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Military Review

The Professional Journal of the US Army

Honora=hnmO&M;rah Lieutenant General Gerald T. Bartlett





2 14 24

Beyond Duty, Honor, Country

by Lew/s .SOr/ey

Major Ganeral Gordon R. Sullivan

OePuly Commandant, USACGSC

Deployable Armor Today

by Lfetienant Colonel A J Bacewch, US Army, and tiaurenant Colonel Robert R. Ivany. US Army (





Operations in Europe
M. Ke/fner, US Army,

colonel James A, Rye, lntenm Eddor/n Chief

by Colonel Wdham W Han20g, US Army, and Colonel John D. Howard, US Army

L&denant C&met Lynn Havach, Assoaate Eddor L.!euleflant Colonel Thomas E Conrad. Managing Eddor Mrs. Patdcia L, Wilson, Secrbtaiy F9atures Mr. Phflt!pR Daws, Books Edmm
Production Stafl Mrs Dw!e R Dommg.ez, Pmducbon Editcw Mr. Charles A Mamnson III, Art and Design; Mr. D. LL Giangrecb, Destg Ed#Or, Edt. Ms, Patricia H. Norma% Manuscnptllndex toc Mrs. Cynth!a L. Teare, ManuscnptlEddorm/ A@stan?; Mr Amos W Gallaway, Pm?tmg off,. cer

34 44

Soviet Reinforcement
by Lieutenant Co/one/Kenneth and Graham H. Jurb!wlle Jr.

Perspectives on Force Projection: 46 A Difference in Style

by Ma/or Stephen E Runak, US Army

51 A Fiord Too Far?

by tvfajor John Moncwe, US Army

Editions: Spariish-Amwican Eddron Lieutenant Colonel F,del A, Camales,Chderm Army. Span) can Eddor; Mr. flaul Aponte and Mrs .%xa L DWIZ, Eddom: Mrs Margaret M Blue., Tfamlamc Mm Wlnona E, Stmble, Eddon.@ Aswsttmt Brazilian Edttion Colonel Franc,scv S C Pam. plon.a, Bra,?kw Army, Combmed Arms center
laUrrAmedcan Liaison Off{cerlMddary R9viaw Advw3r, Mr Atmensio Et. Lopes, Eddoc Mr Carlos M Chacbn and MIS Lore C. Rezac, Translators Ms Bslva K WMOn, Eddom91Ass@ant

59 65 68 80 81 84 88 91 96

Battle Rhythm

Ma/or Robert F Dees, US Army

Lost Island?
by Vlad!mrr Gorshemn

The Warrior Spirit

by Major Robett L Magmms, US Army

Administration: Staff Sergeant (P) Earn~st Stephens, Admm!sfrabve NCO, Mrs Eumce E Ovetfreld, Mrs Merrtam L Clark and Mtss Donna. mane I DeLarenzo, SubSCi7Pt10rIS .

Insights Summaries Letters News Book Reviews ~$;:zzzf~g Bulletin Board

the best from other/ourna/s

MR Advisory Sosrd. CUlone!Orwe N Butts, A.wManf Lfepuiy Commadat, Ch.wma: COILI. nel Cre,ghlon W. Abrams Jr., Ccmbmed Arms and Sewices Staff School; Colonel M,chael T Chase. Depwtnwm of A.cadenvc Operahos, colonel Howard Dan!el Jr., Dep.mrment of Sustainment and Resourc!ng Operations; Colonel Leonard A. Fiore, Schcel for Pm fess!onal Deva/. opmenc Colonel Lows D F. Frasche, Combat Stud(es Insbbde; Colonel George K Hastmqs, AMTY~~~ Guard Adviser Colonel John R Landry, Center for Army Tactics: Dr. Peter Mas!owski, John F. kfomson Ch&r of Mmtary ffstwy; blond Richard H&t Smnfesh. school of Advanced Military Studies. C-alonel Rcivlrd H Taylor, DepattmentofJoint and CQmbmed Oper. abons; Colonel Frederick W T&mmennan Jr., Centsrfor.4nny Lbadershlp








From the Editor

One of the few constants within the military is change, and a major change has taken place at Military Ret.ieco. The editor in chief, Colonel Frederick W. Timmerman Jr., has been named asthenewdirector of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) here at the US Army Command and General Staff College. His education and experience make him uniquely qualified for this position. His leaving Miltturyliewew come< at a very critical point in the journals history. He has been the driving force behind many of the changes in the journal that we hope our readers have taken notice of over the past 21 months. New features such as Insights: Dialogue and the Bulletin Board have been added. Innovative graphic design incorporating more photographs and artwork, an increase in the number of articles providing the opportunity for more professionals voices to be heard on a wide range of subjects and the behind-thescenes efforts to make the journal more effkient in this time of constrained budgets are but some of the contributions made by Colonel T. The sailing has not all been smooth. Changes are not always met with ready acceptance, The focus, talents and efforts of many people have to be balanced, guided and sometimes nudged along for maximum effect. There are even those who would let the journal fade away if there were not someone who is wilhng and able to articulate the need for forums that enhance the professional and educational development of those in the profession of arms. Colonel T has done all of this for Mditury Reuteu,, and it is with our highest esteem that we wish him the best for the future. His influence will be felt for a long time. What bas ;11 this to do with this issues focus on force projection? Not a whole lot except that, were it not for some of the Colonels efforts, there would not be a focus to talk about. For that matter, there would be no editorial space to introduce it. Git thar fustest with the mostest is how one professional ISsa]d to have described force projection. But getting there is only the first part of the job. The mostest part involves ensuring that the right forces get there, are used effectwely and are sustained and that adequate follow-on forces are available. This issue provides a wide range of thoughts on this far-reaching subject (no pun intended). Colonel Timmerman has joined a distingmshed list of former Jfflrimy Remew ed]tors who have contributed immeasurably to the prestige and influence of the journal through the years. But perhaps no one has done more to help the Jouznal git thar fustest with the , mostest than Colonel T.


m Trahlng Management The (m) rdmstmata, UK Acln,y Cmnmand and Qeneral Staff College 0J3MG3@, shmgsd w name dur@ Jimmy to the Sohooi of C&reapondlng 2hxiles, or SOCS&&GwmQJt jothe lo-month hnmand



2tAd70fflo8re C9Urea (CGSCC), the C!Onlbhled Arm9 and E9rvlsea 3taff &hOol (OAW), the &hOOl for Profesaionaf Davalopmant (SPD)
andtha&hcd of Admncad Mllltarg 3tudles (2AM2)as tbeflfth sshOO1atthe LJE@W0. 3CCS offlsials ask that alf mrrsapondenoe with the ashool US-S ths new Utle, but lmtrwtional material containing Dre

aeon-teretlrg nUltary pammmel toaeeksemndssmars Inteaohmg and sohool admMatmttOn. The US Department of Edusatton has prepared a paoket of materials Which lnsludmabook16t, A 2a00nd Os?aerfiu Yom, thatex@ina how, tn find a job in elementary, aewndmg and
p+xkweondmy wlmofs and the oertfflcation proscss tYOm W@ military standpoint To obtain the infomnatfon pwket, write the US Department of Education, CMloe of Public Affaira, Room 2039, 400 Maryland Avenue ~+:5ES&@3Q DO 20202, or safl (202)

An ratfred and






printsd envalopea with the old ~1% title wi119tiu bad.eHver&l



The of annual

reunion of

the 43th


The C!mnsil for International Exchange of 3ch01ars W Snnounwd tha Opanmg of wmpatition for the 1933-39 Nbrlght

@iltlta ill rasearoh M tiW1S@ Iedmring abroad More than 300 maearoh @anta and 700 lmturing grants are available for perfcda cftbnamontbs taafldl timis year in mar 100 wu.ntrlw, Nbrf@t
awardaam diEICi@M granted inna@ye wry m Scholm% of all r@3d9nlic ranks.

World War II will be held 7-9 May at the Green Oak Inn and Cmferenra Center, Fort WOxtlATemw. Fur more Mormation on the munioz write to I&my Holllway, 1333 Northwest llth, Oklahoma oi~, OK 73103. Anyone deah9ng mom reservations at the reunion site shoufd OSU 1-80043S2174
calllng fkcsn .772.2341.

Within I

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APPlloation dedlines are atsggemd between 15 June 1987 and 1 I%brumg 1923. For more tiormation and applications, writs the Caunsfl for IntarnstiOneJ Exchange of
2sholam, 11 Dupont Circle NW, Wasblngton, DC 2003&1267, or will (202) 932-3401.

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The U3 Navy Memorial, a llving trifmts to the men and women who have emwd m the NaWI aim% its founding, will be dedicated in Wash@tQn. DO, on Navy DW m Ostober. The memorial will lnolude the Naw Memoriaf @g Worn sontalnlng a somputedata Msa of names of Navy vetmane. For more information on the

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-P~ ~th rates and range of s+3mima offered ateaoh Italm liskIaD dlxarg rest and recreation sentars worldwide. H you oannot find it Iocdly, Wllta to Military Living Publications, Pbet Office EQX 2347, Falls Chursh, VA 22042, or @ (703) 237-0203.

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Military . Review
USkny Commandant Geneml StallCollege Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66627-6910 .

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Military Review
USArmy Command and General Sta!TCollege

Fort Leavenworth, RUMS 66027-69~Ll

artillery posmons, Divis!on rounds 1951 troops falling observe on

L-. .
white Chinese phosphorous Commun!sr .


April 1951, all indications were that communist forces in Korea were preparing for a major offensive. The US Eighth Army, under Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, continued its advance northward with full knowledge of these preparations. Defensive positions had been organized, and Van Fleet was prepared to gradually fall back if pressed. Once the

By early

enemy offensive

had been stopped,

he planned

to counterattack.

The offensive started 22 April. After shrugging off the initial assaults, the United Nations (UN) forces were pushed back, but communist successes were dearly bought. By the end of April, the UN lines had stabilized, and limited friendly countertitacks were being launched by early May. During the subsequent series of thrusts and counterthrusts throughout the summer, UN forces regained all the lost territory and more. By November, a defensive line was established that essentially became the truce line between the two Koreas in 1953.

Beyond Duty, Honor, Countr


1986 was the year of Values in the US Army, and the ideals and reflections surfaced by this focus continue to receive atteution in 1987. This article reviews the ethical staudards within the Army and snggests some precepts that may aid all professionals in living up to what is expected of them by peers, subordinates aud superiors.



HE professional ethic of the US military establishment is based on the concepts of duty, honor and country. Derived from the teachings of the military academies, these concepts stress devotion tQ duty, personal honor and loyalty to country aa the fundamental elements in professional conduct. From them have been derived subsidiary concepts of dedication, bravery and self-sacrifice that are widely accepted within the profession. Despite disparities between these precepts and the practices observable within the ofiicer corps, the concepts of duty, honor and country still provide a useful and workable ideal for the motivation and guidance of the military professional.1 But the concern is often expressed that the ethical standards taught to cadets do not serve them well when they move into leadership positions in the real world of the Armed Forces, that the motto Duty, Honor, Country cannot or does not snftice to guide the actions of t~ose charged with day-to-day leadership in the field. This is a profoundly important iesue. The Special Commission on the US Military Academy(the Berman Commission) held, in its final report, that the Honor Code must be viewed as a goal toward which every honorable person aspires, and not as a mini. mum standard for cadets alone. This assertion pushes the imperatives of the Honor Code forward into the real world of the professional soldier, countering the assertion that such dictates can or do apply only within the raretied atmosphere of the mihtery academies. But ifduty, honor and country and the elements of the Honor Code are reasonable and practicai guides to professional behavior, they are, at the same time, znsufficzent guides. This is what leads to the difficulties so often cited in moving from the military academies to the field. Those difficulties stem from the need for augmentation if these

touchstones are to serve as practical guides to ethical professional conduct.

The Need for Supplemental Precepts

The Berman Commission report also stated a fundamental truth but one that is not universally recognized. Following Upon its characterization of the Honor Code se a minimum standard of behavior, the commission obsem-ed that its proscriptions do rwt encompass all fo~rn~ of dishonorable conduct; the test of whether conduct is honorable or dishonorable does not depend solely upon whether it is proscribed by the Horwr Code.3 The Drisko Report, a wide-ranging survey of the views of Army ofiicers from second lieutenants to colonels, indica~s that serving otlicers share this view. Only about one-

. . . ifduty, honor and country and the elements of the Honor Code are reasonable and practical guides to professional behavior, they are, at the same time, insufficient guides. This is what leads fa the di~culties so otlen cited in moving from the @ilitary academies to the field.

third of the respondents indicated they thought the concept ofduty, honor and country was effectiue in promoting ethical behavior, but they were far from rejecting it or its impact. Junior officers in particul= . reflected w a group a deep commitment to the ideal of Duty, Honor, Country which to them charactertied individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence and unselfish motivation . As the author analyzed these responses, he concluded that they seemed to be saying


APnl 19e7

that Duty, Honor, Country was all right, but it was not enough.3 It is not difiicult to see why something more specific might be helpful in determining the proper course of conduct, ethically

Sehfom is there disagreement over the rightness or wrongness of actions directly contrary to the generally understood ethical code @the officer corp. . . . in many other cases, the dichotomy is not so clearly between that which is right and wrong but among competing values, each having its own ualidity and claim on our ethical consciousness, yet cannot be fully reconciled.

speaking, in many of the situations confronting military professionals. The classic case involves values in confl icttwo or more goods to he served but no apparent course of action mutually satisfactory from the standpoint of competing claims on our loyalty or conduct. Philosopher Sidney Hook has articulated this complexity with clarity and compassion: . Most human beings (except fanatics) haue plural and, taken in speczf?c contexts, con flictmg ends in life. In our own mora~ econ omy we medtate these conflicts by assessing the consequences ofalternatwe actwns on the whole constellation of values that are rele. uant to the problem at hand and selecting what promises to be the most prosperous issue with the least costs. But there are always costs. Thephenomenology of the moral experience reveals that our starting point IS always g confhct between the good and the good (or the right and the right): This is a most relevant observation. Sel-

dom is there disagreement over the rightness or wrongness of actions directly, contrary to the generally understood ethical code of the officer corp. Lying, cheating or stealing, even when they are tolerated or even rewarded, are known to be wrong, and their perpetration is viewed as evidence of corruption. But, in many other cases, the dichotomy is not so clearly between that which is right and wrong but among cornpeting values, each having its own validity and claim on our ethical consciousness, yet cannot be fully reconciled. Of course, the professional soldier is expected to have already resolved some of these potential conflicts in ways that are not demanded of those in other walks of life. Se] f-interest is to be subordinated to the publlc interest which is to be served not in addition to but, when necessary, instead of self-interestthe extreme case involves sacrdice ofones life in the service of others. L]kewwe, it is part of the professional ethic that the commander looks after his mens needs before he attends to his own. The professional soldler has already renounced the competing claims of some kinds of otherwise legitimate goods when he accepts the responsibilities of service. But there are other nonpredetermined conflicts in which soldiers are faced with difficult decisions as to which values should have pre-eminence, something that cannot depend solely on rules and mottoes so general they cannot be applied without informed individual judgment. Ofcourse, supplemental precepts would not eliminate the need for informed Judgment either. Judgment is an essential and integral element of the ethical person. But some precepts could help to clarify issues and increase awareness of how frequently there is an ethical component to be considered in determining therigbt thing to do. Cyberneticist Stafford Beer once provided a delightful illustration of the futility of de-

April 1987


Relationships with peers are at the heart of the satisfactions of service in any true profession. Peers become ones lifelong friends and provide the bulk of the meaningful support and encouragement one requires. Their approval is, in many ways, the most important reward of service.

manding that an organization be fully capable of foreseeing its future and laying plans to deal with it: KIww where you are going, and orgaruze to get there cou[d be the motto foz-stedon to us and on to our firms [read organizations or units]. And yet we cannot know the future, we have only rough ideas as to what we or our firms want, and we do not understand our environment well enough to marupulate events wtth certitude. Binds euolved from reptdes, it seems. Did a representatwe body of kzards pass a resolution to [earn to fly? If so, by what means ccndd the llzards have organized their genetic oariety to grow wings? One has only to say such things to reeogruze them as ridiculousbut the binds are flying . ... Likewise, we cannot envision all of the circumstance requiring ethical decisions and choices in which professional soldiers

will find themselves, but some sup~lemental precepts could help to bridge the gap between simply duty, honor and country however interpreted and embellished and the demands upon ones ethmal Judgment ofservice as a leader In a mditary unit. There must be any number of ways to approach the problem of developing a tentative collection of such precepts. The central element in many situations appears to mrevolve human relationships. Thus, exploring the matter in terms of the various relationship typical in military units might be productive. For our purposes, we will concentrate on relationships with superior off]cers, peers and eubordinates. This approach owes a debt to Major General Orrw E. Kelly, a distinguished officer who served as chief of chaplains. He put it very simply: Ethm are somehow related to what happens between people. For that reason, the ethical pro-



APIII 1987

cepts to be suggested key on relationships between the leader and other peopIe in the organization and the values to be transmit. ted in the course of those relationships.

Relationships With Peers

Relationships with peers are at the heart of the satisfactions of service in any truelmofession. Peers become ones lifelong friends and provide the bulk of the meaningful support and encouragement one requires. Their approval is, in many ways, the most important reward of service. Shared experiences with peers form not only the folklore of professional service but also many of those crucial episodes which define a life. For anyone aspiring to be a member ofa profession, his most precious possession is his professional reputation. That reputation rests on the dual bases of character and competmce. Peer relationships are the principal basis for professional reputation. Two key precepts seem to follow . Conduct yourself so as to enhance the profession of which you area part. It sounds so simple, and yet it is so comprehensive in its application. During another period when there was widespread concern about the professional standards of the officer corps, then Chief of StatT General W]llism C. Westmoreland addressed an open letter to Army officers. In it, he reminded his colleagues at every level that the good repute of the officer corps is a responsibility shared by every oflicer. Each of us stands in the light of his brother officer.. .8 while the imperatives of constant awareness of ones obligation to his peers are many, a more recent Army chiefof staff, offering his views on the essential professional military values, has given high priority to selfless service which he has described as the opposite of Yhe sustainedpursuit of self-interest, a characteristic destructive to all the other values we cherish.g

Encourage and acknowledge the accomplishments of fellow soldiers. This precept focuses attention on the unproductive and, in fact, destructive nature of too much of the competition which occurs within the profession. It is part of the professional ethic to expect every oflicer to do his best and to seek the highest level of responsibility he can at. tain. Ethical considerations enter the picture when success is achieved by, and is con- , ceived by the striver as involving, beating out the competition. There have always been more than enough tough and demanding jobs to go around in the military services. [n fact, the first problem confronting anyone who gets promoted to a new and more challenging post is to find some help. If, in the course of getting there, the incumbent has alienated his peers through destructive competition and has likewise damaged his professional reputation, help is going to be hard to find. It is not only t the advantage of the profession as a who re for every oflicer to help and encourage his peers to develop to the limits of their capacities but also to the advantage and satisfaction of every officer as we] 1. Those officers who have been generous in recognizing and acknowledging the achievements of their colleagues have found a far more rewarding stance than those who have begrudged and envied the successes of their fellow officers. There is at least one other point relating to the success of ones peers that should be made. Admiral James B. Stockdale pointed it up when he recalled some years after his extended period of captivity thati when we were in prison we rem em bered the Book of Ecclesiastes: 7 returned and saw that the race zs not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wme nor rzches of under. standing, nor favors to men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all. 10 This is an essential reminder for every officer, for the professional environment is not

April 1987


Zf . . . the incumbent has alienated his peers through destructive competition and has likewise damaged his professional reputation, help is going to be hard to find. It is not only to the advantage of the profession as a whole for every officer to help and encourage his peers to develop to the limits of their capacities but also to the advantage aad satisfaction of every officer as well.

now and nev& will be ideal. Some who do not deserve to do so will prosper, while others who have earned advancement will sometimes find themselves disappointed. It is the essence of both professional and ethical conduct to adhere to standards no matter the outcome. Johns Hopkins University Professor Stephen M. Schwebel, newly appointed to the International Court of Justice, stated the obligation well at a gathering honoring his selection. What do you hope to do? he was asked. Comport myself respectably was his reply.

Dealing With Superior Officers

The context of a military organization provides commanders with influence and leverage probably greater than that in any other relationship between leader and follower. This imposes enormous demands and responsibilities on the military leader. There are also great opportunities for the

ethical leadership in the relationship. Certain precepts thus seem pertinent to dealing with a superior oftlcer. They include: Give a supercor oficer euery bit ofloyalty to which he is entztled. The essence ofthis admonition is to avoid confusion as to what the requirement to be loyal to ones superior does and does not entail. It does not mean, for example, that only an able-commander deserves the loyalty of his suborditites. Probably arrinept commander needs loyalty more (and will be more grateful for it). One must assume that every commander who is not behaving unethically is doing the bestjob he can do. Loyalty from his subordinates requires that they do not undercut him, either to their own subordinates or to others inside or outside the organization. It requires them to do all in their power to compensate for his shortcomings and to teach him gracefully those things he needs to know to be more effective in, his job. It refoUozvertoexert


Aprd 1987

quires them to attempt to carry out his instructions, at the same time working diplomatically to help shape those instructions to ensure that they will be as appropriate as possible. It is easy and rewardlngto be loyal to an outstanding commander who can set the example in every respect, but it is no less

The context of a military organization provides commanders with influence and leverage probably greater than that in any other relation. ship between leader and follower. This imposes enormous demands and responsibilities on the militarg leader. There are atso great opportunities for the follower to exert ethical leadership in the relationship.

important or obligatory to give unstinting loyalty to less able ofiicers entrusted with leadership. Where the line is drawn, however, isat the bounds of ethical conduct. This was the point lost on many of those involved with the Watergate affair and itsaftermath. They failed to realize, or to act appropriately if they did realize, that one never has an obligation out of loyalty to aid or abet a superior in unethical behavior or to cover up for him should he conduct himself unethically. Quite the contrary, one is obliged, in such cases, to look to ones own ethical conduct andtOdO what isnecessary andappropriate in the situation. Richard A. Gabriel has expressed the imperative succinctly: Loyalty toonessuperiors is neuer anythirzg buta condztzonal relationshzppredicated upon the continuing perceptions of ones subordinates that their superzor is acting honorably in hw position of command. . Inform superiors when you do not or cannot carry outthezrorders. Superior off]-

cers are entitled to assume obedience on the part of their subordinates. Most vigorous soldiers like to operate on a long leash, getting mission-type orders rather than de- , tailed instructions and being lett to get the job done without being oversuperviserl. The price of this privilege, and it haa an essential ethical element, is accountability to the superior officer who provides such an operational climate. I Superiors keep abreast of what is going on in their subordinate units by avariety of means, including personal observation, statYvisits, ;eports and what they are told by their subordinate commanders. Of these, the last is, or can be, by far the most important. Once a subordinate has earned his commanders trust and confidence by demonstrating that he can be relied upon to report fairly, completely and on time, he will become the most valued source of information for that superior officer. The reporting channel will take on many of the aspects of a tutorial relationship (what the Army is now calling mentoring) in which the senior brings along atrusted andvaluedjuniorof ficer by gradually imparting to him the sum of the older mans experience and reflection. This can only happen when the element of shared trust is strongly present. The subordinate seeking to improve his perceived performance by withholding bad news orreporting incompletely, especially when he has not complied with the orders he has been given, will find (usually too late and to his regret) that he has forfeited something infinitely more valuable-a priceless professional opportunity. Establish yourethical stance early on in a new assignment. This is probably the best means of protecting oneself against being asked or pressured to perform dishonorable acts. It can also serve to inspire, instruct and support a weak superior who might otherwise ba tempted to compromise his own ethical standards. Virtually every officer can re-


late an experience in which some petty dishonesty was expected of him or it was made clear to him that it would he to his (supposed) advantage to cut a few corners in terms of hk personal integrity. Examples range from the intlation of scores on the rifle range through certifying the destruction of classified materials without witnessing it, signing for joint inventories of property that have not been conducted and boosting head counts in the company mess. One officer assigned to inspect expended rounds on the rifle range (to ensure the primers had been detonated before the brass was packed for shipping and salvage) was told by his company commander to just sign the certificates and get in the jeep, as he was in a hurry. The lieutenant declined to make the certification without completing hk inspection which he proceeded to carry out. For his trouble, he got to walk the 5 miles back to the company area. But he was never again asked to do anything dishonest by that comm?nder who, in fact, boosted the younger officer ahead of others to take over the command when the commander was reassigned. Deal dwectly with questionable orders. While most pressures to compromise ones integrity are subtle and implied, occasionally an ofticer will receive an order to do something he believes is dishonest or illegal. Some people have found that an effective technique is to talk the matter over quietly and privately with the person who issued the order, explaining why it would be improper to carry it out and requesting that it be withdrawn. Impossible, an alternative solution that M not ethically flawed maybe offered. If the senior persists in his original course, it can be effective to ask for the gmder in writing. In some cases, this request will by itself be sufficient to get the officer involved to change his mind, while, in other cases, the written order can be the basis for further discussion with higher level com-

manders or with appropriate staff advisers. Form alhances wzth colleagues of like mind on ethical matters. This may sound as though it belongs in the realm of peer relationships, but actually this precept constitutes an element of dealing successfully with superiors. There are cases in which officers who refused to compromise on matters ofprinclple have been penalized by their superiors for that refusal. While it might simply be observed that such is life, there is more to be said. A book reviewer once made the point, acknowledgingthat some readers might think It unfair that he had been assigned to review the second volume of a projected trilogy after having dealt unkindly with the first. Life is unfair, he aftirmed, then went on to denounce the second volume as well. He closed with the only positive comment in the entire review, conceding that (the print is legible and the volume is sturdily bound. But given that life is unfairsometimes unfair even within the bounds of an institution that is philosophically committed to


April 1987

fairness-there are still some things that can be done to head off ethical crises. One of the most important is to form alliances with other of fkers of like mind on. ethical matters. It is diflicult for a brigade commander, for example, to demand intlated readiness statistics when three of his battalion commanders and several of his principal staff officers have discussed the matter informally and agreed that they will not be parties to such dishonesty. It might be a different matter if he could pick them offand lean on them one by one, each not knowing that he is not the only holdout. Likewise, such links of shared values with staff offkers at higher levels, and with other cornmandera throughout the unit, can do a great deal to curb pressures for unethical conduct. Never bet the come where integrity is concerned. Some officers, unhappy with what they view as dishonest or unprofessional practices in a unit or on the part of their commanders, rationalize that they ~ will not openly object lest they jeopar ]ze their own further progress. But, they ell themselves, when they get to a high enough position to really have some influence, then they will be able to bring about reform. This is an Insidious approach, with the result nearly always being that the individual who takes it wakes up one day to find that he can no longer recall the values he once sought promot]on to advance.

