ntroduction: the netherlands and the beginning of World War II

During WW-I The Netherlands had the Neutral status. Our pacifist Politic lead to a deplorable state of our army in the 30 s. In fact! "e "ere di#ided in t"o camps at that time! $ust a slight upper hand for the pacifists. %ecause "e "ere only a small country that "ould ne#er be able to defend itself against a large in#asion army! "e tried to maintain our neutral status. When it became clear that &itler had no peace in mind and the first s'irmishes started in (urope! Dutch politics changed rapidly and ne" la"s "ere acti#ated to impro#e our army and general defense. Too late of course! our old fashion army could ne#er be moderni)ed in time! not enough arms could be produced or bought in time either. *t the time that +ermany in#aded The Netherlands on may ,0 in ,-.0! only .0/ of the needed arms "ere present. *part from an old 0enault tan' from WW-I! used for training! "e had no tan's at all1 The only armoured material "e could put into action "ere 23 light armoured cars li'e the one on the photo. They did a great $ob defending the airfields! inflicting a high number of casualties on the light armed +erman Paratroopers. Due to the circumstances as described abo#e 40/ of our artillery "as dated ,330. We had ,20 planes! 50 of them old dual-"inged reconnaissance planes. We had an impressi#e number of bombers too! - to be e6act. We had only -0.000 men 7di#isions of ,0.000 men each8! most badly trained soldiers! "ith no sufficient supplies at all. With the mobili)ation "e had a totall of 230.000 soldiers and officers. This fighting force had to stand up against .50.000 72. di#isions of ,9.900 men each8 +erman soldiers! "ell trained and e:uiped "ith modern gear. In addition ,2000 "ell trained +erman Paratroopers! "ith enormous supplies. ;ust for the record! our neighbour %elgium had 540.000 soldiers at that same time. Dutch defense strategy: 'Fortress Holland'

%ecause it "ould be impossible to defend the "hole country against a +erman in#asion! it "as decided to defend only the "estern part. This defense strategy "as called <esting &olland 7=ortress &olland8. It contained the ma$or part of our big cities en de largest port in the "orld> 0otterdam. This strategy e6isted since hundreds of years and "as mostly based on defense "or's among the numerous ri#ers and canals. When an attac' "as eminent "e "ould slo"ly pull bac' behind these lines. The deserted terrain "ould be flooded by #arious means of inundation. This "ay! it "as thought! "e could delay the ad#ance long enough and mean"hile "ait for our allies to come to the rescue. Political tensions also lead to serious differences among the military leaders. Numerous re:uests for more financial and material support "ere denied. *lso the differences in opinion! bet"een "ar minister Di$6hoorn and our supreme commander of armed forces +eneral 0eynders! "hat strategy should be used! lead to the resigning of the latter. &e "as replaced on =ebruary 5th by +eneral &.+. Win'elman. May 10th 1940: the attack

=all +elb! the masterplan from the +erman +eneral (rich <on ?annstein "as the basis for the attac' of "estern (urope. * ma$or attac' through the %elgian *rdennes 7"hich "as thought to be impossible8! outstepping the strong =rench ?aginot @ine on the borders of +ermany and =rance. It "as by this maneu#er that the +erman forces could con:uer large parts of the open area in northern =rance easily and stri'e for"ard to the =rench coast "ith great speed. It "as because of this plan that &olland suddenly became strategic important. There "as great danger for an attac' from &olland into the bac' of the ad#ancing +erman forces. %esides! +ermany desperate needed the Dutch airfields to supply it s ad#ancing forces. During the raid on &olland history "as "ritten. Ne#er before so many paratroopers landed in such short time on enemy territory. *ll of +ermany s *irlanding forces 72 di#isions from "ho no one 'ne" the e6istence8 including the ma$or part of +ermany s air force! "as put into action in The Netherlands. They "ere put in action to capture the Dutch *irfields and the 0oyal =amily. &olland "as attac'ed by *rmygroup % under the command of the legendary =ield ?arshall =edor #on %oc'. May 1 th 1940: the surrender

%ecause the lines around 0otterdam "ere holding! and the +erman ad#ance didn t "ent as smooth as planned! +ermany s high command feared that an in#asion of %ritish troops in &olland could not be pre#ented if the battle in &olland "ould not be ended #ery soon. * re:uest for a pin point attac' by bombers on 0otterdam "as done by the local commanders of the +erman forces 7Atudent!Achmidt8. &o"e#er +ermany s supreme command 7+oring in this case8 changed this re:uest in a total bombardment of the city. %ecause &olland didn t "ant to gi#e up that easy and due

to circumstances it "as on may ,4th ,-.0 that +erman bombers attac'ed 0otterdam and 'illed 300 ci#ilians. one third of the city "as destroyed and all this "hile the ultimatum "as still in it s timeframe. It "as because of this brutal "ay of "arfare! and the +erman threat for e#en more bombings on large Dutch cities! that The Netherlands had no choice but to surrender on ?ay ,4 at 0i$soord. Despite it s lac' of decent "eaponry! the small army and the o#er"helming odds of troops and "ar machinery against them! the Dutch put up a fears resistance. Aurrender only came after the barbaric bombardment of 0otterdam and the treat to do the same to all other ma$or cities. Where the in#asion of Nor"ay and Denmar' "ere accomplished "ith only minor losses! in &olland these losses "ere e6tremely high. 2095 Dutch soldiers lost their li#es! compared "ith the other *llied forces in#ol#ed in the in#asion of Western (urope! "e paid the highest price of all. ?ore then .000 out of ,2000 +erman paratroopers "ere put out of action. These e6treme high losses of troops and airplanes had direct conse:uences for the planned in#asion of %ritain. Ne#er "ould +ermany carry out a large scale airlanding operation again because of it s decimated airborne troops! loss of airplanes and the losses that "ere to be e6pected li'e in &olland. 323 of ,02. +erman deployed aircraft "ere destroyed in this battle. relations to !"eration Market #arden

* number of similarities to the +erman in#asion of ,-.0 and Operation ?ar'et +arden can be named. Aome of them are pure coincidence! others are important. I "ill name some of themB ,8 &olland "rites historyB largest airborne operation of ,2.000 +erman paratroopers 7,-.08. TargetsB bridges and airfields. =our years later &olland brea's it s o"n record "hen o#er 30.000 *llied paratroopers land 7,-..8. TargetsB bridges. 28 +eneralleutnant Curt AtudentB Dommander +erman *irborne =orces attac'ing &olland in ,-.0. This commander ta'es a se#ere hit in the head by his o"n troops! "hen he tries to stop AA men firing during a sei)e fire! at the negotiating table. * fe" months before ?ar'et +arden! Atudent returns as commander of the +erman *irborne =orces that are all stationed in &olland. *n *irborne e6pert! his 'no"ledge is #ery important for the +ermans during O?+. &e 'no"s the territory. It is Atudent that delay s the ad#ance of EEE Dorps "hich is the main reason for the failure of Operation ?ar'et +arden. 7,-..8 38 AA @eibstandarte *dolf &itler di#. battles around *rnhem and 0henen. 7,-.08 =our year later men of these units return to the battle scene they 'ne" from ,-.0 to play a decisi#e roll in ?ar'et +arden. =rom inter#ie"s "e 'no" that many of them still 'ne" the area #ery "ell.

