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Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Lieutenant Genera Wilson A. Shoffru

Cwnmandant, USACGS


Bulfath ND--924

Bri adier General Wil 7iam M. Steele _




Review Sal

Colonelx teven F. Raus(

Ec#tcY in Chief
Lieutenant Colonel Ronald N.

2 An Impact of Leadership 3 Creighton Abrams and Levels of Leadership

by Lewis Soriey

Liienant =t~:d~wG. Vacant


Portrait of a Contemporary


by General Dorm A. Starry US Army Retired

Editor,LatinAmerican Edfi
Phillip R. Davis

Pmduetbn Editor
D. M. Giangreco

14 Army Leaders: How You Build Them; How You Grow Them
by Brigadier General William M. Steele, US Army

Patricia L. Dunn Books & Features Editc Charles A. Martinson II

21 A Comprehensive

View of Leadership

by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, US Army

Art and Desgn

Consulting Editors
Colonel Gilson Gon@ves L
Brazilian Army, Brazilian Editic

30 Trust: The Cornerstone of Leadership

by Major Mark D. Rocke, US Army

Lieutenant Colonel Juan M. C

Chilean Army, Spanish-American I

41 General Leslie Groves and the Atomic Bomb

by Major Allen C. Estes, US Army

By Order of the Secretary of M GORDON R. SULLIVAI General, United States Ar

Chief of Staff
MILTON H. HAMILTON AdministrativeAssistant to Secretary of the Army
The Mfssionof MILITARY REVIEW is tt forum for the open exchange of ideas on fairs; to focus on concepts, doctrine and I at the tactical and operational levels of I support the education, training, doctrin( ment and integration misskms of the Arms Command and the Command ar Staff College. Professional Bulletin 1W2, MILITARY appears monthl m English, bimonthly ?d%%%a$aioms ofkes. This pub i~tlon presents profe formation, but the views expressad herei! of the authors, not the Oepertment of De elements. The content does not necess the official US Army @tion and does r or suFwsade any information in other Army publications. MILITARY REVIEV the @t to edii material. Basis of ofkial is one per general officw and one per five officws of the Active Army, ad one per ters (baftahon and hgher) of the Arm Guard and the US Army Reserve. I REVIEW is available on mimofilm fmm Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106, and by the PAIS (Public Affairs Informatit Bulletin. Postmaster Send change of ad mation to MILITARY REVIEW, USAC Leavenworth, KS 66027-8910. Teleph 684-5842 or AV 552-5642: FAX [913) Subscriptions (91 3) 684-5130. MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-4 US ISSN 0U26-4148

53 Leadership: 63 FM 100-5: 70 The

Views from Readers Just Meeting a Requirement?

by Major Michael W. Cannon, US Army

Strategikm A Forgotten Military Classic

by Charles C. Petersen

80 World War II Almanac:

Initial Allied Land Victories in the Southwest Pacific
by Major James 1? Young, Australian Army

84 Insights:
The Role of Leadership in TQM
by Lieutenant Colonel John D. Richards, US Army

87 Letters 93 From My Bookshelf 94 Book Reviews

contemporary reading for the professional

Leadership Makes a Dt~erence

If you have not become the Navys Tailhook completely aware of the drama known A tailhook in mediadom as scandal, perhaps you should be. in Las Vegas last September, of the Navy Lawrence is the aircrafi dehas come 14 of whom for vice that snags the arresting wires on m aircrafi carrier deck but Tailhook to signifi the-convention drunk aviators. attempting Secretary where 26 women, were Navy officers, were grabbed, groped and otherwise what he termed his leadership failure in the handling the sea lines of communication. No, you will not find a prescriptive dealt with problems and challenges set of fixes for the crisis in this Leadership on their respective change, issue. You will find, however, examples of how such senior leaders as Abrams and ~Puy tours of duty. These two senior the principles remain. Could was, is leaders deserve to be studied not only for the facts of what they did but also for the principles of why they did it. Even if the challenges there have been a Tailhook under the senior leadership of Abrams or of DePuy ? Perany challenge. The outcome level. War, post-Desert Storm Army. a trained and ready Army to the will depend upon how

sexually assaulted by a mob of III resigned his position of the Tailhook investigation,


to take the heat himself and get the Navys full attention

back to policing

haps it is too easy to say no. One thing that can be affirmed is that leadership now and will be key to meeting effectively There leadership are many challenges is applied at the appropriate work of maintaining

ahead for the post-Cold

From the grinding, dayt&lay emotionally

charged discussions on whether

to redrafi military policies on homosexu-

als to the ideas of creating a modem-day, military-run Civilian Conservation Corps, Army leaders, at all levels, will have a fill plate with many outsiders doing the serving. Whether the Army will have to endure a culture crisis of the porportion of Tailhook remains to be seen. Though lane, events Clearly, healthy strong and appropriate after the fact. of Military Review ends with this issue. indulgence I have been I have for how journal of each soldier must give priority to working his own are still very much of interest. with a to damfrom fire team to Army, coupled on the right, left, in front or behind leadership,

dose of integrity, honor, humility

and a sense of honor, are preferable

age control

My tenure as editorin<hief profoundly

blessed to serve in this position

for the past two years and wish to thank and support.

readers, authors and staff members for their patience,

learned much during this short time and have come away with an appreciation diverse our Army is and how well it goes about doing its day-to-day ing our country. the US Army. butions publication. Military Revkw occupies a unique position the talent As I have come to understand, I am indebted to you all. as professional

business of defend-

of the staff and the contria very bright future for this

of authors

from all parts of this Army promise


Wting for Military Review

Mi/itary Review is published for the military professional and those interested in the profession of arms. Readers are located around the world and include government and industry executives, scholars and journalists. Spanish-language and Brazilian-Portuguese-language editions are published for readers in Latin American countries. Subjects. Any issue of general interest to the US Army is a good starting point for selecting a topic. The publications goal is to stimulate thought about matters that are important to the military profession while fostering professional growth and development. Mi/ifa~Revjewcovers a variety of subjects including national defense policy the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war organization, logistics; weapons and equipment foreign military forces; leadership and management military history-in fact, any subject related to the military that is of current interest and significance. Historical articles should draw parallels or illustrate lessons that will be useful today and tomorrow. Articles intended to coincide with an event or anniversary should be received at least 100 days before the publication month. If you have a specific idea for an article, we suggest that you contact us in advance. Explain the intended theme, scope and method of presentation. This may save time, give you a better grasp of our needs and help us in scheduling, We, of course, will make no acceptance decisions until we have seen the completed manuscript. Remember, just because a topic does not conform to the party line does not mean it will be rejected. The journal seeks articles that make the reader think, generate discussion and foster the exchange of ideas. Style. MlitaWReviewprefers the concise and direct, the active voice, precision and clarity, the specific to the general. Each article should have an introduction that catches the readers interest and gives an idea of the central theme; a body or main part which logically develops the main points; and an ending that concludes gracefully. We edit all manuscripts, as necessary, to conform to accepted style and grammatical standards. Some articles require a certain amount of rewriiing ora change of tile. However, substantive changes are made only with the authors consent. Many manuscripts can be improved by eliminating meaningless, obscure or repetitive words and phrases. This is especially true of those prepared to meet academic requirements. Be your own editor save us the effort and improve your chances of acceptance. Concentrate on communicating your ideas to the reader. Specifics. We acceptor reject manuscripts only after careful study and review. We assume that all manuscripts submitted for consideration are original, have not been published and a[e not being considered by any other publication. The normal time from acceptance to ublication for nontimf+wmsitiie articles is six to ten mont [ s. Mlita~l?ev@v,cas an official publication, is not protected by cop~ght. Indwldual authors may obtain co yright registration by special arrangement. Acceptance of an article for

publication conveys to the US Army Command and General Staff College all rights for subsequent reproduction and use of any published materials for training purposes. Copy-Send clean, double-spaced manuscripts typed on one side of the sheet. Type your name and approximate length of your manuscript at the top of page one and then drop down to about the middle of the page to begin your article. We like to have the original and a copy. Be sure to retain at least one copy of all your work. We are currently accepting 31/2 or 5 1/4 floppy discs for lBM+ompatible word processors/computers and 3 1/2 Macintosh or MS-DOS floppy discs. Len@+Manuscripts of 2,000 to 3,000 words are best for our purposes. We have published articles as short as 800 and as long as 5,000 words. The best guideline is: treat the subject adequately, develop your thoughts, and stop. Reference*Attribute your references in the text or cite them in endnotes using accepted formats. Enclose all quoted materials in quotation marks. Bibliographies or bibliographical notes are helpful, but not required. ///ustratkm-Graphics (sketches, photos, maps, line drawings) always increase reader understanding and enhance interest. Frequently they are essential. Our artists can prepare finished work from suggestions or rough sketches. If you do not have artwork but know where it can be obtained, please advise us. llogmph~nclose a brief biography including significant positions or assignments, and any experience or education that will establish your knowledge of and enhance your credibility in the subject. Secur@Review-Articles written by US active duty military personnel or civilian employees of the Department of Defense must be cleared prior to publication. You may obtain clearance yourself; otherwise we will handle it. Allow four to eight weeks for clearance. Remuneration. MMWy Reviewpays a modest fee for manuscripts when they are published. The amount depends upon the thought, quality of wriiing, length, illustrations furnished, evidence of research and other factors as judged by the editorial staff. Feesare generally between $25 and $300. Military personnel are governed by their service regulations on Standards of Conduct or other appropriate rulings. Up. If you are interested in a particular subject, Summing chances are that others will be too. Pick such a subject. Do good research or think a new idea through thoroughly. Wriie with enthusiasm. Be natural. Do not adopt a style foreign to your own way of thinking and speaking. Do not wriie in some manner you imagine Ihey will approve. To improve your style, read good literature. Be your own stern criiic. Revise. Rewrite. But retain wit, animation and personal touches. Good wriiing is hard work. But when it has been done, it is noticed and the feeling of accomplishment is as great as that in any field. For more information, write to the Editor in Chief, Mi/itafy Review, Funston Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 660276910 or call (913) 684-5642 or Autovon 552-5642.





A First Step Toward Victory

Eight months after Pearl Harbor, two months after the Battle of Midway, and only after Admiral Ernest J. King forged a Pacific strategy over the objections of other service chiefs, the first American offensive of World War II began. The 1st Marine Division landing on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 began an epic campaign in the Solomon Islands. Six months later, the outcome of the Pacific war was certain-victory for the Allies. Guadalcanal was a classic multidimensional joint combined campaign. Fierce battles were fought in the air, on land and at sea. Americans, supported by Australian coast watchers, used every weapon in their arsenal during this campaign. The Marines made an unopposed landing and then heroically struggled to hold Henderson Field. Marines were joined later by Army troops, and the island was finally won. The Navy fought seven major battles around Guadalcanal, including Savo Island, which marked their worst defeat at sea. The only naval battle in which American battleships directly confronted and severely damaged an enemy battleship was part of this campaign. The air battle saw carrierand land-based planes fight for superiority at a cost of almost 1,200 aircraft to both sides. Operation Watchtower created legends and goats. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, commander of the 1st Marine Division, would be awarded the Medal of Honor and finish the war

as commandant of the Marine Corps. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, brilliant and dominating, would remain convinced of victory through the dark hours of the campaign and would become (King of Amphibsforthe duration. The right man for the right job and the impact of one person are illustrated by the relief of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. Guadalcanal was Halseys finest hour in the war. His arrival unquestionably bolstered morale at a critical juncture. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had the tenacity to stick it out. Rear Admiral Guni chi Mikawa clearly demonstrated during the Battle of Savo Island how boldness and skill can defeat a numerically superior force. The victory at Guadalcanal came at enormous cost to both sides. Over 35,000 Japanese were killed or missing, and the Allies suffered 7,100 killed or missing. For every soldier or Marine who died ashore, almost three sailors and Marines in ship companies perished. Guadalcanal was much more than our first offensive of the war. Just as Midway was the battle that doomed Japan, Guadalcanal was Ihe turning point. Japan now lacked the time to develop and replace skilled aircrews lost during this campaign. Guadalcanal represented the actual shift in our strategic posture. The route to victory was now open.
Colonel Nicholas E Carlucci Jr., USMC

on Units and within the Army

As the Army Iwshupesand msizes to meet the chdenges of the 1990s and beyond, we must also tk?vebp the leaders to understand and expkbitthefullpotential of the present andftium Army. Thefollowing artick present the contributions of two key lkwdersduring an earlkr period of changefuing the Army.






Lewis Sorley
Copyr/ght 1992

Leadership hus diflerent views at diflerent levels. The author uses Geneml Cwighton Abmms as a study to show how thik view chunges as the level changes. He points out the leadership style Abrams disphyed during his time as the assistant diviswn commander of the 3d Armored Division, highlighting the ways Abrams changed the trainingphilosophy of the diviswn. He nextpoints out the changesAbrams made in the 3d AD as its commander and how his leadership abil~ made the changes easier on the stafland the division.

n his way to becoming Army chief of stti, Creighton Abrams comman ded combat arms elements at every level from platoon through field army. In these posts, he demonstrated one of the most valuable attributes any leader can have, the ability to differentiate between those things that are his responsibility and those that are in the province ofhis subordinates. Abrams had, said Brigadier General Hal Pattison, former Army chief of military history, a very strong sense of his preserve and someone elses. This fhirly unusual quality was much appreciated by subordinate co mmanders, who found it very refreshing that their boss did his job, lefi them to do their jobs, knew the di&erence between the two and had the Selfdiscipline to abide by it. There were certain things that interested Abrams passionately, no matter the level of command-combat readiness, training, prof~ional integrity and the wellbeing of his soldiets. His service as assistant division commander and then, after a short interval, commander of 3d Armored Division (AD) in Germany from 1959 to 1962 demonstrated his concentration on these matters. Abrams was introduced to the 3d ADs officers at a large party. Everybody expected that he

would give a big speech. Instead, he thanked the division commander, expressed his appreciation for being in the division and said his one hope was that he could contribute just a tiny bit to the divisions success. All that took less than 2 minutes and he sat down. He was beginning the assignment by making it clear to everyone that he understood the role of the ussistantdivision commander, his assigned level of leade~hip. The primary training activities in an armored division are field maneuvem and tank gunnery. Abrams had a major impact on the way both were conducted, not only in his division, but throughout the Army in Europe during his assignment there. Every battalion and every company in the armor, infimtry and artillery took an annual training test. V7hen Abrams arrived in the division, these had evolved into very highly structured exercises, complete with detailed checklists of everything a unit was supposed to do during each phase of the test. Large numbers of points were associated with each checklist, with an aggregate in the tens of thousands being the theoretical maximum a unit could achieve if it got five points for having a clean windshield on a jeep during a road march, 10 points for posting an air guard in each turret, 20 points for refheling


August 1992

promptly in the assembly area, and so on and on. Overall the checklist approach had the effect of producing a canned outing that tactically was not very instructive. Abrams watched how these tests went, then talked with some of the senior subordinate commanden who were not

Abrams soon pickzd up the fmt that the briefing charts this o~cer was using were the same ones he had used the previous &y for a quite different mattm Abrams. . . very quietly began to ask him questims. . . . The briefer was soon tied in knots trying to respond to increasingly detdled and probing queries . . . [andjinally] broke down and cried. . . . Some people thought it hud been a ftily brutil way to deal with the problem, but nobody doubted thutAbrams was serious about integrity.

happy with the approach. Then he heard from some o~lcers who had gone as umpires to other units that went through a completely canned scenario. They were being asked, they told Abrams, to critique and criticize the final performance of a well-rehearsed play. Abrams decided to do something about this. He drafted recommendations for a completely changed method of conducting battalion and company tests. Higher headquarters did not immediately agree, but they did convene a general officer board to look into the problem, with Abrams to head it up. The results laid the groundwork for a later change to a much more dynamic approach to testing, one using opposing forces and providing much more latitude for initiative and tactical innovation. When Abrams dug into the tank gunnery program, he found some of the same kinds of problems. The centerpiece of the firing exercises involved two members of the crew firing, from the halt, at stationary and moving targets. There was nothing that gave the entire crew a chance to train and be tested as a team.

Abrams viewed this as a total waste of time and ammunition. He led a long fight to get things changed-again to a more dynamic and less canned approach that would really test a crew and give it some opportunity to interact in engaging the target. Eventually there evolved a whole series of firing tables conducted on ranges built for the purpose at Gdenwohr. Table VIII, as the sort of graduation exercise was designated, involved the crews taking its tank dawn range on two runs, one during the day and one at night, and engaging a series of targets that were presented in a random sequence. Every weapon was used, every crewman had to do his part, and both accuracy and speed of engagement were scored. Teamwork was the key, and the result was a far better trained and more Cotildent crew. According to Lieutenant General Jock Sutherland, who had served as a combat command commander in the division, That change was brought about due in large measure to the efforts of General AbramS. Abrams made his mark on attitudes and professional conduct as well. On a winter exercise, he pulled into the headquarters of a combat command and found the commander in the process of bitterly denouncing the support he was receiving from the divisions service elements. His comments were directed at those goddamn quartermaster jerks and the like, and were delivered in front of a number of visitom there to observe the maneuver. Abrams took the floor. In the 3d Armored Division, he told the assembled commanders and staff, there are no goddamn engineem, no goddamn ordnance officers, or goddamn artillerymen. We are all part of the team and, while we might discuss our problems face to face with each other and have honest disagreements and complaints when we are talking about a unit of this division, its that great old 23d or the solid 102nd, and they are part of our team. From then on, that was the policy. Vkits from Abrams were usually enjoyable (at least in retrospect) for people who were putting on effective training and knew what they were doing. He recognized good work when he saw it

August 1992



and, although he was not a gusher when it came to praising people, had a way of letting them know by his demeanor when he approved. But such visits could be an ordeal when things were not going well. At a command post exercise being conducted by the division, the G4 got up to brief on the simulated laying of a minefield. A key element was the logistics arrangements. The same officer had briefd the day before on another aspect of the problem. Now he began to go through the number of mines, the trucks to transport them, and so on. Abrams soon picked up the fict that the briefing charts this officer was using were the same ones he had used the previous day for a quite different matter. Abrams let the man finish his presentation, then very quietly began to ask him questions. Each was more incisive than the one before. The briefer was soon tied in knots trying to respond to increasingly detailed and probing queries. He would not come out and say that he was not prepared, that he had just tried to fake the figures to make them come out right, but each time he gave an answer Abrams would ask him something else, and it soon became quite clear that the briefer was either a liar or terribly incompetent. A staff offker who witnessed this said that it was one of the toughest situations that Ive ever seen a person put in, short of a court of law, in public. Finally the briefer, a fairly senior oflcer and a man probably in his late 30s, broke down and cried, right there on the briefing platiorm. Abrams stood up. Gentlemen, he said, I dont appreciate having anybody lie to me. Then he turned away and walked out of the briefing tent. Later it was learned that this oflcer had taken a nap ~er lunch, overslept, and wound up with too little time to properly post his charts. He had taken his thumb and erased some of the grease pencil numbers from the earlier briefing, then written in other numbers. He left everything else on the chart unchanged, hoping that nobody was going to remember what the correct figures were anyway, and that he could fake his way through it. None of this had escaped Abrams. Some people thought it had been a fair-

Colonel, Ill go over this for you one more time. I want you to re+lo th.ut training program, and I want you to put it on two sheets of pape~ Bautz had the message. Yes, siq he said, picking up the [2-inch thick] document and heading out. Just as he reached the hoq Abrams relentedbut just a Wtle. With a faint smile he said, 6Say,EdUie, you can use both sides of the papez 99

ly brutal way to deal with the problem, but nobody doubted that Abrams was serious about integrity. Things began to happen fast when, afier a short time as a staff officer at US Army, Europe, Abrams returned to take command of the division, and it did not take his sulmrdinates long to realize that Abrams was serious about all things professional. When he took over, he held a meeting at which he told his senior associates how proud and happy he was to be joining them: I want you to be assured that I know that Im coming into the best organization that there is, and Im not going to make any major changes. Its set up just the way I want it, and all I want to do is contribute my little bit. Everybody had big smiles on their faces when he finished, and it was a good two days before he began changing just about everything in sight. One of his first actions was to call in the division operations officer. This was Lieutenant Colonel Edward Bautz, the same Eddie Bautz who during World War II, as a major, had been operations o~lcer of Abrams tank battalion in the fighting across Europe. He was a brave and capable ofEcer, and he and Abrams knew one another intimately, as only two old soldien who have shared the hardships and dangers of battle can. None of that was evident on this morning, however. Get me the G3, Abrams told his aide. Bautz reported in, standing straight and tall. Abrams addressed him formally: Colonel, do we have a training program in this division?




Of course, he knew full well that they had a training program in the division. Yes, sir, said Bautz. Colonel, may I see it? asked Abrams. Yes, sir. Bautz ran down the hall, got the training program, brought it back and laid it on Abrarns desk. The document was fully two inches thick. Abrams drummed the stack of paper with his fingen, flipped it a couple of times. Then he handed it back across the desk. Colonel Bautz, I want you to re-do that training program on two pieces of paper. Bautz was a hell of a soldier, but he choked out: Sir, theres no way you can put that division training program on two sheets of paper. Youve got all these 7th Army requirements, youve got all these V Corps requirements. You just cant do that. In fact the thick sheaf spelled out in great detail, even down to company level, the exact subjects and hours of instruction to be presented. Unit comman ders

had little say about how their own troops were to be trained-it was all dictated and controlled by higher headquarters. Abrams looked at Bautz. Colonel, Ill go over this for you one more time. I want you to do that training program, and I want you to put it on two sheets of paper. Bautz had the message. Yes, sir, he said, picking up the document and heading out. Just ashe reached the door, Abrams relented-but just a little. With a fkint smile he said, Say, Eddie, you can use both sides of the paper. When it was all fhished, the revised directive simply set forth the basic training policies, putting the major responsibility for deciding what training their units needed on the commanders of those units. Abrarns reasoned that they were in the best position to know the strengths and weaknesses of their organizations, not std oRicem located at headquarters several levels higher.

CreightonAbrams andLeading in Battle

An important professional discussion taking place in the wake of the Gulf War concerns the proper role and place of the maneuver unit commander in battle. At least one division commander in the conflict apparently specified that some of his subordinate leade~battalion commanders, for example-were not to fight their own combat vehicles (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles), but rather devote themselves entirely to directing the employment of the rest of their forces. The issue is not a simple one, and there may well be more than one right answer. Also, of course, variations in the combat environment might dictate different solutions at different times and places. But there is one crucially important aspect of combat leadership that is very much intertwined with the questions of how and from where a leader leads. That is how the leader is perceived by his followers, and thus what impact he has on their motivation and performance. In World War II, Creighton Abram, destined later to become US comman der in Vietnam and then Army chief of sti, commanded the 37th Td Battalion, part of the 4th Armored Division that was ofien found leading General George Pattons Third Army in the drive across Europe. It was Abrams who led the task force that punched through German lines to relieve the 10lst Airborne Division when it was encircled at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, and the driving personal leadership he exhibited there was characteristic of his approach to combat command. Abrams led born the hnt. Once things got moving on a daysoperation, he would never return to the command post. If more orders had to be issued, Abram did it over the radio, or gathered a few leaders around his personal map or one hung on the side of a half-track. Rarely did he have to ask one of his company commanders, What is your situation? because he was therein his tank and could see for himself, or he had one of his staff offkers in an oversight role reporting steadily to him on what was going on. But at the same time he was efkctively employing the assets of his entire tank battalion, Abrams was also fighting his own tank. John Gatusky, the gunner, was the top gun in the entire tank battalion. This was not an accident. Abrams had drilled his crew relentlessly in preparing for battle, just as he had set and enforced high standards for the rest of his battalion. In England, during the final stages of preparation for the Normandy invasion, Abram himself or one of his experienced staff offlcets rode on the back of every tank as it went down range in order to score

August 1992



But with the authority to determine what training should be given also went the responsibility for the results. Abrams expected every outfit to meet his high standards for being well trained, and he held his subordinate commanders responsible for achieving those results. He was building a climate in which people had every opportunity to take responsibility, to use their initiative and to show what they could do. At the heart of it, said Bautz, was that the primary mission of the division is combat readiness. Everything else is secondary. Abrams never deviated from that policy, wherever he was assigned, throughout his career. Thus things that got in the way of training, such as paperwork, were anathema to Abrams. One of his first orders to the chief of staff was to cut paperwork in the division by 50 percent. Were going to give the land back to the Indians, Abrams said, and the Indians probably

dont want it. If training came first under the new regime, how to evaluate readiness and petiormance was Abrams next point of emphasis. He instituted a kind of acid test of whether a unit was combat ready or not, and made it an absoluteeither a tank company or rifle squad or whatever was ready for combat, or it was not. The key to determining that rating was the professional competence and judgment of the higher-level commander. This strengthened the entire chain of command. It meant, as well, that every leader had to have the sine qua non of a credible evaluatorhe had to know a good job when he saw one and be able to earn the trust and confidence of his followets in his ability to evaluate them and their units fairly and objectively. The mutual trust and confidence this produced carried over into every other realm of their relationships.

and critique the crews performance. Some company commanders complained that it made them nervous to have a staff officer riding on the turret of their tank. Abrams response was simple: If that makes them nervous, what are they going to do when the Germans start shooting at them? There were no more complaints about that training technique. Then Abrams insisted on crew response times in taking a target under fire that company commanders viewed as too stringent. It was impossible to get every crew trained to that standard, they told him. To deal with that complaint, Abrarns made up a tank crew of battalion staff officers, with himself as tank commander. He had the exec or operations officer as gunner, somebody else as loader, and so on. Afier a little practice, the makeshift crew went through the gunnery course and showed how it could be done. After that there were no fimther complaints on the response time issue either. Thus, when he got into combat, Abrams was decidedly not going to use his own tank simply as an armored office. He bagged the first German tank killed by the battalion, having the geat good fortune of encountering it while on his way to a commanders conference at higher headquarters. Abrams frequently led with the light tanks of his D Company, commanded by Captain John McMahon, and

followed closely himself. Abe was always in his tank and ready to fight with it, said McMahon. He did not direct his units from a safe command post. Instead he mixed into the battle and participated like any other tank. For those who rode in Abrams columns, pushing across France, perhaps their strongest impression was simply the force of his personality. He would not be thwarted in achieving the objective. From early morning until &er dark he was on the mdio, urging his tankers forward, issuing instructions, encouraging them, demanding that they get on with it. Some staff office~ at higher headquarte~ later revealed that they would begin the day by tuning their radios to Abrams command ikquency, just to be entertained by his hard-driving leademhip. Abrams and his crew named their tank Thtmderbok, which seems just right. While no authoritative record exists of the number of German tanks they finished off, it is certain that they were aces a number of times over. Art West, who commanded one of the armored infhntry battalions in the division, once told a reporter that he thought Abrams tank at the end of the war had probably knocked out more enemy tanks than any other in the US Army. But-or at least this is how it seems to m+the destruction personally inflicted on the enemy by





The real work of the division, of course, took place in the field. Given that it was an armored division, and one positioned in a critical spot to intercept any invading columns from the east, tank gunnery was the centerpiece of the divisions training program. The highlight of the training year was the annual tank gunnery shoot, conducted on the superb ranges of the Grafenwohr training complex. Each tank commander would take his tank and crew through a series of firing exercises, culminating with record firing on a course through which the tank moved, engaging in quick succession targets for the main gun and both machineguns as they popped into view. Each crew received a composite score reflecting the results of a day run and a night run through this course, and it was a very demanding, stressfhl and exciting event. Those crews that qualified, especially if they made a very high score

and were designated a distinguished crew, could just about float home on the euphoria of the accomplishment. Abrams loved tank gunnery, and he took a keen interest in the training for and the results of the tank gunnery shoot. Soon afier conclusion of the annual tank firing, Abrams had his senior subordinate commanders over for a social evening. Only one of his three combat command commanders, who were full colonels heading up the equivalent of todays brigades, had taken his own tank down range at Grafenwohr during the record firing, and he and his crew had qualified. After a couple of drinks, Abrarns roared (something he did a lot, and was good at) across the room. Mike, what did you shoot down at Graf? What was your score ? At that moment the room went silent, and the colonel announced what his score had been. Abrams said, Goddamn it, thats great, you know. And

Abrams and his tank crew was not the most important aspect of his command philosophy. Rather, it was the effect of his example on the rest of his men. That effect was as dramatic as it was positive. As one tank driver put it, I can recall during our tank battles Abe was right alongside of our tank giving orders to my tank commander and having a ball . . . shooting tanks like the rest of the boys. He would mix in wherever the toughest battle was. And, he added, It made us feel more like fighting harder when you could see a great manlike Abe right alongside of you, You gave your personal canteen tome so that I could give my buddy some water and sulfa pills for his wound, another tanker from his old outfit later wrote to Abrams. You then proceeded to knock out the German gun emplacement which had scored a direct hit on my tank. Yet another tank commander, remembering events then 40 years in the past, said: I could close my eyes and see Abe in the turret of his tank, big long cigar in his mouth. He would raise his hand and drop it, and say Roll them, and off we would go. Attack! No stopping for anything. And I remember his big smile and hard handshake when I got my Silver Star. It may lx argued that things are different today more complex, more difficult-and perhaps that is

so. Whether that negates the value, or indeed the possibility, of personal involvement in the combat actions one is responsible for directing is the issue. Before answering with any finality, I think we need to learn more about the unfortunate episodes of casualties resulting from fi-iendly fire in the Gulf War, then seek to determine whether these were in any way a hmction of commanders who became engrossed in fighting their own systems at the expense of controlling the actions of their units. That Abrams was able to do both-fight his own tank with devastating effectiveness and control the entirety of his battalions operations-was not an accident. It was, rather, a fhnction of carefid planning and training on his part before the fact, and of exceptional energy and tactical acumen once the battle was joined. The organization of the World War II tank battalion provided for only two tanks in the headquarters. In England, Abrams withdrew a tank and crew from each of his three medium tank companies and brought them into the headquarters to provide a tank for his operations officer, his intelligence officer and his liaison officer. This enabled these relatively experienced officers to accompany the combat forces. Then Abrarns ofien assigned them to overwatch portions of operations, or sometimes to take command of






he took his cigar out of his mouth and blew smoke at everybody. That was all he needed to say. They got the message. It is probably no coincidence that the colonel who qualified his tank, Mike Davison, was subsequently to wear four stars and command the US Army in Europe. He later said that taking that tank down range was absolutely the most nervous and anxiety-ridden time in his entire professional experience. He felt that he had a lot on the line. Abrams appreciated what that meant, and took this way of pointing it out to his other combat command commanders, who had elected not to put themselves at that professional risk. Small wonder that Davison remembered his service under Abrams as a professionally exhilarating year. At every level, Abrams troops and subordinate leaders responded to the confidence he displayed in them. This quality of his leadenhip

made a great impression on Paul Ignatius, then an assistant secretary of the Army, on a tour of US Army installations in Europe. As was so often the case, the 3d AD was then to be found in field training at Grtienwohr, and Ignatius spent several days with the division there. Other senior commanden in the field would try to stage-manage visits to their units, hovering anxiously at a visitors side and monitoring every conversation. But not Abrams. He and Ignatius would arrive at the training area, land the helicopter, and then, Ignatius remembered, General Abrams would disappear, and I must say that I did not find in subsequent visits, and I made many to military installations, in all of the services, an officer who was always willing to do that. He would simply disappear, and I was in the hands of the sergeant or the junior officer for as long as I wanted to spend; he wasnt standing by listening to what they were

them. They could thus keep him continuously informed, coordinate support for the maneuver elements they were with, and otherwise extend the reach of Abrarns command. He customa~j~ maintained ments of the combat trains tucked up in his tactical column, both protectCreighton W. Abrams ing and keeping them close at hand for immediate resupply. At the same time, he could thereby maintain awareness of their status, exert immediate control over their actions and closely coordinate logistic and operational actions. And of course-an absolutely key element Abrams was himself tirelessly and fearlessly involved wherever the action was most intense. Thus he had little need to depend on the reports of others as to what was going on or what needed to be done. He was there, seeing for himself and,

in the most direct and personal way, making it happen. Where should we come down today-and looking to the flmre-on the issue of the proper role and placement of the commander of a combat maneuver element ? Maybe, like the classic response to tactical problems made famous at the Armor School, it all depends on the situation. But during World War II, Patton, watching the relentless drive east of the 37th Td Battalion, reportedly said, Im supposed to be the best tank commander in the Army, but I have one peer-Abe Abrams. Hes the worlds champion. Reflecting on that assessment, one thing seems certain: Had Abrams commanded from the rear, or had his tank gun remained silent, Patton would not have been moved to bestow upon him that supreme accolade, And Patton, himself so sensitive to the spiritual and emotional aspects of combat leadership, must have understood fill well that it was in the effect on the men under his command that Abrams battlefield petiormance had its greatest impact. If, in our prescription of the fiture battlefield role of the combat leader, we diminish the possibility of such impact, we willI believe have paid a heavy price for whatever procedural gains are realized. I





saying or coaching them in their answem This was, Ignatius felt, an indication of the cotildence he had in his people, and really the confidence he had in himself. It soon became apparent how fortuitous it was to have Abrams at the head of the 3d AD, for what we later came to call the Berlin Crisis erupted in the summer of 1961. Abrams had by then been in co remand of the division for nearly a year. War plans called for the 3d AD to plug the Fulda Gap, an historic east-to-west invasion route that Abrams once called a playground for tanks, where the division was expected to blunt the first thrusts of any Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression. Abrams was ready for the challenge: If theres going to be trouble, he said, I prefer to be right here and right in this division. This is the job I want. As the crisis tiolded, Abrams and his commanders walked the whole forward defense line, then took division elements on a maneuver in the Fulda Gap as part of the US response to the Soviet threats. One of his combat command commanders remembered later how he and Abrams had stood on the high ground overlooking the Fulda River, gazing out at the terrain and in the direction of the border, discussing how they were going to fight the battle. It was impressive to me, he said, to listen to General Abe and to be aware of the firm knowledge that he had of the use of terrain and the tactical concepts and the employment of armor and the conduct of a mobile defense. Abrams was a teacher, but at the same time that he imparted factual knowledge and guidance he was communicating strength of purpose, calmness, confidence in himself and his ouflt. These intangibles were, time tier time, to have the greatest impact on those around him, whether he was looking out at prospective invasion routes or calming an explosive civil rights confrontation, leading a tank battalion

in combat or rebuilding an Army shattered by a long and inconclusive war. The Berlin Crisis had fmused attention on NATOs defenses in Europe, and specifically on

Only one of his three combat command commundem. . . had tizken his own tdnk down range at Grafenwoh~. . . [tier] afier a couple of drinks, Abrams roared across the room: Mike, what did you shoot &wn at Gra$ . . . ? At that moment the room went silent, and the colonel announced what his score had been. Abrams said, GodMmn it, tha$s great.. . [then] took his cigar out of his mouth and blew smoke ti everybody. That was all he needed to say. They got the message.

the crucial role of the 3d AD. Abrams w= chosen to be the subject of a Tmw magazine cover story. The publication noted that it was getting a remarkably consistent view of Abrams. Its correspondent in Bonn cabled that virtually all of the people he had interviewed emphasized that Abrams was not an Army politician. His idea of how to get ahead is to do the best possible job on the assignment he has at the moment , he quoted one Abrams associate as saying. Right now he wants to be the best goddamn division commander in the United States Army. The way he went about that was to figure out his own responsibilities and concentrate on those, then teach his subordinate commanders what they needed to know to meet their own (different) responsibilities, energize and inspire them, show them that he had confidence in their abilities and hold them accountable for how they performed. It was a great way to run an outfit. Ml?

