FM 71-1'
Fight Outnumbered and Win
. I . .
Published by
Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027
Deputy Commandant
Colonel M Bradford EdItor In ChIef
EDITORIAL STAFF L,eutenant Colonel Jam,e W Walton.
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fel'" A Aqu,',lar Adrn,n.stlal.ve Suf)er.",so!
EX OfFICIO ¢;ene'dl Donn A Starr\< Commander Tra,n,ng and Doctrine
Command L Genpral J R lhurman Commande' Comb'flf'd Auns
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(omm,lndef Combmed .4rms Combat Dellp10pment   and CombIned
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ACTIVE T E Blagg Df'partmenf of TactIcs. Colonel Warnp 0 Mpad
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Military Review
by Major Robert P Straut US Army Reserve
by Captam RIchard F. Rlccardelll. US Army
and Captam Gary L Jackson. US Army
by DavId F.' Porreca
by Martm Reuss
by Major Robert R Ulm. US Army
NO 5
by J. F Wallace
by Major Stanley E Henning. U.S Army
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Military Review:
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. I
Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027

Fort Leavenworth Hall of Fame
32d Inductee --   Eben Swift, Jr. 4 May 1979
As a soldier, scholar and teacher, General Eben Swift had a significant influ-
ence on ·the US Army as it entered the 20th century. His innovations as a
teacher while at Fort Leavenworth were important factors' in the preparation
of World War I officers, and his teachin'gs played an important role in their
Swift was born in Texas on 11 May 1854, and appointed to the US Military
Academy from Kentucky in 1872. Although commissioned infantry, he
shortly thereafter transferred to cavalry. He served for II years with his
regiment in the West, participating in the Big Horn and Yellowstone Cam-
paigns in 1876. Hi!, first break from the line came when Swift became Gen-
eral Wesley Merritt's aide-de-camp in 1887.
In 1893, Swift went to Leavenworth to bec!:bme one of Arthur Wagner's
assistant instructors in the history of military art. This four-year period
allowed him the opportunity to improve the preparation of future cam-
manders, After analyzing the failures of Napoleonic battles" Civil War
battles and Franco-Prussian War battles, Swift concluded that the absence of
a systematic means of issuing orders led directly to the misunderstandings
which ofttimes resulted in failure.
To overcome the confusion of order issuance, Swift created "simple tac-
tical forms" to meet various situations. The standard form was a five-para-
graph order which gave information on the general situation, the objective,
the disposition of troops and tasks assigned the command, instructions on
logistic support, and instruction on communications. Not only did this pro-
vide a form for issuing orders, but it also created a systematic method to
solve tactical problems. '
A further advance in tactical instruction at Fort Leavenworth was the intro-
duction of the kriegspiel, or map games. Swift led the way in refining this
German technique and applying it to an American military classroom.
Swift departed Fort Leavenworth in IS98 to serve in the Caribbean. He
returned to Fort Leavenworth in 1904 as the assistant commandant of the
newly reopened school and as senior instructor in military art. Swift's tour at
Leavenworth was curtailed when he was called to become the director of the
War College in 1907. Under Swift, the War College Division of the General
Staff began to develop into the capstone educational experience for Army
From 1910 until his retirement in 1918, General Swift served with troops in
the Philippines, New Mexico and Mexico, and France. He was appointed
chief of the American mission to I taly and commander of the American
forces in Italy. \
In the final analysis, General Swift's contributions to'the US Army helped its
transition from a frontier Army to one of· world prQminence. His contribu-
tions at Leavenworth and the War College helped shape America'.s destiny.
)·J .. 1 N ZHJ\ RD
AT r f\ S "'ORTpr..!
Ai';1\ I\RBCR •
DOD 314
Ml 4tl106
Major Robert P)Btraut, Army Reserve
Defenders can win. llistory ptoved'it at Waterloo,
Tannenberg and the Bulge. Co1ntless other examples
throughout the ages have sho'l".'n that the trained,
resourceful defender ean prel'ail i' spite of overwhelming
odds. Facing a potential enemy va tly superior in numbers,
and suffering the aftermath of d feat in Southeast Asia,
Americans must not lose sight aT t e fact that we still have
the ability to be successful in battle By taking advantage of
our known strengths and by learn; g from the examples of
other su(,(,essful defenders, we ('an ake up for what we lack
in numbers. Vi(,torious defenders,h ve used a combination of
sound ta('ti('s, weapon systems and leadership to triumph in
hopeless situations. In t e following article, one
author refle(,ts upon some of these battles and relates how
skillful use of combat multipliers hi Iped the defender win.
NNOVATIONS in tactics have
abetted fighting men through I the
ages to engage and defeat numerically
superior forces. History has shown
that in the fluid, confused environment
of the battlefield, commanders and
troops which can draw upon the
mental reserves of confidence in 'their
weapons and leadership, nurtured by
successful training experiences, will
inevitably increase their combat 'effec-
tiveness and potential for survival.
'Receht comparisons of Soviet and
Americ\m . relative land combat
strength's give the Soviets a decided
advantage. In view of this situation,
US military doctrine has taken a
marked defensive position. The
Vietnam ,experience has caused some
of us to Question our leaders and our
national iwtll and induces\ us to see.
other     everywhere we look.
Economic\ and political strains may
further w!\aken the common bonds to
even our most staunch allies. Non·
Americah preceptions of our abilities to
survive a major Soviet thrust in
Europe or· the Middle East may
seriously weaken our bargaining
in world· affairs and reduce our
military and political options.!
It is no 'Wonder, then, that the
average American, geared to winning
and success, begins to question our
ability to prevail in the face of a major
adversary. As kids, we were almost
universally of the opinion that the
"good guys" always won, that rooting
for the underdog was the American
way and that hard work always
If we are to retain, if not regain,
that confidence in ourse'lves which has
so typified our American traditions,
need to rekindle the kind of spirit oUIi
forefathers infused into our heritage.
We need to keep our troops informed of
the threat they can expect to face and
the tactics and weapons we are
devising to meet that threat. We need
to develop realistic training which
simulates the type of conditions we can
expect to face on the modern
battlefield. Above all, we need to max-
imize our number one combat mul-
tiplier: the initiative of the  
American soldier. Herein may lie.<jlur
greatest advantage over the Soviets or
any potential enemy. ' ,
A review of historical examples: of
troops who overcame great odds and
successfully weathered massive
assaults of large bodies of superior
forces reveals some interesting tactics
whiCh may be helpful to today's
defensive planner. ,
One of the earliest recordied
defensive victoriۤ by outnumberled
troops is that of the Persian emper@r,
Cyrus, and his defeat of the LydiAn
army under Croesus (Thymbra, 546
B.C.). Cyrus, we are t@ld, deployed his
army in depth, a deviation of the
normal parallel order of combat of the
day As the forces -rof Croesus
attempted to envelop the Persians,
Cyrus ordered a counterattack which
drove the Lydians from the field in a
Approximately 70 years later (480
B.C.), a Greek force under the Spartan
king, Leonidas,. using the terrain
masterfully, held off a vastly superior
Persian army at Thermopylae. The
Persians, attacking througH a narrow
pass, were unable to concentrate their
combat strength> against the, Greek
defenders. Armies of that age, not
unlike today's forces, needed frontages
which would afford the maximum use
of their weapons and tactical for-
mations. The Persians finally
prevailed by outflanking the defenders
when they discovered a little-known
mountain trail. I
Undoubtedly, javelins and swords
do not compare with saggers and ar-
tillery, but the modern soldiers must be
particularly conscious 'of the advan-
tages of terrain, cover and con-
cealment, superior weapons systems
(his and ours) and good leadership.
Physical condition, morale and esprit,
and discipline areras vital now as they
were 2,500 years jlgo. \
An examinatipn of Roman battle
tactics under ICaesar reveals a
remarkable > parallel' to modern
defensive techniques of covering
forces, echelonmel)t and defense in
depth. Caesar usually, placed his best
units in the front to maximize
their initial shock effect. Whenever
possible, the Romans took advantage
of the high ground, thus increasing the
range of their missiles and forcing the
enemy intp an uphill fight. Light in·
fantry attrited the enemy as far
forward as possible and tried to coerce
him into deployment. As soon as the
advancing force came within range, he
was subjected to an intense barrage of
missiles in the form of javelins.
The Romans apparently considered
thl' defense to be an essentially
offensive operation, or at least an
opportunity to resume the offensive. As
the enemy approached the main
defensive line. the legion almost
always charged. We can only speculate
that this physical effort had a
stimulating effect on the troops, thus
allowing them to retain the offensive
splrit rather than sitting in position
awaiting the enemy blow. After a
shcirt, violent melee, the second echelon
would advance, pass through the first
to engage the enemy while the first fell
I back to regroup. Meanwhile, the third
echelon, been resupplied w,ith
javelins, continued the missile barrage
on the enemy's second line.
The fluidity and movement of the
battle placed a premium on discipline
and organization. Roman forces, under
effective leadership, thus enjoyed a
tremendous advantage over barbarian
armies and were consistently able to
defeat much larger forces.' (See Figure
While there is no cbmparison of the
lethal effects of modern weapons
versus those of antiquity, an in-
terestin'g point can be made in the
comparison of battle casualties
between defeated and victorious forces,
The winners usually
relatively light losses while the
defeatea army's casualties were often
ILrghT InfanTrv;
It '..... ....'
A Skirmishers delayed. then fell back to thicken 3d echelJn
B 'After miSSile barrage. 1st echelon charges to engage enemy
C After short, VIolent actIOn, 2d echelon moves forward through the gaps while
1 st echelon falls back to regroup
. )
(EnglIsh) [2j
Edward WINDMlll®
English archers on slight rise cut down French knights attempting to advance
across open valley to front. Archers were positioned in "V',' formation to provide
fields of fire and to maximize their effectiveness. Hastily dug ditches impeded
French cavalry charges. Edward positioned himself in a windmill to better direct
and control his forces
Figure 2
This was due more to the effect of
the disintegration of formations and
loss of control than to the killing power
of the winners. Once the ranks of the
attacker were broken, they were ex-
tremely vulnerable to counterattacks
and flank assaults. The disorganized
force quickly lost all semblance of a
fighting unit and was often completely
destroyed or captured_ This is a point
we would be well to note in dealing
with the continuous offensive
thrusts envisioned by current Soviet
military doctrine_
One of the outstanding examples of
disciplined infantry standing their
ground and inflicting devastation upon
a superior force is the Battle of Crecy
(1346). Hen', an English army of ap-
proximately 20,000 men destroyed a
French force probably three times
The English had the important
advantage of choosing the terrain.
Drawn up on a slight hill, the English
archers were able to decimate the
French . cavalry which continually
charged across open ground and'up the
slope. A mobile reserve (cavalry) con-
tained any breakthrough and served as
a counterattack force. Combat mul-
tipliers employed by the British con-
sisted of hastily dug ditches which
impeded and channelized the French
cavalry charge into the kill zone.
From a strictly military standpoint,
the Battle of Crecy demonstrated the
value of infantry, makjng maximum
use of terrain and firepower, against a
numerically superior force. The
dominance of cavalry on the battlefield
had been shattered, and the infantry
regained its place as the primary
element of ground combat forces. -, (See
Figure 2.)
Another British general
•• i
BritIsh infantry regiments stood firm to foil a penetration and delay the French until
Blucher's forces arrive on the field and strike the French flank
FIgure 3
(Wpllington) opposing a gallant French
foe (Napoleon) gained a place in
history at Waterloo (815). While many
factors· contributed to Wellington's
victory, not the least of which was the
valor of the British infantry regiments,
he' employed some techniques which
can be applied to modern warfare.
Wellington took great efforts to
avoid the exposure of his troops to
direct artillery fire by positioning them
on rpverse slopes whenever possible.
He followed British army doctrine by
using light infantry as in
front of the main battle area. While the
square formation of the BlJitish in-
fantry regiments of that   resented
an opportune target for cont mporary
weapons, it, nonetheless, inimized
caHualtipR by maintaining rigid dis-
cipline and afforded the opportunity
for its officprs to effective control.
. Finally, one cannot fail to ap-
pteciate Wellington's optimum use of
terrain. The French were forced to
charge ::!tross open, muddy fields
which hindered not only their cavalry
but the emplacement of their field ar-
tillery. The French failure to effect a
rapid breakthrough exposed their flank
to B1iicher's Prussians and sealed the
fate! of Napoleon." (See Figure 3.)
A World War I example of a major
defensive victory of greatly out-
numbered troops, and one of the most
crushing defeats of an attacking army
in ,'history; is that of the Battle of
Tarmenberg (1914). With the_Russians
adtancing in two columns against the
German Eastern front, General Paul
von Hindenburg was called from
retirement and placed in command. He
immediately appointed General Erich
Ludendorff as his chief of staff, and
the two rushed to meet the threat .
The German plans in the East had
been to conduct an elastic defense to
delay the Russians until the Western
offensive (the Schlieffen plan) was
completed. The fact that the field army
staff had' already drawn up
counterattack plans almost identical to
those envisioned by Hindenburg and
Ludendorff is Ii prime example of the
uniform thinking of the German army
General Staff.
In the north, a single German
cavalry division delayed the attackers
while the rest of the corps slipped
south to attack the slow-moving
Russian column. The Russian Second
Army was encircled and completely
destroyed. The Germans then turned
northeast to engage the Russian First
Army, but a counterattack spoiled their
plan to execute a second double
In three weeks, the invading
Russians had been defeated in detail,
losing 250,000 men of their
equipment and trains. ure of each
of the advancing colu ns to com-
municate with the other, extended lines'
of supply, lack of reconnaissance and
complete disregard for security con-
tributed to the Russian disaster. The
ability of the defenders to conduct an
orderly withdrawal while in contact
with superior forces and, then, when
. the opportunity presented itself, shift
direction and defeat the enemy
piecemeal, was instrumental in their
victory." (See Figure 4.)
In 1939, obviously fearful of
'Mansurian Lakes
8   __ _
Second Army
A single German cavalry division delays the Russian First Army while Eighth Army'
units moved south to envelop and destroy the Russian Second Army, Completing
the action in the south, the German army shifts north to engage the Russian First
FIgure 4
German intentions in the Baltic region,
the Soviet Union demanded permission
to occupy the southern portion of
Finland. When the Finns refu6ed and
mobilized their army, the Soviets at·
tacked, thus initiating the famous
"Winter War." The Russian forc:es
totaled nearly one million as opposed
to 300,000 Finns, most of whom were
hastily organized reservists.
Soviet forces hurled themselves
against the Mannerheim line, a World
War II system of fortifications in-
terlaced into the rugged terrain, but
were thrown back. Finnish battalion-
sized units, operating independently,
conducted a mobile defense against
other attacking forces in the dense
forest regions of eastern Finland.
Hampered by the intense cold and
rough terrain, Soviet units bogged
down and, w   t ~ their supply Jinel';
interdicted by Finnish harassing aci.
tions, ,. were effectively cut off. These
units were then systematically sur-
rounded and destroyed.
The only. sector which afforded the
Soviets maneuver room to concentrate
their superior strength and firepower
was against the Mannerheim line.
Fifty-four divisions, supported by
tremendous artillery preparations,
hammered at the defenders.' After two
weeks' of continuous attacks and ap-
palling losses, the Russians finally
achieved a breakthrough.
With no chance of foreign
assistance, the Finns had to capitulate.
The Finnish defense had utilized
tactics which had been specifically
designed for the tettain and weather
conditipns. Well-led, 'disciplined troops,
using bit-and-run tactics to disrupt
enemy.: communications and supply
eperations, inflicted an estimated
600,00q casualties on the Russian
juggernaut while taking only 70,000
One of the great defensive epics of
World War II was German General
Erich von M,anstein's resistance
against the Russian winter offensive of
1943. After the fall of Stalingrad,
Manstein reorganized his Army Group
Don and conducted a brilliant mobile
defense, punctuated by a series of
successful counterattacks. Keeping
their lines intact, the Germans fen
back, inflicting heavy losses on the
enemy who held a 7-1 numerical edge.
Manstein had traded space for a
chance to attrite the Red Army. He was
rewarded by Hitler by dismissal.
The German Ardennes offensive
{Battle of tpe Bulge) was thej.\· last
major offensive ~ t   o n of World War II.
Breakthrough of the Allied lines was
attempted in the Saint-Vith and
.Bastogne area of Belgium with a drive
toward Antwerp to cut the Allies in
two. Under cover of fog and snow, 24,
divisions struck the United States VIII
Corps taking them by complete sur-
While the US front-line divisions
(106th and 28th) were shattered, the
shoulders of the penetration held, thus
canalizing the German advance.
Stubborn resistance at Saint-Vith and
Bastogne slowed the advance and
allowed the Allies to shift their forces
to meet ,the threat. Finally, Allied
counterattacks and air superiority
stopped the advance and -eventually
reduced the salient. Germany had ex-
hausted its' offensive capabilities. II
(See Figure 5.)
We have examined just a few of the
many significant defensive
engagements in history. To summarize
some of the common principles of
defensive battle, it would be wise to
The German breakthrough is canalized when US forces hold the shoulder of the
penetration. Determined defense at Saint Vith and Bastogne slow the German
advance and permit Patton and Hoc!ges to drive into the enemy,flanks.
F,gure 5
note that all the defenders mentioned
made maximum use of terrain. Terrain
as a combat multiplier can enhance the
effectiveness of friendly weapons and
reduce our vulnerability to enemy
WE'apons; it can provide cover and
concealment and mask the disposition
of our forces; it can be used to canalize
the enemy advance into selected kill
zones; and it may prevent the enemy
from concentrating his combat
strength at anyone point. -Man-made
obstacles may further add to the effec-
tiveness of the terrain.
In each of the examples cited here,
the defenders managed to rt!tain the
spirit of the offense. This had a decided
psycholoirical effect on the troops and
increased their ability to counterat-
tack and resume offensive operations
when they were presented with the
opportunity. Successful defensive
stands have caused the attacker to
spend his r e ~ o u r   e s at a furious pace
and have often, resulted in the ad-
vancing force becoming disorganized
and confused.
The alert defender then may be
presented with the chance ·to cave in
the enemy flanks or to decimate his
scattered disorganized forces in
piecemeal fashion. Wha1! began as a
determined effort to check an enemy
advance could well develop into an
opportunity to deal him a crushing
defeat. Defensive planners must not
lose sight of this fact. When the last
assault is stopped, the fight has just.
begun. The enemy should never be
allowed to retire from the field in an
orderly fashion.
The single most jmportant -in-
, /
gredient in all defensive victories
seems to be discipline. A massive
offensive assault is designed to have a
shattering effect orl the defender.
Troops must be conditioned to accept
unfavorable od9s and have confidence
in their leaders and themselves. They
should be trained to fight as small
independent units even if cut· off or
A series of tenacious defensive ac-
tions. such as the one at Bastogne, can
0\((', thf' Npl,lr,1n BomlJ
, 34, " , Dup", 'Od\ T N Dupu,
H,HVllj Hdlpt'l & Row I\j
3/b"j p}b
4 Ibid P 71
b /b,rJ p 357
Ne ... &week 1} Ap"l 1918 P
6 Alben A fl.ot. i'l.!C1llo!eoF1 at War SIfdlf>!lY & Ta({,[s M.Jv
197) p b
have the cumulative effect of slowing
an enemy advance and preventing
breakthrough. Elastic defenses' in
depth may bend but cannot be allowed
to break. Mobile reserves should be
available to contain a threatened
penetration and serve as a
counterattack force. Finally, the in-
dividual soldier must be allowed to
exercise his initiative to devise the
means to stop and destroy the at-
tacking force.
7 Barbara Tu(ilman TIle Guns of August Mdcmdlan Co Ny
1961 p 326
8 Sotlhen,ts.,.n N,neteen Fourteen Farrar
SMau<; & G.rOL", NY 197] P 610
9 Jame';, t Golf W,nlE" War Itle F-lnnl&h Conflict
Novpmber 1939 March 1940 S,rateg-y & 1'](I'C5 Jul". 1972 P 27
10 Dupu" and O{l e,t p 1 114
,11 IbId P 1 112
J.l1a}or Robert P Straut, US Army Resen'e.
Q hl#h school hls(ory teacher, and hlS
Rescrt'l' lb cummander, 1st Bat
talton 31 Ith Reglment. 78th DlI...'lbwn
fTralmngl. He reeewed a B.S. from the Um-
    of Rhode Island and lb a graduate of
the USACGSC'. Hlb prel'IOUS aSSlgnment was
S3. 2d Brigade. 78th Dll'ISIOIl •
Satellite Infrared Detectors. A unique array of satellite-borne Infrared
detectors capable of sensing a room temperature object the size of a
baseball at 1.800 miles IS being developed In a Joint sCientifIc project
sponsored by the United States. the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The system IS designed to operate at a temperature of near
absolute-zero degrees (minus 456 degrees FahrenheIt) to heIghten
detector sensitivity In space -Electronic Warfare Digest, All Rights
'> •
. ' l: -: '" ....
_ . ';...AI. '_.-.!' ..
Captain Richard F. Riccardelli, US Army
and Captain Gary L. Jackson, US Army
Since the Oder-Neisse field exercises in 1969. the Soviets
hal'e made a substantial effort to improve their ground
attack aircraft for('e without diminishing their ('ounterair
('apabilities. This effort has been refle('ted in the ground
attack ('omponent of frontal al,iation. Under the operational
eontrol of the ground force commander. the ground atta('k
('omponent will fun('tion in concert with motorized infantry.
armor and artillery to maintain the momentum and ('on-
tinuity of the attack and provide a means for sustaini';g the
100-kilometer daily advances postulated for offensive
HE objectives of Soviet ground
attack aviation have changed
little since World War II. Characterized
by attacks on artillery, armor; in·
fantry, strongpoints and the covering
of water·crossing operations, ground
attack (GA) aviation acts as an ex-
tension of the ground force com-
mander's artillery. By destroying
pockets of by-passed forces and
eliminating targets not deAtroyed by
artillery, GA aircraft will act as a force
multiplier. Additionally, these aircraft
can be expected to break up enemy
and proviqe flank
GA aviation will also support the
ground   efforts in the
followin ways: the destruction of tac-
tical. nu lear delivery systems and
control posts, the neutralization of
artillery and of reserves,
particularly at choke points such as
narrow passes, river-crossing sites and
road junctions_
GA Aircraft Inventory
Soviet aircraft designed for GA
missions have increased substantially
since 1970 in variety, number and
quality. The basic charactpristics and
ordnance capabilities are depicted in
Figure 1. These aircraft have been
configured to optimize air-to-ground
support capabilities, particularly in
cannon and rocket armament.
A new wrinkle in ground support is
the introduction of the Mi-24 Hind
helicopter. Former Defense Research
and Engineering director Malcom R.
Currie has noted that the Hind·D -
version "is the most heavily armed
helicopter in the world" and that it
"carries sophisticated weapon delivery
and fire control· equipment.'" Two
regiments of Hinds have been deployed
in the Group of Soviet Forces in
German·y.' It appears that the Hind
has supplemented the Mi·8 Hip
helicopter which filled the tank "killer"
role until the Hind was il}troduced.
Fixed-Wing Aircraft In GA Aviation
There are striking similarities
between the techniques employed
during the "Great Patriotic War" and
the doctrine published today even
though many changes have been
caused by developments in air defense,
. electronics, speed and employment as
related to nuclear warfare. Today, air-
craft can no longer "hover" over
enemy locations for long periods as
they did in the war because of the
accuracy of modern air defense
systems; large sorties with multiple
bombing and strafing runs by the
same aircraft are no longer the rule;5
and high altitude flight would I be
suicidal by today's standards.
Soviet emphasis on close support of
ground troops may be traced to the
1930s when Soviet aircraft were
assigned to geographic military dis-
tricts. Because the district commanders
were responsible only for their areas, '
their aviation elements assumed the
role of supporting ground force
maneuvers. Hence, Soviet aviation
bpcame an arm of the ground force
commander's arsenal and an extj!nsion
of his artillery.7 It. should then be of no
surprise that two-thirds of Soviet air
strength in World War II was devoted
. to ground force support."
Certain World War II practices may
be expected to be used today, including,
the phasing of attacks, maintaining
the tempo of attack and use of surprise.
In the war, tactical air support was
divided into two phases. The first
phase, or preparation period, was
timed to coincide with artillery fires
against enemy artillery emplacements,
strongpoints, headquarters and com-
munication centers. The goals were to
.disrupt communication and troop
control and to neutralize separate
The second phase, or -air support
stage, centered upon protecting ground
forces in breakthrough operations,
providing additional fire support to
infantry and tank units, neutralizing
strongpoints, reserves and
counterattack groupings and providing
advance reconnaissance.
Other .aspects of GA aviation

MI24 Su 78 Su 17"20 22 Su 19 MIG214 MIG27 Flogger 0
'ndelles Hind Fitter A flUer Cl Fencer A Fishbed·
Year deployed 1971 72 1959 1972 1974
1968 701
1970 1977
Overall length (meters) 1699 1737 21 65 21 28 1576 168
Wingspan I rotor diameter 1705 892 1295 10 B' 715 B 16/14 24
Imln'max)   180
A Model 2NR 30mm 2NR 30mm , ¥23mm Gsch J Model 1 barrel 23mm
127mm guns In guns In gun and tWin tWin 23mm Gathng.gun
MG wings wings 23mm guns guns
o Model under fuselage