0ight after the liberation of The Netherlands in may ,-.4! my father made this beautiful dra"ing. In remembrance to my dear mother and father! "ho "e miss so much. "relude: $%%I&' Aince the *llied =orces landing in Normandy the ad#ance of the front "as much faster than e6pected and in *ugust ,-.. a frontline "as established at the =rance-+erman and %elgium-Dutch borders. The intent of the landing 7Operation O#erlord8 from the Aupreme *llied Dommander of the *llied =orces (urope! +eneral (isenho"er ! "as to trusts for"ard a front as "ide as possible to force the +ermans bac' to their o"n homeland. %ecause of the high rate of speed of the ad#ancing *llied *rmy! the situation in *ugust ,-.. "as different then "as planned. (normous logistical problems started to de#elop to supply a fast fighting and ad#ancing army! (isenho"er obser#ed the same problems that &itler had during his %lit)-march into 0ussia 7?osco"8. The *llied =orces "ere progressing faster then the supplies could be deli#ered. %ecause of the fanatical commanders and :uic' ad#ance! some of the *rmy +roups found themsel#es in positions other then original planned and this "as also creating opportunities. Once the ad#ance slo"ly came to halt! (isenho"er had a difficult choice. Isolated +erman units "ere dug in around important harbours in =rance and %elgium and ga#e hea#y opposition "ith good success. &o"e#er the *llied =orces too' one harbour! if not the most important one! "ithout any problems. The harbour of *nt"erp1 %ecause of the :uic' retreat the +ermans didn t ha#e time to destroy the harbour installations. ?ost all doc's and infrastructure "ere in "or'ing order. Only one thing pre#ented the use of the harbour! and that "as the ,4th +erman *rmy under command of <on Fangen occupied the North and Aouth side of the "ater"ay to *nt"erp 7Westerschelde8 and shipping "as impossible. (isenho"er had to ta'e a number of difficult decisions. the $llied ar(ies and co((anders (#en during WW II politics played a big role. %ecause =ield-marshal ?ontgomery had the most e6perience in battles! he recei#ed from (isenho"er the command for Operation O#erlord and its follo"ing battles. Public opinion in the Gnited Atates in *ugust ,-.. started to ma'e "a#es! because +eneral %radley "as still under command of ?ontgomery! (isenho"er "as ordered by the Dhief of Ataff +eneral ?arshall to ta'e direct command of all ground-troops. This changed the order of command and all Gnited Atate troops "ere under direct command of (isenho"er and of the Dommander in Dhief 7President of the Gnited Atates8 and not under ?ontgomery.

The important *rmies and their Dommanders on the front line of the +erman and Dutch borders "ereB frontline: )elgiu(*Dutch borderB 2,ste %ritish *rmy +roup +Montgo((ery, containingB ,st Danadian *rmyB 7+eneral Drerar8 and 2nd %ritish *rmyB 7+eneral Dempsey8 frontline: France*#er(an borderB ,2th GA *rmy +roup +#eneral )radley, containingB GA ,st *rmy 7+eneral &odge8 en GA 3rd *rmy 7+eneral Patton8 No" that situation "as changed due to the rapid ad#ance! (isenho"er stood isolated in his opinion about a "ide frontal attac'. Patton and ?onty "ere of the opinion that a s"ift spearhead in a small area "ould ha#e better results. Other commanders supported them in this. No" follo"ed a discussion bet"een (isenho"er and his +enerals about the strategy to follo". Patton "anted one thing! spearhead to the to"n of ?et) and its industrial area of the Aaar. ?onty "anted #ia The Netherlands to spearhead into the industrial area of the 0uhr. %oth plans had its credits and if it "eren t for the supplies he 7I'e8 "ouldn t ha#e to choose. (isenho"er 'ne" there "as only one priority at the moment! he needed a harbour close to the front! and *nt"erp "as the only harbour in allied hands. *nd so (isenho"er ga#e the order to the already stagnant march to ta'e a brea'! temporarily stop and ma'e *nt"erp harbour operational and from there re-e#aluate the situation. This "as against the "ishes of ?ontgomery> ?onty "as con#inced that "ith the supplies of Patton s 3rd *rmy he could ad#ance :uic'ly. ?onty continues his re:uest! "hich ended up "ith confrontations bet"een his boss! (isenho"er! and him. 7*n important factor for the %ritish to continue the attac' into &olland is the numerous <2 launch-sites in &olland doing great damage to %ritain8. The 'ey for the discision ta'en in these discici#e days are the only resources the *llied =orces had in their arsenal! the =irst *llied *irborne *rmy under the command of the G.A. @t-+eneral %rereton. (isenho"er "as for sometime no" pondering on ho" to find a "ay to in#ol#e the airborne into this "ar. It "as because of the harbour of *nt"erp that ?onty s troop had the priority in the supplies. ?onty s last pitch to I'e is to persuade him! and acti#ate the =irst *irborne Di#ision in his plan ?*0C(T +*0D(N and because the +erman *rmy resistance "as gro"ing! (isenho"er had a change of mind and gi#es ?onty the green light for his plan on one condition> that it had to be real fast and :uic'. *nd so completed the decision to go ahead "ith the Operation ?ar'et +arden and the results of this action are of the utmost importance. Patton "as ra#ing mad and ble" a gas'et! ho"e#er he couldn t change anything to the situation. The =irst *irborne Di#ision is eager to $ump into action! because during operation O#erlord time after time the drop )ones 7DF8 "ere o#er run by their o"n ground units before they could e#en set foot on the ground. the (istake

During these stirring times one thing is o#erloo'ed! isolation of the +erman ,4th *rmy lead by +eneral <on Fangen. The %ritish forces neglected to ad#ance another 30'm 720 miles8 and pre#ent the escape of 30.000 +erman soldiers.

While a small contingent stays behind and defends the harbour of %res'ens! the "hole army escapes #ia the islands of Feeland to ta'e position in the surroundings of the Willems Canaal in the line of )reda*-ilburg *)est. The mo#ement of the ,4th *rmy "as one of the first orders issued by =ield ?arshall <on 0undstedt "hen he "as bac' in command. &e had allready seen the ris' that <on Fangen s *rmy "ould be surrounded and cut off by the ad#ancing *llied forces. This causes gra#e delays for the troops of the Operation ?ar'et +arden. * delay that "ill ha#e great conse:uences for the operation.