Working With Subordinates

Leadership studies usually concentrate on relationships with those who are assigned as subordinates of the Ieader. Although we have sought to illustrate that one can and shouId lead ones peers, and even ones superiors, in appropriate ways, there IS much to be said about the ethical dimensions of leading subordinates as well. Some suggested precepts are: Be guided hy considerations of

ishirzg returns. Writing on a proposed set of ethical guidelines for public administrators, George A. Graham suggested that administrators are obliged in exercising the power and discretionary authority with which they are entrusted to be informed, to be fair, to be rational, and to be reasonable. Those are eminently sensible points yet, in unit after unit, one finds commanders who cannot or will not discriminate the more important tasks from those of lesser consequence and who recklessly spend the time, effort and good will of their men on marginal incremental returns where the results are inherently insignificant. The average soldier has a remarkably well-developed sense of what is or is not important, and there is no quicker way for a commander to lose the respect and the willing support of his men than to demand of them unstinting efforts on an unimportant task. The commander who does nol%xercise judgment and restraint in so tasking hb+ troops is operating in an exploitative, ethically flawed and unwise manner. Establish priorities and accept respon stbtlity for the consequences. Military units, almost by definition, exist in a resource-constrained environment. This means that the normal condition is not enough of anything time, people, money, repair parta, range facilities, whateverto go around. Wise leadership in such a situation entails the establishment of priorities and the allocation of the available assets to the various tasks according to those priorities. But, in practice, doing so requires the commander to exercise a good deal of self-discipline (lest he continually change the priorities in an effort to cover all bases, by definition an impossibility, and, in the process, cause everything to be first priority which means that nothing is). It also requires some moral courage, for the time will crnne when smnemie higher u?


Apr!l 19S7


[Some senior oficersl did not want to acknowledge or be involved in trying to deal with some very difficult problems, including drug abase, racial terwioas and dissent in the ranks, even as they were holding junior officers accountable for failing to eliminate such problems. Such unwillingness to recognize and help deal with real problems constitutes a patently unethical stance.

will ask about or point out an area in which the unit has not done well or bas done noth. ing, on purpose, as a result of having assigned a low priority to that function. Many commanders do well when it comes to establishing priorities, but the harder part comes when one has to stand up and be counted m terms of defending the results of having done so, Weak commanders are then sometimes tempted to blame subordinates for the consequences ofhavmg implemented tbe priorities which the commander himself dictated. Eualuate subordinates fazrly and equz tab[y. This seems simple enough but, in practice, is a precept often ignored. A commander sets certain standards which he wants his subordinate units to achieve, such as a certain operationally ready rate for key pieces of equipment or a percentage qualiticatlon rate for crews in gunnery, and then collects statistics on bow the various subordinate units do in meetmg the standards. He then evaluates the various commanders on the basis of their units performance, This sounds fine at first hearing, but there are some flaws so serious and so cen-

tral to effective leadership that they amount to ethical shortcomings. Many things that affect the performance of a unit are beyond the capacity of its commander to influence. These include the strength of the uni~ the experience and ability of the people assigned, the resources provided to perform the mission; the prior state of training and competence of the unit when he took it over and how long he has had to affect those factors; the number, difficulty and diversity of the missions assigned; and so on. General Bruce C. Clarke used to say that the outstanding officer is the one who gets superior results from average people. Clearly, there is something to that but, for many years, certain Army divisions got the lions share of everything when it came to assets, including more experienced and better qualified o~lcers. It was also clear that performing successfully in any assignment in such divisions was a great deal easier than it would be in those units getting only routine support. The point could be extended indefinitely, but it is really simple. The responsible (and ethical) evaluation of subordinates should be based not on how well


APrll 1987


successfully in any assignment in [certain] divisions was a great deal easier than it would be in those units getting only routine support. . . . The responsible (and ethical) evaluation of subordinates should be bused not on how well they did the job but how well they did it considering what they were given to work with.

. . . performing

the~~did the job but how well they did it con .submg what they were given to work wtth. s Neuer prom we anything you cannot deliuer. This maxim derwesfrom an old saying of Alfred E. Smith and is as useful for professional officers as it was for politicians. Trust, and particularly mutual trust, is at the heart of whatever it is that makes a unit something more thanJust a collection ofcollocated individuals. While reliability in word and deed is an ethmal imperative, it is equally clear that it is a practical attribute as well. V. S. Na]paul explained through the character Sal Im in his famous novel A Bend (n the Rluer., My fam z[y have been traders and merchants in tbe Indian Ocean for centunes un der et,e~ kzndofgouernment. There w a reason why we have [asted so long. We bargazn hard, but we stzck to our bargain. All our contracts are oral, but w< delmer what we promzse. It zsn t because we are saints. It w because the who[s.thmg breaks down otherwise. It breaks down just as quickly in a unit and stays that way once the men learn a commander is not to be trusted. Thus, there is a caution here for commanders who wish to be honest and to be regarded as honest. Beyond simply keeping ones word vn matters that one controls, it is important not to make commitments on things that cannot be controlled, for there is the hazard of de-

faulting withaut being able to help it, and the loss of credibility will be the same. . Cast your lot with the unit. There are many things which come under thk rubric, and many of them are ethical in nature. First is the admonition to linkones own success with that of the unit which means that only by working to build a successthl unit can one prosper. The commander who seeks to shift the blame for a units failures to others, thereby protecting his own future pros; pects, may get away with it but, in the process, will earn the disdain of his peers and subordinates. Casting ones lot with the unit also means a willingness to recognize problems affecting the unit and to accept them as ones own, including accepting responsibility for SOIV- ing them or for the lack of a solution if one cannot be found. Much of the bittetiess in the Acrny a decade ago stemmed from feelings on tbe part of many otllcers that their seniors did not want to acknowledge or be involved in trying to deal with some very ditilcult problems, including drug abuse, racial tensions and d]ssent in the ranks, even as they were holding junior oflicers accountable for failing to eliminate such problems. Such unwillingness to recognize and help deal with real problems constitutes a patently unethical stance. For the past several years, there has been a more or less continuous discussion as to whether the officer corps should have a written code of ethics. Those opposed say that such a code is unnecessary, that everyone already knows what is expected of otiicers in terms of professional ethics. But at every conference on the topic and in almost every informal discussion of it as, well, there has surfaced enough disagreement about the elements of such a code to question whether the supposed consensus really exists. Even so, continue the opponenta, a written code would descend into a legalistic device that would cause officers to seek loopholes and to


April 19e7


sail close to the wind in ethical matters. It would, they argue, therefore, do more harm than good. On the other hand, those who favor a written code point to the apparent confusion, or lack of agreement, among ofi%ers about what constitutes the tenets of appropriate professional behavior. This, they argue, is proof positive that something more concrete and more specific than a collection of incongruent notions is needed to ensure that every ofilcer understands what is expected of him. But every effort to produce a written code has broken down due to the inability to draft a code that the officer corps would agree to and support. -. Given the amount of effort that has been expended on this matter, it seems unlikely that it will be resohed in the near future. Perhaps it does not need to be. What every ofiicer aware of his ethical obligations is looking for is some heIp in deciding where his duty lies when he must make choices among competing goods. Very few are in search of a detailed prescription that will lift from them the burden of having to apply ethkal judgment. But most would be grateful for some guidance a little more specific than a mottc-however admirable it is as the bedrock for a philosophy ofprofessionalism-can provide. Perhaps some precepts, ampIified by short discussions of their meaning and application, could help bridge the gap between admittedly divergent understandhgs of the oral tradition, as it now exists, and a de. tailed written code. If so, then perhaps serving ofticers will subject these preliminary efforts to updating, correction and amplification, and wiil provide yet other suggestions for precepts based on their owa experience and outlook. The result could be a sort of perpetual work in progress, serving to focus the dialogue while maintaining the Kind of vigor and adaptability dit%cult to ach]eve in a permanent written code. % ~.



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Leuzs Sorley marntmns a Washington-based pubhc POIWYconszdiurg pmcttce specmlumg m natmnal securzty affam He recewed a B S from the US Mzhtwy Academy <USMA), an .%lA fmm the Untwrstty of Pennsytuanm, an MP.A from Pennsyivama State Umuerwy and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins Umverscfyand w a graduate of the NIWZ1War Coliegeand the US A rmy War College {USAWC).He has serwdon the fmulws of the US. &fAand $/wUSA WCand as an mtefhgence o~tcer wth zhe Centrfd lnceiltgence Agency.


April 1987

Much ot%he debate concerning the employment of light infantr~ fimx?s in various contingencies centers on its survivability when can.fnmting opposing armored forces. [Corps plugs and other add-an elements have been considered to obviate this. Here is a potential solution to this problem that the authors contend is feasible now. )



I *

Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ivany, US Army

ESPITE the acknowledged primacy of US interests in EuroDe. . the ArrnYs attention in recent years has focused on other contingencies. This tendency does not mean that the Army is taking any less seriously its mission to defend Western Europe. Even a brief review of US Army, Europes, tremendous ongoing modernization atlirms the continuing importance of our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Rather, the heightened interest in other contingenciesmost frequently in the Third Worldstems from the belief that the next war will prohahly begin anywhere but the Fulda Gap where we have so carefully prepared ourselves to defend. The success of US military policy in Europe-and of the whole Atlantic Alliance-lies in its contribution to a stable balance of power in Europe. Although ours is an age of uricertain ty, that balance seems likely to survive for the foreseeable future. Outside o~Europe, little stability existeand only the most precarious balance of power. US interests in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Latin America are in greaterjeopardy. In these regions, the United States maintains only weak military forces or none at all. Should defending US interests in these regions require the use of force, deployment-getting an effective mix of combat power to the battlefield quickly looms as a potential show-stopper. In anticipation of this problem, deployability has assumed increased importance in the minds of force designers. To a surprising extent, the shape of our Army has become a function of the size of equipment that can tit inside a cargo plane and of the Military Airlift Commands aircraft availability rate. In the field army, this concern for deployability manifests itself in enthusiasm for *light infantry. Even die-hard tankers can,not fail to recognize that light infantry is a good idea. Light infantry initiatives are

making our Continental United States (CONUS)-beeed Army more deployable. They are expanding our appreciation of where and how to employ dismounted forces. Most interestingly, in an Army that historically has shied away from creating military elites, the developers of light infsutry unite have shown a hold appreciatio~ of how elitism contributes to military effectiveness. Yet, even the most imaginative wrrrplsnner must pause when contemplating the limitations of light forces-in particular, their vulnerability when opposed by ar- mored or mechanized forces in open terrain. HOW can we compensate for such vulnerabilities? One solution is to limit the employment of light infantry to close terrsin cities, mountains and jungle. Doing so, however, excludes light forces from several regions of great potential interest. As an alternative, force developers talk of offsetting light infantrys weaknesses with augmentation packages-additional forces that will provide capabilities needed for a particular scenario. In other words, the much-discussed question of whether light infantry can play a role in heavily urbanized Europe as part of a larger mechanized force is not the issue. Rather, the;ssue is whether that same light force deployed elsewhere can defend itself against an armored threat. The prospect is not an idle one. It is difficult to envision a scenario in Southwest Asia that would not involve significant indigenous enemy armor. In our own hemisphere, Cuba and Nicaragua have acquired a substantial fleet of tanks and personnel carriers to augment their peoples armies.!? Nor should we overlook the Soviet Unions ability to project conventional forces. Each of seven Soviet airborne divisions boasts more than 300 BMDs and 30 85mm self-propelled assault guns. A single 6,500man airborne division thus equipped would


APrIl 1987


2 i : ; g i ~ .. ~

Soviet BMD airborne combat vehicle following air-

. 3

drop. Note that suspension has yet to be lowered.

In our own hemisphere, Cuba and Nicaragua have acquired a substantial tleet of tanks and personnel carriers [and each] ofseven Soviet airborne divisions boasts more than 300 BMDs and30 85mm selfi propelled assault guns. . . . This near certainty that any adversary will have some armor, combined with the Armys growing reliance on light forces, defines our challenge.

seriously challenge a US light infantry division despite the latters larger size. These seven Soviet divisions represent a formidahlc threatmobile, potent and survwable. This near certainty that any adversa~ will have some armor, combined with the Armys growing reliance on light forces, defines our challenge. It is to create a mobile, all-weather, antitank force enjoying at least moderate survivability and capable of rapid, worldwide deployment. The qualitier about weather is an important one. Our reliance upon Army aviation to supplement ground-based antitank systems m steaddy increasing. Even so, until they operate without regard to weather and light conditions, attack helicopters alone cannot provide light infantry w]th the tankkilling capability it needs. Light infantry also needs armor. How has the Army responded to this challenge to reinforce light infantry with rapidly deployable armor? Readers who have followed the issue in journals such as MdztnryReuzew and Armor have been treated to

a variety of ideas. In our search for a deployable acrnored force, we have flirted with the LAV25 armored car. We toyed with the notion of resurrecting the M551 Sheridan in a variety of configurations-as is, with a new turret or with no turret at all but with a hypervelocity automatic cannon instead. We designed a new light armored regimentbut failed to find space in the force structure to establish it. The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) continues to conduct brave experiments based on the ahistorical notion that making ground combat vehicles fast enough absolves them of the nee~ for any protection at all. These ideas testify to the imagination and creativity of our Army. All have merit. Still, none bas tilled the bill. Like it or not, the de- velopment of an adequate light armored forcewith equipment and organization tailored specifically to compensate for the vulnerabilities of light infantryremains an expensive and distant prospect. We may never see it. Ironically, even as we have experimented with exotic vehicles and innovative organizations, a deployable armored force has come into existence all but unnoticed. It is here today, waiting for us to grab it off the shelf. That force is the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) as modified by its new J-series table of organization and equipment (TOE). Our failure to recognize the regiments potential as an instrument for reinforcing light infantry is understandable. The standard doctrinal view of the ACR is that it is a heavy force to be employed in conjunction with even larger heavy forces. Indeed, recent changes to the regiment have been intended not to make the ACR into an ar. mored plug for the light corps but to correct weaknesses that have limited its effectiveness as a heavy force. Some of the weaknesses were cavalry platoons that were too unwieldy, aviation that was poorly


APrIl 1987


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organized and combat service support assets that were preposterously weak. The new ACR organization has remedied these deticieneies by improving the regiments flexibility and self-sustainabdity while retaining its compactness and combat power (see Figure 1). These changes, combined with cavalrys traditional capabilities, have made the ACRhowever inadvertentlyinto an ideal complement for light infantry. The regiment has acqumed unanticipated usefulness for contingency operations, a product of the convergence of related changes in equipment and organization. . Prior to the changes mandated by the Jseries TOE, the evolution of armored cavalry weapons reflected a consistency dating back to the end of World War II. To conduct the reconnaissance and security missions that were the regiments bread and butter, cavalry scouts relied on thin-skinned vehicles of limited fighting value. Tanks overmatched the scouts and were expected to

bear the brunt of whatever fighting cavalry units might encounter. Ligh~ness~ndowed the scouts with speed but left them utterly I dependent upon tanks for protection. Today, the regiment isexcharrging itsolder generation vehicles for Ml A &rams tanks and M3 Bradley tigbting vehicles. For cavalry, this re-equipping hae a special significance. Recalling how recently cavalry meant gun jeeps, Ml 14 reconnaissance vehicles and the unlamented Sheridan, we can appreciate the importance of the change. Bristling with powerful new weapons, a regiment that was once primarily a scouting force is becoming explicitly a fighting force of startling authority. Adding the Ml to regimental cavalry does not account for this transformation. In a sense, the A brains represents a logical extension of the M48 tanks that tbe Ilth ACR, used in Vietnam and of the M60-series tanks that armored cavalrymen hav$ employed in more recent years. The Bradley m~es all the difference. Doubts are wide.





spread about how well the M3 cavalry tighting vehicle (CFV) will serve in a pure sccu&ing role-end for good reason. On the other hand, theBrcdleys lethality permits scouts, for the first time, to fight largely independent of tank ,support. This significant departure radically alters the character of armored cavalry. Organizational changes under the J-series take into account th; increased fighting power now available to scouts. In the past, armored cavalry has compensated for the smuts traditional weakness by assigning tanka to each cavalry platoongueranteeingtheir availability to bail the scouts out of tight comers. The J-series organization creates platoons consisting entirely of scOutssix CFVS per platoon, two such platoons per cavalry troop. Tanks are still found in the armored cavakytroopbut in separate platoons. Are these tank platoons available to support the scouts? Obviously. Yet, that support necessarily becomes less responsive than when tanks were organic to each cavalry platoon. In other words, the J-series organization obliges scouts torelysubstsntirdly less on tank support. The increased fighting potential of the CFV U[1OWS scouts to do so. As a result, scouts in the new regiment will operate on their own to an unprecedented degree. That, some die-hards claim, ispreciseIy the problem. Traditionalists lament the fact that each cavalry second lieutenant will no Ionger lead his own miniatm-e combined arms team into the fray. Such arguments miss the point. This ability of scouts to stand on their own in no way diminishes the regiment. Instead, it invests in the ACR hitherto untapped potential as a tighting force not least of all in support of contingency op erations. How do these changes in equipment and organization facilitate the ACRS employment in contingency situations? By permit-

ting the regiment to deploy by echelons, lighter elements leading with heavier elements following as airlift or sealih permits. If it implies that each echelon must be prepared to tight on its own, deployment hy echelon is usually a bad idea. The Army designs units to tight as a whole, not in pieces. The ACR stands out as an exception to this rule. The regiment can configure itself in such a way that even an easily deployed lead echelon retains an impressive tank-killing capability as well as adequate organic cbrnbat support and combat service support. As a bonus comes a command and control apparatusnotonly sufficient fortheleadechelon but alsueasily able to-accommodate succeeding elements and interface with a division or corps headquarters. Figure 2 shows how a regimental armored cavalry squadron might deploy in three echelons. Inaddition toasquadron headquarters, the lead echelon provides three scout/ antitank troops, each equipped with two platoons of six Bradleys each. Each troop also deploys its organic mortar section, providing the squadron with indirect-tire support as soon as it hits the ground. The lethality of 36 Bradley CFVS (?8 if we count the two in the squadron headquarters) hardly needs commentary. The lead echelon of even a smg[e squadron would

Figure 2


APrll 1987


vastly increase the antitank fires of engaged light infantry forces. Moreover, that squadron could deploy without overly taxing limited airlift assets. With its lead echelon configured as in Figure 3, a squadron could deploy with only 10 C5A and 12 C141B sorties The squadrons second echelon would augment the logistics capability provided hy the lead echelon while increasing available combat support, most notably with the addition of the howitzer battery. This echelon would deploy in an additional four C5A and six C141B sorties (see F@re 4). The trail echelon would make heavy demands on airlift, requiring 30 C5A and 12 C141B sorties. Getting this echelon to the theater of operations is essential if the squadron is to acquire an offensive capability. Depending on the situation, however, a commander might prefer to send the third echelon by sea, taking more time but allowing airlift to be diverted to other priorities. He could mak.p that decision confident that, even without tanks, the squadron would constitute a coherent, self-contained force. It would function, in essence, as a mobile, protected antitank battalion, providing light forces with precisely the assistance needed to neutralize an armosfmechanized attacker. If the entire regiment were called upon to react to such a contingency, it would deploy in a similar three-tiered fashion. The regiments lead echelon would consist of the CFVS and mortars of three armored cavalry squadrons, plus appropriate command and control. With more than 100 tank-killers, this force would deploy in 45 C141B and 39 C5A sorties. The regiments second echelon would provide three squadron howitzer batteries, three engineer platoons and the combat aviation squadron. That squadrons three air cavalry troops and two attack helicopter companies wou~d be especially welcome,

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April 1987


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April 1987.


providing combat intelligence of enormous utility for the ground squadrons. No less important, the squadrons 26 attack helicopters would further augment the regiments antitank capability. The full combat power of the regiment would makd itself felt only upon deployment of the third echelon. In addition to 123 Abrams tanks, this echelon would consist of an imposing array of combat support and combat service support assets. Included would be a support squadron with its maintenance, medical, adjutant general, and supply and transport troops; a combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) company, and the heavy equipment ofa combat engineer company. Fully deployed, the regiment would constitute an asset of incalculable value. The ACRS unique character-its self-contained structure of all arms-translates into flexibility for thesupported Iigbt force commander. He can employ the entire regiment or portions of it as the mission, enemy and terraindictate. And he can do so without engaging in the slapdash task organizing of ground maneuver, aviation, combataupport and combat service support elements that do not know one another. A caval,ry regiment enjoys the inestimable advantage of being small enough that all of its components train together routinely using common procedures. Deploying from a single lecation, cavalry comes task-organized. From the forwardmost aeroscout to the rearmost truck driver, cavalrymen fight as part of a unified, cohesive team. We cannot illustrate the value of this proposition to use tbe ACR as light armor, however, merely by citing the panoply of resources available to a regiment. Nor does asserting the feasibility of echeloned deployment prove our case. The critical measure of the proposals merit lies in how well the regiments lead echelon could tight in the absence of follow-on elements. These questions demand our attention:. Cf41BSorties 20 I 2; 3 31 t 4

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April 19e7



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missions could that lead echelon what conduct? How would its fighting elements best be employed? . How would the presence of this lead echelon on the battlefield contribute to the victory of a larger light infantry force? Consider this scenario. A light infantry division, deployed somewhere in Southwest Asia, is conducting combat operations in conjunction with allied forces under a US corps. Expectations of a iarge-scale attack by enemy armor and mechanized infantry oblige the corps commander to assume a defensive posture. To augment US forces, the national command authority directs the lead echelon of an armored cavalry regiment to deploy from CONUS. Anticipating the ACR lead echelons arrival, the corps commander considers its employment. He outlines three options: Commit the regiment as it arrives to thicken the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the light infantrys sector. Assign the regiment a piece of the corps sector, giving it the mission of blocking the most likely armor approach. . Retain the ACR as a mobile reserve to counter enemy armored thrusts anywhere, in the corps sector. Of the three options, the corps commander determines that the first is least preferable. Still, operational or political circumstances requiring a rigid forward de-

fense could justify such a course of action. Such circumstances could persuade a commander to reinforce his FLOT by parceling out individual cavalry troops ta reinforce each light infantry battalion on its battle position. Any battalion commander would welcome the addition of 12 CFVS to augment his collection of light antitank weapons, Dragons and unprotected TO Ws. Piecemealing the ACR woufd dissipate its effect, however, and should be considered only in the absence of more desirable alternative. The corps commander recognizes that h better idea would be to employ the regiment to block the primary armor approach into the corps sector. Conce~trating the regiments antitank tires makes sense. He can count on the TO Ws and 25mrn cannon of more than 100 CFVS being able to parry even a determined attack. What if the terrain does not readily allow the commander to predict where the enemy will employ his armor? If he guesses wrong, the ACR lead+ echelon becomes a w asted asset, bypassed as the main fight occurs elsewhere, the regiments mobility counting for nothing because of its static mission. With this in mind, the corps commander concludes that the preferred option for employing the ACR is as a mobile reserve primed for employment anywhere in sector. Maneuver is the etyle of warfare for which the ACR is optimally designed and equipped. Freeing the regiment from a static mission brings into play the mobility that is one of cavalrys principal assets. The division already has forces suited to holding terrainits infantry battalions. Yet, no matter how stubborn that infantry, the corps commander knows that penetrations of his forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are inevitable. The ACR lead echelon provides him with the one capability that his corps lacks-a rapid reaction force able to move on the battlefield under any conditions.


April 19S7


Keeping cavalry in reserve enables the corps commander to counter enemy successes. He maneuvers cavalry quickly to the flanks of those penetrations and uses missile and carmon fires to break the momentum of the attack. He does not engage in pitched battles with enemy tank regi= ments-his cavalry lacks the heavy armor w do so on equal terms. Instead, he employs cavalry much as the Wehrmacht need antitank weapons against numerically superior Allied forces during World War IL He skillfully uses terrain for protection and as a platform for long-range shots that capitalizes on surprise, causing a material and psychological effect far out of proportion to the forces employed. Of course, such a scenario represents a vast oversimplification. Defeating theenemy will require not only the ACRS antitank fires but also the synchronized efforts of the entire combined ermsteam-close air support, Army aviation, fieldsrtillery, engineers and CEWI. We believe, however, that armor represents an irreplaceable. ingredient in that combined arms formula. There is no substitute for the qualities that armor brings to the battlefield-survivability, matchless mobility and long-range precision tires. Without armored support, the light infantry concept is badly flawed. Ifour Army is serious about light force% if those forces are expected not just to deter but to tight should deterrence fail-we must find away to provide armor to support those forces iq the tield. The ACR provides that wayavailable now without added cost in manpower or equipment. All we need is the imagination toseize the opportunity lying before us. %

NOTES t (m. s.,5!raqkm possessmge.wmo.edfomes ,rm nas,wprox,

matdy l.ccelanks ammngmem %CO T72s and34W Ch$msms Omerar wrti!,ghbng von,a.: tnclud. 180 BMPsar,dw STR. lraqha3aDpmX# m?.tely2,S031ank3 wstlyfrom lhe Easternblm adaOth,r3 CCOam10?eC f,ghtmg veh.].s Bath .at,orw .1$. nav. exiemrve arsmds 01 I(ght and mti, The M!l!l.rYBaIance 19851986 uman,llwy A!}Ollh~l)WreS.lehcm

Thelnt,niatkaal I,httie for SkatW,C Stud,.,,, Eng 2 N,~r8gua h-&stead(ly eWd,,gffih,aVl_ now ,nclde5 aDPfOX,mal,ly 120 TW, T55$ 30 P77SS and rrcf.
II?Qredprsm. elcarrmm NMg.. amhSti,llsVmgrq

lb(v,mo!y Own WC 8P .Dtol5mm

3 me BMD1,ghtamm ven,aefeatiwa 73mmwwn, -anm. wan!. gu,aso mssm am WOvloes Sonm r,ro!ecllo agalo,t tlmllery

Lm&vumt COIWUZIA. J Bacaxch s the comman&r, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regt merit,FortBlns, Texa.s HerecewedaBS fromthe US Mdztary Academy and an M.A. and a PhD from Princeton Unwer.mtyand t-sa graduate of the USACGSC. Heprevwusly serueda.san tn(erna. twnalaffatrs fellow wtththe Councdon Foregn Relattons H=arttcle-FwhtaWttiCouerzWFome Battle appearedm the Aprd1985MdKaryRe.