Bombs Up to 7- 750kg 2'750kg 6'500kg 250 to Conventlonat 8"500kg or
250kq'f. 2"500kg 0'
500kg 16·250kg.
4-S00kg 6-' OOOkg Nuclear Nuclear 1
GUided Mlss.lps' 4'AT2 2-AS7 Kerry 2'AS7 Kerrv 4-ASMs
Ma.,mum Range
360 500 700) 2000 1 11S 1 300
32,S5 4-1657mm 4-16 57mrn or 4-16 or 4-32' 57mm and
S5 516 521 S24'0
Tvpe rockets or 10·160mm 57rnm rockets 240mm
10-160mm rockets or rockets
rockets 4<l40mm
pod up to
1 Soviets appear to be developing an eqUivalent to the US Air Force A 10 ground attack aircraft
lHind-A with anhedral stub wmgs. Hmd-B with straight wings. Hind-C IS Similar to A version except tall
rotor IS on the right Side, Hmd-D front fuselage redeSigned to enhance gunship capability Unlike the pilots for
other types of hehcopters. Hmd pilots are only officers
lThe Su-20 and Su-22 are export versIOns of the Su-17
Fishbed-N probable el\port verSion (ground attack a secondary mIssion)
"'Two dimenSions used for retractable winged aircraft
SEither bombs or rockets
lAn-to-surface miSSiles only
BAS7 Kerry alr-to-surface miSSiles (so(-mlle range on Hind-AI
957mm rockets can be fitted with shaped charge. fragmentation or chaff dlspensIOg warheads
S5, 516, S21 and S24 rockets are 57mm. 160mm, 210mm and 240mm respecttvely
1 .
during the war included the protection
of flanks and the destruction of enemy
withdra'wal routes,' As tank elements
were limitlld in ,the ammunition they
could "carry, GA aviation provided
fire support while tank elements
. on new stocks of ammunition.
This may hold true today sinGe the T62
'tank maintains a basic load of 40
rounds as compared to the M60Al
tank's basic load of 63 rounds.'"
- Strong emphasis w'as also placed on
achieving tactical surprise and
avoiding stereotype patterns. The
Soviets quickly learned that repeated
use of the same techniques quickly
lowered battlefield success. Use of new
maneuvers, unexpected turns and
strafing and approaches from
unexpected directions were en-
couraged, and the best pilots learned
quickly.11 -
Critical to GA .aviation operations
. will be the selection of approaches or
corridors to the objective. Almost
wit!)out exception, aircraft will ap-
pro'ach at low altitudes to avoid radar
·detection. Routes are planned to avoid
tpe m""jority of antiaircraft sites. Cor-
ridors v.'hich are most sheltered' and
shoftest to the objective may be
selected in order to aircr;'tft for
the least possible time beyond Soviet
front-Iioe forces. Also, enemy airfields
and large inhabited areas may be by·
GA aviation is essential in the
protection ,of ground forces from unex-
pected elements of resistance. For ex-
ample, 'in the meeting engagement
where the, tempo of battle will be quick
and violen,t, Gf>. aircraft will protect
the flanks '{)f maneuver elements and
prevent   if not the
annihilation: of - forces. Attacks on
target\;, suppressive fire on
enemy concentrations will give ground
units more time to coordinate, their
The Soviets will not be restricted to
use of permanent airfields. Planes and
helicopters may operate from such
hasty bases as hard surface roads or
suitable helicopter landing areas.
Helicopter Employment
The deployment of helicopters like
the Mi-24 Hind in large numbers
reflects a Soviet belief in the mass use
of new weapons to' effect major
changes in methods of combat
operations, I I A Soviet expert in
helicopter tactics has noted that the
success of offensives would be doubtful
"unless mass use is made of
helicopters," and that "the mass
employment of helicopters is becoming
an objective necessity in the tactics of
land forces."I' .
The Soviets will use attack
helicopters against a variety of targets,
The primary point targets are tanks
and other armored vehicles. '5 Inten-
tions in this respect were clear when,
in the 1967 exercise, Dnieper. Mi-4
helicopters fired antitank guided mis-
siles (ATGMs) at armored vehicles,I6
The Soviets believe that helicopter
maneuverability and efficient ATGMs
• will allow tank kills beyond the
effective range of antiaircraft weapon
Other targets will include
areas adjacent to helicopter landing
zones,'R antitank forces concentrated
on offensive axes and enemy troops.'9
Helicopters held illert status will
serve as a mobile antitank reserve in
• both the offense and defense
and will
be used to respond to "unforeseen,
suddenly arising missibns."21 r
Important planning considerations
in helicopter employment include: first,
coordination with fixed·wing aircraft
for mutually supporting strikes
fighter aircraft fly overhead cover;2J
second, coordination with artillery
elements. In a'recent exercise, artillery
fired upon targets already destroyed by
helicopters of poor coor-
' Finally, as in fixed-wing
aviation, low-altitude routes to objec-
tives are planned to take advantage of
terrain and avoid antiaircraft
,Forested areas and folds in the
tertain will provide ambush sites fqr
"popup" firing,20 and camouflage paint
will assist in concealment.
ditionally, Soviet military writers have
noted that helicopter pilots have been
extensively practicing night attacks
using rockets and machineguns.
The "popup" technique of firing has
gained considerable notoriety for its
projected success on the battlefield. As
observed in the December 1977 Armed
Forces·Journal, this technique is likely
to be extraordinarily effective. In citing
"Red Flag" exercises conducted in
June 1977, the Journal reported that of
the 256 times attack helicopters ex-
posed themselves to enemy forces, they
were spotted only 39.5 percent of ,the
Terrain and weather conditions per-
mitting, Soviet helicopters need not use
the "popup." They may fire from
ground-level concealed positions .. Also,
they may conduct  
runs with machineguns and rockets
and, at a higher altitude, even drop
After launching ordnance,
helicopters will evade antiaircraft fire
by using such maneuvers as sharp left
or right turns and prompt departure at
low altitude using terrain and
vegetation masking.
It appears that gunships will nor-
mally fly in groups of four aircraft.
Two or more of these flights may
operate in the same area, with one
group acting as a diversion to draw
attention and antiaircraft fire while
another group closes in for the
Or sequenced attacks on mul-
tiple axes may be attempted,33 If one
pass' is not sufficient, flights may
conduct additional passes, probably
from different directions." .
Helicopter and Fixed-Wing Aircraft Tactics
GA aircraft can be expected, as they
approach the target area, to utilize the
basic tactical techniques of low-level,
contour and nap-of-the-earth flying.
Additionally, helicopter movement
may resemble US Army concepts for
traveling, traveling overwatch and
bounding overwatch, Movement by
planes will probably be formation-
dependent because the aircraft have
limited view to the front and maximum
visibility to the right and left sides (see
Figure 2).
There appears, to be no set rule for
the number of planes used in a sortie
although the Soviets usually operate in
pairs or multiples of two. Normally
traveling at speeds of less than 500
knots, aircraft will penetrate enemy
defenses at less than 1,000 feet above
ground level.
Rocket and missile attacks (Figure
3) would be best suited against mobile
ground targets, while employment of
bombs (Figure 4) would be effective
against stationary or hardened targets.
eForward visibility is
extremely limited
e This is the area where
the fighter will be most
likely to see the target
Source Field Manual 90-1 (HTF), Employment of Army Aviation Units in a
High Threat Environment (How to Fight). Department of the Army.
Washington. D Co. with Change 1. 20 May 1977. p 2-12.
FIgure 2
Bombing techniques will vary and
may include high-altitude release
(gravity drop), dive bombing from high
altitude, dive-toss release, low-altitude
bomb aiming system and low-level
penetration (popup and laydown). 'h
A basic rule for missions will be
, thorough planning and target
detection on the first run at the ob-
jective." Also, the time from target'
acquisition to overflight of the ob-
jective will be measured in seconds,
thus reqUIrIng acute perception and
precision bombing and strafing by
The Ground-Air liaison System
Soviet doctrine recognizes that tac-
tical air operations require highly
organized, firm, continuous control
and coordination;'" The air force's
frontal aviation contains tactical air
armies which are subordinated in
wartime to a front commander and in
peacetime t.o a military district or
group of torces outside of the Soviet
This system originated in a 1942
reorganization which eliminated the
attachment of air divisions to ground
armies and placed all frontal air assets
under an air army commander subor-
dinate to a front   The air
army commander function$ as the
deputy commander for air mia-tters fer
the front.,j
Attack from a combat turn
The front commander allocates
specific responsibilities to the air com-
mander, and decisions are made on the
mission types, numbers, priorities and
areas of interest as well as type of
assistance the ground- forces will
The following elements in
planning. are then developed by the
front including the air officers:
• Crossing points over the front line.
• Air-ground signal procedures.
• Target designation means_
• Coordination with air defense
Source: V. Pavlikov, "Air Support for Ground Forces," Soviet Military Review,
December 1967, pp 13-14
Figure 3
Bomber maneuver "steep climb"

Bombing from climb
Position of the plane:

1-at the moment of targ(lt detection ,<"
2-at the moment of bomb release
Source. V. Pavl,kov, "Air Support for Ground Fontes," Soviet Military Review,
December 1967, pp 13-14.
Figure 4
The Soviets also send air army
liaison officers to lower echelons to
assist in planning and control. At
army level. the air force liaison officer
iR known as the "air force represen-
tative," He and his staff assist in
developing the air support. aspects of
the fire plan, They process and
transmit air support requests from the
divisions and suhmit army-level re-
quests to the supporting air
regiments." At division level. four to
six 'air force personnel coordinate
  The division air force represen-
tative's staff may include "air force
guides" who are used:
, .. under special circumstances. , .
to work m close coordination with a
ground force division ... commander
at his forward command/observation
post tv provide air-ground attack
Air liaison officers, inciuding air
force guides, may also be sent to
regimental leveL" Some sources even . r
report use of forward air liaison troops
down to battalion level.
Air divjsions or regiments may be
subordinated to ground armies for
specific operations, and armies or
divisions may be allocated sorties.
Commanders of supporting air units
will attend the intelligence and opera-
tions briefings of the ground units. 50
The method of guiding GA aircraft
to their targets may be by' visual
navigation' or through the use of
radios, radIo direction I finders, radars
and on· board 'navigational systems.
Ground-based electronic guidance
systems are controlled by the air army.
In attacking point targets, a pilot
will remain under the control of the
command post radar until he exceeds
radar range, at which time he will rely
on visual navigation over a preplanned
An additional approach control
measure used in the past includeli a
procedure by which aifraft flew over
checkpoints, and the the ground
control elements signal d mission con·
tinuation or termination.
In the target area, air represen-
tatives or guides will rse radio com·
munications to contro air strikes on
targets and may divert planes from
other missions to assist, while ground
units will have a E' adio link to
gunships." ther methods
of and desi nating targets
have included the use flares, smoke
pots, panels, fires, artillery and small
arms tracer rounds.
1 Leslie R Drane Soy'et 1a('ll(.al   Doctrone a research
papel lor the US All FOILe A" War COll89r Ma" ..... ell Air Force Base
Ala 1976. p 18
2 TactiCS and Organ,zatfon of So",e Ground ForC85 Different
Parts Truppendlenst Taschenbuch IWe t German,;} tran'ili:lted by
the US Army foreign SCIence and TeChfoJ09y Center D 23
3 HInd D was a Suppnse Arm a Forces Journal March
1977 D 7
4 Walter Urbach Jr Beh,nd the Hind United Stares Army
AViatIon DIgest Apnl 1977 p 26
5 A Kankh AIr Support Sov.et MdI(ary Reovl8w September
1912' p 21
6lb,d, P 22
7 Drane op CIt p 10 and V D srkOIOVSklY SOVIet MI/ltarlf
StTateglf translated by Harnet F. Scott rane & Co Inc
NY 1975 p 12
Trends and Conclusions
Soviet GA aircraft have bl!en ex-
panding in numbers and importance
for arms operations. A con-
tinued incrdse in the quantity of
attack helicopters will probably release
planes presently allocated to GA mis-
sions for deep penetration and inter-
diction operations. No doubt, the
sophisticated Soviet ground force air
defense umbreUa has decreased the
need for the quantities of interceptor
and fighter aircraft used in the past,
thus aUowing the Soviets to iricrease
production of other types of aircraft.
Soviet aircraft design, ordnance'
and electronics advances cannot be
ignored. Technological breakthroughs
in the West are soon acquired by the
Soviets and quickly transferred to
deployed military hardware.
Finally, the emphasis oDj low-level
flight and the increased quality and
quantity of rocket and missile ord-
nance, including "fire-and-forget"
ATGMs, carried by planes and
helicopters, will make Soviet GA
aviation a formidable power on the
8 A!'5her Lee The   A,r Force The John Day Co N'f 1962
p 158
9 V Verak.sa Air Sov,etM,htaryReVlew Aprd 1973
pp 38 4t
, a A W McMaster III SOYIet Armor A Study In EffiCiency
Armor January February 1978. p 31 The baSIC load of the 772 tank
IS unknown
11 A Kartkh ImItatIVe In Air Combilt Sov,et M,htary ReView
March 1973 pp 24 27
12 V Pavli!o·.ov Atr Support for Ground Forces' Soviet M,litary
ReVIew December 1967, p 12
13 V G Reznlchenko Tactu:"s (The O'frcer S LlbraTIf/. translated by
the foreign SCience and Technology D,Yr$lon. US AIr Force, p 23
(ongmaU". publjshed by Voyennoye Izdatel stro Moscow. USSR,
1966) •
14 M Belav 'Helicopters and li;md Force Tactics SOVIet M,lJCary
Review December 1976 p 22
15 M Beiov Hellcoplers U5ed b" Ground Troops SOVIeT MIlitary
Revle"", April 1976 P 31
16 Graham H Turb!vtUe A S):yv>et View of Hehborne Assault
Opera"ons Mlttaf\, RevIew Oct<)ber 1975 p 5
11 Belav Hehcopters and Land Force Tactics Soviet MII,tar'f
Rev,s'" Of) Cit, P 23
18 BPIOv Hf'locopter!, U!.ed b" G'ound Trobps M,htalv
Of) C't .
19 F Semyanovsl<,y Above the Bautefleld Kra.snya b'sl(Ja 26
August 1977
20 Graham Turb'vl!le Jr The AHack Helicopter c; Gro ...... mg Ro!e ,n
Russlan Combal Doctrine Army December 1977 pp 30·31
21 l,eufenant Colonel ,lessons ,n (oardona!,on
Krasnjfi1 lvelda August 1977
22 Turb<Vtue The Auacl< Hell(.ppter s GrowIng Role ,n RussIan
Combat Doctnne Army op "t P 33
23 V Gatsolaye\t When Are In the Air 50",,['t
M,lIrary SePlember 1974 Ip 13
24 lak.harenko op Cit
2'::0 SpmVa'10vSk,'I' Of) (A P 43 M Belo\t Hel'copters ,n Ant'tank
\lVrrrlrrrp Vovpnnyy Vcnln,i< J;'Ipuarv 1974 V E:I,zbaraskhvl
Hpl,coph'r., Allarl"ng I(r<lsnya k';lPl'oa 26 December 1976 A
Yutk,f\   on Cumbal Course Thl:' Main Th,ng 15 [ffee
"",eness an"d Quahlv KriJSflyiJ 28 1977 5 Andnanov
iHl,rt VI'   rleh{Ople'S AlP Engagf'd ,n Bailie SaVf't5h,'i
Vo,n 3 februJr'l' 1975 and Gat50layp\o Of) Cft P 10
:116 Yurk,n of' or and AndrIano", aOd Udoy,(:.henko op "r
'27 Belol! H8],('oplers rn Anl>lank Wartare Sower Mlllrary
Rey,f'v. Of) vI p 12 and Ehlbarashlll!< op cd
28 )'urkln op Cd and A Khorobrykh Thp HPh(optpr GunShIp
Al1.:1l"-.S /(rasnva IvenJa 6 June 1976
29 Kl"lorobrYllh op e,r
30 Ib(d .:!nd B810\l Hpl'CQPtC!n, ,lnd Land Fo<ce Taches
M,f'ti'l/1' Relt'ew OP CIt P 24
31 GarsolawlI op e,t
32 OP Cd
33 Gatsoli1yl'v op c ,t
34 S('mvilnovSII,,,. OP ('I
35 Wdham 0 Sraudenm8'£'[ D'V'5«(lndl A,r Defens€'-Ho\l\o Much
I." FnOugh' A,r De/ensf' Mayal,n/:, Seplpmopr 1975 p 3'.) ar,d
Captam RIchard F. Rlccarde/il IS WIth the
OffIce, of the Deputy Ch"f of Staff. in
{(,{hgenct'. lIt'adquarters. US Army, Europe.
ann Sept'nth Arm}. HC'ldclber{;. Germany He
rf'c(,ll..'C'd a B.A. from Seton Hall UniversIty
and an IiI S from OhlO UnWl'rslty He has
sl'Tl,C'd u'lth the US Army Intefltgenc(' Center
flnd School, Fort Huachuca, Anzona HUi
artl( Ie "Camuuflage and DeccptlOn-Sol'let
Style" appeared m the' February 1979 M/htary
Field Manual: {FM 44 1 {HTF), uS Army Air Defense Artillery
fmpfoymerlf (How to F,ghU Department of the Army WaShIngton.
DC, 25 Marqh 1977 p A 7 •
35 FM 44 1 (HTF) 1./6 Army Air Defense Artdlery Fmployment
(How to Flghll op CIt pp A· 10 and' A 11
37 N Kullk.oy The Bomp,ng Range SOVlti!f M,JrtBry ReVIew,
August 1975 p 34
Operat'ons of the Soviet Army US Army Intelligence
Threat AnalySIS DetaChment (uSAIT AD) Report Nurnber 14 u 75
Deparlment of the Army Washington DeMay 1976 p 232 and
Ka',k.h OP Cit
39 HandboQIc on the SovIet Armed Forces, DDB-2580 40 78
Defense Intell,gence Agency WaShIngton DC February 1978 p
4D Atell.and¢r Boyd The So,lIletAITForceSmce 1918 Slem & Day
NY 1977 p f41
41 MIlitary bperat,ons of the SOvIet Army OP Cit. p 237
42 Handboo,. on the Sov,et Armed FOfc-es, Of) Cit P 106 •
43 Ibid
44 CQnceprs of Tact,Ci3f Au Supporr of GrOund Operations
75 DAMI TA 817 USAITAD Department of the Arm\! Washlngton
DC Noyember 1975 'p 2 !
45 Fnednch W,ener The ArmIes 01 (he Warsaw Pact Natrons
translated b\! Wilham J lew.s Car! Ueberreuter Publoshers VIenna
1975 P 152 '
46 (biG
47 IbId and Soviet Concepts of Tactical 4,,' Support 01 Ground
OperatIons op Cit p 2
48 WIener op Of p 152
49 Mfhtary Opf'rattOns of the Sov,et Army op CIt p 238
50 IbId ,
51 A SU1\!dnoV Pilots NaYlgallona! Tra,mng SOVIet M,J,tar'y

op c,t P 38 :
')2 A FeCioluv Sedrch and Attack ot Pmpo,nt Targets
Mr/(fary ReView December 1971 p 22 as CIted m Drane O{J CIt P
• 1)3 Verak.sa, OP [It P 39
54 Kar,!,.h 'AIr Support Sov,et M,lItary Reillew Op c,t pp 21
22 D'dne op Cit p 33 Turb'vltte rhe Attack Helle-opter s Growmg
Rolp Ill,. Ru551Bn Combat Doctrone Army OP c.t pp 32 33
Captain. Gary L. Jackson is the 52. 2·20th
ArtIllery Ballahon, 4th Brtgade, 4th Infantry
DIVIsion IMechanized). Wzesbaden. Germany.
He rl:'ct'Irted a B.A. m polztlcal science from
TrInIty Ulllv('rslt,}1 and lS a Ph.D candldate
zn gOlx'rn7n:.ept at Georgetown Unwersity He
has senJed'\ as an lnstructor wrth· the
Dcpartment' of TactIcal Intelligence and
MIlItary SCIence at the US Army Intelhgence
CcntC'r and School, Fort Huachuca, Arzzona
David P. Porreca
The author was a student at the US Army Command and
General Staff College when we first started disseminating
the new doctrine on how we planned to fight outnumbered
and win the first battle of the next war. The author not only
agrees that we can win the first battle, but believes we can
win the war. His approach differs from our current tactics in
that he feels that with the elements of surprise and mobility,
we can turn a defensive battle 'into an   one, one
which becomes a battle of maneuver rather than attrition.
lie git'es US the idea, we must decide for ourselves if the idea
is feasible and has merit in the 'near and midterm future.
Fight outnumbered and win!
Win the first battle!
See the battlefield!
REMEMBER hearing it all as a student at the US Army Command
and General Staff College. I also remember the typical student reaction
to the new "buzz words." Incredulous, doubting, cynical; the adjectives
that would ?lOst succinctly describe the mood are unprintable. "
.In studYIng thE" issue, however, some colleagues a$d I began to
examine more closely the decisive battles of history, and to challenge
some of our .own and the US Army's most tactictl assumptions.
Why' did it appear so impossible to us to fight successfully out·
numbered? Why, in Creasy's, landmark Fifteen Decisive' Battles of the
World,1, did the victory helong most often'to the inferior
forces, ahd yet we believe we could not win? Why were Germans so
successful initially on the Eastern Front in the first Year War II
while being outgunned and outnumbered? Why did we believe we had to
aUrit the enemy first and achieve some degree of comparability before we
could gain the initiative offensively,? i
, These questions drove us to seek answers and investi"ate our Army's
history of tactical development. In the process, .,ye found some
enlightening and disturbing reasons for our dilemma. i
In a series of historical reviews and analytical   we were
led to conclude essentially that: I
• Force ratios as unfavorable as those which now confront us have
been overcome by superior strategy, tactics, training arid leadership.
• Advanced technology and the lethality of the modern battlefield
could render force ratios even less mmningful as a determinant of victory
ur defl'at.
• The marriage of advanced technology and the lethality of modern
weaponry increased the importance of understanding and adhering to the
claSSical principles of warfarp.
• We did not have a consummated marriage; we.were still locked into a
rigid. conservative World War II formula which prescribed defend, attrit,
stabilize and counterattack events In sequence.
• We still did not understand how to wage mobile, independent battles
of a simultaneous offensive and defensive nature, which are of a priori
necessity if we are to plan to win a short duration limited objective
As a result of our conclusions, numerous investigations of our
historical reviews and analytical assumptions were undertaken. Some
members of that class' attempted to fight "new tactics" battles in war
games. using our more radical approach. Defenders of force ratio outcomes
22 .
and active defense advo'cates could not, or would not, believe our results
at first.
However, our success in those games convinced even the most
deprecating that the tactics we were proposing had considerable
potential. Although we had worked out only the rudiments of a concept by.
the time we departed for our new duty stations, we believed the ferment
would continue to be maintained after we had gone.
As a result, when I revisited Fort Leavenworth last year, I was
profoundly disturbed that the innovations of that period had been
abandoned, and even the major tenets of the relatively conservative
active defense already had been reduced to sloganeering. Students with
whom I talked essentially envisioned the active defense as a series of
delays on multiple battle positions, effecting attrition until some
slowdown of !pe "blitzkrieg" could be attained and rough comparability
achieved. f
Lateral movement was a linchpin of the tactic, and all the right
systems analysis jargon concerning "target servicing rates" was used.
However, basic philosophical issues like the maintenance of mobility,
expansion of maneuver space, flank exploitation and eastward in-
filtration of "counterblitz" forces were not even addressed. Equally absent
from discussion was the historically founded belief that you could, in fact,
win outnumbered and that you did not need to achieve comparability
before commencing offensive operations .•
In the of rekindling this debate, I'm going to present a
RynopsiR of the essence of the tactic we believed was a prerequisite for
winning in Europe. Recognizing that such a limited explanation as is
possible within these ·space constraints will invariably lend to omission, I
will, nevertheless, not deter from presentation and highlight of even the
most heretical aspects of this tactic. On the contrary, I hope debate,
inquiry and, above all, research and innovation are sparked anew.
. Basically, the tactic we proposed rested, in the first phase, on the
• Fight an "actiw defense" in the first few hours/phase of the conflict
but encourage local penetrations of the forward edge of the battle area
and elongation of attacks along main axes of advance.
• Do not waste resources to meet main attacks head-on .
• Slow main attacks with use of obstacles, indirect fire and antitank
ambush neRts on flanks of main axes of advance.
• Main battle area (MBA) primary positions should be employed to
hold and control the width of the shoulders of the accepted penetrations.
The requirements of a forward defense and the 'maldeployments of our
forceR in being precluded seizing the initiative immediately. However, it
was believed that the cpaos of the first few hours of conflict could be used
to advantage.
Rather than pitting mass against mass, we' encouraged penetration
along those avenues of approach where canalization operations further to
the rear appeared practical. Depending on terrain 'analysis and the
developing b<J,ttle plan, we wanted the enemy to believe his attack was
succeeding wioll in certain sectors, and, when it was to our advantage, we
"created" a "but along certain approach routes to encourage massing for'
operations. • '
, .1 ,
A concolnitant feature of this phase of the conflict was characterized
by: '
L,, ___ .+c ..       ,
, I
i • Armor-heavy unit exfiltration in small numbers of selected battle
II positions and infiltration toward flank and parallel routes for

" g

counterattack. "
• ElJ1pJoyment of high-density antitank ambushes on the flank of
a\tack axes, often in special tank killer teams without armor support,
especially 'for combat in builtup areas.
• Designation of reconstituted armored cavalry regiment/corps
covering force assets as "corridor assault units."
As the enemy attack phalanxes predictably elongated and the
momentum of their "deep thrusts" picked up steam, we "thinned" rather
than "thickened" the force buildup poised against the nose of the
attacking echelons. Unengaged forces, instead of rapidly moving lateraJly
or rearward, sought passage forward along routes parallel to enemy main
attack axes. Previously ex filtrated units set up passage points and
conducted local .protect operations as the enemy predictably sought to
"close" seams on its flanks.
It was at this phase of the operation that the following tactic was
usually employed:
• Small airborne/air assault forces inserted to cut selected main axes
of 'advance at critical junctions on routes of attack (usually 20 to 30
kilometers deep).
I • Infiltrated armor-heavy units rally to predesignated· interdiction

I .
, areas and hegin "curl and scissor" operations; counterattack only where
local superiority ohtains (usually 10 to 2G kilometers deep).
• Reconstituted armored cavalry/covering force units conduct local
"hattIe position" attacks on spt.'cted points on axes of advance; seize key
junctiuns and are prepared for exfiltration and linkup with armor· heavy
The next phase of the battle was crucial and dependent on the
resourcefulness and preplanning of subordinate leaders. The crux of the
issue was whether interlocked units could extrieate themselves in such a
.mannpr as to:
• Exfiltrate to new battle positions, both to the front and rear of their
originally defensive battle areas.
• Or they could survive, by dispersion, in sufficient quantities to
transit back rapidly along parallel routes and form new protective
attrition zones within a newly forming MBA.
When we assumed we were on familiar ground and could exploit the
potential of night, continuous operations and mobility, extrication on
fav(irable terms was considered feasible. If we relinquished the value of
surprise, speed, mohility and the night to the 'enemy, we foresaw disaster.
, )
When played as a game over a series of "time lines," it usually was at
this point that logistic questions of a strategic nature began to control
more the success or failure of the outcome than the dispositions of the
friendly forces If the tactic was played out properly and the
first package of Refor&er and follow-on reserves (especially German) were
in position, we were able to seize the initiative. However, if Soviet air
power successfully coped with Allied Air Force, Europe,
plans and extracted maximum interdiction of our air resupply bas and
routes, we were in for a rough time.
Regardless of final outcomes, which were more dependent on'strategic
scenario factors than the tactics being employed; it is' notable that wo
envisioned a superior disposition of friendly versus enemy forces at the
time gate in which scenario dependence on strategic considerations began
to dominate the decision curve. Or in infantryman's clear text, "We would
win the first battle." .
What we had proposed theoretically and played out in the arena of
games may appear a radical approach. However, it had historical
foundation in the theories of The Strategy of Indirect Approach
and in
the tactics of the German "improvised zonal," "attrition zone," and
Russian "web defense.'" The curl and scissor tactic consisting of a
decentralized series of small:unit pincer actions was put to good use by
'The Finnish motti is a good example of attack by infiltration
of armor assets along the flanks then massing for attack.' Rommel
applied the motti tactic to armor warfare as did Halder." '
'-:Vhat we had accomplished, in fact, was a paralysis of the enemy force
command structure. Our unorthodox response generally confused their
"seeing" of the battlefield. Their first-echelon forces, being force-oriented
when attempting to penetrate forward defenses, were constantly dis-
sipating their strength laterally.

