also is the area where the ground
rules are the least clearly delineated
and where the local commander must
establish what his policy is early on.
For this to be effective, it requires the
strong backing of his chain of
command. As with any soldier, the
woman member of the unit will
perform effectively those tasks
assigned her, given leadership and
support from the chain of command. In
the area I have termed
"familiarization," she deserves support
from the chain of command constantly
in order for her to perform the full
range of her assigned duties. She also
deserves the same respect and
consideration given any other soldier
within the unit. Some of the most
common indicators that there is a
potential problem within the unit are
reflected here:
• "Wait a minute. Sally, let me get
that door for you."
• "Let me do that-you're
• "I'll torque that for you-you post
the log book."
• "You catch the 'Roach Coach'-
I'll get the forklift and the safety jack."
• "Here, I'll carry that for you."
• "I write your EER-Iet's help
each other out."
• "My wife and I are going to the
party tonight-how about it if you
babysit the crumb crunchers? No
sweat-you don't. need to be in until
0900 tomorrow anyway."
Institutional sexism is undoubtably
the most difficult to deal with because
there is so little you can do about it at
the unit level other than take it in the
ear because you are discriminating
against your own soldiers!
• Females will be noncombative by
congressional decree.
• Seventy·seven hours' difference in
basic training between men and
• Condescension by male officers
and NCOs.
• Separate but equal (guard duty,
field duty, physical training, duty
Societal ambivalence takes a little
getting used to at unit level. It is the
area hardest to deal with because there
are no easy answers. It does reflect,
however, an area which requires a
great deal of soul·searching and a
great deal of attention. Genuine,
honest and open discussion with all
members of the unit clears the air and
surfaces internal problems to the point
where they can be dealt with on an
equitable basis within the unit:
• Pregnancy and the field soldier.
• Treat me like a male soldier, but I
demand I retain my femininity.
• Dual standards.
• Institutional paternalism.
These broad categories give rise to a
plethora of emotionalism and cause an
unbelievable amount of dissonance in
the unit environment. You must be
prepared to accept that fact and go
from there.
What are some of the facts with
respect to the enlisted women in the
553d? Women perform duty in 22 of the
80 MOSs in the battalion. Following is a
profile of the average enlisted woman
found in the 553d: She is almost 21
years old, Caucasian and comes from a
Southern state. After graduation from
high school with an average general
technical aptitude area (GT) score of
112, she enlisted for three years for
Station of Choice under the Delayed
Entry Program. Following attendance
at AIT in an MOS she did not want,
she joined the 553d where she is a
private first class. She lives in the
barracks and has the person"al freedom
of movement associated with owning
her own vehicle. She is in good
physical condition, has no medical
profile and joins with her commander
in abhorring pregnancy.
She is well-educated, intelligent,
somewhat more mature than her male
counterpart. In my battalion, the GT
score for enlisted women ranged from a
low of 104 to a high of 153. Seventy-two
percent of the men have a GT score of
100 or better, and some 71 percent have
credit for high school completion. That
means, on the average, that my
company commanders have to give
priority to on-duty GT review classes
and general education development
preparatory classes to some 30 percent
of the men and none of the women!
That also means, on the average, the
enlisted woman will appear before a
promotion board with a greater share
of available administrative points than
will her male counterpart.
This has been a quick look at some
of the experiences I have had with
enlisted women in relatively large
numbers within a fully committed TOE
unit. It is a challenge that calls for
imaginative leadership and some
fundamental shift in conviction on the
part of the male commander. Some
things simply cannot afford to be
ignored when you have such a large
number of women and when you
cannot predict with any degree of
accuracy the rate at which they will fill
your unit. My advice is this:
• The enlisted woman is here to
stay, and no amount of discussion 'is
going to change that fact. She is going
to arrive in your unit trained to
perform in her MOS and less trained,
on the average, than her male
counterpart in field-related and
physical training subjects.
• She is determined to succeed, and
she expects the support of a
predominately male chain of command
as she tries to demonstrate her value to
the Army. She is performance-oriented
and demands your support. My advice
is to take full advantage of her
education and enthusiasm and
maximize the use of her considerable
military talents.
• Treat her like a soldier-treat
them all alike-male and female. Bear
in mind that an enormous amount of
work needs to be done to re-define the
standards of performance required of
each soldier holding a given MOS,
male or female. Until that is
determined, you have to work with
your commanders to make those
judgments. When f say treat them
alike, I mean fair and equitable. Lest
you make the same mistake so many
commanders make, you need to
remember they are men and women
first, and then they are soldiers. No
amount of wishful thinking is going to
change that biological fact. My most
successful commanders and':NCOs are
those that respect the difference and
demand the same professional
standards of behavior and job
performance of all their soldiers.
• My final comment is to suspend
your disbelief; get out in the trenches
and find out for yourself. The answers
to the proper and full employment of
women in the Army are being
discovered, not in schools, not in staff
sections and not in "think tanks." The
answers are being found each and
every day in units such as the 553d."h
~   V I   W S
The Horn of Africa
By Marc NeuVille
Armees d'aujourd'hU/
November 1977 (France)
The horn of Africa, situated between the
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, is not
only important, but a problem. The bulk of
the Free World's oil passes nearby in
Middle East loaded tankers. Ethiopia and
Somalia are at war, and the situation is
uncertain in Djibouti. Dominance of the
horn by the Soviets or their sympathizers
will be of great strategic import. The author
outlines recent events of the horn states
and adjoining areas and discusses his·
tories, foreign influences, heritage and
current politics. It is a coming world hot
spot whose issues will remain in doubt for
some time.