"relude: $.I' The most successful and decorated +ermany *rmy Officer is "ithout a doubt =ield?arshall /arl 0udolf #erd 1on 0undstedt . &e is the Oberbefehlshaber West 7O%W8 "hen the *llied =orces are landing in Normandy. When the +ermans in =rance on all fronts are retreating or being destroyed! the O%W on the 2 ;uly ,-.. recei#es a phone-call from &itler s Dhief-of-Ataff Wilhelm Ceitel "ho as'ed <on 0undstedt "hat they should doH <on 0undstedt snaps bac' "ith the ans"er (nd this "ar! idiots1 When &itler hears about the ans"er! he fires <on 0undstedt as O%W and announces that Ithe old manI probably can t handle his duties anymore. <on 0undstedt is infuriated. %ecause of this and his handling the in#asion of Normandy! "hen he "as se#erely restricted by the interference of &itler himself 7he "ould ha#e follo"ed a totally different strategy8. <on 0undstedt is replaced by =ield-marshal +unther <on Cluge. * short time later an assassination attempt on &itler s life is attempted! and because <on Cluge is in#ol#ed "ith this he is called to appear in &itler s head:uarters. <on Cluge understands the reasons and commits suicide on the "ay to the =uhrer. <on Cluge is then replaced by Field*(arshal Walter Model "ho is not only O%W no" but also *rmy-leader of *rmy-+roup %. *n almost impossible tas'. When in Aeptember the situation is further deteriorated <on 0undstedt is summonsed by &itler. &itler "anted personally to testify the opinion of Carl 7<08. &itler sees that the pure frontline commander ?odel is not fitting as O%W and puts <on 0undstedt bac' in this function. In t"o months time! <on 0undstedt is the .th O%W and is bac' at his old post. <on 0undstedt is a model officer. (#en though there are the futile plans of &itler! <on 0undstedt goes directly in action and ta'es a number of crucial decisions! and ?odel can no" gi#e undi#ided attention to his *rmy-+roup % . The military genius <on 0undstedt is> he estimates the situation immediately and accurately. &e notices the unusual stagnation of ?onty s troops and concludes from this! that there is an offensi#e de#eloping. In conclusion he anticipates and e6ecutes a number of important orders! including the follo"ing> The ,4th *rmy under <on Fangen has to attempt to escape the threatening cut off by *llied =orces. @ater this decision is of crucial importance in the e6ecution of Operation ?ar'et +arden.

the $2is ar(ies and co((anders The most important armies and its commanders on the +erman-Dutch borders "ere no"> Frontline: )elgiu(* Dutch border3 *rmy-+roup % 7?odel8 consisting ofB ,4th *rmyB 7+eneral <on Fangen8 and 9th *rmyB 7?odel 84 Fallschir(5ager $r(ee 7+eneral C. Atudent8 Frontline: #er(an * French border: *rmy-+roup + 7+eneral %las'o"it)8 7#ery limited strength8 No" that ?odel is released from his position as O%W can he concentrate on the things he is most suited forB the leadership of an *rmy on the front-line. ?odel isn t the type for paper"or' and meetings> he lo#es the action of the field. Atill he is standing for an almost impossible tas'! to set up a defense "ith a left o#er and ragtag army. On top of this he hasn t got any dependable armored protection in his arsenal to call on.

&is first orders are important in the running interference "ith Operation ?ar'et +arden. &e orders %ittrich to ta'e his 2nd armored corps and gradually retreat from the battles in =rance and settle in still tran:uil country side of The Netherlands! to recuperate and be re-supplied "ith personnel and e:uipment. The ,st *irborne *rmy of Atudent is added to the *rmy-+roup % and settles in the line of %reda - Tilburg %est. Through this ne" 7yet "ea'8 defense-line the escaping and retreating troops from all units of the defeating +ermany *rmy are added. Atudent! the commander of the ,st *irborne *rmy ta'es direct action and let most of his e6perience troops tra#el from +ermany to the line. On top of this the escaping ,4th *rmy arri#es along this line and slo"ly a strong defense is built along the canals in the south of the Netherlands. When in Aeptember the first armored #ehicles of the 2nd AA Pant)er'orps arri#e in the Netherlands! "e can tal' of considerable troop concentration. It has to be said that all sections "ere undermanned and "as less then a fraction of the original strength. There "as ho"e#er a large amount of anti-aircraft guns and field artillery. The opposition against the *llied =orces "as gro"ing day by day... the (istake When the +ermans are dri#en from *nt"erp they are neglecting to destroy! for the *llied =orces so important harbor installations. *lso the other infrastructure is completely intact. %ridges are mined but not ruined. Is the optimist ?odel in the understanding that a counter-offensi#e is a possibilityH (#en "hen on the first day the complete orders of Operation ?ar'et +arden are in his hands! he distrust these and neglects to inform his superiors.

the attack "lan: !"eration Market #arden %y the beginning of Aeptember ,-..! %ritish! *merican and other allied forces ad#ancing rapidly from the Aeine! had liberated most of =rance and %elgium. *fter a short pause for re-organi)ation! they "ere ready for further ad#ances by the middle of that month. Field*Marshal Montgo(ery felt that a pencil-li'e thrust north"ard through &olland and then east"ard into +ermany! outflan'ing the Aiegfried @ine and stri'ing along the main route to %erlin across the plains of Northern +ermany! offered e6cellent prospects of bringing the "ar to an early end. The first step "as to secure the crossings of the ri#ers 0hine! Waal and ?aas in the general area +ra#e! Ni$megen and *rnhem. To achie#e this he decided to lay a carpet of airborne troops! "ho "ould sei)e and hold the crossings o#er these ri#ers and facilitate the ad#ance of the Aecond %ritish *rmy north"ards. To the %ritish =irst *irborne Di#ision "as allotted the tas' of capturing intact the bridges at *rnhem and establishing a bridgehead round them so that formations of the %ritish Aecond *rmy could pass through "ithout delay on their ad#ance north"ards. The crossings at Ni$megen and +ra#e "ere to be ta'en by the 32nd *merican *irborne Di#ision and those bet"een +ra#e and (indho#en by the ,0,st *irborne Di#ision. 6isualisation