LewisSodey, ajbnner M cmier, soldierand civikm intelligence ojfker,isa writs specitditingin national securityafltirs. Thesearticles arebasedon hislmok,Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, beingpubkshednext monrh by Simon & Schuster.






General Dorm A. Starry, US Army, Retired

Copyright 1992

This essay, an e&d verswn of retired Geneml Dorm Starrysspeech at the Foti Lzavenwotih Hall of Fame inslidhtion ceremony, highlights General W-E. DePuyscontributionsto theArmy. Hepaints a vivid poti of the sokiiiv who helped guiak the Army through the changes in combat devekbpmentandthe way ittins, se~ngtheArmy on thepath to becoming thefome thut kboks&fights the way it dim todhy.

n the wall of the hallway leading to the command conference room at Fort Monroe, Virginia, hangs a row of pictures of previous commanders. Co mmandexs of army field forces, army ground forces, Continental Army Command and Tmining and Doctrine Command. They are the men under whose comman d, from Washington and Fort Monroe, have been developed tactical and operational doctrine, equipment requirements, organizations and force structures, and training systems to integrate all that into a competent fighting force. For more than 50 years ourArmyhas been shaped by these men and their work. Some fimous visages stare back atone passing by. Having fhced their stares probably several thousand times, I once observed, with all due mpect to the famous, that one had to move fkom General Jacob L. Devers to General Wtlliam E. Depuy, 24 years later, to bd two men in the queue who had really done something substantive, creative, positive, lasting, something different and new, something essential and necessaq for the Army whose future was in their hands. Depuy is a soldier of quite another generatio~ a generation and a half from Devers. For most of us he is a contemporary soldier. His military experience spans World War II through Vietnam. His value judgments, his convictions

about soldiers and their opemtional milieu, his perceptions of the leaders and the led, his deeply rooted ideas about tactical and operational doctrine, organizations and force structures, equipment petiormance requirements and principally about training soldiers and Unifi for combat, are drawn from the conditions under which he served his active career. He has ever been a thoughtful, perceptive observer of those cmditions. His always inquiring mind forever bears in on the lessons, better or not, of those conditions. As a 21year4d, newly cm-nmissioned graduate of the Reserve OfficeI# Tmining Corps program at South Dakota State College, Depuy joined first the 6th Infantry Division (ID), then the 90th ID in 1941, as they organized and trained for war. It was with the 357th Infhntq Regiment, 90th ID that he went to war in Europe, k as a company ofhceq then successively as a regimental operations officeq battalion commande~ and division G3. The 90th ID had a lumpy, if not rocky career in that war. For it was blessed with some of the best, and plagued with some of the least capable commanders of perhaps any division in the Army. Further, there seemed to be no consistency as to whether or not the best or the least were all there atone time. Hence jerks and starts, &lterings and halts in combat performance; and


August 1992


enormously unnecessa~ losses. In its sum, the 90th IDs story is probably one of the most relevant, perhaps revealing, case studies in military leadership available for examination to this day. It has been described as a perfect example ofhow

Solditm area ftily constint calculus, leaders make the difference; poor leadership gets far too many sohiiers killed unnecessanly; further, poor leadership inhibits unit performance-to the point of preventing misswn accomplishment
not to go about the important task of providing effective unit leadership. On those who suffered the experience, it had a deep and lasting effect; it was, in modern terms, a significant emotional event+ne that changed forever their value judgments, their frame of reference about the most important elements of their profession. Depuy has spoken of this experience many, many times. Some of you have heard himat Leavenworth, perhaps elsewhere. It is the centerpiece of his post-active duty oral history done at the war college, and now available for study. Depuy left the 90th ID and World War 11convinced that, among other things, soldiers are a fairly constant calculus, leaders make the difference; poor leadership gets far too many soldien killed unnecessarily; fhrther, poor leadership inhibits unit Petiormance-to the point of preventing mission accomplishment; that lack of effective unit training is one of the Armys most persistent and recurring problems, in part stemming from ineffective leademhip; that poor or inappropriate tactics, especially small-unit tactics, also lead to unreasonable casualty experience; that there is an inevitable linkage between tactics (doctrine), organization and structure, and the training necessary to put it all together in battle in effective units, that is all too little understoodprofessionally, and that is, along with all other matte~, essentially a problem of leadership. In all that he has done since his 90th ID

experience, one can trace in Depuys pex+ormance, the effkct of that experience. Following the war, Depuys assignment menu included a Regular Army commission; Fort Leavenworth for school; attach~ duty in Budapest, Hungary; duty with the Central Intelligence Agency then comman d of 2d Battalion, 8th M&wry, 4th ID in V Corps, US Army, Europe; Army staff; the Imperial Defense College; and command of 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry, 3d ID, again in US Army, Europe. He was director for special warfare, then for force development, both in Army deputy chief of sti, operations, followed by assignment as J3 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in the 19641966 US buildup in Vietnam. He then commanded the 1st ID in Vietnam. As the Big Red Ones boss for a memorable year, he put in place practices he had drawn from the lessons of the 90th ID. In so doing, he developed a reputation for being tough on leaders, for removing people from command with surgical alacrity when they failed his standards. In his oral history, he put the number relieved at 10 or 11. At the time, the numbers were said to be much larger. Whatever the number, close examination of the problem suggested strongly that he was replacing people for the same shortcomings for which they were being replaced in other commands, and that the combat circumsmnce simply made prompt replacement more urgent than might be the case otherwise. Hence the visibility of the phenomenon. This was unfortunate, for the real lesson was lost to the Army. Depuy acted based on convictions developed in his 90th ID experience. He said to me one time that he could not, in all conscience, risk the lives of the soldiers of his division by keeping in command over them someone in whom he had lost confidence. Those who have commanded in battle find that argument eminently correct. I have done it myself; so have at least some of you. But it turned many against him inan ofkercorps that was increasingly becoming careerist oriented. It was under that tiortunate cloud that Depuy took upduties as special assistant forcounterinsurgency on the joint staff, then became as-


August 1992



sistant vice chief of the Army staff in 1969. In the latter office, he became the architect of the Army reorganization that followed the Vietnam War. As part of that reorganization, it was decided to separate the training base fi-om the residual Continental United States-based Army and Army Reserve activities, creating two commands-a forces co remand and a training and doctrine comman d. The latter would combine combat developments and training base fhnctions. Thus was laid the baseline for the dramatic changes in Army doctrine, equipment development, organization and structure, and training that brought US Army forces to the dramatic and successfd events of the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Two men drove that drama from its inception. General Creighton Abrams and Depuy. Abrams instructions were clear. As I lefi his office to take command of the armor center just as US Army Tmining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was activated, his parting words to me were, go out there and get the Army off its ass. It was a charge he laid on many, Depuy among them. It was a charge Depuy and I reviewed many times during sanity checks to ensure we were about the right matters. So was born active defense, the doctrine of the mid1970s. It took account of the dramatically changed threat in Europe and the offerings of modern technology, especially those in sensor and target acquisition systems, and in longrange antitank guided missiles. It deepened the strength of forward defenses in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Europe, and against Soviet-style threats elsewhere. It was somewhat of a revolution in doctrine; it was accompanied by dramatic changes in equipment, in organizations and structures, most notably in training. Tminingforsoldiers, but more importantly for of-

The success of US milikzry o~rations in the Gulf Ww is due in no snudl measure to theprofesswrud ability, courage, &termination, foresight and intellictuulgenius of [Depuy]. One of the truly great Army kmdas of our time.

ficers and noncommissioned officers, and for all ranks in units-before the battle. It was the genesis of AirLand Battle, the doctrine of the 1980s. Quite clearly it prepared the Army for the next, not the last war. In it one can trace directly the thread of Depuys lessons gleaned from the 90th ID experience in World War II. It was clearly the most dramatic single evolution in tactics, equipment, organization and training ever undertaken atone time. Even on Devers watch at Army ground forces, the scope of the undertaking was in no way so ambitious. But, perhaps because of its scope, certainly because of the driving sense of urgency with which all of us who were involved pursued the pace of change, change wrenched some sensibilities. There was the inevitable naysaying and (largely unwarranted) criticism. An objective history of the process and its outcome has yet to be written; this is neither the place nor the time to attempt it, for it deserves serious contemplation and mature judgments. But it is both necessary and sufficient to say that the success of US military operations in the Gulf War is due in no small measure to the professional ability, courage, determination, foresight and intellectual genius of one of the truly great Army leaders of our time. Depuy was the architect who made possible what got done. It is his legacy to those of us who follow and strive mightily to emulate his example. his a large legacy indeed. MR

General Dorm A. Starry, US Army, Retired, is an adviserto industry and government in the United States and sevendfbreign countries. He rewwd a B.S. from the US Mifitary Acd.emy, an M .S. from George Washington University and is a graduateof the US Army Command mu-l General StaffCokge, theArmed ForcesStaffCokge and the US Army War College. He has commanded armor and cawky unitsfrom@tnon through corps,inckding V Corps, US Army, Europe. Hews alsocommander of tk US Army Trainingand Docmne Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and commancierin chiefof US ReacfinessCommand, MacDiUAir Force Base, Fkn-ida.






Brigadier General William M. Steele, US Army Developing kxuikrsfor the Army has received much atkmtion dwing the pastfiveyears. The author reviewsthAnnys cumtiflve leaderdkvehpment action plans. He begins with the offier and noncommissioned o~em pkzns, highlighting chunges since their beginnings. The author next commentson chungesto the wamznt o~er and ci* kxzderdevelopment actionphzns that were approved in Febnuuy. Finully, the author summarizes the Reserve Com~nent lixzdkrdevelopment actkm pkm
A competent leader can get ejjkkrtt service from poor troops, . . . Unincapubk ?k?adercunderrwrdize thebest of troops. INCE CHANGE seems to be the byword -of our Army, now is the time to consider the effect of ongoing change on our leader development programs. Leader development is more than merely one of the Armys six imperatives. Among the irnperativ=high quality soldiers and civilians; forwardlooking warfighting doctrine; the right size and mix of heavy, light and special operations units; tough, realistic training; continuous modernization; and the development of competent and cotildent leaders; leader development drives the other five and

John J. Pershing My Experimw m de Widd Wur.

represents our Armys greatest long-term investmentit takes 25 yearnto develop division commanders, 30 years for corps comrnan ders. This article reviews the current status of the Armys leader development programs and ponders these programs fiture. The Leader Development Study (LDS), chaired in 1987 by General Gordon R. Sullivan when he was the deputy comman dant of the US Army Command and General Stti College (USACGSC), was the last of five major leader studies conducted between 1978 and 1987.1 Since then, the chief of staff of the Army (CSA) has approved five leader development action plans (LDAPs): one each for otfkers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), civil-

August 1992


ians and the Resene Components (RC) as shown in figure 1. These action plans pr(wide direction to the leader deteloprnent prt~gram and are the result of a process called the Leader Development Support System (LDSS). Established in 1989, the LDSS provides a means to monitor ongoing leader development actions and to develop, investigate and propt~se changes to action plans in figure 2. The LJ3SS consists of senior Army commanders, the Leader Devel[}prnent Office (LDO) ancl the Leader Devek>pment Decisitm Network (LDDN). The deputy commandant, USA-CGSC, is the executi~e agent responsible for the merall cotmlination of the Army leader development pr(>grarn. The senit~r commanders fimction as the txmrd ~~f directors, reviewing current policies and pr(widing guidance on fiture acti(ms. The ct~mmanding generals of US Army Training and Doctrine Gmv mand (TRADOC) and the Combined Arms Command contribute to the prt}cess through their personal in~wlternent. The LDO is the daily operating agency of the LDSS, serving as the deputy commandants leader development staff. Finally, the LDDN is the acti[m agency ftw leader develt>pment. The tailored LDDN membership consists of those indi~iduak who have expertise with the topics under rc~iew. The major product ~~f the LDDN is the LDAP depicted in fi~nm 3.

Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Leader Development

We have goodcorporak and sk,geants, and some good lieutenants and cajxuiu, and those are far more im@rtiznt than goodgenerals.

Wllllmn Twumseh

The choice of noncommissioned oficers is of the greatest importance: The order and discipline of a regiment dependsso much u~m their behavior, that too much care cannot be taken in prefen-ing none to that trust butthose who by their merit and good conduct are entitled to it. Fxmm v(m Steuben: Rq@uum.\ jir JW ordev d of [k rr(x)ps oj h

(hired W&S, 1779.


Published in April 1988, the oficer LDAP was the direct pr(xluct t~f the LDS. Containing 56 recommendations, the tfficer LDAP has f~>cusedleader devek~pment attention on such issues as: . Creating the Army Acquisition Corps. . Changing the functional area designation ~>int frt)m the 7th to 8th year t~fsewice to near the end of the 5th year. . Automatically slating captains selected bek~tvthe zone for major to resident Command and Staff CxJlege (CSC). . Eliminating the fair share distribution plans f~~r grduates of a CSC education (military education le\elJl ). G Impr~wing a CSC education by earlier attendance.

Review LDAPs LDDNs review Inltlal LDAPs Army family team LDAP (Jun)


p@ Officer MILITARY

X-& The

J Reserve component Warrant officer LDAP (90) LDAP


Deputy commandant Command & General Staff College



Noncommlssloned LDAP (88) Figure


LDAP (89)

Leader Development Figure

Office 2,





. Improving of many aspects of the Joint Professional Military Education. . Incorporating of branch refresher and regreening training at the beginning of the course. G Reducing of deferments. . Publishing of Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 6~32, baler Deve&nent~m theTotzdArmy, the Enduringbgacy, provided the leader development framework and explained the principles and imperatives that govern the program.2 The most important ongoing action within the Officer LDAP is the revision of DA Pamphlet 600--3, Commissioned ~er Development and Career Management. This pamphlet will be published at the beginning of Fiscal Year (FY)

Environment < Specific actions

Input Opportunities

4 d

Roadmap Resources # Priorities

Payoff. . . a leader development system focusad on the future Figure 3,

1993 and will lay out updated career life cycle models for all officer branches and fkctional areas. Career paths for single and dualtracked officers from the Active Component (AC) and RC will be illustrated. This pamphlet will also define the company and field grade qualification standards for each branch and kctional area, and will give assignment officers, commanden, school commandants, selection boards and individual o~lcers a singlesource document for career planning. Another ongoing revision is US Army Field Manual 22-103, Leadersh.i~and Command at Senior Ixwel.s. The rewrite of this manual will address direct, senior, and-with the incorporation of DA Pamphlet 600-80, Strategic Level Leadership. The NCO LDAP has been just as instrumental in NCO development. In October 1988, the TRADOC commander, General Maxwell Thurman, chartered the NCO Leader Development Special Tmk Force to develop a strategy and an action plan for improving the Armys NCO leader development system. The LDAPs recommendations resulted in some noteworthy accomplishments. To start with, promotions for both AC and RC NCOS will soon be in synch with attendance at prerequisite schooling-for example, a sergeant cannot be promoted to staff sergeant without having attended the Basic NCO Course. The relatively new Battle Staff NCO Course now provides a Combined Arms Services Staff School equivalent for NCOS. The







Individual Training and Evaluation Program now employs progressive Common Task Tmining-different tasks for different skill levelswhile the commanders evaluation has become an assessment. The NCO .lourrud,published by the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, began as a result of the task forces work. The journal is an excellent forum for discussing sergeants business and has the potential for being an agent for change. A major task lefi to accomplish in the NCO LDAP is publication of DA Pamphlet 600-25, US Amy NCO Pro~essionul Development Guide, , by September 1992. This pamphlet will describe NCO skills, knowledge and attitudes for both components and will include an NCO leader development career life cycle model. As the Army readies itself to meet the challenges of the fhture, the most enduring contribution will be the development of NCOS who make up the largest group of leaders in the Army. For its part, the current NCO LDAP has provided an accurate azimuth for the proftisional development and growth of an already outstanding noncommissioned officer corps.

Warrant Officer Leader Develo~ment

An Army f-d clockwork . of good Oj&ers n-&es like
George Washington: Letter to the President of Congress, 24 September 1776.

This year the Army completed two actions which have a direct impact on warrant oflcer leader development. First, Congress passed the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) and, secondly, the CSA approved the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP). Both of these actions will significantly improve the leader development of Army warrant oflcers. WOMA gave legislative approval to portions of the Total Warrant Officer Study of 1984. The act established the grade of CW5 (chief warrant officer) versus master warrant officer 4 and a single promotion systemthat is, warrant oKlcers are no longer promoted in Regular Army and Army of the United States categories. In ad-

dition, warrant officers are now managed by Active Federal Warrant OfFicer Service rather than Active Federal Service; this means that some warrant officers can have a full 30-year career as a warrant o~lcerin addition to time spent as an NCO. Finally, the secretary of the Army can now convene boards for selective retention and for early retirement of warrant otficem On 27 February 1992 the CSA approved the WOLDAI? Some of the approved recommendations are: . A complete review of the warrant officer training system.3 G Creation of career life cycle models for all warrant officer Military Occupation Specialties and publication in DA Pamphlet 60&l 1, warrant O#icer Professional Development. . Appointment to warrant o&er tier Warrant ~lcer Candidate School rather than tier the Warrant CMcer Technical and Tactical Course. . Establishment of civilian education goals.4 . Designation of all warrant officer positions on tables of organization and equipment (TOES) and tables of distribution and allowances (TDAs) to one of four grade levels-WOlCW2, CW3, CW4 and CW5to help ensure that warrant office~ are assigned and employed in line with their grade and experience. . Creation of a Warrant Officer Military Qualifications Standards System as part of the self development pillar. . Establishment of a Total Army Warrant Off~cer Career Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, to provide executive overwatch for all warrant officer education and training.

Civilian Leader Development

All members of the TotulAnny face must bepre@red to~bnnasfxmtof rheAnny team. This conce~t worked rrwgn$cendy duringoperations Desert Shield and Desert Storm when rnditmy and civiliuns served together . . . .
General Gordon R. Sulhvan, CSA, Februaq 1992

Although civilians are an integral part of the Armys leadership at all levels, until just a few



August 1992




years ago, there wasvery little leader development for civilians. To help remedy that, Sullivan signed the Civilian Leader Development Action Plan (CLDAP) in February 1992. Among the already completed recommendations are: G Adoption of civilian career life-cycle and leader development models. . Emphasis on military and civilian supervisor responsibilities for developing subordinates and helping them with career management. . Assignment of resource responsibility for civilian leader development to the office of the deputy chief of stfi for persomel. . Development of an account to support civilian travel pay and per diem to courses required for civilian leaders in the sustaining base. . Identification of a common core program for educating civilian leadership. We now have ArmyWide implementation of the Persomel Proponency Plan, which categorizes 100 percent of the civilian work force into 58 career fields. Thirty-two proponents have been identified to control these careers; some of the proponents will be overseeing more than one career field. Much work remains to be done, but progress is noticeable. Finally, Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated how critical the civilian component of the Total Army is to our soldiers in the field. As a result of that experience, the CLDAP recommends the establishment o{ a Total Army Corporate Culture-to bring the uniformed and

Army civilian cultures closer together without eliminating the differences that distinguish and enhance each. The final outcome of all these efforts should be a civilian work force that filly complements their uniformed counterparts.

RC Leader Development
The reservist is twice the citi~en.
Attributed to Winston Churchill On 15 February 1991, the deputy chief of staff for operations activated an LDDN to formulate a RC Leader Development Action Plan (RCLDAP). Army National Guard, US Army Reserve and AC counterparts, working together, developed a thorough action plan that was approved by the CSA on 17 June 1992. Some of the more significant issues recommended by the RCLDAP are summarized below: G RC career life cycle models will be written for individuals and commanders to use for career management planning and will be incorporated into the appropriate DA Pamphlet 600-- series. . Leader training that is a prerequisite for promotion must be provided in a RC conf&ured course format. . Comprehensive command and staff development programs, such as the Tactical Commanders Development Course and the Battle Command Training Program need to be more available to the RC. 5 G RC unit order of merit lists must ensure that the best soldiers and oRlcem attend schools,







rather than those who are merely most available. . More opportunities for battle-focused, realistic training events must be made available. . Leaden must be qualified before they assume a specific position; they can no longer hope to become qualified on the job. Moreover, commanders will attend a branch Precommand Gurse before assuming command. . The best qualified leaders should be selected for leadership positions. US Army Forces Command has developed a RC training initiative called Bold Shifi which focuses on seven major challenges to RC readiness. The RCLDAP addresses two of the challenges directlyunit training and leader training. Moreover, the LDAP and TRADOCS Training Development Action Plan have been coordinated with Bold Shifi to ensure their combined strategies enhance RC readiness. This plan should enhance RC leader development and remain a living document for implementation.

The Future
OUT lader development programs are one of the
most i@ortant ways we rnuinnn the quality fmce and are also owr greafest legacy because theyprovide

the leaders that will s@e

the Army of tomorrow

General Carl E. Vucx-m,CSA, March 1989

Leader development in our Army is at a crossroads. It has produced outstanding leaders whose actions have resulted in victories in the Cold War, operations~ust Cause, Desert Sltiekland Desert Storm. Our Army is the envy of all others in large measure because of the quality ofour leadership. Whether officer, warrant o~lcer, noncommissioned officer or civilian, AC or RC, our Army has proven itself able to execute the toughest missions to standard. Many things have contributed to our recent successes. Certainly, our revitalized leader development programs have made significant contributions. The trite admonition, If it aint broke, dont fii it appears to apply to these proven programs . . . but maybe not ! Despite our successes, we cannot be lulled into believing that leadership programs are great across the board because we just won three wars. We all know the Army is changing. It would

be dangerous to automatically infer that leader development should not change along with the Army. General Erwin Rommel warned that: Prejudice against imovation is a typical characteristic of an ~lcer Corps which has grownup in a welltried and proven system. Revolutionary change might not be needed, but should not be dismissed out of hand. With the changes in Army structure, missions and resources, we must continually reexamine our leader development system to ensure we continue to produce cotildent, competent leade~ with the requisite skills to meet the challenges of the fhture. What worked for the Cold War Army may not necessarily work for a smaller, modern, Continental United States=based Army-an Army that will rely more heavily on reserve components and will be following a national military strategy of deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. While downsizing of the Army and decreasing Army resources are two of the major impacts of environmental change, several things have not changed ! First, the Armys mission remains to deter potential adversaries from attacking US interests, and if deterrence fails to win on the battlefield. Secondly, the Army must continue to faus on warfighting, even as we identify new roles and missions with the changing environment. And finally, leader development is our most important investment in the Armys fhture. Much progress has been achieved in the leader development arena. Our systems are proactive and have produced satisfactory results . . . but will they continue to be successful in our changing Army? As we ponder that thought, several other questions come to mind, such as: G Should DA civilians assume a greater role in the TDA (or TOE) Army? Should they fill leadership positions in those units? How do we develop civilians to meet the challenges of leadership? . Should the three pillars (institution, operational assignment and selfdevelopment) of the leader development program extend to general oflcers (GO) and civilians in the senior execut ive service (SES) ? How can we improve






GO/SES preparation for the challenges ahead? . Should we teach leaders the higher level cognitive skills-such as intuitive reasoning, tolerance of complexity and ambiguity, hypothetical what if reasoning, and visionary thinking? At what level should these skills be developed? G How do we enhance the self4evelopment pillar of leader development? G What leader development opportunities and challenges will there be in the closer ACRC relationship? . How can we counter careerism? . Can we afford to keep warrant officetx in our smaller army or should officers and NCOS pick up those technical responsibilities? G Should the o~lcer education system require completion of officer schools as a prerequisite for promotion . . . similar to the present NCO Education System? These questions are only a few of the many issues we must deal with to maintain proactive, up-to-date leader development programs. Together we can make a difference. The Army has invested heavily in leader develop-

ment and has received significant dividends in return. While we have a good system to develop leaders for todays Army, our challenge is to continue to develop leaders for an uncertain future. Our present system has served the Army well. Every leader has a stake in forming our leader development program which will help to shape our Armys future. I hope this article genemtes discussion about leader development . . . that is its purpose. If it generates new thoughts on ways to improve leader development in a post-Cold War Army-that is even better! We plan to begin reviews of our existing programs in FY 93. We need your input. Let us hear fi-om you. Please provide your thoughts to: US Army Command and General StM College, Am: Leader Development OKice, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027, or call at DSN 552-3471/3472. The commercial number is (913) 68+3471/ 3472 and the FAX extension is 3473. MR
A caUformanuscripts: The questionsrepresent &ml topics fm pofessiorud dialogueancf, of course, articlesm pr~essiorud joumai!s. Military Review encourages you to share yow thoughtswthyour contemporarieswkdwr by lettersto the editor, short commentaries or full-kngth feature articles.

1 The five major leader studies, m chronokgid order, are: The Review of Ed@cm and Traini of Offcere in 1978; Professional Development of Officer Stu in 1984; Total arrant Ofker Study m&tJQ385;fWmc0rnmieeioned er Development Study Ofker Y% rofessonal Development Study m 1 , m 1987, 2. The Leader Development Investment Strategy pnnaples are: Institutbnal training, operational ass~nments and self-development must be prcp+y sequenced. - Retain progressive and sequential life de rncdels for all leaders in theu rxve kader *vebpmenf areas. The 7 2 Imperatwes are: - Retain a progresswe and sequential education system, - Train leaders in critcal tasks they will need as future leaders, - &M3iOP the Total AfTny, ht mlx of residentlnonresident mtnxtnn. - Retan a~he? qu rty mtructors (with ex rience) m the training base, - COntinueto .Sdf3Ctthe beet-qualk$ leaders for resident mtructjon. - Continue to produce quahty products, both students and instructors. - Provide leaders critical experienm they will need in the future. opportunitks in adaquateiy manned and re- Provide adequate training sourcad unite. (I-D pfiofi- Distrfbuta Ieders bad on Ieder develqxnant raqurements ties, not W? sham). - m, -W and refine sefi-devebfmwnt ~uimmenfa. - stress the leaders responsibility for hisher own devdopment. 3. Ttw WOLDAP recommends a complete review of the warrant ofksrtrain@g~stemtoreviee,as nemasay, the content, methodology, duration and timIng o the Warrant Officer Candiite School, the WO Technical and Twtical Certif=tion Course, Senior Warrant Officer Training and Master Warrant Ofker %!%e WO ad-= areanassodate degree at the career point eight years for RC) and a bachelors degree by the l%%zx~%t!c 5. The RC&DP etandad requires that RC command and staff programs be devefoped and implemented not later than 2d quarter, IW94

BrigadierGerumd WiUiamM. Steeleisde ty commandant, US Amy Command and General Staff CoUege,Fort Leavenw2 , Kansas. A graduate of The Citaddand the US Army CommandandGeneralStaffCoUege, k haskki wrious comnumdand stiff assignmentsin Vietnam, Europe and the Continental United States. He sd wththe82clAirborne Divhion as divisiontrainingofficer,&W G3, executiveofjicer and commaruh of 2d Battaiion ~Airtnnnej, 5C4th Infantry;as divisionchief,Force Planning Analysis Office, Ofjice of Deputy Chief of Staff for Qerations and Plans, Wmhingmn, D. C.; commander, 504th Parachute InfantryRegimentand 1stBrigade, 82d Airborne Divi.siun;executiveofjicerto thecommanclinggerwmd, US Army Train. ing and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia; assistant commandant, US Army lnfanq School, Fort Benning, Georgia; and assistant division commander ttineuver~, 8th Infantry Division tMechanizedj, BaunWderj Germany.


August 1992



Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, US Army If you ask several soldiersfor their meaning of Leadkrshi@, they will probably huve several dl~erent defindions. The author discusses hzk &@dt&m and oflersfour kzzdmhip functions for considendion. He ~ues tkztan o~anization or unit that h gutidby thesefunctions has a ckzrly idkntiid path to follow and will accomplish its assigned misswns. An organization or unti without this direction will not always
accomplhh its assigned misswns and will generally be ineffective.

VERY Army leader, active or retired, should be considered knowledgeable on the subject of leadership. This is only natural since this has been the essence of the military profession. I have learned much fi-om the views of others and have developed my own way of thinking about leadership and how to talk to younger leaders about it. Before one can understand and write about what leade~ ought to be, know and do (and that is a good way to talk about leadership), one ought to be clear about what leaders are fbr in a more fh.ndamental sense. What are the critical leadership functions performed by Army o~lcers as they lead small and large units within an Army preparing for, deterring and conducting war on behalf of a free society? How are these functions performed differently as one proceeds up the scale from sergeant to general? How do being, krux.uing and doing change at each level and how do we prepare our leadem to advance? The purpose of this article is to propose a systematic way to ask and answer those questions and to thus learn more about the science and art of leadership. There is general agreement that leade~hip is the art of influencing others to take action toward a goal, and that military leadership is the art of influencing soldiers in units to accomplish

unit missions. It is also genemlly understood that smallunit leaden rely on directinfluence processes while senior leaders rely more on indirect processes in proportion to their seniority. This is a slim framework for understanding the leadership tiction-why we Iuzveleaders. What are the key leadership fhnctions that must be perkormed to produce truly effective military organizations ? Effective organizations have clearly defined purposes, respond to direction, are composed of people motivated to pursue organizational purposes along clearly identified paths and have programs that sustain their effectiveness over time. Organizations without these critical characteristics are not effective. Leu&rs provide purpose. They also establish direction, generate motivation and sustain effectiveness. They may do more, but they cannot do less. Thus effectiveness can be reduced to four leadership hctions-providing purpose, establishing direction, generating motivation for unit actions and sustaining the effectiveness of the unit for fhture tasks (providing for continuity and constant improvement of the organization). All other hmctions are really subfimctions of these four; they facilitate the accomplishment of one or more of these four primary fhnctions. For instance, setting the proper unit values may


August 1992


Leaders provide puipose. They also estilish &ection, generate motkvationand sustmneffectiveness. They may do more, but they cannot do ikss. . . . All other finctions are really subfunctions of these four; they fmthe accomplishment of one or more of these four primary jiznctions.

facilitate all four, but the reason for having the proper values is not that they are an end in and of themselves but they area means to an ultimate enda unit that can be led to accomplish its intended aims with greater effectiveness.

Four Primary Functions of Effective Military Leadership

Although the four primary functions of effective leademhip are interdependent, we discuss purpose first because effective directing, motivating and sustaining require a fmus or aim. We discuss directing next because it is composed of the actions the leader takes to guide the unit in the direction of purpose. Motivating follows this because it comprises the actions the leader takes to impel individuals within the unit to follow the directing guidance. We discuss sustaining effectiveness last because it is primarily an activity with longrange payofk. Provide and InstiJlPurpose. The effkctive leader must bean effective link in the chain of command. The leader must possess a broad vision to guide the organization drawing meaning or purpose from this vision for unit activity. The leader must have a clear idea of how the organization fits into a larger scheme-why they are doing what they are doing. The leader imparts a sense of purpose on subordinates and instills a sense of purpose in soldiers, aligning unit missions, goals and objectives within broader schemes and purposes. To shape the vision, the effective leader may draw upon many sources: %ginning- with the oath of office to defe~d and support the Constitution, or even

higher moral and spiritual imperatives. . Draw on institutional and national values, goals and aspirations to formulate the concept of purpose he articulates to subordinates. A leaders co mmander and the next higher headquarters will transmit their articulation of purpose both directly and indirectly. In combat, this may be directly and clearly expressed (paragraphs lb., 2 and 3 of the operations order he receives). A leader may have to read between the lines of their words or actions to clearly understand the commanders intent (or the vision from which they derive purpose). This is called restating the mission and identifying the implied tasks. A leader must remain aware of events beyond those involving the unit. In reality, this may require filling gaps in the picture of purpose by deductive or inductive logic. However arriving at the conception of purpose, the effective leader passes on a coherent picture of how the unit mission fits into the big picture. Imparting a sense of importance of the tasks to be accomplished and how successor failure of the unit mission will tiect the world beyond the unit. In combat, events will not tiold as planned, assumptions may prove to be wrong and assigned tasks may not be appropriate. Knowing the purpose of the unit mission helps subordinates judge what new tasks would be more appropriate. Understanding the purpose of unit missions (the intent of higher cmnman ders) aids them in coordinating their units actions with those of others and leads to overall harmony in execution and economy of effort toward common goals. It provides a fkune of reference for independent thought and decision making by subordinates to solve unanticipated problems, which are best resolved and acted on rapidly. As one proceeds from squad to the highest strategic levels, the leader must become more active in clarifying and transmitting purpose as it becomes more conceptual, longer range and ephemeral. At the highest levels, there maybe a great deal of latitude in shaping, articulating and refining purpose. And higher values such as the oath ofoffice and moral and spiritual impera-


August 1992


tives, while important at all levels, play a more significant role because less specific guidance is provided. At squad level, it may be simply to know, pass on and imbue squad members with a simple idea such as We must take out that bunker because it is holding up the platoon or company advance, or We will train hard because we want to be the best squad in the company. At all levels, it is the duty of leaders to clarify the purpose of their missions by asking appropriate questions, if time permits, and to inform subordinates appropriately. (It is also well known that there is a motivational side benefit of letting soldiers know the purpose of their sacrificesthe more important the purpose, the greater the motivational benefit. ) The key benefit of providing and instilling purpose is to ensure that what is to be done is accomplished so as to fit into a higher scheme. This is the mechanism that aids synchronization in an-environment where initiative is highly valued.

Providing Direction. Effective leade~ provide unambiguous direction and guidance for action. They have a clear vision of what must be done, what is necessary to get the job done and how to proceed. They clearly articulate and assign objectives, missions and goals to subordinates. In addition to such direct guidance, they also provide indirect guidance. They promote values; set standards for accomplishment of tasks; enforce discipline; establish standard operating procedures; ensure the training of soldiers and units in appropriate doctrine, methods and techniques; and establish policies and regulations. At the highest levels, military leadem also may be responsible for development of doctrine, methods and techniques in some or all areas. Providing direction effectively requires command and control skills, processes and fLnctionsinformation gathering, analysis, decision making, issuing instructions or orders,



August 1992


performing appropriate supervision and monitoring the effectiveness of the resulting actions. Effective leadership in combat is measured in terms of the speed and effectiveness of

It is tti duty of kmdim to CkUi~ the purpose of their miiwwns by asking appropriate questions, if time permits, and to inform subonlitis appropriately. . . . The key benefit of provtiing and instilling purpose is to ensure that what is to be dbne i$ accomplished so as to jit into a higher scheme.

this cycle (ofien called the decision cycle) relative to that of the enemy. As leadership advances from the squad to the highest levels, the hnction of providing direction becomes more complex. Setting and communicanting standards, promoting values, enforcing discipline, establishing methods and procedures, and command and control processes become more dependent on systems and organizational fktctionaries than on direct interpersonal relations. Management, the control of things and the coordination and sequencing of events, while applicable at all levels, becomes an important tool in providing direction at senior levels of leadership. It is in this sense that it relates to leadership. Effective senior leaders know that even the act of gathering information about the activities of subordinates may cause a reorientation of those activities. They take this into account in designing systems that will gather tiormation purposefully. They ask for meaningful reports and develop unobtrusive ways to find out what they need to know without unintentionally reorienting the faus of subordinate activity. Providing Motivation. Effective leaders provide motivationthey harness the willingness of subordinates to work toward common goals, missions, objectives and tasks. All combat is, in the end, a test of wills-both of soldiers and leaders. In combat, leaders must motivate sol-

diers to do difficult things in trying circumstances. In peacetime, motivation to perform tasks well is important. In combat, it can be decisive. Marshal Maurice de Saxe, writing in the 18th century, pointed out that a soldiers courage must be reborn daily, and Ardant du Picq, writing in the 19th, remarked that you can reach into the well of courage only so many times before the well runs dry. It is common knowledge that motivation promoted by rewards is more effective in generating commitment than motivation promoted by punishments. Providing positive motivation should be the aim of all leadem, but negative sanctions are also important for delineating the limits of acceptable behavior. Effective leade~ elicit willing compliance and devote a considerable effort to obtaining it. Means and methods for motivating soldie~ differ at various levels. At all levels of authority, mutual trust and codldence are key, but styles may differ. The moral force that impels subordinates to action at all levels is rooted in mutual trust and respect. This in turn stems from a record of association and a reputation for ethical behavior and sound decision making. Values, or held belietk, when appropriate and shared in the unit, are important motivatom This unit cant be beat and This unit doesnt leave its dead on the battlefield are examples. Ethics are standards of behavior in relation to values. Mutual trust and respect derive in part fi-om perceptions of ethical behavior and in part fi-om a record of success. Mutual trust and respect also derive from taking care of the troops. When troops know that their efforts will not be wasted on unnecessary tasks; that the leader recognizes the value and quality of their labors and is doing the best to meet their needs within the constraints imposed; is concerned about them as human beings; listens to their grievances; and respects subordinates and builds their self%teem; they will give their full measure of support. All of these factors combine to provide the leader the moral force he needs to mot ivate in stressfhl sit uations in combat, or anytime.