:y main attack ax:s
we feigned breakthrough conditions. However, we actually were creating· I
ever-narrower gauntlets for destruction. By ex filtrating eastward and I'
pincering at interdiction depths, we allowed the first echelon to "spend"
itself on schedule (approximately five days' supply), but without "
"spending" us in the process. i
, What we were attempting to do was create an interlock enemy and
frIendly forces but to maintain our freedom for egress in the proces!;. We
stressed the need for constant mobility and carefully predesignating
potential battle positions along the length and breadth of the main attack
axes. By "creating" rout conditions, we, in fact, influenced where and
when the enemy would attempt breakthrough. This facilitated
preplanning of air support and indirect fire and enhanced the destructive
return experiencpd in our kill zones.
Iil essence, what we proposed was not so much a radical departure in
terms of the past history of tactics, but, in fact, was a compendium of
experience and a departure for US Army thinking. It seemed to us to be
especially consistpnt with sound application, and not just paying "lip
sprvicp" to the classical principles of war.
I'm not deprecating our past efforts and direction. We were conserv-
ative tacticians in World War II and should have been. The weight of
arms, time and industry was on our side. After the Normandy success,
there was no need to take great risk.
But the times and circumstances have greatly changed. Like the
resourceful Israelis, we must learn to "think" outnumbered. The lock-step
prescription of defend, attrit, stabilize and counterattack is a "no-win"
philosophy. It is body warfare rather than brain warfare." It concedes the
advantage of four (offensive, economy of force, \1'laneuver and surprise)
principles of war to the enemy without a szngle shot being fired!
In order to win in the next conflict, we must challenge some of our
most cherished axioms. We must apply some systemic thinking to tactics
as well as to weaponry.
Among the assumptions we must challenge are those concerning:
• Attrition warfare.
• The need for comparability to seize the initiative.



i __   ______ _
, Among the historical issues we should investigate in detail are:
! • Strategy of the indirect approach.
I • Simultaneous offensive/defenl;live operations .
• Specific meanings of "maneuver" warfare.
• Counterblitz tactics-that is, improvised zonal web defenses;
Finnish motti, curl and scissor tactics.
The intellect and imagination of the US Army office/corps is not
stolid. There are some creative and talented officers in this nation's Army
who have yet to be let loose on the problem. The time for to grasp
the opportunity is long overdue. Our current prescription is cine for defeat
or draw. Let us conceive and plan not just to win (stalemate) the first
battle. Let us focus on winning the war!
1 E" S Cre.J$V F,ft{'en Of'(     of the World
S'8ckplllf' Books Harrisburg Pa 1960
2 B H L,ddell Hi'Ht Tllp Strategl' of In(f,fe(f A,f)f)roae/!
Faber & Faber LId LO'ldon E'lg 1967
3 For a synop$l$ 0
thE'se tact,cs see M J Hatcher and
D P POIIPca Almo' Ant,armor Debate Oral, US At""Y
Command and Gel"leral Stall College Repor, ForI
Lea"enwOllh Kan March 1916 or Departr'r'ent 01 the Army
lOA) Pamphlet 20·233 German Oefense TactICS Against
Rvsslan Breal< TllrougI1IH'STor,cal Sfudl'l Df'partment 01 thE'
Army VVd5h,nglOfl DC 4 October 1951 OA Pamphlet 20
234 Operat,ons 01 EnCIrCled Forces German m
R(15S'" IH,!,toflcal DeparTmenT of the Ann"
Wd,>h,ngfo"" DC 14 19h2 DA Parrph!eT 20 255
The Gelman CampaIgn .n Poland {19J9} {Bv Robe" M
  Departmer>t 01 the Army WaShmgton DC 1 B
Ap'!l 195n DA PalT'pl-Jlf'\ 10 ?61 A The German Campaign
.Il Russ,a PIJnnmg and OperatIons (1940 19421 {HJstoncal
Stvrl''ti DeparTmenT of thE' Army Wa,>rmglon DC 22
March 1955 and DA Pamphlet 20 269 Small Umt AUlons
Dvrl1lq file CampaIgn <n Rvss.a {H'Stonce! SrudYI
DeparTmenT of The Arm" Wash,ngton DC 31 Jul" 1953
4 H Guderian P"n7er Leader E P DuHon & Co NY
5 B H L,ddell Hart The GermiJn Generals Tafl< Wlllla'm
MOHO"" p. Co West Caldwell N J 1948 "
6 B l Monlgompry A
  Co NY 1968
Dal'ld P Porreca 1S a semor research analyst With R &
D ASSOCIates. Jlfanna dcl Rry, Califorma He has an }I.[.S.
m pbycholoffY alld IS a ",aduate of the USACGSC A
.... formcr Army offIcer, he has served'in VIetnam and
Europe, commanded mechanIzrd and alrmoblip mfantry
UllIt$ alld sen'ed III staff POS1lz0llS that dealt with NATO
flue/ear poltcy and planlllng. stratrglc and tactical
targetl1l/i. and stratC/ilc mtelhgenc(' analysis
In Memorianl:
The First
Martin Reuss
Commonly known as the "Berlin blockade" or "Berlin
airlift," the 1948 Berlin crisis was a highly complex series of
events. Miffed at their exclusion from the London Con-
ference in early 1948, the Soviets undertook to test the will
and strength of the Western Powers. A series of moves and,
countermoves followed culminated by the Soviet Union's
virtually complete blockade of West Berlin. The West
countered with the famous "Berlin airlift." Thus ended any
hope of a peacetime alliance between the East and West to
replace the fragile wartime agreements. 'jnf'tead, the major
actors entered into a "Cold War" which would last for the
next two decades.
HIRTY.ONE years ago, the first Berlin crisis occurred
This crisis has variously been termed a blockade and an
airlift. Neither term suffices, for neither "blockade" nor
"airlift" wholly describes the months of tension, fruitless
discussions and magnificent human achievement that is the
true picture of this crisis. I call this the first Berlin crisis with
the obvious inference that there have been more than one.
Two which immediately come to mind are the 1953 abortive
uprising in East Berlin and the construction of the Berlin
Wall in 1961.
Other crises involving this city could be mentioned, but
none were more ,significant than the first. Before the
blockade was established, there still loomed the possibility of
creating a united and neutralized Germany.
But, in the crisis' wake, the social
molds' of two divergent regimes
hardened, and the remnants of the
wartime East-West alliance were
The Berlin blockade was far more
than just one more attempt by the
Soviet Union to force the Western
Powers (France, Great Britain' and the
United States) out of Germany. This
crisis helped, in no small way, to set
the entire tone of the ensuing Cold
War. Each country had been willing to
go to the brink of war, but each, in
turn, stepped back. Such was the
pattern between East and West for the
next 20 years.
There are still other reasons why
this crisis assumed such special impor-
tance. The united determination on the
part of the Western Powers to stay in
Berlin gave heart to the German
pebple, gave them se?u'rity when they
had little and provided the military
support upon which to b\lild a sourid
economy. Furthermore, the airlift
showed American determination not to
capitulate, hut to abide by the wartime
agreemE'nts to which the Soviet Union
was a signatory.
Major Causes
The major causes for the Berlin
blockade were the decisions on the part
of the Western Powers to call a con-
stitutional convention to decide .on a
hasic law for the three Western zones
and to institute currency reform in
West Germany. These two decisions
were made at the London Conference
which lasted from February to June
1948. The Soviet Union was not invited
to the conference. However, the
Benelux countries did participate. The
Western Powers, recogmzmg the
futility of working with the Soviet
Union, had come 'to the decision to
carry out the agreements of the
Potsdam Pact having to do with
eventual economic and political unity
even without Russian participation.
The Berlin blockade must be seen as
one of a series of actions instigated by
the Russians to test the will and
strength of the Western Powers. These,
actions had begun in February 1948
with the Communist coup in
Czechoslovakia. Then, on 20 March,
Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovsky, the
Soviet high commander, walked out of
the Allied Control Council meeting in
Berlin. His excuse was that the
Western Powers had shown bad faith
by not inviting the Soviet Union to the
London Conference, nor were they
willing to report to the Control Council
. what decisions had been made at the
conference. This policy, Sokolovsky
charged, was:
... directed against the Potsdam
agreement and the other Four-Power
declsums, a deal whose aims are in-
compatible with publicity and with the
policy of peace and democratization of
Concurrent with the withdrawal of
the Russians from the Control Council
came a series of moves by the Soviet
Union designed to increase pressure
. upon occupied Berlin. Beginning on 1
April, the Soviet authorities refused to
permit mail cars containing packages
to depart from Berlin to the West, and
they demanded the filing' of additional
forms. On 3 April 1948, the Soviet
authorities closed the Hamburg-Berlin
and Bavaria-Berlin rail routes, thus
requiring all freight to move to Berlin
via Helmstedt.
  at the beginning of April, the
Soviet authorities requested that the
American authorities close down the
aid station on 1 May which was
midway on the only highway between
Berlin and Helmstedt. Later, they' re-
quested removal by 15 April of US
Signal Corps' personnel who were
stationed m the Soviet zone at Weimar.
These personnel maintained repeater
stations required for official telephone
communications with Berlin. The
received a similar request to
remove their Signal Corps men from
Magdeburg. The request was protested
by an American letter on 9 April, but
the personnel were removed as re-
On 20 April, the Soviet authorities
imposed the requirement for individual
clearance of barges moving through
the Soviet zone to and from Berlinl
Protest by the British had no effect.
Three days later, international train
service from Berlin was suspended by
a Soviet order prohibiting the two
international coaches from being at-
tached to the interzonal train between
Berlin and Osnabruck.
Beginning on 20 May, new transit
documents were required for barge
traffic entering the Soviet zone. When
British authorities introduced similar
requirements, a temporary suspension
of all barge traffic across zonal bound-
arie's resulted. Subsequently, this
traffic was resumed for a time on a
reciprocal ,basis.
During the second week of June, the
Soviet authorities introduced new
regulations for German travel into the
Soviet zone, demanding special
authorization in contravention of
Allied Control Council directives. Also,
:the Soviet authorities, by orders to
perman railway officials, tried to in-
terfere with in 'the railroad
yards in the American sector of Berlin.
This interference was prevented by the
appearance of US military guards.
Reform Action
During this same week, thE' Western
Powers announced their decision to
establish a common Western currency
and a 'common West German
government. The common West
German currency was the first to be
instituted. The action wiped out
between 90 and 95 percent of the old
reichsmark currency holdings ox bank
deposit claims and provide\l a new
West mark, issued and controlled
solely by the Western Powers.
The old, devalued c!lrrency held in
private hands tended to. seep across to
East Germany where it still exerted
purchasing power. There, it. added to
the pressure of monetary demand, in-
vigorated the black market and dis-
rupted economic controls. Moreover,
immerse supplies of devalued currency
at the discretion of the' Western oc-
cupying authorities could be used in or
around East Germany. Consequently,
the Soviet authorities were compelled
by the Western currency reform to
carry out an offsetting reform in the
Within six days of their official
notification of Western action, the
Soviets were able to improvise
currency stickers to be affixed on old
currency notes, and, four days later,
the Eastern currency' changeover was
Thus, two currencies-and
all that went with it by way of pricing,
tradjpg and economic life-replaced
the common all-German currency
which had been inherited by the oc-
Pressures Increased
As a result of these Western actions.
the prpssure on Berlin increased. On 11
June, the Soviet authorities stopped all
eastbound ra,ilway traffic at the en·
trance point (Iielmstedt), but resumed
accepting traffic to Berlin on the next
day. However, they closed the Elbe
Bridge on the autobahn between Berlin
and tne West, ostensibly, for repairs. A
dNour and a rather inefficient ferry
service was arranged as a substitute.'
Three days later, the Soviet delegation
walkcd out of the. Allied Komman-
datura of Berlin.
On 19 June, the Russians
suspended all passenger train traffic
between the Western and Eastern
zones. All road traffic from Western
zonefl into the Soviet zone, including
traffic on the autobahn to Berlin, was
stopped. Incoming rail freight' was
reduced in voJume by a change of
technical procedures, and water
transport was subjected to stricter
regulations. That same day, a circular
was dIstributed throughout Berlin by
the Soviet authorities. It read in part:
Citizens of Germany;
A separate currency reform has
been announced in the Western zone of
occupation of Gfrmany, By order of the
American,. British, and French oc·
cupation aut/writies the Reichsmark,
the uniform ¢Urrency unit for all
Germany, is being withdrawn from
circulation and replaced by a separate
currency (for West Germany).
Henceforth Germany will have no uni-
form cutrency unit, and no uniform
currency circulation. This is being j
done in defiance of the will anc! in-
terests of the German people. The
separate currency' reform is., being
effected in the interests of the
American, Bntish, and French
monopolies which are dismembering
Germany and striving to weaken her
by subordinating her economy to their
domina tion.'
The next day, Marshal Sokolovsky
sent a personal p r o t   ~ t to the American
commandant, General Lucius Clay.6
On 19 June, the French commandant,
chairman of the Berlin Komman-
datura, invited the other members to a
special meeting to discuss the effects bf
the currency reform on Berlin, but the
Soviet member declined the invitation.
However, three days later, at the
request of the Western Powers, a
quadripartite meeting of financial and
economic advisers took place in Berlin
to discuss the problem of currency for
Berlin. The Soviet representative in-
sisted that there could be no other'
currency for Berlin different from the
currency of the surrounding Soviet
zone. The Soviet Union would npt
accede to quadripartite control of the
currency for Berlin. Immediately after
the meeting, the Soviet authorities
issued their orders for currency reform
in the Sov'iet zone and all of Berlin.
This decision on the part of the
Soviets left the Western Powers no
choice but to introduce into the
Western sectors of Berlin- the new
Deutsche .mark of the Western zones
(overstamped "B" for Berlin). A public
announcement to this effect was made
on 23 June. Coincident with this an-
nouncement, the Soviet authorities
suspended all railroad passenger and
freight traffic into Berlin, citing
"technical difficulties" on the Berlin-
Helmstedt rail line. Barge traffic was
stopped on similar grounds.
Shortly bEifore midnight on 23 June,
the Soviet authorities issued orders to
the Berlin central electric switch-
control statien (located in their sector)
to disrupt delivery of electric power
from the Soviet" zone and Soviet sector
plants to the Western sectors. Shortage
of coal was given as the reason for this
measure. The next day, Communist-led
mobs rioted before the Berlin city hall.
Soviet traffic restrictions on 12 June
were followed by subsequent
prohibitions in the following week.
Westbound road traffic only was still
permitted for a time, subject to Sovie1f
control at checkpoints. Mail and parcei
post traffic was completely suspended.
On 24 June, because of these unaccept-
able restrictions, the American and
British authorities ordered all freight
trains from US and British zones to
the Soviet zone stopped. Traffic from
the East continued to be accepted.
On this same day, the Russians
issued orders prohibiting the dis-
tribution of any supplies from the
Soviet zone to the Western sectors of
Berlin, thereby violating a Four-Power
agreement for supplying Berlin from a
common pool. The Western Powers
thereupon forbade distribution bf any
supplies from Western sources to the
Soviet sector of Berlin. Meanwhile, in
Warsaw, the foreign ministers of the
Communist countries met and sent a
joint letter of protest against the
London Conference decisions to the
Western Powers.
On 26 June, General Brian
Robertson, the British commandant, in
a letter to Marshal Sokolovsky,
  against interruptions of es-
sential freight traffic between Berlin
and the West." That same day, a
Saturday, 100 planes, mainly. C47s,
brought needed gooiis into Berlin.
President Truman directed that the
improvised airlift be put on a full-scale
ol'ganized basis and that every plane
available to the European Command
be pressed into service.
The airlift had
US Commitment
As soon 'as the airlift began, the Air
Force committed itself to "remain in
Germany as long as needed for the
mission."'" However, at first, it. was
very hard to calculate how much would
be needed, both in planes and material.
General Clay had no illusions as' to the
seriousness of the situation. He
recognized that the failure or" the
Western Powers to defeat the blockade
would 'have a disastrous effect on
Germany and, consequently: would
slow European recovery in general. He
recommended to the president that the
United States commit itself to "any
lengths" to support Berlin.'!
The airlift, he reported, in July, had
been averaging about 2,400 to' 2,500
tons per day. This was more than
enough 1:0 handle food requirements,
but it would be inadequate to include
the necessary amounts of coal.!" He
estimated that the minimum needed to
supply Berlin to prevent extreme
hat;dship was 4,500 tons per day.
Furthermore, Clay, at a National
Security Council meeting, held in
Washington on 22 July, expressed his
opinion that the Russians would not go
to war. When Pr'esident Truman
suggested that armed convoys might
be used to supply the besieged city,
CI[},y argued that planes would be more
i '
practical as convoys would be blocked
while planes would not be hindered."
Accordingly, Truman directed General
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Air Force
. chief of staff, to do all necessary to
supply Berlin.
The airlift steadily expanded. By 20
August, 3',300 tons per day were being
carried; by 9 September, the average
daily airlift had reachC'd 4,000 tons."
By the end of August, 100,000 tons of
goods, mainly food, had been carried
into Berlin. By the end of the year,
700,000 tons of food were brought into
the citv. The Americans, who used
n'lainiy' C47s and C54s, accounted for
70.5 percent of the airplanes used. The
British accounted for the res1.'-' Old
World War II airfields were reactivated
and pnlarged. A p.ermanent bipartite
British and American airlift com-
mission was' organized in November
With the complete frustration of
any attempts to arrive at a solution to
the crisis in negotiations in Berlin and
Moscow, the Western Powers were left
with no chOIce but to rpfer the issue to
the Security Council of the United
Nations. The Soviet government was
so informed hy a note from the US
government dated 22 September which
charged the Soviet Union' with the
"sole responsibility" for creating a
situation "which constituted a threat
to international peace and security."'b
The Soviets responded that the United
States, by referring the matter to the
Security Council;
... not only does not facilitate but
on the contrary complicates the
reachin,{{ of agreement concerning the
settlement of the situation which has
arisen in Berlin as' a result of. the
carrymg out of a separate currency
reform . ... '7
Security Council
,On 29 September, the matter was
officially referred to the Security
Council by the United States which
drew the council's attention to the
serious situation which had arisen:
... as a result of the unilateral
Imposition by the Government of the
U.S.S.R. of restrictions of transport
and commUlllcatwns between the
Western zones of occupation in
  and Berlin."
The Security Council considered the
question at several meetings. The
Soviet Union questioned the council's
competence and took the position that
there would have been no blockade if
the Western Powers had acceded to the
Russian position. Furthermore, so the
Soviet representative Andrei
Vishinsky argued, there was no
blockade in the sense of traditional,
international law. Therefore, there
could be no real threat to peace. After
the question was placed on the.
counqil's agenda, the USSR and the
Ukrainian SSR announced that they
wou* not take part in the discussion.
The neutral nations on the Security
Council-Belgium, China, Colombia,
Syria and Argentina-submitted a
draft resolution calling for the
withdrawal of all transport restrictions
and a common currency controlled by
a Four-Power control commission, but
on' the German mark in the
Soviet zone. However, the Soviet Un-
ion, still resisting Four-Power control
of the Berlin currency, vetoed the
resolution_ The president of the
Security Council did create a technical
commission to try to recommend what
common currency reforms could be
instituted. But none of the po:.vers were
especially interested in accepting
reforms suggested by an outside com-
On 22 October, General Clay again
reported back to the National Security
. Council.'Y He praised not only the
technical achievements that were be-
ing accomplished by the men involved
in the airlift operation, but also the
people of Berlin who stood w   t ~ o u t fear
and faced the gigantic task of
reconstruction confidently. \\fhen· the
airlift startod, these Berliners had no
idea how far America would be willing
to commit itself.
As early as 21 July, Secretary of
State George Marshall had said, "We
are not going to be coerced."20
However, actions speak louder than
words, and it was American deter-
mination which proved Marshall
meant what he said. The people of
W est Berlin were united in their op-
position to Soviet domination.
No further action of any importance
took place until the new year. In a
press interview on 21 January, Stalin
hinted that the Soviet Union would be
willing to discuss ending the blockade,
and, for the first time, he did not tie in
the currency question with the
blockade i,ssue. The US ambassador to
the United Nations, Philip Jessup, took
the initiative and asked the new Soviet
representative Jacob Malik whether
Stalin's omission was intentional or
not. After conferring with his superiors
in Moscow, Malik informed Jessup
that the omission was intentional.
Thereafter, the two representatives
engaged in a series of negotiations to
try to find a solution to the impasse.
While these talks were progress\ng,
East and West Berlin became even
more divided. A separate constitution
was instituted by the committee for
East Berlin, and the' Western Powers
declared the West mark the sole legal
currency in the Western sectors. On the
international scene, a historic moment
occurred on 4 April when 12 Western
nations, including the United States,
formed the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, a pact obviously aimed
at Russian aggression.
The Jessup-Malik negotiations were
supplanted the first week in May by
the Council of Foreign Mil)isters of the
four occupation powers. On 4 May, in
New York, they came to an agreement
to end the blockade as of 12 May.2l A
Council of Forei&:n Ministers was con-
voked on 23 May to discuss problems
relating to Germany in genetal.
Republic Founded
However, after a month's
negotiations, the major issues still
remained unresolved, and the meeting
disbanded without any appreciable
results. The same day that the council
first met, 'the Federal Republic of
Germany was founded and a new
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) was in-
stituted on approval of the Western
Powers. The week before, General
Clay, tired and deserving a much-
needed rest, resigned as US com-
mandant in Germany.
By the time the blockade had ended,
1,583,686 tons of goods, mainly coal
and food, had been brought into West
Berlin. The value of all these goods
was estimated at over $170 million'.22.
On Easter weekend, the airlift brought
'almost 13,000 tons of food and coal
into Berlin in a'24-hour period.
At the
el!d of the blockade, the Berliners were
enjoying a slightly higher standard of
living than at its beginning! On the
debit side, 72 persons, including ;n
Americans. had' lost their lives
carrving food am! coal into Berlin."'
l;he crisis.in 'Berlin, together with
·tlll' West German monetary reform
which touched it off, had profound
reperCUSSIOn", In the Berlin cl:isis. the
tension betweehrhe United State's and
the Soviet Unibe Jose to the brink of
.war. Under the spell of the crisis, the
Soviet Union and the United States
w.ent their separate 'ways, the moral
unity of a Western World. under
American leadership was enhanced
and the formation of a viable West
German Republic was accelerated.
J } I " s", ( I ,,I 'Jc,"
v! AH !-'"
11." 51,/< Q'I""j(''Ijl'I BuliN." uS Dpptl'!menl o! Slat£:'