$2is defense in 'e"te(ber 1944

Aeptember . ,-..! &itler made Field*(arshal Walther Model commander of % *rmy. When ?odel had arri#ed he "as facing huge difficulties. &is army "as split in t"o by the *llies. One half! the ,4 th *rmy "as located south of The Westerschelde ma'ing an effort escaping to %rabant. The other half! the ,9th *rmy! "as set-bac' to ?aastricht and *'en by the *merican *rmy. %et"een the t"o *rmy s lies a gap of ,20 'm. Through this gap +erman soldiers and collaborators "ere escaping North"ard in panic. ?odel "as a master in defensi#e actions. &e had to sa#e the Western front. %y acting fast the +erman flee "as stopped. The ,4th army succeeded in escaping to %rabant! closing the gap. No" a strong defensi#e line "as established again. The -th AA &ohenstaufen and the ,0th AA =rundsberg armored-di#isions "ere called bac' by ?odel from @ui'! to ta'e a rest in the :uiet surroundings of *rnhem and catch up from their hea#y e6ertion in the Normandy. The tan's "ere hidden in the "ooded terrain! repairs "ere made and the di#isions supplied. Dommanding-officers "ere stationed in se#eral places around *rnhem. ?odel himself in Oosterbee' the #illage "here the hea#iest fighting "ould be ta'ing place later. In Wolfhe)e 7the landing-)one8 an AA training battalion "as formed. No"! a large concentration of #arious units "ere stationed in the *rnhem area! including @uft"affe troops from the nearby Deelen *irfield. the frontline on 'e"te(ber 174 1944

The Dutch J %elgian - +erman border from %elgium to Ni$megen! is protected by the strong +erman defense-line> West"all or as the *llies call it> The Aiegfriedline . It is clear to see ?ontgomery "ants to bypass this line in order to go around it and mo#e on to the industrial hart of +ermany! The 0uhr-area. %y ta'ing this ob$ecti#e +ermany "ould soon be cut of from it s main "ar industry and soon be defeated.

It also sho"s a "ea' point. The large distance "hich the ground forces had to mo#e! in order to reach the main ob$ecti#e! *rnhem bridge. They had to mo#e for"ard on a long small single road. 7&ells &igh"ay8. Pre WWII studies from the Dutch *rmy learned that this "ould almost be impossible to accomplish! as #ehicles mo#ing on this long small road "ould be easy targets for air and ground attac's. The soil on both sides of this road "ere to soft for hea#y e:uipment. ;ust the reason "hy the +erman in#asion in &olland in ,-.0 "as planned differently! and also the reason "hy =rench help "as not able to reach their targets in &olland on time to assist the Dutch =orces! as secretly agreed by both countries in case of an attac' from +ermany on =rance.

dro""ing 8ones as "lanned and the local situation

The map sho"s a number of foibles on the plan! "ich "ere the cause of failure on the *rnhem part.

,B The large distance bet"een dropping-)one and main target. 2B Dropping in different lifts. 7Not enough planes a#ailable for one large dropping.8 Only the first lift arri#ed on schedule. The rest "ere late 7bad "eather8! on the "rong spot and "orse! not at all. @ater on! supplies "ere dropt on the right spot but unfortunatly those spots "ere already ta'en by the enemy at that time. One of the "ea'nesses of *irborne troops is! they can t ta'e enough "apens and supplies at once. Therefore :uic' supplying is essential. In this case many supplies "ere dropped on o#errun )ones. %ecause of strict orders to the pilots not to respond to signals from the ground! ad$ustment of dropping-)ones "ere not possible. (ain target: $rnhe( road bridge Well! here it is. The main target for the ,st *irlandingbrigade! the road-bridge of *rnhem. One mile do"nstream this bridge there "as a shipbridge! the middle sections "ere remo#ed a fe" days before the landings! so it couldn t be used for crossing. T"o ?iles do"nstream of the ri#er 0hine! another crossing! the 0ail"ay

bridge. This bridge "as blo"n up in the face of the first troops arri#ing to ta'e it. =i#e ?iles do"nstream! the fourth ri#ercrossing! The Drielse =erry. Aome claim it "as "as sun' on "ednesday 20st by the Dutch ferryman Pieter &ensen. %ut records of the engineers operating the ferry sho" that it "as still beeing used on Aeptember 2,st! so this story isn t thrue. What ma'es it more unli'ely is that "e 'no" that both parties needed the ferry badly. The %rittish to get Polish reinforcements from Driel across to Oosterbee' and the +ermans to get troops across to Ni$megen. The houses direct to the left and to the right of the bridge! offering a splendid strategic position to o#erloo' the bridge directly. This air-reconaissance photo is ta'en in ,-3- "hen *rnhem %ridge "as completed. ene(y "ositions on 17 se"te(ber

%rittish Intelligence did not ta'e notice of the "arnings of the Dutch resistance. Though ?I5 didn t trust Dutch resistance #ery much! it "as one of the best organised resistance net"or's in the "orld and it had send detailed reports about the gro"ing strenght of +erman troops. *larming "as the presence of head:uarters of the -.AA and ,0.AA di#isions as you can see on this map. Dutch resistance spotted staf-cars of high AA officers. They also notified %rittish intelligence about the presence of armoured cars and tan's in the "oods around *rnhem. *lso present are the Dutch AA 718 trainees! and the AA trainings school of ?a$or ;osef Crafft.

*nd there is the strong presence of @uft"affe forces around the airfield of Deelen. Near the airfield! the location of a large %un'er-comple6 called DIO+(N(A! head:uarters of 3rd ;agddi#ision ! "hich still e6ists today beeing used by the go#ernment as storage-facillity for important documents the 9 discisi6e factors for $rnhe( landings

1: It "as thought that the enemy fla' from Deelen airfield and the to"n of *rnhem "as li'ely to be too intense to permit aircraft carrying parachute troops or to"ing gliders to pass o#er or close to those areas. Therefore the landings could not be carried out on the open ground south of *rnhem and close to the bridges. The only alternati#e landing areas "ere the large open spaces north and south of the rail"ay "est of Wolfhe)e station. :: With the numbers of aircraft and gliders a#ailable it "ould ta'e three separate lifts to transport the "hole Di#ision and the Polish %rigade to the area. 9: The enemy situation. Information on this "as rather scanty. In brief! the Di#ision "as informed that immediate opposition "as unli'ely to e6ceed a force of about three thousand men "ith some tan's. In fact! the ma$or part of the 2nd A.A. Pan)er Dorps "as reorgani)ing in the *rnhem area at that time. outlines

=rom consideration of these and other factors the Di#isional Dommander decided upon a plan the outline of "hich "as as follo"s. The Di#ision "ould land by daylight in three lifts on three consecuti#e days. On the first day the lst Parachute %rigade "ould land by parachute in the area "est of Wolfhe)e "ith the tas' of ad#ancing rapidly into *rnhem and sei)ing the road and the rail"ay bridges o#er the ri#er. *t the same time part of the ,st *irlanding %rigade! Di#isional &ead:uarters and as many supporting troops as could be fitted in "ould land by glider in the area immediately North West of Wolfhe)e Atation. The tas' of the *irlanding %rigade "as to secure the dropping and landing )ones for the second lift on the ne6t day. Thes upporting troops consisted of parts of the Di#isional *rtillery both field and anti-tan' guns! (ngineers! and the Di#isional