August 1992


All combat is, in the end, a test of wills-both of sokhlm and kwkms. In combat, leaders must motivate soldiers to do dificult things in trying circumstances. In peacetime, motivation to perform tizsks well is impo~nt. In combat, it can be decisive. Marshal Maunce de Saxe, writing in the 18th century, pointed out that a soldiers courage must be reborn dhily, and Ardant du Picq, writing in the 19th, remurked that you can reach into the wel of courage only so many times before the well runs dry.

American soldiers have always fought well when they feel they are in a good outfit and trust their leaders. At the lowest levels, direct daily facet-face appeals to values, insistence on standards and a record of fairness, selfdiscipline, competence, displays of example, courage and resourcefulness are the most effective motivators. At times, especially in combat, resorting to intimidation may be necessary, but intimidation never elicits a fidl measure of commitment. At the highest levels, personal displays of courageous example, Selfdiscipline, fairness, competence and force of personality (in both a positive and negative sense) are occasionally necessary and effective, but a more complex system of authority, mutual trust and confidence must be established. At the higher levels, soldiers learn to trust the collective leadership of higher headquarters when that leadership is reliable and demon-

strably sound. A trusted and respected senior leader will have diflculty overcoming the deleterious efforts of a fhmbling staff. Senior leaders ensure a positive command climate because they understand that they must influence soldiers through layers of their subordinate leaden. They cultivate positive leadership among their immediate subordinates and resort to faceto-face persuasion to bolster will as the occasion warrants (but usually with subordinate commanders and St21ffS). While discipline is primarily a direction providing tool, in the sense that a disciplined soldier or unit does what is expected even when the boss is absent, maintaining disciphne also plays a motivational role. A disciplined unit is responsive. One of its internalized values is We always do whats right, and what is right is following the direction of the leader toward the purpose to be achieved.


August 1992


Commanders at all levels establish or administer formal systems of rewards and punishments. Tmditionally, on the positive side, this has been in the form of pay and benefits, promotions, decorations, skill badges, service ribbons, symbols of unit recognition and time off. On the negative side have been judicial and nonjudicial punishments ranging from extra training to the gallows, as well as release from the service and so forth. They use the provisions of military regulations

American soklim have always fought well when they feel they are in a good outjit and trust their leaders. At the lowest levels, direct dhily fizce-t+fme appeals to values, insistence on stindhrds and a record of f~ess, se&discipline, competence, dispkzys of example, courage and resourcefulness are the most eflective motivators. At times, especially in combat, resorting to intimidation muy be necessary, but intimidiztion never elicits afill measure of commitment.

and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to administer punishments. In order to motivate effectively, these systems must be seen to be fair by those they seek to motivate. Commanders at higher levels have a more powerfhl, more important and perhaps more difficult role in establishing and maintaining a just system of formal rewards and punishments. They have a more powerfhl role in that they have more latitude and authority. The importance of their role stems from the impact they have in this powerkl tool to motivate positively through an effective system, and the potential damage they can cause with an ineffective system. Their role is diflcult because they have to work through many people who administer the system. As mentioned earlier, soldiers who understand why an action is necessay and worthy of their sacrifices will fight more fiercely or work harder toward unit goals and missions. This fhnction of

informing and educating also becomes more complex with seniority of position. At more senior levels, it involves command Mormation programs of great complexity and subtlety. Sustaining Continued Effectiveness. The final fhnction of military leadership is different in that it orients to the future. Providing purpose, direction and motivation has immediate payofi, but leaders must also ensure the continuity, health and further development of the organization. It is difficult to fiid one word to describe this fhnction; the closest would be sustainment-sustaining the effectiveness of the organization over time. This implies continuity in a Darwinian rather than a static sensethe ability to remain a viable organism through adaptation as conditions change. It implies health in that all elements of an organism remain sound and hnction as intended. It implies further development in that leade~ should never be sati~led with the current levels of proficiency and always seek to improve in areas which are weakest. Leaders should think of organizations they head as organisms and not as machines. Machines have no builtin recuperative powers, and they pm+orm best when new. They wear out with use. This is not the case with organisms and organizations. Organisms can learn, adapt, grow, become more effective and stronger. They can also unlearn, maladapt, shrink, become less effective and weaker. And they can die. An organism cannot be stressed near maximum capacity for too long a time before it becomes less capable, but an organism can peak well above normal levels of effectiveness~or short periods. Effective military leadem recognize these characteristics of military organizations and lead them accordingly. Some have said that the most effective leaders provide for their succession. Others have said that they develop high-performing units. They do both and more. The good squad leader cross-trains the new man on the machinegun, teaches the machinegunner to be a team leader and coaches the team leaders. This squad leader trains the squad to be a cohesive and highly adaptive organism; looks for ways to take the



Senwr NCOS also practice& as I db leadership, ofien not as directly [w junwr NCOS], but they do more. They are primarily responsible for junior NCO development. They execute policies, supervise activities and advise oficers in the performance of all of their purpose, direction, motivation and organi~onal sustinment functions. They are the repository of organizational values.

pressure off when no expenditure of effort is required and ensures that squad members get needed rest when possible. When a tough chore is to be performed, the squad peaks for it. Leaders at higher levels do essentially the same. The higher the level, the more systematic and institutionalized the process becomes. Senior leaders must prepare for attrition of key persomel, the introduction of more modern weapons and a myriad of environmental changes afhecting the health and effectiveness of their command. In petiorrning current tasks, they must consider fimre tasks. In combat, they may mortgage the fimre for a vital present mission or hold back to save strength and peak for a more vital task to come. They train their soldiers and leaders in peacetime and during lulk in battle. They build or rebuild morale or physical strength. They build teamwork between units of different branches and develop highpaforming sta.ilk. The essential elements of this kmction are present at all levels, but at the most senior levels these efforts are formalized and highly organized. In the long term, tending to this fhnction is as important as providing purpose, direction and motivation. Effective military leadership requires that

four key functions be performed well to influence soldiers and units to successfully accomplish tasks and missions over time. To be successful, military leaders must: . Provide purpose and meaning for unit activityfitting the specific mission into a broader framework of guidance derived from higher purpose, direction, motivation and sustaining sensings. . Establish direction and guidance for the actions of subordinates leading to mission accomplishment. . Generate or instill in his subordinates the will, or motivation, to perform assigned missions well. G Sustain the effectiveness of his organization over timeprovide for the continuity, improvement and fiture effectiveness of the organization. The effectiveness of large military organizations depends on the performance of all of these fbnctions up and down the chain of command. Although these functions are pefiormed at every link in the chain, they are performed differently at each level. While there is room for variations in style (or the way kctions are petiormed), there is little room for variations in values and


. August 1992

most effective lkadks provhie for their successwn. Othem have saill that they dkvelbp high-pe#orming units. They db both and mom. The good squud kwder... trtunsthe squud b be a cohesive and highly adaptive oWanfim; lboks for ways to ti the pressure off when no expenditure of effoti is requtid and ensures that squad members get needed rest when possible. When a tough chore is to be pe~ormed, the squad peaks for it.

Some have said thutthe

ethical standards or in the understanding of doctrinal fundamentals. These and the purpose fhnction at each level provide the glue that binds smaller organizations together to form larger ones-to make them one organism. Differences in Levels of Leadership. Intuition tells us that there may be distinct differences in the way the purpose, direction, motivation and organizational sustainment fi-mctions are performed, and what leaders must be, know and- do to per60rm them at different levels. What follows is an intuitive sketch of some key distinctions by level based on 28 years of fallible experience and some historical reading over that time. Junior noncommissioned officers (NCOS) who serve as squad leaders and team leadem and their equivalents practice do as I do leadership almost exclusively. For them, Showing is as important as telling. In combat, Do as I do leaders are at or near the front of their organizations to direct and to motivate effectively. They derive purpose from company-level goals, missions and values. They embody the warrior ethic of their branch and specialty and reflect the values inculcated in them by more senior NCOS. They provide direction by leading from the front, by establishing and etiorcing squad standards and values, by demonstrating how to do it. They etiorce discipline directly and on the spot. They motivate by example and by the respect they have earned within the squad. They work to achieve

a cohesive, high-performing squad. They care for and about their men. They provide for continuity by identif@g talent among the younger soldiers and by providing for their own succession from among them. They cross-train soldiers to petiorm more than one task in the squad, and petiorm necessary individual training. Senior NCOS (platoon sergeants, master sergeants, first sergeants and sergeants major) also practice do as I do leadenhip, oken not as directly, but they do more. They are primarily responsible for junior NCO development. They execute policies, supervise activities and advise officers in the petiormance of all of their purpose, direction, motivation and organizatioml sustainment fimctions. They are the repository of organizational values. Company grade officers also practice do as I do leadership. They lead literally and directly, faceto-face. (Some headquarters company commanders with close to 300 men petiorming disparate functions over a wide area may not fit this mold; they face a challenge similar to the next higher level. ) They act as important value setters; making shortterm policies, setting short-term goals and executing short-range tactical schemes. They make a given organization fiction. Their longerrange policitx and goals are interpretations of higherlevel ones and their plans are very dependent upon plans and priorities set above their level. They are expected to display initiative and continuity in the short-term execution of tasks. Junior field grade officers alternate between indirect and do as I do leademhip. They are the first level of real value shapers. They are responsible for company grade o~lcer development. They make longerterm policies and set longer term goals. They execute short-range combined arms tactical schemes. They make a task force with nonorganic parts function. Indirect leadership is characterized by some physical detachment due to time and space. These leaders must work harder to maintain intellectual and spiritual attachment. Every leader beyond the lowest levels must understand that time and space limits those in the organization







whom the leader can touch personally. And this implies a decision as to whom within the organization, to how many and how far he can spread his personal influence. The leader must choose carefdly, for there are pitfalls to spreading too thin as well as to staying too near the headquarters. One can visualize this as a series of concentric circles. There is a pitfall in bypassing a circle or two and trying to reach all the way down to deal with the soldier in the ranks too ofien. This aflects the mutual trust within a chain of command. It is best to reach out by degrees and occasionally test the waters beyond the three rings any leader can influence effectively. Some may be better at reaching out farther. Each leader should know this range and stay within it. Senior field grade and junior general officers practice mostly indirect leadership. They are important value shapers and are responsible for junior field grade development. They shape command climates in the Army. They are longterm policy makers and goal setters. They execute complex combined arms tactical schemes. They create task forces, shape organizations and make large, complex organizations fhnction. Senior general officers practice indirect leadership except on rare occasion and with a small segment of their subordinates. They lead other general officers and senior field grade oflcers in direct ways and work hard to shape consensus among their peers. They are the very longrange institutional value shapers. They are responsible for the development of field grade and junior general o~lcers. They shape the command climate on Army posts, within major commands and within the Army for long periods of time. They make policies and set goals that have impact many years beyond their tenure. They are responsible for the execution of complex opera-

tional and strategic schemes. They create organizations and set longrange trends. They shape institutions and make longterm important

Whilk there is room for vari&ons in stylk (or the wayfunctions areperjormed), there k liltle room for varkztions in values and ethical standizrds or in the understanding of doctnnalfundamentals. These and the purpose function at each level provide the glue thti binds smaller organi~ons together to form luqger ones~o muke them one organism.

decisions frequently based on intuition because easily recognizable tradeoffs are not apparent. There are differences other than those identified in this short sketch, and they should be identified and studied. Study may reveal that this intuitive grouping of ranks is not the best. Whatever grouping is used, a matrix can be developed. This could be usefd for developing effective leaders because we could then identifi what the be, know and do requirements are for each level. There is much written on the subject of leadership. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22100, and FM 22-103, J!2LUkTShi~ Milirmy kUkT3hi~ and Convrumd at Senior Levels, are the best leadership manuals we have had. The historical record is fhll of usefi-dmaterial as are more recent studies by behavioral scientists. But until we undertake an orderly and scientific study of the fhnctions of leadenhip and understand more follywhat leaders must be, know and do at each level to effectively petiorm those fkctions in peace and war, we will only be partly informed. MR

Brigadier Genend Hubs Wins de Czege is assistant divisioncommander (maneuver), Headquarters,1st Infantry DivisionCMechanized)and Fort Riley, Kansas. He received

a B.S. from the US Military Academy, two mastersdegreesfi-omHarvard University, an M. M.A.S. jbn the US Army Command and General Sta/fCohlege(USACGSCj and is a graduate of the US Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and stajfposition.sincluding director, Advanced Military StudiesProgram, USACGSC; special assistant to the chiefof staff, SHAPE; chkf, Arms Control Branch, Ofjice of the Supreme AUed Commander, SHAPE; and special adviserto thesecretary generaJ of NATO.







The Cornerstoneof Leadership
Major Mark D. Rocke, US Army Thkarticle is the winnerof the 1992DouglasMacArthuriWli@yLa dership WritingAwani. Lzademhip and trust are indispensable to each othe~ The author assertsth~ trust is the basicfoundation a leadermustpossess in order to be eflective. Pointing out the increasingchallengesfizcing todhysleadexs in a chan~ngArmy and society,he also discusses integrity,competenceand predictabilityas componentsrequiredfora leaderto buikion.
IS article explores the concept of trust and its relationship to leadership. At first glance, the concept of trust appears simple enough to grasp. We know from intuition that it is linked in some way to expectations. According to Webster, trust is a dependence on something future . . . . ] For example, in a relationship between two people, when you place trust in someone, you expect something to happen, such as a task being accomplished or an agreement being honored. In a relationship among people, however, clear definitions of trust-and how it interrelates with leadershipare fhr more difficult to determine. anddonot
The viewsexpresstd mthisarticleare thoseof the author torefict tk positionof the @artment of DepartmentofDej2nseor any other gowemment theArmy, ofjiceor agency.-Editor

When one examines how trust affects organizations, it becomes clear that while it still centers on the fairly simple notion of fulfilling expectations, its impact is far more complex. In the words of noted organizational theorists Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, trust makes it possible for organizations to work.2 Behaviorist Carl Larson adds, Tiust is one of those mainstay virtues in the commerce of mankind. It is the bond that allows any significant relationship to exist between people. With trust gone, teams have little hope of hnctioning well and realizing their true potential.3 Clearly, trust is seen to be a prerequisite to, and a result of, effective leadenhip. Tmt is used by leaden in fulfilling their responsibilities. According to General Dorm A. Starry, US Army,


August 1992



Retired, Establishing and maintaining mutual trust . . . is a task performed by effective leaders.4 It is also used to describe the environment, or climate, they create. As Lieutenant General (retired) Walter E Ulmer notes, one specific component [of climates in healthy organizations] which appears crucial, and whose absence or dilution is particularly detrimental to ~kctiveness over time and under stress, is trust. If trust has such a powerhd impact on organizations, then it clearly warrants closer examination. Is there something truly unique about this entity we call trust? Does trust play a special role in the way our military orgmizations hction ? In my judgment, the answer to these questions is yes. I believe that trust perjm an i&@nsable jimction; it is a concept uponwhichthepractice ofeffective leadershipdepends. It is from this perspective that I begin this article. My objective is to move beyond the conventional view of trust, which holds that tm.stresultsjknn eflective leacbski~. By examining some non-doctrinal and historical sources, I seek to offer some new perspectives on how we think about trust-specifically, that effective bdershi~ reskfiom trust. While this perspective is not totally at odds with the conventional view, it does lead to some fresh insights on how personal traits developed during preparation for command can eventually help to nurture trust in units. To achieve my objective, I will explain why leaders must faus on trust now, at this turbulent time for the Army, and answer two central questions: G What is trust? . How is it built or destroyed?

While [trust] still centers on the fairly simple notion of fulfilling expectations, its impact is far more complex. . . . Trust makes it possible for organizations to work.. . . It is seen to be a prerequisite to, and a result of, effective leadership. Trust is used by leaders in fulfilling their responsibilities.
will continue to be challenged. As recent events in Panama and the Persian Gulf illustrate, US military forces must be able to deploy rapidly to conduct either combat or humanitarian operations---uith little or no prefxzration. Army units can expect to participate in lowintensity conflict, or as the new US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operati, refers to it, operations short of war.b In short, the likelihood of conflict is increasing. Further, the environment of fhture conflict is likely to be highly ambiguous and different from any encountered to date. Future battlefields will be less dense, less structured, more violent, and faster paced than anything our soldien have yet experienced.7 This will pose new and complex challenges for our soldiers and leaders. Second, the virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat, coupled with changing domestic and international priorities, will result in a dramatically smaller force structure. The reduction of the force, by over one quarter of its 1990 size, is well underway. As the Army moves from 18 to 12 divisions in the Active Component, leaders will not only face difficult career decisions themselves; they will also be called upon to advise their subordinates. Subordinates will seek honest, informed guidance and will depend on their leaders to provide it. In the words of Colonel Larry Ellis, Chief of Military Personnel: People have just not come to grips with. . . the drawdown. If they have a mentor, a commander or senior officer they can talk to, now is the time to do it.g The implication from these two trends is cleac more than ever before, the Army must be

Changing Army. . . Increasing Leadership Challenges

It is no understatement to say that the Army is at a pivotal point in its history. As the Army responds to the new roles it will be expected to perform to support the new National Military Strategy, two trends emerge quite clearly. First, despite the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the accompanying failure of world Communism, the world will remain a volatile and unpredictable place. US interests






If trust has such a powerful impact on organizations, then it clearly warrants closer examination . . . . lkust performs an indispensable function; it is a concept upon which the practice of effective leadership depends.
prepared to function across the operational continuum-from support to mtional counterdrug efforts, to peacetime contingency operations, to major regional war. This will increase thedemunds we @zce on our laden. In the words of Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, we will require our leaders to be tough and competent, able to obtain the utmost of performance from quality soldiers who have been trained to razor sharpness.9 Since this article is ultimately concerned with the relationship between trust and leadership, a few thoughts on leadership are in order. There are innumerable definitions of leadership and an infinite number of interpretations of them. As James MacGregor Burns observes in his Pulitzer Prize winning work, tiship, Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.lo General Edward C. Meyer, former Army chief of staff, observes, Napoleon listed 115 contributing qualities in trying to define the essentials of leadership. We have no way of knowing if his description was complete at number 115 or if he was otherwise distracted.11 My challenge in this article is to limit discussion of subjective concepts such as leadership and trust, and avoid reciting mere platitudes to produce just another collection of homilies on leademhip.12 To meet this challenge, and provide common ground for developing my argument, I will seek to capture the essence of leadership. I begin with Army doctrine. According to FM 22-100, Military Leudershi~, leadership is the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission b providing T purpose, direction, and motivation. 3 I will focus on influencing, specifically, how leaders translate intention into reality. In other words,

I am talking about how to get things done through ople-which is what leadership is all about.1 Y Of greater importance, I will examine how leaders use power to do this. Power is the vehicle that causes human action to occur. I will demonstrate that successful r-w-wring of trust-a concept that admittedly we have yet to define-+nhmces the power of leaders.

Defining Trust
In seeking a definition for trust, we are reminded by Bennis and Nanus how difficult this is to do, trust is hard to describe, let alone define. We know when its present and we know when its not, and we cannot say much more about it [than that,] except for its For the purpose of this article, however, let us try to he a practical definition for trust. It is helpfd to describe it as an entity, albeit an intangible thing, since this gives meaning to its use in other senses (as either a verb or an adjective). Webster again provides a usefhl starting point. Tmt is an assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something.16 Again, the central thread of expectations is present, but this definition is only somewhat limiting. Does our Army leadership doctrine help us to limit this definition any firther? What does it tell us about trust? While acknowledging its importance, our doctrine does little to sharpen our focus and improve our understanding. FM 22100 states, We must develop and nurture trust that encourages leadem to delegate and empower subordinates, however, this ca stone leadership manual does not define trust. 1? Similarly, FM 22-103, Leadership und Conmumd at senior lJw(4.S, states: Trot is important because it gets the soldier involved and ultimately committed. Through trust, senior leaders communicate that soldiers and units are important and vital. Soldie~ who are trusted become ormnizational ~artners who respond and petiorm.18 Once again, we use the term in trying to define what the term means; therefore, we are lefi wondering what trust is.


August 1992


The good news from our doctrine is that it obviously recognizes that trust is important. The bad news, however, is that by only describing it and not defining it++mr manuals do little to help leaders create trust. Rather than belabor this point, perhaps it is best to develop a clear definition. With the help of our doctrine, Webster, and Bennis and Nanus, who state trust implies accountability, reliability, and predictability, we can do so. Building upon the expectations idea, we can conclude that: trust is cm-$dence that expectationsofintqity, comfxtenceand~edictability, held by both knckn-sand la-l, w1 be met. 19 Before moving ahead, it is important to ask why our doctrine is so vague in this area. I believe that the failure to address trust in direct terms is caused, in large part, by the widely held, t

conventional view that postulates, If I am a good leader, my people will trust me and my abilities. Since trust will result from good leadership, so the argument goes, I need to concentrate on understanding and practicing leadership and trust will follow. I submit a different view, You must develop trust before you can be a good leader. Tmst is the foundationor cornerstone--upon which leadership depends.

Building Trust . . . Or Destroying It

Let us now turn to examining how the characteristics cited in our definitionintegrity, competence and predictabili~help build (or destroy) trust. It is helpfd m think (>fthese characteristics as components since they serve as, to




[Because ofl the reduction of the force . . . leaders will not only face difficult career decislonsthemselves; they will also be called upon to advise their subordinates. Subordinates will seek honest, informed guidance and will depend on their Ieadersto provide it.
use a fmiliar phrase, the buddingblocksof this entit-y. Twt in the leader or comman der results from the net effect of soldiers expectations being met in each area. The creation of trust results from consistent leader performance over time; however, its destruction may occur quickly by momentary fiiilure in any one area. Herein lies the fhgility of this concept. Ulmer observes, Its development is the consummation of a thousand small acts while its undermining may be precipitated by a sin le isolated event of unintended consequence. Y0 Integrity, competence and predictability are the most critical areas of command-in which there can be no failure-if trust is to be developed. Integrity is perhaps the component of trust most fmiliar to us. We accept integrity as a bedrock value to be upheld and demonstrated in all leader behavior. Three aspects of it have a unique effect upon trust: trutilness, candor and ethical conduct. Let us begin with truthklness. Simply put, there is no substitute for being truthfd. The reason for this is cleac soldiers will not trust someone who lies to them. In Com@ny Communal, author John Meyer states, A little bit of integrity wont suffice. Its the basis of everything you do as a human being, an officer, and a commander. It builds trust and confidence between you and your soldiers. A lapse in integrity is catastrophic for you and your [unit]: One slip, one breachand your soldien lose trust in what they train daily to do.21 Meyers view contains a valuable lesson concerning integrity and trust: upholding integrity is an absolutely inviolable leademhip principle. Consider the following example. When someone lies to you, your trust in that person disap-

pears. Moreover, the incident creates suspicion in all future dealings. The effect on an organization in which leaders fice the awesome task of, in historian John Keegans words, ordering men to control their f-, staunch their wounds, [and potentially] go to their deaths, is sim ly, as Meyer rightfully observes, catastrophic. f 2 The actions of General Douglas MacArthur in the defense of the Philippines following the outbreak of World War II provide a valuable illustration of the relationship between integrity and trust. To bolster morale and create the will to fight, MacArthur promised the troops defending Bataan, Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival is unknown . . . . In reality, no such commitment of forces was made since the theater of focus, by combined agreement, was Europe. While MacArthur was perhaps the victim of lies and false promises originating in Washington, he nonetheless perpetuated this lie to the troops. In a study of this event, Matthew S. Klimow reports: The soldiers stranded on the Philippines cursed MacArthur for deceiving them . . . the lies by Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, and MacArthur. . . were unethical . . . an unconscionable breach of faith that only deepened the fh-uddisillusionment of gallant fightem23 In addition to truthfulness, integrity also comprises candor. ~~~r, an expression of integrity, means being hank, open and sincere.24 It means reporting the bad news as well as the good news. For example, it means having the personal courage, as one former commander notes, to look one of your oflcers in the eye and tell him why you think hes a Two-Block, and not merely leaving the matter Iefi unsaid.zs Candor also includes the actions a leader is obligated to take to argue against a decision that affects the well-being of his unit. A fhal aspect that must be addressed in the area of integrity involves ethical behavior in combat, or adherence to the law of war. A detailed discussion of this area is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the adverse impact of a leader who condones, or orders,



criminal acts requires that this subject be mentioned, if only briefly. Behaving in an ethical fashion requires leaders to cotiorm to established standards of behavior-at all times. Their actions during war are subjected to the close scrutiny of their soldiers. Actions believed to be wrong can destroy the fabric of discipline within a unit, and may well destroy the mechanisms that soldiers use to cope with the effects of the violence that they administer. Major Thomas J. Begines provides an apt summary of the complex interaction among Western ideals, the laws of war and why soldiersfight: Our soldie~, as Americans, fight best when they believe they are . . . [fighting for human rights and just treatment. This is the Western idea.] There is no essential conflict between the . . . laws of war and the.. . values of [American] society. Hence, we cannot truly claim to be fighting to promote western values] . . . by violating the laws of war, laws which express many of those same values. . . . Our soldiers recognize this basic contradiction. If we force them into moral contradiction on the battlefield, we destroy their. . . beief that they are fighting justly in a just cause. In sum, comman ders must therefore be honest, candid and ethical in their conduct and serve as role models in this area. The impact of integrity on combat performance bears this out. There is a direct correlation between integrity and success in combat. A recent study conducted by the Department of History at West Point analyzed over 200 examples of leader performance in combat. In the area of integrity, the study found that the sine qua non of almost every successfd commander was unquestioned integrity, . . . coupled with a solid ethical foundation in matters dealing with combat or warfare.27 If this does not occur, it will be impossible to establish a proper ethical climate. Competence, the second budding block of trust, is also a familiar concept, yet there are factors that greatly influence how subordinates measure competence, the importance of which is often overlooked. Three such factors are ex-

While soldiers expect their platoon leader to be able to navigate, commanders and staff expect their battalion commander to . . . have a firm grasp of the missions that must be accomplished by the combat, combat support and combat service support units and resources which are made available. . . . They know that, on the average, the battalion commander has about 10 years more experience than any one of them, and they expect it to show.
amined herein: tactical proficiency, familiarity with doctrine and physical fitness. Obviously, subordinates expect their boss to be proficient in . the tactical skills required of his level. For example, while soldiem expect their platoon leader to be able to navigate, commanders and staff expect their battalion commander to be able to fight a battalion task force. They expect that, as a result of experience and schooling, he will have a firm grasp of the missions that must be






Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth. .. . The good news from our doctrine is that it obviousiy recognizes that trust is important. The bad news, however, is that by oniy describin it-and not defining it-our manuas f do iittie to heip ieaders create trust.
accomplished by the combat, combat support and combat service support units and resources which are made available to the task force. They know that, on the average, the battalion commander has about 10 years more experience than any one of them, and they expect it to show. Consider the example offered by General Matthew B. Ridgway, in describing how he assessed each of his commanders, upon assuming command of the battered Eighth US Army in Korea during the winter of 1951. The very first thing [1 did] was to visit [my] top commandem in the field, personally, and make each commander brief his situation, on his own ground. Then you can get a good idea of what his state of mind is. Is he cotildent, does he know what he is doing, does he know the terrain in his area?28 I believe that Ridgways test is the same test that subordinates subject each of their commanders actions to, whether in peacetime or wartime. In short, they expect the boss to know his business. While vital, tactical proficiency alone will not build trust in the commander. So let us now look to the other two yardsticks of competence that I identifj. Familiarity with doctrine is the second major way in which subordinates assess competence. Subordinates expect their commander to employ current doctrine-and to deviate from it when the situation dictates. Doctrine provides a common starting point as well as organizing guidelines for all Army units. On this point, Sullivan notes, For commanden in the field, doctrine provides a common template . . . for the conduct of operations.29 He continues, doc-

trine brings] his elements into harmony. . . . [It] un~les the disparate elements. . . toward a common, effective result-decisive victory.3 Writing during World War I, Naval Cmmander Dudley W. Knox Jr. stated, Harmonious and co-ordinated effort under the. . . stress of hostilities, on the part of commanders between whom communications are precarious, is difficult, if not impossible, unless there exis~ a bond of highly developed mutual understanding and common conviction.31 Knoxs words are as relevant today as they were in his time. Doctrine provides us with this bond and helps us develop what he refers to as the team mind, an obvious ingredient of teamwork and concerted action--+n any level.32 Consider the impact of a co mmander who either dismisses doctrine during the planning process, or fhils to ensure that a common understanding of doctrine is developed among those who participate in planning. Nothing could be more disruptive to the development of trust than a commander who employs tactical concepts and procedures that are inconsistent with what is being taught in the training base. Consider the officers and noncommissioned officers who spend months in formal education and develop clear expectations of how training management or tactical decision making should occur. The repeated instances of When you get to your unit, they will expect you to be expert in. .. are met head-on by Oh, we know what the book says, but we do it our own way in this unit. The result is what Major General Barry R. McCaRrey, commander of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), bmowing a term horn the field of psychology, describes as cognitive dissonance. 33 In short, the message sent by the leader conflicts with the subordinates expectations, and mental anguish results. This causes subordinates to listen selectively and to reevaluate the leader (who serves as the source of the conflict).34 The ultimate effect is a breakdown in trust. While subordinates expect commande~ to think about battle in current doctrinal terms, they also expect commanders to depart from


August 1992



doctrine when the situation requires. This point requires little amplification. It is hard to imagine a commander engendering trust when he adheres in rigid, mechanistic fashion to doctrine that clearly proves inadequate to the battlefield situation. In commenting on the need for doctrine to be flexible and adaptable, historian Roger J. Spiller notes, War insists upon its own logic . . . whatever prewar doctrines an army might devise, the war that ensues will not be governed by them.35 He adds, in commenting upon the rigid doctrine that British and French forces were armed with during the Battle of Waterloo, Finely wrought doctrines, organizations and strategies lost their iron grip over events in battle. . . . In place of what had been imagined, combat invoked its own rules. Soldiers who had been drilled in one technique quickl adapted to 7 this new world in order to survive. d Clearly, in light of the operations the Army can be expected to perform across the operat ion-

al continuum, particularly at the lower end, commanders who seek to earn the trust of their subordinates must be familiar enough with doctrine to know when to use itand when not to. The third factor influencing subordinates perceptions of competence is physical fimess, which has a direct impact on the degree of trust that a commander inspires. Physical fitness affects both the commanders ability to get to the critical point of decision and the image of stamina that he projects. We can learn much from Ridgway in this regard, To me, a basic element in troop leadership is the responsibility of the commander to be where the crisis is going to happen. He . . . should be where the going is toughest. He is not there to trespass on the sphere of his subordinates. He is there to drink in, by his senses and all his experience, the actual situation, the human element above all else.37 For commanders to be decisive and influence






Candor, an expression of integrity, means being frank, open and sincere. It means reporting the bad news as well as the good news. For example, it means having the personal courage . . . to look one of your officers in the eye and tell him why you think hes a Th-Block, and not merely leaving the matter left unsaid. Candor also in eludes the actions a leader is obligated to take to argue against a decision that affects the well-being of his unit.
the battle, Ridgway adds, I think that the division comman der should have just about as fiie a physique as his infiantrybattalion commanders; the corps commander, certainly as good as the regimental commanders, because [the ri or of combat] is going to take a lot out of him. F8 The West Point study mentioned earlier also provides ample evidence of the importance of fitness. The study supports the widely held view that while actual battle conditions may not be predicted with certainty, they will indisputably expose soldiers and leaders to unanticipated stress and physical demands. For this reason, the maintenance of health and physical fitness during peacetime is one aspect of preparation for command that will have a direct impact on improving individual performance during wartime. From its analysis of more than 200 battles, the study produced two key fiidings. G Successful combat commanders were almost always physically fit, in the sense of being conditioned for strenuous exertion. Throughout his career, the successful combat leader had maintained his physical condition, had preserved his health, and had participated in regular physical activity.39 . The benefits of good health and physical fitness included enhanced sense of wellbeing and selfimage, greater tolerance of fatigue, and greater capacity to undertake strenuous field duty.4 In concluding this section dealing with how competence engenders trust, it is usefhl to think

about how combat leadenhip and trust complement one another. What leadenhip ultimately boils down to is the ability to engender trust during the heat of battle. To use Carl von Clausewitzs kunous extmssion, this fog of war is the crucible in which a leader must demonstrate the competence that earns trust. Ulmer states, Trust derives primarily from a perception of leader competence . . . plus a perception that the leader will treat others fiirly and share the risks to which the group is exposed.41 The actions of General Robert E. Lee, while in co remand of the Army ofNorthem Vlrginia, exemplifi the linkage between competence and trust. In a 1937 lecture titled Morale and the Army of Northern Virginia, Douglas Southall Freeman, noted biographer of Lee, stated: The men believed General Lee. He had convinced them that he would call on them only to do the necessary things and to do that with a minimum loss. . . . when men are convinced that their commander is an able soldier, that he will call on them only to do the necessary things and to do them with a minimum loss and with everv promise of success by reason of his intelligence, then you have a fighting machine.42 The third-major buddingblock of trust is predictability. Commande~ must develop direction for their units and develop a consistent operating style. For this reason, the recent emphasis on developing vision and clear command philosophies is very encouraging. Together, they provide an effective means to implement the senior leaders tasks that our doctrine embraces: G Establish Viiion. G Communicate the Vision. G Be Tough Enough to Execute It.43 The idea of communicating direction, or vision, through a command philosophy is certainly not new. It is a proven means to initiate the process of leadership at senior levels. Note that there are two different concepts identifkd here: vision and philosophy. Vision is a personal concept of what the organization must be capable of doin by some fbture point [in time]. It is the target.5 A CO remand philosophy, however, refers


August 1992



to the set of beliefs, procedures, and techniques that a commander employs to attain his vision. A key point concerning vision and philosophy is that the process of establishing them clarifies expectations. Note my use of the word ckwi&s. It is significant because the members of a command already have a diverse set of expectations, influenced by the previous commander as well as their own milita~ and personal experiences. Vision and philosophy help refine subordinates expectations and close the gap between what they expect and what the commander plans to deliver. This allows for some measure of anticipation to occur. Each time the commander acts in a manner consistent with this anticipation, he reinforces trust, which we defined earlier as confidence that expectations of integrity, cOn@etence, and predictability,heldby bothleadersand M,

Finely wrought doctrines, organizations and strategies lost their iron grip over events in battle. . . . In place of what had been imagined, combat invoked its own rules.. . . Commanders who seek to earn the trust of their subordinates must be familiar enough with doctrine to know when to use itand when not to.
in identifying intent: It is especially important that the commander, not the S-3, G3, or J3, personally articulate the commanders intent portion of the order. If others do this for the commander, the unintentional yet inevitable filters are applied and the result becomes not what the commander intended, but what the staff officem thought he intended.47 The relationship among predictability, intent and trust is cleac subordinates expect their commander to articulate intent (and prescribe direction for all unit activities). When commanders do so, they act to fhlfill subordinates expectations, and thus engender trust. Armed with a clear intent, subordinates are best able to demonstrate the mental flexibility, initiative, innovation, and risktaking skills that our doctrine demands.48 This is how they expect to operate; without a clear statement of intent, they cannot do so. When commanders fail to articulate intent, they are ignoring a fundamental responsibility and, in fact, breaking a trust. My objective in this article was to describe what trust is and to demonstrate how important it is within units, particularly at this pivotal point in the Armys history. I concluded that trust pfm an indispensable finction in our units; it is a conceptuponwhichthepractice of ejfective leadership &&. By drawing upon several sources and filling in the gaps in our own doctrine, I then defined trust as cor$dence that expectations of integrity, competenceandpredictability,Iu3!dbybothkaders and led, will be met. To use the words of Bennis and Nanus, it is impossible to imagine a unit without some semblance of trust operating

Wiu be met.