Lwutenant Coiorwl Robert R. Iuany t.s{k commander, 1st Squadron, 3dArmored Caval?yReg$ment He rececuedaB.S. from the US Milttary Academy (uSMA) andaPhD from the Unwers@ of Wuconszn and B a graduati of the USACGSC He has serued m armored caualry regzments z. the ContLIZentnl United States, Vietnnmand West Germany, asanm.structoratthtUSMA;zn the War Plans Dw.smn of the Army staff; and as the Army a~deto the prcscdent.




NE of the most striking developments in Soviet military capabilities since the end of World War II has been the creation of aviation and naval resources that have given Soviet general purpose forces truly global reach. Long-range airlift and aealift capabilities--through the delivery of military materiel and the transport of surrogate forces-have, for some years now, played an integral role in supporting Soviet foreign policy initiatives and goals throughout the Third World. hr addition, the development of increasingly capable airborne and amphibious assault forces have at least raised the specter of direct Soviet military intervention worldwide. These aspects of Soviet strategic mobility have justifiably received the closest attention from Western military analysts. Accompanying these visible and often dramatic demonstrations of Soviet long-range power-projection capabilities, however, has been a less-studied development in Soviet strategic mobility. This development has centered on enhancing theater war-fighting potentialthe creation of heavy equipment transporter (HET) units for the rapid, longdistance movement of large mihtary forces to, between and within the vast continental theaters of strategic military action (teatr voennykh deistvii (TVDS)) around the Soviet periphery. Soviet mihtaryplanners view HETresources as a means of rapidlyand, in some cases, decisivelyshifting the correlation ofarmored forceson future theater battlefields. In recognition ofthis potential, major components of the HET fleet are designated by the Soviets as strategic movement assets. The establishment oftbese strategic heavy litl units constitutes a new Soviet response toa longstanding Russian military imperative. That is, contemporary Soviet planners-like their czarist predecessors= ere compelled to deal with the many complexities of mobilizing, moving and sustain-

ing large force groupings tasked to conduct combat operations at the end of long, tenuous lines of communication (LOGS). while road, rail, inland and coastal waterway, and air transportation means will all be drawn

. . . contemporary Soviet pkmnera like their czaristpredecessora-are compelled to deal with the fiany comptsxities of mobilizing, moving and sustaining targe force groupings tasked to conduct combat operations at the end of long, tenuous lines of communication (LOCS).
upon, land LOCS, asin the past, will bear the greatest burden in Soviet strategic movements today. In the Soviet view, these land LOCS have become more fragile due to the accuracy and destructiveness of modern weapons systems. Meanwhile, the time available to mobilize and deploy large armored and mechanized forces has been greatly reduced by the threat of these same systems.

HET Development
During the course of World War II, the Soviet armed forces shifted from strategic defensive operations to successive and somet]mes simultaneous strategic offensives. This shift increasingly focused the attention of Soviet planners on the employment of strategic transportation resources. Trans. portation management became far more centralized within operational formations and at the national level. A central transportation management body coordinating all movement means was established under Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services (and Red Army Chief of the Rear) General A. V. Khrulev. Designated the Military TransportaServ-


April 19S7


ice (Sluzhba Voyennykh Soobshcheniy(VOS0)), this central transportation management organization was also represented on ermY and fi-ont rear servim staffs. There, it was subordinate to a deputy commander for rear services/ch]ef of the rear at each level? Today, the Soviet military press is tilled with retrospective analyses of World War II

Zrt the Soviet expenence, particular emphasis is placed on the movement and commitment ofstrategic reserves and the regrouping of forces within and between theaters of , military operations. Certainly, the most notable example of[thk] was the strategic concentration of units and matenel in the Soviet Far East prior to the August 1945 Manchuria opemtion.

operations in which success hinged on the effective strategic movement of large armored and mechanized forces. These assessments address Soviet and foreign military experience. They include examples of every form of strategic movement conducted as well as the various ways the whole spectrum of transport means available in the period were employed.8 In the Soviet experience, particular emphasis is placed on the movement and commitment of strategic reserves and the regrouping of forces within and between theaters of military operations. Certainly, the most notable example of Soviet strategic movement in World War 11identified by the Soviets themselves as the wars greatest regrouping of forceswas the strategic concentration of units and materiel in the Soviet Far East prior to the August 1945 Manchuria operation. This effort included the transfer of a tank

and three combined arms armies over dietances that, in some cases, exceeded 12,000 kilometers. Included in the theater High Command of Forces controlling the threefront operation was a rear service body directed by the Red Army deputy chief of rear services. Thisofflcer, his subordinate VOSO representative and other rear service officers planned shipments of incoming materiel, distributed andredeployedthis rmzterie{ wlthm tkeater boundaries, as well as controlled the actiuittis of the fronts rear service staffs. Transportation statistics from the Manchuria operation and from World War II as a whole support the judgment of contemporary Soviet planners. They feel the effective use of all forms of transportation was essential for the support of the vast and sweeping combined arms operations characterizing the Soviet war effort. While motor transport and aviation became increasingly important at the tactical and operational levels and the waterway +when open and in proximity to designated delivery pointstransported large amounts of men and materiel, the railroads stood as the principal Soviet means of long-dietance strategic military movement. The railroads were capable of rapidly moving large combined arms unite, supplies and the heaviest equipment over great distances in the most severe weather conditions. Recognizing its importance, German efforts to interdict Soviet rail lines were extensive. German aircraft attacked Soviet rail facilities to depths of up to 400 kilometers. The Soviets estimated that 44 percent of all German bombs dropped on the SovietGerman front were directsd against rail facilities. In addition, the Germans destroyed the rail system as they retreated and assigned sabotage squads to interdict rail lines in Soviet rear areas. Despite the many difficulties encoun-





Antieircraftguns guard Soviet railroad trestle from marauding German.eircraft, 19$3

tered during World War II, Soviet planners ended the conflict convinced that their approaches to strategic movement had been lergelysuccessfil. During the early postwar yeers, lessons learned were carefully studied. Based on an expectation that future military operationa would resemble those large strategic offensives, by 1947, Soviet transportation planners believed they had actually solved the problem of wartime military transportation. This judgment was short-lived. By the end of the 1950s, the significance of the growing number ofnuclear weapons in military arsenals, and the likely consequences ofnuclesr war, shook the Soviet view ofmilitary requirements in every area. As a restricted Soviet source put it, the appearance of nuclear weapons meant that mlhtar-y transportation had entered a completely new stage-one for which the experience of past wars did not entirely provide answers,,, Enemy nuclear strikes, unlike the deep strikes carried out by enemy aviation in World War II, werejudged capable of decisively affecting the operation of Soviet transportation systems as well as inflicting massive damage to the Soviet homeland. Perceived as a primary target, railroads, in particular, were seen as highly vulnera-

The Soviets estimated that 44 percent ofall German bombs dmpfled on the Soviet-German tint were directed against mil facilities. Enemy nuclear strikes, unlike the deep strikes camed out by enemy aviation in World WarZZ, were judged capable of decisively affecting the operation ofSoviet transportation systems. . . . By the early 1960s, faced with this apocalyptic vision of future theater battlefields, Soviet logistic planners had turned their attention to the development of what they generically term heavy tractor-tmilers . . . as a means ofstrategic movement.

ble to nuclear strikes. Railroad beds could be restored at a maximum rate of only 40 to 50 kilometers a day and rail bridges at a rate of no more than 120 to 150 meters per day. Therefore, it was judged by the early 1960s that, in theaters of [strategic] military action, railways can no longer ensure the delivery of materiel means to the troops. . ..3 Rather, a heavier burden would have to


April 1987


fall on motor transport, and new approaches to moving combat units and their heavy equipment would have to be developed. In addition, the requirement for the rapid strategic movement of combined arms units and all types of supplies would be greater since the need te reinforce and regroup heavily attrited theater fo}ces could be present from the first hours of a nuclear war. 1s By the early 1960s, faced with this apoca1Iyptic vision of future theater battlefields, Soviet logistic planners had turned their attention to the development of what they generically term heavy tractor-trailers (tia.dwlye autopoesda) ae a means of strategic movement. Heavy tractor-trailers, for which comparable Western designations such as HET and tank transporter may also be accurately used, were certainly not new innovations. Between 1943 and 1945, the United States provided the Soviet Union with some 531 45-ton tank transporters under lend-

Iease. At a minimum, these heavy lift assets were used in limited numbers for moves of tanks and self-propelled artillery. Typically, however, when the current employment and ~alue of HETs are di cussed, no historic examples are given. Th1s suggests that HET~while clc.+wly used for tactical movesplayed no significant role in the major troop regrouping and concentrations that have been so carefully analyzed by the Soviets.a In any event, their utility for at least the local movement of tank% and other tracked combat equipment was reflected in the postwar indigenous production of prime movers capable of towing tank-transporter trailers. This became apparent in the mid- 1960s with the appearance of the MAZ537 tractor truck and ChMZAP5247 semi-trailer and their subsequent variants.m The significance of these heavy tractor-trailer rigs for strategic movement was made explicit in a Soviet book. This 1966 publication, The


ARrIl 1987


Long-Diskwwe Move ofSmall Units, pointed out what the two Smiet authors saw as a pressing requirement of modern w= Under modern conditions, the significance of long-distance rnouementa of small units haa grown imrnsasumbly. This is explained by ths fwt that wio% employment of nadsar weapons in the ue~ beginning of a war can result in great losses of foxes. It is possible that the combat effectiveness of many small units and organizations may be considerably lowered or even lost in ths first days of war. Therefore, timely mauerrwnt of motnrizedrifle and tank small units from the interior of tke country acquires important significance for reinforcing advance operatiwfowes. lti movement of small units ~ill be carrisd out over very great distances? The authors aleo described the spectrum of enemy nuclear and conventional combat means threatening the effective movement of small maneuver unite and addressed how various transportation modes could operate in such an environment. Included was a substantial discussion of the long-distance movement of tank unita by heavy tractortrailerrige explicitly identified as MAZ537s and ChMZAP524 ?S. The strategic movement potential represented by the Soviet Unions growing fleet of HETs was strikingly illuetratsd in summer 196S when military forces of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia. Accompanying the invasion force were several hundred Soviet tanks and other tracked combat equipment towed on C/ukfZAP semitrailers by MAZ537 truck tractors. By rapidly moving armored vehicles from the Soviet Union, these heavy lift resources were judgd by one US government study to have >layed a key role in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia end to be instrumental in a change in Soviet doctrine that previouaIy relied primarily on railroads to transport armored vehicles.n While the 1968 movement may have been deemed an operational necessity by Soviet invasion planners, the mass use of these vehicles also cone$ituted a tsst of heavy lift unite in a strategic movement role. The soviets were seemingly satisfied with the perforrasnceoftheir heavy lift units and

Soviet ana@@s haue noted that prsczkion-gui&d munitions (PGMs) have been equated with %wyield nuclear weapons, and they believe that mi.%?ury transportation and logistic resources will be primary PGM ta~ets.. . . The capabilities and employment options for heavy track tractor units then become all the more important.

the correctness of the decisions that led to their creation. This was reflected in the continued growth of heavy truck tractor inventories and indoctrinel assessments of their utility on increased lethal theater battlefields, By the early 1960s, the Sovieta saw nuclear weapons as creating new requirements for the operation of military transportation systems. Likewise, the ongoing introduction of conventional deep-strike syeteme with precision gaidance hea been cbsractsrized as constituting anew stage in weap 00s technology with grave consequenaw for transpetition eyetem operation. Soviet analysts have noted that precisiongnided munitions (PGMs) have been equated with low-yield nuclear weapons, and they believe that military transportation and logistic resources wilI be primary PGM targeta.x Thus, the threat to transportation resource=ven in the course of conventional operatioms+is judged extensive. The capabilities and employment options for heavy truck tractor unite then become all the more important.



Capabilities and Employment

Today, the Soviet heavy truck tractor fleet designated for strategic movement mmprises some 3,500 MAZ537S with ChMZAR5247 trailers organized into heavy lift regiments.z These regiments constitute Reserves of the Supreme High Command (Rezervy Verkkounogo Glauno konsandovanila 02 VGK))assets employed under the direct supervision of the Supreme High Command ( VGK) or al located to field commands at the VGKS discretion. Operating under the system that preyed so effective in World War II, the employment of these regiments would be planned by the armed forces chief of the rears VOSO organization.zs Strategic heavy lift regiments may well be allocated by the Supreme High Com-

mand to the ZVD High Commends established in 1985.a As noted, VOSO representatives were included in the High Command of Forces in the Far East which directed the 1945 Manchuria operation, and their presence in current TVD High Commands seems likely as well. Strategic heavy lift units will be employed to support a broad spectrum of strategic land movement-from the concentration of forces in the prewar and initial period of war phases, to the strategic regrouping or maneuvering of combined arms forces throughout a conflict.w Heavy lift regiments have the potential of supporting all five continental TVDS around the Soviet periphe~. For purposes of illustrating one employment option that is heavily weighted for the Soviets most important theater, it is as-

Heavy lift regiments could at-so be ased to rapidly concentrate supplies of all tgpes, a role suggested by the exktence of low-boy trailers configured for the transport of tracked armored vehicles and bulk cargo. . . . It is worth noting that the US Army in World War H made use of 45-ton tank transporters to move large quantities of supplies after the Normandy landings.


April 1987


sumed that about two-thirds of the strategic heavy liftassets-some 2,300 heavy tractortrailer%have heen allocated to support the High Command of the Western TVD. These assets would he adequate to simultaneously move all tracked vehicles of either 10 tank regiments, 10 BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments or perhaps two to three tank or motorized rifle divisions.zg Traveling 12 of every 24 hours at a speed of 25 to 30 kilometers per hour (which is a Soviet planning norm for road marches), such a move could be conducted over a distance of 1,000 kilometers-from staging areas within the Soviet Unions western military districts to assembly areaa in central East Germany, for examplein about 72 hours. With reserve drivers and adequate logistic support, this time could probably be cut in half. Ahout 1,500 heavy tractor-trailer rigeless than one-half of the force-would be required to move one of the new corps-type organizations now being established in the Soviet armed forces.8 The new formations, nearly twice the size of a standard Soviet tank division, are judged particularly suitable for serving as operational maneuver groups. The rapid delivery of such a corps to the forward area with rested crews and combat-ready vehicles would be essential for its effective employment as a deep maneuver force. Heavy lift regiments could also be used to rapidly concentrate supplies of all types, a role suggested by the existence of low-boy trailers configured for the transport of tracked armored vehicles and bulk cargo (for example, the ChMZAP9990). It is worth noting that the US Army in World War II made use of 45-ton tank transporters to move large quantities of supplies after the Normandy landlngs. The Soviets, however, may see one oftheir most effective heavy lift employment options as centered on the rapid reinforcement

Strategic heavy liff unit% will be employed to support a braad spectrum of strategic land movement from the concentration of forces in the prewar and initial period of war phases, to the strategic regrouping or maneuvering of combined arms forces throughout a conflict. Heavy Iifi regiments have the potential of supporting all five continental TVDa around the Soviet periphery.

of theater forces by battal]on increment, a view stated explicitly some 20 years ago. Smaller battalion-size columns moving on d]spersed routes would be less vulnerable to discovery and attack by Special Operations Forces, PGMs, nuclear weapons or other strike means than a larger movement, while tbe associated organizational and support measures would be far less. Maneuver battalions would be used to reconstitute or reinforce attrlted divisions m, less likely, used as the basis of forming new divisions in forward theater areas. Under the small-unit reinforcement op-


. Apr!l 1987


tion, more then 50 tank or motorized rifle battalions could be moved 1,000 kilometers in 72 hours or less by about two-thirds of the strategic heavy lift force. Under some assumptions, this move could intluence the battlefield correlation of forces se decisively as the introduction of several new divisions.~ Overall, in establishing heavy lift regimenik, the Soviets have created a meane of rapid, Iong-dietance movement they believe will meet the demanding transportation requirement of titure theater battlefields. While heavy tractor-trailers are by no means seen as replacing railroads

(or any other movement mode), Soviet phmners have added a degree of flexibility to their military transportation system that is truly of strategic significance. As a consequence oftheir potential contribution to Swiet battlefield strength, the capabilities of these heavy lift regiments should be integral to all US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation assessments of Soviet theater movement and reinforcement capabilities. In addition, we need to be I certain that the threats to this impressive reinforcement means set out by Soviet plenners will be, should the need arise, more than just Soviet perceptions. %

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APril 1987



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Lxutennnt Colonel Kenneth M, Keltnm m an znsmuctor uxth the Dwectorate of.%stoumwnt and Resourcmg Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He receuxd a BA Pom ttw Uruuersttyof Texas and an MA. from tti Unmers@ OfSouthern Calzforruaand t-zagraduati of the uSACGSC. He preumusly sewed w the chwl Somet Stmte@r Mobdtty U?ut,Defense Intdhgence Agency, Wa.shmgtcm,D C.

+ ,* a

Grahwn H Turbtudle Jr, s a swum analyst u.lth the Sou@ Army Sttidus Offie, US Army Cornbzned Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansm. He recemedaBA. from Southsrnlllmais Unt cerstty, an MA fmm GeorgeWashington Unzuersoy and a PhD. fmm the Unwwrs@ of Montana. Preumusly, he served as the chzsfoftheSovutlWar. saw Pact Forre Structure and Opemtums Sectzon,Defense lntdrgence Agency, Wa.shmgton, DC.


APrli 1987





AirLand Battle doctrine defines the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and discusses the four basic tenets of initiative, agility, depth and sgnch ionization. The use or disregard of these concepts has provided many historical and contemporary examples of success and failure on the battlefield. These articles provide disparate perspectives on the art and science of war, to include gaining the initiative at the tactical and operational levets, comparing the practice of operational ad and operating where all levet.s and all tenets were intermingled with various degrees of success.

) w

Stephen E. Runals, US Army

ATIONAL styles of war area combination of Dolitlcal and social values. economw strength, geographical position and previous national militacy experience. These elements combine to develop a unique operating style of war which reflects the national military perception of the nature of war and determines its tactical and operational concepts and doctrine. While differences exist in national styles of war at strategic and tactical levels, fundamental differences in perceptions of the nature of war and operational concepts become most noticeable through an armye use of the operational art. The differences m doctrine and field practice of the World War II German and US Armies provide one such contrast in methods and approach in the application of the operational art. While each of the armies viewed the destruction of the enemys armed forces as the primary objective of the war, each adopted a fundamentally differ-

ent approach to achieve the same result.

Operational Art

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, defines operational art as: . the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals m a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, orga ntzatzon, and conduct ofcampaigns and major operations. Essentially, a commander exercises operational art by linking his tactical forces movements and engagements to the goals and objectives established by strategic planners through the planning and sequencing of individual tactical actions, therehy achieving his assigned strategic objectives. Central to differences in C&man and US World War II styles of operational art was each armys use of maneuver. Operational commanders can use maneuver to selectively position their forces

Aprd 19e7


XIV Caps commander and stzff, July 1865. The carps was one of seven that o eratsd under General Willism T. Shermsn during the RUsma Campaign and March to the S.m

againat those enemy objectives which offer the bast chance of att.einirrgassigned strategic objectives, or they may use maneuver to position force agsinst force. The tirst methoduses operational maneuver to gain a positional advantage over the enemy both befora battle and, equafly importantly, after the battle to exploit tactical success achieved against enemy vulnerability. The latter method uses operational Imaneuver to place friendly strength against that of the enemy in an attempt te achieve decieive success at the point of contact through simple attrition.

The German Experience

World War II German operational art was based on long experience in the use of maneuver as a decisive element in the successful employment of large forces in major battles and campaigns. Because of its central position in Europe, Gwrnany had faced the continual threat and reality of a multiplefmnt war. As a result of its geographical position and a lack of superiority in manpower and economic strength, the German srmy early developed an operational concept of war which emphasized tbe envelopment and isolation of enemy forces through maneuver. This enabled its numerically inferior forces to conserve limited manpower and decisively defeat its numerically superior enemies. The German concept of operational success through maneuver began with Frederick the Greats introduction of the oblique approach. BY 1940, the concept had been refined under the genius of successive German military leaders such as Hebnuth von Moltke, Alfred von ScMieffen, Hrma von Sesckt and Heinz Guderren to produce the welldeveloped concept of the KcsseZscMnr/st, or battle of encirclement end annihilation. To complement the use of maneuver to deliberately avoid the costly results of attri-

In contrast to the German army, the US Army of World WarZZ entered the war with little experience in theplanning, maneuver and employment of large forces within the tlamework of major battles and campmgns. Despite its involvement in World WarI, US experience with operationalmrt had been primarily confined to the Amen-can Civil War.

tion warfare, the German army developed equally welLthougbt-out supporting concepts. The principles of Schwerpunkt, concentration of effort to achieve local superiority; Aufrollen, to expand the point of penetration; and Auffragstaktik, missionoriented command and control, emphasizing subordhmte initiative within the constraints of the senior commanders mission and intent, supported the concept of the Kes selschlacht and formed the baem of German World War II operational art. Equally important, German World War I experience had convinced the German army that maneuver, so critical to its tactical, operational and strategic success, was possible only through the effective integration of combined arms and the decentralization of


. APril 1967


operational controI, or Eirslseitsprirzzip. The importance of combined arms operations was reinforced in the German armye prewar doctrine, organizational etructure and unit training.z Early experience gained during campaigns in Poland in 1939 end France in 1940 served to further refine German operational concepts and provided the German army with the training necessary to ensure these concepts were fully understood and applied tlom the squad leader to the army gToup commander. The degree to which these fundamental elements characterized wartime fieId operations can be seen from even the most cursery examination of Erwin Romrnels operations in North Africa, 1941-43; Erich von Mansteins operations in the Crimea and later in the southern USSR while in command of the German Southern Army Group, 1941-43; and, as late as December 1944, in Karl von Rundetedts plan of operation for the German offensive into the Ardennes. These operations, each tailored to the specifics of METT-T (mmsion, enemy, terrain, troops and time available), reflect a high degree of consistency in the execution of German doctrine and the importance the maneuver of large units played in German wartime operational art.

me American Experience
In contrast to the German army, the US Army of World War H entered the war with little experience in the planning, maneuver and employment of large forces within the framework of major battles and campaigns. Despite its involvement in World War L US experience with operational art had been pnmar~iy confined to the Amerman Cxvd War. The pre-World War II US Army generally accepted that the final Union victory had been the result of Ulysses S. Grants ability to use his superior power over a broad front, forcing a numerically inferior

enemy to defend everywhere.4 Grant and his immediate predecessors had consistently attempted to use manbuver to defeat Robert E. Lee and had consistently failed. Final victory had been accomplished through the effects of attrition from superior power applied on a broad front versus maneuver and concentration of effort. The United States limited experience in World War I continued to reinforce this approach to wafilghting. The American Expeditionary Forces deployed to France late in the war and were operationally employed under the direction of the French. As a result, the US Army gained little experience in the operational planning and employment necessmy to success. fully maneuver and tight large forces in the major battles and campaigns which would characterize WorId War II operations. Consistent with attrition warfare, US divisions deploying to France during World War I were purposely designed to absorb the heavy losses resultingfiom expensive broad frontal attacks which formed the basis for Allied tactical and operational thinking throughout the war. US interwar thinking-and doctrine continued to reflect Civil War and World War I experiences. Thus, on the eve of the United States entry into World War II, the US concept of war was based on the idea that largescale forces should confront the enemys main strength along abroad front and overwhelm him through superior massed firepower. In contqast to the German style, with its reliance on the maneuver of concentrated large units as the cornerstone of its operational art, US operational art emphasized maneuver to bring its forces into contact with the enemy, foIiowed by the use of massed firepower to ensure the enemys defeat through attrition. This approa~h also affected US tactical unit organization. Designed for rapid movement to close with the enemy and exploit tactical success,


April 1987.


The potential benefits fiwm the annihilation of German forces in the Falaise-Argentan pocket in early August 1944, folbwed by the deep envelopment and encirclement offered along the Seine in late August and again in the Ardennes in late December, all failed to meet US expectations. Each pocket faited to close before significant numbers of German personnel and equipment had escaped to the east.