- Who's Afraid of the Cruise Missile?
By Calm S. Gray
Orb/s, Fall 1977
Author Gray says the long·range cruise
missile (LRCM) is inherently a second·
strike weapon, therein posing the biggest
problem for the Soviets.
Official American strategic doctrine
does not call for the ability to wage, survive
and win another world war; Soviet doctrine
does. The United States is under no obli·
gation to aid the Soviet Union in this
regard by not deploying the LRCMs that
would greatly increase the US retaliatory
threat to the Soviets. Gray observes that,
although cruise missiles would probably
arrive too late' on target to forestall first·
round Soviet intercontinental ballistic
missile launchers, they would arrive in time
to preclude the reloading of silos. Analysts
who are wont to cite the "empty holes"
problem tend to neglect the probability of
the reload threat.
At the strategic level, LRCMs pose no
danger to Soviet strategic forces, but they
do carry the promise of putting punch in
American second or third strike. Who's
afraid of the cruise missile? You better
believe they are.
Soviet Strength and Fears
By George J. Keegan Jr and Earl C. Ravenal
World Issues, October·November 1977
This articlp was taken from a debate
between Keegan and Ravenal at the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions
and prepared by Fred Warner Neal of the
Claremont Graduate School, Calif.
According to Keegan, the Soviet Union,
along with its Warsaw Pact allies, has
developed, produced and deployed military
and technical capability to initiate, wage,
win and survive a war and emerge with a
viable net military advantage far beyond
that of the United States and the Free
World. He says that, as a consequence of
what the Soviets are doing and what we are
not, global conflict is more likely than not
in the npxt two decades and that such a
global conflict is now in gestation irre-
spective of what we impute to the Soviet
Union. Our failure to understand the dis-
parate growth of Soviet power along with
their ever-expanding intrusion abroad in,
vites by inadvertence and miscalculation
that which we want to avoid-global con-
flict. .
Ravenal counters that intentions
are subject to widely varying interpreta-
tions. What Keegan and others present are
only estimates and citations of certain
capabilities-intentions even-of the Soviet
Union. Even if the public assumes the
situation is as stated and accepts all the
estimates, that still does not tell what US
policy should be. The   says
Ravenal, cannot prescribe what risks we
should take or which risks we should reject.
The American system will do that although
probably not to the satisfaction of Keegan
and others. It will probably cost too, he
adds-cost in terms of strategic response
among our own allies, cost in terms of
unsettling some of our allianc<' systems,
cost in terms of the credibility of our will
and our ability to maintain a defensive
umbr<,lla over all our present allies, but it
wIll be a r<'sponse that is characteristic of
the American system.
The accuracy of either predictio,n is a
cause celebre.
Arme Blindee Cavalerie
Bulletin 54. 1977 (France)
The 1977 edition of ABC (formerly the
French armor school L'Ecole d'AppLlcutlOn
de I'Arme Blmd"e el de La Cavalene mag-
azine) lS the second issue in the new
format. It is a folder of six handy booklets
about foreign armor branches (West
German and Bntish in particular), fording
rivers with tanks, antitank missiles, firing
simulation, some helpful hints one should
know before assuming command of a tank
company and a personnel yearbook. The
booklets have technical data, comparisons,
histories, pictures, organizational charts,
pages for making notes, maps, decision-
making procedures, operational sequences
and case studies presented in a colorful.
authoritative and concise quick reference
series. It is an interesting publishing tech-
nique that SOme of our own doctrinal lit-
erature people might want to see.
Camouflage: Sensible or a Waste of Time?
By E. Bolli
Techmsche Mitteilungen fLir Sappeure,
Pontomere und Mmeure
November 1977 (Switzerland)
Recent technological advances in in-
frared, night and all-weather viewing de-
vices have made it hard to keep infor-
mation out of enemy hands. Camouflage of
outline, radar or thennal signature is no
longer a frill but a necessity if our chances
of survi v al and success in battle are to be
Bolli has illustrated his article with
pictures taken with some of our own new
low-visibility equipment. They are scary.
One has to wonder if the intelligence-
gathering ability of the other side is as
"What do you mean you left the cam·
ouflage net back in the supply room?"
These synopses are pubhshed as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to
ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detaIled
accounts, readers should refer to the original artIcles No offiCIal endorsement of
the VIews, opinIons or factual statements in these Items is mtended or should be
~ T U   I E S
Military Intrusion Detection. The sharp rise in international terrorist activo
ities will necessitate a 288-percent expansion in US military intrusion detection
systems funding during Fiscal Year 1978-83 according to a new study of the field
by the analytical firm of Frost and SulIivan, Inc.
The services have determined that electronic detection a!ld physical security
equipment must be installed at over 32,000 military sites in the next six years. A
large number of military guards are currently used at these sites for security.
The study indicates the Air Force will be the leading user of intrusion detection
devices, spending about $456.2 milIion for them in the 1978-83 time frame. The Air
Force's SAFE program will take the bulk of the outlay to install the program at an
additional 100 sites globallY in order to upgrade strategic, tactical and air defense
weapon systems. The other Air Force program, Base and Installation Security
System (BISS), is presently in research and development and is planned as a
follow-on to SAFE. Expenses for BISS are expected to be about $30 milIion by
In addition to the heavy use of sensors, BISS will develop a laser fence for
barrier protection of open ramps and a voice-print system for entry control
An extensive user of intrusion detection equipment, primarily the unattended
ground sensor (UGS) in Vietnam, the Army also has a major stake in the
intrusion detection program. Key Army efforts will be the Remotely Monitored
Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) and the Facility Intrusion Detection
System (FIDS), both of which had their baptism in Southeast Asia.