In this regard, Bennis and Nanus state, The truth is that we trust people who are predictable . . . . Leaders who are trusted make themselves known, make their positions clear.45 Says Theodore Friend III, a former college president: Leadership is heading into the wind with such knowledge of oneself and such collaborative energy as to move others to wish to follow. The angle into the wind is less important than choosing one and sticking Teasmw.bly cbse to it. . . . In action and in articulation, leading requires that one know where one is taking oneself @3mphasis added].% This notion of choosing an angle and sticking to it highlights the importance of articulating intent-a concept that our doctrine identifies to be a critical aspect of commandership. Intent, in an operational context, includes the purpose for an operation, the method (in general terms) the unit will employ to Mill this purpose and the end state (how the unit will be disposed at the end of the operation). Suffice to say, this amounts to the commanders vision of how the operation will tiold and, more important, where the unit must be at some point in time. The Army Command and Control Master Plan highlights the trust that develops (or fails to develop) from the commanders role






Trust performs an indispensable function in our units; it is a concept upon which the practice of effective leadership depends. . . . An organization without trust is a misnomer.
somehow, somewhere. An organization without trust is a misnomer.49 In describing how commanders build this vital commodity, I highlighted the core expectations that subordinates have of their commanders. In so doing, I hope I provided a fresh perspective on preparation for command. The message in this regard is that trust is dependent upon meeting the expectations of

subordinates. In the areas of integrity, competence and predictability, there can be no failure. While trust results from consistent leader performance over time, a failure (or perceived failure) in anyone of these three areas will be almost impossible for a commander to overcome. What is noteworthy about these three areas is that there is no quick fix that will correct shortcomings in anyone area; excellence in each area results from experience and judicious study of the military profession. Commanders who understand the expectations of their subordinates-and prepare themselves to meet them will build trust, the lubrication that makes organizations work.5 Commanders who do not are likely to experience failure. MR

1 Trust, Websterk Ninth New Co//egiate Lktrorrary, 1986,,1268, 2. Warren Benrws and Burl Nanus, Leaders: The Stateg&s for Taking Charge (New York Harper and Row, Publishers, 1985), 43. 3. Carl E Larson and Frank M Lafasto, Teamwork. W?rat Must Go Rgfrf, What Can Go Wrong (Newbury Park, CA Sa e Press, 1989), 85-87. 4 GEN Dorm A Starry, reww of John W % ardners G Leadershp in Parameters (December 1990) 109 5. LTG Walter F Ulmer, US Army, Retmxf, Leaders, Mana ers, and Command Chmate, Armed Forces Journa/ /rrternatmna/ (July 1986 ? 54 6. Summarized from COL Steven M Butler, Refocusing Army Doctrine m a Chan mg World, Md/fary Rewew (April 1992) 7 ~EN Gordon R Sullwan, US Amy Tiammgand Dcctnne Command Leader Development Study, 1987, 14. 8. Mqors Sbll Face RIF, Arm Times, 13 April 1992, 6. 9 Mchael P. W. Stone and G { N Gordon R Sullivan, United States Army Posture Statement, FIsd Year 1993, January 1992. 10 James MacGr r Burns, Leaderslv (New York: Harper, 1978),2. 11 GEN Edward C. T eyer, Leadershm: 1 Return to Basics, reorinted m IW/itaiy Leademh@ /n Purs~fi of Evce//e&, ed Robert L. Taylor ad William E Rosenbach, (New York Westwew Press, 1986), 79. 12 Stanv lfKl 1~, ~~ I%p-t%ent of the Army Field Manual (FM) 22100 Mdifary Leadersh;~ (V$S?O, DC US Government Pnntmg CMce [GPO], 1990), 1,

the Sornme (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 76. 23. Matthew S. Klirnow, Lyre to the Troops: AmenCan Leaders and the Defense of Bataan, Parameters L mber 1990)49, 24, FM 22-100, 23, 25 Intervew with LTC Richard D McCreloht. Forl Bragg, North Carolina, . 21 December 1991, 26 MAJ Thomas J. Begmes, 71_re AmenCan MIIItary and the Western Mea, &fdIta Review (March 199247 27 t S Military Academy, d epartment of History, 4Leadership m Combat. An HIstorcal A asaf, 1986, 5, 28. GEN r atthew B Ridgway, US Army, Retired, and BG Walter R Wmton, US Army, Retmd, Troop Leadership at the operational Level The Eighth Army m Korea, Mi//tary Rewew (April 1990):59 29. GEN Gordon R. Sulltvan, Dcctnne: A Guide to the Future, ?Aktary Rewew (February 1992):4 30. Ibid. 31 LCDR Dudley W, Knox, US Navy, The Role of Doctrine m Naval Warfare, Uni2til&%es Nava/ k?stitute Proceedings, (March-April 191 5) 4,


Benrils and Nanus, 44 Trust, 1268. FM 221 00, W 18 US Department of the Army FM 221 03, Leaders/r/p and Command at Server Leve/s, (Washington, DC US GPO, 1990), 56 19 A word of explanation ISin order hereon two points. First, I chmx.e to use predctabMy and ehmmate rehabhty To me, predktabilty and rellabMy mean much the same thing. Predctabihty su~ts that someone WIII behave m a manner consistent with estakhed or expected norms. I beheve that, for our purposes, rehabhty IS subsumed under tntegnty Second, I refer to the expectahons of froth leaders and led. While I beheve that trust must be mutual to unleash the full paver of leaders, I WIIIfocus m this atide primanl upon how mmmanders earn, or fail to earn, the trust of their subordinates. 4 IS IS necessary to Ilmti the scope of this t~c. 20 Ulmer, 54 21 John G Meyer Jr, Compan Command: The Bottom Lme (Washington, DC Nat}onal Defense Umversdy 6 ress, 1990), 181-82. 22 John Keegan, The Face of Ba#e A Study of Agmcourt, Waterfoo, ad

15 16 17

33. MG Bar R. McCaffrey, Combat Leadership, lecture delwered to the US Army War cot ? ege Capstone Cuurse .%mmar, 14 August 1991 34. Summarized from tbld. 35 R er J Spiller, The Tenth Imperatwe, MI/@Y Rewew (April 1989) 5. 36. lb%, 9. 37 Rdgway and Wmton, Ml X3. Ibd. 39 US MIIItary Academy, Department of HIstorv, Leadership m Combat, 5. 40. Ibid,, 7. 41 % Challenge of MI/I&y Leadership, ad. Lloyd J Matthews and Dale E Brown, (Washin&n DC: Pergamotirasseys) XII. 42. Stuart W. mm, Lhglas SOuffrall Freeman on Leadership (Newport, Rl: Naval War CkMeue Press. 1990.73 43. FM 22-10?3, 7 44. Ibd. 45. Benms and Nanus, 44 46. Ibid. 47 US Department of the Army, Army Command and Contro/ Master P/an, 31 July 1990, 3. 48. GEN Gordon R. Sullwan, US Army Trammg and Doctrine Command, Leader Development Study, C--5 49 Ibid , 43 50. Ibid , 166.

Major Mark Il. Rocke,an infantryofficer,isassignedto Headparwrs, XWll Airbonw Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He receited a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M. P.A. from ~arvard University, and is a gradua~ of the Infantry Ofjicer Basicand Advancedcourses,and the US Army Command and General StaffCollege. He has served in a variety of mmmand and staff assignmentsin dome, Ranger and momiyd units, and was a strategistwith the Ojfke of the Deputy Chief of Stafffm O@rations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.







Leslie Groves
and the

Major Allen C. Estes,

US Army

Leademhip on a future battlkj?eldrequires leaders to possess a clear

understanding of impmtzvessuch as initiative, enthusiasm, technical and @ctical competence, risk @king and integ~. The author compares the suggested imperahvestim the Centerfor Army Leademhip agmnstthe lkadmhip traits displayed by Lieutenant General Leslie Groves while he headed the Manhattan Project.
where the imperatives of leadership still apply. Specifically this article examines Lieutenant General Leslie Groves and the leadership he displayed in developing the atomic bomb as head of the Manhattan Project. Groves was personally selected by the secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, to head an organization which would build a small bomb with the explosive power of 20,000 tons of TNT that could potentially end the war. Initially Groves did not want the job. He was ending a tour as the Army deputy chief of construction in Washington, where he had supervised construction of the Pentagon and spent an average of $600 million monthly on Army projects. He was expecting an overseas combat assignment and was anxious to leave Washington. Groves, who was quickly

hen one hears the words Army leadership, the image formed in manY minds is a platoon-leader wh~ through the force of his personality convinces soldiem to charge a hill in the face of intense enemy fire. At a higher level, one imagines a corps commander positioning units on a battlefield and, without wavering, making onthe-spot decisions that mean life or death to hundreds of soldiem The case studies used to study senior-level leadership at the US Army Command and General Staff College included General Robert L. Eichelberger at Buna, General Clarence R. Huebner and the Big Red One and General Walton H. Walker at the Rapido river crossing-all of which highlighted leadership in combat. This article fmuses on a different kind of leadership situation, yet one






Lieutenant General Leslie Groves

promoted to brigadier general, reluctantly accepted the position. 1 The entire Manhattan Project was a massive, highrisk undertaking that required unprecedented cooperation between theoretical scientists, industrial corporations and the US government. The industry which would develop the materials needed to make the bombs, plutonium and U235 (a rare isotope of uranium), was in its infhncy. The design and assembly of the bomb, along with the material production plants, had to be constructed on faith, hoping that technological development would be there in time. The necessity to beat the Germans in developing the bomb and subsequently affect the outcome of the war imposed strict deadlines and forced a crash program that many thought was physically impossible. The governments commitment to the project included millions of taxpayer dollars and the allocation of critical supplies sorely needed elsewhere in the war effort. This created intense pressure to succeed. The project scope expanded across the nation as entire plants were constructed in Hdord, Washington, for plutonium production and in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for U235 separation.

Universities at Berkeley, Caltiornia, Chicago, 11linois, and Columbia, New York, were engaged in the basic research and development to support these plants. Finally a select group of scientists was assembled at Los Akunos, New Mexico, to design and assemble the bomb. The man who assumed overall responsibility for coordinating, supervising and, most important, leading this mammoth project was Groves. The Center for Army Leadership has suggested seven imperatives for Ieadexship on the fbture battlefield: initiative, enthusiasm, technical and tactical competence, willingness to take risks, integrity, being a team player and the ability to communicate clearly. 2 These imperatives closely parallel the principles of leadership listed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22100, Militury LadershiP. The leadership displayed by Groves on the Manhattan Project can be evaluated on the basis of these imperatives. Although Groves did not initially want to lead the Manhattan Project, once appointed he assumed the responsibility and moved forcefully to get started. On 23 September 1942, the day he officially took charge, he was the junior ranking member at a meeting by Stimson to discuss his project. Groves requested to leave early. It was his first day on the job and he already needed to catch a train to Tennessee to personally examine potential plant sites.

Groves liked the site at Oak Ridge. It was isolated, yet had plenty of electric power, adequate water supply, good access by road and rail and a mild climate to permit year-round outdoor work. Colonel James C. Marshall, Groves predecessor on the project, had not purchased the site because the Manhattan Project was still in an embryonic state. It seemed premature to acquire land for a plant when the preliminary scientific work on which the plant was to be based was moving so slowly. Marshall wanted to wait for more data. Groves had more confidence and realized with the short timetable, tasks that would normally follow in sequence would have to proceed simultaneously-despite any re-


August 1992



suiting ineflciencies. Groves gave orders for the immediate acquisition of the 54,000 acre siteo3 Upon meeting Groves, Vannevar Bush, director of the OR&of Scientific Research and Development, felt Groves lacked sufficient tact to lead the project. Bush complained to General Wilhelm Styer, chief of staff for the Army Services of Supply, that Groves abrasive personality would cause trouble with the scientists. Styer conceded the point but stated that Groves was chosen because he is a go-getteq he gets things done.4 Bush and Groves quickly came to respect each other and worked closely together. Both were sons of ministers and they found each other to be authoritative, Cotildent and decisive. Groves realized immediately that any chance of success would require the highestlevel AAA priority from the War Production Board. Groves drafted the authorization letter and hand-carried it to Donald Nelson, head of the War Production Board. Nelson balked and claimed that there were too many other war projects of major importance that demanded equal priority. Groves threatened to explain to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the Manhattan Project would have to be canceled because the War Production Board would not cooperate. Groves was bluffing, but he left with his AAA priority.s Groves next decided to tour the existing lalmratories and assess the status of the research for himself. There were five separate processes for the development of fissionable material progressing simultaneously. The experiments on the production of plutonium were based on using a graphite pile and a heavy water reactor. The problem of separating U235 fi-om the more common U238 was being attempted using a centrifuge, gaseodiffusion and electromagnetic separation. All five methods showed promise and the development time for each of them was speculative at best. It was extremely expensive to invest in research and to develop plants for each of the five methods. It was equally costly to eliminate the one method that might produce the timely success that would beat the Germans to the bomb. Groves recommended,

and Roosevelt ultimately approved, devoting full resources to all five methods and plants simultaneously-a bold expression of the US commitment to the project. Groves was determined to press forward regardless of the obstacles. As he visited the laboratories, Groves was disappointed with the relaxed academic pace of the research. He was dismayed to find labs closed on Sundays and felt compelled to instill a sense of urgency into what he considered to be a national emergency. Groves also saw firsthand how little had been accomplished. Afier being briefd on the theoretical calculations, Groves learned from the scientists that their estimates on the amount of fissionable material needed to make a bomb were only accurate to a factor of 10-in either direction. Groves was lefi to supervise development of facilities without knowing whether he needed 3 pounds, 30 pounds or 300 pounds of material to make a bomb. In any event, only grams of the material had been produced and its purity was not yet suflcient for the job. With development so tenuous, Groves was lefi with the daunting task of convincing US industry to devote its resources to the effort.c Groves initially understood his charter to be the construction and operation of plants producing fissionable material. As new problems surfaced, he assumed additional responsibility by default. His stated philosophy was: When in doubt, act!7 As a result, Groves eventually found himself involved in planning a unified bomb laboratory, establishing project security requirements, actively supervising the Alsos intelligence operations to assess Germanys progress on the bomb, negotiating with labor unions, training flight crews for the fial mission, transporting the bombs to the island of Tmian and recommending targets for the bombs. Each new problem presented an opportunity to become more involved. As each new initiative went unchallenged, Groves was one step closer to being responsible for the overall success of the project. Atone point during construction of the Hanford plant, where the plutonium was being produced, there was a critical shortage of qualified


August 1992


pipe fitters. There were simply not enough lefi in the country to have them transported to the site. Groves arranged to locate union pipe fitters who had been inducted into the Army and release them to work for civilian wages at the Hanford plant. Their work output was 20 percent greater than the workers already on site. When encouraged to slow down by union officials, the new workers claimed they were not working as hard as they had in the Army, they were not being shot at, the pay was better and they wanted to help their buddies to come back alive. Eventually the reduction rates of the other workers picked up.! The production of plutonium and U-235 depended heavily on a reliable source of uranium deposits. The initial supply fortuitously came from a Belgian company, Union Mini&e, operating in the Belgian Congo. They had shipped barrels of uranium ore to the United States to prevent it from falling into German hands. Realizing that more suitable sources of uranium would be needed for any longterm development of atomic energy, Groves commissioned a group of geologists to survey the planet and check all available geological literature for sources of uranium ore. As a result of the study, the geologists discovered valuable supplies of fissionable material in South Africa, Sweden and Brazil.9 When building the Hanford site, Groves realized that the Columbia River salmon were sacred to the population of the northwest. He was concerned that the plant might overheat the river or cause radiation damage to the fish. Groves convinced Doctor Lauren Donaldson, University of Washington, to conduct a thorough research project to study successive generations of fish to assess the damage, if any. Groves had Donaldson continue his study indefinitely and establish a fish laboratory at the Hanford site. 10 If Groves could foresee a problem, he took steps to prevent it from occurring. Unforeseen difficulties arose from technological developments, labor and material shortages, disgruntled scientists, security requirements and a race against time. When problems did develop,

Groves was first to seize the initiative and implement a solution in a timely and decisive manner.

The Manhattan Project was plagued by uncertainty. The material for this massive bomb had never been produced; nobody could say how much material was even needed; and the questionable new technology had to be developed under strict time constraints. The confidence and enthusiasm of Groves formed an essential catalyst for progress. In spite of scientists and industrialists who knew more about the subject matter telling him that his mission was impossible, Groves had to bury any doubts and proceed with undaunted optimism. While Stone and Webster, a highly reputable engineering firm, had been contracted to perform all engineering work for the Manhattan Project, the effort was growing too large for one company to handle. Groves agreed that a major chemical company was better suited to build and run the plutonium production plant at Hdord. Based on their size and reputation, the Du Pent Corporation was the unanimous choice. The Du Pent engineem assessment of the project was dim. They demanded to know how they were supposed to build a plant to produce something that had not yet been invented. They concluded that current achievements in the development of plutonium had been overstated, the engineering problems were not well understood, and the job required more experience in physics than Du Pent had to offer. In sum, the technical advisers assessed, The entire project seems beyond human capability.l 1 Groves met personally with two Du Pent vice presidents, Willis Barrington and Charles Stine, to convince them to attempt the job. Both thought the project was pure folly and would require a minimum of five years to complete. Groves conceded there were risks but asserted that the stakes were immense. Until the project was conclusively proven to be unfeasible, he planned to proceed with design, construction and operation to the fidlest extent and solicited their help.







Ten days later, Groves met with Du Pents president, Walter Carpenter, to oflcially ask the company to help. Carpenter also feared the job was impossible but was moved by Groves arguments. Groves contended that Germany was most likely close to producing a fissionable material, there was no known defense against a nuclear weapon and the invention could save thousands of American lives. Carpenter knew his company was already heavily involved in wartime production, there was little chance of success in developing the bomb, and failure could ruin the company. The time constraint did not allow for the pilot plants and laboratory experimentation that usually accompany a high risk endeavor. But Carpenter was impressed with Groves intelligence, sincerity and aggressiveness. Finally, Carpenter asked Groves, despite the governments official party line, whether he personally believed in the project. Groves answered without hesitation, {Absolutely and without reservation. 12 Carpenter agreed to take the proposal to the executive committee. Despite similar misgivings about the effectiveness of the graphite pile technique, the shortage of engineers and the inadequate supply of metal, the executive committee saw a patriotic duty to proceed. Still sensitive over having been accused of war profiteering tier World War I and labeled the merchants of death, Du Pent agreed to take the job for costs plus a fixed fee of

one dollar, contingent on approval by the board of directors. The board of directors, who traditionally owed a responsibility to their stockholders, were given sealed folders with top secret documents describing the nature of the project. They were invited to open the envelopes only if they felt they needed to know. These hardball capitalists were asked to support a project that could pxentially ruin the company-especially in the case of a large explosion-without knowing the details of the project. Surprisingly, all 30 were unanimous in their approval and Du Pent was committed. 13 The same experience occurred at Eastman Kodak when Groves needed them to operate the electromagnetic plants at Oak Ridge. Kodak executives were skeptical and claimed they did not do initial research for new processes. Groves briefed the Kodak executives on the principles of uranium separation, patriotism and civic duty. The executives asked for time alone and provided their reluctant consent. One member stated to Groves, You have just put us in the biggest trouble we have ever been in.14 Groves met the same type of opposition at Union Carbide when he personally convinced them to operate the gas difision plant for uranium separation at Oak Ridge. He consistently made personal contact with the person who could issue an order that nobody else could countermand and forcefully asked for support.


Q August 1992


Groves hit the road once more to convince Chrysler Corporation to produce the large metal di&rsfor the Oak Ridge plant. Eachtime, he provided only scant details of the project but stressed the national urgency. Each time, his enthusiasm and zeal were critical to securing a commitment.

Technical and Tactical Competence

Groves was at a decided disadvantage in the area of technical competence because he was relying on the opinions and theories of scientists and industrialists who had specialized in their respective areas for their entire careers. He graduated fourth in his class at West Point and had served in a diversity of Army assignments that developed abroad base of experience. But he remained a generalist with only a cursory knowledge of atomic physics and chemistry. The teams of scientists included Nobel laureates such as Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton and James Franck. Rather than king intimidated, Groves learned quickly, read everything he could get his hands on and quickly discerned how much he really needed to know to make timely decisions. Herelied heavily on the experts of science and industry because they had to provide the solutions. Groves could best serve by creating the climate for them to succeed and pushing when he thought it necessary.

While Groves listened carefully to the advice of his experts, he made it clear who was in charge. He remarked to a group of scientists in Chicago who knew that Groves did not have a doctorate; that he had 10 years of formal education her entering college where he simply studied and to him, &at was worth two doctorates. 15 While he respected the scientists theoretical knowledge, Groves questioned their ability to appreciate the engineering and industrial applications that translated these theories into reality. He left the technical physics to the scientists and fwused his efforts where they were needed most-as a coordinator and liaison between science and industry. Groves was not reluctant to step in if he felt strongly about a technical question. After visiting the University of Virginia to assess an experiment using a centrifuge to separate U235, he recommended the method be abandoned. Although his knowledge of isotope separation was limited, he felt that as an engineer, he could judge whether or not a process was faible. lb He was fir more codortable commanding other aspects of the project, particularly the security and construction requirements. As the deputy chiefof construction for the enginetm, he had experience dealing with contraction, designers and government oficials on major construction projects. Groves felt totally Codortable with the immense scope of work at the Hanford


August 1992



site that required 11,000 pieces of major construction equipment, over 45,000 construction workers and 1,177 buildings in the construction camp alone. 17 Finally Groves had a working knowledge of Washington politics and government agencies. While he did not always have all the answers, he knew where he could go for help and whom he needed to see to get issues resolved. For example, the giant magnet used for the electromagnetic separation process at Berkeley required large quantities of scarce copper. Groves first determined that silver could be used instead. He then arranged through the Treasury Department to pick up 47,000tons of silver from the West Point Depository and, due to security requiremen~, arranged for the silver to remain on the Treasurys daily balance sheets. 18 Groves specific knowledge of atomic physics may have been lacking but his technical competence in managing resources, troubleshooting problems and understanding the inner workings of government agencies were superb.

Willingness to take Risks

To attempt the development and construction of the atomic bomb within the time constraints allowed was inherently risky. Groves accepted the risk of designing, building, and operating plants without the laboratory procedures and semiworks experience that normally precede these activities. Groves realized that he had to cornrnit resources and hope that the technology would be there when needed. He wilhnglY accepted the responsibility for potential failure. Groves was particularly concerned with stiety and was far more reluctant to risk peoples lives than he was government resources. He fhlly enforced Corps of Engineer safety regulations. He demanded immediate telegraphic notification of any fatal or near-fatal accident on any site and a follow-up written report the next day defining what was being done to prevent a similar occurrence. Despite the hazardous nature of the work at all of the sites, there were only eight fatal accidents on the entire project. 19

When scientists worried that the cooling water from the Columbia River would not be pure enough to avoid contaminating the reactors at Hanford, Groves debated whether a deionization plant should be built to distill the water. The scientists assessment was that the plant was probably not needed, but if it was, they could not ~omplete the project without it. Groves considered this a gamble rather than an acceptable risk and allocated $10 million to build the plant that ultimately was not needed. He was usually w;&ling to risk resources for the projects success. A tougher choice was the tradeoff between stiety and time lost. The first experimental graphite pile was scheduled to be tested at a special site in the Argonne Forest, 15 miles outside of Chicago. Due to insufficient construction time and labor disputes, the experiment was ready before the facilities were. Experimental pile work had already begun at the University of Chicago, which was located in the heart of a populated area. If the pile were to explode, nobody could accurately predict the potential extent of the damage. Afier consulting carefdly with the experimenters and looking at the control system, Groves decided the possibility of an accident appeared remote. He allowed the work to continue at the university, but monitored the situation closely, realizing he must carry the ultimate res risibility if anything happened. NothF ing did. 1 Groves took a calculated security risk in appointing Robert Oppenheimer to head the team of scientists who would build and test the atomic bomb at Los Alarms. Groves insisted on unprecedented security throughout the Manhattan Project. All knowledge was highly compartmentalized, which prevented working groups from knowing what other groups were doing. Industry executives were told only enough to secure their cooperation. Security personnel conducted background checks on all employees. Groves was impressed by Oppenheimers temperament, accomplishments and brilliant mind. Groves wanted him as the single director to lead the experimental physicists, mathematicians, ordnance experts, chemists and radiologists who


August 1992


would build the bomb. Oppenheimer had no real administrative experience and had not received a Nobel prize. Groves still felt that Oppenheimer could work effectively with both the scientists and military personnel at the remote Los Alamos sitea delicate situation at best. The biggest obstacle was Oppenheimers prior associations with the Communist Party. He had dated and seriously considered marriage to Jean Tadock, a member of the Communist Party. In 1940, he married Katherine Harrison, who had a Communist background, and Oppenheimer had himself joined several Communist supported causes. The security organization refhsed to grant Oppenheimer a clearance and the Military Policy Committee recommended that Groves choose another candidate. Assuming fill responsibility, Groves ordered that Oppenheimers clearance be approved immediately and accepted the security risk. 22

Groves, as the son of an Army chaplain, had the values of honesty, integrity and hard work instilled in him at an early age. Leslies father

preached a disdain for drinking, smoking and profmity. In adult life, Groves had an absolute moral code that unhesitatingly judged an action as right or wrong. Some of the scientists found him naive and simplistic. They wondered how Groves could possess no doubts, insecurities or hesitations, given the uncertainty of the proj ect and the massively destructive nature of the bomb. Groves set the example with a work ethic and dedication that was energetic and indefatigable. The general was a strict t&master, and secretaries who were not totally devoted to their jobs did not last long. He tried to squeeze every minute of work available out of a situation. Groves ofien had his secretary accompany him as far as Baltimore on train trips to dictate memos and letters and sent her back to Washington when the train stopped. Groves devoted his life to the Army and his job.23 Groves was no saint. He had a reputation for being tough, tactless and inconsiderate. He demanded respect and many subordinates feared him. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Nichols, with a doctorate in hydraulic engineering served as deputy chief of the Manhattan District and a direct subordinate to Groves, described Groves as the biggest sonovabitch I ever met in my life.24 Nichols criticized Groves huge ego and ruthless nature but lauded his tireless energy and confidence in making decisions. Nichols said that he hated Groves guts but would want him again as a boss. Groves drove people hard but pushed himself even harder. He had no patience f(x-delays, no tolerance for sloppiness and no talent for polite amenities. When Groves toured construction sites, he would oken catch a 1 a.m. train, m-rive at 6 a.m. and proceed to the site without breakfhst-much to the dismay of those accompanying him. Even as a cadet at West Point, Groves developed a reputation for outstanding work and efficiency, which he perfected throughout his Army career. When Groves needed help designing and engineering the barrier for the U235 gas diffusion process, he went to F! C. Keith, a vice president







of the M. W. Kellogg Company, for help. Keith assessed Groves as an o~tcer of immense energy and integrity. He appreciated how Groves could speak of patriotism, values and duty as fluently as he could of construction, design and machinery. He was impressed by Groves unshakable philosophy of duty and his old%shioned sense of values. Keith, like everyone else Groves talked to, was reluctant to enter so risky an operation. Keith agreed to the project only if given complete responsibility with no intetierence from anyone. Groves agreed not to intefiere and not to allow anyone else to, either. Groves expected Kellogg to put everything it had into the project and promised his full support. Keith and Groves shook hands. Keith commented later that he ordinarily would not accept the verbal commitment of a man he scarcely knew, but felt he could trust Groves.25

Team Player
While Groves may not have possessed the pleasing personality that genera~ed universal popularity among his associates, he firmly recognized the need to build cohesion and teamwork among the disparate groups involved in the Manhattan Project. To secure the trust, cooperation and loyalty of the scientists, industrialists and military personnel was not an easy undertaking, given their different backgrounds and perspectives. Many of the scientists, for example, believed that all design and engineering should be accomplished under their personal direction, which Groves regarded as absurd. In an effort to allay the scientists distrust of a military officer controlling their work, Groves officially appointed a scientific committee to advise him on all aspects of the project. Groves chose Doctor Richard Tolman, the dean of California Institute of Technology, and Doctor James Conant, chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, who were noted scientists and whose opinions Groves respected.2G The toughest teambuilding challenge came at Los Alamos, where engineers, chemists, physicists, metallurgists and military officers were brought together to build the bomb as soon as

sufficient quantities of atomic explosives were available. Oppenheimer and Groves agreed that the best compromise between security and free exchange of information was to assemble everyone involved at an isolated location. The facilities were primitive; water supply was scarce; and fi-ustrations quickly mounted. Friction developed between military personnel (the @anbers) and scientists (the kmghuirs)as the population in the camp soared to 5,000 and the summer temperature rose past 102 degrees. The scientists objected to the censorship of mail, morning sirens and the hardship on their fhmilies. One wife threw a bad piece of hamburger from the commissary on the Los Alarms commanders desk and exclaimed, You expect us to eat that dogmeat ?27 The military personnel viewed the scientists as pampered prima donnas. Groves and Oppenheimer worked well together. Oppenheimer was popular with the other scientists and was able to present the austere facilities and rigid security requirements in the most favorable light. Oppenheimer relied on Groves to wear the black hat, and appreciated Groves toughness and discipline. He let Groves make the necessary but unpopular decisions and silence the chronic whiners among the scientists. The dedication and relentless devotion to the project displayed by both Oppenheimer and Groves marked the greatest contribution to keeping the team together. To improve the rela. tionship with the Los Alamos scientists, Groves appointed another committee of scientists to oversee the work, similar to the ones appointed by university administrations with which the scientists were accustomed. 28 Life was difficult at all of the sites that were isolated and under construction. Groves was concerned about the disenchantment and potentially disruptive turnover of several thousand women who were employed at the Hanford site as file clerks, stenographers and secretaries. Many had traveled across the country to serve. Groves secured the services of Beatrice Steinmetz, the dean of women at Oregon State College, to serve as supervisor of womens activities. Steinmetz ensured the women were idormed of


. August 1992

the critical importance of the project and their contribution to the war effort when they arrived. She arranged for movies and church services on site, shopping trips to the town of Pasco, nearly 40 miles away, and invitations for the women to the nearest dances.29 While Groves was regarded as tough and insensitive, he conceded when a complaint made sense. On one visit to the Hanford plant he was told by Slim Read, an outspoken Du Pent engineer, that things would go much faster if all the top officials would stop visiting all of the time. The time required to assemble data and make charts was slowing progress. Groves agreed to stay away and insisted that the Du Pent executives and the Chicago scientists do the same.30 Once Groves appointed people to positions, he tried to offer his fdl support and create an environment for them to succeed. Groves was tough and not the least bit reluctant to fire someone-but not at the expense of disrupting a team. Professor Harold Urey, who was developing the gas diffusion barrier for the U235 separation at Columbia University, became exhausted and strained under the pressure of the project. Urey wrote letters stating that the project should be cancelled, and he refhed to cooperate with the Kellogg and Union Carbide engineers. Groves felt he needed a new leader but that the firing of Urey would severely damage the morale of his coworkers who were needed to finish the project. Groves appointed Doctor Lauchlin Currie, a Union Carbide engineer

known for his tact and diplomacy, as associate director of the Columbia laboratory. Urey kept his title and position but the responsibility slowly shifkd to Currie, who possessed the litical acumen to make the organization work.3Y While Groves was gruff and ruthless, he recognized the impatance of cohesion, cooperation and team building. Groves felt that a personal visit and fhce-toface contact were the best means of creating an initial working relationship. He did this with both the industrial corporations he needed for the project and the intelligence community. In 1943, Groves was given the additional responsibility for coordinating all foreign intelligence on atomic matters. He expected resistance fkm the established intelligence community, which was reputed to be uncooperative among even their own agencies. When Groves made a personal visit to General William bnovan, head of the ~lce of Strategic Service, he was warmly received. Donovan stated that Groves was the first general officer who had ever visited him in his office. Donovan escorted Groves on a tour of the agency and pledged his fill support. Groves received cooperation from all of the intelligence agencies and felt that his personal visits were largely responsible.32

Ability to Communicate Clearly

Whih a pleasing pemcmality was not tiong Groves strongest attributes, his ability to solve problems decisively, communicate his orders


August 1992



gyFJgw$gx?f$slydtJ9~i&l toC&tlect !abmtoh and Gmvesbrought - uts in a deqwate in expansible kailers and quonset
effort tohousethe expbdingpopulatbn.


clearly and stand behind them resolutely were his greatest strengths. Groves had assign~d Major J. H. Dudley to study the southwest United States for a fiture bomb laboratory. The criteria included isolation, adequate water supply, good road access and a pleasant surrounding for scientists to be creative. Groves traveled to New Mexico to visit Dudleys recommended site, the Yemez Springs Valley outside Albuquerque. He did not like the site because it was located in a gloomy and depressing valley and it would be difficult to displace the Indians living on the site. Oppenheimer suggested they visit a site north of Santa Fe, at Los Alamos. Groves liked the site immediately and decided on the spot to purchase the land.33 Groves faced a great dilemma in the development of the barrier for the gas difh.sion plant being built by Union Carbide at Oak Ridge. The plant was designed around a lace curtain barrier being developed at the Houdaill~Hershey plant in Decatur, Illinois. The lace curtain was kagile, difficult to weld and possessed non uniform separation characteristics. Kellogg was working on a new barrier that appeared more promising but would require that the Union Carbide plant be stripped and replaced with new machinery. Groves listened to the impassioned arguments of both positions, carefhlly considered the advice of everyone available

over several days and announced with absolute confidence that the Union Carbide plant would be gutted and the new barrier used.34 If he felt any anxiety or hesitation, he refkxxl to show it. There was no question that the issue had been resolved. The project, which could easily have been bogged down in months of study or indecision, moved forward. Once the plutonium bomb was developed and the test had been scheduled, the Los Alamos scientists worked fiuiously to meet the deadline. Many senior advisers and scientists pleaded with Groves for a 2+hour extension due to bad weather. Rain would cause excessive radioactive fallout to cover a small area rather than dissipate harmlessly over a wider area. Groves knew that Roosevelt, who was attending the Potsdam Cotierence, wanted to know the test results prior to negotiating with Josef Stalin. Groves also saw that the scientists had worked to such a feverish pitch that any postponement would require rest for key personnel and new equipment checks that could take days. Oppenheimer was frantic and was receiving conflicting advice horn all corners. Groves tried to bring calm reflection to the state of confhsion. He refhsed to cancel or postpone the test. When the weather cleared at the last minute, the bomb was successfully detonated as


c August 1992


Groves was equally as clear and candid with his superiors. When asked about potential targets for the bombs in Japan, Groves adamantly recommended Kyoto, an urban industrial area with a population of one million people. Since Kyoto was a historical city with great religious significance to the Japanese, Henry Stimson vetoed the target. Groves persistently argued the advantages of bombing Kyoto, but to no avail. Afier the war, Groves admitted that Stimson had been wise and was glad Kyoto had been spared. 36 Groves was sometimes wrong but he was always clear, adamant and decisive in expressing his views. While Groves never got to lead men into combat, his generalship significantly altered the course of the war. The efforts of the Manhattan Project culminated with the dropping of a U-235 atomic bomb nicknamed the little boy on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the subsequent release of a plutonium atomic bomb known as the fat man on Nagasaki three days later. The unconditional surrender ofJapan soon followed. Having assumed responsibility for every aspect of the Manhattan Project horn scien-

tific development and plant construction to security and military intelligence of enemy activity, the leadership of Groves was instrumental in the projects success. Senior-level leadership need not be confiied to directing soldiers on the battlefield. Groves demonstrated the same imperatives of leadership that support the AirLand Battle doctrine as he conquered the immense challenges facing the Manhattan Project. His unabated enthusiasm in the face of popular doubt, his defiant confidence to succeed in spite of the obstacles, and his unwavering patiotism inspired others to join his effort. His personality, better suited to getting a job done at any cost than to winning friends, proved effective on this project. How Groves fmused determination would have coped with a project that really was impossible makes for interesting speculation. Groves headed the Manhattan Project until 1947, when atomic energy afhirs were transferred to the newly created Atomic Energy Commission. Groves served as chief of the Armed Forces S ial Weapons Project until he retired in 1948. F7 MR

1. Stephane Groueff, Manhattan project: The Untok7 Story ;~~ ~ng of fhe Atomtc Bomb Boston, MA: Lttle, Brown and Corn Irnpexatiis, &#y/?&@O2 LT. Cecil B. Llloway, U3w+ership vember 1966):57-59. 3. LansI Lament, Day of Trmily (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 30-31. 4. Rcha%Rhodes, ~eMkfWoftieAMk_b(NWYok: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1986), 427. 5. Groueff, 14. 6 Ibid 1720 7, Ibti.; 43. 8. Leslie R, Groves, Now/t Can Be Toti (New York: Hqwr and Brothers, 1962), 101-3 9. Groves, 181-64. 10. Groueff, 13746. 11. Ibid,, %. 12 Ibd,, 56. 13. (X&lff &2. 14. 15 Ibd., 32!, 16. lb~d., 18. 17 Ilxd,, 143. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

&ov&3, 162. Ibd., 90+3.