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YI"'5 "; t Sr,t,
oj uS Go\'l'll"\mt'''' Pr,m,ng Qtt,CI;'
D ( J D"cprnbt" 1948 Velu"'l;;' XIX p 423
liI),O" ,lna t1,f' Berl,,, on PI' C,f f1:,4
18 Gt",.,j<l, 1947 US Oep<Hlmen! QI :::'1 ale
">"llt',."I, !lLl> n, 01 Doc   uS Prtl,\>ng Qfhcl'
V .... l'>h··'ql<Jn D l 1950 p 273
19 T'll"''''' .. ,' "I I-l 155 S"'t" ,)1"'13 Lw,u,> Oe(,S1011 ,n
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20 [JP/-M,t"'t'l>I B"lIp(", US Df'parlfllc'nt ot Sla!!:'
'u."'l IJr Do' uS GOI>P,nme"l Pr.n1tng 011,(1;'
OCT 1 948 V:ulume l<;1'I:. p 232
11 (,e,m,.r>y 19471949 0>' (,/ P 274 1=-01 Ihl;' olj,(.,al {\::,pO!\ of
,h," """,,[1, <)(t"Hed ...... Ih.n Ihl;' S"(ur'h (.ounc,1 ,n Orlob!:'!
1948   Co",,,,,, FieC"'<1s Un,led rooar.IJn<; OGlotWf 1948
... ,)1,>,""'> 11') 20
• 22 S'''\jlon ".' "f !J 117
'-'" d"'" \". VI, ",",]'1\,,, I'. 1\ Y P j.li 23 '>.'v ph.!!,p,> D.Jv'"(,,, fl.e Bt"/ofl P'.nce!on ljn,ye''O'I\>
Pr .. Pr,,,,, Itln !\j J 19';)8 !J 38g 1 ,,j T" "., " " ) ,,' 1\ 1 '-,
1':J A,i, U. " ,t" S""jh,n \3, r(.,. B',I'!("',!,) B,'"k "I /I". /.:1 B,.,d.,' Ct,«" .'),,<1 (f'dJh''';li:' lJermarl ln101,,-,al<on (enlN !\I Y
l'JbJ f> 14 f., , [1, d," ". ""',lJU ", 1900J PI' 1 1 1 I
.\1artl1l RCll ... S It> a hu,tonan for thf' Army
Corp" of Enfll12l'l>rs, "Tashmf.,'tull, DC. He
rt'Ct'lll'd n H A. from Penns,)-it'ama State "m-
l er.,lf, ... and an Jl A and Ph D (rum Dukf>
['nil f'r • ..,a,'" III' has GI'rman hli:J(ary at
(;1'or;':la Southern.,   and \'J1'gtnla
1'1J!\{CC}lIlH and State L'll11'cr::,ltv
and ,'>('n t'd at'! command hlMoflan. es Arm)
LfI.#l.' .. flC,> Center, Furt Lcf', Vlr;!Jnla
. ,
Active Guard In Puerto Rico Adds Battalion The Army National Guard
In Puerto RICO IS so alive and well at 111 percent of ItS authOrized
strength that the Army IS ad91n9 another Infantry battalfon to the 92d
I Infantry Brigade's force structure there
The add-on battalion IS expected to be ready In about two to three
. years Its initial cadre will come from 92d overages The Army National
Guard In Puerto RICO has a proven record of sustaining personnel
, strength at high percentage figures over extended periods of time:
Major Robert R. VIin, VS Army
The 1978 oil crisis caught the United States short. Altholu:gh
there had been many forecasts that  
dependence on oil would cause serious problems, no one
foresaw these problems coming to the fore in the early
1970s. The emergence of the "oil weapon" found the in-
dustrialized countries of the West without an)1 coordinated
or coherent policy to deal with the problem. Fortunately, the
United States did not resort to "gunboat diplomacy" or
military power in response to the problem. The Department
of Defense as the largest single user of our nation's energy is
faced with a multitude of problems as a result of the energy
crunch: less fuel at a higher price, a larger portion of the
military budget at the expense of equipment and training
and, possibly, a reduced state of readiness. While our
national security depends largely on our military posture,
the problems of maintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil
from the Middle East are diplomatic and politicalin nature.
Our use of force probably would be counterproductive. The
United States must develop a coordinated energy policy,
explore and develop alternate energy sources and exercise
good diplomacy to ensure the flow of foreign oil continues.
ANY Americans have forgotten
the oil crisis of 1973 when gas-
oline prices overnight, service
frequently ran out of gas and
rumots spread that the oil companies
were : manipulating the American
public for profit. For many Americans,
this Was just another short-term in-
conveni'ence, and some method would
be found to turn on the oil once again.
Howeyer, the fact remains that a few
Arab states put the United States in an
awkwprd situation.
How could we have been so blind
not to have realized our vulnerability
to oil imports? Why didn't we have a
plan :to c:ounter this threat? Many
government officials cquld foresee a
time when our increasing dependence
on oil would cause us serious problems.
However, they were either not heard or
not in a position to make any impact
on the government bureaucracy.
.. In 1926, Professor John Ise of the
University of Kansas published a book
entitled The United States Oil Policy.
He realized that domestic oil would not
be sufficient to sustain oqr rapidly
industralized nation. In looking
around the world, Professor Ise
remarked that the Near East, includ-
ing Mesopotamia and Persia, had
tremendous oil potential bas'ed on the
character of the land and geological
His views were confirmed in 1944
by the DeGolyer report which provided
some clue to the extent of Middle East
oil reserves.
At that time, the United
States led the world in oil production.
In 1973, the Middle East was the
world's leading oil producer with 60
percent of the petroleum reserves.
Professor Ise recognized that· the
United States was dependent upon
great wealth to maintain its standard
of-living and indu   activity. What
Ise cQuld not foresee was that the
United States in 1973 had overtaxed its
oil resources and was consuming 30
percent of the world's petroleum.
In 1948, the former petroleum ad-
ministrator for war, Harold Ickes,
stated that "Beyond a few local rules
and regulations, the United States had
no oil policy.'" The consensus during
that period was that supplies were
ample for current needs and appeared
to be ac!equate. In 1973, the oil crisis
was upon us. Prices soared, supplies
dwindled and deep concern was
reflected in the Congress and the
public at large.
How, then, did this shortage of oil
impact on the national security of the
United States? This article is in
response to that question.
In order to understand national
security and the policy which derives
from it, it is necessary to examine the
elements of national security. For the
most part, security connotes physical
security of a nation and the forces
required to guarantee it. However,
"governments cannot define their
security solely on the basis of military
forces·in,being or planned.'" Foreign,
domestic, economic and other areas of
national interest and concern have
become intimately integrated to the
extent that foreign policy and national
security policy have become in many
ways identical.
/ The House Committee on Fpreign
Affairs.in October 1972 examined the
issue of national security. In the
economic context, Congress has stated
. . . a viable U.S. economy is vital to
the security interests of the United
States because it makes possible the
resources needed by whatever military
establishment Congress decides upon.
Thus, t h ~ linkage is made between
the economic well-being of the state
and the military force which is'
provided to protect t h ~ state. Congress
further states that US national
security also   e p e n   ~ upon the ability
to protect the access to overseas
sources of raw materials and ensure
the safety of American in';estments
General George A. Lincoln, former
director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness, stated that:
... energy and energy policy [is] of
central importance to the U.S. national
security, and It would be impractical to
divorce energy from national security
or foreign policy considerations: U.S.
national security could be threatened
by economic and political factors in
energy supply. M
No doubt the linkage is fonned
between oil, as a prime source of
energy, and US national security as it
pertains to the socioeconomic pulse of
the nation.
Emergence of the Oil Cartels
.. The energy crisis did not occur
overnight. Despite repeated warnings
by leading individuals in the academic
community and government to estab-
lish a coherent international oil policy,
the United States was not prepared for
the 1973 oil embargo. In order to have
a better understanding of how and
why the oil embargo came to be used, it
is necessary to discuss 'briefly the
background of Arab oil solidarity .
To say that'the Arabs are united on
all issues is a fallacy. However, they
all share a common aspiration and
that is to rid themselves of foreign
domination. The major oil companies
were the visible instruments of ex-
ploitation in the Middle East. Once the
Arab oil-producing slates found they
were powerless to deal with the oil
companies concerning oil revenues,
they formed an oil cartel. On 14
September 1960, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was formed.
The founding members were
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Kuwait, and Iraq. OPEC has' since
expanded to include Algeria, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates.
The initial aims of the OPEC are
somewhat broad in character.
However, two are of particular impor-
tance: the need for a steady income for
producing countries and an efficient,
economic and regular supply of oil to
the consuming countries. Initially, the
oil companies refused to deal with the
OPEC, insisting that their agreements
were with individual countries and as
such they would only deal with the
representative of those governments.
Eventually, the companies were forced
to capitulate and deal with the OPEC
which presented a unified front con-
cerning the price and availability of
In 1968, the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) was formed by Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Libya. This organization
was an Arab OPEC which was fonned
ostensibly to:
... keep oil matters out of the
politicization and bureaucracy of the
Arab League and in the hands of those
cuuntries who had oil. Anuther u'as
that It would become a vehicle for
common Arab investments in
petroleum·related projects.'"
Whatever the -reason for its for-
mation, it proved to be a useful in-
Rtrument for coordinating the Arab oil
embargo of Octo her 1973. By 197:3, the
OAPEC had grown to include all the
Arab oil producers except Oman-that
is, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,
Qatar, Syria and the United Arab
Emirates, as well as the three founders.
Tne organization of the oil
producers and their ability to impose
an effective oil embargo on the
Western World was recognized by the
US Congress. During congressional
hearings into the oil shortage in
December 1973, it noted that:
The Arab oil state,s have been able
to inflzct a serlOUS all shortage un the
industrzalzzed natlOns of the non·
communist world due to their ability to
present a united front to a disorganized
group of uil consumzng nations."
One may ask the question: Why
would the oil·producing states deny
their petroleum to the Western World if
the price they receive is considered
fair? The answer, of   is not
econumic but political. The US
presence in the Middle East is a con-
On the one hand, the United States
has a favored position because it has
never been a colonial power in the
Middle East, its dealings with the oil-
produ.cing. states through the mul·
tinational corporations have been fair
and, lastly, many of the' leaders and
professionals in the region have been
educated in the United States or in
American-sponsored universities
abroad. On the other hand, the United
States is the major supporter of Israel
much to the' disple.asure of the Arab
states. Therefore, the "Israeli question" ,
is, the central issue and has been so
since the formation of the Palestine
Mandate in 1920.
The Arabs have attempted to use
the emb'argo at least three times to put
pressure on the West in order fOT the
Arab states to reach their objectives.
During the Suez War of 1956, an oil
embargo was imposed against the
British and the French as partners in a
conspiracy with the Israelis.
In 1967, President Nasser of Egypt
urged Middle East oil producers to halt
production. However, none of the
states had the financial reserves to
carryon without the aid of revenue
from the oil companies. Saudi Arabia
held out for one week and lost over $30
million in revenue. Kuwait resumed
'production next, having lost just under
, $1 million a day.'" The Western World
, did not feel the pinch Iran and'
Venezuela stepped up production and
took advantage of the shortages
caused by the Arab states.
Even more Important to the failure
of the 1967 embargo was the fact that
the United States imported very little
Arab oil, and the shut·in capacity of
the United States oil fields were con-
On 29 August 1967, the Arab oil
nations met in Khartoum to discuss
the situation. Most realized the worst
sufferers from the embargo were the oil
states themselves. Leonard Mosley in
his work, Power Play:.oil in the Middle
East, conclude;;:
The greatest weaknesses of the
Middle East oil states have always
been their (nability to stand together in
an emergency and their susceptibility
to bribery artd corruption."
In 1973, however, this thesis was
The oil import picture for the United
States changed dramatically during
the period· 1967 to 1973. Increased
concern' for the environment by the
American . public caused legisla'tion
requiring the .use of oil as a preferred
fuel over coal in many industries. Tl;tis
fact, coupled with a C'3ntinuing
domestic rate of growth and declifting
US oil reserves, substantially in-
creased the percentage of oil imports
from abroad.
When the 1973 Arab oil  
struck, the United States was caught
in an energy crisis for which it had no
contingency plan. This time, the Arab
states were coordinated, financially set
and ready to unleash their "oil
weapon." By 1973, the Arab oil
producers knew the United States was
using 25 million barrels of Arab oil per
day either at home or supplying
military forces abroad.
' .
In contrast, the US government was
not aware of its 'degree of dependency
on imported oil. Congress declared,
"Only since November [1973] has the
Nation discovered the full dimensions
of U.S. increasing dependence on oil
from the Arab states."lb Thought to be
five to six percent dependent on Arab
. oil, it was determined the United
States was 14 to 18 percent dependent.
Altogether, "the United -States must
import more than 30 percent of the
petroleum' it needs for domestic con-
Nearly a year before the 1973 oil
embargo, the House Subcommittee on
Foreign Relations conducted hearings
concerning the foreign policy im-
plications of the energy crisis. General
George A. Lincoln was asked:
... t9 react to a scenario which set
a 1980 Arab threat to cut offoil to the
United States unless the country
withdrew its support for Israel.
General Lincoln said he did not believe
that such a scenario was likely.I8
John C. Campbell, senior research
fellow, Council on Foreign Relations,
was asked:
... how serious were the chances
for a total ad cutoff (from Middle East
producers). Mr. Campbell did not think
that there would be a total cutoff, even
in the event of. an ultimatum' over

Many Middle Eastern specialists,
however, did not agree with General
Lincoln or Mr. Campbell. In May 1973,
Mr. Simon, the "Energy Czar,"
testified before the Senate that he
believed the Middle Eastern oil
producers had accumulated sufficient
monetary reserves to enable them to
"shut down and tolerate a shut down
for a longer period than we, a con-
suming nation, tolerate .... "20
While there seemed to be concern on
the part of some in. the Congress to
determine the degree of US dependence
on imported pil, there was a. general
lack of consensus concerning the
potential threat and its consequel1ces.
Emergence of the "Oil Weapon"
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the
seminal event in the emergence of
Arab oil power. Hanns Maull, in his
work Oil and Influence: The Oil
Weapon Examined, states that the oil
. weapon:
... signifies any manipulation of
the price and/or supply of oil by ex-
porting nations with the intention of
changing the political behaviour of the
consumer natlOns [andl oil power is the
pou'er which stems from the
dependence of the consumer nations on
These definitions are useful to this
discussion because the terms "oil
weapon" and "oil power" are not
abstract terms; each has force and has
been applied with reasonal;Jle success.
At the outbreak of the Arab·Israeli
conflict in 1973, the oil ministers of the
OAPEC, encouraged by ,Egypt, im-
posed a total embargo on'the United
States and the Netherlands for their
support of IsraeL Saudi Arabia was on
the horns of a dilemma: as a friend of
the United States on the one hand and
a mbmber (some would say leader) of
the Arab world on the other.
Regardless of the possible reaction by
the United States, Saudi Arabia had
little choice but to use the oil weapon.
Hanns Maull writes: .
... refusal to support front line
states With the Oil weapon would have
incensed public opinign leading to a
high risk of vlOlence, strzkes, and sub-
uersiue actlOn agaznst oil installations,
directed from the outside with the help
of a large Palestine community m the
Gulf, 21
Initially, Saudi Arabia: •
... supported a production cut
policy but opposed embargoing the
United States and the Netherlands.
However, when the President's [of the
US] $2.2 billion military assistance
request for Israel was made public,
Saudi Arabia changf'd its position and
the embargo went into effect.
The reaction to the embargo in
Western Europe-which receives most
of its oil through the refineries in the
Netherlands-was one of deep concern.
The oil weapon had a telling effect on .
the members of the European CO/Dmon
Market. A study mission to the Middle
East reported: .
It seems that many of the nations of
Europe live in fear of each new Arab
request and will react to almost any
demand the Arabs make of them in
terms of restricting movement of either
crude od or refined products."
It was subsequently reported in
December 1973 that:
Israel was nafurally deeply disap-
pointed by the role of Europe before,
durmg, and after the recent war. Oil is
judged by Israel to be the principal
motivation for these European
The significance of the oil weapon
has been demonstrated-its effects are
known. According to one source:
The effects of the 1973 Arab em-
bargo [in the US] were higher in-
flation, some increased unemployment,
and a 1.5 percent decline in real output,
associated both with the loss of fuels
and price hikes and with concomitant
market uncertainty.2"
Another author compares the period
of the oil embargo with the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis as "a dramatic case study
revealing significant principles. of con-
temporary world politics."27 According
to the US Congress'in December 1973,
"The burgeoning U.S. energy crisis has
dealt our Nation the most serious
threat to its national security since
World War 11."28
In a military sense, the impact of
the oil embargo is more profound and
far-reaching .. The very physical sur-
vival of the United States rests with
the viability and credibility of its
armed forces. Our military-ind.ustrial
complex is energy intensive. In 1949,
the National Petroleum Council
remarked that oil was "A prime
w ~   p o n of victory in two world wars, It
is a bulwark of our national
security.""" That statement today could
be changed to read "the bulwark,"
given the urgency of our times.
The Department of Defense is the
largest sil).gle user of the nation's
energy. George Marienthal, deputy
assistant secretary of defense, stated:
We account for approxlmately 1.7
percent of the total national eon'sump·
tlOn. . .. Our peak petroleum re-
qUlrements, the amount estimated to
support full wartlme conditioris, zn·
creases b,y a factor of three or "{ore. lU
In light of these requirements,lwe as
a nation are dependent upon assured
availability of critical energy resources
largely' beyond our direct control.
Because of the demands for energy
usage by the military, the sharp rise in
fuel costs due to the 1973 oil embargo
had an impact on readiness. These fuel
costs had to be ·"absorbed" by \many
units at the expense of other programs
which simply lost out because of the
shortage of funds. The result was a
reduced level of training and a
program of austerity to live within the
imposed budget.
Previously, I stated the oil embargo
had far-reaching effects. In 1977 (50
months after the embargo), George
Marienthal stated: I
There has been a strong cons'ensus
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and'
the Military Departments that recent
petroleum levels of the operating forces
have been at least margznally ade-
quate to maintain force readineJs .. 11
Additionally, in February 't' 1978,
Secretary of Defense Harold . rown
I cannot report that our
forces . .. are as ready as' I would like
them to be . ... Our necessary efforts
to conserve fuel have meant reductions
in ground combat training exercises,
Navy steaming hours, and flying
hours for all services . .... 32
("ince the future energy situation
probably will not improve
significantly, we may have to accept a
reduced state of military readiness
unless the allocation of energy
resources is reoriented toward national
If the Arabs have the oil weapon
and seek to use it against the United
States, do we have a counter.o/eapon to
use against them? Unfortunately not.
Dr. Henry Kissinger once remarked
that the United States suffers from the
impotence of power. We h-a:ve so much
military strength and international
political power we are not permitted to
act as lesser states. The exercise of our
power must be with great restraint and
due concern for the world community
at large.
In May 1973, just five months prior
to the outbreak of war in the Middle
East, the US Senate conducted
hearings concerning energy and
foreign policy. The discussion centered
around a US government official's
pronouncements concerning the
possible use of force to secure
petroleum from the Middle East.
Robert E. Hunter of the Overseas
Development Council commented:
I think it is absolutely critical for us
to do nothing . .. [we should] make no
plans, ... make no threats
lor] ... even discuss such a horrendous
possibility . ... Even just (l;sc'ussing it
is likely to make our difficulties with
the oil producing state's worse.
The hearings concluded with the
general consensus that no one in a
responsible position in government
made any pronouncements con-
cerning the' use of force. One month
uft!'r the wur hud begun, the aircraft
carrier Constellation and three
warships sailed into the Indian Ocean
and entered the Persian Gulf.
'[his {{'as the first Instance In more
than 2.5 years that an Amencan air-
craft carria had been In 'the Gulf, On
January 12th, another U.S, carTl£'r-
the nuclear powered Enterpnse-
entered the Indian Ocean,"
Certainly, the protestations by the
US government officials' followed by a
"showing of the flag" in the Persian
Gulf must have alarmed s.ome of the
Arab lead!'rs.
When questioned about possible
intervention in the Middle East, Sheik
Yamani, the Saudi oil mInIster,
responded that the Arabs would
destroy the oil fields before they could
be captured. Consideril'l.$ that Arabs
make up approximately RO percent of
the oil field work f ~ r c e   there are few
who doubt their capability to do so. For
some observers, however, the Western
governments erred in refusing to use
force against ,the' Arab OPEC
members, or even contemplate it
seriously. h
Technical hazards, destruction of
production facilities likeiy and growing
'concern over Soviet air and sealift
capability dictated caution. There
seems to ce a lingering tendency in the
United States to reach for a weapon
whenev!'r trouble erupts. In the case of
the Middle East, the use of force was
not a viable alternative, for many of
the reasons cited above. Howeve'r,
probably the most ominous was the
possibility of touching off a super-
power confrontation.
Dr. Kissinger was asked whether
the United States had considered
mili tary action in response to the oil
embargo. He replied:
A [Jery dalll?erous course. We should
hal'e learned from Vietnam that it is
caSlcr to get Into a war than to get out
of it. I am not sayinl? that there's no
circumstances where we would' not use
force. But it is ~ n e thinl? to use it ill the
rase of a dispute over price, it's dnother
/('here there is some actual strano
Mulatwll of th .. llldustrialzzed world. ",
It is abundantly clear that Dr.,
Kissinger would rather negotiate a
solution than bomb the oil fields, but
one wonders if indeed there was a
US Policy Toward the Middle East
Current US concern for the Middle
East is focused on three objectives:
1. To insure that the region does
not fall under the control of an outside
power hostile to the United States and
its allies.
2. To secure the survival of Israel
as a national statc on normal terms
with its Arab neighbors.
3. To insure the continued
availabillty of Middle Eastern oil on
acceptable terms to our Western Eu-
ropean allies and, of late, to the United
States itself. 17
To achieve these objectives,
diplomacy must prevail over the use of
military force. At present, many of the
oil-producing states with their great
national I wealth are firmly on the path
to modernization-committed to eco-
nomic development and rising stand·
, ards of living. They will be less able in
the future to afford the sacrifices im-
plicit in the use of the oil weapon as a
political weapon.
The oil reserves of the Middle East
are considered to account for 60
percent of the world's petroleum, and
estimates are revised upward each year
as new fields are located. At first
glance, it seems that the world oil
situ<;ltion is not as bad as we think.
However, it is an undeniable fact that
petroleum is a nonreplenishable
resource (at least in tlitis millennium).
And, if the US domestic oil con-
sumption continues to increase at five
percent per year and oUl: volume of oil
imports continues to rise by more than
la percent per year, we will drive
ourselves into a national security crisis
of the first magnitude.
In order to help offset the b<;llance of
trade deficit experienced by the United
States, the Middle E<;lstern oil-
producing states, have become the
world's leading weapons importers,
spending approximately $6 billion
during the 1973-74 period.
Recently, Congress approved a con-
troversial arms s<;lles package for
Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and
more such deals seem   ~ be
forthcoming. Some observers question
the wisdom of selling l<;lrge amounts of
advanced arms to the Middle Eastern
states. However, the United States is:
faced with a perplexing problem: How
does it maintain stability in the Middle
East in order to obtain vital ellergy
resources at a socially acceptable cost,
and how does it meet their demands for
goods and services when it may'be
potentially destabilizing.
The answers to these questions are
complex and beyond the scope of this
article. The United States must move
with caution to retain its friends, both
Israeli and Arab, while, at the S<;lme
time, forestalling any potentially
destabilizing influence' in the Middle
East.· .
The United States along with the
remainder of the industrialized world
has rushed headlong into an energy
crisis. The general lack of awareness
and concern for the energy situation is
reflected by the lack of a coherent
intern<;ltional oil policy. Increasing oil
consumption 'and oil imports, par-
ticularly by the United States, had
escaped the notice of the national
security decisionmakers until they
were confronted by a genuine CrISIS.
Accordingly, the knee-jerk reaction,
when faced with a threat, was to reach
for a weapon. The moving of warships
into the Persian Gulf is reminiscent of
the "gunboat diplomacy" practiced
during the "Roughrider era." However,
it seems somewhat out of plac;e in the
decade of the 1970s. We can be
thankful that common sense and good
diplomatic maneuvering prevailed.
By the use of the "oil weapon," the
OAPEC has demonstrated its resolve.
One can agree with Hanns Maull who
Oil diplomacy u·ilI replace the
actual use of the oil weapon because.
while the latter is a relatillely awkll"ard
and costly political Instrument of last
resort. 0/1 dlplomac,v can make full use
of all dimensIOns of ozl pou'er and the
forms of pou'er derit'ed from It; threats,
symbolic sanctzons (embargos u'lthout
cutbacks, stoppages), u'ealth, mzlztary
pri II 'Pr, and finally, 'economic power. '"
This new form of Arab solidarity
has awakened the national security
policymakers who are scampering to
find ways of obtaining energy self-
suffIciency. Perhaps the OAPEC has
performed a great service to the in·
dl)strial world.
In recent years, billions of dollars
have bl'l'n put into oil exploration. This
new quest for oil is similar to the surge
1 .h"'" 1<,,, TI,,' UIl,rpo ad Po/,cr >-inughton f\.1,!/hn Co
Bo,>lnn Mas,> 192b p ,,')1
? fn,lcl1 \'v .. OWP""", 1rpk of I"f' 0,/ F,nOI"S A HIstnry
r"l/()f II",,, t, r Pef;"IP<Jm ihp Amp"Uln A'i'>llc,<ll,on of Pt'I'O'eu'Tl
Gpb'llll,q<, I"I,>.1 Okld 19"7b P 1 JJl
;3 R M 8,"'ell Clnri ,\1""",, J «(lHrpll 'Jop W,/\/l,nqtn" Pa(1prs
P"J./" 0,1 ,J,'a till' Wpvprn 1I.1pd,(prr<lnt'dfl 5f1l;1f' Puhl'(')\'lln"
L.H'dnrl 1,) 7] p 38
.:l f-;,llh",l L Ho"lI.,n., fI/I,q,l/(, [flSI 0" ,n Unde'(1 Fore'oJil
. p"/'t, HVppf en P't'.,,,, l'l\,. Wf-'SlPOrt (Or)n 1976 p 3
l,'''l.l B '\lilt." ['If'r\lv Speu"!V find ;:o,p·9n PohrV A Rp\l PW
l",,<'" "'I,r",t"tl1-ISt'(Uf,tv VOlu""'t' 1 Number 4 1977 P 111
of activity in Oklahoma and, Texas
during the first part of this century by
the "wildcatters."
However, today's activity extends: -
•... from the Siberian plains to the
North Sea and the Amazon
jungles. . .. Already the search is
paying off. Production from: recent
dzscollerles has created a glut of oil in
the world and is forcing OPEC nations
to hold the line on their prices.
However, this flurry of activity
surely must end in the future. No one
really knows when the world's oil will
be consumed_ Some estimates give us
until the turn of the 21st century ,to
find alternate sources of energy; some
are less optimistic.
The question we must ask ourselves
in the meantime is: How can we
remain strong economically and
militarily in the face of high prices for
petroleum which has upset the balance
. of .thrde? It seems as if the
management of scarce resources has
become a way of life.
The formation of the Department of
Energy is long overdue, but it will be
sometime before it has any real impact
on alternate'sources of energy. Until
such time as these alternate resources
can be found, good diplomacy will be
call1'd on time and again to guarantee
the flow 'of foreign oil which is so vital
to our national survival.