REMBASS, an all-weather day and night sensor system that operates in any
environment, can distinguish between personnel, animals, wheeled or tracked
vehicles. The sensors, which feed data into the central monitoring unit, can be
emplaced by hand, air drop or artillery. The Army plans to spend an estimated
$52.5 million for post installation during the 1978-83 period. Other initiatives
include the Joint·Service Interior Intrusion Detection System (J-SIIDSJ, the Field
Artillery Acoustic Location System (FAALS) and the Platoon Early Warning
System (PEWS).
The Navy, according to the study, will have a significant intrusion detection
program for nuclear equipment and weapons. Their six-year outlay will be
approximately $30 million. One emerging Navy program with a sizable potential
is the Waterborne Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) which includes a variety of
passive acoustic, active sonar and other sensors to protect ships and submarines
in port and at sea.
The obvious and immediate threat of terrorism is triggering an accelerated
development and use of intrusion detectors. Tangentially, their increased use will
result in operator experience and availability in the event of war.
Items in thiS department are summaries of studies currently underway or
recently completed in the defense communIty While every effort is made
to ensure accuracy, publication lead time may result In dIfferences
between the summanes and the actual study program.-Edltor.
~   T T   R S
University of Indiana?
Please refer to your January 1978
edition and the short biography of Lieuten-
ant Colonel Michael T. Plummer on page
IR. As a loyal reader of the Military
Revleu' and an even more loyal alumnus of
Indiana University, please be advised there
is no University of Indiana. It is either
Indiana University-the Big Ten school-
or Indiana State University in Terre Haute.
Alan Glaubinger
Soviet Tactical Revolution
[ found Mr. Phillip A. Karber's article
"The Tactical Revolution in Soviet Military
Doctrme" Ul1dltary ReView, November-
December 1977), excerpted from
Europalsche Wehrkunde, quite interesting.
It is possible, however, that he may have
erred in coming to the conclusion that a
Soviet preemptive attack could be
successfully mounted only through the use
of multiple regimental attacks.
As Karber points out, Soviet military
thinkers are encouraged to examine and re-
evaluate their combat activity. The BMP
has certainly fueled the continuing
discussions; however, this is not true
simply because the vehicle is vulnerable.
Lieutenant General Bukharenko, writing in
the Soviet Military Review, November 1975,
describes, as follows, a reinforced motorized
rifle battalion deploying as the advance
guard (movement to contact): The
motorized rifle elements leave the "slower
tanks" (indicating that the motorized rifle
elements are BMP-equipped) and artilLery
in a "swift dash" tactical maneuver
designed to seize high ground, thereby
denying a deploying enemy unit a
favorable defensive position.
Karber correctly points out that Soviet
military doctrine has undergone many
tactical changes. The bulk of these
alterations are designed to facilitate their
equipment·driven speed and mobility. His
assumption, however, that the motorized
infantry is an endangered species because
of these doctrinal changes bears some
scrutiny. To the contrary, the firepower
contained within the current motorized rifle
division's table of organization and
equipment is considerably greater than
that of a tank division.
Without a doubt, the armor plating of a
8MP is more susceptible to a zero-degree
obliquity kill than that of any currently
fielded Soviet medium tank; however, the
BM P is a low·silhouette vehicle (2 meters)
incorporating a high degree of upper and
lower glacis armor slope. These
characteristics-coupled with the BMP's
speed, maneuverability and armament (for
example, the 73mm smoothbore main gun
and the Sagger antitank guided missile)-
make it a formidable weapon system
indeed. This vehicle is certainly more
capable than any infantry combat vehicle
(lCV) currently fielded by the world's
In a fluid battle situation, Soviet
planners see little reason to dismount their
ICV s. Their current doctrine indicates that
a dismount will occur only when a battle is
joined with a well-prepared enemy; a
deliberate frontal attack would then be
mounted. In the Soviet's view, this is the
least desirable form of attack. They would
far prefer to attack a weak flank or find a
dpfpnsive gap.
Should the Soviets desire to mount .a
preemptive attack, it is not necessary that
they do so by breaking their divisions into
individual regimental attack forces. They
could, in fact. use the opposite strategy.
Two major arguments can be offered on
this point: first, the Soviets require very
positive command and control of their
tactical units; second, such a fragmented
attack scenario would be virtually
impossible to support logistically.
Soviet positive command and control
begins prior to the attack with the
"commander's estimate of the situation."
When all the options and available
intelligence have been discussed, battle
plans are drawn up. Regimental and
battalion commanders are given precise
guidance as to their primary and secondary
objectives. Plans are reviewed and
finalized, and individual commanders are
required to adhere to the instructions given
them. Should a situation develop during the
course of battle that requires alterations of
the battle plan. subunit commanders must
contact higher headquarters to get
necessary instructions.
Combat support and combat service
support assets within the Soviet Army' are
located, for the most part, at division and
higher echelons. Division and higher
headquarters, therefore. are tasked with
overall responsibility for logistical support
of engaged maneuver elements. Logistics
are force-fed from higher to lower echelons.
with supplies moving along preplanned
lines of communication (LOCs) on
preplanned schedules.
Detailed planning factors and LOC
protection procedures combine to create
extreme difficulties in implementing a
battle scenario requiring multiple tactical
uni t axes of advance.
On the other hand. several large-size,
deep-penetration maneuvers (in a frontal
zone) can be mounted simultaneously
without degrading the commander's
command and control capabilities. his
ability to secure LOCs or his resupply and
logistics capability. Given this scenario.