Groves, 107-9. Ibid., 110-11. Groueff, 300-301 Groves, 53. Lament, H. Groueff, 31-33. Rhodes, 426. Groueff, 105-6. Groves. 4446.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Grouaff, 290. Ibid., 266-67. Grows, 186. Groueff, 64-65. Ibd., 261-72. lament, 206-12 Groves, 275. Ibid., 465.

Major Allen C. Estzs is adjutant fm the 36th Engineer Group, Fort %ming, Georgia. He receiveda B.S. jiwn the US Military Academy lUSMAJ, two masters degreesfrom Stanfmd University, an M.B.A. from Long Island University, and an M. M.A.S. from the Schoolof AAxmcedMilitary Studies, US Army Command and Genend StaffCoUege.His previousussignmerm includeassistant @ofasor, i)epartment of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, USMA, West Point, New YA; compaFort B& ny commander, Fkdquarters and &@tumers Company, fst Battaliun, voir, Virginia;instructor, Structures and UtilitiesBranch, EngineerSchool;civilengneer, J8th Engineer Brigade; and @eon leader,249th Engineer Bauahon.

August 1992


To& divemity to this Ladenship issue of Mihlary Review, the editors solkited the readkdn!p for short statements on leadership based on the foh!owingquestions. Whutisyourdejinition of leadership? What Gre~ Captuin epitomizes your concept of a leader? What are the essential qualities of a successful leader? Additionally, readers were pven the option to concoct their own question and answec Folbwing are the results. We huve received much more input than we coukd ever hope to publish. Letters camefrom allparts of the Army, active and reserve, from generals and privates, commissioned and noncommimwned. What follows is a healthy sampling, presented in noparti.cularpriority ororde~ Soldi@rs hud a lot to say about leadership but the subject is a matter of wide ranges of opinwn. All seemed to agree, howeveq th@ leadership is the necessary ingredient, without which the nation would not huve an Army, but an armed mob and an unreliable one@ tluul


A Dependents View

Thomas StonewaII Jackson

Leaderships concepts are epitomized in General Stonewall Jackson. He personifies FM 22100s 11 attributes of good leadership. He sought selfimprovement, was proficient at the art, responsible and soundly decisive; he led by example, cared for his troops, developed subordinates, ensured task completion, trained his team, and used his unit according to its capabilities. By using these sound principles long before they were set down formally, his units performed feats far in excess of what other commanders extracted from their men. His flanking maneuver at Chancellorsville is the historical forerunner of General H. Norman Schwarzkopfs Hail Mary.
Major Warner D. Farr, USA, Brooks AFB, Texas

Green ro~s of mud>overed men silently marching past my fi-ont yard; sergeants and oFicers excitedly talking shop in my quarters living room, and the solemn, respectful, changes of command that I have attended each has given me the opportunity to see what leaders can and should be. As a dependent, Ive seen the kind of commanders who watch their drenched, red clayed soldiers slide up and down ravines while they sit in a dry, clean jeep. But growing up through countless Hails and Farewells, Ive talked to leaders who stress participating in training, not just observing. These are the commanders for whom coldness and fatigue may threaten, yet cannot hinder, a mission from being accomplished. The leader who is known for thinking ahead, for inspirational actions, for always remaining flexible, and focusing on the impa-tant is the leader I can strive to become.
Ms. Kerith Dana Dubik, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Ability to Articulate a Vision

Leadership does not seem to follow any type of template, each Great Captain achieving greatness on his own merits based



s August



on the challenges encountered. But the truly great leaders seem to have similar characteristics. All have a vision, and more important, the ability to articulate that vision to their soldiers. They have a sense of selflessness, always ensuring they maintained this perspective, no matter to how high an office they had ascended. Part of this selflessness involved taking the jobs that were not always the most popular, or the most career enhancing. The great leaders were also unique in that they took the time to train and develop subordinates, usually in their own mold, and had a great love for our country, the plain old flagwaving type of patiotism.
Mqjor Eduardo Martinez Jr., USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Words on Leadership
Realization recognize the present. Visionknow where organization ought to go. Prescience anticipate needs. Involvement participate, teach train and educate, learn commit to self-improvement, practice practice, practice, pmctice. Incisiveness - dig for details and truth; mediocrity fails. Linkage interrelationship of events; go beyond the obvious. Responsibility keep subordinates and superiorsinformed, on time, and out of trouble. Thick skin - withstand trivial and professional denigration. Dignity exercise your vocabulary, but avoid profane and vulgar language. compliment people, say thank you and mean it, do not touch peoplemay be perceived as patronizing and presumptuous, treat people fairly, with respect and honor. Reward recognize good and bad, appropriately. Courage - physical, moral and prof~ional; do the right thing.
Major Eben H. Ikevino Jr., USAF, MacDill AFB, Florida

R.E. Lee: Example of Personal Integrity

Robert E. Lee was a great captain. His brilliance and audacity on the battlefield inspired his men. Yet it was his personal integrity his moral fortitude that gave his soldiers unity, identity, purpose and loyalty. It enabled them to go beyond their physical limitations. General Lee became the center about which everything revolved within the Army of Northern Vkginia, center of gravity for an army.
Chaplain (CPT) Robert N. Neske, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Leadership: Sergeants Business

The great captain I am going to talk about is my Command Sergeant Major, Johnnie Riley. Although Riley is not well known, he has the &ree qualities that make a great captain-he is a thinker, a motivator and most important a warrior. During the two years I have known him, I have consistently been in awe of his tactical acumen, his rapport with the soldiers and his overall knowledge of the Army. An example of his tactical brilliance was his input into the plan for our 80-mile air assault into Iraq. His recommendations were sound. In hearing that Riley was in a defensive position during a brigade field training exercise, the divisions assistant division commander for operations said Riley was such a combat multiplier

Tome Ieademhip is the art of wisdom, intelligence and decisiveness to handle a crisis situation, turn it around, and get it under control or solve the problem that it represents. Examples of this would be General Matthew Ridgway in the Korean War and General Ulysses Grant in the American Civil War. Jimmy Doolittle is my idea of a great captain because he served in both the Army and the Air Force. He also showed the proper balance of vision, intelligence and decisiveness in his handling of air power in the years of World War II. Charles 1mdell, West Carrollton, Ohio







that it was like having another platoon in that position. Perhaps the essence of Rileys philosophy on being a soldier can best be described by this quote: People say that war is hell, well if thats true it is our duty as soldiers to put out the fires and kill the devil.
LTC Frank R. Hancock, USA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

The Virtues of Followershio

I believe that in order for one to be ~successful leader, he must first understand and appreciate what it takes to be a good follower. The successful leader must experience what it is like to be on the receiving end of commands. He must gain this experience so that he can comprehend the strength that his own actions and words will one day have upon others. This appreciation is essential because he understands what it takes to inspire and motivate just as he realizes what rewards they appreciate for a job well done.
Cadet Allen T. Thiessen, US Military Academy

his meteorologist. Had any one commander been adamant or had even seriously taken exception, for whatever reason, the chances are that the invasion of Normandy would not have taken place on June 6th, and no amount of intuition on Eisenhowers part could have cajoled the members of the coalition into going along with him. Intuition has definite imitations in decision making. Eisenhower was aware of the limits and relied heavily upon his staff to help him with his decision.
David Craig New Orleans Louisiana

Intangible Inspiration
Leademhip is that intangible quality which inspires subordinates to follow with assurance and confidence when hardship and danger are present. Leadership is therefore of the utmost importance to soldiers at all levels since success depends wholly upon the leaders ability to control and direct. In fact, it maybe said that the effectiveness of our Army depends more upon the quality of its leadenhip than any other factor. Inferior numbers and tierior material, coupled with superior leade~hip may always be counted upon to win against superior numbers, superior material and inferior leadership.
Colonel Dennis P. Vasey, USA (Retired), Naples, Florida

How to be an Effective Leader

I was very proud the day my dad pimed my second lieutenants bars on me; he was a colonel in the mature years of a distinguished career. His guidance on leadership summed up what he had practiced all his life: Keep your troops out of the sun and dont BS the old man. Dad summed up a lot of books with those 13 pithy words, which have guided me ever since: take care of your soldiers and they will take care of you and your mission; tell it like it is, even when it hurts; uncompromising integrity in all you do.
Colonel John B. Haseman, USA, US Embassy, Indonesia

Stuck in Transmit?
We lead people, we manage programs. We all lead people sometimes, so are we good at it? Can we change our leadership style, or were we cast in final form? Should we adopt some clever leadership style, or should we be ourselves? If we lead by fear, do we get the top effort? If we lead with a firm human touch, do the hearts and minds follow? Do we lead alone, or do we seek advice f.i-om all levels? Do we learn each day how to be a better leader, or are we stuck in transmit?
Colonel David K. Burke, USAF, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Ike and the Limits of Intuition

Field Manual 22103 states that leadership vision can bean intuitive sensing. There is no question that Eisenhower sensed the right moment to launch Operation Overlord. Whether he sensed it intuitively is subject to question. He did, however, have all of his commanders present when he made his decision, including







A Great Captain at Vera Cruz

Winfield Scott, bold but not brash, epitomes the phrase Great Captain. His Vera Cruz campaign shows these characteristics. Designing his own landing craft and doctrine, he led the Armys first largescale amphibious invasion. Outnumbered, he boldly advanced on Mexico City without a supply line. With his small professional army, he outmaneuvered his adversary on three battlefields with minimal losses. After a march of 200 mountainous miles, he captured Mexico City, thus winning the war.
LTC Timothy T. Tilson, USA, Wauwatosa, Wisconsin

The Techniques of Leadership

Leadership techniques are not concrete, m~r guaranteed to be successful. Being able to adjust to changing situations and using the available resources are traits that a successful leader must exhibit. Successful leadership integrates consid eration for subordinates and goal planning.
Cadet Marshall Arthur McKay, US Military Academy

w(~rk defines not just the workers purpose, but the organizations purpose. The trenches is where the organization happens the true bettom line. The real purpose of leadenhip is to reduce the uncertainty of those at the next echelon below, until, finally, when the decision making of the chain-of<ommard finally meets with the energy of the worker, there is, ideally, no uncertainty in the minds of either party. Too ofien, the people in the trenches have unmet information needs, even at the moment when human energy is finally applied to the actual doing. This is not ignorance; it is uncertainty. Bottom-line uncertainties reflect failures on the part of leaders, at all levels, to provide workers with timely, accurate, coherent information. The next time you see an organization chart, I(x)k at the trenches. Youll realize that the levels and the positions above the trenches, all the way up to and including the chief executive officer, are of no value whatsoever unless they somehow sene the information needs of people d(nvn there on . . . the bottom line.
LTC Mike McGee, USA, Washington, D.(2

For the Troops

Leadership is an intangible concept, exercised in many ways, dependent on many factors. Some, including personal charisma, are beyond ones control. Others, such as use of troop leading procedures (TLP), are within ones control. In my opinion the key element in leadership is personal commitment to ones troops and involvement in their activities. The commander who is on the scene participating in training (or combat) will know his troops and their problems and sees in person what must be done. His presence motivates them and his presence at the site of critical acti(m may in itself determine the outcome. Brigadier {;eneral Peter W. CIegg, USA,
Fort Devens, Massachusetts

I Propose to Fight on this line.. .

As g&eral in ch[ef of the Union armies, Grant conducted multiple campaigns over half a c(mt inent, commanding over 500,000 troops in 21 army corps. Grant spoke little and listened well. Selfreliant, he was calm amid excitement, patient, sure in judgment and foresight, and not depressed by reverses or unduly elated by success. He was tenacious and could discipline himself and others. Th-eless in action, he once personally wrote 42 important dispatches in one day. Fearless in battle, he had empathy for his soldiers. Setting an austere example in the field, he provided the steadfast command and control around which everything else turned. His magnanimity to Lee at Appomattox saved the country from prolonged guerrilla warfare. He was all the Uni(m Army tvanted, a leader.
LTC Thomas D. Morgan, USA (Retired), Leavenworth, Kansas

Bottom Line Orientation

In most organizations, there are few people at the top, a bunch in the middle, and a large number at the Imttom. The bottom is where products are made, and where services are delivered. This






The leadership


Killer Angel
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain is a great captain whose example few can match but all can follow. He volunt&ily answered the call to serve; self-motivated himself to study the profession of arms; accepted mentoring by his commandeu trained his soldien for combat with available time; continually inspired his soldiers through his personal example, even when wounded; was tested at Fredericksburg; innovated at Gettysburg took up his unit colors and moved forward at Petersburg marched to the sound of the guns at Five Forks; respected his enemys capabilities and honor; continued to serve his state and country after leaving the Army.
Captain Edward S. Loomi%USA, Fort Polk, Louisiana

In my previous assignment as an ROTC instructor, we had a cadet in our battalion who thought that leade~hip was like a contest. Show up with the shiniest boots and win the prize. Become a fhir-haired boy of a few superiors and rest on your hands. Nothing could be fhrther from the truth. Utiortunately, too many of us in leademhip positions forget (in fact some never learn to begin with) that leadership of men and women is really a paycheckit has to be earned every day. More important, the check is signed by our troops, not by our superiors. Our troops are the ones who grant us the privilege of leading them. They alone decide whether or not weve earned our pay.
Mqjor Joseph W. T. Pugh, USA, Fort Blkx% Texas



What are the Essentiai Quaiities of a Successful Leader?

There are those who fail, those who survive, and those who succeed. Any man charged with the leadership of others who is lacking integrity, morality, honesty, and concern is doomed to fail. Any leader possessing these qualities at a minimum has at least established a platform to succeed. Finally, there are those who seem to rise above the platform. That leader is the one who has the courage, foresight, and persistence to ask: Why? A successful leader will question the status quo. A response of It has always been that way will not sati~ a leader seeking improvement. That leader recognizes that nothing is petiect and everything needs improving. He views the old adage If it aint broke, dont fix it as an excuse for complacency. The strive for excellence is, and will always be the determining factor between the successfd and the survivor.
Captain Phil Deaton, USA, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico

Before one can discover the essential qualities of a successful leader, he first has to communicate hw definition of success to his audience. Although there are many ways to assess the success of a leader, the most resourceful is to measure the success of his unit in accomplishing given tasks. Regardless of whether the leader epitomizes ones concept of a great leader or not, a leader whose unit is successful is successfd as well.
Cadet Landy Donnell Dunham US Military Academy

The Hallmark of a Leader

By definition, leadership is the art of influencing others to accomplish the mission. To paraphrase Napoleon, the great leader is not the one who can lead men. The great leader is the one the men will follow. This is truer today than it ever was, owing in large part to the intelligence of todays soldiers. Any officer or NCO can give orders, and the troops will have no choice but to obey. To be a leader, however, means understanding your sddiem and what makes them tick. A leader is one who can make the tough choices, who will roll up his sleeves and get dirty when hes short-handed.
SFC Terence L. Johnson, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Basics of Leadership

I believe all successfid leaders have one fundamental quality that stands out the quality of human understanding. All soldiers need to know that they are more important than a weapon system. With all of our new technological advances and the downsizing of the Army, the

August 1992


soldier remains the key ingredient for success. Tw ofien the needs of the soldier are subordinate to the needs of the Army. When a soldier knows that he has a chain of command that redy cares and listens, his attitude and performance is magnified. Leaders work with people and feelings.
Captain Joseph C. Lopez, USA, APO AE 09630

Successful Leaders Develop Successful Subordinates

Successfd leaders develop confidence and aggressive, independent action in their subordinates. They take a moment tier a brutal afier-action review to express continued confidence in a subordinate who has made a mistake while attempting to faithfully achieve the commanders intent. The successfid leader does not sanction poor judgment; he reaffirms aggressive initiative on the part of junior leaders. In the darkest moments of an NTC rotation, a fi..mre leaders aggressive spirit can be formed or broken by a single word.
CPT Frederick C. Hellwig, USA, Columbia, South Carolina

The blacksmith in this case is any leader fi-om general officer to section leader. The leader must be proficient and should have a vision of what goals the unit has set out to accomplish. The hammer is one of many tools available to us as leaders. Its equivalent to position, authority, knowledge or the ability to make things happen. The metal is the unit and soldiers. In almost every situation, soldiers want to do well. Theyre malleable metal ready to take shape under the direction of the leader. The anvil is the key item of equipment. Without it you can bang away at the metal and get the sparks and sound of a blacksmith, but the finished product will kmk nothing like the horseshoe. You need the firm evaluative base of an anvil to make things go right.
Major Stephen P. Walsh, USA, ML Clemens Michigan

Words of Wisdom
In his search to be a great leader, the young centurion sought out the Republics veteran warrior. Looking up fi-om his labor, the sage spoke: I know not what beats beneath your tunic, but what I saw in a leader from foot soldiers to proconsul is thus: One who makes drill bloodless combat and combat bloody drill... One who disciplines the offense and not the offenders... One whose heart is with the Legion and whose loyalty is to the Republic... One who seeks the companionship of the long march and not the privilege of position... One whose commission is assigned from above and confirmed from be low... One who knows the self and, therefore, is true to all... One who seeks to serve and not to be served... This is the one who leads best of all.
LTC Jeffrey L. Spara, USA, Syracuse, New York

Successfd leademhip has many facets to it. A leader must know the fimdamentals of leadership, but must also be able to improvise. Answers to most leadership puzzleswill never be found in a book because the people involved will change constantly, causing new puzzles. A successfid leader must be able to understand people and human nature. Leaders need to know the limits and capabilities of those they lead to maximize their potential. Being able to adapt to changing situations quickly and effect ively has always been the hallmark of the more successful leaders.
2LT Lawrence E. Collins Jr., USA, DeKalb, Illinois

For Want of a Nail

A former commander of mine used the metaphor of Leadership as the process of making a good horseshoe. He began by noting that you need a skilled blacksmith, a hammer, a heated strip of metal and an anvil to make a good horseshoe.

Getting There
Leaders are first and foremost individuals of character. Although Army leadership doctrine does not neglect this attribute-and even places it first in the Be, Know, Do trinity-practice







places Be far behind Know and, especially, Do. Army practice looks at leademhip as an algorithm in suchand+uch a situation, do the following and you too will be a leader. Its alla question of technique. We have missed the leadership boat. We talk about history while encouraging our officers to spend their spare time earning business administration degrees. We publish lists of professional books but reward reading military fantasy novels. The first orients on Do; the second kills time. The Chief of Staff encourages us to grow leaders of character, and Harry Summers suggests fhture readiness will emerge from education. Without an institutional change, we wont get there fi-om here.
Major Steve G. Cappq Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ter. Davouts competence on the battlefield saved Napoleon from defeat at Austerlin. Dav outs concern for his soldiers was evident to them. The soldiers, who didnt like their commander personally could look around and see that he kept them supplied better than any other unit in the French Army. Marshall Davouts reward for his leadenhip ability was the respect and obedience of his men.
Cadet Veronica D. Robertson, U S Military Academy

Leadership and Modern Technology

The complexity of th=-integrated battlefield and application of technology to complete mission objectives as demonstrated during Operation Desert Norm suggests that leaden should possess the ability to identifi individuals, irre&ctive of rank, who posse& relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes and to effectively and eflciently utilize these individuals to complete assigned missions. This essential quality if possessed and applied by leadexs will provide participating soldie~ with enhanced self esteem and the pride of accomplishment. Consequently unit esprit de corps and combat readiness maybe enhanced through the demonstrated recognition of and reliance on individual capabilities.
lLT Doug Rokke, USA, Rantoll, Ilinois


Testament Style

Nehemiah was an Old T~tament leader who was able to translate co mmanders intent into mission accomplishment and the Old Testament book bearing his name is perhaps the first written manual on effective leadenhip. He clearly epitomized the four value~ourage, candor, commitment, and competence-that leaders should possess. As cup bearer to King Artaxemes, Nehemiah showed considerable courage by asking for an extended TDY to rebuild Jerusalems walls. He demonstrated candor by requesting specflc assistance. Despite active opposition, Nehemiah remained unwavering in his commitment to the mission. Nehemiahs proficiency in communications, planning, recomaissance, and decision making attest to his competence. His adherence to the four G resulted in the rebuilding of the walls in only 52 days.
LTC Russell V. Olson Jr., USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Right Leader at the Right Place

Writing on Sir Garnet Joseph Wolsely, Archibald Forbes says, The heavenborn soldier is he who achieves startling success with apparently inadequate means. Only good leadership turns defeat into victory. Good leaders set personal standards that harden individual and unit resolve and take risks because they trust subordinates to do the right thing at every level of command. Great Captains have the flexibility of mind to seize every initiative the enemy allows them and have the physical and mental toughness to stand firm on their decisions. Thus, leadership is the right mix at the right time of trust, flexibility, and firmness. The Great Captain who epitomizes my definition of leadership was Field Marshall Sir

From the Napoleonic Era

Marshall Louis Nicholas Davout, of Napoleons Army, possessed three qualities that are the hallmark of a great leader--character, competence and caring. Marshall Davout believed in honesty, loyalty and courage. Even though men made fun of his devout Christian beliek, no one ever doubted Davouts purity of charac-


August 1992


William Slim, co mmander of Allied Land Forces in South East Asia, perhaps the toughest and least resourced World War II front. His commoner roots, his experience teaching the poor before he became a soldier and his service in the colonial army taught him to value the humanity of those he led regardless of race or class. From his World War 11experience and his wounds at Gallipoli, Slim learned the importance of not wasting soldiers lives. A rare blend of improvisation and determination, he did not repeat the same mistakes. He was a leader who knew his trade, had great rapport with the men he led, and had the physical and mental resilience to turn a hopeless defeat in India into a remarkable victory over the Japanese in Burma.
Colonel Joseph T. Cox, USA, U S Military Academy

selfimprovement by providing guidelines and perspectives. Teaching, the fiil component strengthens the caring and guiding foundation. Leaders teach subordinates through positive role models and examples. Working together, these three components make successful leadem by creating better subordinates.
Cadet Heidi Strubbe, U S Military Academy

Qualities of Leaders
- The three most essential qualities of a successful leader are competence, courage, and wisdom. Competence is essential because a leader must know what he or she is doing. Without competence, the followers will not have confidence in him or her. Courage is essential because a leader must keep trying when the followem want to give up. Without courage, a leader cannot push his or her followers in tough times, which is when they most need a leader. Wisdom is essential because a leader must know how to react to circumstances. Without wisdom, a leader will make wrong decisions.
Cadet Steven Park, U S Military Academy

The Human Quality

The best leaders, in all walks of life, are honest and humane. As a noncom once remarked to me You dont lead men into battle by telling them youre taking them to the Post Exchange. And as General Schwarzkopf observed: men dont die for abstract ideals like Mom and apple pie but for the buddies at their side. A leaders most important job is to inspire by being trustworthy and protecting the lives of his men.
Mm D. J. Collier, China Grove, North Carolina

LeaderShin as Instinct
Leade~hip-is not an art nor a technique, but an instinct occurring at a precise moment in time. A moment which might be critical on a smoke-filled battlefield or important to a boardroom problem-solving process. It exists just below the level of consciousness yet essential to its environment. Its absence creates a void which is ofien filled by a randomness of undefiied and unguided efforts. The leader sees clearly at the critical moment and acts to faus available energies to seize that moment and turn it to its conclusion. The study of this instinct creates an art and the imitation of its characteristics defines the technique.
Major John W. Lemza, USA, Fort Lee, V@inia

Caring is Key
The ability to care, guide, and teach are essential components for successfd leadership. Weaving these components into a solid foundation, a leader makes subordinates better people. The first component, caring, creates a trusting relationship between leader and follower. Both parties show the other empathy, compassion, and understanding. This caring gives the leader the ability to guide subordinates to

August 1992





k cwrent~


The author reviews the 46year histi~ revikhn attempts during #m.t span. He doctnke have aflected the manual He varhus senwr &vel ofiem dunngthis
HE article by Colonel James R. Mcbnough in the October 1991 issue of MilitaryReview provided an excellent discussion of why US Army Field Manual (FM) 10&5, O#wrati, is being rev~d in the fmhion it is now. His contention that the writers should not only look at the product but also need to constmct a viable process for the formulation of the doctrtie is an im portant point. Those who have been on the periphe~ of the development of the current FM may wonder why the proces is so involved and

of the munml and the vtius points out how changes in US discusses the opintins heti by same pew.

of time and creative resources. For the past 40 years, FM 10&5 has been the keystone of Army doctrinal litera~re. As such, it repre~n~, in theo~, a broad con~mm wifih the Amy as to what operational and tactical doctrine should be. Its conten~ detemine the course of instmction at schmls within the military educational system and provide one of the underpinnings for force strucmring and weapons procurement. Mchnough sup~m this Posi. tion, saying that all of the business of the Amy . . . derives from doctrine.l It would follow, therefore, that FM 100--5 should assume an important pkwe in the daytday life of the Amy and receive serio~ attention from professional soldiers. The reality is far different, however. A look at the Army3 doctrinal proces~ that have contributed to the development of the m~ual, an examination of the chages (or lack of them) that have been brought about in the doctrines

why so my people are being consulted. The reasons are numerous but one in particular needs to be more thoroughly developed. The historical antecedents for the development of FM 100-5 justifi this enomous expenditure
are thoseof the aub ?%eui.ews expresti h & unicle

2&YR=%f2F:2::EF2z! of)icem &em_-y.-E&m






Until the formation of TRADOC in 1973, the system for developing concepts was fragmented and subject to convicting pressures. Immediately follbwing WorkUWar II, titine dkvelbpment was afinctibn of the G3 staff section of the General Staff, with Fort Leaven worth retaining responsibility for developing the field manual. This was an inadequate arrangement but the following years saw /iMe, l~any, improvement.

the FM contains and a consideration of the attitude of the Armys leadership toward the manual show that from the end of World War 11until the release of the 1976 edition, FM 100-5 has been a muchmaligned and ignored document.

Doctrine Development
Although todays Army has an organization that has the formulation and dissemination of doctrine as one of its specified missions, this has not always been the case. Until the formation of the Tmining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973, the system for developing concepts was fi-agmented and subject to conflicting pressures. Immediately following World War II, doctrine development was a function of the G3 (operations and plans) staff section of the General St&, with Fort Leavenworth retaining responsibility for developing the field manual. This was an inadequate arrangement but the following years saw little, if any, improvement. In October of 1952, the chief of sttiordered the creation of the office of the deputy chief of staff (C&3) for Combat Developments (CD) under the Army Field Forces (then the major continental US co remand). The C& also directed that CDdepartments be established at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the four combat arms schools. fie CD role was to revolve around research, development, testing and the early integration of new doctrine, organizations and material into field units. While

CD was to address issues at least 10 years in the fhture, the staff in the G3 section remained responsible for overall supervision and short-range doctrinal requirements. Invariably the G3 section became involved in long-range planning and operations to the detriment of its CD responsibilities. In an attempt to solve this problem, the secretary of the Army ordered a reorganization in 1952. The CD group that had been under G3 became a separate staff agency, with G3 retainin responsibility for shonrange developments. 5 Three years later, the problems of doctrine development had still not been overcome and yet another reorganization took place. In Februa~ of 1955, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) was formed to direct the activities of the forces within the United States (replacing the Army Field Forces). CONARC was also responsible for the continued improvement and development of the Army (to include doctrinal matters). 3 The CD Section of the G3 became a CONARC staff division in 1956.

The Product
Udortunately, two problems kept these attempts at rationalization from being entirely successful. The first centered on the fact that one agency still did not exert overall control over doctrinal matters. CONARC remained responsible to three separate sections of the General Staff as far as the formulation of doctrine was concerned.4 A second shortcoming was that CD in the US Army was not as broadbased as it might have appeared to be. Operations research tended to confine itself to the study of the optimal use of wea~ns or, at most, weapons and tactics. 5 Doctrine rated a poor second. As a result, by January of 1959: The Armys program for combat developments was still a loosejointed arrangement among CONARC, the General Staff (where three agencies were involved) and the technical and administrative services. Coordination and concurrences required to reach decisions on new weapons and equipment among so many agencies still required an enormous amount of time.a





FM 100-5

In the early 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commissioned a broad, overall study of the Army titled Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army. This was perhaps the most thorough study that had been made of the Army since World War I and took six months of effort by a select military and civilian staff. One area that received critical comments was that of CD. The study (known as Project 80) found the responsibility for CD still split among many agencies. Long-range planning of new documents and concepts was deemed to be inadequate and Project 80 recommended that CD be freed from all operating responsibilities. Moreover, the report suggested transferring from Army schools those fhnctions and personnel connected with the development of doctrine. Apparently, those individuals who had been tasked with doctrinal development were also given additional teaching and training fhnctions. Because of this, their primary work in doctrinal matters suffered. Unfortunately, although many of the other committee suggestions were adopted, the responsibility for FM development remained with the school systems under the overall direction of CONARC, while CD was transferred to a separate agency within the command.7 In this kaleidoscopic shifiing of agencies, responsibilities and acronyms over a 2 lyear period, there remained only one constant. Fort Leavenworth, and in particular CGSC, retained responsibility for FM 100-5. What kind of product was turned out under this system? If the manuals are read chronologically and topically, the similarities between them leap out at the reader. Entire sections of the preceding edition appear to have been lifted out and transplanted into the newest version. The tables of contents of the 1949 and 1954 editions and those of the 1962 and 1968 versions are almost identical. Large portions of the text have also been transferred almost verbatim. The impression one gets is that the ofilcers who were responsible for writing the manual took the previous version and changed or amplified only small portions of it.