US tactical unit organizatioir failed to emphasize combined &ms operations as the primary means to generate superior combat power. Throughout the war, US infantry and armor di;isions would require the cross attachment of at least battalion-sized units ta achieve an effective combined arms capability. US employment of these task-organized units would be plagued by a lack of trauring and experience in the employment of combined arms and a continuing reliance on tirepower versus combat power as the primary means to achieve the destruction of the enemys forces. Thk stood in marked contrast to the Oerman army which placed great emphasis, m training and field practice, on the use of combined arms operations. As a result, even by the winter of 1944, the most hastily formed and fielded C&man units generally retained tbe skills to deal harshly with even the best American units entering combat for the first time. Despite attempta by individual cotrmxandera to use maneuver ta avoid enemy strength and strike at vulnerability, the US Army consistently executed its prewar doctrine and operational concept of operations throughout World War II. The US Armys execution of operations during the landings and subsequent advance across France in 1944 can be generally characterized by divisions, corps and armies advancing over a broad front to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Once contact was established, instead of using tirepower to fix the enemy and maneuver to envelop and destroy him, US units generally attempted ta use the massed fires from aerial and artillery firepower to destroy him through attrition. Isolated cases of the use of concentrated forces advancing on narrow fronts and long sweeping advances by divisions and corps can be found following the breakout from the ocage country of-Normandy in early Au t 1944. However, upon closer examinati k n the decisive effects of annihilation available from an effective understanding and use of large forces in the envelopment were never fully achieved. The potential benefits from the armihila-


April 1987


tion of German forces in the Falaise-&gentart pecket in early August 1944, followed by the deep envelopment and encirclement offered along the Seine in late August and again in the Ardennes in late December, all failed to meet US expectations. Each pocket failed to close before significant numbers of German personnel and equipment had escaped to the east. In each case, an opportunity perceived and planned by a senior headquarters or offered for exploitation by the daaive actiou of subordinate ~o~ ers such as John Wood, commander, 4th Armored Division; J. Lawton Collins, commander, VII Corps; and George S. Patton were lost. This was due @ a hesitancy by unit commanders at every level to fully deviate from an operational style of war which emphasized broad-front advances and destruction through tirepower. Today, the US Army is actively attempting to change an operational style of war

baaed on the heritage of ite military experience through World War IL AirLand Battle doctrine rejects attempts to achieve operational victory through a deliberate attrition of enemy forces. Instead, it attempts @build on the German concepts of maneuver warfare to keep the enemy off balance and a concentration of effort to strike at enemy vulnerability. The US military experience t~oughout World War II should serve as a clear Warnl ing that changes in concepts and styles of operational art are not easily accomplished. To be effective, these changes to doctrine and styles of operational art must beunderstood and fhlly integrated into operations at all levels of commend. Effective change will require painful and extensive education and training, continual emphasis and, most importantly, time @ fully reedify a national style of war built upon a heritage of military experience reaching back to the Civil War.

NOTES w?w,DC,5M .y1986,Pi0



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Germanard us%.mat..awi Gctc&?r 1555 D 23 HG91m.

-@ XmS#m~ti, mea~MIWt, th. Gemamy, tierme d!. rwwm.1 ffi c!miof the Genera Slafl, Hans vcn _ lwgan &aInlrm m SWU31 ccm.mwae. m me enmkwmam. ! tawe fmmawns ard,. WUP%3 me .PJWY of emq,m rkcm.e #+ueh mtqrated tank, mdu ati aImlane dwel. cwwnE. Thus. by 1=. thaGem @.nnyInIonb hed .s4..6 c!eanneand CS.3mbma SM8 of .. WWSl Smphaszed S+!e6d h-.smdu,l otmtr.n, cm canlrmm of .Rw ag.ns+ enemy vulmamhliy mm. w114w.WW mm. tired am cscatxliv, oaomg a merm.moc genera!,% mmm power calmer man an0vM0rmwarmfir6ww bMa!sOan olFcer~tn3nrn I. ds .s9 3 C.S@JWr WWSC8 P Franz, Cw.ral&@ Cwtcat.u M,JIIW Renew. .lk 1%4, w %*5 4 R.5ml F Wwgrey, Bsenhower.s tieumnams The C9mPaf9. of frame and SemmnY, 1944.7965, lmdme Unrwmiy P-, S!commgmn M V2S1,p6 5 fwa, D7

tam< ccm@aL9nI Cc.3mtw 0. exiew l(nes mm by a cccmmetti off.nsvn 0 au 17mllsprwe! MS ermlrj IKall UsJnghis mlermr ltnu3mgem, Wp311army ononemLmma.mtitie.qti.nm, 7 FM1m5,, oP ti, zO/w9w11W2P26 CQmhalFOWWm a. fined as m+ ef16cbve ccmb.uta.1 maneuver, fnwmfmr, pfotti.. and !eadwsmu t. mbai aciwrs egamut an ec+my t. w SW61W emmat POW Vmti ershp 8 mm, 9 10 71 IS 9m4~W m.wh m-s C=OKI@#S mmtil mmhmtkm of W mda. E16mems of -1 EOnw. me,, fir6mW6+, Wolec+!nn and lead. t.asc+m6#wwhti st$e. wt.mlorcafulbexecaiw Mm Van Cmve!d, F@hbn@owr German end U S ,4wIyPe~nn. 1W9.W45, Gmerwccd Press, WesC.3#, Cm 1992. w 1S3.S9 Weqw, w af, P555 !tia, pim W0,P245 1

MqorStephen E Runals w tbt chufi G3.Plans, 10lstAubwneDuimm(AtrAss ault),FortCampbell, Kentucky. He mewed a BA. fivm Nomzch Unmeiwty and z.sagmduate of tbeCOmmandand Geneml Staff 0i7irers Course cmd the School of Advanced MthtcvY Studus, USACGSC. He has served as the 34 and company comnumder, 1st %attdwiz, 75th lnfanhy <Ranger),Fort St#mm-l, Georsia, andmttiS3a&bw&epmtwmo ficm, 193dInfantzyBngadz, Fort Clnytan. Pamma


APril 1987


Major John Moncure, US Army

N APRIL 1940, the German army dazzled a world still shocked by the swift destruction of Poland by striking across the North Sea to Norway. The northern prong of that invasion sent a light infantry force into the port of Narvik to pre-empt Br]tish seizure of the iron ore conduit from Sweden. The 4,000 German troops suffered from harsh weather, intermittent resupply and adverse odds in a hostile country. Their commander was obliged to address operational and strategic considerations even as he fought the tactical battle. And yet, the operation, Weserubung, succeeded beyond the expectations of planners in Berlin. During the planning for the conquest of Norway, strategic imperatives were predominant over operational and tactical considerations. Narvik lies 2,000 kilometers north of Germany. It is inside the Arctic Circle, an isolated port of little political and no symbolic significance, with narrow, hazardous roads and rugged terrain features tor-

tured by the harsh arctic weather.! The L@uxsjfecould not fly that far, and the Royal Navy menaced the sea routes. But the port was vital; nine-tenths of Swedens iron ore bound for Germany passed through Narvik. In December 1939, Adolf Hitler directed tbe Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmarht (OKW)) to plan an occupation of Norway. Admiral Erich Raeder, who originally suggested the operation, wanted Norwegian ports from which to tighten the blockade of England. Hitler chose Narvik as an objective-in fact, the real key point of the entire [Norwegian] op. , erationin spite of its remoteness, the terrain and tactical insignificance, because it was the primary ore transshipping routes Thus, the OKW planned to project power to (and perhaps beyond) the limits of the armed forces. Because the operational concept was so risky, the OKW planned in complete secrecy


ADri 19S7


Hitler chose Narvik as an objective-in fwt, the real key paint of the entire [Norwegian] operation-in spite of its remoteness, the temn and tactical insignificance, because it was thepnmary ore transshipping route.

and created, as a consequence, a degree of uncertainty. Because General Nlkolaus von Falkeuhorst had visited Finland briefly in 1918, Hitler appointed him to command the ground component, the XXI Arrneekorps. In February 1940, he was summoned to Berlin and told of tbe operation. He was not made privy to previous staff planning but was given 4 hours to present Hitler with an operational concept. His division commanders were not alerted until 20 March.G The tactical plan wee complicated by traditional interservice rivalries, intensified, in tbe case of Germany, by the Byzantine organization and personalities of the Nar.I regime. ARuy, navy and a@orces involved in the operation were not $ed to a single commander but were directed by their individual services. Von Falkenhorst planned to send his only available seasoned and trained troops, the 3. Gebirgsjdger (Mountain Infantry) Division, to the north flank, one regiment each t-a Trondheim and Naryik.8 He realized he had insufficient troops to accomplish his task if the Norwegian array resisted. But he was unable te allocate more tQthe operation because of insufficient aealitl and thcademands of the upcoming invasion of France and because he had to seize more southerly porte as well. Because the German navy needed the element of surprise to cross the North Sea, the OKW deployed ite forces in phases, according to the vulnerability of the transporta-

tion and the distance to the port. Merchantmen loaded with war materiel and fuel called at Norwegian ports the day before.g Deatmyere served as troop transports because the Gerrnaus had no craft dedicated to that purpose and because only destroyers moved fast enough through the Bntieh-controlled waters to reach Narvik. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, two powerful battle cruisers, were sent to the North Atlantic to divert British attention long enough for the fast destroyers ~ discharge their troops. The 10 destroyers and the battle cruisers with the 2,000 troops bound for Narvik, and those goingta Trondheim, departed Wesermiinde shortly before midnight on 6 April.10 The remaining groups left Oerrnsn ports the following day. The 3. Gebirgsjdger Division commander, Brigadier General Eduard Dietl, chose to accompany the 139th Regiment to Narvik, undoubtedly because it was tasked tn seise the centerpiece of the operation. He brought mountain artillery and took a coast artillery detachment to man the Norwegian guns pinpointed by German intelligence reports. The voyage through the stormy North Sea was traumatic to the Austrians of the mountain infantry. A motorcycle, grenade launchers and all of the artillery and ammunition were swept overboard and lost. AJ@er (light infantryman) had to be fished from the North Sea in midpaesage. One of the destroyers dropped out of the convoy because of a compass malfunction and shortage of fuel. But the British never attacked. Atler the miserable and dangerous journey north, the actual attack on Narvik seemed almost anticlimactic. The German force reached the entrance to the Vest Fiord Ieadingto Narvik at 03000n 9ApriLWhen two old coastal defense ships refused to al. low the Germane to >rotect Norway from the British, the naval commander, after consultation with Dietl, destroyed them with a torpedo attack.


ALInl 19S7


The Germans (and the British, too, for that matter) believed that the Norwegians occupied fortifications guarding the entrance to the Ofot Fiord at the Narrows of Ramnes and dispatched three destroyers with 600 troops to locate and neutralize them. while this intelligence proved faulty, the landings of I and III Battalions, 139th Regiment, to secure regimental stores at Elvegaard reaped an important harvest of desperately needed equipment. The remainder of the invasion force moved directly to the wharf at Narvik. There, Dietl arranged a truce with the Norwegian commander, Colonel Konrad SundIo. Sundlo, often accused of being a Nazi s~pathizer, actually served Dietl notice that he would resist. But, hy that time, the Germans had compromised the local defenees, and Sundlo was persuaded to avoid bloodshed. Dietl was able to report, Narvik is firmly in German hands (Naroik fest in deutscher HandV, with no casualties to the mountain troops. The swift British naval action after the landing at Narvik contrasted with their response to the Germans movement to Norway and accentuated the logistical difficulties Dietl anticipated. British naval Captain Warburton-Lee led five ships to capture or destroy the single ship believed to be m Narvik as an interim measure to sending combat troops.zo His German opponent, Commodore Fritz Bonte,, suspected nothing and knew U-boate in tbe Vest Fiord would warn him. Still, he posted a destroyer in the Ofot Fiord and anchored his ships in three separate fiords as insurance. The captain of the U51 mienrterpreted his sighting of the British flotilla so that, when Warburton-Lee descended the next morning upon the sleeping Germans at Narvik, they suffered complete surprise. Two German warships were destroyed before a German shot was fired. In the first few minutes, three others were severely damaged. But

the German destroyers from aside fiord surprised the British, in turn, and sank three before they could escape. As the British exited the fiord, they sighted six merchantmen, one with most of the ammunition for the expedition, and sent them to the bottom. Three days later, on 13 April, a task force built around the battleship HMS Warspite finished the task Warburton-Lee had begun, destroying the remaining German ships and chasing the Germans m the town to the hills for a few desperate hours. Had troops been available to land, Narvik would surely hsve returned to Allied hands But Dietl bad accomplished his task of taking Narvik. Now, he had only to keep it. The Allies had no intentions of letting him do so. They had destroyed the naval forces that brought lum and blockaded the port. The 6th Norwegian Division opposed him on ground it knew, and the British and French pronused reinforcements. Three merchantmen that should have been waiting in Narvik with the bulk of the German


APnt 1987


supplies, including artillery and antiaircraft guns, never arrived.= The Norwegians had obstructed the only nearby aitileld at Bardufoss, making the logistical situation Critical.x On 14 April, the Allies began to arrive. First came 350 men of the ski-trained Scots Guards, followed, on the two succeeding

For transportation, Dietl commandeered all r!ocrd vehicles. He set his headquarters, logistical and medical facilities in the towns public buildings and hotefs. He began fwd mtioning immediately forsoldiera and townspeople alike. To control the total popukztion, he ordered the mayor and the chief ofpolice to continue in their civic duties [and] approved a properly censored newspaper.

days, by the 1st Irish Guards, the rest of the 1st Scots Guards, a brigade headquarters, an antiaircraft battery (less its guns) and the 2d South Wales Borderers.2 Dietl had no artillery and, of his 4,700-strong force, only 2,000 were rellable mountain troops, the others being rescued sailors. Success in his strategic objective left him in a dangerously vulnerable tactical position. Dietl had to control the town and the ter. rain overlooking it until stronger German forces in the south could relieve him. He took a number of measures to increase his chances of survival. He sent divers to extract all undamaged supplies and foodstuffs from the sunken German ships. For artillery, he dismantled the guns aboard the destroyers. He also salvaged naval radios.~ For transportation, Dietl commandeered all local vehicles. He set his headquarters, logistical and medical facilities in the towns public buildings and hotels. He began fd

rationing immediately for soldiers and townspeople alike. To control the~ocal population, he ordered the mayor and the chief of police to continue in their civic duties and to ensure the townspeople continued with their daily lives, insofar as military operations permitted. He approved a properly censored newspaper,z Dietl assigned tasks to his troops iccording to their abilities and began aggressive operations with his Austrians. He placed sailors, now dubbed Gebirgsrnarine (mountain sailors)z as perimeter and railroad guards and set them to patrolling areas believed to be free of hostile forces. He assigned naval technicians and machinists to repair the vintage 1871 steam locomotive, christened the Narvik Express, that would carry ore (and supplies to the Jdgers).n He directed the 139th to seize the mountaintops surrounding Narvik, patrolling far forward of his defensive positions in accordance with German mountain doctrine.= On 16 April, the I Battalion, 139th Regiment, under Major Schleebruegge, took the Spionkop from a Norwegian battalion. They captured 51 men, 12 machlneguns and 150 pair of skis, and secured the eastern end of the railroad.$o He attended to all details and used all of his assets aggressive] y. Corps beadquarters and the OKW in Berlin were virtually powerless to assist Dietl. As early as 15 April, General Alfred Jodl, chief of the OKW staff, urged that German forces evacuate the town. He almost convinced Hitler to order DietIs withdrawal, but Hitler, at the last minute, changed his mind and directed Dietl to remain as long as possible. German airlift assets consisted of Ju-90 and FW200 transports and the smaller Ju 52 that required auxiliary fuel tanks to make the round trip, thus reducing carrying capacity. In any case, German aircraft could not lift heavy equipment or supplies. On 17 April, a flight of 10 Ju-52 transport aircraft


April 1987.


(without the extra fuel tanks) brought in a battery of two 75mm mountain guns and ammunition on the ice-covered Hartvig Lake, but the lake began tothawbefore they could take off. Thereafter, air resupply wee limited to parachute.= The Luftwaffes chief of air transport considered the airlift effort es a lest, desperate measure.On 24 April, the Allies opened offensive operations. They began by shelIing Narvik from the HMS Wars@e, three cruisers and a destroyer, sinking a pier and destroying pert of the stores at Elvegaard.w The attack came from both north and south of the tiwn. The Norwegian division, supported by the Scota Guards, began frontal assaults southwardduringaheavy snowstorm against 150 German troops on the high ground cd Lapphaug and another company at Gratangen. By 1900, the Norwegians had failed in their attack against Lapphaug but had captured Gratangen. The Germans were able te retake the town hut at such a cost that they evacuated both positions within two days. The AIIies, reinforced by the newly arrived C%z.sseurs Alpins, now had four brigades and en artillery force of 24 guns. But the terrain favored the defense. The Allies pressed the badly outnumbered Germans slowly, advancing only 5 miles in 10 days. The British lended west of H&ik and approached Ankenes so they could shell Narvik directly. As arduous as the Allies found their task, the Germans sutYered far worse. Attrition, weather end logistical difficulties took their toll. Nonbattle casualty rates were higher than the combat losses so that, by May, the battalions were at company strength. The rains mixed with snow began. The men were never dry, end the sharp winds increased their discomfort.m Dietl shitled his forces inside his ever-shrinkhg perimeter until, by 10 May, he had one mountain end one naval battalion to defend Narvik, the railway and Ankenes and two other battalions defending in the north. His supplies from ves-

sels in the harbor exhausted, Dietl relied on the railway which was often under tire. Intermittent parachute drops brought scant relief. Food rations were reduced again k melted snow and five slices ofhread per day. During the entire siege, the troops had only three hot meals. DietIs reinforcements, chiefly arriving by parachute, numbered only 700.0 The town end its garrison were under intermittent tire from the British naval vessels powerful guns. German forces were winning farther south, but the mountainous terrain between them and Dietl was too great to provide him assistance.., Although the Allies needed SW@d weeks to negotiate the difficult terrain and overcome the tenacious defenses of DietIs men, the end was clearly insight. Major General Dietl (promoted 17 April) understood the importance of being at the front. His rules of leadership were simple Live with the soldier! Wish to have nothing but what he has, and Be herd, ifnecessery, demand the utmost, but first do the utmost yourself. He visited each position personally, often traveling by skis to assess the materiel condition and morale of his men. He knew many of his troops had no ground




cloths, thst they could not dig into the rocky hillsides and that the hoots ofhis paratrooper reinforcements, and even those of his mountaineers, were worn out.n On one occasion, he was visiting the wounded at Bj@mtjell by railroad handcar when he was ambushed and nearly killed by. British fighters~ Numerous vignettes indi-

Intermittent parachute drops brought scant relief Food rations were reduced again to melted snow and Eve slices of breadper sky. During the entire siege, the troops had only three hot meals. Dietls reinforcements, chiefly arriving by parachute, numbered only 700.

cate that Dietl was an unpretentious, direct man with a well-developed Bavarian sense of humor to match his strong dialect} While he was unable to solve many of these problems, his attention to the soldier and his problems contributed materially to his Jagers morale and WII1to resist. The attack to retake Narvik combined Allied an-, land, amphibious and naval operations of overwhelming strength. On the night of 12-13 May, the Allied offensive began. On the northern flank, the Norwegians took the heights of ~he Kuberg plateau, driving back a battalion of Germans. The Royal Navy furniehed artillery support, while two battalions of French Fereign Legionnaires with five light tanks landed at BJerkvik on the 27th. The last stores m the town were destroyed by artillery.s As the low clouds cleared at about 0200, aircraft from the HMS Ark Royal began to provide tactical air support as weil as strike missions against the railway. The tanks, unhampered by enemy antitank weapons, artillery or aircraft, made their relative

power felt. They silenced German machinem pOsitions and assisted the legionnaires in clearing Elvegaard house by house.47 That morning, the Allies took @jord. In the south, a combined British and French force pushed toward Ankenes. At midnight on the 27th, the Foreign Legion and a Norwegian battalion assaulted just east of Narvik from across the Rombaken Fiord. On 29 May 1940, after determined German ground and air counterattacks, the Allies entered the town. Dietl had ordered his troops to evacuate Nsrvik and withdraw toward the S,wedish border. Half of the troops moved toward BodW the others retreated up the railroad line toward the Swedish border. On 18 April, Dietl had been instructed to hold as long as possible while relief efforts could be readied. This order was amplified by the XXI Corps on 8 May to allow him to fight through to the south with his trained troops and cross ta Sweden with the others.~ His men were exhausted, and supplies end ammunition were low. But Dietl moved aa slowly as possible, hoping that a relief effort or mmtake by hls opponents would enable him to hold the rail line. The Germans were fighting a retreat in the high alpine country near the Swedish border. Since 25 May, four Swedish trains had been awaiting the remnant of the force at the border. The campaign seemed over. It was, but not in the wsy Dietl and his worried superiors in Berlin expected. The British had decided to evacuate their nearvictorious forces on 24 May because ofpressure on the newly opened front in France. A final attack to push the Germans into Sweden, set for 8 June, was abandoned.m The 15,000 British, French and Polish trwps sent to aid the Norwegians at Narvik let% even more sudderd y than they had Dietl, high in the mountains, was both aetounded and elated. Hitler called the success of Nsrvik not




only bold, but one of the sauciest undertakings in the history of modem warfare.* A more hostile observer attributed the German success to Boldness, speed and ruthlessness . . . in the face of Norwegian hesitancy and ill-conceived British naval strategy.m In both a strategic and tactical sense, they were right. Hitler protected his important iron ore source until his opponent was no longer able to threaten it. Dietl compensated for what US planners call a lack of hostiIe entry capabi~ity with sheer audacity. However, the glitter of the victory must not blind one to the reality of a near-run thing. The long arm of Hitlersfragile navy reached to its limit, and the light infantry fist struck an unwary and ill-prepared target. Hitl*r *w3 sure, at mm time, that the vmrture was a fzilure When the Jagws fought four Norwegian battalions who were mentally unprepared for war, they had impressive success. But, when the Allies massed their naval artillery and manpower resources, the intensity of the confhct became too great for the Germans. The arrival of a handful of tanks turned the tide at Bjerkvik. The Germans should not have won. Generalship may have been the factor that tipped the scales. Dietl was a capable otllcer who made optimum use of the assets he had and the adventages he found. He understood the importance of coordination, first with the navy and then the Luftwafie, and control of a hostile civil population. He kept the operational objective in mind as he executed tactical plans. But, if the Norwegian garrison had fought until reinforcements had arrived or if the British had been quicker to reactor more determined to win, the result would have been far different. The circumstances in which Dietl, a mere division commander, found himself were a direct result of the national-level strategy tn secure the railroad from Sweden to the

Genemtship may have been the frrclor f%?g $Zppezi <&eeeaies. Bietl rotia a capable or%=er UM%O mad-e optimum use of the assets he had and the advantages he found. . . . no force other than his cauld have even attempted to take Narvik. A force with a better chance, a force with survivability built in, would have been toe cumbersome for, the weak assets of the {Germans] to transport and support.

coast. His tactical considerations were dommated by that strategic objective. Had Dietl been Iess resourceful or determmed, he could have failed instead of the Allies. But, at the same time, no force other than his could have even attempted to take Narvik. A force with a better chance, a force with survivability built in, would have been too cumbersome for the week assets of the Luftwaffe and tbe Kriegsmarine to transport and support. Light infantry was the only possible military answer to the strateg]c problem that faced Germany in April 1940, but lt was an anewer that pushed luck to its limit. %


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April 1987




DESIRED goal of all units in combat is to seize and maintain the initiative, both physical and intellectual. Seizure of the initiative can be accomplished through many forms of action, but the common ingredient is to force the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining our own freedom of action.1 This act of forcing the enemy can only be accomplished by an agile umt which intellectually anticipates upcoming contingencies and quickly redirects resources to carry out command intent. The maintenance of <ternpo is key to this proactive forcing process and can be further expanded into a concept called battle rhythm. Battle rhythm is based upon the principle that it takes far less time and energy to redirect an object which is already movmg than to start a stationary object. Examples abound. The flywheel of a car overcomes tbe inherent inertia of the motor and allows for rapid acceleration. The spinning of a gyroscope allows for the fluidity of motion in a spaceship. The rhythmic beat ofa drum and welkunderstood calls of cadence make possible the amdinated mass action of a marching army. In each case, a repetitive process, a rhythm, is key to the success of the machine or the organization. This concept of rhythm directly applies to combat organizations-hence, battle rhythm.

At the heart of battle rhythm is a well-understood and stringently en forced ptanning cycte. Ail operations, whether an exercise or actual war, haue rhythms. A planning cycle which recognizes this unique rhythm and allows for decisions at key time+ is essential.

A combat unit, particularly brigade-level or higher, must develop a corresponding battle rhythm of planning and execution which assists in getting inside the enemys

decision cycle and seizing the physical and intellectual initiatwe. In essence, this battle rhythm is a well-understood system of cyclic command and staff actions, repeated

A unit which simply alternates between planning and execution phases will not be abie fo execute in a flexible, . timely or successful manner. A continuous ptanning process, concurrent wifh . . . execution, is mandatory. . . .

m set time intervals, which synchronizes the units planning and execution efforts. It is the oil which enables the timely observance of troop-leading procedures and en<ures that the familiar military decisionmaking processz is not subverted by the tyranny of the urgent (normally close-in battle). Finally, as with all combat decision aids, battle rhythm specdlcs must be driven by a carefui analysls of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T).

Disciplined Planning Cycle

At the heart of battle rhythm ISa well-understood and stringently enforced p[anning cycle. All operations, whether an exercise or actual war, have rhythms. A planning cycle which recognizes this un]que rhythm and allows for decisions at key times is essential. To Illustrate, consider a division planning cycle used by the 1st Armored Division during REFOR GER 86 Today M Wednesday m an ongolngbattle. Last mght (Tuesday evening), the division huddle group (the command group and key staff representatives) conducted a 36hour meeting in the division tactical operations center. This meetmg focused upon predictive intelligence, consideration of friend-

ly options to seise or maintain the initiative in Thursdays battle and the specification of priority intelligence requirements (PIRS) which wiH drive the use of intelligence assets for the next 12 to 24 hours. Of course, a small amount of diwuesion related to Wedneeday mornings execution took place, but the focus upon Thursdays battle was rigidly enforced. On Wednesday morning, the huddle group meets to discuss Thursdays battle which is now 24 hours away. The group reviews the results of any PIR-related intelligence available since the previous nights meetmg and receives final planning gnldance from the commander for the publication of an operation order which directs Thursdays operation. The commander is now free to be at the critical point on the field of battle where and when his presence is most needed. The staff, which has developed and coordinated the general concept with lateral and subordinate units for the past day, now has 4 hours to publieh an order by noon Wednesday. This order, published 18 hours before Thursdays execution, is based upon necessary assumptions and establishes the means (contingency plans, graphirs and rcde words) for flexible execution when the scenario departs from the assumptions. The ultimate objective is to ensure that company commanders m the division know the plan 12 hours prior to execution. The cycle is continuous in nature with Wednesday nights huddle meeting focused on Fridays battle. The lead times built into this rhythm are goals the unit must constantly seek to meet. This requires strong commitment and discipline by the command group to honor the time lines and designate decision points, The result is a force equipped with a flexible plan early enough to allow for proper troopleading procedures at the lowest levels and, ukimatdy, successful execution of the mission.