Soviet capabilities to conduct a preemptive
attack are still considerable. Secrecy and
deception means are intact and positively
controlled. but they raise an entirely
different subject.
Sgt 1 st CI Larry H. Hodge.
Threats Division. CACDA
US Deterrence Not Enough
After reading "The Impact of Strategic
and Technological Innovations on Nuclear
Deterrence" by Harold Molineu (January
1978 Miiltary Review). I am left with the
impression that Molineu has based his
conclusions on assumptions that do not
exist and omission of facts.
First, he assumes that mutual assured
destruction still exists. Here he fails to
consider the effect of known civil defense
efforts by the USSR begun after SALT I
and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
to protect both its population and its indus-
trial capacity.
Second, he fails to take into consider-
ation that it is not what each side has in
equivalent warheads, equivalent megatons, <
megatons, throw weight, counterforce po-
tential. strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
before an attack, but what each side has
left after a counterforce or countervalue
Third, the "threat to inflict 'unac-
ceptable damage' by destroying its cities"
is just that-a threat. How much is unac-
ceptable? With Soviet execution of its civil
defense measures prior to the attack, the
United States would lose over 100 million of
its citizens compared to a maximum of 5 to
10 million Russians as a result of our
reaction, and it could be as low as 1 to 2
million. This is less than that lost in World
War II and less than they themselves
slaughtered while securing dominance over
their own people. "Unacceptable"?
In addition, one· half to three-quarters of
our industrial capacity would be destroyed
compared to 10 to 30 percent of Soviet
Under their prelaunch evacuation and
hardening plans, our missiles would have
to be targeted against a population that
has been distributed by evacuation over 27
to 48 percent of the Soviet landmass, and
we have not yet considered targeting indus-
trial capacity. In short, we do not have
sufficient missiles to cover the required aim
points necessary to achieve the capacity to
inflict "unacceptable damage."
Disregarding the academics of who has
most of what, their civil defense program
has circumvented the ABM Treaty and
made an end run around SALT I if not the
"spirit" of SALT II.
Should the Soviets launch a counter-
force attack, it would normally be strategi-
cally sound for us to respond with a coun-
tervalue attack (disregarding the moral
implication) in order to destroy or delay
their industrial and economic recovery
capabilities. However, this is not possible
given their civil defense posture, and we,
therefore, face the prospect of choosing
between a counterforce or countervalue
response. Neither response offers the
United States any advantage.
Under a situation where the Soviets
launch a counterforce attack, whether we
respond with a countervalue or counter-
force attack is academic, if the Soviets have
survivability. Whatever is left, they could
have the capability of burning as many as
100 million Americans at which point we
would then face nuclear blackmail.
Dr. Molineu questions the feasibility of
limited nuclear war. He has a valid point
when applied to the deterrent strategy.
However, his conclusion is based on wrong
assumptions. The fallout and consequeI\t
casualties depends upon the type <If
response-that is, countervalue missions
require high·fallout techniques. Counter·
force missions require blast effects against
hardened sites of 50 to 600 pounds per
square inch. Counterforce missions would
produce far less fallout over far less ter-
ritory. Under evacuation plans, the popu-
lation casualties could be as low as one and
one-half million.
Unfortunately, Dr. Molineu's otherwise
well·thought-out article falls short of real-
ities. Within the parameters he has con-
fined himself, however, he does raise some
interesting questions.
Stephen O'Arrigo Jr.
Letters lS a feature deSIgned expre5sly to afford Ol.l.r readers an opportumty to aIr their opmwns
and tdeas on milltary tOPICS It lS not restrtcted to comments or rebuttals on prevwusly published
malerLUI but lS open to any vanet)' of expre5stOn which may stImulate or Improve the value of
thought m the mdttary commumty
The right to edIt IS reserlJed by the staff of the magazme and exerCIsed prlmarzly In deference to
alJazl(1.ble space -EdItor
~   W S
EDO Corporation of New York has received a Research and Development Cost-
Plus Award Fee contract from the US Navy for an advanced airborne mine
countermeasure system called the lightweight magnetic sweep (LMS).
The LMS is expected to be the Navy's nexf generation airborne magnetic mme
countermeasure system. It is designed to augment the present EDO-built MK105,
a hydrofOil, helicopter-towed minesweepmg platform used to clear Haiphong
Harbor at the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the Suez Canal and Its
approaches after the Israeli-Egyptian conflict
The EDO research and development effort will result in two prototype systems for
Navy operational evaluation prior to potential future production.
The total value of the contract is approximately $18 million.
.. :'1"<' A,.
The first nodal of a superh,gh frequency tactical satellite com-
mUnications network is being built for the US Army Satellite
Communications Agency, Fort Monmouth, N. J ,by RCA. Designed for
Instantaneous Intratheater commUnications from headquarters
down to brigade level, these ground stations provide highly reliable,
short or long-range communications without the need for relay links,
extensive site preparation or dependence upon Ionospheric con-
The AN/TSC85(V)2 multipOint terminal transmits up to 96 vOice
channels of PCM digital data and orderwire and can simultaneously
communicate With up to four other superhigh frequency carriers. The
AN/ TSC93 and US Air Force AN/TSC94 terminals are pOlnt-to-POlnt
variations Each is equipped With a 500-watt transmitter and an
automatic 8-foot ground-mounted antenna Setup time IS 20 minutes
for full communications capability.