'972 n
7 National Secunty Pn{,ev and the Chilflglflg World Power
41'qnJnPnt Report uS Coogrps!i. Comm'ttee on Foreign
  9211 Congre',;',; Second Sp',;s,on ]5 OClober 1972
Super,nlendent of Documents uS GOvprnment Pr,ntlng Off'ep
V'va"hmglon 0 C 1972 p 8
8 Fo'e'9n po/,cy IJnp/,£ilfrons 01 En8rgv (tiS'S I-Ieallngs US
(onw",,, .. Suhcomm'l!t'P nl Foreign Eeol"om,c Poliev of the
(omnl ttpp on Forp'qn Alfa1fs c12d (ong,es<; Secold SeSSion 21 26
dr'll 17 !::,,·ptpmh.·r 1972 and 3 OUober 1912 ref
US [;OVl>rnrnent Pronl,,,\; OH.c.. W.]!',Il"'Yh)n D (
'9/2 p 342
9 nu)r"Tl • .h A R.)rgPI F"t>ry'r 0//1110' W,,'la Arab 01
tilt' Gull (en!lo'r lor I'lt' SllJdv <)t M<ll.ne Polrcv Cotttiy\! pI
M.lr.ne S'ln].e., Of Dptdwd'''' Nt· .... 1fk DE'I 1975 P 34
10Ib,,/ P 37
, 1 Tlw Un,tecl   0,1 Sllorraqe Jlld tile ArdD l"dPI. Conlfld
H"I'"'' L'::> LL''''J'eo->o" HUll'>" CO""'1III,", ,ln fUI, 'y" At'.]II:' !)J'J
F,r.,t 5 .. .,,,,on 2ll Dp,pmlWI 19]3 Superrnlt''lOP'l1 at
DULUmlo'''l ... uS P, nt''ly Ofhce ""dbf ,nglon D (
1973 ""
I, L"0'-"",1 M..,,,ley P.HVPI uri '" (lIp /IA"ltJlt £ R...t"dL.rll
H, t'1e to. 1973 P 344
13 B,-l,y .... ' (1/1 01 P 4D
14 Mo-. .... OJ' (',r p 40LJ
158alyH <'0 e,1 041
16 rile Un,If'J 0·1 <I".J rll", Ar"b (.'0/1" r
ot.! 1,1 fi. I
18 iOI/!.<)r> Pol., v   ,d II,,·   "r> lIr p 3-18
191D,rI P 3':10
20 Enel", .1"" f,JrI""lrl pu/'ov H,'al"'''''> us C')"lJ'''''>:' S"''',1,1'
Co,nm,!,,..,, un Fp,p'g" Rptd!'(ns q3d (cngll''>c, F"S) 5".,."on )0 d"ll
31 fIJld\ 19/3 5ulJt:'r,n!!-"l<Jt:('\ DOl,,,np'1l,> uS GOv\:'I.,Illt'nl
Pr '11.n'1 art" l' Wa.,t>rnyhJn 0 C 1974 P 230
21 'hlnr'& Ma,,11 Gil a,1<1 !nl/uP",!, The 0 I W<"'f)Oll If'',,,,,<1
Ac/t'fJd', P,II'<rs fl..un)'lt'r 117 fnle 11.]1,,).,tI In,:>I,1(,'1' tal Stl;11<'>I"
Londe" [n'J lD75 pI
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Pan I TI,p ''''1'<,,1 ,)/11,.· 1973 ,VI' AlI .. I,,!>, P.1I'ttS '\t .. "IJ .... , 1111
r.'I!-'tnal,,)ndi Ir<,t,luh' tv 51'dlt"'y,e S'"u"'> London [,-.g 197') P
,3 11,(> Un'lt'll 0" Sl!ortdf)e ana lIlt;! Afab Israeli Coofl,( t
UJ' (,/ I,"
24 flJ<t1 P 'J
')'J Altet '"t' W,lf" lVflJ{W,ltl <llld 1/,& /lAIfiC/flC' /: .. .1.1 Repul!
uS Cungrt'% House Commll1pP on A·td"S 93d
r ".,1 St:"" lJr DeCPfllblll 11/3 Of ne!)t.... uS
Go"",rnrnt>"1 Pnnt,ng OH,C(;' Vliasll'''glOn DC lq73 07
26 MalOI D.1n,ef Vv Ctl r.,tmdn I'lnll M.Jfnr VlieSlpy '< C'drk
F :f:,=01   M,I Power /IA'/I Rf'. e '.
28 lilt Unlleu State< Or! Ilorray€' .J/IU lJl[' ArJD Isrlef, [,IfI/I(1
29 H".,k 'hI (I P 10
30 Gl'Olqt> Mdt.",,,\ tdl   DoD <::. L Ipl "It tVI l'1,,1
Sl'cu"t\ (u D" <I 2':) D+-'clnl'PI Q7'" p ')
31 !bd IJP 34
i} HdlO a B·u .... n Intelr)flt·onflr TIPI'd,> (lnd De!ens", Gifl"
manoptS 23 1978 p 11
33 E,'er<7'r alld FWP'f)/l Palu'r 01' llr p
34 8':l<tv B ec.]"lman rorCe al'll D pfu'''dCY lI,e I'VdSI<,nY'IOIl
P<i;1 7 h'b'udrV 1975 p 22
313 'IA.rI!:, , ot' elf p 113 •
3b Wet-I< 13 197tJ p 69
37 .>dlll!"!'. A Boll and Robert IJ\,   Pcrf<llLS Pprr"'pufl)
rh, '1,1"hlle £./::.1 ,)1)(1 the '\1"\1 '> (Jelt! CO"'rH""'ldlro'1.,
BI (H (1t-,o 'qn, p 16f,
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vp (·t I 3
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Ou <,I PO 35 36 ,
/1.1 II 5 IV.,."", & WO'''} Rtil'<"1 f, Mdrl') 1<)78 p 32
MaJur N",", N Ulw '8 all mstructor III
thl' L'm{lcd ond Comhmcd
C'SA<FGSC Hf' recelt'ed a R S
fwm Camt'rUJ1 L'ntL'rrt>ltv, an .. U A. from the
.... ()f Kansa,,., and i.'; a 197H Jo!radualf>
of Ihl' ['SAC(;SC HI' ha::. t/; () ifl
• III!' Nt'puhli( of \.'it'lnam and U'aJ plan:;.
oilIff'r and IWl.'wn nifl/'cr tt) Central ArnJ)
Group, ('I'l/fral Europt', jor the 56th FlI'ld
ArttilcT.\ UnJo!ad(' rPcr:.-rhl11#)
USACGSC Master's Degree Theses. The 1978 MJi'lary ReView Index
(December 1978) carried a listing of Masters Degree Theses prepared
by the students of the Master of Military Art .and SCience degree
program The Combined Arms Center Research Library cannot supply
copies of these theses. All theses are entered Into the Defense
Documentation Center. Cameron Station. Virginia. wh,ch w,1I provide
cop,es to qualified users Other users may buy copies from the National
Tech'l,cal InformatJon Service. 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA
22161 Access,on numbers for the theses can be obtained from the
Combined Arms Center Research Library, (913) 684-2544 or AUTOVON
552-2544 •
Nuclear Deterrence
Not Make
Civil Defense
,J. F. Wallacp
Th(' ('oncept of mutual assur('d destru('tion, appropriately
at.,.onym('d MAD, has allOlc('d US policymakers l'irtually to
it.rnor(' l'il'il d('fells(' against nu('lear attack. This inattention
has b('('n 1l'('I('omed by thp US puhlic which is psy-
clwlogica/ly disposcd to ignoring th(' "unthinkable" of a
nuclear   Th(' So,,;et Union's dril'e for nuclear
superiority,         coupl('d u'ith its civil def('ns(' program
nOll' l('at'CS th(' Unit('d States in a position of unilateral
l'ulll('rability. W(' can no longer 'ignore issue; no
gOl'crnm('nt has th(' moral right to dismiss measures which
could sat'e millions of Iit'es. An effectil'e civil defense
program could be cost-('ffectil'(' through the use of existing
faeiliti('s. It would also prol'id(' greater flexibility for the
pr('sident at a mom('nt of crisis. Knowledg.e thai measures
had b('('n lah('n to sat'e millions would strengthen his
bargaining position. Conl'ers('ly, th(' lach of such measures
renders the nation's population hostage to: the nuclear
thr('ot, s(,I'erely limiting the pr('siuent's options.
Ren"nleli from Canarlran Defence Quarterly Volume 8, Number 1. Summer 1978 Published by Defence Publlcahons,
loronto GII1,HIO f,anada Copyrrgtlt ' 1975
HE American doctrine of strategic
nuclear deterrence through mutual
assured destruction (MAD) leading to
strategic stability, which has reigned
supreme for' the past decade,   now
being seriQusly challenged. The con-
tinuing Soviet drive for superiority in
the field of strategic weapons has come
as a distinct shock to a great many
Westerners, and revelations of the
nature and direction of Soviet civil
defense programs are undermining the
concept of MAD. Ironically, many
Western strategic analysts had written
off civil defense as irrevelant to
modern strategic thinking.
One can hope that the tremors have
reached those in Canada responsible
for our military and nonmilitary
defense policies. For too long have they
been using the crutch of deterrence as
a substitute for defense. Most certainly,
their rigidity 0'£ thought based upon
the myth of no survival excluded any
possibility of developing realistic civil
defense programs. The development of
effective emergency programs, which
would ensure Canada's ability to
survive should deterrence fail, will
require a major modification of a
policy which now overemphasizes
planning to counter relatively minor
and. in most cases, inconsequential
peacetime emergencies.
The limits of Destruction
Unfortunately, most people have
only the vaguest ideas about the effects
of nuclear detortations. Yet an ade-
quate, though not necessarily com-
prehensive, knowledge of what
happens is basic to understanding why
civil defense is important and why the
debate on defense and war
strategy continues.'
When a nuclear weapon detonates,
it releases energy in the form of blast,
light and heat, and nuclear radiation
(both initial and residual or fallout.)2
The extent of damage and casualties
which will . result from t\;)e energy
release will depend on a number of
factors, including the size and design
of the weapon, whether it ,was exploded·
on, under or over the surface of the
land or water. The important thing to
remember is that against each of the
effects, except in the ground zero area,
protection and protective actions are
possible. i
The best forms of protecti'on are
either preattack evacuation of
threatened areas or some type of
shelter, either fallout or antiblast. The
former is designed to give protection
against radiation fallout but provides
only some modest incidental protection
against heat and blast, while the
latter, depending upon' designed
strength, will provide protection
against all effects. And, contrary to a
mythology popularized by anticivil
defense bureaucrats, they are not too
expensive for governments to provide.
A word needs to be said about
residual radiation or, as it is commonly
called, radiation fallout. This form of
contamination, carried aloft by the
explosion to form the familiar
mushroom cloud and then gradually
descends to the ground, could con-
taminate an area downwind from the
explosion of some 7,000 square miles.
The dust particles making up the
radiation fallout mayor may not be
seen-the radioactivity itself cannot be
seen, felt or smelled. The danger is
most Severe in the first few hours after
the explosion; after two days, it has
lost 99 percent of its strength.
However, in areas where the priginal
intensity was high, fhe remaining one
percent could be dangerous. Hpnce,
protectIOn in the first few hours is very
important. ,
There could be long·term health
pf"fecls from being expospd to Horne of
the fission products or us a result of
exposure to fallout radiations.
However, WIth proper control measures
and publw educatIOn. the severity of
t hesc cffeets can also be substantially
A 1 !)fl, report of the United Nutions'
secretary general' Illustrates
dram uti cally the overall effects of a 1·
megaton explosion over a city of ap-
proXImately one million persons as
li:dll·d 1>1..,[ and hpnt :!7fl.flilil
• Killt·d ),,, r"UInl''ln iallout !llI.fHIII
• InJull',j !)[).!)f)()
• l'Il1l1JlHPd   IIO,OOIl
Such figures dramatically
"dpTTlol1strate tlw frightful l'onse·
quen('l'S for should an all-out
war pver mvolve the use of nuclear
weapons agalllst unprepared CIties."
Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence
The stratPgic nuclear relationship
bptween the $oviet Union and the
United States is a constantly changing
phenomenon. For the first years after
the first two atomic bombs had ex-
ploded over Japan. the United States
for all intents and purposes enjoyed a
strategic superiority over the Soviet
Union, and the :doctrine of "massive
retaliation" camEi' to form the basis of
deterrence to rontain what were
perceived to be Russian threats to
national existence:'
However, the Russian detonation of
a thermonuclear weapon III 1953, soon
to -be followed by the missile and
Sputnik sllccesses in 1957, led many in
thl' Cnitcd Statps to believe that their
, suppriority not going to last very
much longer. Also, by the mid·1950s,
the Soviets had deploy'ed short· range
which cOljld reach most of the
US Strategic Air Commnnd then
rimming Hussin' The doctrine of
massive retnliation based on US
strategic superIOrity came to an abrupt
pnd, but it was not until the mid-1960s
that the present Western un-'
df'rstanding of what constitutes'
stra tegic stabili ty and btrategir
n uelem deterrence was renchcd.
Up until 19f12, the Cnited States
still enjoyed an overwhelming
superiority in strategic nuclear
wen pons and, with the growth of these
forces over the next few yenrs, attained
a capability whereby it was said that it
could absorb a Soviet first strike and
then retaliate with an assured second
strike which, according to Robert Mc-
l'."amara, would ensure the "assured
destruction" of the Union. nut
the new Soviet initiatives in the
strategic weapons field, following their
clumsy attempt to correct the strategic
imbalance by siting medium-range
missiles in Cuba, convinced Robert
McNamara that soon the Soviet Union
would have its own second-strike
As a consequence, McNamara
began to doubt his earlier belief about
. the effectiveness of damage-limiting
systems in blunting enemy attacks. He
was thus led to place reliance solely on
a policy of strategic offensive
deterrence to provide for the defense of
the United States.
Mcl\'amara's thinking had moved
in a few years from the pre·Cuba
position of .strategic superiority and
assured destruction to one of MAD,
Assured destruction had been defined
... an abilzty to Inflict . .. an un·
acceptable degree of damage . .. even
after absorbing a first strike . ... In the
case of the Soviet Union I would judge
that a capability on our part to destroy
say, one fifth to one quarter of her
population and one half of her In·
dustrial capacity u'ould serve as a'n
erfectwe deterrent.'
The assured destruction theme
bemme mutual when he attributed this
same capability to the Soviets.
Henceforth, because of MAD, he and
his supporters believed that neither
side would be able to escape intolerable
damage, hence deterrence had been
By the end of the· 1960s, Mc·
Namara's doctrine of mutual assured
destruction was coming under hostile
CrItIcIsm. The unquestionable
vulnerability of the United States pop·
ulation did not sit easily in the minds
of many. The Western, and certainly
the American, interpretation of just
what constitutes deterrence is still
under dispute. Y
The Faltering of CIVIl Defense
When the iron curtain drew to a
close across Europe in the late 1940s,
most Western nations reintroduced
civil defense programs which had been
di;banded at the conclusion of th'e war
in Europe. For the next 15 years, civil
defense was recognized by
governments as a necessary com-
ponent. of the defense strategy of
nations. Civil delense was certainly
one of the damage-limiting systems
advocated by the Kennedy ad·
ministration in the Uniteli States.
': Yet a fanfare of emotional criticism
greeted the publication of Herman
Kahn's book On Thermonuclear War.!O
Kahn had dared to suggest that
nuclear war was not only a distinct
possibility, but that civil defense was
indeed a factor which, if properly
organized and executed, would not
the total extinction of mankind.
... for reasons that were again
psychological rather than   the
American public ... reacted vwlently
against the fallout shelter program
studies proposed by Kahn and
accepted by the Kennedy ad·
As the debates over the issues of
strategic defense and offense con-
tinued, the majority of the 'strategists
became obsessed with the
technicalities of weapons systems.
They ignored or soon dismissed civil
defense as not being significant. But
the most stunning blow to civil defense
came with the introduction of the MAD
concept. Civil defense was junked as a
destabilizing factor in the concept of
deterrence through strategic stability.
The blind acceptance of MAD was
devastating to civil defense. It became .
the refuge of politicians who accepted I
willingly and without thought that if
deterrence failed the result would be
"annihilation'." Why waste funds on
civil defense? In most Western coun-
tries, and certainly in Canada, the
military-uneasy and unwilling com-
panions of civil defense officials-
deserted this facet of national security,
happy that civil defense would no
longer be a competitor for thp defense
dollar. The irony is that while the
military have not yet shown how they
propose to fight a nuclear war, or how
they would defend the nation against
nuelear attaeits, th" few civil defense
advomtes lpft werp prepared to offer
some sort of prPHl'l'iption t6 save
millions of lives.
Tlw civil defender reasoned that
d ... 8pite thp eatastrophic nature of
nut'lear ,war, civilization would not be
    and that people who sur·
vlved would wish to continue to live.
Bel'llai'<l Brodie, the American critic of
8tratt'gy. ('v en when defending the
    of dt'terrence. has observed
that "thp 8trategy of deterrence ought
nlways to pnvishge the possibility of
dt'lel'l'encp failing.""
This "eems a perfectly reui/onable
"bSl'rvatlOn.in a world where there are
constant change" in thp strategic
picturp. And now that the strategy of
dl'lprrencl' IS under fire. it is about timp
that governments looked seriously at
the problem of reducing thp
of theIr populations-or.
as one write)' puts it. to move from
MAD to somewhere closer to the Soviet
program of SANE (Survival and
l\'ational Existl'nce)."
Civil defense is a program whprebY.
through a combination of population
defense measures. the effects of an
attack can be mitigated. It is not active
in the sense of shooting down a
bomber. Some writers prefer to call it a
p'assive defense accomplished through
population defense measures, con-
cealment, hardening and dispersal-
precisely the same measures which are
used in the defense of the strategic
second·strike forces and the tactical
strike forces in Europe.
CiVil defense does not have, as is
often suggested, the objective of
"reducing to an acceptable level the
damage .... "l> This post-World War II
concept is a flaw in many of the
arguments used to downplay the im-
portance of Soviet civil defense and is
based on an economic interpretation of
the ability to function at a fuirly high
degree of efficiency and eff!i'ctiveness.
The Soviet concppt of survival and of
then moving forward to VIctory IS
foreign to this idea. Some writers,
when discussing cost exchange ratios
Ilf'tween weapon systems and casualty
reduction,' even go so far as to dismiss
as fruitless a fallout shelter program
which might reduce casualty levels in
the United States by 25 million.'"
The actual objectives around which
a civil defense program is formulated
• The continued operation. of
governments and their essential serv-
• The protection of the population.
• The sensible use of surviving
An essential and fundamental prin-
Glple of civil defense is dual use of
existing organizations and facilities,
many of which are in existence today.
For example, the structures required to
provide protection against radiation
fallout already exist in tens of
'thousands of buildings,'" and "cost-
effectiveness analyses generally
demonstrate that the number of lives
saved per dollar spent is greatest for
fallout shelters, up to the point that
everyone has a fallout shelter."I? In
other words, the civil defense payoff
commences with the first dollar,
wljereas several: hundreds of millions
must be expended before active defense
becomes viable.
If a country is serious about a '
program and makeR the best use of
exiHting organizations and facilities,
costs will not be overwhelming, and in
no case would they come close to those
needed to meet the costs of operating
military establishments. Unlike
military systems which become ob-
Rolete due to technological advances,
most civil defense installations and
equipment such as radiation .detection
devices or hardened control centers
will remain effective until the day they
disintegrate. Another:
... strength o{ civil de{ense is that
i{ a new method o{ delivering nuclear
weapons IS invented [such as the nelL'
cruise missile]. the ciull de{ense
measures designed against existing
weapons would probably b.e equally
e{{ectlVe agaznst the nell' threatY
The breadth and depth of an
effective civil defense program cannot
be expeeted to increase if it is con-
tinually subjected to the process of
stops and starts so evident in past
Canadian programs. It must be
planned and be in place qefore an
attack -is launched. To be fully
effeetive, it mlist cope with the im-
mediate preattack and attaek'problems
and also with the longer term problems
of postattack survival, recovery and
rehabilitatioh. The relatively good
state of civil defense preparations in
countries like Russia, Sweden and
Switzerland was not achieved over-
night. It is the result of continued
growth over many years of planning
and implemel).tation of a broad
spectrum of civil defense measures.
The Smaller Allies
An aspect 'of the strategic picture
too often ignored is the relationship of
allies to the overall posture of strategic
nuclear deterrence. Undoubtedly, the
strategic weapons held by Britain and
France are worrisome to the Soviets,
but it is highly doubtful that the other
NATO allies really enter American
calculations of strategic posture. From
a eivil defense point of view, Canada
and the other smaller allies should
bear two situations in mind. It is
conceivable that a nuclear exchange
could take place between the two super-
powers only-Canada could have
radiation fallout deposited across the
southern portions of the country, and,
therefore, patterns of fallout being
subject to the vagaries of upper level
  eivil defense would be needed in
all' areas within :JOO miles of the
At the same time, even if one agrees
with those who suggest that effective
eivil defense is destabilizing, one must
question whether civil defense
preparations made in Canada will
alter any strategic factor or decision.
Alliance commitments could draw
Canada into a war which eventually
could involve the use of nuclear
weapons, but an appropriate level of
preparedness in Canada should not be
hindered as it has been by the fantasy
that what is done by Canada will upset
the strategic balance.
Another consideration which is es-
pecial1y pertinent to our Western allies,
but which should not be dismissed by
Canadians, is the current NATO
defense strategy which calls for a
conventional response to any Soviet
incursions into Western Europe. In
order 'to raise the nuclear threshold in
the face of growirrg Soviet conven·
tional strength, the United States has
been encouraging the development of·
more conventional forces by its allies.
Thus, if the ppriod M conventional war'
is of any duration at all, cities and
towns in European countries would, in
all probability, be attacked with non·
nucll'ar weapons during the so·called
conventional phast'.
It would be foolish to think that
conventional war would' be less
destructive, and thus more desirable,
tqan ;'uclear war or that strategic
delivery systems would not be used
. against civil populations. Modprn con·
ventional wars have resulted in far
more civilian casualties than those
inflicted on military forces, a fact
which makes it difficult to justify the
fragility of civil defense preparations
in most NATO co!mtries.
The Soviet View
The recent revelations of Soviet
civil defense programsl" are nothing
new to students of civil defense. The
Soviets realize th&t nuclear war would
be an unparalleled disaster, but, at the
same tiT¥f' they believe that victory
will come to the sidp which has made
the best efforts in its defense posture.'"
ThE' present chief of Russian civil
A JOint military· cIvilian CIVIl
defense leam on a nuclear.
bIOlogical and chemical recon-
naissance exercise. Marker flags
are mscflbed "contammalion"
Soviet border guards carry out a
nuclear; biological and chemical
reconnaissance exercise
defense is Colonel General A, T,
Altunin, He received this appointment
in 1972 and holds the rank of deputy
defense minister. according the
program a position of some status in
the defense arrangements of the Soviet
This is in striking contrast to the
situation in Canada where the
program has been buried and stifled in
the defense departmen t for the past 10
years! It is claimed that the recent
sophistication' of the program "dates
more or less from 1972 and the signing
of the Soviet-American ABM (anti-
ballistic missile) Treaty. which may
have inhibited one aspect of active or
strategic defense"" but did not impede
the furtherance of passive defense
measures and training for survival.
Certainly. the Communist Party
and the Sovi,et government have set
civil defense "extraordinary and
crucial tasks," including protection of
the people as a primary role.
preparations to ensure a working
national economy in wartime "and
organization and training so as to
perform essential rescue and
emergency repair work,"" Whereas
civil populations in the West have been
led to believe in the futility of civil
defense. the Soviet people are told that:
Althuugh the discussed means of
destructIOn are called mass means,
they will not destroy masses of people,
but ollly those lrho neglect the study,
mastery and the use of these
rneasures. '1
Through its plans to evacuate the
population from   targets, it is
suggested that direct effects casualties
cun be kept down to less than 10
pl'rcent of the population. Plans in·
clude the marrying of evacuees to
specific collective farms where they
will literally dig in to achieve
protection against radiation fallout.
Evacuation planning is now
pamlleling a new emphasis on anti·
hlast s!u;!ters, the aim being eventual
she:ter protection for the whole pop·
ulation, and a variety of training
program" and exercises begun in the
sC'hools to create a public "buttressed
by a nationwide and Increasingly in-
tpnsive civil defense program.".'!
Other areas of Civil defense
preparation have received considerahle
attention, The evidence indicates that
from the highest to the lowest organs
of government, protected facilities are
in being from which the leaders would
Iw able to provide direction and control
of their war effort and defense. The
provision of essential protective
measures to render industrial
machinery usable after an attack also
receives priority attention. Thus, while
the 130viets appear to be evading the
formula for MAD through its
protection programs for industry and
the people, the United States is leaving
its population naked.
Despite the cynicism often ex-
pressed 'about the effectiveness of
Soviet civil defense, it would be wise to
pay heed to Paul H, Nitze's obser·
vation that:
... what is plain is that they have
made . .. an approach to the problem
of !luclear war that does assume, ·to a
deMree incomprehensible to Americans,
that nuclear war could happen and
that the Soviet Union could survil'e.":'
Up to this point. consideration Ihas
been :given to the principal fadtors
which   the place of civil defense
in the strategy of deterrence through
strategic stability. Without dis-
regarding the uncertainties con-
cerning the effects of nuclear attack,
and accepting the near impossibility of
achieving protection close to ground
zero, there is absolutely no uncertainty
ahout the technical possibilities of
providing_ protection against all
.significant effects.
Working from this premise, it is
entirely conceivable to develop around.
it a civil defense program which woul(\!
be effective. An important feature of
the deterrent strategy based on MAD
was that the civilian population would
not be protected by civil defense and
other damage-limiting systems, but,
instead, would become hostages to the
good behavior of the two sides_ It was
thus incomprehensible to the sup-
porters of this theory that the Soviets
were striving for and likely to achieve
superiority. As a consequence, the
United States has let itself slip back
into a pOSitIOn of unilateral
Civil defense certainly has not been
a major factor in the Western concept
of deterrence, but it was and still is an
important factor in the Soviet Union's
current drive for security through
strategic nuclear superiority. It would
be well" however, to consider other
than strictly technical matters when
trying to determine the value of civil
First, if it did, exist at the moment of
a crisis, the effect might tend to result,
as Bernard' Brqdie has suggested, "in
courageous rather than craven
political decisions." Second, such
protectio,(l as can be achieved can be
justified on strategic as well as on
humanjtarian grounds, for no
government has the moral right to
dismiss measures whicH could result in
the saving of miliions of lives which
might otherwise perism
What in effect creates deterrence is
not the current concept of strategic
It is the existence of a suf-
ficipnt number of weapons and forces
together with the will to use them
should national or alliance interests
demand it; it also depends on the
willingness to accept the certainty of
being hit in return.
The decision to go to war or to
respond to international intimidation
will be determined when a nation's
leaders feel the objectives it is seeking
are strong enough to override the in·
evitability of a p'unishing response
from an opponent. Yet, in coming to
such a decision, the knowledge that
reasonable preparations have been
made to protect the civil population, as
opposed to leaving them as naked
hostages, ,could stiffen the resolvp of
leaders to mept the challenge to the
nation's integrity or existpncp.
J F Wallace ha," h('('n ('onn('ctf'd lI..111h
Canadian Cll'll d('[("Ul(' {rom 1949 to 1977.
dunng ['l'hlCh hl' {died a llumhcr of SC'l1lOr
posltlOns. mcludlllA that of head of the