AIXII 1987


A logical question relates to the observance of the one-third-two-third rule, or planning role. The planning rule maintains that higher headquarters should use only one-third of the available planning time, allowing subordinate headquarters at least two-thirds of the available time. This is a useful concept, hut it is not simple to understand or apply at the division level, The major complication relates to the definition of available time. In reality, on a fluid battlefield, there is never a discrete package of intelligence and instructions from corps headquarters which formally begins the planning process. It is continuous. A possible exception would be the issue of a corps order initiating a campaign plan which differs significantly from previous command intent. Usually, information and the corps commanders intent flow to division headquarters as they become available. In similar fashion, the division passes along numerous intelligence updates and warning orders prior to issuing an order to subordinate units. Thus, brigade headquarters are able to anticipate upcoming opera-

tlons and can usually dispatch an order supporting the division scheme in a minimum amount of time. The cyclic liaison oftlcer (LNO) system is vital to this continuous flow of planning information between headquarters. To complete dissemination of the divition order to company level 12 hours prior to execution, tbe brigade must produce an order within 4 hours, and the battalion must produce an order within 2 hours. The dissemination method transitions from being pt-imarily published at the dwision level to being largely verbal at the company level. These pla~ning times for the production of the brigade and battalion orders are reasonable and sufficient if these headquarters likewlse discipline themselves to maintain a continuous planning function which uses available information to anticipate future friendly and enemy actions. A unit which simply alternates between planning and execution phases will not be able to execute in a flexible, timely or successful manner. A continuous planning process, concurrent with ongoing execution, is mandatory for


APnl 1987


seizing and maintaining and physical initiative.

the intellectual

Robust Liaison System

Another key ingredient of battle rhythm is a robust LNO system which rapidly disseminates orders, conveys intent to commanders and maintains a positive, continuous flow ofcommunicatlons between higher and lower headquarters. Certainly, other means of communication are also used, but the predictable rotation of LNOS between headquarters allows the heat to go on despite frequent failures of other means because of jamming, terrain dependencies or the catastrophic loss of a key command post. The rotation of LNOS m designed to corn. plement the planning cycle, spotting the LNOS at key times and locations to rapidly disseminate orders or return needed nrformation to higher headquarters. This technique has proven useful over many decades of battle with most of the great captains, including Napoleon Bonaparte, the Duke of Marlborough, George (;. Marshall, Bernard L. Montgomery, George S Pattmn and Ulysses S. &rant, using a highly developed lialson system.! What must be avoided M to depend too heavily upon electronic means of communication with little attention or practice given to the oldest form of commumca. tion, the human messenger. In World War 1: British ouerreltancc on technology led to many hzgh level commanders fazlzng to clearly see the battlefield and eon trzbu ted directly to one dtsasterafteranot her, the cru cialBattle of the Somme being one of the best sxamp[es 4 To avoid the inevitable failures associated with giving hp service to the need for LNOS, a unit must pay the price required to make an LNO system effective. Matters such as life support, detailed standing operating procedures (SOPS), command emphasis and visibility, synchromzed schedules

To avoid the inevitable failures associated with giving lip service to the need for LNOS, a unit mastpag the przce required to make an LA@ system effective. Matters such as life support, detmled standing operating procedures (SOPS), command emphasis and visibility, synchronized schedules and information exchange procedures mast be finely honed.

and Information exchange procedures must be finely honed. Because the LNO syetem has the unique adaptability to convey the commanders Intent in an emphatic and minterpretative way, the selection of good LNOS is essential. These LNOS must be quality officers who understand tactical nuances and ~. interface well with th umt and senior officers at higher hesdqua ers. Only a well- resourced LNO system will allaw the units LNO flywheel to maintain organizational momentum and battle rhythm, thus allowing for quick decwions and agde execution. The specifics of a units battle ~hythm must be determined by a METT-T analysis. For the unique tempo related to REFORGER 86, the Ist Armored Division conducted such a MElTT analysis to devise Its battle rhythm. The activities of the corps headquarters, the division command group, the division staff and the division LNOS were meshed into a synchronized flow of complementary activities. Stringent observance of this battle rhythm streamlined division decisionmaking and allowed thedivmon to seize and maintain the physical and intellectual imtiative. Generally speaking, there are certain key benefits and potential pitfalls of battle rhythm. The first benefit emphasizes the predictive nature of intelligence under the


AWIl 1987


battle rhythm concept, The key question is, What is the enemy going to do? This question, fnndsrnentally different from What has the enemy done?; highlights the need to tailor intelligence gathering to support or deny assumptions related to a propo%d plan and forces intelligence personnel to predict what the enemy will do. This predictive element, though uncomfortable and ditiimlt, is essential. By definition, when friendly actions are based upon what the enemy has done (history), then such actions are actually reactiom+ and the enemy has maintained the initiative. If the prediction is correct, the initiative is gained or maintained, possibly to e decisive degree. However, even ifthe prediction is tottdly wrong, unit agility-enhanced battle rhythm-allows for the rapid adjustment

Thtk question, from What highlights the gathering to tions related

faruhwnerttallg ditXerent has the enemy aqne?, need to taitor intettigence support or deny assumpto apmposedpkm, . . .

Forces predictive intelligence What is enemy going todo? Disciplines planning process Set decision points force living with uncertainty Gets word toexecutors early Complements higher headquarters planning cycles Planning be@s Order issued 60-72 hours CENTAG8 5 days (120) 3 days (72) 36-48 hours Corps
Division 2 days (48) 18 hours

Adds robustness to command and control system Liaison officers provide predictable/ reliable communication
Central Army Group, Central Europe S.s.rcaL,e.lenmt C-ao.elJecnW,nde!nr G3 Plem,v,, CWS we phone con..rsmo. mlareno.gwgharhead-wane= Olannlng wmme!ers lsFebm.srY 19s6rmoGeneral GlmnK 0+$ mmmandermch,el. uSAmV. E.roDe, vml t. W MmO.e-a O.ISW.20Dm%mber 19S5

and maintenance of the status quo until another opportunity can be devised. A second key benefit derived from battle rhythm is the eetabIishment of decision points which force the commander to live with uncertainty. It is a natural human ten- , dency to avoid the risk of being wrong by avoiding predictions and ta defer decmions until perfect intelligence is available. Unfortunately, decisions made when all desired information is avaiIable are wualjy late. The battle rhythm concept disciplines the planning process, thus allowing for timely decisions which properly balance aasumed risk and the time required for the proper dissemination and execution of the commandere intent. Another important battle rhythm benefit is that it forces better interface with bigher headquarters planning cycles. In a US Army, Europe, setting, the higher headquarters planning parameters are as shown in the accompanying figure. It is particularly important that the division rhythm supports the weII-defined planning cycle established for certain types of intelligence sources and Air Force assets. A units battle rhythm must complement higher headquarters planning cycle~ otherwise, external actions and requirements will subvert the units ability to maintain battle rhythm. FinaHy, the LNO system associated with battle rhythm adds robustness to the division command and control system. The LNOS provide a predictable means of communication which transmits command intent as well as basic information.


A@ 1987


. . . the battle rhythm concept

should be stringently observed but not perfunctorily pertormed. As with any rhythmic event, a malaise can creep in, causing the staff to go through the motions without developing bold and aggressive courses of action to seize the initiative.

Battle Rhythm Limitations

Several possible limit~tions of battle rhythm should also be noted. One caution is that the battle rhythm concept should be stringently observed but not perfunctorily performed. As with anyrhythmx event, a malaise can creep in, causing the staff to go through the motions without developing bold and aggressive courses of action to seize the initiative. The command group must be aware of this danger and periodically remind the staff of the purpose of battle rhythm-seizure of the initiative A second caveat relates tothe METf-T applications of battle rhythm. Few battles are as predictable as REFORGER with designated start and stop times. The modern

battlefield will be more continuous in nature, but a battle rhythm is still ne~essary and is possible to achieve. The specific battle rhythm for a given METT-T scenario must be carefully chosen, with particular emphasis placed upon the anticipated enemy temp>the unavoidable alternation between peaks andvalleys of activity. Knowledge of this aspect of the enemys decision cycle will greatly assist the seizure of the iritellectual initiative. Sir Isaac Newtons first law of motion maintains that an object at rest tends to stay at rest, and an object in motion tends to stay in motion. This is also true of military organizations. Each unit must develop a battle rhythm which keeps it in motionable to quickly seize upon opportunities to gain or maintain the initiative. Initiative has two components-physical and intellectual. Battle rhythm is particularly linked to the Intellectual initiative as it forces planmng and decisions under uncertainty using predictive Intelligence. These timely decisions allow for proactive combat rather than reactive combat, The result m the aggressive execution of flexible plans and a confused enemy whose next step has been anticipated and disrupted. The initiative has been seized! %

t F!e)d M,,, (FW ,mjLan,DC,5M.,1986 1035 015 ODe,eOOn, De&mment o, the Amy Wash S,, 1985 4 m,. d COmmmd..6Gene.a S!73 us Amy 12 Februao Tm.,w 1986 and Sta,l CO!leqe 60rl Lea.enwoh. .. Me.

2 FM 101.5 Sfaffomn,zm.a.ti 0!9,,,1,0$ Wae@IrJO D C May 1984 P 56 3 Mato? Gaw 8 G,,.,, The C.reC!eO TerescoPe Ef+achve Cmm.d CSI Rem Numb.,



A rraOIPOnal E!er=el

5 General w $tam R R Cham.m Cmmame, Dcc!r.e Commana ?st O ?s! Armored D,.,, )..

9 Combat StU6 es Inst$lte (CS, I

Major Robert F DCLS ISthe CXCCUtLLIC officer, 1st BattalLon, 6th )nfa,ztn, 1st Armored Dwulon, 14 lesbtvm, West Germany Hc recemed a B S from the US r!fdltaw Academy, a. .lf S frOmthe Natal Postgraduate School and LSa graduate of the LISACGSC He ~ .l~~ ,er,,ed czst~ G3, P[an., and the deput>G3, 1st Armored Dmwon -?

r d






Volutnes of material imve been w>itten and thausmds of words kaee been spoken coneerwing the cquhtries and terri~ies that have been wmexedorfaUen wtakrthei%msindion ofthe%uiet Union since its iueeptiori. TItie a&cle tells af &e first pieee of te2@0..rg [oat to Soviet aggression. The countrg that lost tful ternttii.j mag surprise gou. t

.. >,;--- ... -.
N ADVANCE of the 1985 Ronald Rea. gan-Mikhail Gorbachev summit in Geneva, The Wall Street Jourruzl published an article that began with the question: What country was the first to lose territory to Soviet aggression? The answer was, <No, not Finland, and not even the Baltic Republics, but the United States of America. This lost territory is Wrangel leland which, acmtilng to Soviet maps, lies at the edge of the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas and, it would appear, belongs to the Soviet Union. Butr in reality, Wrangel Island was discovered in 1867 by American Thomas Lang That same year, tbe United States and Russia concluded a treaty for the sale of Alaska. The appendis to that treaty included an article on the dividing fine between %e.sia and the UtitedStates, but-and this is very importantthe treaty makes no mention of an international border. The divtdhrg line did not stipulate that all lands to the west belong te the Russian Empire ..

... \

and aH to tbe east to the Unlte&%ates. Tbus, there is nothing unusua3 id thehs~ . sertion of Calvin Ffooper, wh~ explore%, . . .. VJrangei fsland in 1881, that i~ie USt.6!ta. > :, ry. Interestingly, US eengressionai ciocu. ments contain a record of this. Mor-ver, in eucceedingyears, US whale, fur and walrus hunters Mters visited the ieland. But the Soviet regime in 183.7 w+Pudiated all international treaties mnciuded by the czarist governme~t and recarwxl the borders of the Russian Empire to $% eatia . .. faction. Tiare tinally eeught up with W-ti. , land. The Soviet gunboat RedOcW,on~ : exploratory expedition: approrieh@ .&e island on 20 August 1924. The %phmem f: arrested the 14 US trappers then on the & land. Twelve were rdeased dr@l~ **&&if-, ter, but it remains urwlear what -Ed: to the other two. Anarctic res@@@@irm.> and permanent settlement werh foq~@ , 1926, acmrding to the smndetitimof%: ;~. -. Great Soviet Erseyclopedin. .- ~ - ~ ~ $ . , .$ ..


--., .. ...

Why this Soviet annexation was forgotten by the US government M unclear but, in December 1985, Republican Senator Jesse A. Helms from North Carolina introduced a Senate resolution prohibiting the recognition of the Soviet Unions rights to Wrangel Island. The resolution says tbe issue of an international border should be resolved only on the basis ofa treaty. Helms noted that the issue concerns not only who owns this small piece of land but also what international law gives the United States tbe basis to establish the borders of its arctic continental shelf. No less important are the military and strategic implications of the issue which affect the employment of Soviet submarines in a sizable portion of the Arctic Ocean. Apparently, Helms speech and resolution rubbed the Soviet leadership the wrong way. On 27 March 1986, it reacted quickly by publishing a report in Red Star noting. . . valoroas service of a radar company on

the remote island in tlw Arctic Ocean at an altitude of several hundred meters, in the im medmte uicinity of the USSRs national border. Two aspects of the report are interesting the admission by the Soviets of the existence ofa military unjt on Wrangel Island and the contirrnation tliat this island is Soviet territory. 1 visited Wrangel IsIa&& part of an inspection commission m spring 1975 during the period of so-called detente. The Chukot National Okrug district is a strategically important area which is closed not only to foreigners but also normally even to Soviet citizens. Even so, the Ministry of Defense was persuaded by several Canadian scientists ta grant permission for them to visit this Soviet territory as part of an experiment related to the transfer of a herd af musk oxen &am northern Canada to Wr~gel Island. At the same time as this visit, the Soviet commander of the 25th Air Defense Division, along with his political department chief, chose to inspect their subordinate units, including the one on Wrangel Island. However, they completely forgot about the Canadian invasion. The regular Aero/7ot aircraft carrying our inspection commission, upon landing at Cape Schmidt airport, was ordered to unload its passengers i% the gate furthest from the terminal building. As was explained to us, local security organs had received an order from Moscow to ensure that the Canadians did not see a single person in military uniform.


A@ 1987






aea+a&ave al a S.JV@t

Having hidden us in the local military preventive care center, the commander of the radar battalion filled the days with enforced idleness. TWOdays later, we were ordered te fly immediately to Wrangel Island hut only after the Soviets were certain the Canadians, who were interfering with our inspection, had gone home. Although a modem ai<leld with a runway capable of receiving both civilian aircraft and bombers exiete on Cape Schmidt, Wrangel Island can only be reached by military hehcopter. The mission sasvgned to the local radar unit is tracking aerial and sur-

face targets from the US military base at ElmendorfAlr Base, Akaaka, and abmmordtoring Soviet aerial end maritime borders. We were on the island barely a day when the local commanders, cureing the chnate and isolation of this radar locality, began rushing us to complete our inspection,end return to division headquarters. As we proceeded back to the Ushekovskiy aettle,ment where the helipad was located and which represents the permanent settlement cm the island i% which the Great Sorrtet @yChpedti makes reference, our tracked &ensporter brake down. Fortunately, there remained only a short &let.ante to travel. Still, we sought shelter frem the piercing arctic wmd m the first building along tbe road-a dormitory for gerdogisis. The pleasant young fellows quickly explained their presence in this godforsaken corner of the worldstudies they bad conducted in the vicinity of Wrangel island showed enormous oil deposits. So, the island has more &r offer than snow, ice, wakuees and Canadian musk oxen. This may also explain why the US Ilepartment ofState, US congressmen and een. ators, and Red Star, the central organ of the . Soviet Ministry of Defense, are all so interested in this piece of lost territory. %.

Vladtmlr Gmshaun ISa professor.{ the US Army Russum In.stzturE, Gnrnri.sch, WestCizmnany He rrrrtued an MA fmm Patrrre Lurnumba Untuersctym the Sou!et Union. Born and edumztrd in the Souiet Unum, hr has re.rinkd1. the Westsmce 1982.Heprrumudy served m ihrpolmraldrpartment of the Souretarmy and as an!professor of thP Party H@rr Schmd, Comnwusi Party of the SouzeC(hum, Moscow.


APnl 1987


EITHER numbers nor strength brought vicbwy in war whichever armY goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withdraw them. The soul of an army is a mind-set, a commitment to duty and the excellence of its battlecraft. This is the esoteric and nebulous fabric that makes the difference on the battlefield. It is the stuff that leads to success despite overwhelming odds. It is tbe winning excellence of the warriors spirit. The great warriors of the US Armys past-the George S. Pattons, the Douglas MacArthur and the Dwight I). Eisenhowersare gone, and the memory of their victories has all but faded away. Great American warriors yiel~ an enviabre profile. They were handsome, opular, athletic, PIOUS, intelligent, mod 1st, courageous, wealthy, eloquent, merciful, well-bred, happily married, Idealistic, all-around just plain great guys who were born to command, thoughtful and confident. Theu collectivebattlefield prowess may, however, be suspect. In their place, the modern Army has cultivated legions of bureaucrats, systems men and managers. These men have inherited a legacy of self-doubt that runs from the tragedy of Vietnam to the failed Iranian rescue mission to the lackluster success in Grenada? In contrast to the American warriors (past and present) are a not-so-select group of the Great, the Terrible and the Conqueror. These warriors provided hardfought victories despite a less than endearing behavior and trait profile. Refining a long list of their salient behavioral characteristics provides a provocative profile. They were bald, epileptic, ectomorphic, hunchbacked, warty, snobbish, vicious, impotent or homosexual, effeminate, adulterous, one-eyed cowardly dwarfs with severely dysfunctional paranoid schizophrenia who drank heavily, ate sheeps eyes,

suffered from piles and enjoyed sacking towns, murdering rivals and turnipg fertile land into barren desert. The Army must harness this kind of warrior spirit, tempering it with accepted societal behaviors. We need to find an acceptable middle ground somewhere between the latter (the Vespasians and the WHliam the Marshals) and the former (the Pom-

We need sotdiers with the wam.o#s spirit because they are winners. They are the tighter-s, the soldiers who take rikks and kill the enemy. Future wars foayht by soldiers energized with the wam%r spirit wiU feud to victory.

peius Magnuses and the Robert E. Lees). This article proposes a means for defining the middle ground. It accomplishes this feat by analyzing significant American warriors, compiling their significant behaviors across three stages of service-preservice, precombat service and combat service. The model suggests how the modern US Army can harness the American warrior spirit. Harnessing this spirit will increase readiness and consequently increase effectiveness on the airland battlefield. We need soldlers wth the warriors spirit because they are winners. They are the fighters, the soldiers who take nska and kill the enemy. Future wars fought by soldiers energized with the warrior spirit will lead ta victory. The German army of World War If is said to have captured the warrior spirit. British military writer Lord Moran said that the secret of the awful power of the German Army is . in a certain attitude.of her maidhood. Moran says this attitude translates into more combat power. He says that .


. April 1987


World War II statistics indicate that the German soldier, on the average, intlicted three casualties on the Allies for every two they incurred. When extrapolated to army level, it becomes evident that the warrior spirit is a tangible, resource-preserving pbmm=mw. US .peratims doctrine says that future success relies upors Sobliars charged with the warrior spirit. It says that the future warrior must be accustomed to improvisation, initiative and aggressiveness. He must aggressively pursue the enemy and kill him. He must be creative and willing to act independently without confirming decisions with higher headquarters. The Army needs a tougher, smarter corps of warriors, fraught with this spirit. Soldiers must be energized to take the risks te win each fight. This spirit seems to be a state of mind-the blending of the spiritual, physical and mental in a total ethos aimed at excellence. Excellence is the goal, and the wsrnor spirit is the catalyst.


The Armys 1985 Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) indicates that 80 percent of the officer corps exemplifies the warrior spirit. The chief of statYdirected study defines the warrior spirit as: the stati of mind andpreparedmws requi~d of eaeh offier which blends all tke physiral, mental, moral and psychological qualities essential for an ofir to successI%lly lead the Army in its mission ofproteeting the nation. Since most of the Armys present leaderSKIPcorps has never been in battle, it may be rather presumptuous to suggest that we have and understand the warrior spirit. HMmy suggests that the only true test of the warrior spirit is combat. For example,

S. L. A. Marshall indicates that only 450 men of all of the US forces involved in the 6 June 1944 Omaha Beach invasion were fighters-that is, they effectively employed their individual weapons. The rest were notilghters who actively withdrew when und=srt%%&t&r physidl~ a? ~ydnehgie2JIy). How many of the F?30S% 80 percent will be fighters? Retired Colonel Dandridge M. Malone suggests an equation for measuring a werriors effectiveness a soldiers skill in performing tasks critical to success in the battlefield times his will to learn and put that skill to work equals the performance of the individual soldier. The most complex and evasive element of this equation is will. In many historical examples, this is translated into risk taking or, more commonly, courage. Courage promotes both fearlessness and brave~ in war. The courage of the few is often the ingredient that leads to combat victories. According to Moran, courage is the expression on the battlefield of character. He also advances the thesis that: . . courage 2s a moral quality; it is not a chancegifl of nature. . it is a cold choice between two alternatives, the fried resolve nat to quit; an act ofrenunciation which must be &notonce but mnny times bytkepowerof the will. Courage is willpower. Aristotle explains that will power (and courage, used interchangeably here) is a habit-the daily choice of right or wrong It is a meral qaality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war. . for war. . b no power to transform, it merely exaggerates the good and evil that are in as, till [sic] it is plain for all to read; it cannot change, it exposes. Mans fate in battle is worked out before war begins? Warriors are men of character who are developed through a lengthy maturation process. The process varies because of the differ-


April 1987


Soldier teamwork and soldier relationships are key to the wamor spirit integration process. The interaction among soldier character, hk relationships urith other soldiers and the dynamics of the combat situations dictate whether he wilt evidence this spirit.

ences in soldier temperament, personality, abilities, environment and opportunities. The Armysjob is to understand these variables and begin to develop soldier character that leads to the cultivation of a warrior spirit.


Upon ent~ into the rnihtary . . the more elabomte the training, the more likely it is that among its obJectmes was the implanting of the mi[itary ethos, by which wosgenerally meant subordinating the recruits self- unage to the collective m?entzty of the group, sttmu lating his aggressive Impulses.. ..3

The success of this approach is evidenced by the testimonies of many yotmg soldiers. One young Vietnam soldier wrote: . . after a time in the service, with the people I was araund, with the fizet that ifCkarlte wletcong] came over the wire I was going to kill him, with the training that I had, I turned into a quiti violent person. This testimony indicates that the Army transformed one young soldier. His reluctance to commit violent acts (his willingness to kill) was overcome through training and a cultural integration process. Yet, the warrior spirit is not just a willingness to kill; it also involves a willingness to be killed while seeking to accomplish the mission. The warrior spirit appears to be a product of the syaergy of training, leadership and


April 1987


Wamors are men of character who are developed through a lengthy maturation process. The process van-es because of the differences in soldier temperament, personality, abilities, environment and opportunities. The Armys job is to understand these variables and begin to develop soldier character that feuds to the cultivation ofa wamor spirit.

soldler team development (soldler relationships). The young soldier is persuaded to risk his life and to kill largely by the same things which induce him to face life bravelyfriendship, loyalty to responsibility, and knowledge that he is a repository of the faith and confidence ofothers.i6 Soldier teamwork and soldier relation. ships are key to the warrior spirit integration process. The interaction among soldier character, his relationships with other soldzers and the dynamics of the combat situations dictate whether he will evidence this spirit. In peace, we can somewhat influence soldier character (behaviore and traits), soldier relationships, and place the soldier in famly realistic situations. (It is questionable whether the fear that permeates thoughts during battle can be created. ) Peacetime success in harnessing the warrior spirit can best be measured when evidenced by the individual soldier in battle.

by the soldiers behaviors maturing over time. Marshall says that our soldierv . . . is what his home, his religi+n, his schooling, and the rrsoml code and ideals of [the Army] his society have made him. It must reekon w ith the fhct tkat he [the soldier] comes from a civilization in which aggres sion, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. . This is his great handicap when he enters combat. k We take this young person and try to transform him into a warrior or at least into a fighter-that is, someone who will kill when told to do so. It is the Armys job to help develop the soldiers will power to tight and win. This will power is reflected in the strength of his dominant behaviors. Thus, character (will power) is a key dimension of the warriors spirit.

The Warrior Model

z!!L$i . -,,
F!gure 1


The warrior spirit is very complex (see Figure 1). However, it can be captured in part by looking at each of five variables Character, or will power, is evidenced

impact on the soldiers * Relationships courage (will power). Marshall said, the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a corn: rade. Colonel Ardant du Picq explained the value ofrelationshlps. He said Four brave men who do not know eaeh other will rwt dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing eaeh other well, sure of their reliubdity and consequently of mutual aid, will attark resolutely. There w the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell. 7




The Army must capitalize on this science. (This science has been tapped within the cohesion, operational readiness and training (COHORT) units.) The specifics of the combat situation will influence the warriors response. In many cases, necessity becomes the mother of invention. Heroes are made from the shambles of hopeless situations and lucky soldiers. A thorough analysis of the situation will illuminate the behaviors required of the warrior. The battlefield environment impacts on the warrior spirit. The outnumbered Israeli defenders of the Golan in 1973 saw hope beyond their immediate dilemma. For our purposes here, environment includes those influences external to the immediate situation: perception of support at home, success of the overall war effort, influences from higher headquarters and the enemy situation. Time is the final dimension. It never stops to wait for the maturation process to catch up. Soldters exposed to many different situations, m different environments, working with the same comrades over time, begin to cultivate the warriors spirit. Their will power matures, evidencing combatcritical behaviors (see Figure 2). US history is replete with examples of soldiers who posseseed the warriors spirit. Their development processes hav% many similarities. The following examination of an American warrior will include an assessment of each of the five dimensions from the warrior model. The byproduct of this analysis will be a set of behaviors that matured through the warriors distinctive service. .