The MILITARY REVIEW and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no
responsibility for accuracy of Inforll)allOn corltalned In the NEWS section of thiS publi-
cation Items are printed as a service to the readers No offiCial endorsement of the Views,
opinions or factual statements IS Intended -Editor
South Afnca has developed its own combat vehicle for Its armored infantry
battalions. The new mfantry combat vehicle, designated Ratel20, has a combat
loaded weight of 16 tons and carnes a crew of 10. Its armament mcludes a
20mm automatic cannon and a coaxial 7.62mm machinegun in a two-man
rotating turret, an antiaircraft machinegun-mountmg capability and four smoke
grenade launchers The Raters maximum road speed IS 104 kilometers per
hour (64 miles per hour) and 70 kmph (43 mph) on open terrain.
On each side of the vehicle are four firing ports consisting of viewing blocks
and weapon holes The side and front windshields on the driver's side can be
covered with armored panels. The viewing blocks in the commander's dome
are also armor·plated. Full use of weapons IS pOSSible even with the turret
hatch closed.
Sandock-Austral In Bocksburg and Durhan IS bUilding the new combat armored
personnel carrier The tires are almost shell-proof and, with appropnate
treatment, can be made napalm-proof These tires, also made In South Africa,
can be dnven for some time without air.-Truppendienst
The Canadian firm of Can-A-Mex
Manufacturing, Ltd, has developed a
heavy-duty terrain clearer which cuts
through heavy undergrowth, mulches it
and levels the ground all in one oper-
ation The Madge Rotoe/ear also can
break up hard surfaces such as packed
gravel or macadam roads with ea&e,
loosening the matenal to a depth of 9
The machines are available in self-
propelled or towed versions and operate
effiCiently at a speed of 2 5 kilometers
per hour.
Military engineering applications
would be construction of access roads,
hasty alrstnp preparation, construction
site clearance, breaking up of hll dirt for
fortifications and mine-laYing operations.
A Norwegian company has de-
veloped a laser detector for ar-
mored vehicles. Designated RLT.
the new device registers laser
range finder and laser target
Illumination beams stnking the
vehicle. The RLT consists of the
detector (top photo) which must
be mounted as high as possible
on the vehicle to obtain a three-
dimensional pickup range, and
the indicator (bottom photo). This
detector has eight arrow lights to
show the lateral direction of in-
coming laser beams within a 45-
degree sector and a center light
pOint to show laser beams
coming from above the vehicle
Poland has delivered two mod-
Ified versions of the Soviet Pol-
nocny class of landing craft to the
Iraqi Navy Modifications Include
a platform on the bow for heli-
copter landing. The photo Shows
the platform with a loading port
for heavy cargo. The forward
30mm tWin antiaircraft gun is
just visible in the plcture.-Soldat
und Technik, (e) 1977.
An alarm sounds to alert the tank
crew to incoming laser beams.-
Soldat und Technik © 1977
~ O O   S
The Officers' Olio
A GENIUS FOR WAR The German Army and General Staff. 1807-1945 by Colonel T N Dupuy 362 Pages PrentICe-Hail, Englewood
Cliffs, N J 1977 $1495
Trevor Dupuy had a point to make, so he wrote a book. The point was worth
making, and the book is worth reading. And for those who have been concerned with
the utility of military history and the achievement of a historical mindedness within
the officer corps, it provides a certain justification.
Dupuy says that, iri the two world wars, the Germans were better soldiers than
were the Americans, British and Russians. Why? He offers several explanations
dealing with such things as genetics, motivation and tradition, then rejects them all.
The answer, he says, is in the institutionalizing of genius, or excellence, in the form
of the Prussian/German General Staff.
A Genius for War is the history of the General Staff beginning with Prussian
reforms spawned by the defeats inflicted by Napoleon. Reforms and setbacks,
organizational changes and sketches of chiefs of staff follow in chronological order.
The text is supported by several succinct annexes which quantitatively analyze
selected battles of the two world wars. To many historians, particularly the older
ones, clinometries is not only undignified, but inappropriate. But Dupuy presents
simple, practicable ratios demonstrating that, in World War II, 100 Germans had the
combat equivalent of 120 Americans or 120 British troops-in other words, a 20-
percent German superiority in combat effectiveness. Dupuy also determined that the
Germans inflicted three casualties for every two they suffered. World War I data
produced almost identical results. Given the recent revelations about ULTRA, it
could be plausibly argued that the World War II ratios should be widened in favor of
the Germans.
Whether or not the German General Staff was the institution of excellence Dupuy
makes it out to be, it doubtlessly was an efficient war-making body. If it is true that
imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, the German General Staff was flattered
indeed. considering the number of military establishments that adopted similar
How did the German General Staff maintain this excellence? Dupuy lists 10
overlapping areas as the keys, including selection, examination, specialized
training, historical study, inculcation of the initiati,!,e and objective analysis. Small
in numbers with members permanently assigned, the General Staff represented the
elite of the Army. The US Army system, of course, has little in common with the
German General Staff.
Not all of Dupuy's arguments necessarily hold water. German arms would have
achieved a modicum of success without its General Staff. And if a criticism of the
book is to be made, it would be d i r ~   t e d at the author's tendency to protest too
much-he continually calls attention to the correctness of his thesis. But he has
much on his side. Certainly, an educational process that stressed military principles,
theory and analysis and thereby produced consistent reliability and excellence is
something to be considered. As Dupuy points out, Germany had no monopoly on
theory and analysis; consistency is the operative word.
In many ways, the US Army today is at an educational crossroads. Several high-
level boards are immersed in the study of officer education and Army training. They
would do well to examine a system that produced such consistent excellence, a
system whose officer education relied heavily on examinations and a proper respect
for the value of military history.