This could have been brought about by a combination of several factors. It could have been a recognition on the part of the system that doctrine had remained stable and needed only

Airmobile operations were brkjly covered in the 1962 version in the same chapter as airborne operations. In the 1968 version, both were given more detailed treatment in separate chapters. Overall, however, the changes were minor and the doctrine as it was written in 1968 was much the same as that in the 1949 version. What this meant was that the Army of 1968 was using the same basic doctrines as the Army that fought in World War II.

minor clarifications or revisions. On the surface, this appears to be the most obvious explanation. It may also have been due to the lack of a single agency that had as its prima~ responsibility the coordination of the development of doctrine within the Army. The shih in agencies and organizations responsible for doctrinal matters have already been discussed. The lack of centralized control may have led to the reftiement of the manual by committee rather than by taking bold new strides forward.g Another plausible explanation may lie in the problems discovered by Project 80, in particular the manner of tasking individuals for rewrites. Unless a major project such as the revision of a FM had command interest or dedicated assets, the amount of time devoted to the project may have been minimized due to the crush of daily pressures.9 This could have resulted in only minimal and superficial changes. Substantive changes are evident in the evolution of the manual, however. The 1949 edition listed only one form of defense. Although it stressed that the defense is conducted along mobile lines. . . [and] . . . must be aggressive. .., it took the sha of what we would today call position defense. T0 In 1954, a change was made to






contain what amounts to direct criticism of the Air Force and Navy. The United States Department of Defense is organized on the premise that the day of separate land, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. No single element of the nations overall military power will suffice.14 In war the ultimate and decisive act is the The &s&sfizction of the nation with the dbctnne of exercise of landpower. Massive Remn and the adoption of Flexiblk Response by . . . The ultimate aim of President Kennedy was reflected in [the 1962 version]. . . . both sea and airpower is Almost 10percent of the munual[goes] into a dktidtreatment to influence the situaof the nature of militiry power and its use along what was tion and operations on termed the Spectrum of Wa~.. . General Taylor [tier] land; landpower makes s~ed: The conjlict in Washington over Massive Retaliation permanent the otherversus Fhzvible Response as a hctnw for our nutional strategy wise transient advanmude it di~ult if not impossibh to have an authenticated tages which air and naval document of the kind FM 100-5 triks to represent. forces can gain.15 More important, the manual stressed that The United States faces a defensive measures, which were categorized as threat which is broad and diverse and which is falling into one of two types, position or mobile directed by a flexible and pragmatic defense. 11 By 1962, the boundaries between the Other changes in substance were more limited two had been blurred, and there was recognition in scope. Nuclear weapons were discussed for the that the area defense and mobile defense lie at first time under a separate heading as well as unopposite ends of a scale of wide variations in the der the topics of offensive and defensive operaform of defensive operations . . . [and] . . . the options. 17 Airmobile operations were briefly coverations of the various component units may enered in the 1962 version in the same chapter as compass both defensive patterns and delaying airborne operations. In the 1968 version, both operations as well, with certain units being aswere given more detailed treatment in separate signed primarily an offensive role.12 chaptem 18 Overall, however, the changes were A New National Strategy minor and the doctrine as it was written in 1968 The most significant changes in the manual was much the same as that in the 1949 version. 19 occurred in the 1962 version. The dissatisfaction What this meant was that the Army of 1968 was of the nation with the doctrine of Massive Retalusing the same basic doctrines as the Army that iation and the adoption of Flexible Response by fought in World War 11.20 President John E Kennedy was reflected in print. The development of FM 100-5 stagnated The first 14 pages (almost 10 percent of the manuthroughout the 1950s and 1960s. Why was this al) go into a detailed treatment of the nature of allowed ? The answers lie in two areas: military power and its use along what was termed G The introduction of atomic weapons. G The interservice conflict that arose as the Spectrum of War.13 Parts of this discussion


August 1992


FM 100-5

each service attempted to define what its role in a nuclear war should be, and the attitude of the members of the military concerning the FM.

wm engaged in a continuous fight for the Armys survival in the years of Massive Retaliation. The atomic battlefield seemed to require less and less participation from conventional forces, and so budget reductions fell heavily on the Army in particular. Doctrinal problems were, therefore, the least of the leaderships worries during this time. General Maxwell D. Taylor stated: The conflict in Washington over Massive Retaliation versus Flexible Response as a doctrine for (mr national strategy made it difficult if not impossible to have an authenticated document of the kind FM 100-5 tries to represent.2 ] Even so, the Army leadership felt that those forces that were to engage in combat would continue tt~use those tactics practiced in World War 11, modified only slightly for use on a nuclear battlefield. Organizational and structural changes designed to provide more flexibility appeared to be more necessary than doctrinal change, and these consumed much of the o~lcer C()rps energies. In addition, the fragmental ion of the doctrinal effort limited the ability of the Army to determine what changes were necessary and forced it instead to concentrate on developing progrdrns and wea ns designed to keep the Army viable instead. P These problems could have been overcome however, had there been a driving force at the upper echelons of the Army. Unfortunately, according to Tayl~>r: Nowhere in the machinery of government . . . [was] there a procedure for checking military capability against political commitments or our forces in being against the requirements growing out of the approved Basic National Security Policy (drawn up by the National Security Council).~~ I have not been able to find mention anywhere of an ofhce that controlled or scheduled the revision of FM 100-5 other than brief com-

Senior Leadership The top Army leadership

ments stating it was Fort Leavenworths responsibility to publish and update it. 24 As Major General LB. Honey, a distinguished military theorist and educator, stated: There are many organi@ms addressing docrnnal problems, but how many of them have perfected adequate procedures to ensure that the doctrines produced represent only the most refined distillates from experience? . . . One can find statements indicating which organizations are responsiblebut very little guidance on k the flow of in@rrruuionis secured and how the analysis is to be conducted.25 Although the purpose of the FM has varied somewhat over the years, Taylor summed up its role quite well when he wrote that the Field Service regulations [sic] was an important document between World Wars I and II, serving as a guide for field operations and a basis for the instruction at kavenworth. In general, it represented the tactical experience acquired by the Army in World War 1.26 Afier World War II, the FM had a similar role and consolidated the Armys experiences fi-om World War 11. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the development of the manual would receive a great deal of attention from those who would have to put the doctrines it contained into practice. Between the end of World War II and the release of the 1976 edition, however, only one article can be found in Military Review that discussed FM 100-5. In this article, Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy enthusiastically endorsed the 1956 edition of the manual, saying: The latest edition of Field Manual 100-5 . . . is a very fine manual indeed. It is reassuring and co~orting to read its sound, forward looking exposition of current Army doctrine. Thoughtfd soldie~ will appreciate the restatement of the principles of war as fundamental truths proved by the lessons of history; and will approve clearly expressed recognition that these principles are no magic formulae for victory.27 Several oKlcers who have occupied key positions in the ranks of the Armys senior leadership have disagreed with Dupuysglowing comments, however. General Bruce C. Clarke, one-time



c August



The consensus seemed to be that onlyfiki sokiim coukiproduce an adkquate line munud and thal FMs &rivedfiom staff di$cusswns were of little use. Furthermore, this @itu& was not limited to the upper ranks within the Army. . . . [Howeve~ at a recent] Senwr Leaders W@ghter Conference. . . a full day was devoted to a discussion of the issues involved in shaping the FM. There is also a squad of lieutenant colonels and majors ensconced in the School for Advanced Mili@y Studies whose duties revolve solely around the revision of FM 100-5. Quite a changefiom the past.

commander of CONARC, claimed, I never had anything to do with writing FM 100-5 . . . . Such things are usually written by English majors with limited military experience.28 Furthermore, according to Clarke: Ive never seen it referred to in Div, CQrps, Army, and Army Group Hqtrs [sic] in my commands . . . . We have very few writers who understand the reception of military academic concepts by tactical units in the field. The writers of these concepts usually have very little prestige in combat situations. I never heard mention [of-lFM 100-5 when I commanded troops in 2 wars. I am sure that Ike and George were not following the edition of the day.~~zg These comments by Clarke take on an even more scathing nature when one realizes that CONARC was the headquaxten that CGSC and the development of FM 100-5 fell under prior to the formation of TRADOC. Clarkes attitude was not unique. When queried about Clarkes comments, General James M. Gavin stated that they summed up the feelings of many of the senior o~lcers during the time period under consideration. The consensus seemed to be that only field soldiers could produce an adequate line manual and that FMs

derived from staff discussions were of little use.30 Furthermore, this attitude was not limited to the upper ranks within the Army. General Dom Starry, one of the principal authors of the 1976 edition, reflected the Armywide opinion when he said: Our Army has regulations that cover many subjects-almost all subjects it would seem save military tactics. Whether this is by design-to protect the ignorant---or by oversight is not at all obvious. Most probably, its because, since we all consider ourselves tactical experts, we can never agree sufficiently and for long enough to write a regulation about tactics. However, we do set forth operational conceptstactics-in field manuals. Normally, these manuals live a pretty quiet life, serving as references or as exhibits for various inspecton checklists. In many cases, one fiids they are little read, less ofien followed and not exactly the prime topic of Army conversation-professional or social.31 The military experience of such distinguished combat leaders as Taylor and Clarke confirm this attitude as both of these talented soldiers claim to have never read the manual while on active service.32

Todays Challenge
Co&rast this wit~ how the FM is being treated today. In a December 1991 drafi of a vision statement for the US Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army chief of staff, listed two governors or control measures we will employ to ensure that the Army will be reduced in a manner consistent with keeping it an effective force. The two measures are doctrine and sound management procedures.33 This in itself does not necessarily elevate doctrine, or the FM, to a higher level of importance or visibility. The Armys senior leadership, however, is fmusing currently on the doctrine and, in particular, the manual. A Senior Leaders Warfighter Conference held at Fort Leavenworth extended over a two-day period. A fill day was devoted to a discussion of the issues involved in shaping the FM. There is also a squad of lieutenant colonels and


August 1992


FM 100-5

majors ensconced in the School for Advanced Military Studies whose duties revolve solely around the revision of FM 100-5. Quite a change from the past. Over the past 40 years, FM 100-5 has evolved through four different editions and almost a dozen published changes. During this period, the FM has supposedly represented the o~lcial stand on matters of doctrine. Unfortunately, until recently, the disjointed system of doctrinal development ensured that changes in the manual were minimal and did not necessarily reflect the conditions that the Army was fhcing or could possibly face in fhture combat situations. More-

over, due to the Armys fight for survival in the 1950s, close involvement of the leademhip necessary to ensure a quality product was not available. Without that interest, the attention of soldiers at all levels was directed to matters other than the dissemination and refinement of doctrine through official writings, and the FM was viewed by all levels of the Army as a pariah. During this period, therefore, FM 100--5 remained something far less than a doctrinal statement and only slightly more than something used to meet a requirement. To avoid a similar experience in this era, we must fmus on the process as well as the product. MR

1. COL James R. McDonough, Building the New FM 100-5: Process and Product, Mi/itary Review (Gctcbr 1991:6. 2. James E, Hawea Jr., Specta/ Sb.KleSs.eriea: f=rvrnRoottoAkYWmrara Army @rnization ad Administmti lsZD-1%3 (Washington, DC: Center of MMary History , 306. 3. Russell Wei Ie HIstory of fhe United Stafea Amry (New York: MactWIa. Pubhshmg~. ?97$, 528-29, 4. Hews, 262 5. Russdl F. We Icy, 77reAmerixrr Way of War: A Hisfory of Unifed States A.fihtary Sfrafegy a#Po/icy (Naw York: MacMillan Pubhahing Co, 1973), 408. 6. Hawes, 262. 7. Itxd., 323-28, 341-44 and 360. 8. I have examined the files at Leavenworth, the US Amy fWita Hlst~ could I fir#~h~; Instrtute (USAMHI) and the National Archives, andnowhera torfcal files on adtions of FM 100-5 prior to the 1976 version. At the U I did find a draft adiin of the 1968 version that had a staffing btter endoaed. The draft F@ been sent to more than 48 agendas for comment. The aMraasaes indudad a diverse number of groups and involved a majority of the service schools and rasa~ and davebpment a$endea. AHhough over half of the agencies raspmdad, their comments wara Ilmited to minor matters. It may also tm sigmficant thatI cannot find any indication as to why the manuals were ravsad with the excepbon of the rewsion to the 1962 manual, This was dm%xt b the Army in letter CDCCD-, HQ USACDC, 22 April 1965, T;l%y Army-W& Ihtrinal Ltierature Program for FY 66-7. This latter was mentioned in an annex to the draft of the 1968 edition, not exactly a prominent locat~n~fo& m the USAMHI in the Military Publicdons section). ible that an instructor in the Department of Tactics (or its aquivalent) at =WSS gwen the %ddiional d% o~~isi~ the manual Due to ccmflicts with teaching or training schedules, is i wdua may have fallen back on the time-honored system of taking what had come before (be if an operatxm order, letter of rdrucbon or standing operati~ ptiura) and changing only those aspects that were confusing or glaringly InacuJrata. ThLs is not meant to imply a miticksm of the method but merely to point out that the process of quaatioring the substanm of the manual may not have been as deep or far-reaching aswasr uiredornacessa ~ 10. US%s partrnentofthe rmy, FM 100-5, Fieti Service R ~bo~, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GP r AaW% 1%$: 11, US Dapartrnentof the Arm , FM 100-5, r%/dServh Re@dons, @erafbns (Washington, DC: US Gl%, .%~mbr 1954), 113. 12. USD nt of the Army, FM CW5, Field Sen%x R@#ons, tbns, (WSS=DC: US GPO, Februa 1962), 76. Ths is repeated Fa moat verbatim m the 1968 adtion, 6-14 to 61 r 13. US Department of the Army, FM 100-5, (February 1962), 1-15. 14 Ibd, 11 15 Ibid 16 Ibd.. 6-7. 17. Ibd,, 59-77. 18. Ibid., c@7., anda,lso US ice Regulations, Cwabons (W%meOfeAymmF*-m!aton,DC: US GPO, February 7and8. 1 ~ontiewishn btilWd~n WbuNinti~7timy comparisons d=FMa. 1968),


(m~n $;j%*flA. Do!$j%%%%r%%~/!%~%%%%%% 1946-76, ba~ f~r, Numb 1, Combat studies lnstft@, US Army Command and General Staff Cotlaga, Forl Laavenvath, KS, August, 1979. On page 41 he stated that TWvdthstanding the atomic bomb and the intense pcdwar studies . . . the doctrine fortha empbyment of American tactbl units in 1950 eff@vefy remained that of World War Il. Also on page 41 dunngthepariodfrom 1965to 1972.. .nom~changes%?%a%%~ WaSPOnS,equipment or doctrine. GEN Dorm . Starry supports the idaa that dcctrine had udargona minimal changes during the period 1946-1976 in an ust 1978 issue artida Mad A Tactical Evolution-FM 100-5, found in the 9 Iracfly indvad of w/tiyRe*,~ 5. COL Edwin Scri briar, although not m the twsms to e 1976 ediin of FM 100-5, worked on the manuals ccm,. %!%%!!ZY~?l$Z$!+!%i~Zn% indoctrina .6cx2wradiithel ata 1950s, aarfy 1960s: Ymsidarable ch and aarty 1970s%imprasaion is that although there was much irMectual ferment over tactical pmblema, operational doctrines (such as those that FM 100-5 would address remained relatively stable. 21. Latter from GE k Ta brtotheaufhor dated 18 Jufy 1983. 22. Ernest F, Fisher, ~ Strategy of flexible Response, Military Review Also C. M. F uaaon, MiIii Forces ad National Ohjec(March tivas,Mi/ifaryReview@tobarl%?i512. PmgramsauchastheUSAnm~ Strategic Army Corps and the Pan@mic DMaion took an inordinate amount o the officer c.o~ ermrgies. 23. EN Maxwell D. Taylor, US krrry, Retired, ~ Lkwertain Tiurrpt (New York: Haroer and Brothers, 1980), 83. 24. tier than footmta 7. Prmxaa: Some 25. MG 1. B. 1-1o11, US Air Forca Reserve, The Doctrinal Suggaated Sta@, & Ret4ew (April 1979):14. 26. Latter from GEN T br. 27. COLT. N. D#wy, $arwtlhoutVctoty; h#~Rekw(March 1956):28. 28. Lettarfrom EN Clarkato author datad 14 uly 1983. 29. Ibid. =. La%r from GEN Gavin to author dated 20 July 1983. 31. GEN Dorm A. StarrY, A Tac$cal Evolutbn-FM 100-5, M#itary Review


A#.u?~%)i;footrwbs&3 and 27. 33. The United States Army: StrategIC Force-strategic cember 1991, 10.


draft, 16 De-

Major MichaelW. Cannon isdeputy executiueojficerfmCommander, US Army ForcesCommand, Fort McPherson, Georgia. He receiveda B.S. j%m the US Mikq Academy, an M.A. jbm the University of Iowa, and an M. M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff CoUege (USACGSC). He isakoagraduate of both the US Army Command and GetwrdStaflOj&rCome and theSchoolof AdwmcedMilitary Studies, USACGSC. He has helda wmietyof commandandstafi inchding G3 plum ojjicer, 2d Infantry Division, Koreu, and taskface S3 operationsand assignments, training officer, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cawdry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.






-- -----a -0



The Strategikon waswritten toserveasaman~ to assist with the training of the mounte@ troops of the Byzantine army. The author suggests thut this fo~otten work hus use for I @days milihwy organizations. He compares ~ the philosophies of the Strategilcon to those of Sun Tzus The Art of War and discusses their dt~erences. Finally, he notes thal it was not until the 20th century that the Byzantine type of warjhre returned@ the Mtkfiekl
O EDWARD GIBBON, the vices of the \ Byzantine Ties were inherent, their vie- , ~:;;:;~%FE:kt;s~$%~ one ranks with the most glaring. For It was large {


----1 [ &&i T

A Forqotten

Charles C. Petersen


.:$. A % .! %

him ~

organization and the sophistication of its art &ry of war that enabled it to withstand assaults from Persians, Avars, Franks, Slavs and Arabs (to name just a few of its enemies) for more than 500 years between the sixth and 11th centuries. 1 he sources ot this excellence lay not in the genius of Belisarious or Narses who, despite the brilliance of their victories, lefi no lasting im- 1 print on the Byzantine military system, but in reforms enacted a generation later by the soldier~ emperor Maurice (582--602) and codified in an out%nding military manual, the Strategikon. So I successful were Maurices reforms that they remained substantially undisturbed for the next five centuries. Not until well into the nineteenth century, writes J. E C. Fuller, were mili- 1 tary manuals of such excellence produced in western Europe.2 Yet, very few copies of this work have survived; a printed version of the Greek text appeared only in 1981; and the first k English translation, only in 1984.3 Published by 1 an academic press, it appears not to have come I to the attention of the general military reader ~ and has already gone out of print.4 The Strategikon is a practical manual, a rather modest elementa~ handbook, in the words of its introduction, for those devoting themselves I to eneralship.5 Its concern with contemporary I military problems contrasts sharply with the philosophical detachment of Sun Tzus The Art ! ~ of Win-, written a millennium earlier.b Even so,


its military wisdom, like that of the Chinese military classic, speaks to generals of every era, and the principles that influenced its instructions for the deployment and employment of the East Roman armys field forces remain of interest today.

The Strategikm on *aurices Reforms 1 i

The Stru.tegikon consists of 12 chapter-length books, all but one of which deal with the organization, training and support of mounted troops. But the mounted troops described in the Stmtegikon were no ordinary cavalry; they were balanced and versatile fighting formations capable of winning decisions independently in battle against a variety of opponents and in many kinds of terrain. The Byzantine armys infantry, as Sir Charles W. C. Oman points out, was altogether a subsidiary force, used more for garrison duty and smallscale mountain warfare than for taking the field with the horse.7 The basic tactical unit of the Byzantine army, as reorganized by Maurice, was the bundurn or W, a mo~ted company whose size fluctuated between 200 and 400 horsemen. All of the tagmm should definitely not be of the same size, asserts the Strutegikon. If they are, the enemy can easily estimate the size of the army by counting standards.8 Three or more tugmasformed a brigade or moira; three moiras in turn, a division or meres-all of them, like the tagma, of variable strength. Twelve hundred years later, Napoleon laid down a similar rule for his own higher formations for similar reasons. 9 Nevertheless, the requirements of efficient command and control did impose upper limits on the size of these units. Thus, the moira could not exceed 3,000 men, nor the meres more than six or seven thousand; otherwise, as they become larger and more extended, they may prove to be disorderly and coni&ed.l@ The Byzantine armys success on the battlefield as a result of Maurices reforms was founded on its effective blend of striking power, mobility and protection, and on a keen awareness that the art of fighting depends upon the closest combination of the offensive and the defensive,

so closely as does the structure of a building de-pend upon bricks and mortar. 11 Every formation in the Byzantine army, from the smallest to the largest, embodied these principles in its or-d ganization and tactics and was, consequently, able equally to fight on its own or as part of larger units, performing specialized roles. The smallest tactical unit, the tagmu, derived its striking power from its combined use of fire ( (from horse archers) and shock (from lancers), ~ an innovation that no Bvzantine adversary could ~~ match, being proficient in one or the o~er, but seldom both together. Well in advance of the rest of the medieval world, as the Strategikon reveals, the East Remans discovered that fire prepares the way for shock more through su~~ession than attrition and that the effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy than on sheer volume and high trajectory. For when the enemy has to worry about avoiding the missiles raining down on him, his attention is diverted from what is happening directly ahead, and he 1 becomes vulnerable to the shock of a chauze. 12 Therefore, in the instructions for drilling thetagma, the horse archers line up behind the lancers, reversing the earlier practice, so that they must use highangle fire in order to reach the enemy and avoid hitting their own men. 13 The directions for training the individual horse archer are equally revealing: He should be trained to shoot rapidly . . . . Speed is important in shaking the arrow loose and discharging it with force. . . . This is essential. . . . In fact, even when the arrow is well aimed, firing slowly is useless,14 This emphasis on speed, and hence volume, of fire, even at the cost of accuracy, was also without precedent in Byzantine military practice.* 5 The tagmas high mobility was the product of not only its equine locomotion but also the special training to enhance its cross-country capability. It is essential, according to the StrategiImn, that the horses become accustomed not only to rapid maneuvering in open, level country, but also over hilly, thick and rough ground, and in the quick ascending and descending of slopes. If they get used to these different types of ground, themneither men nor horses will be


The basictacticalunit of the

Byzantine army, as reorganizedby Maw-ice, was the bandum or tagma, a nwunted company whosesizejZz-UuM ated between 200 and 400 horsemen. (A]] n{ t?t~ tagmas ShOU~ deputely not be oJthe same size, asserts the Strategikon. If they are, +LoOWlomal r-d- Z)AC1*I 1 nst-hate tk size oj the army by counting stundurds. Three or more tagmas f-cl a higade m moira; three moiras in turn, a division m mero~ll of them, like the tagma, of variable strength. . . . [They] derived its striking power from its combined use of fire (from horse
archers ) and shock (fimn I!uncers ). an


t d

suqxised or troubled by any sort of land. After~ describing some drills to be used in difRcult country, the manual adds: The men who spare their horses and neglect drills of this sort are real-. ly planning their own The tugmus ability to move and fight on irregular terrain was fh-ther enhanced by the fact that its troopers were trained to fight on fret, as well as on horseback. This infb.ntry training also improved their chances of survival if they were unhorsed or their mounts were killed in combat. 17 For protection, the tngnuzs horsemen relied on helmets and on what the Stmtegilumdescribes as hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles, which can be caught up by thongs and rings. The lancers in the two front ranks also carried shields, and their mounts wore protective pieces of iron armor about their heads, and breastplates of iron or felt, or else breast and neck coverings such as the Avars use.18 In addition, the tagnuzwas trained to fight both in extended (offensive) order and in close (defensive) order and to make rapid changes from one to the other7 as conditions required. During the charge, the k tugrrwadvanced h close order,fie horse archen protected by the lancers ahead, and the lancers, in turn, by volleys of suppressive fire from the horse archers behind. 19 In higher formations, Maurices reforms introduced a distinction between assault troops (cursOres) and defenders (de~msores): one third of each division or nwros was to consist of the former, drawn upon its flanks in open order, and the remaining two thirds of the latter, drawn up in the center in close order. 20 The task of assault troops was to move out ahead of the main line and rush upon the retreating enemyin other words, to conduct pursuits, presumably after the enemy line of battle had been successfully charged and routed. The task of defendem, on the other hand, was to follow them, not charging out or breaking ranks, but marching in good order as a support for the assault troops if they should happen to fall back.21 An inherent weakness of mixed infantry-cavalry formations had been that pursuits tier a battlefield success inevitably entailed the separation of the fonna-

+ tions mobile striking arm fi-om its less mobile, defensive base, exposing the cavalry vanguard of the pursuit to possible annihilation in wellpre pared ambushes. The Byzantine army solved this problem by making the defensive base as mobile I as the striking arm, enabling the one to support the other in mobile warfare, as well as in set k piece actions. p The conviction that correct offensive action presupposes a sound defensive also found expression in a new order of battle for Byzantine field armies. Each was required to draw up for battle not just in one line, as before, but in two lines, one of them arrayed behind the other with about a third of the entire force. The author of the S&ategikon makes a forceful argument to justify this change. To form the whole army simply in one line. . . for a general cavalry battle and to hold nothing in reserve for various eventualities in case of a reverse is the mark of an inexperi22 enced and absolutely reckless man, he writes. For if it should be outflanked or unexpectedly attacked by the enemy, and it has no support from its rear or flanks, without any protection or reserve force, it will be forced to retire in headlong flight. With a second line supporting the first, however, such a disaster could be avoided. If, on the one hand, the first line retreats or is pushed back, then the second line is there as a support and a place of refige. This makes it possible to rallY the troops and get them to turn back on their attackers. 23 On the other hand, When we are pursuing the enemy, we can make our attack safely, for if some of the enemy turn back on us or if there is a sudden attack from another quarter, then the second line can hold its ground, join battle, and protect the first.24 In effect, then, the new two-line order of battle reproduced, at the grand tactical level, the organization of each meres into assault troops and defenders at the tactical level. Of no less importance in the new order of battle were the detached bodies. Two or three Ixmdumswere to be posted as flank guards to the lefi of the first line, where hostile outflanking and encircling movements may naturally be ex -

petted (against the weaponless lefi arms of the+ men on that side). A bundum or two of archers, known as outflankers, were to redeployed to the other side of the first line to turn the enemys left ~ flank, and an additional three or four bundums were to be placed in concealed positions on both sides, from where they could attack the enemys i rear . 25 According to the Stmtegikon, well timed attacks against the enemys flanks and rear are much more effective and decisive than direct frontal charges and attacks . . . . [If the enemy must be faced in open battle, therefore,] do not mass all your troops in front, and even if the enemy is superior in numbers, direct your operations against his rear or his flanks. For it is dangerous and uncertain under all conditions and against any people to engage in purely frontal combat.2b These dispositions proved so adaptable that they were still in use, almost without change, 300 years later, when the emperor, Leo VI, issued his Tmticd Constitutions. 27 Nearly 900 years more were to pass, however, before an order of ~ battle of comparable sophisticationFrederick the Greats celebrated oblique orderappeared in Western Europe.28 -


The Strategikon on the Arf of War

The highest principle of the Byzantine art of war, as the Strategikon makes clear, was economy of force. A ship cannot cross the sea without a helmsman, nor can one defeat an enemy without tactics and strategy. With these and the aid of God it is possible to overcome not only an enemy force of equal strength but even one greatly superior in numbers. For it is not true, as some inexperienced people believe, that wars are decided by courage and numbers of troops, but... by tactics and generalship and our concern should be with these rather than [with] wasting our time mobilizing large numbers of troops.29 The manual likens warfare to hunting: Wild animals are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such stratagems rather than by sheer force. In waging war, one should do likewise, whether the enemy be many or few. To try simply to overpower the

was the@ch4ct of not only its eqwne locomotion but also the speczidtraining ,. to enhance its cross-country capability. . Tk tagmas ability to move and - fight on irregular terrain was further enhanced by the fmt that its troopers were tm.irwdto fight on foot, as wel as on horseback. This infantry training also improved their chances of survival if they were unhorsedor theirmounts wme killed in combat. . . . In addition, the tagrna was trained to fight both in extended (ojj%nsive)order and in close (defensive) order and to make rapid changesfrom one to the other as conditions required. During tk churge, the tagma advanced in close order, the bse archersprotected by the lancersahead, and tk kmcers, in turn, by volleysof supjnmive fire j+omthe horsearchersbehind.

enemy in the open, hand to hand and face t~ fbce, is a very risky enterprise that can result in serious harm even if the enemy is defeated. 1 It is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which i so costly and brings only empty glory.~ Thus, a wise commander will not engage the enemy7 in a pitched battle unless a truly exceptional opportunity presents itself.~l He will avoid emwlating those who are admired for their brilliant success [but] carry out operations recklessly. ~~ He will watch for the right opportunities and pretexts and strike at the enemy hefbre they can get themselves ready.~] One does not have to delve very far into this treatise to recognize its kinship with two other milita~ classics, one of them written a millennium earlieu the other, a millennium later. The . -. . first, Wn 1 ZUS Art oj War, was already mentioned. To capture the enemys army, we read there, is better than to destroy it; to take intact I a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is mm the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.~4 The master of war, we read elsewhere in Sun Tzus book, conquers an enemy already defeated; a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of ?935 winning. I Two thousand years later, the 18th-century French general Maurice de Saxe echoes these ~ thoughts in his Reveries U/XXIthe Art ofWar. I do not favor pitched battles, he writes, espe- , cially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillfil general could make war all I his life without being~orced into one. He adds: I do not mean to say by this that when an oppor-, tunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance. And this is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general. b That the commander must strive to conduct war without leavirw anvthirw to chance is also a recurring theme ~ the Scra&ikon. A general
F . . . . . .

:,# WR.

//:.:> #



cavakv in battle from an illustrationof an ivorv relief, ~

should not have to say: I did not expect it.37 The general should be ignomnt of none of the situations likely to occur in war.38 The sharp general takes into account not only probable dangers, but also those which may be totally unexpected.39 We should not take this to imply that the general must strive for omniscience only that his plans should be flexible, that they ought to have several branches, as Pierre-Joseph de Bourcet says, so that alternative courses of action are always available if the one initially chosen does not bear fruit.w Just as the wise co mmander should seek to reduce his own uncertainty, so too must he strive to magnfi the enemys, for only those battle plans are successful which the enemy does not suspect before we put them into action.41 Thus, counsels the manual, The general who wants to keep his plans concealed from the enemy should never take the rank and file of his own troops into his confidence. 42 Your plans about major operations should not be made known to many, but to just a few and [only] those very close to you.43 Nor should the army ever draw up in its fill combat formation . . . when it is just drilling, for these dispositions are matters of strategy rather than of tactics, and they ought not be

made known ahead of time during drill.44 The author of the Strategikon was aware, moreover, that the effort to magnify the enemys uncertainty must not end with passive security measures such as these. He devotes a whole chapter to what we would now call exercise deception, describing a series of mock drills (in addition to one suggested for actual use) to be practiced so others [enemy spies and potential deserters] will not fiid out which ~ one we think is more important.45 He is also an enthusiastic proponent of misleading the enemy with disitiormation: It is very important to spread rumors among the enemy that you are plannin one thing; then go and do something else. 8 He has a sophisticated appreciation of how to make defectors and deserters-who by most conventional reckonings are a liability-work against, instead of for, enemy interests. The enemy should be { deceived by false reports of our plans brought to them by deserters from us, he writes.47 Suspected deserters, he says elsewhere, should be told the opposite of what we intend to do, so that we may use them to deceive the I enemy. 48 Letters should be sent to deserters who have joined the enemy in such a way

The taskof defenders . . . /,- **


e assaukj, not
D Ynnkc
u ,







in good *

~~ *

us u

that the letters . . . fall into enemy hands 1hese letters should remmd the deserters ot the prearranged time for their treachery, so 1 that the enemy will become suspicious them, and they will have to flee.49 7 1he author ot the Strutegikonunderstood, too, ~at~e~steconomy offorceen~ilsmoreh~ 1

SUf@OYI ~~


just mistiorming

the enemyhe must also be

they-shouldhappen tofd &k.i

An inherent weakness of mixed infantry~vcdry fmtions had been that pursuits a~ a battlefield success inevitably entiled the sep~

aration of thefmtions mobile striking arm from its less mobile, defensive base, exposing the
cavalry vanguard of the pursuit to possible annihikztion in wellPrepared ambushes. The By~antine army solved this problem by making the defmive base as mobile as the striking arm, enabling the one to support the other in mobile wa$are, as wel as in setpiece actions.

mi.sdirecd, so that, as in jujitsu, his own effort is turned into the lever of his overthrow.s The general, he writes, should act like a good wrest. den he should feint in one direction to trv to de- [ cewe his adversary and then make good use ot the opportunities he fiids, and in this way he will overpower the enemy.s 1 As a practical guide for the Byzantine field commander,the Strutegikon offers a rich menu of ruses, tricks and stratagems 1 1 trom which to choose, with special emphasis on ambushes, which are of the meatest value in H wartare, ltorj they have in a short time destroyed great powers before they had a chance to bring i their whole battle line into action.52 By same token, the general must constantly loo for enemy ambushes, sending out frequent and fwranging patrols in all directions in the area around the battlefield, and he must avoid disordered and uncoordinated pursuits.53 Above all, the general must avoid being predictable. He must not always use the same modes of operation against the enemy, even though they seem to be working out successfully. Oken enough the \ enemy will become used to them, adapt to them, and inflict disaster upon us.54 For in war, the line of least expecta~ion is ever shifiing, driven by the independent will of a thinking, reacting opponent, so that a surprise today is always purchased at the risk of a reverse tomorrow. That is why the Strutegikon says, A general who takes nothing for granted is secure in war.55 By no means did the author intend to suggest that advantages should not be pressed, nor victories exploited; for in war opportunity is fleeting, and cannot be put off.5b Thus, while it is essential to be cautious and take your time in making plans, once you come to a decision [you must] carry it out right away without any hesitation or timidity. Timidity fier all is not caution, but the


1 k

m~wntion t~fwickwkw.w.57 And if the outcome ( )f the battle is kwahk, one should not be satisficd with merely driving the enemy back. This is a mistake made by inexperienced Ieadem who do m>tknow how to take advantage i~fan t>pp~rtunity, and W}NJ like to hear the saying: Be \ict(~rious but do not press your victory too hard. By not seizing the opportunity, these people only cause themselves more trouble and Place the ultimate results in doubt. There can be no rest until the enemy is completely destroyed. . . . One should not slacken after driving them back just a short distance, nor . . . should one jeopardize the success of the whole campaign because of lack of persistence. In war, =,,~ hunting, a near miss is still a complete miss. The author of Srrategik.on understood that the principle of economy of force directs the commander to know his opponent to avoid his strengths and strike at his weaknesses. The manuals forceful words again bear repeating in fidl: That general is wise who before entering into war carefhlly studies the enemy, and can guard against his strong points and take advantage of his weaknesses. For example, the enemy is superior in cavalry; he should destroy his forage. He is superior in number of troops; cut off their supplies. His army is composed of diverse peoples; corrupt them with gifk, favors, promises. There is dissension among them; deal with their leaders. This people relies on the spea~ lead them G into diflcult terrain. This people relies on the bow; line up in the open &d force them into close, hand-to-hand fighting. . . . If they march or make camp without proper precautions, make unexpected raids on them by night and by day. If they are reckless and undisciplined in combat and not inured to hardship, make believe you are going to attack, but delay and drag things out until their ardor cools, and when they begin to hesitate, then make your attack on them. The foe is superior in infantry; entice him into the open, not too close, but from a safe distance hit him with javelins.59 Book XI of the Stmtegikon, Characteristics and Tactics of Various Peoples, elaborates at , length on the foregoing advice.~ This assess-


J# b

1 yl:$?*A7 *4 ;.. $ ,v ~-.,; ,,9 ; ,;; d

ment of sixtkentu~ Byzantiums principal adversaries is of interest today chiefly to historians of the period. Still, it does serve to highlight one of the Byzantine armys keys to success--its willirwness always to learn from its enemies; to make . abilities of opponents on another, while forging its own unique tactical synthesis along the way. Thus, the skills in close combat learned from the Franks and Lombards, it used against the Persians and Scythians; and the skills with the bow learned from the Persians and Scythians, it used when fighting the Franks and Lombards; but the fire-and-shock combination that emerged from this experience was distinctively In this way, therefore, the Byzantine army may be said to have turned its enemies strengths to advantage as much as it did their weaknesses. Only a fortunate accident of geography-the Byzantine Empires central position vis+vis its adversarie~made this possible. For not only did it confer the inestimable advantage of interior lines of operation, it also kept the empires enemies physically apart and, therefore, largely unable to learn from each other, even as it enabled the empire itself to learn from all of them.