0econnaissance 0egiment "ith a proportion of *dministrati#e troops. To lift the lst Parachute %rigade and this force ,5, parachute aircraft of the G.A. -th Troop Darrier Dommand and 2-9 gliders and tug aircraft of 33 and .5 +roups 0*= "ere re:uired. With the second lift on the second day "ould come the .th Parachute %rigade landing on a dropping )one bet"een Plan'en Wambuis and the rail"ay! and the remainder of the *irlanding %rigade. They "ould be carried in ,25 parachute aircraft and 304 gliders. * further 34 aircraft "ould drop supplies at the same time. *nd on the third day the lst Polish Parachute %rigade +roup "ere to land Aouth of the main bridge! it being estimated that by that time enemy fla' in *rnhem "ould no longer be operati#e. They "ould be carried in ,,. parachute aircraft and .4 gliders. *t the same time ,53 aircraft "ould drop supplies for the ,st *irborne Di#ision. The tas' of the *irlanding %rigade! "hen the landing and dropping )ones no longer needed to be secured! the .th Parachute %rigade and the ,st Polish Parachute %rigade +roup "as to form a perimeter round *rnhem lea#ing the ,st Parachute %rigade holding the bridges and in reser#e. The sectors to be held by them "ere respecti#ely West! North and (ast of the to"n! the Polish Parachute %rigade crossing the ri#er on arri#al to reach their sector. D*Day: 17 se"te(ber

The day selected for the operation "as Aunday! ,9th Aeptember! ,-... The "eather "as fine and the flight from (ngland une#entful. @andings commenced at one o cloc' in the afternoon! "ere most successful and accomplished practically "ithout opposition! the troops being enthusiastically recei#ed by the local population. Within t"o and a half hours of the start of the landings! battalions of the ,st Parachute %rigade had started their ad#ance to capture the bridges. *nd by half past eight that e#ening after o#ercoming and bypassing a certain amount of opposition the 2nd Parachute %attalion under command of @ieutenant-Dolonel ;. D. =rost had captured the north end of the main road bridge. One company of this %attalion had been detached to capture the rail"ay bridge! but this "as blo"n up as they arri#ed at it. Thereafter the company "ere surrounded! forced to brea' out and "ere ne#er able to reform and $oin their %attalion at the main bridge. The ma$or part of the &ead:uarters of the ,st Parachute %rigade ho"e#er reached the bridge later that night. Gnfortunately they "ere "ithout their commander! %rigadier @athbury! "ho "ith +eneral Gr:uhart had been #isiting the 3rd Parachute %attalion and had been forced by enemy acti#ity to remain "ith it. This %attalion and the ,st Parachute %attalion had also both ad#anced east"ards! the former to support the ad#ance of the 2nd Parachute %attalion and the latter to sei)e certain high ground north of *rnhem so as

to deny the enemy obser#ation on the to"n of *rnhem. %oth these attac's met "ith serious and increasing resistance! "hich held up this ad#ance. During the night and morning of the ,3th Aeptember! determined efforts "ere made by both battalions to ad#ance! and some progress "as made despite hea#y casualties! a position near the At. (li)abeth &ospital being reached. On the ,9th Aeptember the remainder of the troops in the first lift had comparati#ely :uiet night. (arly on the morning of the ,3th enemy acti#ity in the area of the dropping and landing )ones increased and at the same time! though information "as #ery scanty! it "as clear that all "as not "ell "ith the ,st Parachute %rigade. %rigadier &ic's! "ho had by no" ta'en o#er command in the absence of +eneral Gr:uhart! decided to reinforce the ,st Parachute %rigade immediately! and on the arri#al of the second lift to di#ert part of the .th Parachute %rigade to this tas' also. The latter "ere due to start landing at ten o cloc' on the morning of the ,3th! but due to the "eather in (ngland their ta'e-off "as delayed! and they did not start dropping until about three o cloc' in the afternoon. *lthough there "as more opposition than on the pre#ious day! the landings "ere carried out south of Plan'en Wambuis #ery satisfactorily. 't; &li8abeth Hos"ital * De )rink * Museu(

Gnfortunately on the ,-th neither the .th Parachute %rigade nor the force trying to brea' through to the bridge "as successful. *s a result +eneral Gr:uhart! "ho had by no" re$oined his &ead:uarters in the &artenstein &otel! decided after #isiting %rigadier &ac'ett! the Dommander of the .th Parachute %rigade! that this %rigade should disengage from its present position and mo#e south of the rail"ay to an area about the road and rail"ay crossings south of De Coepel! "est of De %rin'! and at Oosterbee' @aag. It "as hoped that it "ould be possible from this position to de#elop further operations for the reinforcement of the force holding the bridge.

clic' on the map for a full scale o#er#ie"

%y the e#ening of the ,3th Aeptember the situation "as as follo"sB 2nd Parachute %attalion "ith certain other elements holding firm on the north end of the *rnhem %ridge! the other t"o %attalions of the ,st Parachute %rigade trying to brea' through in the general area of the At. (li)abeth &ospital and De %rin'. On their "ay to $oin them "ere the 2nd %attalion! The Aouth Ataffordshire 0egiment of the ,st *irlanding %rigade and the ,,th Parachute %attalion of the .th Parachute %rigade! "ith a #ie" to a further attac' being made on the ,-th. The rest of the .th Parachute %rigade "as concentrated in the area of Wolfhe)e and to the "est of it "ith a #ie" to attac'ing east"ards along the rail"ay. &o"e#er the .th Parachute %rigade "ere #ery hea#ily engaged on the e#ening of the ,-th Aeptember in mo#ing south of the rail"ay about Wolfhe)e and again on the morning of the 20th! "hen they started their mo#e east"ards. %y the end of that day some 200 men! all that "ere left of that %rigade! "hich then included the ,45th and ,0th Parachute %attalions! had assembled in the &artenstein area and "ere placed in position co#ering the approaches to &artenstein along the main road from *rnhem. In the mean"hile all efforts on the ,-th Aeptember to reach the bridge had failed and the remnants of the ,st! 3rd and ,,th Parachute %attalions and of the 2nd %attalion The Aouth Ataffordshire 0egiment had reassembled in the area of Oosterbee' Dhurch! "here they "ere reorgani)ed into a composite force by ?a$or @onsdale of the ,,th Parachute %attalion! this force thereafter being 'no"n as @onsdale =orce. T"o battalions of the ,st Parachute %rigade ad#ancing to the bridge! are confronted by tan's and self-propelled guns! they ha#e already suffered hea#y losses in fierce street-fighting. In the night of ?onday-Tuesday they are in the system of streets "est of the At. (li)abeth &ospital! to this ma)y area ha#e also been directed the ,, th Parachute %attalion "hich forms part of the .th Parachute %rigade landed on the +in'else &eide near (de on ?onday afternoon! and elements of the 2nd %attalion Aouth Ataffordshires! "ho ha#e been "ithdra"n from the defence of the landing )ones near Wolfhe)e. The orders these troops ha#e recei#ed from Di#isional &ead:uarters are to push through to the road bridge at *rnhem and to relie#e =rost s battalion from its encirclement. The 500 men at the bridge "ere fighting hea#y! many already dead or "ounded and short on ammunition.