Brooks E. Kleber,
Histonan, US Army Trammg and Doctnne Command
lHE GENESIS OF lHE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS' CORPS by G Teltler 246 Pages Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. Calo! 1977
One of 12 books in the Sage Series on Armed Forces and Society, this book is an
English translation of Teitler's original Dutch text published in 1974. A Dutch
sociologist, Teitler adds to the literature on professionalization by using historical
data and the comparative method to trace the acquisition of professional status by
the military officer corps.
'feitler says the characteristics of the military profession include: technical
competence, esprit de corps anchored in tradition and a code of honor and rendition
of services to a certain public authority (the state). Three circumstances, he suggests,
helped foster the professionalizaton of the military occupation: the possibility for
both the problems with which the military was concerned and their solutions to be
standardized; the existence of a reasonably, powerful and centralized state; and the
existence of social groups which could administer to the "technical" and "esprit de
corps" elements of the professional arsenal and which, at the same time, could
tolerate each other. '
The author traces the development of military leadership at sea and on land. In
discussing military leadership at sea, Teitler contrasts the development and
activities of the British Navy during the age of sail with those of the French and
Dutch Republican Navies. A powerful and affluent middle class, the existence of a
group of lower nobility and prosperous yeomen and an effective centralized state
provided the necessary social and administrative conditions for professionalization
of the English naval officer corps. The end of privateering, the development of the
"melee" school of tactics with an emphasis on aggressive, decisive battles, the
advent of a new signaling communication system and the development of new
weaponry suitable to the melee approach helped the English establish naval
supremacy in the 18th Century.
Teitler reasons that the professional military army has its origins in Prussia!
Germany. Because of its vulnerability on many geographic fronts and its lack of a
strong military figure like Napoleon, Prussia began conscripting members of the
mIddle class and established a General Staff in the 19th Century. Members of the
army developed a monopoly in military knowledge as a result of specialized training.
Prussian/German officers preserved the Napoleonic tradition of a mass army and a
preference for speed and encirclement.
Unfortunately, Germany failed to learn anything from the American Civil War,
the Russian-Japanese War and the Boer War when, during World Wars I and II, its
army tried to decide a conflict with one conclusive battle, ignoring the political and
moral consequences of such an approach.
Thus, this obsession with tactics rather than strategy led the Germans to
miscalculate the nonmilitary forces which were to be unleashed with their blitzkrieg
of World War II.
Teitler concludes his book by implying that the professional soldier may himself
become an "aristocrat" if he underestimates the importance for warfare of political,
economic, psychological, ideological and moral factors.
The substance of this book commands our attention although the English
translation is very awkward in places and replete with many mechanical errors.
Lowndes F Stephens,
College of Journalism, Umverslty of South Carolma
LIDDEll HART: A Study of HIs Military Thought by Bnan Bond 289 Page, Rutgers UnIVerSity Press, New BrunSWick, N J 1977
Any attempt to study the military thought of Sir Basil Liddell Hart is an
immense project, for, as one of the 20th Century's most famous military critics.
theoreticians and historians, the impact of Liddell Hart has been formidable. His
influence ranges from infantry tactics, to mechanized warfare, to atomic or nuclear
warfare and conceptual approaches for the formulation of strategy. This work by
Brian Bond, nonetheless, is an admirable study of a difficult topic, for it reveals not
only the general thrust of this noted Englishman's thought, but it also relates his
individual personality to the development of his ideas. Such an achievement in an
easily readable book is much to be admired.
Bond emphasizes the influence of J. F. C. Fuller on Liddell Hart's concepts of
mechanized warfare and quotes Liddell Hart on Fuller: "You were the pioneer
and ... my conversion did not begin· until 1918 and was not complete till 1921." By
the mid·1920s, Liddell Hart moved from his preoccupation with infantry tactics and
the individual in combat to embrace history, strategy and a general theory of war.
His biograplfy of Sherman during this period gave firm direction to his concept of
the strategic indirect approach. By the late 1930s, he was an exponent of progressive
ideas on the need for mechanization. But his increasing awareness of the strength of
the defensive and his arguments against any type of continental commitment by the
British tempered his belief in the broad·ranging, blitzkrieg-type operation that would
be so successful between 1939 and 1941.
During World War II, Liddell Hart became one of the most stringent critics of
total war and Winston Churchill, and his reputation suffered. After the war,
however, his urging of restraint toward the enemy appeared in a more favorable
light, and his public reputation soared as his influence over the, early evolution of
armored warfare became more evident. It was in this era of improving public
reputation that he became one of the first theoreticians on the implications of atomic,
and nuclear weapons. Bond argues that Liddell .Hart was one of the first to
appreciate the limitations of atomic deterrence in the 19408 and, in the following
decade, was one of the severest critics of the policy of massive retaliation,
The one drawback in this book is the final chapter on Liddell Hart's influence on
Israeli military theory. While one hesitates to denigrate Israeli military theory, a
more likely subject for a concluding chapter may have been Liddell Hart's influence
on current military thought. Concentration on the Israelis only serves to obscure
Liddell Hart's influence over the Americans and Russians, for example, and detracts
from the overall reputation of this profound military thinker.
Despite this flaw, the book is mandatory for anyone interested in military
thought in the 20th Century. The author does an excellent job of summarizing the
wide-ranging ideas of Liddell Hart, and the reader can clearly discern the ebb and
flow of his ideas along an often imperceptible shore of continuity. Despite his long-
time association with his subject, Bond manages to write about his friend in an
impartial and fair manner. His balanced presentation of this very important thinker
is a work of which Liddell Hart would have been proud.