Audie L. Murphy, the most decorated American warrior of World War II, was born in 1926 near Kingston, Texas. He ~ew up in northeastern Texas near the Oklahoma line. His father was a sharecropper, tenant farmer and handyman. His homes were crudely built three- or four-room shacks made of clapboard or plank. They had none of the modem conveniences. Meals were simple-biscuits, cornbread, molasses with milk and gravy.

Preservice Period
As a student, Murphy was anxious to learn and learned quickly. He was especially good in art, writing and numbers. His inconsistent school attendance (attributed by the necessity to contr]hute to the slim family coffers) was blamed for his poor educational progress. He was always willing to stand up for himself. Although he never tried to start a fight, he never ran away from one. He invariably paired himself against the biggest boy in the opposing group and defied him tq fight. His willingness to accept these challenges either reflects great courage or poor judgment. s This blue-eyed, fair-complexioned boy was unusually accurate with weapons. It

Examples of Combat-Critical Behaviors

Mentally and physically hardened Blunt conscience Pride and sense of membership the profession oj arms Technical competence Initiative Decisiveness Independence
F]gure 2



was said that he could shoot rabbits with a .22 from a moving car. He also trifled with shooting varimrs articles from the fingers and off the heads of his friends-a mod-

It is the Armys job fo help develop the soldier% willpower to fight and win. This willpower is retlected in the strength ofhh dominant behaviors. Thus, character (willpower) is a key dimension of the warriors spint.

em-day William Tell. (He reportedly shot srrutTboxes from between the fingers of the holder and cane off heads at 30 to 40 feet.) These technical skills proved tQbe valuable in combat. Murphy was naturally aggressive, had steady nerves, was level-headed and, most of the time, demonstrated good judgment. His tendency to anger quickly was a problem he never really resolved, It was a desire from his youth to get into the Army. He ate vegetables he did not like so he could grow big enough to get into the Army. Initially, he tried tojom the Marines to train as a sniper, but he was too small (5 feet, 5 inches, 110 pounds). The 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor provided the final impetus for him to enlist. Sometime on or before his 18th birthday, 20 June 1942, he joined the Army.

and reserved but, with a rifle and bayonet in his handa, he became a different person. It was & if he had to prove himself a man among men.n He never complained about his duties. He watched out for his fellow soldiers, helping them to negotiate physical and mental obstacles. His battalion commander is reported to have said he was the most promising soldier in the entire battalion. Murphy loved his gun. He frequently could be found cleaning and polishing his weapon long after others had stacked their rifles and gone to chow.ti His aggressiveness, steady nerves and tenacity were evidenced during a prisoq guard detail. He escorted two prisoners to the quartermaster to draw shoes. The prisoners were large men, both convicted felons. When they were en route, one of the prisoners asked, what would you do if we tried to get away? Without hesitating, Murphy looked in the eyes ofthat great hulk of a man and said, Id shoot youboth of you.~ Later, the captain questioned him about the statement. The captain asked, <what would you have [really] done? Murphy unashamedly said, Id have killed em, I dont cotton to spending the rest of my life in jail for something other guys did.ze

After advanced training at Fort Meade, Maryland, Murphy was ordered overseas. On 20 February 1943, now Private First Class Murphy landed in North Africa where he was assigned to Company B, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division.~ Murphys diwslon (the 3d Infantry Division) was destined to log 531 days of combat duty and own the distinction of the only US division to fight the Germans on all western fronts. The division conducted four amphibious invasions and participated in 10

Precombat Period
Murphy thoroughly enjoyed his inttlal soldiering experiences. He took the drdl and training seriously and espemally enjoyed the bivouacs and field exercises. It was like playing cowboys and Indians, and thus he wholeheartedly participated.= Murphys demeanor seemed meek, mild,





campaigns. Murphy became one of 39 Marnemen ta earn the Medal of Honor. Murphy wae scared and seasick as he waded ashore on Yellow Beach, the Marnemens amphibious attack area in Sicily. It was during the 3d Divisions drive ta Palermo that he discarded the platoon meaaengersjob for that of a dogface infantryman. His baptism of fue occurred somewhere between Licata and Canicatti. While his pkataon was under close enemy tire, he reportedly jumped up, started firing from the hip and yelling for the rest of us ta follow. . . .~ He demonstrated his cat-like reflexes and Lndls-eye prowess with a rifle when his plataon flushed two Italian officers from au observation post. The enemy otllcers meunted two white horses and rode away. Without hesitation, Murphy intuitively dropped ta one knee and fired two quick shots. Both bullets found their marks.w He survived his first major campaign unscathed. On 20 September 1943, he boarded an LSZ (tank landing ship) bound for the Italian mainland. The 3d Division became pertofGeneral Mark W. Clarks Fifth Army during the Naples-Foggia Campaign. For 50 days straight? the 3d Division never lost contact with the enemy for more than a few hours at a time. Murphy was assigned as the third platoon sergeant of Company B following Cisterna. He was to command that platoon until he was commissioned in October 1944. It was during the quagmire battles of Anzio (where trench foot was one of the occupational hazards) that Mqrphy earned histiret of many decorations. According to the commander, 1-15 Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Edson, Murphy was selected to destroy a disabled Oerman Mark IV tank because Edson <knew that he [Murphy] could do it. The commander wanted to deny the enemy an opportunity to recover and repair the disabled vehicle. Also, given the quagmire con-

This blue-eyed, faifi compkxwnsd bog was unusualtg aecumte with weapons. It was said that he could shoot mbbits with a .22 tiwm a mooing car. He also tritled with shooting vanous arhcles tim the fingers and off the hem-k of his fiends.. . .

ditions, the disabled tank was blockirig the only hard stand leading to the l-15th Infantrys sector. Murphy accomplished the mission with a couple of Molotov cocktails and hand grenades.= During the five-month period of 15 August 1944 to 26 January 1945, Murphy won the nations three highest decorations for valor, was wounded three times and was awarded a battlefield commission. - This heroic period began with the 3d Divisions amphibious assault onto Yellow Beach 2


ADrll 1987


(Saint Tropez, France) on 15 August 1944. Murphys platoon was in the first aasaultwave of the 15th Infantry, landing near the town of Ramatuelle. As he led his platoon inland, they came under intense smell-arms tire. Murphy signaled his unit to remain covered while he dashed 50 yards forward, heroically silencing two machinegun crews and taking five prisoners. The award citation addressing this heroic situation failed to mention a key ingredient. According to Murphy, his best friend (Private First Class Lattie TIptmr) hsd begun the assault with him. As they advanced,

taking advantage of all cover, Murphy and Tipten saw one of the enemy machinegunners raise a white handkerchief. Tipton surveyed the situation and climbed out of his position. As Murphy shouted for him to stay down, a single shot rang out. A snipers bullet in;tantly killed Tipten.M Grief-stricken and infuriated, Murphy completely disregarded his own safety and went on an unmitigated killing spree. His objective was to revenge his friends death. After the battle, be returned to Tiptons body. He laid the body out under a tree, pillowed Tiptons head on his pack and then

Audie L. Murphy-World
Preservice physically and mentally
Compassionate Anxious Happy Responsible for actions to learn Enjoyed learning

War II Hero
Combat Service
Sought opportunities to fight

Dominant Behaviors
Precombat Service
Enjoyed rigors of job

Fast learner

in combat

Enthusiastic Assertive/self-confident Spoke his mind ,



and aggressive

Coolness (steady nerves) Good judgment Quick to anger Neat, organized Withdrawn (quiet) Polite Reliable, loyal Worshiped mother Proud Aggresswe Foresight (good hunter) R&taker (firing .22) Riskfaker (spoke out) Figure3 Total commitment Obedient to leaders Cared for equipment _ Ttmid, quiet

Coolness underflre Quickly grasp situation Quick to-r (Tipton) -Loyal up ~nd down (make something of self)

Proud (self, job, equipmefl:~Proud Fearful

Aggressive (bayonet training) Aggressive in combat Foresight (anticipated enemy) Risktaker (frequent disregard for own waifare)





bawled like a baby. On 2 October 1944, the battalion commander and executive ofllser came forward to see where machinegun fire was holding up the battalions advance. As they approached the vantage point, they suddenly became trapped inside a web of German fires from two positions. Simultaneously, to the rear, Murphy trailed the commander as a security measure. (This action was taken on bis own initiative and without the approval of his company commander.) when the trap closed (and the commander was caught), Murphy maneuvered around and surprised and killed both machinegun crews. = Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Paulick said that Murphy constantly dmplayed alertness and coolness under fire . almost daily against the enemy. For this reason, he pushed for Murphys battlefield commwsion. On 14 October 1944, Murphy wascommissioned a second lieutenant in the US Army. Thie wa.4 over protest. Captain Harris, Company B commander, said, SGTMurphy did not consider himself officer material. He was embarrassed by His lack of formal education. . . and he did not choose to leave the men he had fought with so long.o (R was customary to transfer a newly commissioned enl]sted man to another unit. This did not occur in Murphys case.) The winter of 1944 and 1945 in France was reminiscent of Anzio in at least one regard trench +%otcaused many dogface casualties. It was during the winter, early one morning (26 January 1945), that Murphy assumed command of Company B, the same company he had joined as a prwate in North Africa less that two years earl]erfl His command included only 18 enlisted men On this fateful day, Murphy also won the Medal of Horror for practwdly sy-igle-handedly stopping a German attack by six tanks and waves of infantry. Murphy was

His aggressiveness, steady nerves and tenacity were evidenced dunng a prison guard detail. He es. corted the quartermaster to dmw shoes. The prisoners werelarge men, both convicted fetans. When theg were en route, one oftlse prisoners asked, What would you do if we tried to get away? Without hesitating, Murphy looked in the eyes of that great hulk of a man and said, Id shoot youboth ofyou. !

well forward when tbe attack began. He ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions while he continued to tiqe and call in artillery. As the enemy approached, be left the safety ofhis command post and mounted a burmng tank destroyer. He aimed the destroyers .50-caliber machinegun and tired in three directions, killing dozens of the enemy. When the machinegun ammunition was exhausted, he lumbered back to his men, organized a counterattack and subsequently forced the Germans to withdraw. The 3d Divisions historian called this Aud. le Murphys wild man stand.s Figure 3 displays those behaviors evidenced in each of the three phases of Murphys service life. Many of the behaviors matured with new situations and relationships over time, yet few new hehavlors were evident in war that wera not at least in their embryonic stage during his preservice years



Murphy provides a sterling example of an American soldier who blended the variables of the warrior model to evidence tbe prowess


Aprd 1987

and success of the warriors spirit. He joined a rich heritage that began with the American Revolution and the likes of Anthony (Mad Anthony) Wayne and Henry (Light-Horse Harry) Lee. These men focused their energies on seeking out and de-

One approach to harnessing tfu% esotenc ingredient is to develop a behavior-basedpro file for use by accession authorities. Once the Uoung person enters the Army, sustain or strengthen those cntical behaviors bg repetitive, demanding and independence-onented training. Challenge the sofdier at every opportunity.

stroying redcoats. The American Civil War had warriors like William T. Sherman and Stonewall Jackson, as well as college professor and later Medal of Honor winner Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain. Young bugler Calvin P. Titus bravely scaled the walls of Peking during the Boxer Rebellion, evidencing the daring of a true warrior. These warriors were joined by World War Is Samuel WoodHll and Alvin C. York, Koreas Cafferata and Red Cloud. The list of American warriors is long and inspiring. These leader-wamiors possessed remarkably similar basic behavior profiles. Although their socioeconomic and situationalpeculiar backgrounds were dissimilar, the common thread of embryonic behaviors during their preservice period and their subsequent refinement during precombat service led to their eventual battle successes. The warrior model ofFigure 1 with its five variables is a good starting point for current ArmY leaders concerned with the honing of a force destined to increase its warrior prowem. With an eye on each of these variablescharactsr, soldier relationships, situations,

environment and time-consider the following three-prong approach tv harnessing the warriors spiriti Assemble a behavior-based profile that is representative of past American warriors. To be a true behavior protile, it must exclude any reference to socioeconomic background, race, heritage and academic opporhmities. The accession of tomorrows soldiers based on a set of desirable critical combat behav. iors which have development potential is a sound starting point. After induction, help the soldier to develop those critical behaviors within the context of his training. Encourage his aggressiveness by team sports, frequent bayonet drill, hand-to-hand combat, strenuous physical training and obstacle courses. These activities (and others) will produce self-confidence. The competitiveness of team sports demonstrates to the young soldier that he must support and be supported to win. Build up those behaviors which foster independent actions. This begins by adopting a philosophy that expects initiative, creative approaches and vigorous execution. Rewarding subordinates who comply with your intent will encourage such behavior. Keep things as simple as possible. Focus on doing the manageable rather than the cumbersome. Although independence training can become complex, it usually succeeds if the basics are done well. Stabilize small units as much os possible. This facilitates eforts and protects the foundation of the independence-building process. Make certain units do not lack the fabric ofdiscipline. Their survival (individual survival) on a future battl@3eld may well depend on a mature degree of individual and group discipline. Emphasize the development of loyhlty and trust up and down the chain of command. Always set the example and insist

that subordinate leaders reciprocate in kind. After all, this is the professions Iifeblood. In combat, commanders need to develop a climate of trust. Subordinates who perceive that their leaders trust theirjudgment will tend to take acceptable risks which, more likely than not, will be in the Armys best interest. Murphy took such a risk when he took the initiative to follow (as rear security) his battalion commander who was looking for a German machinegun nest. Although his superior would not have permitted him to act as he did, in hindsight, he was lauded for his genius and courage. There is no templet for the warrior spirit. Yet, it is a real, very significant phenome. non t t will make the difference on the future b ttlefield. One approach ta harnessing this esoteric ingredient is to develop a behavior-baaed profile for use by accession authorities. Once the young person enters the Army, sustain or strengthen those critical behaviors by repetitive, demanding and independence-oriented training. Challenge the soldler at every opportunity. Finally, Army leaders must understand that the warrior spirit is rather maverick in nature and is frequently evidenced by some rather unorthodox manner. Commanders who am quick tu support and slow to judge this <waywardness may well contribute to the future vitality and success of tomorrows warrior spirit. %

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MaJorRdctiL. Magmnus ch~f of k Leader. shtp Bmnch, US Army Infantry Scbcal, Fort Ben nmg, Georgm He mcetvedaB.S. fmm the US Mdl tary Academy and an M..%from tk Naunl Post. graduate School and as a graduate of the USACGSC He has served unth three mfantty dtm. SCons ma mmwofcommti adstiffpsctmm m Korea, Europe and tlw Contmmtnl U?uk-dStates. Hu arttch SelcctmgEnwrgmg Technologws)appeared m the December 1986 Mihtary Renew.


The Air Force View on Projecting the Force

(7. theamnnoffonxpm,~twn, the US Army imd th US AU Fonx kat.wdtfferent mfes The Army represen&the form mom bkdy to k pmjerted/ u,hemm the AL, Form representsthefor.x mm MAY to& the PmwctuwForce pm]dwn, as you m@ Lrna&, LSa sf@[fuant-t.ssu for AwFomepkmners Wkat folfmwsu a forcepmjectwn wer. urew@m h FaJl 1986 eduum of the &r Forcefssues Book Thekwk cwdauu what the dut-etorof theAt,-Fome [sues TeammJf.san u* on hgh mtmestpmgmms and coruwnsfor A tr Fen-emmmndms mzd mpwsmla tum Eddor ) Our abihty tm succesafaflydeteraggression,linut contlct or wage war depmds on howwell we deploy, employ and sustain forces lb achieve natlond se ~ty gals, the Departmentof Defensehas develOPA a de~mnt strategy based on a mm of Continental Umted States-bad and forwarddeployed fomes.Inherentm this strategy ISthe requmement @ rapidfy projact,then sustain, the r.qnred mall. tary fighting forces anywhere in the world. The United States visible means and national vnll ta pm@ military pawer by au can deter adversaries fmm taking actions hostde to our interests Fur can b+ the stabihzingfactor In ther,forte PIUJ@IOII preventing smzdlcrises from escalating intro large cmltllcta. The aulfi m]salon IScurrently performed by a combmatmn of general purpose, specmhzed and dacbcatedmission aircmfl These rewumes are ope,rated in actwe duty,Assmate Reserveand Am%. W_JeFOIWunits (Am Force Reserve and An National Guard)had aroundthe world. These um~ are augmented by the Cd Reserve An Fleet (CfZAF)composedof cd passenger,cargo and wgo.mnverhble ammll operatedby commerciala]rhnes Theseassetscan be calledup inWI-IOU stages duringconhngency or emergencysnuat]ons in 1983,we began programstnmodernizeand mm?aae the capablbty of the amliff form structure. These included the C5B procurement.CRAF enhamxment, and the CT39 and C140 replacement programs. We expandwl the ACIO pmgmm and mntinued development of the C17. fn Fiscal Year (FY) 1986,threeofthese programswere completed The CT39 fleet was replacedwith 80 C21Sand 40 Cl.% mitlally undera leasepmgmm, mth an early buyout of aU lZO aumaft completed IIISeptember 1986.Final procurementof lf C20S h replacethe C140fleetwaacompleted,wth find defiveryin FY 1967. The CR4F enhancement procurement was afso finishedwith the fandmg of 19Boeing 747car go-convertible mcdifkabona. FY 1967 ISthe laat year ofKCIO and C5B pmcumment. Our .airhttpmgmm for the future is primardy comprisedoftwo part-s. Nearkm, we will continue Improving current systems through upgrade or maddicatlon efforts The cornemtane of our 10ngtermpmgmm is the developmentand procurement of tbe C17.Requiredwartime capabIfitxmanpawer constraints, high reliability and maintainability, and affordabilim were the prunary conmderations uwd m ourcompetitwedeas]on to buy theC17.The excellent operatlonid charactenstica and low lifecyclecostof the Cl 7make Itthe beatchoiceto meet overaflmrbf? rwpmementaand pmmde a crecbble force-pmjecmon capabMy well mto the 21stcentury Tanker modermzahon ISthe primary Au Force program to increase our tanker capability, The mcdermmd tanker (KC135R) is bmng augmented by the contmued.pmcurementof the KC1Oto lmprcweAir Force form-prqection abdity These are complementary programs wh]ch increase tanker and mobility eapabihty Re+ngmmg the KC135S wlulepmmring 60 KC20 aircraff will pravidea flexible tankerforcecapableof meetmg a wde rangeof competmg strate~c and general purpose rmsaion mqumement.s SPc=oal @ratIons Forces(SOF) are also recmving increasedempha.msOur pmgmms to purchase more MC130H Combat Talon 11s and AC130 gunsbips, afong vnth the conversionof addmonal CH/ Hlf53s to thePaw Low llZ conf@ration, am giant $tepstoward the Aw Forcegoal tzIprovideeffectwe axbft and selechve firepower sup~rt for Army Specml Forces, Army Rangers and Navaf Special warfare units The primary long-range Improvement to our SOF wdl be the addtion of the tlxed+vmg,tdt-mtor CV22A. Tfus amcmtl combmes the long-rangecapabihty of the MC130 and the vertical takwdf ind landingcapabdity of the HH53, greatly enhancing andexpandingthe AmFameSOF ability to respond m cms






Wkh the increasing national emphams on the conceptofrapid deployment,the awldt nussionhsa grown in scope and the mad for effactweness.The command snd contil syswm to manage sirlitl w sets must ha responsive to vsriad taakings on a global basis The Mifitary &rfitl Command ia pursuingan upgrndeto impmvethe effectivenessof its cmnmnndand control cs+fdilitiea It is designing sn irdegmtedsystem cmmsting of the procedures, communications, information-processing equipmenL pensmnel nnd facikhea requued ta rawve, process,displayamdtransxmt essentinfinformation needadhycommandandcontrolscheloneto exacnte their wia+mne tasking and respons]bdity.

New Technologies & Third World Conflicts

kiy Dov S. Zakheim Defense 86, July-August 1986 Disputing cr]tics who argue that the use of high-technology weaponry is irrelevant to the demands of warfare outside the European Central Front, the deputy undersecretary of defense for planning and resources writes in Defense 86 that, indeed, h]gh technology ISa major factor in contlcta taking place in the Thmd World. Dov S. Zakheim admits that a convement Lmage of Tlurd,World conflicts has armm+ne of unsophisticated forces armed with simple weapons. And he notes that critics of US expenditures on m]litary technology for force projection operations think these outlays are irrelevant as well as morallv noxmus for [their] expraasion of neocolonialism But Zakheim challenges these clalms. He writes Thtrd World batt~es and the forces engaging m them haue attazned a leuel of technological and operatzonnl Sophwticatlon that pose szgnaficant challenges for Western planners contempfnting the demands of any type ofproJectmn or znterven ttona~ e.rpeditlon. He further disputes the clalm that the French and US defeats m Indochina are proofof the irrel. evance of h]gh technology on the Thmd World battlefield. He says technology is central to most potential battlefields because Third World nations have made It so Zakhelm adds that it was not so much the irrelevance of technology but Its misapplicatmn-cce] ther in tactical, operational, strate~c or politlcal term--that contributed to the fa]lures in Indochina. I Nat)ons wmhThmd World interests ]mport.nnt enough to fight for Ignore technology at thew

own peril, accmdmg to Zakhelm, He rewews a ser]es of Thrd World cont%ctsto buttress bis assertion that technology IScentral to these battlefields and concludes that a combination of high technology, command, contil and comnmnicationslintel figence, electronic coun. termeasures, and electromc counter-countermeasures lead to success on the Third World bat. tlefield. Projection forces, he says, must remain strategically flexible and must possess stilcient tirepower tn outgun an adversay. For this rea$on, he writes, the United States has expandad Baval and marine amphibious forces, created new hght divisions and expanded Special Operations Forces as well as amlift and sealitl capab]htles, Such increases will ensure that the Umted States mamtams its projection forces as wable fighting units, Zakhe]m adds: It is only by such means that {t can ensure that euen as theseprojectton forces engage an enemYforce, thP1rway capabtlctmw Will deter the escalation of that engagenwnt to a longer lnstuzg or geographwally under conf7wt.-ELH.

From Presence to American intervention

By Michaej D. Malone, William H Miller and Joseph W. Robben Survwa/, September-October 1986 The ways m which US Marines, as part of the multinational force (MNF), were used m Lebanon during 1982 and 1983 hold critical lessons for the future, according to M]chael D. Malone, W1lham H. Miller and Joseph W, Robben, writing m the September-October 1986 Issue of Suruwal.


APHI 1987


The authora aay five critiral decisions by US policymakers concemingthe Marine presence in Lebanon doomed the US peacekeeping mission. They conclude that peacekeeping operations can be successtld only if they include the maintenance of imptilality and non-coercion. The MNF bagcn with the intention of remaining neutral and promoting peace in Beirut, Howcritical points durever, decisions wera mnde at ing the Marines stny there that eroded [their] neutrality and led ta the use of military force. The fimt occurred when the Americans threw their support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According ta tbe authora, success of the US prasence required MNF neutrality with the LAF because of its Christian leadership. But, when faced with the choice of pure peacekeeping or support for the strengthening of the LAF tbmugh a combination of money and quick fues, the United Statas chose the latter. The authorasay the United States became an ally of the LAF ~~lddestroved the semblance of American neutrality. Contributing tn this dechne m US neutrality was a decision to abandon the Marines rules of engagement and to employ naval gunfire--a move perceived as more than self-defense or response mth equal force to a provocation. Use of naval gunfire, the authors write, probably strengthened the oppositions resolve. Even more provocative in appearance, the authora say, were reconnaissance overthghts using F14 Tomcats. The authors contend that, even though these aerial missions were: announced as non-hostde acts, t tninly must have been perrewed at a mmzm-um us -tie proumatiue by the Lrbanese factmna opposed to the Genmyel gouemment and the A merlcan pres eilce. The US force further d]sdamed Its role as peacekeeper by choosing to remam at Beirut International Airport and allow the LAF to occupy areas in the Chouf Mountains being vacated by Israeli forces. And, finally, the Americans intervened on the side of the LAF with combat support in the form of naval gufire during the tight for the tawn of Suq al-Gbarb. The Umted States was now unquestionably in a mil@m-yassistance role and the Marines were alhes of the LAF, the autbora wrote. They conclude that peacekeeping failed when the United States chos~ stablhzmg the Ganayel government over maintaining neutrality. They write In the future, pohcy-nuzkers need to be aware of

such a step, nat so & necessarily to<atmid it, but ratker to recognize that it B the end of one role and tke beginning ofanattir. The lsaue of using force external to the peacekeepera is also critiaal, the authors suggest. Using naval @ire ~d aerial reconnaissance is not in keeping with neutrality, objectivity and peacekeeping, and this change to the role of aggressor should have haen recognized. The mission, rules of engagement and security measures should therefore have been changed accordingly, they concludp.ELH.