On Tuesday at early da"n they launch their attac'B the t"o parachute battalions #ia Onderlangs 7the lo" road8! the other t"o battalions along the Gtrechtse"eg %o#eno#er 7the high road8. The action in this narro" corridor bet"een the deep rail"ay cutting on one side and the ri#er on the other side is a signal failure. *long Onderlangs the paratroops initially manage to penetrate to the Oude &a#en! but then they are beaten bac' by a frontal +erman counter-attac' supported by murderous fire from the bric'-yard on the opposite ban' of the ri#er 7&ea#y machine guns and 30mm ** guns8.

With great difficulty! less than a hundred men succeed to regain their starting point! the 0hine Pa#ilion. &ere they return at 3 a.m. *t that time! the attac' along the Gtrechtse"eg has been chec'ed at the narro"est point of the corridor near the ?unicipal ?useum and the offices of the P.+.(.?. 7Dounty (lectricity %oard8. =or a fe" hours the Aouth Ataffordshires! "ho form the #anguard! succeed in "arding off the thrusts of the selfpropelled guns of the &ohenstaufen Di#ision! but a about noon the +ermans brea' through and repel them to the At. (lisabeth &ospital. There a chaotic situation de#elops "hich might "ell be said to be typical of the %attle of *rnhem. +eneral Gr:uhart! "hom his troops ha#e been unable to trace or contact since Aunday e#ening! because he had been cut off en route to *rnhem and had been compelled to see' safety by hiding in a house in this same area in order to a#oid being 'illed or ta'en prisoner by the +ermans! has in the meantime returned to Di#isional &ead:uarters in &artenstein. Aince he reali)es that the situation of his di#ision is becoming critical - "est of Oosterbee' +erman pressure is li'e"ise increasing steadily! "hilst attempts of the .th Parachute %rigade to brea' through the +erman Aperrlinie near the ;ohannahoe#e! north of the rail"ay line Gtrecht*rnhem! are entirely ineffectual - he has ordered the ,,th %attalion to brea' off fighting on the Gtrechtse"eg and to retreat to a ne"! defensi#e line further "est. The battalion starts preparing for this "ithdra"al! as soon as the commanding officer has dispatched a runner to inform the Aouth Ataffordshires> ho"e#er! they do not recei#e the message and are still under the impression that they can fall bac' on the positions of the llth. %attalion! but "hen they ha#e to gi#e "ay to the +erman counter- attac' they land up in the middle of a +erman column ready to march off. In the resulting confusion the british suffer hea#y losses. Thus! of the four battalions "ich ha#e ta'en part in the attempted brea'-through to the bridge!only remnants succeed in falling bac' to Oosterbee' in the course of the day. To the battalion surrounded near the bridge this means that their only hope of rescue is the ad#ent of the second army. all <ounded recie6e e=ual treat(ent During the battle! The At. (lisabeth &ospital! "as used by %ritish as "ell as +erman army doctors assisted by Dutch medical personel! to ta'e care of the "ounded on both sites. The ci#ilian patients "ere e#acuated by the +ermans. During the battle there also has been a truce! in order to e#acuate the dead and "ounded on both sites.

$rnhe( )ridge

During ,3-,- Aeptember! most of the &ohenstaufen s a#ailable armour! $oined by the

Campfgruppe Cnaust launched hea#y attac's from the north-east. (#entually pinned do"n by superior numbers of infantry! =rost s battalion "as reduced by artillery! and the concentrated fire of the AP s and tan's "ho "ere able to roam #irtually at "ill. On the bridge at *rnhem on the ,-th and 20th the defenders "ere continually attac'ed! shelled and mortared. The houses "hich they "ere holding "ere set on fire! food and ammunition ran lo"! and the numbers of "ounded continually mounted. Ne#ertheless the position "as still held. &o"e#er by the e#ening of the 20th nearly all the houses held had been set on fire and there "as no"here to put the "ounded. During the night enemy infiltration made the position "orse. *t about the time that ;ohn =rost "as "ounded! the bridge force lost one of its most important positions. In the substantial <an @imburg Atirum Achool building! half"ay along the eastern side of the ramp emban'ment running do"n to the to"n! the combined force of 0oyal (ngineers and 3rd %attalion men "ho had held this e6posed position throughout the battle! "ith no hea#ier "eapon than a %ren gun! "ere about to be o#er"helmed. *bout thirty men remained un"ounded! but ammunition "as lo" and there "as no food or "ater. (ither a +erman tan' standing on the ramp only se#enty yards a"ay or a +erman gun further a"ay started systematically blo"ing a"ay the roof and top store of the building! "here most of the defenders "ere positioned. One shell set the roof abla)e> another burst "here t"o of the 3rd %attalion officers! ?a$or @e"is and @ieutenant Wright! "ere ta'ing their turns to rest! in$uring both officers. What did happen ne6t became an emoti#e sub$ect among the defenders. There "ere no means of putting out the fire! and it "as ob#ious that the building had to be e#acuated. Daptain ?ac'ay appointed a party of sappers to remain at their positions to pre#ent any +erman attac' o#er the surrounding ground "hile the e#acuation too' place. The "ounded "ere brought up from the basement! the eight seriously hurt being carried on doors or mattresses. ?ean"hile! the shelling of the upper part of the building had continued! and one of the rearguard positions "as hit "ith t"o men being 'illed and one badly crushed. Daptain ?ac'ay returned to the building to fetch out the remainder of the rearguard. The intention no" "as for the "hole party to mo#e to a nearby building! the one e#acuated by the 0oyal (ngineers on the Aunday night. ?en "ere being hit outside the school! and ?a$or @e"is called out from his mattressB Time to put up the "hite flag . Aome men being un"ounded! felt guilty about allo"ing themselfes to be captured! so they called out to as' if the fit men could attempt to get out. &e shouted bac' that they could. This ne"s "as passed to the 0( s. *bout ten men! including Daptains 0obinson and ?ac'ay! then dashed across the road into the gardens of some houses to the east! only to be disco#ered later and ta'en prisoner. 7?ac'ay e#entually escaped and reached (ngland8. * sapper "as sent to the top of the emban'ment "ith a "hite to"el tied to his rifle but "as immediately struc' on both legs by a burst of machine-gun fire. &e died of those "ounds fi#e months later. The +ermans closed in! and the firing ceased. Ao ended the gallant defense of the <an @imburg Atirum Achool. *t fi#e o cloc' on the morning of the 2,st an attempt to reta'e some houses failed and it "as clear that the end had come. Those remaining split into small parties and tried to brea' out. *ll opposition at the bridge no" ceased. The tas' of the ,st Parachute %rigade had been to sei)e and hold this bridge. Those "ho reached it did