Lessons Learned
In the Strutegikon, then, the Byzantine army as reorganized by Maurice possessed the doctrinal

Just as the wise commander should seek to reduce his own un certzzinty, so too must he strive to magnify the enemys, foronly those [ battle P/uns are successju~which the 1P 1 enemy does not suspect bejore we put them into action. Thus, counsels the manual, The general who wants to keep his @m.s concealedj+om the en. emy SW never take tk rank and file of his own troops into his confidence. YourPkzns about major operations should not be m.ude known to many, but to just a few and [only]thosevery cihseto you. Nor should tk army ever drawZ@ in its full combat formation . . . when it is just drilling,for thesedispositions are matters of strategy rather than of tuctics, and they ought not be malt ~ known ahead of time during drdl.

foundations for an effective response to en-~ croachments from any of the Empires neighbors-a response that exploited the versatility of that armys own formations and the lack of balante in those of its opponents. NOWthe troops of those adept in war, says Sun Tzu, are used like the Simultaneously Responding snake of 1 Mount Chang. When struck in the head, its tail attacks; when struck in the tail, its head attacks; when struck in the center both head and tail attack.b2 There lies the essence, perfectly encapsulated, of the Byzantine art of war as expounded in the %utegikon. Although it is customary to call the Byzantine armys mounted troops cavalry, the appellation is quite misleading, for they played many more roles in combat than those to which cavalry in Western Europe was to become confined a millennium or so later. Not only did Byzantine horsemen pursue and recomoiter the enemy, they also conducted an early form of fire preparation, assaulted enemy lines of battle and dismounted to fight on foot when conditions 1 so required. Onlv the thickest forests and the roughest terrain remained inaccessible to them, requiring the services of specialized infantry. Thus, for all practical purposes, the seventh century Byzantine meres was a combined arms formation-as versatile, in terms of the combat requirements of its day, as Napoleons corps darm~e was to become 1,200 years lateq and superior, from the standpoint of its mobility, which was uniform throughout the formation, to that of the corps darrn6e that was restricted to the marching speed of its infantry.b3 So different, indeed, was the Byzantine meres from the cavalry that was to evolve in Western Europe that one must reach as far as 13th-centu~ Central Asia to find its nearest counterpart, in the Mongol tmnen.& Not until the 20th century was a comparable combined arms force again to emerge-in Heinz Guderians panzer division, whose mobility was no longer based on the horse, but on the caterpillar track. Only then were the standards of striking power, mobility and protection set by these ancient formations reattained.b5 MR 1



i -*Y

1. C@d m C. W C Oman, The ArI of War irr the Midd/e Ages, rev and ad John H. Beeler, (Ithaca, NY. Cornell Umversty Press, 1953), 32 2. J. F C. Fuller, A AMary History of the Western World From the earksf frmes to the Battfe of Lepanto, VOI 1, (New York Funk and Wagnalls, 1954), 395 3 Das Strateglkon des Maurrlwx, Corpus fontium h@onae byzantrrae, ad George T Dennis and trans C--C* G~-ll+l-~m.~ 7 Iwn--n 1981), wumg ;.. h:, .<: J d trans George Strateg/kon Handbook of B;..- ; ~. .1 -1-, -, ... .j 1. : . ,,, , ...., 1984) HereafT Denrus, (Phhdelph!a, PA ..:1 ter c!ted as Strategkon 4 Unbl relatively recently, most authormes beheved that Maunca hlmsalf rote the Sfratea/kon About a decade aoo, however. Maurrc@s brother-in-law, the general Ph@pwus, was proposed w-the author See John Wuta, The Etf mka m B zanbne MIIItary Treabses, Ph D d!ss Unwerwty of Minnesota, 1977, c@ci m i trateglkon, xvxvII 5 .%ateg~on, 8 6 Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans Samuel B Gnfhth, (London. Oxford Unlversty Press, 1963) 7 C W C Oman, A H/story of The Art of War m the Mtik? Ages A D 378-1278, 2d rev ad , vat 1 (London, 1924), 187 8 Strateg/ken, 9 Oman, H/story of the Art of War m the Mcfd/e Ages VOI 1, 175 10 Strateg/ken, 16 11 J F C Fuller, Armored Warfare An Annotated Ed/bon of lectures on F S R /// IOgerafions Betwean Mecfranlzed Forced (Hamsbura, PA MMarv %rvce P~bl;shmg Company, 1943), 134 12 The effect of h h trajectory was demonstrated at the Battle of Hasbngs, where the fire from WI 7 Ilam the Conquerors Norman archers was meffecbva until he ordered them to use high-angle fire-that Is, to shoot their arrows Into the a!r so that they would pass over the heads af his knghts and, falhng verbcally on the enemy, Induce the men of [Harolds] shield-wall ta rasa their shlekfs, Fuller, M//rtary History, WI 1, 381 13 In the days of the Emperor Justmlan (527565), for example, the lancers Stratefollowed the horse archers, see Oman, Arlof Warm the Mddle Ages, glkon, 29, 35-36 14 .9rakrcykon, 11, ~ The ratio of horse archem to lancers In the taoma also rrdcate~ an Intenbon to use massed fire The men m the frst two and-last ranks of the forrnabom should all bear lances All the others, drawn up an the middle, who know how to shoot, should be archers Since the tagrna normally drew up m seven ranks, each file would Ideally have four archers and three lancers If we disregard the lancer m the rank, then the rabo of mssda troops to shock troops could have been as high as 2to-1 15 An anonymous Byzantine mlltary treabse, written m the mtd+xth century, far example, places equal em hasw on accuracy, power and r td~ of fire See The Anonymous Byzarrtme ? reafrse on Strat y, m Three % zantrne MI/itary Treatrses, ad and trans George T Denms, Dum 7 artan Oeks Texts 9, (Washington,DC Dumbarton Oaks, 1985), 129-33 16 Sfrateg/ken, 78 Had this lesson been applmd m Worfd War Il. man unnecessary tank .mcrew losses mght have been avmdad Accordm #zto the erman Y mander General Hermann Balck, Casuahes m e tanks themsa es were almost always quite hght However, once the tank crev@ had to abandon tfwr tank[s], we often had to employ them Immedlatefy as m)anby At this point we took unheard+f losses among the tank crews because they had co infantry sk!lls Thts IS why I feel very strongly that all tank cfews must have really thorough infantry trammg before they are put m cnmbat T,rans/afron of TConversation wth General Hennann Bald, 12 January 1979, acd Brief BnYreal Sketch (Columbus, OH Batelle Columbus Lalwatones %%ology Center, 1979), 58-59 18 Strategikon, 19 Ibid , 36, 20 Ibd , 26, 76 21 Ibd, 15 22 Ib\d 23 23 Itxd , 24. 24 Ib\d 25 Ibid , 27 26 Itxd 197-99 27 See Oman, Hrstory of the Ari of War in the MK#h? Ages, vol. 28 Far a brief but percepbve discus.fmn of Fredericks oblique order, see Gunther E Rothenterg, The Arl of Warfare m the Age of Na@eon (Bloommgton, IN Indana Umversly Press, 1978), 16-19 29 Strat /kOn, 64 : ;tn: ,%$65

(Hamsburg, PA MIIItary Serv\ce Publ!shi Corn ny, 1940; reprinted by StacApde Books, 1985), 296-99 Saxe pen #the ~enes m 1732, butrt was not 1 published untrl 1757, seven years after his death. 4 37 Strateakon. 66 38 Ibd.. 61 39 Ibnj , 86 40 Pierre Joseph de Bourcet. Pnnapes de la guerre des montagnes Pnncl pies of mountam warfare] (1775), ated m B H Lddell Hart, The Gfrost o } N~/eon (London Faber and Faber, 1933), 36

2 %?%!29 43 ltxd:80
44 Ibid , 40 45 Ibd , 63 46 Ibid, 80 47 Ibid 48 Ibtd , 82 49 Ibd , 81 These are what Sun Tzu calls expendable agents, Art of War, 146 ff 50 The words have been borrowed from B H L@dell Harts Strategy The /ndmcf @roadr (New York Frederick A Praager, 1954), 163 51. Stra lkon, 69 52 Ibd, 7 2-55. Bcok IV m tts entirety IS devoted to the sublect One such ruse, wh~h the Strateg/kon calls the Scythlan ambush, wwolvas drawlcg up tie smaller part of the army to face the enemy be of battle When the charge IS made and the Imes dash, those Soldlers qutckl turn to fbght, the {hey nde past the enemy starts chasing them and becomes disordered place where the ambush IS lad, and the umts m ambush then charge out and strike the enemy m the rear Those ffeemg then turn around and the enem force IS cau ht m the mtile This pioy was already ancient by the SId century-m 1 eed, a naval verwon of tt was used m the Peloponneslan Wars Battle of CyzIcIJs (41 O B C ) It was a favorite ruse de uerre af the 13tht to armored century Mongols, and m WorkJ War 11,Erwin Rommel #*ted warfare m the North African desert, Iunng Bnbsh armor Into carefully lad traps Imed wtth anbtank guns and then counterattachng with his own tanks More recently, the Iraqi army used n effectively m the later stagas of the Iran-Iraq War (1980--1988) E X?%on w






32 Ibd ; 87 33 Ibtd ,93 34 Sun Tzu, 77 35 Ibid, 87 36 Maurice de Saxe, My Reveries u n the Art of War, m Roots of Strategy The 5 Greatest Mi/rtary C/asses of all Fme, ad and trans Thomas R PfNlhps,

58. Ibd 59 On Irregular terrain, if IS very d!ffwtf to mamtam the unbroken front that shock tactrcs relyl on the spear raqure In hand-to-hand fighh vwtually useless. %modem version of this ruse was the senas%a~j$ stand-downs corxkted by North Korea m the wanty of ~ southern border during the months precedng its invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 In time, the South Koreans came to dmagard the alerts, so the attack that followed the rruine alert came as a sturrnmg surprise See Richard K Betts, Surprrse ~#L_nsfw~fenWPlaml@ (W=hin@n, DC The BmokmgslnstWbon, 1962), 105, Sfrateglkon, 65 60 Strategkon, 61 The Franks and Lombards threatemsd the B zantrne Empres western ~loM,tiewlas(*tieByzantlwMll~the rmmadicAvar,Turklsh and Hunnlsh tnbas IIWW north of the Black Sea and m the Central Asian steppes), w Danube fronber, and the Persians, rts eastern fro~er 62 Sun Tzu, 135 63 Napoleons formation, however, still enpyed a cnmderable advanta e m mobMy over those of his opponents because of @ faster marchmg sPea& greater rehance an hwng off the courrtryade, abd to nmve dlspasad (to mml? for battle See Dawd G. mlze road co esbon) and et corwentrate s?wfty Chandler, Tfre ?7 ampagns o rVz@eon (New York Macrmllan, 1966), 147-55 64 For a discussion of the Mongol milttary organization and art of war, see James Chambers, The Dew/k Horseman The hkmgcd Invaon of Europe (New York Athenaeum, 1985), 54-62 65 Heinz Gudemn, Armored Forces (1937), The Infantry Journal Reader, ad Joseph I Greene, (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1943) 469,461. German General HeInz Gudenan unllke the al!-tan~ school of armored warfare that prevated m Brrtain, behaved that the panzer dwwn must be a combmad arms formabon, for, as he wrote m 1937, W@ any other arm, the tank IS Incapable of sofwng all [tacbca~ problems by itself. Thus auxiliary weapons desgned for co-operahon vnth tanks should be combmad with [A]rrnored fo~ them mto permanent unts compnsmg all modem arms wthout speedy auxhaiy weapons are recomplete and wll not be able to reahze their maxlmurn potential!bes. When Bnbsh and German armor dashad m the North African desert, the flaws m the all-tank approach soon became apparent Sea F W w Mellenthm, Panzer f3attfes A Study m the Employment of Armor m the Secwrd Wodd War (Norman, OK Umvers ~ofC+dahorna Press, 1956), XV+XVII, 55, CoreIll Bametf The DeserI Generas (New York Viking Press, 1961 ), 104--5


Charles C. Petersen is a militaryanalyst who senesm c(mwdtant to variousUS gowrnment agenciesand professimudservicesjirtns in the Washington, DC. area. He holdsa B.A. from theCJiqe OfW~XMta and an M. A. from George WimhingtonL)niversity, HisUIOA centers(m .smiet militarydoctine and militaryart.





in the Southwest


James P. Young, Australian Army

intersenice rivalries and personalities, the Pacific was subdivided into two commands. The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), under MacArthur, included Australia, most of the Solomon Islands, Papua and New Guinea, most of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The Pacific Ocean Area, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, included the remainder of the Pacific, although Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley was responsible to Nimitz for the South Pacific Area (that portion of the Pacific Ocean Area south of the equator.) Following the establishment of the SWPA in April of 1942, MacArthur planned to protect Australia by defending in Papua, and to this end, early efforts were made to improve Allied defenses there and to deploy bomber forces forward in north Queensland, Australia.b The Battle of the Coral Sea (5 to 8 May 1942) thwarted the planned Japanese amphibious invasion of Port Moresby, although a detachment managed to secure the lefi flank at Tulagi in the Solomon Islands on 3 May 1942.7 Afier the Battle of Midway (4 to 6 June 1942), Japanese naval and naval-air capabili. ties were reduced, and plans to cut the lines of com-

August 1942 was a pivotal month for the ground war in the Pacific. Despite the Germany first strategy, the United States had been deploying more forces and equipment to the Pacific Theater of Operations than to Europe. 1 General Douglas MacArthurs campaign for Papua New Guinea and the concurrent operations to secure Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands from July 1942 to February 1943 produced the fimt Allied victories on land in the Pacific. These operations also signaled the ebb of the Japanese tide fi-om its high-water marks in Papua and the Solomon Islands. The Japanese war objectives in the Southwest Pacific were to secure the southern resources area of Malaya and the Indonesian archipelago and to establish a defensive perimeter against the probable US counterattack. The first objective was achieved by March 1942; Japanese forces also occupied areas on the north coast of New Guinea and on New Britain Island. Rather than occupy Australia, the Japanese navy developed a plan to cut the lines of communication to Australia by occupying New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa.2 Positions at Lae and Salamaua on the north coast of New Guinea would also be consolidated by capturing Port Moresby in adjacent Papua, which would provide a base for air operations against Australia and restrict the reach of Allied air power. A Japanese amphibious invasion to occupy Port Moresby was planned for 10 May 1942.3 The US prewar plan for operations against the Japanese, the Rainbow 5 plan, called for a Central Pacific drive on Japanese lines of communication through the Marshall, Caroline and Tmk islands.4 The collapse of the Allied defenses on the Malay peninsula in the Netherlands East Indies and the fall of the Philippines in less than six months made it clear that a revised theater strategy would be required. President Franklin D. Roosevelt identified two vital flanks: India and Burma in the West and Australia in the East.5 By agreement with the British, the United States assumed responsibility for strategic direction of operations in the Pacific Theater of Operations. For a variety of complex reasons involving


August 1992





50 ~oo
Sfafute Males




Solomon Sea




,: land. Nimitz was also developing plans for an offensive, based on a drive to Rabaul through the Solomons. By early July 1942, the Joint Chiefi of Staff had agreed on a compromise three-stage plan, which provided each command a portion of the action. 10 The first task, allocated to Ghormleys South Pacific Command, was the seizure and occupation of Tulagi and positions on Guadalcanal in the Solomons. The second task required the seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, plus Japanese positions at Lae and Salamaua on the northwest coast of New Guinea. The third task called for the seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions on New Britain and New Ireland islands. The latter two phases were to be completed by MacArthurs SWPA Command. MacArthur planned to start the offensive by establishing an airfield near Buna on the north coast of Papua. He timed the operation for early August, to coincide with the Guadalcanal landings. The Japanese preempted Allied operations by landing a force of approximately 2,000 menatBunaon21 July 1942.11 This was one leg of their tw~pronged overland attack on Port Moresby. Its axis was the Kokoda Tmil, a native track across the Owen Stanley Range fi-om Buna to Port Moresby. Allied resistance along the Kokoda Tmil was limited to 400 men of a New Guinea battalion, supported b 11 company-size elements of an Australian battalion. By the end of July, the Australians were fighting a rear-guard action, and the Japanese had commenced a buildup. Meanwhile, an Australian militia brigade, supported by US engineers, had been dispatched to Milne Bay to construct an airfield, which was

Coral Sea

munication to Australia were first postponed, then cancelled.8 Following these setbacks, the revised Japanese plan for the capture of Port Moresby assumed increased importance and changed to an advance across the Owen Stanley Range from the north coast of Papua, to be accompanied by an overland approach from Milne Bay, which protected the eastern approaches.9 Meanwhile, MacArthur began to reinforce Papua and w= drafting plans for an offensive, which would commence with the occupation of bases along the north coast to facilitate air operations against the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul, on New Britain Is-







11,US Army, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

MM George J blorcka

Saturday 1The Soviet rail center at Salsk falls to Germans as their forces reach beyond to the Kuban River. Monday sPrime Minister Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke arrivein Cairo to reviewBritish Eighth Armys lack of success,

Thursday 6A campaign of civil disobedience

is threatened pendence. in India if the British do not allow inde-

Friday 7-US forces take the offensive in the Pacific with the invasion of Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands. Saturday 8=ix previously arrested and tried German agents, who had landed by submarine on the US East Coast, go to the electric chair. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill agree on General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command Opemtion Tc~rch. Sunday 9Allied naval forces suffer one of the worst defeats in the Pacific at the battle of Savo Island in the SoIornons.

Wednesday 1 zThe first Moscow conference isheld. Churchill and W. Averell Harriman (for the United States) meet with Joseph Stalin to discuss strategy.
Saturday 15---General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander assumes command of British forces in the Middle East replacing General Claude J. E. Auchinleck. General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery takes command of the Eighth Army fhllowing Lieutenant General W. H. E. Gotts death. Monday 17-US Marine Raidem under Lieutenant Colonel Evans E Carlson raid Makin Island in the Gilberts and destroy the Japanese base there. German forces establish bridgeheads across the Kuban River in the Soviet Union. and British forces conWednesday 19-Canadian duct a major raid at Dieppe on the coast of France that turns intc~a disaster with losses in excess of 60 percent for the Allies.

Friday 2 1Japanese forces launch a major counterattack against Marines at Guadalcanal but fail with heavy losses. Saturday 22Army aircraft begin to operate on Guadalcanal. Monday z&The Battle of Eastern Solomons begins with the US Navy turning back Japanese attempts to reinforce their depleted forces on Guadalcanal. Wednesday 26The Battle for Stalingrad intensifi~ with a million Germans attacking the city and Soviet defenders. Sunday SoAustralians go over to the offensive in Milne Bay, New Guinea, against demoralized Japanese f{xcm.

completed by July 1942.13 The Guadalcanal landing, by the 1st Marine Division of Ghormleys South Pacific Command, on 7 August 1942, diverted Japanese air cover from the Buns area and delayed the landing of the Japanese main body there by over a week. 14 Having builtup troop numbers and logistic support, and despite the discovety of the Allied airfields at Milne Bay, a major Japanese offensive was launched along the Kokoda Tmil on 26 August 1942. Over terrible terrain and under appalling climatic conditions, the Japanese thrust was eventually halted by Australian forces on 17 September 1942, only 30 miles from Port Moresby. To coincide with the offensive along the Kokoda Tmil, the Japanese also conducted a naval amphibious landing near Milne Bay on 26 August. Part of the Japanese amphibious force had been detected the previous day and interdicted by Royal Australian airplanes operating fi-om the Milne Bay ai+lelds. Although supported by light tanks, the Japanese met stubborn resistance in the form of the Australian 7th and 18th brigades, together with 1,300 US combat and service troops. 15 Close air support and air sttacks on Japanese supply dumps proved effkctive and, when combined with a counterattack, drove the Japanese out of Milne Bay by 5 September 1942. The action at Milne Bay was the first Allied defeat of the Japanese on land and provided a much needed boo5t to morale. The Japanese did not reinforce their faltering twoaxis drive on Port Moresby but ordered the withdrawal of the force on the Kokoda Tmil when Army troops and naval air support were diverted to Guadalcanal . 16 As a result, an Australian counteroffensive commenced in mid-September and pushed the Japanese across the Kokoda Tmil to the Buna area by 16 November 1942. The Japanese withdrew into deceptively strong defensive-p& itions at Gona, Sanananda Point and Buna on the north coast of Papua. As the Australians were driving the Japanese from the Kokoda Tmil, MacArthur developed his plan for the capture of the Buna area. The Australian 7th Division was to attack Gona and Sanananda Point, in the north, from their Kokoda Tmil line of march. The US 32nd Division was to attack But-wfrom the south. One battalion advanced over the Owen Stanley Range by the Jaure track, to the east of Kokoda, while the remainder of the division was airlifkl to airstrips cleared by an Australian battalion from Milne Bay. 17 By 21 November 1942, the Allied forces had reduced the Japanese perimeter to the three main defenses at Gona, S anananda Point and Buna. Continuing attacks against the well-sited and defended


August 1992


positions took a heavy toll. There were no tanks, and artillery fire support was limited. Early close air support missions were also inaccurate. Casualties from illness and fatigue mounted, in addition to those from combat. Concerned about slow progress and reports of poor leadership among the raw 32nd Division, MacArthur placed Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger in command of the Buna operation on 1 December 1942. With additional

troops, increased fire support, some tanks and MacArthurs directions to Go out there Bob, and take Buna or dont come back alive, Eichelber er replaced subordinates and pushed the fight. 1~ By 9 December 1942, two Australian brigades had secured Gona, and by 2 January 1943, the 32nd Division had secured the Buna area and its airstrip. The forces then combined to reduce the Sanananda Point strongpoint by 22 January 1943. Whereas the Papua campaign was characterized by a struggle for the initiative, at Guadalcanal, the initiative was firmly secured by the predominantly US forces. The amphibious assaults by the 1st Marine Division against Tulagi and Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 surprised the Japanese. By the end of the second day, the opposed landings at Tulagi had secured their
objectives, while on Guadalcanal the unopposed landings had resulted in the capture of the airfield. 19 The early withdrawal of carrier and transport ships hampered the initial buildup on Guadalcanal, while the naval Battle of Savo Island on the night of 8 August, in which the Japanese surprised the screen of Australian and US cruisers and des~yers, provided early naval success to the Japanese. The Guadalcanal campaign quickly became a competition to secure the ai~leld and build up reinforcements quickly enough to achieve a victory on kmd.21 The opposing fleets clashed during nightly resupply operations, and during the day, land-based and naval aircraft sought to establish air superiority. The US Marines formed a defensive perimeter around the airfield on Guadalcanal, against which the Japanese built up forces to counterattack. The Japanese reinforcements, including those diverted from Papua, undertook two general offensives by late October. Growing Allied domination of the air and sea prevented another main reinforcement in mid November, and the Japanese began to divert troops back to Papua to support the defense at Buns.22 Increasing Allied air and naval operations eventually forced the Japanese to withdraw, which they did from 1 to 8 February 1943. Whereas the Coral Sea and Midway battles had halted the seemingly inexorable Japanese tide, the concurrent Allied effort by MacArthurs SWPA Command and the South Pacific Area Command


. August 1992


4. Spctcw, 59 and 147. 5. ibid.,142. 6. Tfm Can@gna othfadrthurb the Padfic, Votume 1: Reports of Genera/ A4acMfW 35,4546. 7. Ibid., 46. in the Southwest PArea: Vofunw 11, parl 1, R&?< Ma@thuc ad. by Charles A. Willoughby, ef al., (Waal% too,DC: Superintmdanl of Documents, US Government Printing Offke, 1866, 7

21. Chariaa Bateaon, The War with J@an-A Comae Histoty, (Eaat Lanai% M~M~tiid S* Univerarly Preaa, 1966), 224 Qwratms in the &ntffrwtxt Pacific Area: Volume 11, part 1, 193 and 174-75. r

ly%$iorwi%b%? w)27

10. Spector, 166. 11. Jma17asec%e@0nainff ?esollttrwstP@ic 4wL 142.


Ibid., 139.

Vofurnell, partl,

145. 1+1-q, 210,

R 1

12. Ibid., 203. 13. Gavin Long, 7h? Six Y%wa War: A Com5se Hiskxyof A@#iarnthe 193945 WaC (Canberra: The Auatralii War Mamoriat, 1973), 188 and 203. 14. Japaneae @eratione klfhesouu)wwat Paci&Ama: Volumell, pall 1, and The Canpa@ns of Mac4rthur

in the Padtlc, Volume /:

Volume I\, part 1,


Japanese Qerafiorw

in the Southwest Padfic Area:

17. Long, 226. 18. Samuel S. Milrwr, Vifory in P United Stakw Army in Workl War 11, The Warti the Pad% ad. by Kent R. F reenfidd, (Washington, DC: Department of fhe Army, 1967), 204. 19. Spectcw, 191 and John H. Bdey, The5%corKIWwkf War: Aeia&xlfha Pacafic, The West Point Mlii HSeries, ad. by Thcnnaa E. Grieee,

MajorJames P. Ywng, Australian Army, ispresent-> lycompleting study o~US and Canaciian militaryengineer computer systems prior to returning to Australia wkre k is the designate ojficer commanding tk 21st Spa&m, Royal Australian Engineers. He holdsa hkkws of engineangand a masters of engineeringfbm the University of New South Widesand is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Dunrmon, and the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort lkwenworth, Kansas. He has kkl wmious in Austwdiaand sd as command and stafipositi an enginming adviser in Vanuatu.



of Leadership

in TQM
copyright IW2

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Richards, US Army

The Department of Defense has decided to adopt the Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy. Hopefidly, this will not be just the latest management vogue. If it is implemented as espoused by the three TQM gurus-W. Edwards Deming, Philip B. Crosby and J. M. Juran-TQM will require considerable training in the techniques and total management commitment at all levels. Additionally, employees must be trained, understand the process and, likewise, become committed to the process. Deming is regarded as the developer of TQM. In the 1930s, he began formulating TQM principles and processes based on the work of Walter Shewhart, a statistician who published Economic Control of Quality of Mam4@ured Prcduct in 1931. This volume applied statistical concepts to the determination and control of quality. The results were presented in an easy-to-understand gmphical form. Deming had some minor successes in the United States, but his fame came ti-om his work in postwar Japan. The Japanese followed his guidance to rebuild their war-torn country. Juran, another American, was also training the Japanese in quality control. (His Quality ContTol Ha.ndbk is more popular in Japan than in the United States and is currently in its fourth edition.) While Deming was teaching the Japanese quality control principles, the United States was thriving

as basically the only industrial power in the world. The world bought our goods, which led to growth
and prosperity. However, as Japanese products gained in quality, their demand increased and ours decreased. Jurart states, IrI recent years, many key industries (automobile, color television sets, computer chips, and so on) have lost more than 25 pereent of their sales to foreign competitors. A leading nxison has been quality of the product.l US industries wert slow to make the changes required to compete in this fast-moving, competitive market. What is the TQM philosophy? Demings philosophy is summarized in his 14 points: G Createconstancyof purposefm imp Cwernaltof product ad service. Deming suggests a radical new definition of a companys role. Rather than making money, it is to stay in business and provide jobs through innovation, research, constant improvement and maintenance. . Ado~t the new @iknophy. Americans are too tolerant of poor workmanship and sullen service. We need a new religion in which mistakes and negativism are unacceptable. . Ceuse dependenceon mass inspection. American firms typically inspect a product as it comes off the line or at major stages. Defective products are either thrown out or reworked; both are unnecessarily expensive. In effect, a company is paying workers







to make defects and then to correct them. Quality comes not from inspection but horn improvement of the process. With instruction, workers can be enlisted in this improvement. G End the practice of awarding businesson price tag alone. Purchasing departments customarily operate on orders to seek the lowestpriced vendor. Frequently, this leads to supplies of low quality. Instead, they should seek the best quality and work to achieve it with a single supplier for any one item in a long-term relationship. G Improve constantly and fmewr the system of @cducth and serwke. Improvement is not a onetime effort. Management is obligated to continually kmk for ways to reduce waste and improve quality. G Institute training. TW ofien, workers have learned their job from another worker who was never trained properly. They are forced to follow unintelligible instructions. They cant do their jobs because no one tells them how. . Institute leadership. The job of a supervisor is not to tell people what to do or to punish them but to lead. Leading consists of helping people do a better job and of learning by objective methods who is in need of individual help. . Drive out fm. Many employees are afraid to ask questions or to take a position, even when they do not understand what the job is or what is right or wrong. People will continue to do things the wrong way, or to not do them at all. The economic loss from fear is appalling. It is necessary for better quality and productivity that people feel secure. . Break down barriers betweenstaff areas. Men staff areas-departments, units, whateverare competing with each other or have goals that conflict. They do not work as a team so they can solve or foresee problems. Worse, one departments goals may cause trouble for another. . Ehninate slogans, exhortations, and targetsfm the wdjbrce. These never helped anybody do a good job. Let people put up their own slogans. . Eliminate numerical quotas. Quotas take account only of numbers, not quality or methods. They are usually a guarantee of inefficiency and high cost. A person, to hold a job, meets a quota at any cost, without regard to damage to his company. G &move bawiers to prideof workmanship. People are eager to do a good job and distrewxl when they cannot. Too ofien, misguided supervisors, faulty equipment and defective materials stand in the way of good performance. These barriers must be removed. G lmtitute a vigorousprogramof educationand retraining. Both management and the work force will have to be educated in the new methods, including

teamwork and statistical techniques. G T& action to the transfornwicm. It will require a special top management team with a plan of action to carry out the quality mission. Workers cannot do it on their own, nor can managers. A critical mass of people i~,he company must understand the Fourteen Points. In other words, the TQM philosophy is that quality must be designed and built into a product or service, with everyone from the lowest worker to the chief executive officer involved in the process. It is easier and cheaper in the long run to make a product right the first time, than to rework it. Juz ran states, In the United States, probably about a third of what is done consists of redoing what was done previously, because of quality deficiencies.3 Communication must be open, especially from the bottom to the top. Teamwork is essential not only within an organization but also with the customer and the supplier. The civilian sector is embracing the TQM concept as the management style of the fLture-techniques by which US companies will again compete succesdidly in the world markets. The Ford Motor Company has made major changes focusing on quality. Ford even requires its vendom to be trained in Demings methods.4 Chrysler Corporation built a billion dollar research, design, engineering and production center incorporating TQM lessons to produce better cars faster. Many other companies have made the commitment to this new management philosophy. The Honda plant in Marysville, Ohio, is using TQM techniques and processes extremely effectively with American employees. American employees are as capable as any, given the right organizational climate and process. The importance of quality cannot be overemphasized. The Department of Commerce has instituted an award, the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award, named afier its late secretary. Presented by the president of the United States at special ceremonies in Washington, D.C., it is a prestigious award. Companies devote great resources to its attainment not o-nlyfor the resp-mt it brings but for the accompanying changes required in the organizationschanges that enable them to compete more effectively in the marketplace. (Coincidently, the Japanese equivalent of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award is known as the Deming Prize.) President George Bush has stated, Reasserting our leadership position will require a firm commitment to total quality management and the principles of continuous quali~ improvement . . . @ality improvement principles apply to small cornpani&, as well as large corporations, to service industries as well






as manufacturing, and to the public sector, as well as private enterprise.5 Although a national priority, the processes and techniques of TQM improvement remain a mystery to many and present particular challenges tt; At-&y leadership and thinking For leaders, one challenge, or as Deming calls it an obstacle to implementation-is blaming the workforce for problems.d Juran est it-matedthat about 15 percent of the problems in an organization are due to local causes that could be changed by the workers. This leaves ~agement with the responsibility for 85 percent. Currently, the orgmization sees its process as appropriate; therefore, problems are viewed as the fault of the employees. These individuals are labeled as poor performers, malcontents, disruptive, recalcitrant, stupid, slow . . . . How often are soldiers and leaders frustrated by an inflexible system, thinking if only it (the system or process) would change this or allow that, it W(XM k easier, cheaper, more efficient. How many times have com-rnanders h)ught parts from the local auto pm store to get a vehicle off deadline because the official process was slow and it would reduce command emphasis. Was it the Fault ~~f the parts clerk? The motor sergeant? The battalion maintenance officer? Probably not. Can the process be improved? Most likely, but it requires leadership that accepts that the process may be the problem, it can and should be changed, and the best i&as for improving the system may come from the user level. A sectmd obstacle to implementati(m is the klief that our problems are different.g Is this a valid reason, an excuse or just a factor to be considered when TQM procedures are implemented? The answer to this _question will detet%ine, to a great extent, the succ&s an organization will have in adopting new procedures and outlooks. Initially, it was thought that TQM applied only to manufacturing pro&ses where th~ employees could stop the assembly line if they thought the product was not up to the prescribed standards. Now, however, it is proving successful in its application to service industries and the health care industry. A third obstacle to implementation for leadership to overcome is false starts.9 For TQM to work, it must k fully supported by the entire management chain right from the onset. If it is viewed as just another shortterm, quick fix, buzzwordprogmm, it is ckx)med. Additionally, implementing only a part of the process, such as setting up quality circles or statist ical quality control procedures alone, will lead to failure. In companies where TQM has been successfid, it Iwgm with the education and support of the managem at all levels. This wa followed by the

education and support of company empk~yees in the goals, procedures and philosophy of TQM. TQM must be viewed by lewlership as this is the way we are going to do business from now on, rather than this is another one of those things we will try until the next hot program comes along. Employees very quickly perceive which progmrns leaclerx believe in and support and those progrwns in which leaders are just going through the motions. Perhaps the greatest challenge for leadership will be to continually strive to improve. The TQM process is one of continuous improvement. Th produce a better qudlity product or service at lower cost, in less time, with greater customer satisfaction, with less rework and less warranty work is the TQM goal. This involves close coordinati{m and cooperation between customer, producer and supplier. Another challenge will be for leadership to l(x)k upon TQM not as a destirmtitm but as a mode of t-tampon-. Leadership must be c(~tnmittecl enough to empower employees to do the j~~band to keep itself and the employees fkwd and nmtl vatwl to these processes. There will be unique challenges f&- leaders in applying the TQM pr{~ess in the tnilitary. The military is a multilevel, hierarchical, structured organization with f(mndized command and staff channels. Civilian organizations that have successfully itnplemented TQM have flattened or reduced the levels of management, increased ctmununication outside ftmnal channels and generally reduced structure. Leaders still tnakc declsitms and give directions, but the employees have km empowered to provide more information, suggesti(ms and ideas in the process. The Department of Defense has had its successes implementing the TQM process. The US Armys Watmvliet Arsenal applied TQM to more than 100 processes involved in chrome-plating the 120mm tank cannon barrel for the M 1 tank. Techniques included flowcharting, brainstorming, cause-and effect analysis, Pareto analysis, amdlysisof variance and various standard control charting techniques. These actions resulted in an increase in the pr(x)ffiring acceptance rate for the cannons from 70 percent to 98.5 percent. Savings from the reduct ion of r;,~~rk, repair, and scrap were more than $10 millicm. Another Army organization with success is the Communications-ElectronicsCommand (CECOM) lcxaed, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which has had reductions in General Accounting Office protests and fewer Congrcsional inquiries for bid x~licitation and award. CECOM has also significmtly reduced the time required to process contract just ificat ion and approvals, one of many improvements that c(m -






))11 tribute directly to increased customer satisfaction. Congressional constraints, federal guidelines and regulations, and the institutional inertia are all challenges that leaders must deal with in the process of implementing TQM. In this time of reduced manpower and fiscal resources, TQM should provide the tools to do the job better the first time with less waste, less rework, greater efficiency and reduced cost. The experience in industry gives encouraging evidence in these areas. This is a very brief overview of the TQM philosophy and some thoughts on the challenges that leadership may face in implementing TQM. It is by no means meant to be all-inclusive. Any good pessimist could provide a very lengthy list of problems, obstacles and reasons why it will not work. Our leade~hip is certainly capable of overcoming all impediments and successfldly instituting TQM procedures and processes; it is a matter of commitment and education. hff? NOTES
1, Joseph M, Juran, Juran on P/armmg rbr Qua/ity, (New York: Macmllllan, Inc., 1966),1, 2. Mary Walton, The Lkrning Man+wrrerrt at Work, (New York: Putnam Publsfvng GrOU , 1966), 1719. 3. Joseph M! Juran, Juran on Leadership @ Qualify:An Exec&w Hard-

~, (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1969), 34. 4 Howard S. and Shelly J. Gifbw, 7% ~rm ~ Guide to Qua/ilya&&nnpetrtrve %sibon, (E Iewcod Cliffs Prentm+l-ia , Inc, 1967), 33. 5. .n,dSWes%mofPemnMI MaMgemMt, Feder.Clualitylnsfitute, Federai Total Quai@ A&nagemem H~ How to Get Skirted lmp/arrrentmg Tots/ Qua/ Management, (Washington, DC: US Government Printi Of fica, June 19$ Excerpt from 29 September 1969 speech by George%sh quoted made the front cover. 6 Mary Walton, The Dammg Management Method, (New York: Putnam Pubhstmg Group, 1966), 94. 7. Nancy R. Mann, The Keys to Excellerw: The Story of the Darning Philosoph , (Los Angeles Prestvd Books, 1967), 7 1 Walton, 94 9 Ibid. 10 United States Offica of Personnel Manqement, Federal Quahfy Institute, Federal Totai Oua/ity Mana@ment Har@od(: lntrvduction to Total (%alily Management in the federal Government, (kWashmgton, DC: US Government Pnntl Office, May 1991), 9. 11. T om Vanan, Beyond the TC)M Mystr@e: Real World Pers~ves on Tofa/ Ouahty Management, (Burlington, MA: Organizational Dynamics, Inc , 1990), 14.