Soviet Use of Surrogates to Project Power Into the Third World

By Richard Shultz Parameters, Autumn 1986 Using the Caribbean, Central America and the Middle East as settings for case studies, Richard Shultz examines how and to what extent the Soviet Union uses surrogates to promote lowintensity violence, primardy insurgency and terrorism, and to ass]st newly established MarxlstLaministregimes, Tbe author. a T&s Umversity associate professor, suggests there is %gniticant primary evidence pointing to Moscows reliance on surrogates to help accomplish foreign policy goals. He adds that th]s subject IS one requiring much more analytic and scholarly examination than e writes that tbe Soviets employ surrogates ddTerently than they have traditionally been employed: First, the;e Soviet chents appear ta have much more specialized tasks. Moscows control also seems to vary and depends on the ideological, political, geographical and economic nature of the surrogate itself. And, finally, these surrogates involve themselves in an array ofoperations both m peace and low-intensity con. flicta. In the case of low-level violence, Shultz saye. Soviet writings suggest that Moscow employs both political and paramilitary instruments to promote instability, includlng guerrilla insur. gency and terrorism In the case of assisting Leninist factions w consolidate power, Moscows goal is to insure that regimes that come to power through Leninist means remain forever inviolate, he writes. in preparing hls case studies on the Soviet use


APnl i 9a7


of .mrragates, Schuka relied on captured documents and testimony by former inaidem+sc he calls them, He says these sources clearly show that Moscow integrates surrogates into its . . . drurlstrategyofpmrrwting. . . tarmri-stand insurgent rrmuernent.v . . . through t?w employment of politico-psychological warfare campaigns, w wellaa in a.ssiatingthesegroupa on tha ground through arms transfers, tmining, and advisoly support. He rdaoconcludee that primary eorrrcematerirddiacloeee%iet uaeofsurmgatest osssist newly established Lenkriet regimes. He writes that, in both Grenada and Nicnragua, the Soviet Union and ita proxies aseisted friendly governments in arming and training their eecurity forces, Schukz adde that, although the Puleetine L1baration Organization (PLO) was not an official government, it received similar Soviet ussistarrcain the 1970s and early 1980s. It wae at this time that the PLO was, in effect, a de facto government in southern Lebanon; he writes.-ELH.

Anything but a Ground Tour!

By Captain Paul Loschiavo, US Marine Corps Proceedings, November 1986 Most Mnrine aviators exist for one thingta tly: mites Captain Paul Loschiavo, a Mnrine Corps oflicer, in the November 1986 iesue ofProceedmg$. However, there is a lot more to the Marine Corps tharrsimply flying and, he says, if nn aviator wante a better picture, he shoufd eervea tour as an air oftkr on the ground. That is where you w1l work ae air otlicera or forward air controllers with something called un ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire Liuison Compuny). f.oschiavo writes that the ANGLICO doss not normally work with or support other Murrne Corps uuits. The purpose, he says, is to support US Arnry or allied units. The concept of the ANGLICO etnrte -in 1948 within the Mnrme Corpe tu provide Na naval b ontrol~lre epottera and Marine forward air Ieratothe Army. Support to allied units waeadded over time. The miesion has changed little. In hk year at 2d ANGLICO, Loschlavo eupparted the 82d A:rbome Division, the 10lst Alrborue Divieion (Amnobile), the 24th IrduntryDwision, the Rangers arrdseveral Navy carrier air wirrga undships, se well as Turkish, British and Norwegicrrunits

But, for Loscfriavo, getting to ANGLICO wae halfthe fun. Since the unit otl.arr supports the Armys 82d Airborne Division, everyone in ANGLICO must bepruachuteqrrnl~led. He tcek the uirbome physical fitnees test w quafi& for jump school at Fort Berming rmdadmitted, Nothing could be more embarraaaing for a Marine tharrta flurrkoutofarrArmyschcul because he was not in good enough shaps. He paased and entered airborne training in Georgia. He cuflsjurrrpscbooh . . . a big thingfortIwArmy; . [somethingltn see [f a soldim hn.vwhat It takes to go to a highspce# unit. Jump wings area sort of lend b~e of coumge and indicate that a soldier is tmgh. Leschiavo graduated nnd was assigned to hie ANGLICO where, he writes, as cn aviator, he got ta do things few aviatam get to do. He led a convoy of 22 vehicles to a training site, Iecrned to rappal, rappeled from a helicopter and led a 10. man patrol in a night attack. That proved to him that it is enaier @ find the bad guys from an aircrcfl thnrrfrom the ground. He did find some mom for improvement with the ANGLICO. He says he learned very little about Marine Corps iufarrtryduring his tour because the ANGLICO mainly supported ArurY nnd allied umts. And he saye there were officers everywhere, at times ten captains shuring thma desks in the operation ot%ce. During these timee of etarrdingroom only,. . . we dld a lot of reinventing. the wheel, he writes. But, overall, Loschiavos ground tour was well worth it. He is certain that now, once he is back in the cockpit, he will not be late for an air strike, and he will make cure he drops the grunts in the right LZ (landing zone). Laat but not Iecat, Loschiavo says, Youll try to enaurathat some other aviator wont have to explain to the ground troops why You did somet~lng wrong.-ELH.



Socially Acceptable


The December 1986 issue of Military Reutiw contained much-needed nrticles on emerging technology selection ss well as the spacitk subjects of artiicial intelligence and rabatics. Captaina RIcky Lynch and Michael R. McGees aggressive pursuit of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics ehould be tempered by Mtior Robert L. Maginnis %slscting Emerging Technologies and Major Kenneth H. Roees Why Artificial Intelligence Wont Work. Lynch and McGse nesd ta be mindful of the editors opening remarks and this etatement by Rose that there ars two forces at work within rabotic evolution When estimating the potential for invention, two types of people should he considered those wbo develop the technology the researchers--and those wbo apply the tecbnologthe users. Although there is considerable actimty within the technical commrmity ta address robotic material problems, there is little work dirscted at determining user acceptance. The developing commands of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Tank-Automotive Command, the Missile Commamd,tbe Armament Development snd Engineering Center ad tbe Laboratmy Command, as well se some supporting industrial firms such as FMC, Martin Marietta, General Dynamica, Gould and Grumman, are all nsvigatin< dowo technical salution paths in todays mbatic evolution. However, if we accept the selectIon of emerging technology preposition ta filter present developments through military history, we will be able ta readily anticipate the future and corresponding implications. Though mhotic ideas are only lidrited by the imagination of the user, the military use of technically developed robotic devices is linuted by the user communities social acceptance. From T. N. Dupuys 1984 book, The Evolution of Weaponsand Warfare, the following is an example of inetila-generated obstacles exerted trIwsrdthe then-evolving srrnoredtank The Unitsd States exp+rimsnted with mechanized combmed-arms forces in maneuuers in 1928 and 1930, and in 1932 estnblialwd the 7th

Caualry Brigade (mechanized) at Fort Knox, Kentacky (which ironically is C!aptams Lynch and McGees present duty station [inserted] ),.In order to accomplish this ths Army found tt neces. smy & adopt the absurd arpedtint of designating , cavalry combat cars to circumvent th stututmy rsstrtction on tanks as infantry tweap.

Inadaptingmbotica @ the groun~ battlefield (for they already exist in the air as cruise and TOW missiles se well as remotely piloted vehlcles), we need to aacislly prioritize the replacement missions of either hazardous,lrepetitious, time-consuming or labor-intensive functions, TMeprioritization is desperately needed to help develop the middle g-round.More importantly, it is this proper mix of technology and user demand (either overt or latent) which wdl lead us to the high graund on the future battlefield In the long run, the nation, the US Army and their supporting industrial firms will benefit from a better understanding of tbls emerging and critical electronic technology As M Cetron tits in The Future of Amerman Business m World Compehtion: battfes of thsfuture will depend on weapons that have the most advanced embedded computers. According to mdttary developers, elec tronicswill be rwededas a force multlplter to offset ths Somet bloc numeracalsupenonty. The US, pmspsrity, w well as, Its nataonnl security wdl in. creasingly dqend on this vital link, Just as Dreadnoughts and the tanks after them baveheen considered yardsticks ofpolitlcal and military virility, so, too, will these ground robots bscome thew equivalent, The 1980s robotic pioneem(such as Rase, Lynch and McGee) will no doubt follow in the earlier footsteps of the 1930 era tank pioneers As a final note, Major General J. F, C, Fuller obserwd m his 1932 book, Armored Warfare, that historically weapons of war change so does the as tlw charactir of war change, and though tht.sISan undoubted fact, tnct~ally tt must not be over. looked that weapons ckange because ctutkzation changes; thy da nutchange on thewown uccount. To-ahy(sic) warsari.scout ofeconomircauses, becauseourpresent cwilizataonis essentiallyan ecO -

Aprd 1987.


rwmzc OIW,its master being the mnchim m one form or another.
J. D. Cemy, Fairfax Sfa/i@n, Viqinia

premisemnmerwmer m thealwayscontmumgsikig ,@ to rctamtheArmyspmfessmml]ourwt,Edtbr)

Army Needs Space Premature Burial for MR?

The article by B. Bruce-BrIggs, The Army in Space: New High Ground or Hot-Au BaIloon? (Md~ta~ Reuww, December 1986), presented a umque opinion on the role of the Army in space. The authors somewhat negatwe approach and h]s sweeping generakzatlons could well lead the unreformed to readdy accept his argument. The result may be a behef that space is not important to the Army and that space solutions to battlefield deticlencw% should not be pursuedand nothing is further from tbe truth I use the phrase unique opinion to highlight the lack of substantiation of Bruce-Briggs position. He did not mention either of the two documents which are driving all current Army space efforts-the Army Spare Poltcy ,and the Army Space Operational Concept. In additmn, neither of the two sources quo~edformer Congressman F Edward Herbert nor Karl von Clausewltz -has contributed srgmticantly to recent Army space operatmns or planning. The Army Space PolLcy clearly states that the thrust of all space efforts w to enhance the accomplishment of Army missions and that the Army WIII capitalize on national andjomt programs. To ]mplement these broad goals, the US Army Combmed Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has developed tbe A rmy Space Operational Concept, wh]ch mtegratw space mto the AirLand Battle doctrine, and tbe US Army Space Agency has drafted an Army Space Master Plan iASMP1. The ASMP mcm-por&s the results of two key space studies (the Army Space Intttatiues Study and the Rand Arroyo Center Report on potentmj Army uses of space) that represent more than Zb man-years of effort and analysis and which advocate Army exploitation of space I mvlte readers to examine these documents. They wdl quickly note that the thrust ofmall Army space efforts is to integrate space systems into Army operations only where technically feasible, cost-effective and to satwfy a cr]tical battle. field deficiency, The bottom hne is that space sys. terns are being pursued for their contributions to that which is most critical to tbe Army-ground combat operations To ach]eve these contnbutmns, the ArIUY must

I read in the January 1987 issue of National Guard magazine that the Department of Defense, in a budget-cuttntg move, has eliminated most of its mditary magazines, includlng Infantry. Armor, Field A rtdlery Journal, Parameters, Au- Resei-ucst and, regretfully, Mdtfary I?emew. Under my subscr]ptmn, I am assured ofreceivmg whatever wsue of Mdztmy Retxew becomes your last one. However, for the sake ofposterity, 1 would hke to also receive the last Issue of all of the other military magazmes being eliminated Please send me cm up-to-date hstmg of the ones being eliminated so I can write to them directly and request copies of their last issues. May I recommend that you increase Mitztary Reuwzokannual subscription rate so that, m effect, your subscribers pay the cost of pubhshing It, or at least most of K?
COL DsvidReinah, US4R,Yonkers.flewYork

<Thehstof magaztrtes being eltmznated cannot besent to .Youbecause none of theJournals You mentzoned arego. $ngout of business Tlw bestI can say at thzs point u not to count us out wwr The $trugiqlecontcnucsas Maluajs has [t 1strue that tie Department of the Amy (DA/ has offrtally wtthdmwn funding support from Md@rY Rewew, Parametersand o hobt of other penodtcals, m .Iud!ng those wt. refer to as the branch journals But. atwe along u tth that actmn, DA has offeredan altern pubhshmg strategy that apparently u$dlallow most of these formw penodtcals to continue pubkcatwn-in some cases, u~ rtiudly unchanged, In othm cases. tn a somewhat mod@icd format. and, w std[other cases.m o lCSS frequent bars Publuhmggudehnes are stall being dec,elopedOnce completed, they wdl be used tojust,fj contm tied opera tmn of the pubkcatzons, and funds wdl be allocated for przntmg We un&rstand that qualzfwng publzmtmm wdloperate M thts fashmn for an mprzm period as more cost. efficient przntmg and pukhcatron methods are sought The bottom hne = MdmuYRmww ISstall here and m m no danger that we know of thanks to our loyal readers. Inctdentallv, your [den of mcreasmg our murmls prmate subscnptton sales u an t=rcellent one and one we
hew considered We cpprectale Your potronag, and


. April 1987

be an active and interested party in the space arena. Army needs must be addressed in the development of space systama, and the Army must continue b provide ita fair share of resource support to joint space programs. It is only hy demonstrating our commitment that space systems will be avadable wherrneeded by the combat soldier.
COLJoe B. Thwston Jr., USA, USAmry Spaee Agency,
Petwson IWrForcE Base, Colorado

aud extratemestrial transport. The Army clesrly hse a mission in spaca as do the Air Force and the Navy. Accordingly, the mission of the Air Force and the Navy coufd continue to ba the provision of long-range transport as is now accomplished by Military Airlift Commarrdaircrst? rmd navaf troop carriers. I fully concur with Bi-uce-Briggsthat the future of the Army is in the mud. However, the mud does not necessarily have to be locsted here.

[n the Mud, Wherever I would like to respond to the December 1986 article by B Bruce-Brlggs. Among the many interesting ideas presentsd, his discussion comparmgthe tactlwd utility of a hot+rirballoon and the tactwal utility of an Army presence in space was most thought-pmvoking. SuraIyit would ha quita clrallengingtobe pcsitionadin a satelliteobxarvirrg ground activty end simukarrwmsly&swing enamy tirain the opan, The author contendstlmt, if this is h be the &my missionin spare,this miwion shouldbe given to the Air Forte! But is this really an appmpriata Army mission? I suggest that, in the past, as in the future, the Army mission exists well beyond manning either a hot-air balloon or a satelhte. Rather, the mission of the Army is terrestrial m nature. Mm slons include attacking, selzmg and defending. The Armys mission also involves exploring and charting unknown territory, as well as huddmg upon and operating in hostile envmonments. Recalling the mle the Army played m the development of the American West, it would perhaps be reasonable to state that it ISthe mission (and destiny) of the Army tnexplore, chart, build upon and operate in terrestrial environments regardless of locationforexample, whether or not they are of this planet! The only reason why the terrestrial m]sslon must now be restrlctad is because of technological hrn]tatlons. When the t]me does come, we must be prepared h carry out our role. Thus, the Army must be involved now to assume IWproper role later. when Americans caupy a pbmeL whom woufd you expect to do tbe exploring, charting, huildmg and operating? The Army w, already conceptual y configured tn perform these diver-seterrestrml missions. For example, cavalry and infantry could explore all the lands Engineers could chart, survey and build upon the barren landscape. Aviators could operate short-hop terres-

CPT Robml M.Sarino. USA, llS#kmyfoRign Science andTechnology Gent.% Chwlottssville, Vlqinia

Army Must Exploit Space

B. Br-uce-Briggsarticle in the December 1986 Issueof Mihtqy Reuiew providad an interesting view of the Army role in space. We commend him for presenting a very pragmatic view of how the Army should he involved in the space pmgmm. Brrrce-Briggsis correct in hk tactiral assessment of tbe space high ground. Objects which orbit the earth are both visible and vulnerable, logistical support of manned space operations is difficult and space things are expensive. Although there is a lot of excitement and hoopla about the enhancements space can promde ta land warfare, we believe tbe Armys aspming spacemen are prepared to operate with the same constrained resource enviromuen as ysis the rest of the Army. However, Briggs x of the Armys use of space waa very shallow end should be expanded lest it present a false impression of the utdity of space systems ~ the rest of the Army and tbe other services. Weather forecasting includes environmental sensing data wh]ch N critical to commanders who are concerned about terrain conditions for maneuvering vehicles and for the employment of weapon systems. Despite the emoneous belief that the Au Force is responsible for total Army weather support, the Army has the respmrsibility to provide epecific weather data to support ita tactical and operational-level commarrderx. Tbe military has used polar-orbiting satellites in the Defense Meteorological Satellita program (DMSP) to satisfy most of ita requirements. However, DMSP was desigrredfor national and stratagic weather support and doss not satisfy many of the Armys tactical and operational needs. These satellites, because Oftheir restrictive cov-


Aprd 1987


erage, are usually not avadable when reqrured by the ground ccmuxrander and cannot provide cmtical and timely data. To correct this, there is an effort under way w]thm the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to document Army envmonmental sensing requirements for the next generation of weather satellites. Navigational aids are progressing beyond the traditional compass and map (which wi fl never be totally replaced). Modern warfare requires that Army units deternune their location and then rapidly and accurately position their weapons and supporting systems, Tbe Army has committed substantial resources to the development of the ground-based Position Location Reporting System (PLRS). However, PLRS does not satmfy all the ArIuy requirements for positiorunavlgatlon which creates a void that ]s being filled by the space-based Global-Pos]tion]ng System (GPS). As a result, the Army M committmg re. sources for the development and purchase of GPS recewers for use hy foot soldiers, land vehicles and ancraft. GPS will not only provide more accurate navigation but wdl also provide more accurate weapon system targeting. Although satelllte commumcatlons WIIInot solve all of the Armys commumcations problems, iandhnes and couriers are not the scdutmn either. The ideal commumcations system to support the Army would be an appropriate mix of ~ound- and space-based communications systems. The diff]cult question which the Army continually tries to answer is, What LS the appropriate mlx~ Clearly, the Army must rely on satelhte commumcatlons to accomplish Its mission when the employment of other systems M Lmpractical. The problem for the ArIuy ISthe lack of ava]lable space assets to support the Armys requmements. Unfortunately, people wltbm and outside the Army, who have the same attitude as Bruce-Brlggs, have relegated the Army to accepting leftovers from the other serwces Tbe Army must be a credlhle player In the space arena, -\ to include prowdmg the resources reqmred to en. . \ sure that crltlc~i s~ace-based assets are avadable to the ground commander The Army must take advantage of space systems which can support the ground commander As the old saying goes, <ThereMno such thing as a free lunch The Am Force and the Navy w*III not allow the Army to benefit from then work wmhoutcontributing Its fair share. The future of the Army may not be [n the envwonment of space but, as we approach the21 st century, the Army as space system support becomes must progress commonplace and not staguate with the idea that its place ISin the mud. The space age will come whether the Army chooses to purticipata or not. The Army must not miss the opportunity to ap. propriateIyuse space. Be aasuredthat our adversary is capitalizing on space to support hmarmy. LTCS John R.French Jr.,Ronald J. Fa?kenhmck and David Jefferson Barker andDavid TibJ& Jack B. Tombrells andMr.Elberl S. Kennedy, CPT Fort Lemfenwonh, Kansaa Army Spaceinstitute,

Deception Plan Revealed

Tfus lettar M a rejoinder to Major Thomas A. Savoies article, Are We Deceiwmg Ourselves?, in the March 1987 Military Reuww. My rejoinder is based upon the following facts The US Army Intelligence Center, the Army Development and Employment Agency, the Combined Anus Combat Development Activity (CACDA), the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC ), the US ArIuy Materiel Command (AMC ) and the Department of the Army (DA) have already constructed and are imple. menting an Annywide battlefield deception programwh]ch redresses current doctrinal, train. Ing, force structure and materiel deficiencies. The Intelhgence Center widely disseminated an information booklet on the current status and future plans for the program last October. The program has been briefed to the DA sti principals and to the commanding generals ofUS Army, Europe,AMC, TRADOC, CACDA and$he US Army Logistics Center, and to other seruor Army leaders. Near-term program efforts will result in doctrine, trammg, force structure and matariel being simultaneously fielded during Fiscal Year 1988. Inshort, although Savoles effort in developing the article is, from my perspective, both commendable and laudatory, It is perhaps regrettable that ]t only now corneato light. My hope m that the article spurs the Army ta embrace the fruits of our program with ae much enthusiasm, speed and energy as we have expended while sow~ngthe seeds. Thad S. Strsnge Jr.,
Battlefield Deception Office, USAmrylntelligence Center and School, ForlHuachuca, Arizona


April 19a7


RAPID GRAVEOIGGER 7he US Army lsevaluabng a mcdtfled commercial gravediggmg machine that may be requlrti In mnshuctmg temporaty cemeteries on future baftleftelds untd Wartime conddlons allow bedtes to be processed and shipped for ftnat burial. Studies have shown that the rapIdly changing, flu!d conditions of future warfare may require temporary cemeteries for casualties and that graves regwtrahon compames WIII need gravedtggmg equipment that !s faster andmore efflcmnt than the standard backhoe currently used To meet the requ{rerhent of dtggmg a grave every 15 to 20 mmutes. the US Army Troop Supporl Cornmands Belvoir Research. Develop ment and Engmeertng Center is ex. pertmentmg with a graved!ggmg machmeproauced bythe SEMCO Mamdacturmg Company of Pharr. Texas Themachlne has beenmodl. fied to excavate smaller. shallower graves for bodies m bags rather than caskets. Usmgasenesof rotatmgbuckets on an ad]ustablevertlcal track, the machme can be comb!ned with s!mllar machmes to dlg more than 200 gravesm an average 10.hourshdt. In operat! on, the machine would be towed toacemeterysde where!t could maneuver under its own power durmgthedaggmg process Thema-

Chine could be used lalerforexhumatlons as well,

A new environmental control and a[r-condtt!onirtg system keeps soldlers ndmg Ins!de an armored veh!cle cool even when they are wearing nuclear, blologtcal and chemical proteCtlve clothing The SyStem, built by VSE Corporation, Alexandna, Urgln la, was recently developed by the US Army Troop Support Commands Belvobr Research, Development and Engmeenng Center The equipment, called a mlcrocllmate conditmn!nglcollectwe protecbon system, forces cOntammat! Onfree cooled air mto special vests worn by crew members and troops m armored veh]cles, It can coot troops even m outside temperature up to 12o degrees Fahrenhc+t, llre amcondmonmg unit fNs mto the space formerly occup!ed by an internal fuel tank on the M113 armored personnel carr]er It has a 22,000 -Btu-per-hour capacity, enough to cool 11people Indtvlduals ms!de the vehicle wear the cooltng vests underneath their uniforms, and the cool alr IS pumped from the alr-condlttonmg umt to the vests through insulated hoses


The US Marine Corps has accept
ed de fivev of Ids first two-seat 1AV8B

The trainer vers]on of the Harrier

cumes w!th a mOdlf led, fwO-cOckpit,

Iargedvertlcal than the one on

ta+-17 the

inches AV8Bto

taller offset

trmner mrcraft The Marines, who plan to purchase 28 of the trainers from the developer, MC Donnell Douglas, WIII use the bamers to teach p][ots to fly the AV8B verbcalishort takeoff and landing hght attack aircraft. The Mamma also mtend to purchase 300 s!ngle-seat
Harnerllpdot Hamers

extended fusela e con ftguratmn The forward coc t pltmtended for use by the studentis Identical to that of the AV8B Full fl!ght and eng,ne controls and d!splays are prowaled to the Instructor m a cockp!t Iocated above and behind the student Thetramer alSOCar[leF$an efl-

handling differences caused by the Ionger fuselage Fhghtcontrolsystem computers on the trainer have also been tadored to duplicate fllght charactenstlcs of the single-seat verson


April 1987




The US Armys M!ssde Command recently awarded a $30 milffon demonstrafwm contract for the development of an advanced anbtank weaponsystem-medwm (AAWS-M) that of ftcfals say wdl lead to a replacement for the Dragon man-portabte antlank weapon. The 27-month program under the contract wdl be tamed out by the Ford Aerospace and CdIIMIIUfIl@ fions Corparatlon, NewpDrt Beach, Cahforn!a, andwill demonstratea weapon based on laser beam-rider technology 7hecnntract wdlccver system des[gn costs and the fhghf testing of 18 missdes.

As part of IIS ~cwe to a new arbl. leryftrecon!rol system, the SWISSarmy !s ordering 900 La Gomo 85 forward observer stauons from the SWISScompany wild Heerbrugg Ltd The statmn cons!sfs of Wlds SG4T1 goniometer and an LP7G laser range finder which wdl be produced under a manufacturing a9r0emeRt wdh Slmrad Optronrcs MS of Norway, According [o th; Swiss, target de!ermmatlon accuracy ?sso much improved wdh this new sySteM that the artdlefy WIIIno longer have to foe zeroing rounds. La Gomo .95WIIIenable batter!es 10 engage targets wdh masswe fwe for effect wdhm 2 to 3 muwtes

Ch,na has developed a prototype 155mm towed artdfe~ piece called the &fF45 that has ach!eved a m8xlmum range of 40,000 meters m test flnngs with full bore-base blead ammunmon The weapon has also fired standard extended-range, full-bore projectiles more than 30,000 me!ers. The MF45, reportedly destgned w!fh Western assistance, has a 45. cahber barrel and IS mounted on a convenoonal spht-trail carnage. The weapon has two rubber bre road wheels mounted on e]ther side of a walk!ng beam suspension system to Improve ads cross-count~ mobMy.Janels Defence Weeklfi G 1987


The US Marines. In conjunction wdh the Johns Hopkins Unwersdy Applred Physics Laboratory, F3altlmore, Maryland, have developed an mexpens!ve, expendable drone for use m Iammmg enemy cOmmuncatlons. Ptans call for deploying mtral vetslons of the system thrs year wdh Manne air-ground task forces, N!cknamed ExDrone, thedewce IS 4~zfeet long wdh an 8-foot wing. span According to developers, the drone wdhaccompanymg barrage jammer ISexpected to costless than $5.000 once vOlume production be-

..*, P

. ~)..y

. ... . [


gins ExDrone werghslessthan50 pounds and is made of balsa wood. plast!c and Styrofoam Its desgn and Cons fructlon result m a low radar cross sect!on Powered by a 7-pound chain saw engine, ExDrone can anam dash speeds of 100 miles per hour fully loaded. Developere planned for a Iodering speed of 55 m!les per hour at 3.000 feet. A sllngshot device IS used to launch the drone. Even though it will be expendable, thedevtce can be reused after belly landmgs-AwafJon
Week & Space Technology O 1986.