1-'" 5 The t. fleets 01 !Vuclear Weapons RevFsed
EditIon SuperinTendent of Documents US Government Pr,n!,ng
0ll'C8 I/vdf>hlnqlon DC 1974
2 Another effect e1eclromdgnel1c pulse .• s an electrical Impulf>8
produceCl by high vleld 8l1plOSlons Just above the atmosphere It COuld
dIsrupt p!pctt,e power or telecommunications but.1 IS not dangerous
to I'v,ng tllings
3 The lIulhor of Ih,,,, article IPsts M'Id Ihelr results In
Nevada These leSls proved concluslvel" to him thai prof cellon was
Indeed feds,ble
4 A Leg.Jult and G. Llndsp" The af the Nuclear
8alanCl' Cornell Un'l/er",t" Press Ithaca N 'r 1974 p 38
5 Ib,d p 39 •
6 E:.scolt Re'd ',me of Fear and I-Iopp Tile fV/al<lng of Ow /Vorth
Atlant'c Tredty 194749 Mc.Cleliand & SlewlIrl Toronto Can
lq77 Chaplers 1 and 2
7 R €lsqoodt' NATO The fntallgldlg AlIsdnce Ul\lverSIIV of
Chlcaqo Pre"<, Ch'cago III 1962 P 174 Chapter VII prOvides a'1
,nlp'€'sl,rg arod rpvf:'along commentar" on Ihe earlv phase of '''e
m·s.-.,,'e rdCp
8 R McNamara Statement Before the uS Senatp Armed
Spr,,'Cf'f> Commll/ee Super,nlend(>nl 01 Documents uS Governm.enl
Prorlong 01l,(p \l\rJS'l,nglon DC 22 JaflUan,. 1968
9 Bernard Brodie War dnd Ca':.sell & Co Lond,,)n E:.og
1<)74 Chaplers 7 and <:I r C Ilke Can N"Clear 1 a." Oul
Ire CI-'nh"" FO/Plqn Alf;J,fs Volume 51 NU'T'bpr 2 1973 P H
N.lle Slral"'glc Slab,111" In an E:.ra 01 Detente ForeIgn
Januar" 1976 and Helmul Sonnenfeld! RUS'Ola Amer'Cil
a'ld Detente Fore.gn AffeJlrs 1978
10 Hermfln Kahn On Tllerrnonurledf War p"ncelOn
p,,,,,,<, Pr.ncetun fIl J 1960
11 O{J CJt P 420
12 Rernard Brodlt' Ana'olT'\- ot Dp.prrence 1heor,es Of Ppacp
am) Se(U"'v A RPd(jpf rn (ont",m{)("JrV <)lr.JtPI}'( lhoU.'lIl[ Fd"ed
.10'1- C Garrplt Md('Tl 'Illn Co 'Ij Y lQ10 p 99
1 J Jo"'l E:"Ck,>or' T'lt' So".P! M,Llar" E:llnrt ,n 1'"If' Sevec,t,(,s
Pc and Pr nr.hes R U Stand Br",<ev s D"fpnCI;? Yp"lf
Be)"A 7'176 77 B.rd<,<,pvsPubt<"lP",lld Lon,jon fng 1,)7b p')7
1.1 Idn Srnart A(jl'dnced Sf'dfe<jl'; .<4 Siron Gul(j",
Ad"IOl>, P fl"dTlbpr 63 Tt'e tnlp'nflllu'la' In-';./"ute fo' -:'Iratpgl(
Slud'eo; London Erog DecPI"ber 1969 p 4
1'J L V\I Man,n Ball,st'c Defense fjrod Ihp 51'areg (
Ral'lfllp [I>eo',e,> of Pe-'lcf' ann Sec,,"'y A R(l1(jef ,n C(lnrerrrOOfJ'"
S[to'ltpql, '''''ufiN OP c>r p 115
16 A C.)nad,an ,>ur"ev reveil'ea over 70000 t1u,ld,ngs with good
prnIP("'On Pll<,Slb,lol.e<, and Ih,S p>:cluded Ovt;'r twn m,lI,on
'10,,<'1"10'.1<, Wh,..), ha"p bilSPfTlenl<., w'"·:h with III nor
rrcv.dro good p,ult>(,I,on
17 G FI l,nd,>p,! 'he Stfilfeg,. and [[Ofl0m,rs of Intercont,nental
De/PIl,e ORD 1""o,,.,...al Paper fI,j"mbpr 65 P1 011"''''''11 Ca'l
19b':> p ·11
18 Lelj<1ul' and op (d p 1'203
19 Arroon'J tl'e rnorp rl-'(pnl '<' the SlIa/PY'( SUIO'ey 1976 l'"1e
1r.lprnl'l'IO'l,l! InS!IIute frr' Strolleq,e 5Jt.r1,f'S London Eng 1977 PD
3' 34 .lnr1 r. N Donn,·,l
('vol D ... fprJ"p ,., lilp SOV'O'lI Union
Inrp,,",ll,(lndl Augu"o! 1 g77 pp fi35 43 See also
l'ldu<.,tr at Deil'n",,' anrJ NlJclpar Al!ark C,.d  
Pdft /I RpOll11 of l"f' JO,f11 Comrp,ttee 0'1 D(,iense ProduC!10n uS
Super,nlPndenl of DOCumenls u5 Go"ernment Pr,"!.ng
OU«P V\,l.,h,ng!o'l DC Ap,0I1977'pp69113
20 R l Gart!lolt SOl,'et ,n the rvucl",al Agf' Praeger
P"blo<'!H"<' r.. 'l' 1958 p 90 P V'gor S';h,(,f V,e",s on   Pea,,,,
,lnlt rv"IJI"i1.t,. I=Iputtr>dgp & Kpgan Paul London Eng 1975 p 111
and V D SLikoln .. Suv.ei 51'meg .. Ed>ted b,! H r Scoll
P",<1 E' ,1>\"1'1 Cr,,'lp Ru.s'Oak & Co In( fIl Y 197'20 pp 208 211
.md 299
21 QI) e.1 p 105
22 R \I\r Bd''''--'' 1'dns Salt SO" el Sirdteg'c Doclr,.,e Orb,s
VO'um, lo;t); r..J,Jrnbpl 2 1975 p
23 SI<1lpmpnt 01 M,)r<,lla' V CJ'l"kov D(>fence Moscow
19G9 fdlto>[J I TranSjalf'd 5 J R.mf,t];11111 ORNL lR
2)06 1971
24 fl" I\<;on Cit jJ 89
2':0 N,I/p "1' ,(>' rJ III
TI1(, ('him>,'" are a history-conscious people, and, with mor('
than 2,cll)() ,,'('aI'S of histori('al ('xperienee on ll'hich to drau"
they often us(' the past in dealing ll'ith modern-day
proh/cms, nco hasic military strat('gies are inte/'lcol'en in
China's history-one a yidding d('f('llse stl'Ut('gy, that of
trat/inl-: space for time, and the other a forward defense
str(ft"I-:Y lchich sl>d?s a deci"il'e   l1'ell fO/'ll'ard,
Roth are hased on the same military ten('ts but with different
interprC'tations, ,lIao's lel-:acy to the ChinN'" people is the
yief"ing defense strateg\', Since the late 19/)Os, the
profe"sionals in the People's /,iberation Army hal'e been
concerned ll'ith del'eloping a foru'ard d('fense strategy, but
sUl'h a strateRY requires a modern industrial state. Until
China i" able to uPRrade its industrial bas(', u'e can expect to
,'ee the yidding defense strat('gy remain dominant,
l/oII'el','r, since the tu'o strateRies are nbt mutually exclush'e
hut complementary, u'(' can expect a gradual transit(on to a
jOl'll'ard defense'postllre in the foreseeah/e fllture.
ilE ('hint'"'' hnw alwnvs bpl'n a
      Pl'OI'liL-, and til('
('OI1l111Ulll"t" ha\'<, pl'O\'pd to 1)(' no
f'x('('ptiOll. in thI" n'gard, C'nllll1lUlllst
  on history is that the' past
,,1l<luJd     llw prl'Sl'l1t, and, tn this
,'Ill!. hi"tol'll'nl writlllgs normalIv
,dlucll' 111 "onll'   to l'lIlTPllt ISSUe'S,
providIng insight Into the
'th(,l1Is('lv('s a" \\'l'1I as to
111<'11' ""JIltlon,
For instance, I}[.'CllSSIOIl of the
liattl, > of Fc/ Shlll (:lS:3 A.D,), published
111 1 HI,'>, apPl'nrs tn haY(' been dictated
  the nppd for internal unity and
oPPOSItion to Soviet expansionism,'
('losl'ly rl'lated to this isslil' is the need
for all effpctin' defense stmtegy to
('mmte!' the Soviet thrent in £1 high·
ll'chnology rn\'ironml'nt.
Thl' Chl'nese pJ'l'spntJy are forced to
Ii\'(, WIth n defensp strategy inherited
from Mao Tse-tung which attempts to
make the best of a bad situation by
planning to trade spacE' for time-a
yielding defense strategy. On the other
hand, the Chi"nese hi8torieal experience
l'l'veals strategy designed to
achieve a dl'cisive engagement well
forward-a forward defense strategy.
TIm; article seeks to identify the source
and reveal the essence of these two
defense strategips through an analysis
of selected Chinese wrltlllgs on
military thought and historical ex-
Yielding Defense Strategy
N at surprisingly, the current
Chinese yielding dl'fense strategy is
on the military thought of Mao
Tse-tung. However, the roots of Mao's
thought run depp into the fertile soil of
the Chinese past. His key military
writings, to include Pro h/PIII S of
Strat",.;)' /1/   Rpl'ullltlfll1ary
War, Proh/CIIIS af Strategy lIZ [,u<,rnl/a
War .-kalll.,t Japan anti On Pmtrac-tf'd
\Far. r('v('al a henvy (h,ht to Sun Tzu's
labout ,!OO RC.) Art of War, clearlv 11
primary s(;urcp for man,\' of  
hnsic militnry ('oncppts. '
l\lno's   thought was baserl
on the ChlllfJse historical experIence,
and his military genius   in his
ahility to intprpret anrl practically
apply the lessons rleriverl from it. Even
his often cited comparif;on of the
guerrilla among the peasants to the
fish in \\ater can he traced to a more
universally applicaule quote attrihuted
to tIl<' famous politico-military figure,
Chu-ko Liang (liH-2:J4 A.D.), who said,
"Man's loyidty is like deep water to the
fish: if the fish loses water he dies, if 11
man lose!; loyalty lof those around
him] he will meet disaster .... '"
Among, works on military thought
and published il) the People's
Republic of China during the 1970s is
Our Nation's AnCient _Battle Examples
of the Wmk Victorious Ouer the
Stronp,' Published with the purpose of
furthering the reader's understanding
of Mao Tse-tung's earlier military
writings, this work recapitulates in
detail 10 historical examples, referred
to by Mao, which contain the basic
elements of the current Chinese
yielding strategy:
• Ch"ang Shao (684 B.C.)
• Ch'elm P'u (6:J2 13.C.)
• Klll J;.ing (:1;;3 B.C.)
• Ching Hsing (204 B.C.)
• eh'eng Kao (20:3 B.C.)
• K'un Yang 1(2:3 A.D.)
• Kuan Tu (200 A.D.)
• eh'ih Pi ('WX A.I J.)
• I Ling (222 A.D.l
• FpI Shu! \:3-,,:3 A.D.)'
Fr()m analysis of the [0 pxamples
a],o\,(' anrl relevant passagE's from-
:'Iao·s writings, as influenc('rI by his
intl'rprptation of Sun Tzu. emerf!es a
strategic (/Prens!' doctrine based on
foul' intpl'Ueting pnnciples:
• Preserve oneself and rlestroy the
• llpl'eivp and surp,rise the  
• Exhaust anrl attack the enemy.
• Attack wpak points first and
rlE'fl'at On(' by one."
Arl'ording t1'r Mao, !'the principle of
prpserving onpself and rll'stroying the
enemy is the basis of III I military
prInciples," thl' ultimate ohjective ,of
all wadare, Inherent aspects of this
hasil' principle art' the rlual eoncepts of
.vielding and offensive llction. the
formpr to preserve oneself nnd develop
the prl'conditions to execute the lauer.
IntentlOnal yiplding as part of a
plan fur decqJtlon and surprise allows
011(> to draw out the enemy for an
,lttack on him under
CIrcumstances. Yielding can cause the,
enemy to overextpnd his l.ines of cum·
munication. hinder his ability to mass
l'ffeetivE'ly and reveal wflak points
which can he attacked. This yielding
concept tracps its origin to Sun TZ!l's
Ylew that a weak forc.e should be
prepared, as a mattpr uf coursE', to
withdra)'" from or pvaelp a strongpr
furce under circumstances that would
endanger its continued existence.'
DecejJtiun and surprise are treated
together because surprise, often though
not always, is applied in conjunction
with deception. Decpption is dominant
in accordance with Stin Tzu's assertion
that "all warfare is based on decep·
tion .... "" The Chinese military
histurical experience is replete with'
diVl'rsions and feints to the point
where "nuise in the east, attack in the
west" has become a commun phrase in
the languagp.'" The.se, plus psy-
chologically directed actions to gain
the advantage over a superior foe, play
an Important role in the yielding
defense strategy.
The Chinese predilection for psy-
chologically directed actions, often in-
tegrated with deception operations, can
bp traced back to Sun   but was
most succinctly stated in reference to
Chu·ko Liang in what may be the first
dirpct use of the term "psychological
warfare," about 1,700 years'prior to J.
F. C. Fuller's use of the term in 1920.
According to Chu-ko Liang, "In
military operations, to attack the mind
is superior, to attack fortifisations is
inferior. Psychological warfare is
superior, combat is inferior."12
An objective analysis must be made
of the enemy's psychological elements
of combat power (morale, discipline,
leadership, state of training and
Rociological makeup of forces to in·
clude minority groups, alliance forceR
and other soc:ial, economic and
political factors), as well as his
physical elements of combat power
(manpower, weapons, materiel and
quality of training).
A strong enemy may reveal actual
or potential weaknesses in his psy-
chological elements of combat power.
If SQ, these should be exploited to the
Political Support
Weather and Terrain
Reward and Punishment
maximum. Where the enemy appears
Rtrong on the surface, his will to fight
can be weakened by well-planned and
executed limited objective operations
which seek to develop and exploit weak
The psycholugical elements of
combat power form the locus upon
which the four principles converge,
bringing into proper perspective Mao's
vipw that "weapons are an important
factor in war but not the decisive
factQr; it is people, not things that are
decisive.;'u Sun Tzu's estimate of the
  alsQ consists Qf a friendly·
enemy comparisQn Qf seven factQrs
which show the importance of the
psychological elements of combat
power in strategic planning (see
Psychological self· strengthening
and psychological attrition Qf the
enemy should be given equally close
Surprise, often executed in con·
junctiQn ,with a plan of deception, also
can be applied independently, under
Element of Combat Power
Physical Environment
the right circumstances, in the effort to
exhaust the enemy. Surprise is
somptimes carried qut by extraor-
dinary means. Ancient examples were
attackR by fire against concentrations
of troops or materiel under cir·
cumstances similar to those under
which tactical nuclear strikes might be
directed today. Sun Tzu devoted an
entire chapter to attack by fireY'
Yielding, deception and surprise,
anri attackmg WP1lk
"IIlllhlll<' f" ,1l1d d,'moralIzp thp
\'1]('111 .... · III tilt> ot trYIng 1<1
111m To L'JH!.
:In' ,'olHluctl'd lH'hllld
l'lll'lll\ hnt"- to lnain foret'
('IIII1"t:--.. Tlll':--.t· 11Pt'r. .. Ctlrnpn:-::e lht'
,Idll<!l "P"llph::--. war" (,(HHluctt'd h:--.'
l'"r'lllll!J.tan as 1 Ill' militw,
'I'll<' ('IWIll\' ,tl", ,'an Ill' l'XhallSlpd
h'mg lun,d 1111" ,Itt'll'killg rlpfpnsivl'
til"'fll):--ltl(ln .... , undt'r c()nditions tavoting
') cI"I'pptlOn and surpl'1s(',
    tilt' PIH'Tl1V ;llllf' n px-
1l'1I'1\'I' IIItvlligl'lH'P nl't\\'ork comhllll'
til rlP\ l'llip and l't'\'eal wl'ak OInts 111
till' .. of ('omba! p,\w r wIthin
til<' l'IH'm<s <lrdl'1' of haltlp, Weak
!lomb ,iL'\'l'I"p in tIll' 01'
oj cOll1hnt
pow PI', <II' 'I (,<lmhinatlOn of hoth
, \\ hal,'\'('r tIll' ('asl' may 1)(" numl'l'ical
:-;t l'l'ngth Ill' 111(lSS an ilnpol'tant,
lh<lllgh n"l till' only, ('oIlsjdl'ration in
attpmpting to l'xploit wenk points,
According to Sun Tzu, flll enemy of
('qual strpngth could be engaged
(assul11ing an advantage in the other,
of cOlllbnt power), while Mao
preferrpd at least a two-to-one
sUperi'lnt,v, depl'nding on the cir-
l'lllllsranCl'S, LaC'king the ability to
mass sufficipntly to destroy the enE-my,
om' should avoid him or withdraw
(yil'lrl) until circumstances p{ovide a
weak point to attack or, as Sun'Tzu put
It. "Ill' will win who knows when to
right and whplI not to fight."'"
The fnrpgoing analysis of the
defense strategy reveals many
solid military eonC'epts t,hat have beE'n
tril'd and proven in the/nearlY 2,400
ypars of ChinE'se military E'xpl'rience
"!Ill''' Tzu's day, 110'.'. ever, in the
l'lllTPnt high-technology environment,
sole I'plianc(' on It risks massive
rl,'stl'uction within China's borders,"
COlltinupd aeceptahility of this risk
has bel'1I a mnjor issue with People's
Liberation Army professionals since
\r- the last half of the 19EiOs.
Sun Tzu's counseL echoed by Mao,
to forage on the enemy to supplement
materiel shortages will be of' limited
value on the nuclear battlefield.'>
Mao's go-for-broke attempt, in the
Great Leap'   to bridge the
technological gap through. rapid in·
dustrialization failed. Although China
began to develop a nuclear capability
before Mao's death, he appears to have
becorTIe too obsessed with perceived
problems confronting his ideal society
to concpntrate on updating his
thinking on defense strategy.
Even had he updated it in theory, it
could not have been put into practice
without increased technological
capability on k large scale. Thus, it
appears that China will be forced to
live with the yielding defense strategy
until industrial· modernization becomes
a reality. I"
Forward Defense Strategy
Since the late 1950s, a major goal' of
the professionals in the People's
Liberation Army has been to develop
the capability to implement a defense
strategy better designed to prevent
destructive incursion into Chinese
territory-a forward defense strategy.
Economic and social experiments such
as the Great Leap Foiward and the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
haw only hindered toward
this goal, but noyv, with the
"moderates" in control, the prospects
'look brighter. '
The best historical exposition of the
forward defense strategy can be found
in Hsieh eh'eng·jen and K'o's
Ch'l (,hi·kuang, first published in 1959,
.. especially in the chapter of Ch'i's
strategy for the defense of the northern
bOj'dl'r agalll"t n"}!TIad intrusions , ..
Ch'i Chi-kuallg I A.I U was om'
of Chllla'l-' m""t outstanding
prol,,;;swnal gent'mis, A studl'nt of Sun
Art oi! Irar, 1)[" ,,"ns giftl'd with
tlw ahilit I' 10 tranSlall' thl'Ol'V into
practll"l', 'and - vIews hpl'n
111 twd ,mIlitary
In'ali""", Sel<' Uook 0/ r,rli'clu'c f)o('-
Inll{' <1nd Pm('itcai Record of Tra in 1IIJ--:,
Th" forward d,'ll>IlSl' strall'g,v i"
I>"",'d on tIll' sam'" foul' Ilnnclples as
11ll' ,\ i,'ldlllg bUI ,'mphasls III
the ha"lc print'lple, self'pn'sprvat,on
and 'dt'stru('\lon of the ('Ilt'm,\' shifts
from tilt' ,I'I,'ldlllg COlwept to offl'n"ivl'
Of ':--l,t'ldng det'isl\'l' pngagl'n .... l'nt
'\l,ll forward, TIns "uhtl,' shift. in turn,
IS mariL' po""ihle bv tl'chnologll'al and
orgnnlz'ltHlnal innovation l'l'sulting
Irom 'I thorough analYSIS 01 tiw thn'ut.
Th" thn'at i" ,Ulalyzl'd h,v a dl,tailed
llbjt'{'(ll t' ,'ol1lpariSllll 01 the friendl,\'-
elll'lll\ dispositwn 01' rOl'n's in terms of
tIll' following Jl!IysH':!1 aspl'f'ts of
combat pm\l'r: '
• T{'lTHlll Inreu"and nature).
• disposltion.s
Itypt''' nnd numbl'rs!.
• Troop stn'ngth; nnd amounts and
typ,'" of l'" UlPll1l'l1t. -'
TIH' of tlie art' ad-
justn1l'l1ts III ol'ganization, troop
stl'l'ngth and quantity, quality and
type" of l'quipnll'nt designed esppcially
to cuunter the threat. Thorough
training of officl')''; ann mt'n based on
thest' adjustl1lpnts is a must. Quality of
i;;, stn'sHed over quantity, and
tlll'l'l' is a practical balance betwcen
'men and I\'t'apons, As eh'l explain,;,
", , , qualIty weapons but poor troops
" IS calh'd waste", quality troops
,but poor weapons, , , is   empty
"Enwty strength" best describes
ChinH's CUITl'nt defense jJosition Jis-a-
I is tlw Soviet Union, Exhortations by
t'lI.trenll' intl'rprt'ters of Maoist military,
doctrinl' as tu the supremacy of men
weapons are merely a psy·
ehological smoke screen to covel" up
l'xlsting deficiencies and give nhe
appl'arallce of strength in the face of
actual weakness,
The "ll1otil'rates" in power and thl'
mihtm'y IJ1'()fessionals are aware of
their tl'IlUOUS situation and plan to do
sOllwthll1g ubout it as evidenced by a
:'vb,v 1 Y71' l'l'solution of the Military
Affairs Commission which "l'ommpnds
urgent study of the strategy und taC'tics
of pt'ople's war under lIlrJdcrn cpn':'
dtlllllls,"-' This l't-'solution portends a
l'esulTection of eh'i Chi-kuang's
forward defense strategy in modern
form, with attendant implications for
sociaL ('<'(momic and political policies,
In the final analysis, Mao Tse'
tung's yielding defense
how the People's Liberation
Army must expect to fight, while eh'i
Chi-kuang's forward defense strategy
reprl'sentl' how the)" would like to fight.
The two stwtegies are complementary,
not mutually exclusive, and their im-
-pit'mentation should he considered in'
relative wther than absolute terms,
Th" twnsition from on the
former to the latter will be a function of
industrial modernization, _
Reg1rdless of the strategy{ the fun-
damental principles remain the same,
and they ultimately can be traced to
Sun Tzu's Art of War and the Chinese
historical experience,
As for Sun Tzu's Art of War, it
remains a military hest seller in Cbina.
Editions have been published as
rect'ntlv as 1977 in both Taiwan and
mainl;;nd China.'! With :!,400 years of
his[Drical. l'xpl'riPlll'C: tD support its
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Arm:\.'   and Threat Anal.'
Center, A,rltll!-!toll.· lie rect'll'cd a
B.A {II Illtolun' from the Vlrl{l11ta iUdlta
}n, ... lllut,' and an ,M,A ,.,trCSS11l# C'lllllCbt:
lau/tua";f' and arca from the COlli'
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. .,t, and ha:.. :,t,rt,t'd Vletnam.
Tatu'an nnd ICltll the Ufflce of th:., C'ummalld
HI . .,torzan, Hcadquqrt,'r ... , Commander III
CIII<'f. Paclf,,·
The IIltimate WJClI o( training i" to prepare the indit'idllal and
the 1I11it to condllct success(lIl. slIstained combat operations.
COl1l1nf/l;d(:r., and trainer.< responsible (or accomplishing
this important Noal are orten pressed to (ind the necessat:y
time. material and manpOll'"r to do/he job .. 4 neu' technique,
the Training Exten.,ion ('ours,.     promises help.
1l""l1l1se it i., based on the philosophy that indiddllal
profIciency i" th(' hey to lin it ('((('('th'en('s", TEe has put into
the hands o( thc trainer the rc"ollrces lchieh u'ill permit him
to talu' II gil/nt Me" tOlcard (lchin'ing this end. TEe employs
mllltimedia method., and (·on,".;ists o( prl'packa{!ed MOS (
[""s{)ns in -12 specialties. The prof!ram ii, self-paced, simple'
to admini"ter and /"'O/'('n ('((ecti\'''' /loU' 1,,('11 the com-
lnllllri('r US('.'i this nell' traininN tool is nOll' left to him.
The New
Major Joseph E. Nickens, Sr., US Army
OMMANDER. TEe is ready when
  are! You have said you were
IlI.'hInd In your training because you
"can never get everyone togl'ther." or
"the hatt"dion classroom is not
available" 'or "preparation for in·
struction takes up too much of my time
and my subordinates' time." Well,
Commander. I wish I could say that
the Army has solved your problems by
giving you full control of your per·
sqnne] 24 hours a day .. all the
classroom space you need and extra
personnel to teach 'your classes. But
you' arid I hoth know we would be
in a world of fantasy if we were
to believe this possible.
However, to assist commanders-and
training !11anagers to meet their
responsibility for developing well·
trained soldiers and well·trained units.
a new technique for training has been
developed. This new technique is Galled
Training Extension Course (TEe). It
consists of prepackaged military oc·
cupation specialty (MOS) lessons that
may, be presented in anyone or a
combination of three ways:
audiovisually, audio only or printed.
The audiovisual method of using
TEC consists of a Cue/See projector
(similar to a television), video tape,
audio tape a,nd Lesson Administrative
Instructia"ns (LAIs). This method is
used for lesSons in subjects such as
aHHembly and disassembly of the MI6
rifle. rThe audio·only (tape player)
method cOlilsists of a portable cassette
tape player and the audio tape. It is
designed to provide "step-by·step" in·
structions as an individual works on a
piece of equipment-for example, a
tank. The printed lessons apply to
those sul1jects where "hands-on"
training is not feasible.
The course is completely self·paced
and may be used 'by one person or by
as many as :30 at anyone time. The
procedures for the lessons are as
• Obtain the lesson desired/desig·
nated by
• H.ead LAIs.
• Administer the pretest. (If pretest
is passed, the lesson is completed. The
individual may move to another lesson
if he desires.)
• If pretest is not passed, study the
• Administer the posttest. (If
posttest is passed, the lesson is com-
pleted. Individual may move to
another lesson.)
• If posttest is not passed, work on
There are over 1,725 TEC lessons
either in the field now or being
prepared for soldiers in 42 MOSs. The
software (projectors, uipe players and
tapes) are available to all US Army
units.' TEC has proven to be successful
in those units where the commanders
and trainers have used it.
The TEe project began as a result
of a study whose pbjective was to
identify problems leading to ineffective,
soldiering and to   some possible
courses of action for their resolution.
The group I tasked to complete' this
study was originally known as the
Board for Dynamic Training. Formed
at Fort Bellning, Georgia, in it
was terminated during the early
month;; of 11972 when its functional
successor, the IPS Army Combat Arms
Training' Board, took over." In mid·
1977, the name was again changed to
the present name, the US Army
Training Board.
The Hoard for Dynamic Training
began its mission using both a system
anti systems analysis approach. The
systems analysis identified Armywide'
problems. Once isolated into generic
categories, a systems approach was
employed to isolate needs. -These needs
included a requirement to improve
training Armywide (including Reserve
component units) from the standpoint
of both technical and' tactical
proficiency. '
Applying logic and cost-effec·
tivooess irisight to the gap between
present and desired training, a course
of action was recommended that would
provide prepackaged, self-instructional
training to soldiers everywhere.
Until recently, the unit commander
had very little time and almost no help
in providing soldiers with up·to-date
MaS study materials and tl1aining'.
TEC is helping to remedy this. The
system transports knowledgtt from
service schools to the field in easy to
understand, audiovisual, only
and written formats. Soldiers are
provided self· paced instruction with
these lessons which assists them in
improving thpir proficiency. Most
Ipssons are prespnted on fIlmstrip with
an accompanying audio ,cassette.
However, some lessons use only an
a udio cassette.
In addition to  
pal'kaging. TEC alsd uses a pretest
hefore each lesson. If the soldier passes
the pretest, he need not take the lesson
but moves on to another lesson. ·This
servl'S several purposes. First, it allows
th" soldier to ('oncentrate his time and
pffort on those arpas req Ulrtng
training. This lets some soldiers reach
thp dpsired standard of performance at
a morp rapId pal'e, saving valuable
tImp for other actnntIes. Next, it acts
as an incentivp to those who wish to
excel, thus providing peer instrUctors.
Fll1ally, it givps the trainers morp time
to concentrate on those individuals
who need additional instruction. If a
soldier does not pass the pretest, he
must take the training presented,
preparing him eventually for the
Whilp the primary goal of TEC is
MOS proficiency, the material is ideal
for other training programs such as on·
the-job training, cross-training, con-
current training and remedial or
makeup training. Lessons are designed
to teach soldiers the critical individual
skills they must master in
specialties in order to be effective in
combat and to progress in their career
managemeht field (CMF). Accordingly,
TEe materials are tied into the
enlisted personnel management
system through selection of training
tasks based on the Soldiers' Manual.
(The Soldiers' Manual defines the
critical tasks that each soldier in the
MOS or CMF must master to move to
the highe\' skill 'levels.) TEC materials,
• therefore, are one source of training 'for
mastery of job-specific skills which are
tested by the Skill Qualification Tests
(SqTs) within each CMF.'
TEC can be used in units to provide
the basic skills fundamental to both
unit training and unit operations.
Thus, TEC training should also con-
tribute to unit performance on Army
Training and Evaluation Programs.
While some soldiers will use the
lessons on a voluntary basis after duty
hours, the most successful com-
manders have provided incentives ·to
encourage the less-motivated
soldiers. The incentives for successful
completion of training objectives range
from the motivational technique of
praise to more sophisticated forms of
l'ontingency management, allowing
the soldier to participate in other ac-
tivities only after demonstrating
mastery of specified training objec-
tives. For example, the commander
may hold a performance inspection on
Friday afternoon instead of pay ac-
tivities. The inspection would cover the
objectives contained in several TEC
lessons. Those :oldiers demonstrating
that they could accomplish the objec- v
tives would be permitted to begin their
weekend early. -
The most effective incentives and
motivators have been those assoCiated
with the actual use of the Cue/See
projectors and TEC lessons. In the
172d Infantry Brigade, Fort
Richardson, Alaska, one cOlTImander's
policy is that the duty officer imd
charge of quarters will review.at least
TEC lesson per night and be
to brief the commander or his
designated representative on the lesson
the next day. This policy relieves some
of the boredo'm during the long hours
of duty, irpproves the individual's
. knowledge of general military subjects
and, most of' all, "sells" the TEC
program to the Army trainer by con-
vincing him that TEC does teach.
At Fort Hood, Texas, one noncom-
missioned officer (NCO) learned about
TEC whilp attending a Trainers'
Workshop. The NCO had been recently
reclassified from a combat service
support MOS to a combat arms MOS.
He had heard of TEC nor had
his unit taken the time to explore the
uses of the TEC equipment which it
had on hand. During the workshop, he
was told to develop I a class on
"Preparing the Circular Range Card."
Trying to do a first-class job, he
worked about threp hours gathering
materials and barely familiarizing
himself with thp subject. Hp was
finally stopped in the middle of his
frustration and was shown the TEe
Status List which contains a listing of
all TEC lessons on hand in the units or
under developmpnt. He was then given
the TEC lesson on thp subject and was
shown how simple it was to operate the
TEe components. Within two minutes,
he had a class that was capable of
passing any type of training in·
spection. This individual could hardly
wait to get back to his unit so that he
could inventory the TEC equipment
and lessons that his unit had and to
begin giving general military subject-
type c1assps, to his subordinates. The
moral is that TEe will sell itself if
given the proper exposure.
Some commanders in the US Army
Reserve centers and National Guard
armories are perhaps asking,  
about us; when do we get TEe?" In
1974-75, TEC hardware and software
issued to all combat arms bat-
with the exception of combat
engineers. It was issued on the basis of
eight sets of TEC hardware and two
sets of software per battalion. Centers
and armories with signal, combat
engineers, military police and
maintenance units should be receiving
TEe hardware and software now.'
Actions are also underway to furnish
additional lessons to armories and
cente!'s with combat arms subordinate
• units and those with training divisions
and combat arms training facilities."
TEe materials are distributed to a
training facility for use by all per-
sonnel and units assigned to that
facility. The senior commander in the
facility is normally designated the
TEe custodian, and it is his respon-
sibility to establish a standing
operating procedure governing the
operation of the TEC' library and
learning center. Reserve component
training facilities nationwide should
now have TEC materials on hand.'
In developing the TEe program, the
US Army Training Board accumulated
a vast amount of experience relative to
the management and use of' the
system. Experrence has shown that the
extent to which trammg can be
enhanced and overall unit readiness
increased by TEC is directly related to
the commander's management and
utilization of the training materials
within his unit. This fact is further
evidenced by the higher number of
personnel passing their SQT in those
units with a working TEC program.
A learning center in a combat unit'!
Th(> name itself brings up visions of
comfortable, air-conditioned rooms
similar to thosp found in the Army
servicp schools or civilian institutions.
Whilp that kind of learning center
would be ideaL it may not be possihle
or np(;'l'ssary to establish one that posh
Il1 a combat battalion. Throughout the
Army, more and more units are using
lparning centers' as an important part
of thpir training program. A unit
learning center assists the commander
in the performance of his miSSIOn by
providing an easily accessible, cen·
tralized facility for the storage and use
of trnining matprials. It ·also provides
tIll' environment required for in·
dIVidual training.
In thl' learning (,pnters, thp soldier
can increase his skills and knowledge
through an individualized approach to
performancp-orlented training.' Very
oftt'n, commanders choose to integrate
TEe with general education
dpvelopmpnt educational materials
and instructors. thus an
opportunity for soldiers to develop
personally as well as professionally.