Mal Robert A, Doughty,
Department of Umfled and Combmed Operations, USACGSC
The Red' Spread
THE GIANTS, RUSSia and AmerICa by Richard J Barnet 190 Pages Simon & Schuster, N Y 1977 $795
Very seldom does a book appear that is of equal interest and value to both the
general reader and scholar. Richard Barnet's study of recent Soviet-American
relations is such a work. It provides both an overview of the superpower relationship
and raises important issues for the consideration of the citizen, scholar and
Essentially, thIs work is a study of the policy of detente. Beginning with a brief
history of Soviet-American   during the past 60 years, the author discusses
how detente evolved, what the policy is and what it might mean for the future.
Perceptions, important incidents and factors influencing the policy from both the
Sov.iet and American perspectives are addressed.
Barnet sees detente as a "vague word" which only describes one stage in the
history of the two giants. For the past three decades, the author views both powers
as being controlled by small elites. This small group has been influenced by each
other, the world environment and internal pressures from their own societies.
Detente is a logical outcome of the many factors influencing the elites.
John Kennedy is given credit for initiating the policy of detente, but his efforts
wert> stopped by Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Nixon-Kissinger, the two
converted cold warriors, actually initiated meaningful dialogue with the Soviets. On
the Soviet side, the post-Stalinist era brought sufficient changes in Russian society,
the Communist movement and the world situation to make detente useful and mean-
ingful to the Soviet elite. Although each nation views detente in different terms, the
overall necessity for coexistence and increased interrelationships is recognized by
both parties.
Barnet, co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies, is well·qualified to write
about his subject. He is one of America's foremost experts in Soviet-American
relations and is the author of several important books on foreign and defense policy.
, Lt Col John A. Hardaway,
Faculty Trammg and Development D,v,s,on. Training Developments Insfltute, Fort Eustis. Va.
RED STAR ON THE NILE The SoO/et·Egyptlan Influence RelatIOnship Since the June War by AlVin Z Rubinstein 383 Pages
Pnncelon UrlvP""Y Press Pr.nrelon. N J 1977 $7500 clothbound $995 paperbound
In this timely, thoroughly researched work, Professor Rubinstein offers new
insight into not only the tortured course of Soviet-Egyptian relations, but also a
broader understanding of influence relations between nation-states.
The Soviet commitment to gain Middle East influence coincided with Nasser's
desperate search for assistance following the 1967 Arab defeat. The Soviet com-
mitment gained enough momentum to sustain their efforts through spectacular
successes and precipitous declines. The author constructs a frame of reference for
gaging influence in terms of successive issues holding opportunities for Soviet
pressure to bind Egyptian policy. Egyptian self-interest, as represented by Anwar
Sadat, proved remarkably resistant to Soviet influence even during periods of
massive Soviet presence and almust total reliance for military support.
The Soviet experience in Egypt 'refutes the generally held belief that arms
dependence conveys a veto power over local leadership. Despite such Soviet policies
as the demtnd for cash payments during periods of crisis, critical dependencies
persist. The role of arms and economic benefactor has succeeded in building a
durable, if uneven, Soviet influence in Egypt. Just how durable and useful this
influence relationship is will most likely be demonstrated during the 1978 Israeli
peace talks.
Although Egypt cannot be viewed as a Soviet satellite, the Kremlin relationship
which was built so painstakingly since the June war cannot be dismissed. Professor
Rubinstein's analysis suggests that influence stems more from the convergence of
perceived common interest than from dependence relationships. The Soviet expe-
rience in Egypt bears directly on our own notions concerning military aid, arms
sales, presence and expected influence.
Although the book is decidedly academic in style, it reads well and conveys a
message of critical relevance to US policy. Rubinstein offers a sobering view of the
limits of military dependence in creating and preserving influence. Red Star on the
Nile should be required reading for those professionals concerned with arms policy
and the projection of US influence.
It Col John W Messer. USAR
The Rest Is History
EARLY LEAVENWORTH AND FORT LEAVENWORTH: A PhotographIC History by J H Johnston III 143 Pages P"v;tely published
1971 $18.95
Residents of Leavenworth and those who have spent some time at Fort Leaven-
worth or at one of the other institutions in the area must occasionally wonder what
the place looked like in its prime.
In some 300 photos taken from the end of the Civil War to the early years of this
century, this book captures some of the flavor of the city and surrounding area when
Leavenworth was the most important city between St. Louis and the West Coast.
Many of the photos are by E. E. Henry, pioneer photographer and longtime recorder
of life in the city and fort. .
Street scenes of downtown Leavenworth with its streetcar tracks, blocks of
multistory buildings and crowded sidewalks near the turn of the century have the
flavor more of an Eastern metropolis than a city on the plains. A picture of the rows
of three and four· story mercantile "'houses along the levee, of which nothing now
remains, reminds one that the city was once an important river port.
The fort, St. Mary College and the Veterans Administration Center have done
much better than the city in preserving the old buildings. Many structures pictured
in the book are still familiar sights today. Also included in the book are scenes of the
city's and fort's social, religious and business life as well as a study of a dapper Wild
Bill Hickock, sometime city marshal of Leavenworth.
Although there is no accompanying text, the captions are adequate, and the book
provides a valuable historical record and a pleasant interlude of nostalgia for
anyone who has lived in the Leavenworth area.
Col Donald J. Delaney, USA, Retired
SHILOH-IN HEll BEFORE NIGHT by James lee McDonough 260 Pages UniverSIty of Tennessee Press. Knoxville, Tenn 1977 $995
clothbound $500 paperbound
Author McDonough, in this latest on Shiloh, the western bloodletting of April
1862, has provided a graphic and gripping account of one of the earlier battles that
began the legend of the infallibility of U. S. Grant.