this for nearly four days under continual attac' and fire and against increasing and ultimately o#er"helming odds. !osterbeek "eri(eter *t nine o cloc' on the morning of the 2,st Aeptember! +eneral Gr:uhart held a conference at his &ead:uarters to organi)e a defensi#e perimeter of those troops that remained. These "ere di#ided into t"o forces! one under %rigadier &ic's! the other under %rigadier &ac'ett. They "ere to hold a position "ith its base on the ri#er 0hine! and running from the area of Oosterbee' Dhurch north"ards across the main road to *rnhem to the neighbourhood of +raftombe! thence its "estern flan' passed a fe" hundred yards "est of the &artenstein &otel to &e#eadorp. This position during the battle did contract and indi#idual enemy troops "ere to infiltrate into! but despite intense +erman efforts it ne#er ga#e "ay. 1st >olish >arachute )rigade #rou"

It is no" necessary to recount the acti#ities of the ,st Polish Parachute %rigade +roup. Its anti-tan' battery had landed in gliders in the midst of the battle on the ,3th and ,-th Aeptember and been absorbed into the ,st *irborne Di#ision on the north side of the ri#er. %ecause of the altered course of the e#ents! the %rigade itself could not be dropped on the ,-th Aeptember as planned. It "as clear also that it could not carry out its original tas' of landing south of the main *rnhem bridge! crossing it and occupying a position east of *rnhem. * dropping )one "as therefore selected for the Poles east and north-east of Driel on "hich they landed on the e#ening of 2,st Aeptember "ith the tas' of holding a firm bridgehead on the south ban' of the ri#er in that area.

During the flight a radio message came in that the group had to return because of bad "eather. 2K3 of the *rmada turned home but Aosabo"s'i ordered his group to 'eep flying. Therefore the Polish %rigade landed at Driel "ithout the hea#y "eapons and only at ,K3 of it s strenght and "ith no up-to-date information or intelligence on the situation. %eside that they landed in occupied territory and during the landing they "ere shot at from all sites. It "as a miracle that only fe" casualties occured during the landing. That night their patrols found that the &e#eadorp ferry had been sun' and that the north ban' of the ri#er at that point "as in enemy hands! meantime during the 20th and 2,st enemy attac's on the Di#isional perimeter had been continuous and the "hole area "as being submitted to an intense bombardment by e#ery 'ind of shell! mortar and bomb the enemy possessed. &and to hand fighting "ith enemy infantry and close range engagements "ith enemy gun and flamethro"ing tan's "ere fre:uent occurrences. It "as imperati#e that if the %ritish Aecond *rmy "ere to ta'e ad#antage of this small remaining bridgehead on the north ban' of the ri#er they should do so immediately. 0einforcement of the perimeter "as also essential if it "as to remain of sufficient si)e to co#er a crossing of the ri#er in force. &o"e#er it "as only by the night of 20th Aeptember that a gallant operation by the %ritish +uards *rmoured Di#ision and the *merican 32nd *irborne Di#ision had succeeded in capturing the bridge at Ni$megen! and despite all efforts made it "as not until the e#ening of the 23rd Aeptember that the .3rd %ritish Infantry Di#ision succeeded in reaching the south ban' of the ri#er "est of Driel in force. They "ere too late for any ma$or crossing to be attempted that night. Ne#ertheless efforts had been made on the night of the 22nd Aeptember to get as many of the Polish Parachute %rigade as possible across the ri#er from south to north. *s a result of enemy action and a shortage of boats or rafts only some 40 men got o#er. The follo"ing night the Polish Parachute %rigade again tried to cross the ri#er in force and! after many casualties! they ferried o#er a further 200 officers and men. Aosabo"s'i "as a #ery e6pirienced officer. &e had fought against the +ermans in ,-3- "hen Poland "as in#aded and "as one of the fe" commanders "ho "as still boo'ing succes against the +ermans "hen the battle in Poland "as allready lost. Aosabo"'si analysed the situation. &e still sa" a change to turn the tide in fa#our of the allies. * ma$or crossing do"nstream close to Wageningen "ould offer the opportunity to attac' the +ermans in the bac' and rescue the remainder of ,st *irborne Di#ison and also establish a bridgehead further upstream.

%ut his superiors sa" it all different. &e "as ignored and at the <alburg conference became clear that the %ritish Dommanders "ere allready loo'ing for a scapegoat. It "as decided that a %attalion of the Dorset 0egiment and ,st %attalion of the Polish %rigade "ould try to cross the ri#er under command of EEE Dorps. Aosabo"s'i made clear that there "as absolutely no chance of success to cross the ri#er on that spot "here the +ermans "ere in control of the higher grounds on the opposite ban' of the ri#er. &e "as ignored and send a"ay in a #ery unpolite "ay. Ao on the nigth of the 2.th Aeptember the .th %attalion The Dorset 0egiment of the .3rd %ritish Infantry Di#ision made a attempt to cross the ri#er led by their Dommanding Officer! @ieutenant-Dolonel +. Tilly. There "ere not enough boates for the ,st Polish %attalion. The landings "ere #ery scattered o"ing to enemy fire and the s"ift ri#er current! and the battalion "as ne#er able to concentrate on landing. It "as a total failure and a "aste of troops and the outcome made no difference at all. the <ithdra<al