The overall concept of the learning
center, as an aid to training in Army
units, is founded on the realization
that today's soldiers learn at different
rates and have reached maturity in an
age of rapid mass communication.
They have been exposed to audiovisual
and ,other media presentations since
-childhood. Networ'k television has
affected their thinking to. the extent
thpy now regard audiovisual presen-
tations as a normal approach to enter-
tainment and learning. I
The learning center, normally es-
tablished at battalion, is usually
organized into three parts, not
necessarily in the same room:
IndIVldual Study: This area uses
most of the space in 'the center. In this
arpa, thp soldier uses the varipty of
matprials available in the lparning
Group Study: This area provides
space for small, supervised groups of
up to 25 personnpl to use lesson)
material at thp same time. The actual
space   may be a part or all of
the individual study area or it may be
the day room, a squad bay or other
large area.
Admlnistratwc: This area encom-
paSRes the record-keeping area of the
lparning center and a storage area for.
lenrning center equipment and
materialR; preventive maintenance.
servicps are also accomplished here.
Learning centers are an intekral
part of the battalion training program.
Its use by small groups, such as
and platoons, is plannpd in advance
and sh0wn on the company training
The battalion is normally respon-
sible for' the overall operation and
staffing of the learning center. rhe
day-to-day operations of t4e learning
center is usually delegated to a
qualified NCO or tlie post education
adviser. Commanders should ensure
that hours of operation are p0sted
throughout the unit and personnel are
enqouraged to use the facility. Hours
should be adjusted as required by
usage factors and additional time
made available on request.
The flexibility of the TEe system
allows effective implementation in
units at practically any level. Ex-
perience indicates that battalion is a
feasible level to manage the system for
individual and group use. However, the
mission and organization of the unit,
as well as the physical availability and
the desires of the commander, will
determine the actual level for the im-
'plementation of TEe within each unit.
The impact of centralization should be
considered in terms of:
• Responsiveness to subordinate
unit needs.
• Accessibility to all members of
the unit.
• Duplication of facilities.
• Availability of all training mao
terial required by members of the unit .
• Sufficient devices (TEe
hardware) to meet the expected
• Optimum utilization of training
materials and devices. "1'
• Adequacy of maintenance and
management personnel."
There are numerous advantages
and       to locating the
learning center at various levels. A
learning center at company level
provides the company commander
with maximum flexibility in the
conduct and scheduling of training
and is probably more easily accessible
to its users. This arrangement, though,
requires an enormous amount of coor-
. ,
dination because the TEe hardware
and software are only issued to
battalion-sized units. Also, the
company may experience diffi'culties
providing a qualified operator and
A learning center located at bat-
talion gives the small-unit commander
less flexibility but will normally be
easily accessible to its users and will
ensure greater utilization of equipment.
Additionally, the battalion will
probably be capable of providing ade-
quate space and personnel for the
learning center.
If learning centers are moved to
brigade and division, the duplication of
facilities is reduced, the availability of
qualified operators is increased' and
lesson materials become more readily
available. However, the lack of flex-.
ibility and the distance the soldiers
would normally have to travel to gain'
access generally makes these arrange-
ments unsuitable.
The role of the trainer changes with
the advent of TEe. No longer do they
merely stand in front of a group of
soldiers and dispense information.
With the TEe system, they become
testers, demonstrators and managers
of training resources for their subor-
dinates, thus ensuring that their unit
meets or exceeds the performance
In training environments using the
TEe system, the trainer is likely to
employ peer tutoring or instlruction to
assist members of his unit in:achieving
training objectives. While' the faSt
learner is the obvious candidate for
duty as a "peer tutor," in reality all
soldiers could, be used in this function.
In fact. slow learners may profit most
I from helping theIr contemporUl'ies as
. thev gain addl'd practice and con-
in thier own' abilities,
The training inspectors' role also
changes. :'I/o longer will the criteria for
a satisfactory traming period concen-
trate on tll£' aspects that add little or
nothing to the soldier's individual
proficiency, When inspecting training
in which the TEC system is pmployed.
the inspector uses the accomplishment
of performance objectives by soldierH
as hiH mea:.;ure of the adequacy of
individual trainmg in the unit." ViSits
to fil'ld units during thl' past two and
one-half years have revealed, as a
general rule, the trainers and m-
speelor:.; at lower levels (company and
battalion) have httle or no problem
changing roles.
} vVp<,It''I '" RobE''''' Jt( A !\-1J ,./Jaf!-l" Plower ,,} tlluCluc".]1
T,     Par! II Fp,j>".) P, 'Pony Plilnr Fo't Benn.ny Ga 1,)16 p
4 H C ':,Ir,).., ... , .m.1 .J f: Hqlrnt;j't'rl Traofl,,'y Cnursf'
ITtCI .III,} T'd,,,,,,,) ttlpo,veness ARt fort BennIng F,e1!1 UnIt
F"" B.,,1I"' '''1 Go 1977 pp 1 2
'J TEC Rt>,>pr\/p Corn.pu"ent UpdatE' i"aU 51,eer Trdln'ny
.Recently, the effectiveness
of TEe was tested in relation to that
for conventional training in an ex-
periment ir\volving 24 combat arms
batralions, 12 Active and 12 National
Guard units. Both initial training and
thl' retention of skills trained after
eight weeks 'Alere investigated. Com-
parable groups of soldiers were selected
for with TEC, for training
with conventional instruction or to
receive no special training (the base
line groups) in one of the five TEe
iesHon series. Initial effectiveness
testing showed that TEC training
yielded a significant improvement in
performance of the trained skills over
both the trained groups
<lnd the base line groups."
'SuPPOI! (..-nTer fOil Eu,>],,,> Va 16 JLlnuil'Y 1978 p 1
b Ib,u P 2
8 0., (,'
') Tra,,,,ng [.If'rI<"on lour<,e (H'CI Publ,c,ty Filer Sllf't>t
Tla'rllh',) Support Cenle' Fort   Va p 4
Ie flHf
11 EkerUr'Ot> FlPDo't at th" Board tor D"r,dm ( T'dln.nq
h'a""dl P"ntong Plant Fort Benn ng Gd 1971 Volu:rne 1 pp 3 6
}'vlaJor doseph E .VlckhlS Sr with the
Educatw11 DIrectorate, US Army Adjutant
General Ce11te
, Washln#to11, DC. lie
re('('ll'cd a B S in architectural ('nglneenng
frum liampton institute and an .M".A m
and COUTlsellnF! from West Vlr#lnW
Unu erslfy and lS a graduate of the Armed
Force, Staff Colle!(/'_ He has :'crt'ed m field
artIllpr)' posillUTlS In Greecf'. Vu'tnam, Hau.:all
and as a proJcct offIcer u'uh the Army
Tralnln# Board,.For( Benning. Georgza.
Tflbes and Tflbulations in AfflCa
By Smith Simpson
Foreign Service Journal. December 1978
Does America have a reasoned,
balanced, coherent African policy? No,
says Simpson, a retired Foreign Service
officer whose la,t overseas assignment was
as consul general in Mozambique. He con-
tends that America's African policy has
ignored the most important facet of the
African populatlOn- tribes and tribal in-
fluence_ Further, we have compounded this
ignorance by attempting to superimpose
our own, totally different ideologies onto
people who cannot accept them. •
Africa is a land of tribes, and the ar-
hitrary boundaries estahhshed by 19th·
century empire huilders bear no relation to
trihal distribution Nigeria, for example,
has over 200 tribes, "each with its own
roots, history, culture and languages or
dialect." Nationhood, defined by boun-
daries, has little relevance to these people.
What is relevant to the people IS the
power and influence of their own particular
tribe. TraditIOnally, tribal ascendancy has
been obtained through tribal wars, violent
wars that may be bizarre and incomprehen-
sible to Americans yet which are accepted
as normal by the African people. This,
Simpson says, expla'ins why other black
African leaders refuse to condemn the
behavior of Idi Amin in Uganda. They
came to power by waging and winning
tribal wars against rival tribes within their
"nation'al" houndaries. Amin's actions are
thus understandable and acceptable as a
tribal phenomenon.
American objectives. however, are built
around the stated concepts of "black ma-
jority rule" and "one man, one vote." These
objectives presuppose nationhood as
defined by geographical boundaries rather
than by tribal influence. ~ h   y are incom·
patible with the Ideologies of the African
.people to whom tribal rights and interests
take precedence. ,Joshua Nkomo. for ex·
ample. is a member of the minority
Matebele tribe in Rhodesia. To him, "black
majority rule" would mean that the
dominant Shona tribe would outvote him
and the M atebele tribe on all issues. Nkomo
rejects American efforts at free el"ctions.
He does not want "one man, one v';te"; he
wants Matebele dominance in Rhodesia.
Simpson sees thiS inability to un·
derstand the African people' as a glaring
error wluch dooms our policies to failure.
Significantly, we pursue this falling by
appoii-Jting ambassadors unwilling' to try
and understand Africa's unique problems.
Ill' cites. for example, "the Andrew Youngs
who try to understand Africa by superim·
posing upon it their own civil rights ex·
perlence in the United States."
Ominously, the author points out that
Africa is becoming increasingly important
in the world's balance of power. The Soviet
Union has recognized this growing impor·
tance and has pursued a realistic policy
based on national interests rather than
ideology. Certainly. we should do no less.
The Yom Kippur War
Born In Battie, Number 3. 1978
A hybrid of historical novel and field
manual, this relatively new magazine has
much to offer. It will be of value to the
tactician. military historian or squad leader
teaching vehicle recognition.
In the context of field manual, it
presents excellent discussions of battles,
equipment and technological innovatIOns.
The tank·missile controversy and the
impact of the Egyptian aIr defense system
are covered in detail. EspecIally hIgh
marks are given to the Egyptian engineers
who deVIsed a simple yet ingenIOUs system
to breach the 70·foot-high sand barrier
constructed on the Israeh side or' the Suez
Canal IsraelI planners considered It an
impassahle obstacle to tanks. The Egyp·
tians hreached it in 60 different locations In
a few hours.
There also IS a chapter on the little·
war at spa. including a detailed
dIscussion of the first naval missilp hattlp
in   The Issue IS wplJ.tllustrated with
maps. drawings and plfotographs. The
maps are plain. uncluttered aids to un·
oerstandIng the hattles. The excellent
photographs and other artwork. wIll
augment current graphic training mds on
equipment recognition.
The magaZine IS easIly readable and
mon° In the vein of historical novel than
field manual due to the personal glimpses
and asides. The pathos of war stnkes the
reader with the reality of the Israeli sons
who dIed fighting In UnIts commanded by
th"lr fathers and the death of EgyptIan
President Sadat's younger brother as hp led
the first EgyptIan air attack. By contrast,
the irony of war IS the description of Israeh
and EgyptIan soldiers exchanging
mpmentos dUrIng the cease·fm'.
Each War Is Iilifferent From the Last:
Any Future Eluropean War Would Be
Totally DIfferent
By Coloner H G Lellch
Canadian Defence Quarterly.
Volume 8. Number 2. Autumn 1978 (Canada)
Ilespitp the great efforts taken by the
US military hIerarchy to avoid the
. malodorous charge of "preparing to fight
fhe last war," the accusation has surfaced
once again. Specifically, rhe charge is that
we are preparing to fight the last European
war. According to Colonel Leitch. our entire
evolutionary approach to combaL
development and our conceptIOn of any
f"ture Warsaw Pact·NATO war needs
Reviewing the strategic philosophies of
NA'I'O and the Warsaw Pact, he concludes
thai NATO is irrevocably and correctly
committed to being able to conventionbIly
clefeat a conventional Warsaw Pact attack.
IIaving properly ,defined the threat,
however, we have incorrectly determined
how to meet it. Two materIal factors,
preVIOusly not considered in either our
tactical doctrine or our combat
development process, have emerged with
enough Impact to demand a reasspssment)
of both. The fnctors?-energy and en·
Moi)Jhty IS essential to success in
warfare, and energy sources are essential te>
mobility. The 197:1 oil crisis carried a
simple, yet ommous message: The era Qf
'ahundant energy is over. Inexplicably. we
have continued to develop mobility systpms
dependent on oil. Leitch feels our combat·
developers must face reality and deliver
new propulSIOn systems-alternative fuels
or eng-inps. or both. And we must do so by
the turn of the century.
Lpss obvious to the layman, yet highly
SIgnIficant to tactical doctrine, is the en·
vironmental impact. Europe has a new
landscape. created by economic
development and urban sprawl. NATO
defensive doctrinp is based on thp "in·
correct assumption that the war will be
fought in rolling rural countryside." That
may have been the case in 1945. but, today,
West Germany and the Ben-elux have a
forecastpd urban sprawl rate of two percent
a year, already there are mo're than 25
buildings every 4 kilometers. Operations
will more likely be described as fighting ih
builtup 3reas and the immediately sur.'
rounding forests. Based on doctrine, vir·
tually all current weapon projects are
directed at incl effective ranges.
TheRe long-range weapons may be ideal for
thl' Sma!, yet detrimental to soldiers
fighting amid the urban sprawl of modern
Europe, ' , J I
The future, though, is not hopeless,
Warsaw nationR have also failed fO
consider energy and en\'ironmental factors,
ThIs pruvides NATO with a slight edge,
The superiur science, technolugy and in-
dustrial capacity of the NATO cuuntries
make them better prepared to meet these
new challengeR; we need unly tu recognize
China's MIlitary Potential:
A Growing US :Dllemma
By Bonner Day
Air Force Magazine, January 1979
Sent tu press prior to President Carter's
announcement of the new US· People's
Hepublic of China pulicy, thIS article dis-
cusses the underlying causes of China'R
()\'ertures to the West and posIts surlIe
complications 10 closer $ino·US ties,
Let us nut be lured Into believmg that
Chma has had a chahge of heart; the
reachmg uutward IS totally pragmatic. The
United States, says Day, is still considered
hy Chma to be its number two enemy. The
United States, however, dues not present an
immediate threat as does its number one
enemy, the Soviet Union. The Chinese
perceIve this threat to bJ so grave that they
will Reek assIstance from any suurce
regard]"ss uf differences and ideulugies.
There are verv real reasons for this
perception. Twice -in the past decade, the
SovIet UnIon has mdicated a desire to
destroy Chma, once even asking the United
States to participate in a ioint nuclear
attack against the Chinese mainland, The
SovIet Union also pussesses the capability
to accomplish these intentions. The 43
modern Soviet divisions along the Sino-
Soviet border, backed by powerful navai
and air forces, would have little difficulty
against the Chmese forces. These are'
largely ill-equipped light infantry whose
equipment is at least a generation behind
that uf the Soviet Union To counter this
Suviet tbreat, China's leaders belIeve they
must modernIze. Pragmatically, this will
require importing vast amounts of ad-
vanced wesjrn technology fbI' industry as
well as for eapuns systems.
The US r vantage in playing its "China
card," the name applied to US actIOns
favormg China, in its disputes with the
Soviet lJ nion will be realizl-d (it is hoped) in
Eurupe. The influx of Western technology
and weapons will enable China to develop
a credihle   furce along the Sinu·
Soviet border. It is anticipated that this
threat wIll furce the Soviet Union to deploy
greater military forces to its Asian
proVInces, thus reducing the threat facing
ThIS advantage may be transitory,
however, and merely ShIfts the emphasis
and lucatiun of the prinCIpal threat to US
vIwl natIOnal interests. Two factors must
be considered. First, China has the un-
deniable potentIal to be. a truly inter-
national superpower. Strategically located,
it has untuld natural resources, includll1g
011, and the world's largest pupulation.
Second, the Peking government is noted for
Its instabIlity. The possibility that the
present government could be toppled and
replaced by another upenly hostile to the
Umted States is very real.
Can we risk developing tomorrow's
giant, not knowing if it will be friendly or
These are publIshed as a serVIce to the readers Every effort IS mJ.de
to ensure accurate translatIOn and summanzatIon How('ver, for more detailed
accounts, readers should refer to the OrIgInal artIcles officIOI endorsement of
th ... Vl(IWS, opinions or factuol statements ill these Items 18 mtended or should he
Inf'prred.-Edltor. ;
Armor vs. RPV
Our SP"IUUS military pusHlOn In  
has been a gruwing source of concern. fur
thp past 10 years. NATO IS outnumbered In
men. tanks. strikp <llrcraft, helicupters,
infantry fighting vehicles and bridging
l'quipl1wnt. In addition, the retent,on rate'
among US Air Force pilots has fallen tn
alarming levels. In the past. a good deal of
thl' edgp 0llr aircraft pnjoyed was due to thp
high degll1f' of training- and experIence our
plluts had. Suon, Wl' shall not enjoy this
L"hl"ll Hart taught us nut to attack our
p,wmy's strength, but his weakness Wfiat' ,
weaknl'ss can the \Varsdw Pact furCPH '"
havp, armured as thev are in theIr I'
numeruus machines'! That is precisely their
Infantry make poor targets. Even
though they are unarmored, they are
spread uut and don't show up well on radar,
Rulling p,ecps of metal offer concentrations
uf men in radar·findable containers,
Current planning envisiuns slowing
down armured columns by striking the lead
elements wHh antitank missiles. That is an
excellent start. What comes next, however,
IS fatal: bringing in units from the Can·
tinental United States to link up with pre·
pusltlOned eqUlpment and then to fight It
out. This IS attacking the Soviets In their
strength and promises at best a bloody
victory, worst, a sound defeat.
In what area du we currently outclass
the Soviets'? Electronics and computers.
Instead of throwing men into the breach,
let us throw guided missiles.
In the waning days of the 1973 October
War, the Israelis shot down two Syrian
planes uS\l1g a television·guided remotely
plloted vehicle (RPY) which carried air·to·
air missiles.
Given uur advanced RPY technology,
We muld easily build RPYs specifically to
find and destroy the enemy. They could
operate autonomously, With guidance from
the rear, or both, RPYs are cheap compared,
to fightf'rs, so who cares if they get shot'
down'} We can build 20 to 40 RPYs for the
price uf one modern fighter, .so we can
afford to fluod the skies with them, Alsu,
rocket boosters rid them of the necessity of
airstrips and thus less liable to be inter·
dieted before launch.
flying RPYs could search for
Soviet armor and launch air· to· surface,
mIssiles With active guidance, while other
RPY s could clear the skies,
The aim wuuld be to strip the attacking
Wnrsaw Pact forces of their most effective
strike capacity with minimum losses to
NATO forces. After stripping the pact of
must of Its armor and air support, the
conflict would devolve into an infantry
war, and our more lightly armored allies
(that IS, all but the Federal Republic of
Germany) would become effective.
Armonng up has always been
: something that men have dOlle to improve
security, flut nothing is free: al'moring up
reverses the centuries-old trend of dis-
persing men as weapons become more
lethal. The armor itself provides a means
for finding the target. It would be foolish of
us not to take advantage of this weakness
built into the Soviet-designed forces.
Capt Edward Hume. USA
The article "Officer Education and
Training in the Army: An Alternative
Solution" by Captain Robert R. Begland in
your October 1978 issue was interesting,
but Captain'Begland misses a major factor
in his discussion on why officers leave the
Army. In addition to changing career goals
and aspirations that do not include the
Army, many officers (Regular Army 05s,
for example) leave because their original
Army career goals are increasingly unat·
tainable. Without the US Army Command
and General Staff College (USACGSC),
battalion·level command is rare. Without
the opportunity for battalion·level
command" promotion to 06 is virtually
impossible for 54s/operations and force
development, and so on. The ticket punches
required are numerous and, of course, do
include education p'unches like the
USACGSC and the Army War College.
Miss one lind you are finished, so why not
seek other opportunities? Who wants to
retIre at 28 years as a lieutenant colonel?
Lt Col James P Westbrook. USA
Lf'tteTs IS a fPlltUTe' dpslgned expressly to afford our reariPTs an opportumty to aIr their
OpIniOns and IdpHb on mIlitary tOPICH It IS not restrIcted to comments or rehuttals on
prf'vlousiy   materIal but IS oppn to any V3rIPty of expreSSIOn whIch may
stlmui.ltr or Improve the value of thought In the mIlItary" commumty.
l1w rIght to pdlt is TesIo'rvIo'd by the staff of tht' magaZIne and exercIsed prImanly In
defpTIo'nce to available sparf' -Editor.
GI Bill Educational Benefits. Some officers who entered on active duty
prior to 2 January 1978 may still be eligible for GI Bill educat!onal
benefits according to education offiCials at the US Army Adlutant
General Center (TAGCEN)
A recent decIsion reached by Department of Defense and the
Veterans Administration IS that persons who entered the Reserve
Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program before 1 January 1977. and
were commissioned and served on active duty before 2 January 1978,
are eligible for educational benefits under the GI Bill.
The recent ruling applies only to officers who took part In ROTC
programs before 1 January 1977 and served as of/,cers before 2
January 1978. say TAGCEN offiCials All servlcemembers who came on
active duty after 31 December 1976 are eligible to participate In the
Veterans Educational ASSistance Program .
Further information may be obtained from Veterans Service Centers
and local installation education services centers
~   W S
the US Army MIssile Research
and Development Command IS
developing a new Infantry' light
assault weapon (LAW) which will
enable a soldier to put a grenade
mSlde a buildmg 200 meters away
The new system, known as SHAWL
(special hard target assault weapon
LAW), will have two warheads m
tandem The first warhead strikes
Ttl€ M,lrt,Jry Review. thE' Department of the Army and the US Army Command and Gene:ral Staff
Cortege 855ume no responSibility for accuracy of Information contamed In the NEWS section of this
publication hems are printed as a sennee to the readers No official endorsement of the vlevys,
OPlnlgns or factual statements 15 Intended -Editor
the target and detonates on Impact,
blowing a hole large enough for the
second warhead (the grenade) to
enter behind it. A delayed fuze
allows this second warhead time to
get Inside the building befor,e ,It
WITH OElA'!' fun f.:tPlOOES
detonates. The SHAWL IS designed
primarily for use against troops
inside bUildings; it should be ideal
for fighting in builtup areas   D ~ S
Intelltgence, ©. 1978.
The longjawalted Israeli tank \s'
ready for series production Named
the Mrkava (Chanot) Mk 7. Its
design philosophy was profoundly
If1fluenced by the Israeli preference
for flghtmg defensive actions from
prepared. bulltup ramps Crew sur-
vivability and comfort also were
  Armor protection was
given preference over f"epower and
The 56-ton vehicle has a thlck-
walled. slf1gle-cast hull The narrow
turret IS mounted well back. af)d
most of ItS components also are
The malf1 armament IS a 105mm
nfled gun However, the turret can
accommodate a larger weapon.
Israeli sources state the tank
carries 62 malf1-gun rounds An
Interestlf1g feature IS the rear door
ammUf1ltlon 10adlf1g capability. thus
avoldlf1g the labonous manhandllf1g
of rounds down the turret hatch
The fire control system re-
qUirements are not as stnngent as
the XM7 or the Leopard 2 since the
Israelis determined that tank
engagements In the 1973 Middle
East War were pnnclpally In the
1.000 meters or less range The
Merkava turret has been designed
.0 allow for retrofitting 'of thermal-
Imaging equipment when It IS
The 900-horsepower TElledyne
Continental engine which powers
the Chanot IS located forward of the
fighting compartment-another
crew survivability factor The
mobility of the vehicle IS comparable
to those with more powerful
engines due to a specially designed
running gear with SIX road wheels
linked In pairs to the suspension
unilS -InternatIOnal Defense Re-
VIew, ,r 1978
China recently may have
deployed multistage, Intercon-
IInental CSS3 miSSiles with a range
of up to 4,000 miles Though the
intercontinental ballistic miSSile has
not been fully tested, it IS claimed
'the miSSile has been used
successfully to launch Chinese
satellites Into orbit The new
wElapon would be able to stnke
targets deep within the Soviet Un-
Ion but would not be able to reach
North American targets.
China IS believed to have 30 to
40 intermediate-range ballistiC mis-
siles With a range of up to 700
miles The Chinese also are es-·
tlmated to maintain a stqckpile of
several hundred nuclear weapons
Western estimates put China's
defense spending at about 10
percent of thEl gross national
product or about $35 billion
annually -MJiltary Electronlcsl
Countermeasures, [ 1978
, 1
, ! The new 80mm antitank weapon
scheduled to be Introduced Into the
Ita han army In the next few years IS
called Fa/gore (lightnmg) It IS 1 85
meters (about 6 07 feet) long. It fires
3 1-kllogram (about 6 82-pound) fm-
stabilized shaped-charge projectiles
with ,a velocity of 380 meters per
I second (about 1.250 feet) which can
, penetrate 400 millimeters of steel.
The ammunition. composed of
rocket and launching charge.
weighs 52 kllogram5 (about 11 44
For distances up to 500 meters.
the 17-kllogram antitank weapon
can be fired from the shoulder with
a IlghtEjr optical device.
For distances from 500 to 1,000
metelrs, a tripod and a range fmder
are also available In this con-
  the total weight IS 28
The Fa/gore IS currently under
advanced development by Breda
Meccanlca Bresclana -Truppen-
dlenst. ,c' 1978 •
Folgore on tripod
Shoulder-launched version
Folgore projectile
Weapons manufacturers. of the Czechoslovakian
army have developed tre prototype of a new
universal small arms ystem Sl ted the URZ
(Umversalny runci zb ., e system consists of an
automatic rifle, a Ilg machlnegun with bipod or
gun carnage, a edlum machlnegun and a
remotely flred'tank macHlnegun In which all con-
struction pieces are interChangeable Each weapon
IS fitted with a meta scope for Infrared surveillance
and fire direction, as weil as a grenade launcher
sight permanently fitted to the front sight block.
Cyclic rate of fire IS 800 rounds per minute except
when employed In the tank mode which IS then
1,100 rounds per minute. It IS believed that the
system IS chamber-designed for the NATO 762mm
A new mobile. long· range. three·
dimenSional radar designed to
provide complete air defense
coverage throughout the 1980s and
the 1990s was recently anno'unced
In Great Brrtaln The system-
,Martello-was deSigned by Marconi
Radar System Ltd and IS scheduled
to be In productlor by 1980
Martello automa!lcaily deter-
mines and accurately plots height.
range and- bearrng for targets out to
300 mrles on each aerral revolution
It operates In the L-band (NATO 0-
band) for greater performance In
conditions of clutter and 'preclplta-
Electronic counter-counter-
measure capabrllties are enhanced
bV adapuve digital processing.
doppler frl)errng and a planar array
antenna with accurate control of
radiated and received patterns. The
antenna also has very low
sldelobes Martello ossesses full
frequency agllrty In hlch the fre-
quency of each puis IS changed
and cannot be. predict by enemy
sources Thus, enemy Ja mers are
precluded from locking o'n and
Jamming a specific 'frequency but
mus.t diSSipate power over the
entire band
HIQhly mobile, the entire syStem
IS hQused In containers with
deslgnijted prrme movers When
deployed. Martello can beAome fully,
op,eratlonal In SIX hours_
" .
. '
OffiCl'T Job/Task Analysis and Training Dl'vl'lopment, A follow on to the
Review of Education and Training of Officers mETO) study highlighted in
Mllztnry Revleli', October 197H, is the Officer Job Task Analysis and Traimng'
Development study This program is designed to provide a detailed description of
all officer jobs, both commIssioned and warrant, WI through 06. The study group
will further identify the tasks and skills required 10 the performance of these jobs,
and develop flexible and cost-effective learning options for these required skills
and tasks. If approved, the study recommendations wIll effect a fundamental
change in 'the way officer education and trammg is structured and conducted.
Tha study recommends that the present' instItutionally focuserl, group-paced,
resIdent mstructlOn be replaced by an educatIOn :training program geared to the
professional development requirements of the indIVIdual officer. Conceptionally,
each Army officer course would include three phases:
Phase I-Personal Assessment (Diagnostic Exammation).
Phase II-IndIVIdual Education/Training.
Phase III-Interactive Education 'Training.
In Phase I, a dIagnostIc examinatIOn will be used to determme the strengths and
weaknes5es of each officer scheduled to attend the course. The baSIS for this
diagnosis will be those officer tasks and skills identIfied as being required for the
officer's grade level and speCIalty. Thus, the education' trammg program can be
tailored «) individual needs and mini mile officer overtraining and 'or under·
Phase II mstruction WIll be modularIzed and entirely self.paced so that it may be
taken equally well in either a resident or extension mode. This will provide the
5erVlce school, the US Army MIlitary Personnel Center and the indIVIdual
• maxImum flexibility 10 scheduling to meet professional development as well as
assIgnment needs.
Pha5e III instruction will be conducted in residen,e. It will include instruction
whIch must be presented in an interactIVe, group-paced mode or whIch requires
the student to interact with eqUIpment which is not aVaIlable in the field
The job and task/skill analysis basic to thIS program is a joint function of both
the training development and the personnel management communities. The
completed task lists will be fiehj-validated by both VISIts to operational units and
data from a questionnaire 5urvey to be administered under the auspices "f the
Army Occupational Survey Program.
Items in thn, department are summaries uf currently underway or
f('('ently completed In the defense cummunIty Whilp ('very effurt Ih mach·
tu ensure accuruc)-. publicatIOn lead time may result In dIfferences
b(;'tween the summaries and the- actual studv program -EdItor
- 87