Aprd 1987



G@dyear Aerosp8ca and Grumman AermspacearecOfn Iefing sixmonth prehmtnary dest t n $Iudies Iha! the US Army hopes will lead to fhe development of a lightweight, nuclear-swvivable enclosure for the h!gh-mob!hty mUlfipUFpOSewheelad vehicle known as the Hummer. The Army wants ihe enclosure wdhmounhngh ardware, protection outriggers and equtpment racks to weigh no more than 600 oounds. Current enclosures that are not nuclear-hardened weigh about 1,150 tmunds The Army feportedlyestb mates it will require 5,000 Hummer enclosures over the nexf four years. An Army campeldwe cnrdract for the nine-month phase two development wto produce two prototype shelters for testing and evaluation. Begmn!ng late th!s year, the shelters will undergo simulated nuclear, mobifiry and environmefdaltncds The Natck Research, Development and Engmeermg Center in Massachusetts !s overseeing the proiect. GUN 9EVELOPMENTCONTINUES makes the gun useful against both ground and naval targets, Theon-camagegun computer accepts both w!re and radm s!gnals from all fire control statmns Unds emplaymg the CD77 are expected to have greater freedom m setectmg deployment sites because of the guns design and the short start-up hme Theremoteiy mmtrolledlay!ng SySteM automatically slaves the gun to target data received trom f!re control rdadons Operators merely check the accuracy and make minor adpIstMents A slate-of-the-art coastal defense gun+alled tfie CD77-wh!ch IS self-propelled and has the capabt(V of employmg gun-and-run tactics cononues m ds Uevefopmental stagesatthe SOfOra Companym Sweden Based on the successful 155mm howdz6r,theF/f7Z thenew CD77 willemplo y arevamped laymgsystem, gun computer and cOmmunlcahonsequ!pment. The CD77W!II have fhe unique capabildy of engag!ng mavmg targetsat very long ranges with extreme prec[slon, a factor that

L.ASERTI?AINING E)EVICES The US Army has awarded the Loral Corporabon of Pasadena, Caltforma, three contracts totahng $40.3 mal!on for the producbon of Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System(M/LES) cOmbat and marksmansh,p tra!nmg devices Unoerih ef!rstconlract, the US Army Armament, Mundrons and Chem!c lCommand(AMCCOM) awarde c?Loral $17.1 m!ll!on for an upgraded small-arms transmdter to be used wdh rifles and machmeguns Thenewtransmdtert s40-percent smaller and kghter than the one currently used and provides for a much simpler atignment of the laser wdh me weapon sight. The semndC=3nfracf-for$214 miIhon and also from AMCCOf&wIll build M/LES-based tm!nmg systems for infantry and armored vehtcles and ms.siles. It WII also prdwde some test aqutpment Under tie fhirdmntracf, worth $18 m!lllon, Lord wll prcduca Iaser-sensdwe target interface deVIC?Sfor use m matksmensh!p @ainmg at US Army tramng centers 4

Anew paint system for the US md tary that resists contamination by chemtcal agents, reflects mfrwed rayslodeterenf?mys urvedlance and prov!des a high-sottds content has been mtrcduced by lhe Mobay Corporsfion of Pdfsburgh, PennsyIvanfa. The paint was developed especIally for use by the US Army for chemical agent-resistant coatings and by the US Navy and Air Force on arcrafr to raduca survedlance. The Army directed more thana year ago that all tact!cal vehicles be painted wdh coatmgsihat res!st chem!cal agents. Conventional alkyd palm systems caussd problems byabsorbmg netve gas and other chemtcal agents, rendering veh,des usefess after being contaminated Mobays new coadng has demonstrated excellent resistance to temperature changes, an important factor m its use on aircraft




GORBACHEV byZhores A, Medvedev. 272 Pages.W. W. Norton&Co.. N.Y. 1986.$15.95. Iu the two years since he bemrne the Soviet leader on 10 Mxrch 1985, the world hae seen a great deaf ofMikhad Gurbachev. Yet, in spite of the international expoeWe resnlting from KIS positive media presence, relatively little has been written about the background of the new genersl secretary. Exiled Soviet scientist Zhores A. Medvedev hae provided Western reader-awith a faarinating look behind the facade of oficiul state propaganda. His book 05era a remarkable view of the forces that are driving the new leader and the entire Soviet state into the next century. The hook does a commendable job of tracing the life of the Soviet leader through the obscurity of the state bureaucracy. IrIthe process, the reader learns about Gorbachevs university room. mate from Csechoslovskia who is credited with introducing Western fashion to his fellow student. The biography recounts Gorbachevscarcer through Komaomol work ssrdprogressive jobs in the regional Communist Psrty committee to hia Polithum respeneihilities for agriculture. The authore own agricultural background lends credibility w hk surprising aesertion that Gorbachev would have received official blame for eeverai yeare of disastrous Soviet farm pohcies If Konstantin U. Chemerdm had lived only one month longer. Aa events turued out, Gorbachev, representing the Andropov faction, M credited with a masterful coup at the appropriate moment in history. Throughout the book, readers are treated to explanations of marry hizarm tricks and techniques employed hy Western Kremlin watxberx. Unfortunately, some of the books etrengths may also be viewed as liabilities. While the authors agricultural mteresta complement Gorbachevs career, many readera will tire of extenwve descriptions of Soviet harvests. Additionally, placing Gorbachevs w-rear in a lcrger perspective leads to tedious passages covering dozens of other Soviet politicians. However, the bwks positive sapecta fer out. weigh any negative features. Gorburheuwill provide readere with invaluable insight inta the

new Soviet leader. That insight may help them to anticipate and understand the Soviet policies of tmmorrowcnd into the foreseeable future. MAR CPT Scdl R.Gouriey,

TUGOF WAR:The Battlafor Italy, 1943.1945 by

DominickGraharri andShelfordSidwell.445 Pages.St. MartinsPress,N.Y. 1986.$24.95. Dominick Grsham and Shelford Bidwellk new study of the Italh Ccrnpaigsl is cn important addition to the literature of World War If for eaveral reeeons. As a comprehensive account of the campsigns most Important elements, from both Allied and German perepestives, the book hse no parallel. Itx objective treatment of Allied aud Gerrur.ncommander%provides a refreshing aftersmtive to the accounta of the ofticisl Green books and other recent po.negp-ics based on them. In addition tu providing a comprehensive oveswiewof the etrntegicdeciaionxwhmb brought the AIhes ti Italy and largely determined the coume of the rampaign, the atithore aleo provide sui%cient detail on battles msdsarnpaigne to illur.trxte their bread themes vnthout bccorning lost in a morase of details. A few themes dominate the hook just aa their substance dominated the campaign. General Mark W. Clurk ~merges as a vain, barely competent leader who despised nmch of his commxnd and whose nationaf arrogance constantly drunaged Allied effortx. Personally brave, he wax, nevertheless, a caricature of what a eornrnander ofeomblned Allied smnies should have been. The authore also establish, to be cure, that, higher up the comrnxnd, General Harold Alexunder was anything but errideal commander in chief. The GsrrrIanecddiere,who were hardly the cream of their army, consistently though not universally proved more skillful than their Allied opponentx. With some exceptions, German leadera were typical of those of World War II. They were calm in the face of vset enemy superiority, resorsrceftdin containing their opponents and in exploiting tactical opportunities, snd possessed of seemingly limitless resources of impmvised solutions to ex-


Aprrl i 987


tremely difficult problems. Graham and Bldwell consistently illustrate the importance of the actmities of small combat groups for large operations and the problems encountered by dlvislons whose smallest umts lacked tactical competence. The authora are crltlcal both of the Air Forces interdiction campaign and the distorted treatment of it in the oflicial histary Graham and Bidwell relnfmce a solid and con-i vincmg text by their ywiic]ouause of pnmaty records from both sides In their search for authori. tatlve informaticm, they combed various archives from New Zealand to Washington They have compared sources, analyzed mconslstencles and reached plauslble~udgments on several controverslal aspects of the campaqgn PartIcuIarly on the questions of Clarkstlmldlty at AnzI (where thev establisb the fact of ovenvhelmin

mgly exploited the available evidence. In short, Tug of War takes a place alongside Carlo DEstes recent study of the Normandy Campaign m demonstrating that old subjectd still offer opportumt!es for diligent kesearch and sober Judgment Good h]story need be neither works of hero worship nor of ]conoclasm. Anyone interested m the Itafian Campaign, Clark or minfantry operations in rugged terrain ought to give this tine volume more than a casual glance. DsnielJ. Hughes,
Comb!ned Arms CenterHtstortan, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Al~ed supe~]onty) and the bombmg of theabbe~ of Monte Cassmo, they have fully and convmc-



979 Pages


by David Random House, NY, 1986

S2995 Emenhower.At War is tbe tirst volume ofa projected trilogy by Dawd Eisenhower on h]s qand-

HOWTO WRITEby Herbut E Meyer ano J,ll M Meyer 102 Pages Storm KlnQ Press, Wash,nglon D C 1986 S4 95

The authors have accompl]~hed everything they prom]sed the reader he m]ght ach]ei,e by followlng their three basic steps to good wrltmS Tb}s ]sanlnterestlng, ]nformatlve,brlef andreadablegmde to good pros+ a I]ttleJewelamong the many Ilnear feet of books on Edward B. Alkeson, how to wr,te already adorning I,brary sheives - MG
uSA, ffehred, Alexandrm. Vrgmfa

THINKINGIN TIME TheILsm 01 His!oIY lo: Oeclsion-Makers by RscharaE Neustadl and Ernest R May 329 Pages Free Press N Y 1986 S19 95

chromcles the use and misuse of history by key dec]slonmaker> ]n relatively recent tImes,offering a prescription for better use of history In the decmonrnakmg process No decmon can be made without history, experienced or studwd, expertly considered or }neptly applled Accordingly, this book challenges every Army decmonrnaker and e~ery sold]er and cl~,lllanwho supports a de. Office of the Command Hmtorian, US Army c]sanmaker -fames T. Stenwaag.
Think/ng In T[JMP Jrammg and Docfrme Command. Fofl Monroe, V!qvnla

ARMS CONTROLVERIFICATIONThe TechMlogles That Make N Hsppen. Eattedby Kosta TSIP!S. OawdW Hafe me,ster and PennyJanetiay 419 pa9eS Pe[gamon Press Elmsford N Y 1986 53495

There are thrce sectmnsin this dl~cusslonof arms control, the verification process, Imaging technologws and momtor>ng The book IS a useful reference on arms.control technology since, as Itsblbhogra. phy showh, most prevmus literature has been either overslmplltied accounts by Journalists or highly technical wrmngs by electronics US Army Research Institute, A{exandr!a, Virginia engineers Charles Oa!e, Thts 97-page history of Fort Sheridan, Illmols, was recently pub. 11.shed privately by Colonel W,lbert W Sorenson The book, a copy of which has been donated to tbe Comb]~ed Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth. traces the history of Fort Sheridan from Its m 1984 as a Naconstruction In the late 18805 to 1ts des}gnatlon

VIEW FROMTHETOWER:AHISIOtV of Forl Sheridan, Illincns by Martha E Sorenson and Oouglas A Mam 97 Pag. es Tower Entmpr(ses Hlghwood HI
1985 S12 50






fatherspublic career. Volumes 2and 3 ofthetrilogy will cover Dwight D. Eisenhowers two presidential administrations. 1943 was chosen to begin his biography because it was during that year that General Eisenhower emerged as one of the principal actors on the world stage. It is also to that year, according tu the author, that one must look to begin to understand Eisenhower the president. The author examines in extraordinary detail the path of Eisenhower from commander, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), in North Africa to the wars end in spring 1945 as commander, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). He explores a number of issues aqd questions, including the impact of coalition politlcs, postwar objectives (or the ambiguity thereofT and general housekeeping difficulties on the planmig and decisionmakitig process at AFHQ and SHAEF. While Eisenhower remains the focus ot the book, the author cleblyplaceshim in theconte@ of the lnrger perspective of the Allied war efforf For each accomplishment, there are periods of uncertainty, extended debatas and the search for compromise. The author provides a number of insights regarding the ways in which Eisenhower coped with the mounting pressures aa the invasion neared in June, especially the ways he dealt with intractable subordhatas over the uir issue and the crisis in December 1944. A greater understanding of the utter complexity of high corn. mand alone makes Eisenhnwen At War worthwhile for the military reader. What the author has accomplished in this volume is not necessarily the gathering of much that is new, hut he has pulled together a maas of both published and archival material and put it into a very readable form. A few minor factual ermra mar tbe text, but they can be corrected in fu-


H)st,rmc Landmark. Amply mlxmg text and photographs, the book also contains a guide to the posts h@.cmc lnndmarks.--SOL Oonald C.Rambadl, USA, 851h r2ivismnManeuver TminingCommand, ForfShendan,


Illinois AFRICANARMIES: Evolution and Capabildies. Edted by Bruce E Arlrnghaus and Pauline H Baker 202 Pages West. v,ew Press, Boulder. Colo 1986 $31 50

The principal focus in this book Mthe fighting capacity of African armed forces, including dimmutwe air and naval forces. Frevious works tended tx concentrate on ground forces and regarded the Africanmihta~ as a principal player in the drama of regime change and displacement. The essays are well-written, carefully documented and usually brief, makmg this an appealing work both for mditary and civihan audiences.Richard Oale,Southern Illinois Univemity, Cardondale, Nlinoia ?

TERRORISM,IOEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION The Origins ot Modem PoNNc81 Violence. Edited by Noel OSullwafl 232 Pa es Westv!cw Press Boulder, Colo 196 8 $2800

This is a unique scholarly treatment of tcrrorlst rationale based on the definition of terrorism as the pursmt of Ideological objectives by the threat or use of violence The essays set out the terrorist mindset and show its operation in vanoue mcamations. To defeat terrorism, we must first understand h Th]s book ISan excellent starting point for such enlightenment Kevin L. Jamlson, Kansaa Cdy, M!ssouri Some md]tary oflicers will not hke this book, pnrnardy because the author contends that war should be waged w]th morality ever in view and that US airmen neglectad this aspect in the strategic bombing campaigns of World War U Nevertheless, those who approach Wings ofJudgnzent with an open mind will profit-it ie different, provocative and certmnly controvemal, Itwill force the reader to thmk.-KennethP.WerreU, Radlofd UmvemnY. Radfonf, Kirginis


ing in World War N by Ronald Schaffer 272 Pages Oxlord Un,versJy Pfess. N Y 1985 S18 95

APrA 1987 .

ture editions. Irsspite of the esoteric nature and depth of detail of much of the work, the author is able to sustain the attention of his readers ~ughout this l~ngthy book. ~hermore, so ~~*t fOra ~locY, he whets hm readers appetatefor the next volume. Jnm!d E.Bmwrr, ConrbatShfdi8slnsMufa, USACGSC

WITNTNECONTRAS ARepmterirrthe Wilds of Nicaragua by Christopher Dickey. 328 Pages. S[mon & Schuster, N.Y. 1985. S18.95. In some ways,jormmlist Christopher Dickeys

temalrm operatives, and Central American mifitm-y offieera is, of nacfwi~, onfy partially complete. It is reveafing, nonetheless, for anyone in doubt se b how smart actkma can beast in motirm ones a US prsaident has made a fiuding and crmgressionaf watchdogs have approved it (often on the baais of incomplete or intentionally distorted information). Dickey tells hls story witfi a remarkable detachment that is ram in the literature on Centraf America theas days and is. therefore, all the more h bs applauded: Shrdlesloatituta, uSASGSC Lawrms% A.Yates, t!ombst

With tti Contms is a disappointing f.mok.Its focus is at once too bread. In 32Spages, Dickey tries TNELOSBANOS RAID me llth Airborne Jumpsat ta cover the fall of Armateaio%moza Debayle in Dawnby Lieutenant General E. M, Flanagan Jr., USA, Niearagus in 1979, the coming to power of the Rettrad. 276 Psaes. Prasldlo Press.Novato. Calt 1986. Sandinis@e, the origins of the counterrevolution I J $17.95. mrd the wer waged by the Cor&aa into 1984. It is The 23 February 1945 raid by Filipino guerrilulae too narrow. When, in 1983, Dickey joins up las mrd the 1lth Airborne on the Los Barioa inwith the Contm.rin the wilds of Nicaragua, it is ternment camp marks one of the finest examples with only one gmrrp,albeit the largest und most of a military raid for humanitarian purpoase. active one, led by a sergeant with the nom de Had the mission failed, the prisonera would gun-m Suicida. Other Contra task forces, ta the quite likely have been slaughtered by the Japaextent that they existed at the time, are mennese. Pharmedin a very short period and rarried tionad only in pawing. out by a division which wes afso engaged in frontTbe heok is also episodic. It centaina huge gaps line combat, the raid was a reaoundirrgsusceas in the nsrratwe of such crucial developments SE which offers important Iesaons in the planning the meanx, methods and Whcies that enabled the and exscution of rescue operations.. United Statea, disaffected Nicaraguams and othE. M. Flanagan Jr. approacheshis study of the er mteresksd parties to salvage what was left of raid by looking at the three rneingroups involvack National Guard, train and organize it, the intemses, the guerrilla and the men of the find recruits and put it into the field with adellth Airborne. By blending officitd reports with quate weapans and supplies. Finally, the books pararmalaccounts, Flenagan adda a humeri eleinaightaconcerning the SecretWar are derived ment to his atary,making it beth exciting and inlargely from examining portions of the Contm fornretive.Of apacialinterest k Flanagans effort to do the Fifipino guerrillasjustice. Unlike mauy ewerienc% tbe Sandinista perspective was HI. mifitary biatoriena,he realizes that the guerrillas tentionally left for enother reporter from ThE Wrsahirrgton Post to cover (a collaborative effort moat be judgsd on their own merits and not for bstween that reporter esrd Dickey woufd have their failure3as conventional infantry. made a fascinating book, assuming the other re1hii book offers an excellent description of the porter completad his assignment successfully). most succeaatil airborne mid of World War IL Aa such, it shoufd have wide appeal. Military offiHaving briefly stated what I conuder to be the shortcomings of Dickeys work, let me hasten to cers will apprecia~ both Flanagans study of aay that tbe book should be considered must 1lth AWwme administration nndcosnmsndprore ng by anyone interacted in tbe current sit. cedures and hls efforts to relate the rsid ta the a ion m Nicaragua snd Central America. The principles of war. Finally, military histariana will appreciate the effort Flanagan spends study. (au orhmpiwedtigether afmcinatingmostic ~ o@rigue and betrayal, of lofty rhetoric and bsring the war from the psta~lve not just of the military but of the civilians and guerrillas who amc acts, of idealistic motives and personal, ulimately deadly hatred, jealousy and rivalry. wera involvad. f& effort has paid off in a finely written, well-researcharfand entertaining study The picture that emerges of a Latin-Arnerimn u { derground network of Central Intelligence of the f-m Bmios raid. Agency agentx, Argentine, %lvadoran and GuaBrian M.Lhm, Univsssily olHebraaks


APril 1987


NEW BOOKS RECEIVEO llm bstmw mpmnded
to bring recently Publmbd pmfes.nal LIKJkS tOthe atte.t,.. of raden BQJkS are not offered for de

HEART OFOAK byTristan Jones. 240 Pages, Bantam Books,

N.Y.19B6.5350 MOHTECASWNO by Dawd Hapgood and DavrtRlchardson 288 Pages Berkley Books,NY.1986.S395. BELGIUM: ACOunbySfirdy. Edited by SteRhen B. Wlckham, 364 Pages. IX Government Prmwrg Office, Washington, O C. 1985. UNfTEO STATES ARMYIN WORLO WAR lkTbe Technical Services The Corps ofEngineeK TOE War Against Germany by Alfred M Beck, Abe Borlz, Charles W Lynch, Lrda Mayo and Ralph F. Weld 608 Pages. US Government Pmrhno Office, Washington, O.C. 1985$31.00. SAFEl_f ANO ENWRONMENTAL Regulation IN INDUSTRUIL MOBILIZATfON by WONam E Dunwachter, Oonald A. Kane and James E Thompson Jr. B7 Pages. National Oefenae Umversify Press, Washington, O C 1985 GULF SECUfNTY ANO THE IRAN-INAO WAR. Edited bv Thomas Naff. 193 Pages Nat!onal Oefense Umvers!ty Press, WasfnngtOn. O C 1985 WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, 1879-80 The Personal Olarj of Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacOragor. Edded by Wdllam Trousdale. 267 Pages Wayne State Un!verady Press, Oetrolt. MIcfl. 1985$2995 THE cOOE OF lN7ERNATfONALARMEO CONFLICfi Volume 1

andVolume 2byHoward S. Lewe1,099 PagesOceana Publv

cations, Oobbs Ferw, N Y 1986 $S5 00. AUGUSTfNESLAWS by Norman R Augusbne 380 Pages VIkmg Press, N Y t9E6 $1895 THE ROAOTO ROME An Annofaled Bibliography by Albert J Menendez 133 Pages Garland Publrshmg, NY. 19B6 $7000 INSIDE THE AOUARIUW The Making of a Top Soviet SPY by Vlnor Suvorov 249 Pages MacmMan Pubbslmrg Co , N Y 1986 $1795 THE GREAT WAR by Woham R Grdfdhs 224 Pages Averj PubOsh(ng Group, Wayne, N J 1986 $2500 chihbouno $1800 paperbound ONE AMERICAN MUST OIE A Hos!ages Personal Account of the Hijacking of Flighl S47 by Kuri Carlson. 224 Pages Cong. don& Weed, NY 1986 S1395 THE WAR OfARIES OF KENNETH SLESSOR: Official Australian Corre$pondenl, 1940-1944. Eddedby Clement Semmler 623 Pages Unwersliyof Queensland Press. Lawrence, Mass. 1985 $4250 ROCK OFCHICKAMAUGA Tha Life of General Oeorge H. Thomas by Freeman Clea#es 328 Pages Unwers,tyOf Ok13h0ma Press, Norman, Okla.19B6 $11.95. THE SECONO INOOCHINA WAR: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Alrlle, Virglnla, 7-9 November 1934. EdltdbyJohn Schh@rt 276 Pages US Government PrmOngOtf!ce,Wa$ h,ngton, DC.19B6 S6.50 THE GREEN BERETS GUIOE TO OUTOOOR SURVIVAL. Emted by Oon Paul. 140 Pages. Pathfinder Publrabons, KaAua, Haw. 1985 $129S

CAMP OAWO: Peacemaklngand POGUSS by Wdiiam B. Ouandf. 426 Pages Brookmgslnstduhon, Waahinglon, O.C. 19$6. $3295 clothbound $12.95 paperbound PRISONER OFWAR by Major pat Rerd and MamfceMichael. 192 Pages Beaufon Booka, N.Y 19B6. $1795. BEYOND REAOAFk The Politics of Upheaval. Edded by Paul Ouke 342 Pages. WamerBnoka, N.Y 19B6 $995 THE HAITIAN JOURNAL OF LIEUTENANT HOWARO, YORK HUSSARS,1796-179S. Edltedby Roger Norman BucklSY 194 Paaes UnwersdvofT ennesseeP ress,KnowAle.T efm.1985. $2i.50. PSYCHOLOGY AHO THE PREVEH770N OF NuCLEAR WAR A BLMkof Resdhrga. Eddad by Ralph K. Whale. S91 Pages. Columb]a Unwerwy Press, NY. 1986 S45.00 clothbound $20,00 paperbound SOWEf MILfTARY PSYCHIATRY:lle Tbemy and PracGceal Coping WGb Baffle Sfmaa by Rtchafd A. Gabriel. 171 Pages. GreenwoodPress, Wesfport, Cam. 1986.S3500 THEKOREANWAR Unannotated Bibliography by KeOhD. McFarland 463 Pages.Garlsnd Publishing, N.Y. 1986.$70.00 OIPLOMACYIN A OAHGEROUS WORLO: Protection for Dfplomats Under Nrfefrratimml Law. Ed[ted by Natahe Kaufman Hevener. Foreword by the Honorable Joseph J. SISCO. 266 Pa9es, Westwew Press, Boulder, Colo 1986.$25.00 THE MARCH TO VICTORY: A Grridelo Wmfd War G Bafffes and Bafflaflelds Fmm London tofbe Rhine by John T Gnokman and Stephen T Powers. 340 Pages Harper 8 Row Pubhshem, N.Y. 1986, 51S 95 clothbound. $9.95 paperbmmd. NUCLEAR ETHICS by Josepb S Nye Jr 162 Pages Free Press. NY. 19B6 $1495 ASAM Irratlrmaf Termror PoGllcal Tool byAnat Kmzand And Meran. f20 Pages Wesfwew Press, Boulder. Colo. 1985. $1500 MILITAtlY GOVERNMENT ANO POPULARPAR7fCiPATfONIN PAHAMK ,~e Torrfjos Regime, 1968-1975 by George Prie5tIey. 166 Pages Wesfww Press, Boulder. Colo. 1986$20.00. JOHNNYS SONG bv Steve Mason. 134 Pages Bantam Bobks, N.Y. 1986 S995 GENERAL GEORGE CROOK HIs Autobiography. Edded and annotated by Marhn F Schmltf Foreword by Joseph C. Poiter. 326 Pagea Unweratj of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla 1986 m Q5 INOIA A Count~Sfudy. Edrted by R!chard F. Nyrop 6B8 Pages. US Govammmt Prmhng OffIce, Washington, O.C. 19S.5. AERfAL ESPIOHilGE Secret Infelligerma Flights by Eaaf and Wesi by Olck van der Aarf Translated by Sidney Woods. 167 Pages Arco PubNshlng. NY. 1985.$19.95. COMBAT AIRCRAFT PROTOTYPES SINCE 1S4S by RoberfJackson 174 Pages. Arco Pubbshmg, N.Y. 19S6, S19,95. MILfTARY A1RCAAF7 TOOAY by Chris McAfhster 16S Pages Arco Pubfishmg, N Y. 1985, S9.95. HISTORY OF THE MILfTANY INTELLIGENCE OIVISION, OE-

.. ...


Amhlbald FT.LewSand TlmothyJ. Unw9rsOyPre ss,Bloom,nglon,lnd RLrnyan 192 Pages.lndlana 198S $2250



Bruin W Bldwell, 625 Pages Umverwty Pubbcatmn$ of America, Frederick, Ma 1986 $2950.


APrO 19B7