In fact, McDonough's book is more a ministudy in field command at division and
brigade levels than it is a story of a battle. His bibliography shows . that, for
McDonough draws very. heavily on the Union Official Records, Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War and Dame Chestnut's Diary, all of which have been around longer
than the author himself. I looked very hard for a new twist but, finding none related
to tactics, logistics or even strategy, settled on leadership and command relations
and enjoyed the book.
McDonough portrays the hurrahing at Shiloh as a triumph of the less inept-the
Union's "drunken" Grant (reviled by his regimental commanders), "insane"
Sherman, dilatory Buell, tardy Wallace, Davis' "pet" Albert S. Johnston who loses
his reputation and his life on the eastern reaches of the Tennessee, the sour Bragg,
ex-churchman Polk, dilettante Hardee plus a cast of thousands of new recruits on
both sides. When the author gets below the high command level, his accounts of the
fighting are excellent, and he leads the reader through the hell that was the Hornet's
Nest and Shiloh Church.
As is usual in Civil War books, we find the dispirited losers (the Southerners)
struggling back to Corinth, Mississippi, to escape entrapment and destruction by
laggard Yankee divisions now commanded by the master of procrastination, Henry
Halleck. Grant, relieved despite his victory, pouts. At this point, McDonough
speculates with "what-irs" and wrapup on whose reputation was made and whose
destroyed at Shiloh. As could be expected, the Yanks all go on to bigger and better
things while the gents in gray begin their descent into obscurity.
For readers who want a good, accurate blow-by-blow account of one of the key
western theater's early battles, Professor McDonough's work will complement their
library. If you are already reasonably conversant on this phase of the war, ask your
local librarian or book seller, "What else might be new?"
Col James B Agnew, USA, Retired
BUGLES. BANNERS AND WAR BONNETS by Ernest LISle ,Reedstrom 400 Pages. Caxton Printers. Caldwell. Ind 1977. $1795
Billed as a study of the soldiers, weapons and equipment of the 7th Cavalry from
Fort Riley to the Little Big Horn, Ernest Reedstrom's rambling book actually
delivers more than it promises on a well-worn topic. The initial chapters provide a
generally sound and interesting history of the 7th Cavalry from 1867 to 1876. The
narrative tends to be anecdotal and somewhat disjointed and will thus perhaps not
appeal much to the true experts, be they historians or Custer fanatics. The text is,
however, sufficiently interesting and clear for the general reader. No startling new
theories are offered for the Little Big Horn disaster, which is perhaps a blessing of
no small moment.
The later chapters contain a wealth of fascinating detail on such varied subjects
as the uniform changes of 1872, Army slang <the Indian was commonly referred to
as "Mr. Lo"). cavalry tactics, horse furniture and the sequence of events at stable
call, the Gatling gun and Indian sign language. The last half of Reedstrom's book is
a veritable mine of interesting details and Jlnecdotes augmented by the reproduction
of extensive passages from Army regulations and general orders as well as
quotations from contemporary letters to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal.
For the reader with a passable general knowledge of post-Civil War military affairs,
the book will be of value in understanding the details of frontier mounted service.
The book is generously supplied with photographs, both contemporary vignettes
and modern views of weapons and equipment, supplemented by the author's own
artwork. The selection of contemporary photographs is good, but a few photographs
have rather strange captions. The group photo/5raph on page tOl, for example, bears
a caption which leaves the reader with the impression, probably erroneous, that
Charles A. Varnum, first lieutenant, 7th Cavalry, who served with Reno at the Little
Big Horn, is still alive in 1977.
The volume is generally well·edited and is equipped with a useful bibliography,
an adequate index and a list of illustrations.
Bugles. Banners and War Bonnets appears to be one of those rare tomes which
can do dual service as both a coffee table conversation starter and a reference work
for the more intense reader. Reedstrom offers something for everyone and does so in
a pleasing fashion. Where. other than Bugles, Banners and War Bonnets, could one
find reproduced the official Quartermaster photographs of both the pre and post-
1872 issue underwear?
Mal Charles R Shrader.
Department of Umlled and Combmed Operations. USACGSC
1933·1945 by Charles W Sydnor Jr 371 Pages Pnnceton
UnlVC!Slty Press Pnnceton. N J 1977 $22 50
JEfFERSON DAVIS by Clement Eaton 334 Pagel Free Press.
N Y 1977 $1295
JIM MUNDY A Novel of the Amencan CiVil War by Robert H
fowler 470 Pages Harper & Row. N Y 1977 $995
JUST AND UNJU,T WARS A Moral Argument With Hlstoflcal
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Selected Letlersand Papers. 1776 1790. Volume 1 December
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THE LATIN AMERICANS: Theil Love·Hate RelatIOnships With
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MARINES AND HELICOPTERS. 1946·1962 by Lieutenant
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NO NEED OF GLORY The Bntlsh Navy rn Ameflcan Waters.
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PROFILE OF A HERO Absalom Baird. HIS Family and the
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PURGATORY OF FOOLS' A MemOli of the Anstocrats' War In
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QUEST FOR EQUILIBRIUM. Ameflca and Balance of Power on
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THE RUSSIAN NAVY: Myth and Reality by Eflc Morns 150
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SEAfORD HOUSE PAPERS. 1976. Edited by Philip Panton
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SHOOTING-WHY WE MISS Questions and Answers on the
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SMALL ARMS or THE WORLD by Edward CIIOton Ezell 640
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Heatmg and ReSidential DeSign 144 Pages Drake Publishers.
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THE STORY or THE GUARDS by Man Paget 304 Pages
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