New Directions
NEW STRATEGIC fACTORS IN THE NORTH ATlANTIC Ed,ted by Bert"m dnd Jotran J HOllt 193, Pdges unrver
;"tet' !lH1dht't lh10 Jnd I PC SCience &   Ptes,';) ltd Guddtvd Eng 1977
TIll' growth of the Soviet navy to become a major threat to the Atlantic Alliance has
highhghted thl' Notth Atlantic as an important area of competition between NATO and the
Sovil,t Cniun. Seventy percent of the Soviet navy's surface· launched ballistic missile force is
b"oed in the Kola urea together with strong general purpose naval surface and air forces. The
North Atlantic IS a prImary area of deployment and transit for the strategic nuclear force of
the Red Fleet, makmg the area important for the superpower status of the Soviet Union.
The North Atlantic is als'" the lifeline of the Atlantic Alliance. The exploitation of'
hydrocarhon and protem resources in these northern waters could easily trigger future
In thi" book, experts from countries surrounding the North Atlantic address the many
pohey Issues and perspectIves prismg from this situation. The problem of countering the
Soviet threat is examined in detail. The Phillip Karber and Jan Lillenberg, focus
on the fact that the relative streng-th of US naval deployment in the North Atlantic is far
\)ehmd the deployment in the Pacific and MedIterranean and that the vessels of the Second
Fleet in the Atlantic have the lowest level of readiness, Another problem for the naval forces is
trymg to establish priorities. What takes precedence: the projection of naval power into
Central Europe in support of :\ATO land forces, or securing control of the North Atlantic lines
of communIcatIOns?
ChrIstoph Bertram, director of the' International Institute of Strategic Studies, holds the
opimon that military considerations on land will determine the use of naval forces at sea, The
outcome of a conflict on the landmass of Europe will be decisive. .
Another, main topic of the book is the neW Law of 'the Sea and resultant security
Implications. In the relationship between the USSR and Norway, the problem of the
continental shelf dividing line in the Barents Sea is not solved. Other between these
'" two countries are protection of the fishmg resources and the Soviet settlememt in Svalbard,
NegotIations are going on, and the present Norwegian undersecretary of defense points out
that "in order to resist intimidation, it will be necessary for Norway to obtain visible support
from hel' primary allies."
The book gives a good outline of the security problems gJ'owing out· of tpe new Law of the
Sea. The solutions, however, are few. The essays in the book are well worth reading for
individuals who seek a better understanding of the defense problems in the North Atlantic sea
It Col GuilOw Gleseth,
Norwegian Army Staff Colfege
NO SOFT OPTIONS The Polltlco·Mllltary Realities of NATO by 5" Peter HIli Norton 172 Pages McGill Queen s UniverSity Press.
Montreal Quebec Can 1978 $1295
. !
Even the most casual observer of the evolution and current state of affairs within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization realizes that the alliance continuously grapples with
longstanding problems. Their magnitude and duration vary, they encompass the entire
spectrum of political cooperation and military preparedness, and nearly all spring from the
difficulty (impossibility?) of uniting 15 disparate and often competing national interests.
This book is a sketch of those problems or, in the author's words, an attempt "to set out the
main boundaries of the whole NATO problem." It is a compilation of the major issues which
have troubled, and will almost certainly continue to confront, the partnership.
As the immediate past chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Sir Peter HiII-
Norton brings a great deal of firsthand insight and conventional wisdom to the subject. After
a cursory look at the founding and first three decades of its existence, the author launches into
a broad overview of "the viability of NATO today-an examination of the internal vitality of
the partnership per se and the efficacy of the alhance vis-a·vis its potential adversary to the
East. The balance between the two major areas of examination is good.
As for the internal state of affairs, there is an excellent discussion of current weaknesses in
the consultation and decision making processes, particularly as they impact on. the
organization for crisis management. There is an extensive examinatIOn of doctrine and.
equipment standardization problems where he lucidly portrays the difficulties in movement
toward the deSIred state of uniformity. NATO's regional aspect is emphasized by a brief look
at the problems that result from command, deployment, reinforcement and supply of differing
types of forces along a 2,OOO-mile front that encompasses varied geography, economies,
cultures and political persuasions.
Concerning its potential against the Warsaw Pact, there is a good portrayal of the
threatening expansIOn of Soviet sea power and an equally good, though brief, treatment of the
intangibles in the entire NATO/Warsaw Pact equation. A section devoted to detente conveys
caution to the Western policymaker, and a short treatment of the nature of the threat from the
East concisely 'argues for maintenance of a high state of vigilance by the Western p<1rtnership.
There is a prevailing   of throughout this work although it closes with a plea
for continued or renewed dedicatIOn and commitment by the member governments. There is
little new offered here. for !the experienced NATO-watcher, but I recommend it as a com-
prehensive reference for the entering student of the current state of military and political
difficulties facing the alliance.
Mal Manon L Johnston.
Department of UM/ed and Combmed Opera!wns USACGSC
SIRATEGIE FRANCE EUROPE by Guy Daly 287 Pagel leI Ed,lions MeO" Pans france 1977
Strat"!<Ir' Frallc£' Europe prUYHjes n good insIght Into the current streams of thought in the
Fn'nch ,,[f,cers' curps. The author. Mnjllr !July. IS typical uf a generation of military-tuo
young to bcen liranded by World Wnr II and the decolonization of the French Empire. yet
"ld ('nough to make use of their lessons. The inf1.pence of' these officers is starting to be felt in
the urlUV hlCrnrehy' Major Doly recently finishcd the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, the French
countl'rpart of till' US Army Command and General Staff College. His book has been prefaced
bv tlll' latl' General Launer who was ut the time cummander uf this academy .
. TIll' author gi""o his ideas on strategy It IS quite remarkuble how much the ideas uf
(;Pnt'ral de Gaulle urc acceptcd by today's young officers; supremacy of politics over the
mJiitHl'Y. total and worldwide nat!Jre of threats. t"tal and worldwide nature of the strategy to
IH-'   to counter threats and nt'ee::;tHty of an a,utonomOllH defense policy warranted
by md;'pendpn t nudear strnteglc forces. ' .
IIp tl"'n depIcts tbe Frencb armed forces and tries to determine the current trends in the
  pollcv of the government. Ill' exposes some defiCIenCIes and proposes some remedies. ,
Th,s part probably the weakest heca'use he is not careful enough with his statistics. For'
""ampll'. by amalgamating data coming fl'Om dIverse sources, he gives a false picture of the
Cf}mpunson between defense expl'nditul'es of selected 'countries.
His ('()ndusion will astonish thuse whtJ still believe all French are ultranationalists. He
re('"mmend, an ac(,plpi atlOn tJf the ul1lficatlOn of Europe. He thinks it would be an appropriate
m"wer to th,' armed challengl' from thp East and, simultaneously, a revival of an ideal
('apabi<' "f thrillIng thp youth of Europe. j
1I Col Paul A Jeandel
French l'dlson Oncer HambuTR FRG
GRAND STRATEGY fOR THE 1980s by B'u;e K Holloway Theodore R'Mdton Bruce Palmer ir. Maxwell 0 Taylor and Elmo R
Zumwalt Jr Edited by Bruce P31mer Jr 113 Page) American E.nterpno;,e Institute lor PubliC PoliCy Re':..earch. Wa')hlngton. 0 C 1978
[)ecisions made today will determine the nature of America's strengths aIH:! weaknesses
until the In light of this, General Bruce Palmer and several eminent military
contemporaries have provided a series of essays designed to "develop a broad concept of
global strategy for the United States over the next decade ... addressing non·military as well
as military factors." It is an impressive task, and the authors are equal to it"
General Maxwell Taylor, echoing the sentiment of Frederick the Great that "diplomacy
without arms IS music without instruments," sets the stage. He is clearly worried not only
·about the potential trouble areas, the military means which United States has available,
but also America's will. Bluntly stated, Taylor asks "Will we fight?" when our vital interests
are judged to be involved.
General Bruce Holloway's essay is impressive for its concern with US energy resource
dependence and our inherent vulnerability. Recording our political actions everywhere, but
especially in Europe as nof good, Holloway postulates Soviet interdiction of seaborne traffic
along the coast of Africa and wonders what the United States could effectively do about it.
Admiral Zumwalt, in an analysis of Soviet strategy, begins by a series of revelations of the
illogical decisionmaking process in the Carter administration. He observes that national aims
and "bjectives' must precede a net assessment and the design of strategy and force structures
ra ther than a parallel process. .
General Milton's thoughts on strategy for the future center around the use of limited
resources. He observes that national self·interest may have been pre-empted because of
multiethnic group interests.
General Palmer's concluding essay is a tour de force. Recognizing the need for strategic
direction in a multipolar world, yet still a "bi-polar world dominated by the United States and
the Soviet Union ... in the stark terms of raw power," he outlines a national strategy .• He
argues strongly for the ability to intervene quickly anywhere. in the world,
Although each essay easily stands alone, there is a great cpmmonality among them. Each
work is the measured, deliberate reassessment of past policy with an apparent disagreement
With the course of present policy. These views of retired military leaders must make
prudent policymakers pause. The reading of these views is crucial for current military l.eaders
so that they may be more knowledgeably   in the current debate on America's strategy.
Training Soldiers
Mal Michael D Krause
OffIce of the Jomt ChIefs of Staff
COMMON SENSE TRAINING' A Workmg Philosophy for leaders by lIeutenant General ArthUl S COllIns JI US Army RetIred 225
Pages PreSIdIO Pres;. San Rafael. CalIf 1978 $1195 clothbound $695 paperbound
"Leadership is so much a part of the conduct of training that at times it is difficult to tell
where one stops and the other starts." Common Sense Trammg by' Lieutenant Gene.a! Arthur
S. Collins weaves that thread throughout the entire book. It ean be argued that Military
Revlew is not the forum of "military mechanics"-that is, those whom Collins says are the
ones dedicated to troop command, the technical aspects of their trade and the soldier.
Therefore, it follows that a review of his book should be limited to the usual 300 or so words.
But, and this is a very vigorous BUT, his book is worth not review but serialization in this
publication. It is an outstanding exposition of training philosophy and as such should be read
by trainers-that is, leaders-and kept as a prized addition to their professional library,
General Collins retired from the Army in 1974 after nearly 40 years' service. As a combat
veteran of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, General Collins served at all levels of command
from platoon to field army. He soldiers as a leader and brilliant trainer, and these
traits are eVIdent on every page. General Bruce Palmer has called his book a "har<lhitting and
unvarnished .. authoritative work that should he read and reread by everyone who aspires to
be a truly professional soldIer." I'
Much of the training emphasIs m the form of the TrainIng Extension Course, the Skill
qualification Test and the Army Traimng and Evaluation Program is eliminating some of the
problems discussed .by General Collins. However, while this emphasis is valuable, nowhere
dol's it all come together so concisely and so well integrated in one coherent philosophy as in
Cum mOil Sellse Trau",!". The author is telling all levels of Army leadership to return to the
basics and muke traming the focus of all we do.
Examples abound 111 the book on how to accomplish this task. General Collins explores
such practIcal topics as training management, ma1l1tenance, unit schools and individual, crew
aml unit trainIng based on his experience. He outlines training programs that have proven
vdlue, to Include some that allied armies use.
You mIght not agree with everything in the book. You rnjay InSiSt that·his definition of
training I, too broad You may even say that you have   or know all the training tips
glvpn. But I guarantee that this exclt1l1g book wlll revltahze' your training conSClDusness.
Mal Paul Baerman. USACGSC
Orders for Germany?
lEXIKON OER OEUTSCHEN GESCHICHH by Gerhard Taddy Kroner Verlag Stuttgart. I RG
Whil" absigned to the US Army Command and General Staff College as a liaison officer,
th" reviewer frequently was asked about an encyclopedia ·on German history published in
recent years." I have been lookIng around, and this work is the answer. In approximately 6,000
articles begInning with the Battle of the Teuteburger Wald, 9 A.D., and filling '1,352 pages up
to events in 1945, this neat book offers to its readers an immense wealth of information on
people who played Important parts in this time span.
Events such as treaties, congresses, important laws passed, uprisings, wars and battles as
well as Institutions and org.<I.nizations formed for political and social reasons are included in
the work. The area covered is the Holy Roman Empire, German Nation, including Switzerland
up to 164b and Austria up to 1945. Twenty-five well-known historians, scholars and archivists
present the facts objectively. It is the best up·to-date handbook on German history printed in
Germ'tn that I have seen. I hope it will find its way to interested students, sCRqlars and
educational institutions well beyond the military community.
tANGENSCHEIDT The New College German DICtIOnary-German/English. English/German. Amenean Usage. Munich,' fRG
. In this search for reference works that I can recommend to the readers of the Military
Review. I have also taken a very close look at the New College German Dictionary. American
Usage. Over 300.000 US soldiers and their families are living in Germany at this time. and
interoperahility is becoming a must for both our armies. This calls for increased US as well as
German efforts toward a better understanding of each other.
Next to willpower, this dictionary is one of the basics that could help with this endeavor. It
is superbly up to date in every field and should accompany every US officer or noncom-
missioned gfficer coming to Germany. The smaller pocket edition is a good starter and can be
stowed easily ih the pocket of a field jacket. I gave my wife one for Easter and she really likes
it However, now she tests my English ahility.
COl Wolfgang Gerhardf FRG Army.
HeadQuarters. LANDJUT
India Emerging
THE GREAT MUTINY India. 1857 by Ch·"topher.Hlhberf 472 Pales V,k,ng Pre" NY 1978 $1595
In a foreword to The Great Mutzny. Hibbert. the author of several fine popular histories,
stntes that his purpose in WrIting thIS narrative hIstory of the Indian mutiny of 1857 was not
to duplicate the detailed analyses contained in the many \,lUltivolume scholarly studies of the
Sl'poy Rehellion already pubhshed, but to make knO\yn several previously unpublished
personal accounts of the   including those of non-EuJopean participants. He achieves his
purpose admirahly. .
The complex onihns, events and personalities of t e Indian mutiny are descrihed by
Hibbert in an understandable and lively style. The interesting eyeWItness account; provide
excellent of the ternhle events of the mutiny :at Meerut. the Cawnpore massacre,
the gallant defense and eventual relief of Lucknow and other key events of the mutiny. These
accounts are woven into a :"olid explanation of the political, economic, social and religious
causes and implications of the rebellion. The story is a fascinating and often frightening
portrayal of the clash of cultures ana values in the Brilish Indian Empire of the mid· 19th
century. ,i
The author has not ignored the more purely militarYI aspects of the mljtiny. The revolt
began as an apparently unco'ordinated series of local mutiIilies by some of the native regimehts
in the service of the British. The mutineers were sooth joined by the private armIes: of
natiV<' princes and ambitious adventurers with grand hopes for the elimination of
the British presence in IndJa. Following the initial period in which the isolated European
garrisons and communities were attacked and the people massacred, the forces of the East
\India Cumpany and of the queen began a series of slow, methodIcal operatIOns to. suppress the
,ebelhun and pumsh the JllP.lefacturs. ,
ThE' middle stage of the mutiny thus involved formal campaigmng by two armies of
approximately equa1 strength, training and armament. The characteristic operations of this
stage were the advance to contact, the siege and assault of fortified towns and, of eourse, the
by small groups of Europeans and their fmthful natIve troops. The eyewitnesses
quotE'd 10 T,he Great Mutiny uffer many insights intq the organization, administration and
<tactical employment of the British Indian armies of the mid· 19th century. The firsthand
desrnptJOns uf the employment of siege artillery and the conduet of assaults against defended
to" n walls are particularly mteresting.
The Great MutinY is proVIded with notes, a good bibliography, exeellent illustrations
lindu.ding many photographs!. an indcx and a most useful glossary of Indian words and
terms. This readable bouk is popular hIstory at Its best and is especially recommended for the
gene'rnl .. eade .. mterested in the history of India, the British Empire or colonialism in general.
Mal R Shrader
Department of Untfled ,wd Combined OperatIOns USACGSC
INDIA A Wounded'ClVllizatlon by V S Na'paul 191 Pages Allred A Knopl NY 1911 $195
INDIA Emergent Power' by :'Iepller P Cohen and R,cha<d l Pdrk 9" Pagfl Crane Ru"ak & Co NY 1978 $750 clothbound
  50 paperbound
IndIa The very word evokes images of poverty, caste and Hinduism; or "Gandhiism,"
nonviolence and pacificlsm-hut usually little else. These books both reinterpret these images
and identify new ones such al; IndIa's large and growing mllitary·industrial capability.
Naipaul, a native of Trinidad and a novelist widely published outside the United States,
empluys a to probe the people, problems and psychology of India today. He
presents a series of vignettes highlighting two problems of development: adaptation of
Western technulugy to local conditions ("lndianization") and its application in Indian society.
Naipaul discusses Hinduism's impact on the psyche wherein rituals regulate the will, and
caste and clan define the individual. He sees this as a flaw in Hinduism since it does not
provide the Idea of contracts among men. In contrast with a Western notion that the industrial
revolution dehumanized people, he then argues that industrialization is humanizing where
workers, through the exercise of new skills, "discover themselves as meh, as individuals."
Industrialization's effects 'on India's psyche and problems are inconclusive, yet l1erhaps the
• March 1977 election mdicated an awakening sense of contracts and racial awareness.
certainly proved the viability of political democracy in India calling into question the need for
Cohen and Park, respected· American South Asia specialists, employ an an'alytical
approach in discussing military, industrial and nuclear capabilities, and the
I •
government's strategic policies. Is India strategically i' portant now, and will it be more so in
the future? What does this mean to the United States? hese two questions. are the cC!ncern of
their careful study.
India is the crucial factor, by virtue of ' its centr I position, in solving South Asia's
problems. It has successfully created a mix of materipl resources, modern technology and
orgamzational skills in conjur.,tion with its   low-cost manpower pool. Thus, it
enjoys a highly professional armed forces officer corps, maintains a large standing army, has
sophisticated weapons and "is one of the very few of tqe 'poorer' nations of the world with a
substantial indigenous military manufacturing capabillity."
In foreign relations, the authors contend India domif.ates Pakistan strategically, note that
the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a troublesome is ue and consider the smaller states an
arena in which India, Pakistan and the PRC compete. espite the gradual rise of superpower
naval strength in the Indian Ocean and the increase strategic importance of the Persian
Gulf, they questiun the efficacy uf future American and Soviet gunboat diplomacy in the light
of India's growing navy. -
The authors outline four possibilities on the directioh of India's nuclear development, but
think India will maintain the status quo as the most cost-effective.
Cohen and Park conclude India is strategically impprtant now an'd will be more so in the
future They believe India's regional dominance is thE starting point for any rational US
pohcy In the 1980s and urge an Indo-US dialogue now l±t a new cepter of power and influence
arise f,)f which we are not prepared.
This is a sound analysis which provides brillia Insights about the misunderstood,
growing giant of the subcontinent. They omit Afghani tan where the Arril 1978 coup (which
occurred after they finished writing), with its potential impact on Pakistan and by extension,
India, can only enhance the latter's role as a stabilizing power.
Both books are valuable additions to the literature, providing current appraisals of a nation
knocking on Western doors for attention. Despite opposing titles and authors' differing
perspectives and purposes, these books are linked by a comJ\;Jon setting wherein the paradox
and irony of India are apparent. That setting is a collage, with its background of hundreds of
millions of diverse peoples in a resource-rich land,. from which tens of millions of prospering,
literate citizens-more than most nations' populations-emerge to grapple with th£l in-
creasingly modernized environment of their democratic, yet mihtarized, nuclear-capahle"agro-
industrial "nations·state" and its role in the internatIOnal arena.
It Col Charle, W Raymond III
Department of Und,ed and Combined OpelatlOns USACGSC
BRITAIN S ARMY IN INDIA From Its Origins to the Conquest of Bengal by Jame, Lawford 342 Pages George Allen & Unw,n
Wlnche,ter. Mas> 1978 $2050 i
The origins of the Indian army stem from the private army formed in the 17th century to
protect the interests of Honorable East India Company against the Portuguese and the
Dutch. The Portuguese fleet was defeated by the British in 1615, and their naval supremacy in
Indian water vanished forever, but the land battles continued until the Portuguese
. Em allIance with against the depredation of the Dutch.
In the second half of the 17th century. the BritJsh expansion in India continued. and the
company raised a private army to secure their acquisitions from internal disorder !lnd to
defend them from attack. They came mto conflict with the French. the Dutch. the Moguls and
th" Mahrattas thIs period. but a pattern of peaceful training was established for the
next .'iO years and the Mogul Empire disintegrated:
In 1746, the Anr::lo-Frpnch rIvalry began in earnest. and the ensuing 18 years saw defeats
and on both sides with the establ\shment of British power in the Carnatic. NortherIJ
and Misunderstandmgs from the directors in London and rivalries betweeri
thl' regular army and the company's troops created fnctions that spilled over onto
battlefield Fortunately for the East India Company, their main antagonists, the French.
suffl'r"d from similar problems and ineptitudes_
of India, although no diplomat. understood the limitations and abilities of his sepoy
troop'; and obtained the assistance of the Royal Navy and the British army in a joint
command. He reorr::amzeJ and equipped the Indian army on British lines. Battalions were
raIsed 'and wore red ,jackets. the establIshed Indian officer hierarchy was retained and the
c'ustoms of thp soldier observed. The sepoy army was well·led and. in 1760 with three
Eu]'oT}('an battalIons, a battle under Colonel Coote. which went far to decide finally
whether BntaIn or France would preVaIl In India.
After the Carnatic was securpd. all that remained was the surrender of Pondicherry. Th¢
l'llnHolIdatlOn Dr the Bntish power m Bengal tobk a period of some 18 years to achieve from La
B()urdnnnais attacking Madras in 1746 to the Battle of Buxar in 1764. The sepoy battalions
urganlLl'd by Clive proved their worth and loyalty beyond ,challenr::e. and British '>lilitary .
power In Indw came of age. This power remained until the end of British rule in 1948 .
• James Lawford has written a superh history of the eady forming of the British army in
Indw It has the clarity and detail one expect from ope who served in the Indian army
throughout World War II. The book has been published posthumously and is a fitting tribute
to thlH well-known mllltary hi'stonan and lecturer.
COl John S Fowles
British 1,Jlson Of/lcer, USACGSC
WHO fiNANCED HillER The Sl'Clet funding of t,iltler') RI!il' to
Power 1919 1933 t\' Jd'llP\ Poo. ,Jnd CiJldn'lI:' Pee: 53] 01211
Ny 1978 $1095
THE TRIAL OF ADOlF HITUR by P1l,jliope van Rind! 334
)tJrlml Boo);." Ny \978 $99J
15'1 Sterl'ng Puoli')tl.ng Co N)' 1978 $895
STANLlY SPENCER Al WAR by Rlcharu Carline ZZil Pages faber &
fat1l'! 5a1em NH 1978 $2195
ROMANIAN FOR£JGN POLICY SINCE 1965 The Political and Military
limIts of Autonomy bv AUf!:'1 Braun Zl7 Pag\':. Plaeger Ny 1978
POSITION RIFL£ SHOOlING B,I' Pullum and Frank T Hanenhrat
277 Pdge-S I)tOIi!?E'1 Co South Harkeno;,ack NJ 1978
Northern Ireland by Robin 184 Page':. McGuill Quet'n S Unl
  QlJebe{ Car] 1978 $179l)
PARTISANS AND GUERRILLAS H Balle,. and thp EdItors 01
Tlmp l,fE' Books 708 Time Ite BOOkS Va 1978
$99\ '
PATRIOT OR TRAITOR The Case of enetal Mlhal!m/lch Introductory
h':>a,. bv Martin foreword Frank J [ausche 499 Pages 0-
Hoovpr InstltutIQr Stantord, Calif 1978 $1900.
MURDER USA The We Kill Each Other by John GodWin 391
Paw's Ballantine Books N'f 1978 $1000
THE MODERN RIFLE by JIm Car michel Stoeger Publlshmg
Co, South Hackensack. N J 1978 $) 9) ;t
THE LURE OF ANTIQUE ARMS by Mrm,\! Lllldsav 11\6 Pages Stol?ger c
Da\ld MO\ay NY 1978 $17 50
HersptlOg and Ivan Volgyes 273 Pages Westvle'h Press Boulder. Colo :::
1978 $2100

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