%y the morning of the 24th Aeptember it "as clear to +eneral Gr:uhart! the landings during the pre#ious night ha#ing failed! that hea#y casualties! fatigue! and lac' of ammunition! food and "ater "ere e6ercising an increasing effect on the defenders of the perimeter and that further strong enemy offensi#e action might cause its defences to disintegrate. It "as at this time that a message "as recei#ed from 2nd *rmy stating the possibility of the "ithdra"al of the lst *irborne Di#ision south"ards across the ri#er. +eneral Gr:uhart immediately replied that if this "ithdra"al "as to be carried out! it must be done on the night of the 24th Aeptember and no later. * signal confirming that the "ithdra"al "ould be that night "as soon after recei#ed. (nemy action during the 24th Aeptember "as fortunately less intense than on pre#ious days! and by ten o cloc' that night the "ithdra"al began in a storm of "ind and rain and strong artillery and machinegun support from the south ban' of the ri#er! "hich all helped to deaden sounds of mo#ement. %y da"n on the morning of the :?th appro6imately ,900 men of the ,st *irborne Di#ision together "ith about 4:0 pilots had been ferried across the ri#er! 300 men remaining on the north ban'! all "ho could s"im ha#ing already done so. These "ere all that remained from a force of ,0.000 men. The courageous %ritish and Danadian sappers did e#erything in their po"er to rescue the trapped para s! a #ery dangerous $ob. When the first 3 Danadian storm boats "ent in the "ater! one of them recie#ed a direct hit by a stray mortar. The dramatic incident "as obser#ed from both sides of the ri#er. The result "as that all three engineers in the first boat and another 2 in the second "ere 'illed. One of the casualties from the first stormboat "as the Danadian Aapper &arold D. ?agnusson. &is body "as reco#erd from the ri#er on ,.-,,-,-.. far do"nstream

near +or'um together "ith a Polish soldier. &arold "as 22 years of age. It "as only in o'tober 2003 the family got to 'no" "hat had happend e6actly to &arold. the end of the battle of $rnhe(

Thus ended the %attle for *rnhem! but no account of it "ould be complete "ithout mention of the heroic efforts made during the battle by the 0oyal *ir =orce and the Gnited Atates *ir =orce to supply the ,st *irborne Di#ision "ith ammunition! food! and other supplies by air! by the medical ser#ices in their treatment of the "ounded! and by the local population by the information they ga#e! their efforts to succour the "ounded and aid the escape of those left behind. The 0oyal *ir =orce had to contend "ith bad "eather! intense opposition from fighters and fla' and lac' of e6act 'no"ledge of "here to drop supplies! the planned dropping )ones not being in the Di#ision s hands. No "onder that much of the supplies dropped fell into enemy hands! but if e#er men of the ,st *irborne Di#ision needed inspiration it "as pro#ided by the sight of the supply dropping aircraft flying straight and le#el through the fla'! and continuing to do so e#en "hen on fire until they had dropped their supplies. *fter the battle! the medical personnel of the Di#ision "ere e#acuated "ith the casualties to *peldoorn. The ma$ority became prisoners! but some! including %rigadier &ac'ett! "ho had been seriously "ounded during the battle! and Dolonel Warrac'! the Dhief ?edical Officer of the Di#ision! succesfully escaped. ?any others including %rigadier @athbury "ere concealed and fed by the local population! "hile arrangements for their escape "ere made. No praise can be too high for all those Dutch men and "omen "ho ris'ed their li#es in this "ay. Within a month of the "ithdra"al of the Di#ision a party of ,20 officers and men had crossed the ri#er in a body. Thereafter escaping became much more difficult but for a considerable period odd groups of men continued to infiltrate across the ri#er into the %ritish lines. the results In conclusion! it is necessary to sum up the results of this battle. In the opinion of =ield-?arshall ?ontgomery the action of the %ritish ,st *irborne Di#ision against o#er"helming odds held off reinforcements from Ni$megen and #itally contributed to the capture of the bridge there. On this account alone the considered that the battle had been ninety percent succesful. =inally in a letter to +eneral Gr:uhart "ritten on the 23th Aeptember ,-.. he said as follo"sB In the annals of the %ritish *rmy there are many glorious deeds. In our *rmy "e ha#e al"ays dra"n great strength and inspiration from past traditions! and

endea#oured to li#e up to the high standards of those "ho ha#e gone before. %ut there can be fe" episodes more glorious than the epic of *rnhem! and those that follo" after "ill find it hard to li#e up to the high standards that you ha#e set. Ao long as "e ha#e in the armies of the %ritish (mpire! officers and men "ho "ill do as you ha#e done! then "e can indeed loo' for"ard "ith complete confidence to the future. In years to come it "ill be a great thing for a man to be able to sayB I fought at *rnhem fter the battle

Aoon *rnhem became frontline and The %ridge "as destroyed by the 0*= and GA**= in October to pre#ent the +ermans reinforcing their positions on the Island 7space bet"een the ri#ers Waal and 0i$n8. Once again in the second World War our bridge "as destroyed. 7,-.0 J,-..8. *rnhem and Oosterbee' "here to suffer from numerous artillery shelling and air raids to come. arnhe( destroyed

The people of *rnhem and Oosterbee' "ere e#acuated. *rnhem became a ghost to"n. When the people returned many sa" their houses destroyed and possessions ta'en a"ay. They had to start all o#er again. the casualties

Not only many soldiers lost their li#es here. ?any ci#ilians became #ictims of

brutalities and "here shot "ithout reason. Dutch resistance lost many members that had pro#en so #aluable during the battle and "here so badly needed for the coming "inter. The "inter of ,-..-,-.4 "ent into history as star#ation-"inter . O#er ,00.000 ci#ilians died of hunger in this "inter. ?any Dutch "here put on transport for forced labor in +erman factories the last fe" months of the "ar! many ne#er returned. the beaten;;;

@ieutenant ;. 0eynolds e6presses his anger and disappointment to the +erman photographers by gi#ing them the finger "hen he is ta'en a"ay at the ?useum on Gtrechtse"eg *rnhem.
7photoframe center8

and the 'loot' is going to the fatherland

The houses depra#ed from e#erything that could be used for defense "or's. O#er ,0.000 doors "ere remo#ed to co#er the system of trenches along the ri#er 0i$n. Properties systematically stolen and put on transport to +ermany by the =eld"irtschafts-commando and %ergungscommando . With the city e#acuated! signs li'e these could be placed "ithout danger. Photographer De booys ris'ed his life shooting many photo s of these e#ents. 7photosB De %ooys8 -he )ridge

The building of *rnhem 0oad %ridge started in ,-32 and "as completed in ,-34. In ?ay ,-.0 during the in#asion of &olland the %ridge "as destroyed by the Dutch *rmy. *fter &olland "as captured the +ermans reinstated the original ship bridge that connected both parts of the to"n before the bridge "as build in ,-34. It "as only in Aeptember ,-..! 3 "ee's before the start of O?+ that the %ridge "as finally repaired again by the +ermans. There "ere no" 2 bridges operational. The main %ridge and the Ahip bridge. It "as only a fe" days before the operation! that the middle sections of the ship bridge "ere remo#ed and stored a fe" hundred meters do"nstream. One of the original ships is reco#ered some year ago. It is beeing restored for display as "e spea'. It "as in O'tober ,-.. "hen allied bombers destroyed *rnhem bridge. In *pril ,-.4 "hen &olland "as liberated! the Danadians first build a double pontoon bridge 7Dampbell %ridge8on the spot "ere the ship bridge had been. *t the same time the construction of a bailey %ridge "as started $ust east of the destroyed road bridge. It "as opend on ;une 3th! ,-.4. =inally in ,-40 the rebuild road bridge "as opend again.