Liauenant Coknud]ohn 1). Richardsis the chief, Alcoholand Drug Training Branch, Behavioral ScienceDivision,Academy ofHakh Sciences,Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He receiveda B.S. jiom the University of Florida, an M .A. ji-om the University of South Florida and a Ph.D. jbm the University of Southern Cahfti. He previouslyservedas a battery commander, 25th lnfan~ Division; assistant profasor, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy; and as chief, Standardization and Analysis Division, Directorate of Ew.duation and Standardization, Academy of Heakh Sciences.

Fairy Tale Review

l%: April 1992 Military &view published a review of the book Kiss the Boys Goodbye: How the United States Betrayed Its Owm POWs in Vietnam by Monika Jensen-Stevenson and William Stevenson. I do not know your reviewer, but he is clearly unqualified to have reviewed this book. I served over four years in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Special Office for Prisoners of War(PW)Missing in Action(MIA); two of those years were as chief of the DIA Special Office, and I know of what I speak. The review is a travesty, as filled with misinformation and falsehood as is the book. Military Review has compromised its editorial standards by publishing a review of a fairy tale by a clearly unqualified reviewer. A better title for the authors book would be Kiss the Troth Goodbye. Contrary to your reviewers assertion, the book is not a good piece of investigative reporting. The book is, instead, a collection of untruths, halftruths, anonymous sources, sources with code names and other foolishness. I was present at

many of the events described in the book. I am thoroughly familiar with most of the stories in the book. The book is nonsense. Let me deal with certain of the specifics raised in the review. US intelligence agencies do not continue to receive locational information on soldiers captured in Southeast Asia. We do continue to receiv4cause we actively collectreports that, upon inves-

tigation, are found to be either sightings of men captured during the war who returned; sightings of Westerners imprisoned in Southeast Asia, at various times for various reasons; or, in a small number of cases, false stories. The chief of the DIA Special Office did not resign. My successor was in the job for seven months, during which time he was counseled by a general officer several times for his incompetence. When he was advised that he was being relieved, he struck with a you+mt-fire-me-I1 1--quit-first routine. He stapled a letter of resignation to the door of the office. Very professional. His charges of malfeasance and interference were invest igated by a US House of



c August


Representatives committee and by a team appointed by the assistant secretary of defense, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. His charges were determined to be groundless, a fact
your reviewer neglects to mention. The recent release of photographs of missing [PWS] is equally without foundation. In the summer of 1991, three sets of photographs, purporting to show missing Americans alive in Southeast Asia, hit the media. In each case, the photographs were fakes. One was a doctored photograph fi-om a magazine and two others were photographs of a third country national living in Bangkok and a Laotian villager, respectively. Why did your reviewer not mention these faCtS? Former US Marine Corps Private First Class Robert Garwood was court-martialed because he did, indeed, collaborate with the North Vietnamese. It did not take seven years for the government to debrief Garwcmd, as your reviewer asserts. Garwoods 1981 conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court. In January 1986, the court upheld his conviction. During the time his case was under appeal, Garwood and his attorneys refhsed to have any contact with US intelligence agencies seeking to debrief him. Within one month of the courts decision, we were debriefing Garwood. He had nothing of substance to offer regarding Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Your reviewer missed the boat, again. Former US Army Major Mark Smith, while assigned to the special forces detachment, Korea, made a number of training visits to Thailand. During some of these visits, h: encountered three of the MIA stories that float around the refbgee camps and bars of Northeast Thailand. Contrary to his assertions, Smith was not on intelligence-gathering missions. Smith reported his information to Army intelligence in Korea, and his reports were investigated. His information had nothing to do with missing Americans. Smith, however, was not content with these findings. He has pursued his own agenda and now lives in Thailand. Smith alleges he was forced out of the Army because he suspected some great conspiracy. The fact is, Smith, a high school graduate, was not selected to attend the US Army Command and General Staff College and not selected for lieutenant colonel, and was thus obliged to retire at the end of 20 years of service. His lawsuit was dismissed by a federal court. Your reviewer does not mention these facts, all of which are matters of public record. The global conspiracy by a secondlayer government to conceal the existence of [PWs]/.MIAs in Southeast Asia is a damnable lie that your reviewer seems to have swallowed whole. This line, woven

throughout the book, is the substance of a huge lawsuit brought by the Christie Institute against major generals John K. Singlaub and Richard SeCord, and anyone else Christie could defame. The suit was dismissed when a federal judge, in granting a summary judgment to all defendants in the case, determined that the Christie case was absolutely without merit. Furthermore, the institute was required to pay damages to the people it sued because it had filed a frivolous and groundless suit. Again, your reviewer is ignorant of publicly available fhcm or purposely chose to ignore this bit of legal terrorism. In his concluding paragraph, your reviewer raises three questions. I will answer those questions. Are there still [PWS] alive in Vietnam? All available evidence makes two things clear. First, there is nothing to suggest that all American PWS, alive at the end of the war, were not released at Operation Homecoming. No, PWS are not still alive in Southeast Asia, or any other country, for that matter. Second, the Vietnamese government has far more information about our missing men than they have chasen to reveal. Is there an active cover-up to protect questionable operations in Southeast Asia? No. Not now, and there has never been. Is the US government using the [PW1/MIA issue as a political tool to keep the Vietnamese governmentin line? No. We seek the fullest possible accounting of our missing men and nothing more. The final chapter has not been written on our efforts to account for our missing comrades in Southeast Asia, but when it is, the conclusion will be that the US government was on the right track and pursued that right track in spite of drivel such as Kiss the Boys Goodbye. Military Rewiew should be embarrassed for its part in spreading this grotesque misinformation. COL Joseph A. Schlatter Jr., USA, Yokofu,Japan

CAL Training Package for Lieutenants

In the May 1992 Milirur)-Reviewarticle, Training Lieutenants, retired lieutenant colonels Robert J. Schneider and Faris R. Kirkland pose the question of who is responsible for training l~eutenan& The article unfolds by citing both the historical background and the more recent developments in preparing lieutenants to be leaders. W;thin the context of current leader development, the authors refer to the military qualification standards (MQS) system. The authors say the MQS program defines military tasks, standards and per-


August 1992


formance measures to guide the development of offi. cers at each point in their career+tarting from precommissioning schooling. They go on to state, But the MQS program by itself does not address all of the essential issues. Both the US] Army schools system and commanders need to focus on interpersonal skills that are outside the realm of the mission essential task list. . . . Commanders should emphasize skills not included in the MQS system such as counseling and motivating . . . and communicating with other soldiers of all ranks. The MQS system does, in fact, include leadership skills such & counseling and motivating. The Cen-ter for Army Leadership, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the Armys proponent for leadenhip, develops training materials for training leade~hip skills, including motivation, counseling and developing subordinate leaders. The training packages are included in resident training at precommissioning sources, officer basic courses and officer advanced courses. Like the authors, we have recognized the need for wellrounded officers who are masters of interpersonal leadership skills, as well as being technically and tactically competent. LTC William A. Knowlton Jr., USA, Center for Army Leadership, USACGSC

der type achieved durirw World War 11,epitomized

by M~cArthurs quote. - Decisive victory in those terms would be an unconditional surrender, achieved quickly, with minimal loss of American lives. This is surely a goal to be sought, but it is unlikely to be achieved in an era of limited war for limited political objectives. It is hard to imagine a set of circumstances under which the United States would consciously seek to militarily overthrow a government and then impose martial law and rule that nation for an extended period of time, as we did in Germany and Japan. What is far more likely is that we will posture, deploy or fight to achieve limited political objectives. These objectives will be achieved when our opponent perceives there is no utility in continuing to pursue his objectives and changes his objectives to accommodate ours. This is clearly the message of 11-mrmans article. This excellent article highlights the political nature of the Army of the khre~ It highlights that every activity the Army is involved in has a very important political context. The key to the fbture viability of the Army is the understanding of this political context. Each military effort, even training, has a political purpose that is, or should be, its primary purpose. If this is clearly understood, our Army will significantly increase the United States influence--whether to cause someone to do something or not to do something. In this regard, Thurman speaks of decisive as being the properly structured response. Decisive victory is that which results from such an activity. Decisive victory is thus the result of the properly structured political application of military power that results in the desired political outcome. This is just another way of applying Carl von Clausewitzs famous dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Understanding the criticality of political ends is key for both the soldier and the politician. Politicians must understand the need for clear political guidance for the three days of warthe day before, the day of and the day after. If this occurs and the soldier responds quickly and appropriately, wars will be deterred or fought for the desired outcome, and the conflict will terminate in the way envisioned, with the political goal having been achieved. Either of these outcomes would be a decisive victory by the definition I am suggesting. What is needed to assist in the development of clear political objectives translated into military objectives is a group of skilled politicalmilitary operatives, who are trained and comfortable operating at the interface between the political and the military-that gray area where the strategist is

US Army Strategists Program

I recent~ read, with~eat interest,-the April 1992 Military Rtwiew. At about the same time, I read Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivans testimony to the US Congress on the US Army budget. I was struck by the need for consideration of what it means to win in the new strategic environment we are entering. Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Thurmans piece Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and Wa~ The Continuum of Military Operations is very informative in that regard. The following paragraphs are my feeble attempt to reconcile these two documents. General Douglas MacArthur spoke of decisive victory in his 19 April 1951 farewell address to Congress, But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. Wars very object is victory-not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. In his 26 February 1992 testimony to the Clmgt-ess on the Army budget, Sullivan said the Armys mission was to provide forces capable of achieving decisive victory. Many feel victory is of the unconditional surren-






key. Unfortunately, the Army has let the US Army Strategists Program languish. The result of this could be our fhture failure to achieve decisive victory as envisioned by Sullivan. We will fail because we will have experts at fighting wars but not experts at dealing with all of the political-military problems. Thurmans article clearly puts the issue on the table of the Armys need to be prepared for its involvement. Bernard Brodie, one of the preeminent strategists of the second half of the 20th century, had very strong views on the requirements to be a strategist. In Nti Security and hemmimd Stability (edited by Roman Kolkowicz), published tier his death, Brodie wrote: We need people who will challenge, investigate, and dissec_t~e prevailing dogmas-of our foreign policy, and of strategic studies; it is important for students of strategy to be aware of the inevitable limitations and imperfections of scientific method in strategic analysis and decision making particularly with regard to the imperfections of the practitioners, whose greatest limitation is that they sometimes fail to observe true scientific discipline; it is necessary to understand that the most basic issues of strategy often do not lend themselves to scientific analysis . . . because they are laden with value judgments and therefore tend to escape any kind of disciplined thought; and last, but not least, the Clausewitzian admonition on the need to stress the superior importance of the political side of strategy to the simply technical and technological side is particularly relevant in the age of nuclear deterrence. I believe it is time to revitalize the US Army Strategists Program to provide those skilled practitioners of the art of strategy as espoused by Brodie. This will be of even more importance as we enter an era of political uncertainty. Military Review could serve a usefd purpose in this regard, as a forum to explain and discuss what it will take to be a strategist in the 21st century. COL Bruce B. G. Clarke, USA, Carlisle, Pennsylvania

Oral Teaching Traditions

The US Army-does not effectively train combined arms commanders. This theme has been a point of professional discussions for quite a while but became particularly relevant to me during a discussion with a team of retired office~ who are studying whv artillew is broken at the combat training centers (m(ls). They are considering the poss;bilitv that one of the greatest causes for a;illery not being effective in CTC rotations is that battalion com-

manders do not filly appreciation the intricacies of employing combined arms. I agree this is a glaring weakness. As an armor officer who has experienced one rotation as a platoon leader at the National Tmining Center, Fort h-win, California; two rotations as a company commander at the Combat Maneuver Tmining Center, Hohenfels, Germany; and watched several more rotations as the plans officer, I have seen the problem firsthand. I disagree with the recommendation under consideration to establish a school to train combined arms commanders. The classroom environment is not an effwtive means for creating hitech battlefield operation systems (BOS) warriors. I once fell asleep reading doctrine . . . The fire support coordinator and the air defense coordinator incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support and air defense annexes of the maneuver plan so that offensive counterair, defensive counterair and joint suppression of enemy air defense plans are developed simultaneously and in concert . . . [Snore] Understanding US Army field manuals (FMs), or any doctrine for that matter, is more about reality, people, experiences and stories, than reading graduate-level research. Perhaps the whole problem of educating joint combined arms commanders would be solved if we set aside the FMs, for a while, and went back to oral traditions. While some things can only be learned by experience, other things are best learned by listening to someone describe their mistakes. And none of the latter can be taught from FMs, unless the FM is written like a novel, which certainly would be unprofessional. Right? So, we are stuck in a dilemma. Lecturing basic course students on joint operations between their trips to the local pubs will not make them joint commanders The valuable, hands-on leadership experiences the students had as platoon leaders and company commanden have nothing to do with the combined arms mentality required of senior commanders. And senior commande~ in the field are justifiably too busy to mentor all of the young officers who need to learn from their experiences. With the myriad of incompatible tasks required of commanders, that old adage, What gets ins~cted is what is important, holds true. Sharing combined arms lessons learned and mentoring are not inspected, therefore, they currently are not considered important. We should somehow encourage the informal learning process in such a way that junior officers learn what it really means to integrate all BOS into the plan. I believe senior commanders would participate in informal, professional discussions with their subordinate commanders, if only there were a rein-




forced structure to make it happen. This reinforced structure could come in the form of visiting junior instructo~ from the schoolhouse, with agenda and outlines in hand. The cost of creating this environment for interaction, which commanders currently cannot or will not expend, would be paid for by the schoolhouse facilitator. There should also be more emphasis on seminars in the field, facilitated by outsiders. The expense of sending outsiders could be tided by decreasing time spent on temporary duty to the schoolhouse to learn things more effectively taught in local seminars. This would be in keeping with the efficient philosophy that schools only teach the student enough to perform his job well enough to survive on the job. The average officer student in the modern low-+tress military course pays little attention to anything else but that anyway. Then, in the field, through practical experience, the officer will effectively learn firsthand and hands-on what it really means to be a combined arms commander. CPT Gregory P. Rowe, USA, Headguurhn, Head@arters Company, Zst Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany

Negotiating Strengthens Insurgents

Steven Metz has made another thoughtful contribution to the study of lowintensity conflict in his article, Victory and Compromise in CounterinsurHe points out gency (April 1992 Milirary Reti). that counterinsurgency is more complex than doctrine suggests. That is a fhnction of the difference between prescriptive doctrine and descriptive academic study. An insurgency as a political contest would be an easy-to-remember comparison in an election year. The government is the incumbent. The insurgents are the challengers. The prizes are the confidence and support of the population. The winner is the party better able to mobilize support fi-om the population at large. To do that, it articulates issues and offers solutions. The insurgents objective is more than to replace the people in power. It is to change the constitutional system. Insurgency violates the constitution because it demands more than the system can accommodate. It refixes compromise and employs violence to overthrow the legal order. The only negotiations that a government can conduct with insurgents are those that end the insurgency. The insurgents must agree to abandon their violent methods and operate within the constitution. This type of negotiation was concluded successfully

in 1990, when the M19 insurgents of Colombia agreed to give up their fight and become a legal political party. By contrast, in Vietnam, the communist side agreed to cease--fires with the French in 1954 and the United States in 1973. Both were ploys to increase the legitimacy of the insurgents and decrease that of the Saigon government. The communists had no intention of abiding by the agreements. In both cases, the insurgency continued. Unless the insurgency surrenders, negotiations can only harm the government. Instead of negotiating, the government must revise its political program to gain the support of the politically active people and the neutrality of most of the rest. The central feature of the internal defense and development strategy, formalized as doctrine in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20/ Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 320, Military @rations in Low hensiry Conjlict, 5 December 1990; Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine jbr Joint @mZiOns in Lao Intensity Conflict, (T&st), October 1990; and Joint Pub 347.1, Joint and hcdmes fm Foreign herrud Thctics, Tech+, Defense (Find Draft), September 1991, is recognition that a government must change in order to succeed in counterinsurgency. The winner must be the better revolutionary. Government political, economic and social policy must accommodate the desires of the people within the limits of its value system. If it cannot accommodate most popular demands, it will surely lose. Violence for the insurgents is a political device to discredit the government and undermine its legitimacy. For the government, it is a necessary defensive measure. For neither side is it decisive. Victo~ in an insurgency isa political concept, not a military one. Government success in counterinsurgency is not marked by parades and celebrations. An insurgency never formally ends. It simply recedes to insignificance. (The communist terrorists of the Malayan Emergency, now very long in the tooth, are still holding out in the Thai border region. They are no threat to the government of Malaysia and of no benefit to themselves. By contrast, the New Peoples Army of the Philippines maybe considered sons of the Huks, who have continued the struggle since the late 1940s.) Metz is correct in his idea of the desired end state but wrong on the subject of negotiations. Likewise, he errs in advising that the government rebin from acting against insurgents until it can combine negotiatio-m with drama;ic military action. The governmentshould stop the insurgency in its earli&t stage by identifying and locating the insurgent party leaders, arresting them and prosecuting them for their violation of constitutional methods. Of course, the






government must not violate the constitution in the process. To do so would undermine its popular support. Every possible element of due process of law must be observed. The earlier the government acts, the more it is able to act within its own constitutional system. Government violence is defensive, in aid of law etiorcement. The enemy soldiers are the countrys own citizens. Killing them is not a government goal. The goal is to rectuit them away from the party of revolution. Violence must be kept to the absolute minimum adequate to meet the threat. Under the worst circumstances, that could be considerable, but the best government violence is none at all. LTC John B. Hunt USA, Retire~ Leavenworth, Kansas

technique, attacking along lines of least expectation and least resistance. By indirect approach, Liddell Hart did not necessarily mean always approaching in a long, roundabout, circuitous manner, although, in some cases, he might have meant this. By indirect, he meant not going directly against enemy strength and approaching the enemy in such a way that one confronts enemy weakness rather than enemy strength. I realize the word indirect is a source of confusion and misunde~tanding because people assume that not going directly against the enemys strength must mean using a roundabout, circuitous route. However, exploiting the weakness created by a breach in the enemys fi-ont would bean example of using what Liddell Hart called the indirect approach. It is significant that Liddell Hart first thought of the indirect approach not from oberving circuitous flanking or enveloping movements, but from observing frontal attacks in World War I that attempted to create and exploit weaknesses in enemy positions. It is appropriate in discussing Liddell Harts influence upon current Army doctrine to go back to his original writings such as his book Strutegy. Liddell Hart was not advocating going out and attacking enemy weak spots wherever they are found and did not equate weak spots with decisive spots. He advocated avoidingwsistzmce and exploitingweaknessto get at the enemy. Just attacking weakness is not synonymous in Liddell Harts writings with exploiting weakness. Nor is it synonymous in his writings with attacking the enemys decisive points. Liddell Hart advised: Exploit the line of least resistance-so long as it can lead you to any objective which would contribute to your underlying objective. In other words, get at the enemy through his weakness. Joseph Forbes, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Avoid Resistance, Exploit Weakness

I disagree with Colonel Bruce B. G. Clarkes criticisms of US Army doctrine-AirLand Operationsmade in his January 1992 letter in Military Review. Clarke claims: The doctrine emphasizes maneuver warfare concepts as originally espoused by B. H. Liddell Hart and J. E C. Fuller. Unfortunately, the doctrine also suffers the same disease one sees in their writings. Weaknesses are attacked in order to win. This means that attacking weaknesses is synonymous with attacking the center+f~vity. . . . In other words, weak spots are not necessarily decisive points in the course of battle. US Army Field Manual 10&5, O@utiom, uses British military analyst Liddell Hart as a source. (I will not discuss Fuller, since he is not cited. ) What Clarke seems to be opposing is a misconception of Liddell Harts thinking on the indirect approach

WorldWa II VeteranSurvey
The US Army Military History Institute is conducting a major survey project to acquire source material on World War II. The project consists of an 18-page questionnaire to be filled out by the World War 11veteran. In sampling the more than 2,500 responses already received, almost everyone remembers where they were and what they were doing on 7 December 1941 and recalls the tremendous role the GI Bill played in shaping postwar society. Other answers reveal unique personal experiences in basic training, as well as what it was like to be in combat for the first time. Many veterans are also domting letters, diaries, photographs, Ix&s, patches, insignia and other items related to their service experiences. Completed surveys and other materials are made available to the many researchers, scholars and individuals who visit the institute. This is a wonderful opportunity to answer the question, What did you do in the war? For more information, write: US Army Militaty History Institute, Am: Assistant Director, Historical Services, Carlisle Barracks, PA 170135008








for Army



This months From My F300ksheljrepresents the collectivejudgment of the members of the Center fm Army Kansas, of which leadership bucks Leaded@, US Army Command and General Stajf College, Fort kwwmrth, you u.mdd most likelyfind on the bQoMehM of those in the military who study leadership. The books are genendly limitedto those thal relate direcdy to the subject of leadership, and, mth a few exceptions, do not include biographical

works on or by great leaders. No attempt is made to portray this list as the dejkitive reference on leadership; there are numerous other books that could have turned upon this list and are equally as central to the theme of kukrship. Rather, this list refkcts those books we found particularly useful and enjoyable. Except as otherwise indicated, the synopses are by numbers of the Center for Army Leadership.

Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge

by Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus. Based on a study involving 90 leaders, the authors describe the leadership environment civilian and milita~ leaders will face into the 1990s. This book offers leaders a simple, but powet-fhl, framework for energizing and sustaining organizations to meet the demands of a rapidly changing world.

Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander by General Bruce C. Clarke.
Presenting, in condensed form, the principles conceived, adapted and tested by Clarke during his service in command positions from squad leader to Army group commander, the author provides a checklist of things to consider in the areas of training, command, operations and administration. It is an easy-t~read, commonsense look at how to lead in the Army.


and the One Minute Manager

by Kenneth BL chard, Patricia Zigarmi and Drea Zigarmi. This book explains how to diagnose the developmental level of a group and provides guidelines for matching a leadership style to a developmental level, according to situational leadership theory.

Taking Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership. Edited by Samuel H. Hays and
William N. Thomas. Blending research from the behavioral science, managerial methods and wisdom fi-om practical experiences, this book stimulates understanding of the concepts, processes and techniques involved in influencing and directing others within the US Armed Forces.

Military Leadership. Edited by James H. Buck and Lavnence J. Korb. A collection of essays from prominent individuals in the leade~hip field, this book focuses on leadership theory, contemporary leadership issues and leadership in the field.
by James McGregor Bums. This extremely detailed and in-depth analysis of leadership uses a political science and historical approach to examine both Western and nonWestern civilizations to develop and portray a unique set of leadership challenges and concepts.

The Mask of Command


by John K~gat-t. Dissecting the essentials of leadership and how four historic figures (Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, General Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler) applied it, this book focuses on the senior leader and his role in national decision making and war.

The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations

hy James M. Kouzesand Barry Z. Posner. As a distillation of leadership ideas from over 500 examples of personal bests by senior- and middle--level managers in civilian business, this book provides a discussion of basic ideas and supporting techniques to improve leadership anywhere and at any level.

Before the Battle: A Commonsense Guide to Leadership and Management by Lieutenant

General Edwad M. Flanagan Jr. This book is a usefd guide to everyday, realworld challenges of leadership, management, organization and operations, ranging across 87 subject areas. Each area is packed with a dozen or so techniques, tricks of the trade, and the just plain magic used by Flanagan and a hundred other fine leaders. (Synopsis extracted from a review by retired Colonel Dandridge M. Malone.)

Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach by Colonel DandridgeM. Malone.

This comprehensive primer for the small-unit leader covers developing soldiers and building


Q August 1992


soldier teams, and includes a how to section that is particularly valuable.

The Challen e of Milita Leadership. Edited by LloydJ. Matt f ewsand Dale T . Brown. The authors present highly instructive case studies in combat command and detail the ethical dimension of leadership; the need to build and coach a staff; the difficulty in evaluating, selecting and developing leaders; and how to identify and develop the strengths of character essential to leaders of military personnel. Compan Command: The Bottom Line by Colonel Jo [ n G. Meyer Jr. From taking command through the Uniform Code of Military Justice administration, personnel administration, training, supply and maintenance, the author walks the prospective company commander through the dos and donts of company command. The illustrative vignettes are particularly enlightening. Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership by Major General Aubrey S. Newman.
General leadership the 1930s, leadership Newmans collection of short essays on draws on his experiences in the Army of 1940s and 1950s and expertly illustrates principles.

ice and oldline industrial companies. It discusses four attributes of excellence to masten taking exceptional care of customers, promoting innovation, inspiring employees and providing visionaty, impassioned leadership.

Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun by Wess Roberts. This extremely entertaining book uses the supposed leadership style of Attila the Hun in a tongue-in-cheek manner to bring out many fundamental leadership principles. Taking Charge: A Practical Guide Leaders by Major General Perry M. Smith. for

One of the best leadership primers around, this book is indeed a practical guide that covers all aspects of leade~hip and command.

Military Leadership:

In Pursuit of Excel-


Edited by Robert L. Taylor and William E.

What Are Generals Made Of? by Major General

Aubrey S. Newman.

Rosenbach. These two editors reviewed more than 2,000 articles on military leadership and selected 23 of the very best. The wisdom of some of the great military leaders of the last 50 years, as well as that of distinguished academics and government and business leaders, is included. (Synopsis extracted from a review by Major General Perry Smith. )

Command in War by Martin van Creveld.

Examining how leaders exercise command in war, this book focuses on the coordinating aspects of the commander and surveys the history of command systems from primitive to modern war.

This continuation of Newmans essays contains sections on company grade and field grade leadership, as well as general officer leade~hip. A Passion for Excellence: The Leadership Difference by Thomas J. Peters and Nancy K. Austin.
As a sequel to In Search of Excehmce: Le-ssons fiorn Americus Be.w Run Cmtis by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman Jr. (which focused on 43 very large, mainstream companies), this book f~uses more on smaller businesses and many serv-

Leaders and Battles: The Art of Military Leadership by William J. Wood.

The author concentrates on five traits-courage, will, intellect, presence and energy-and uses 11 individual battles to show how leaders apply these leadership traits in action.

CHURCHILL A Life by Martin Gilbert. 1066 pages. Henry Holt & Co., New York. 1991. $35.00. This book is the k one-volume biography of Winston Churchill ever written. Martin Gilbert, the official biographer of Churchill, with full access to the Churchill papem, has rewritten and condensed his eight volumes on the life of the British statesman into one volume. It is the most lucid and authoritative account of the life of Churchill

ever put into a single volume. This book is a must for anyone who wants to understand Churchill and the conduct of politics and war at the highest reaches of the British government in the first half of the 20th century. Churchill took part in a cavalry charge in 1898 during the Battle of Orndurman in the Sudan, resigned as prime minister of Great Britain in 1955 and, between, played a major role in just about every


August 1992



event of any importance to Britain. In the course of the longest and most distinguished career in modem British political history, he was one of the men who truly shaped the history of the modem world, his career going well beyond the affairs of Britain. Several impressions emerge from this biography. One is that Churchills energy, resilience and willpower were superhuman and permitted him to battle onward &d win in situations that would have defeated other men. Another is that, while Churchill was a statesman who shaped the fate of nations and moved great events, he was also a humanist who cared deeply about individuals and actually judged the effects of politics, wars and the like in terms of how they would affect the common man. Gilbert also shows that Churchill was deeply interested in social legislation that would improve the lot of the British working class. However, the main interest to the readers of this biography will be Churchill the soldier, the war leader and the statesman. It is all skillfdly laid out from the first time Churchill was under fire in Cuba in 1895 to his thoughts on military action during the Suez Crisis in 1956. For 60 years, Churchill fought in wars, managed military machines and made military policy and strategy. No man in the first half of the 20th century has seen more of war in all its varied aspects: He was a iunior officer in two late 19th-centurv colonial wa~s; captured by and escaped from the Beers; became first lord of the admiralty at the beginning of World War I; was battalion commander on the Western Front; minister of munit ions; secretary of state for war in the aftermath of World War 1; remained in the wilderness, warning of the Nazi threat during the 1930s; became first lord of the admiralty in 1939; and, finally, prime minister and minister of defense during World War II; and, again, prime minister in the 1950s during the Cold War. Gilberts biography, besides k-ing a very good read, is indispe&able for any person wishingto understand Churchill the soldier, the statesman and the person, as well as the world in which he lived. David Syrett, Dep-utmeti of Histiry, Queens College of the City University of New York, Flushing, New York

SANDY PATCH A Biography of LL Gen. Alexander M. Patch by William K. Wyant. 249 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1991. $49.95. Alexander M. Patch has deserved a biography. His World War 11 achievements included commanding the Americal Division, the XIV Caps on Guadalcanal and, ultimately, US Seventh Army in Europe from the August 1944 invasion of southern France

(code named Dragoon) through V-E Day. The author, William K. Wyant, served as secretary to the Seventh Army general staff during World War 11,and this Imok is the result of his admiration for Patch. Using sources such as Patchs wartime letters home and official personnel file, Wyant provides some (often amusing) insights into his subject. An example is Patchs r&ponti to a request for a general staff officers removal: Of course he hasnt got any sense-I thought you knew that. However, he is not incompetent and your job is to keep him out of situations requiring judgment . Present, too, is that most elemental feature of war-death. Patchs letters to his wife following the death of their son, who was killed leading his infantry company in OcOne wonders tober 1944, are quite poignant. whether Patch, who had been stricken with pneumonia and poor health in the Pacific, subsequently worked himself to death in avoiding his grief. Unfortunately, Wyant has produced neither a critical study of Patch nor an I was there tale of Seventh Army headquarters. Wyant, himself, never appears in the text. Instead, we have a rambling, anecdotal recitation of Patchs career that badly Throughout, the needed an editors attention. reader is so inundated with tedious and inane detail that Wyants kernels of wheat are almost completely covered by chaff. As a result, the narrative ofien loses its focus on Patch, especially during the European campaigns. The reader rarely gets a sense of Patch as an-Army commander, how he planned and managed his battles and how he dealt with the competing and contradictory pressures from above and below. There is little discussion of Patchs use of intelligence as either corps or army commander. Wyan;s treatment of cetiain topics is also disappointing. The chapter Education of an Infantry Officer does not address that subject. Neither does Wyant explain how Patch, who spent 11 years between the- world wars teaching at a secondary military academy, became recognized as a superior officer. Indeed, the whole interwar period receives short shrift. Patchs 1936 assignment to the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia, merits two sentences. Subsequent assignments as an Alabama National Guard instructor and commander of the 47th Infantry receive even less. Wyant avoids any critical comments regarding his subject or his subjects actions. We get glimpses of Patch, but never come to feel we understand him. The author prefers one-sentence character summaries, but these are often trite. The book was researched sporadically and relies heavily on the Seventh Armys Report of Operations, 3 volumes (1946) and memoir literature (Jean



c August



de Lattre, Lucian K. Tuott

Jr.). It also contains the most idiosyncratic endnotes this reader has ever encountered. There are no maps. Read this book for its anecdotal material, and because there is no other biography of Patch, but do not expect analysis of either Patch or his campaigns.
Stephen J. Lofgren, Center of MiMuy Histov, Wmhington, D.C.

The ~tary Career of THE CHIEF OF ST~ General Walter BedellSmithby D.K.R. Crosswell. 437 pages. Greenwood Press, Inc., WestPort, CI. 1991.$55.00. This excellent and splendidly researched work is actually two books in one. It is the only biography available of General Dwight D. Eisenhowers influential wartime chief of staff, General Walter Bedell (Beetle) Smith; it is also a thorough presentation of the coming of age of the US Army officer corps from the turnof-the-century to the end of World War II. This volumes dual personality, plus the authors inclusion of detailed and outstanding substantive endnotes that fhther enhance an already fine narrative, compensates for the books hefty price tag.

The military life of Walter Bedell Smith began in 1911 when he joined the Indiana National Guard
as a sixteen year old private and ended thirty-nine years later with his retirement as a four-star general in the U.S. Army. Smiths career pattern typified the long generation of officers who rose to command the armies and staff the higher headquarter in the Second World Wac as a member of the interwar officer corps, he held a series of training and staff positions that climaxed in his attendance at the Fort] Leavenworth ~ansas, US Army] Command and General Staff Schools and the Army War College; a Marshall-man, he emerged as a central figure in the inner circle of General George C. Marshalls Washington establishment, eventually heading the secretariats of the War Department General Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Chiefi of Staff; reluctantly sacrificed by Marshall, he went on to serve as Dwight D. Eisenhowers chief of staff in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of war. Smiths road to the top provides a valuable vehicle for assessing the fundamental changes in the professional outlcoks and institutional structures that attended the emergence of the modem militaxy in the United States. The author, D. K. R. Crosswell, explains and describes the relationship between Eisenhower, as supreme Allied commander in northwest Europe, and Smith, as his Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force [SHAEF1 chief of stafl Crosswell

emphasizes the important role the acerbic Smith played in managing, on a dayto-day basis, SHAEFS prosecution of the European war. He asserts that, because of the position Eisenhower held as an Allied commander, he was required to reach compromises, build consensus and smooth ruffled feathers; Eisenhower needed someone like Smith to do the dirty work for him. Crosswell writes, Since Eisenhower always had to be the nice guy, Smith played the villain. The author points out that in achieving his various ends, Eisenhower worked through others, and the individual most responsible for his success was &dell Smith. Crosswell forthrightly describes Smiths faults and strengths. Chief among his faults was a hair trigger temper that caused him to frequendy and too easily fly off the handle at subordinates. Nicknamed the barker by the SHAEF staff, Smith was probably one of the most disliked senior officets of his time. He was, nevertheless, instrumental in helping Eisenhower manage the most successfi.d coalition in the history of warfare. Smiths career (and this book) deserve study by todays military professional as an accurate and insightful accounting of how the Army officer corps evolved into a truly prof=ional and competent organization despite a hostile Congress, a resenkd public and an executive branch overwhelmed with domestic issues and other concerns. As we enter into yet another era of shrinking military budgets and reduced military force, it might prove useful to study how we survived it in previous years. COLJerry D. Morelock, USA, Policy andSt@egic fsofStiff, Washington,D.C. Plans, 0~eoftheJoinlChi2

A BETTER IDEA: Redefining the Way tierican Companies Work by Donald E. Petersen and John Hillkirk. 270 pages. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA. 1991. $24.95. Donald E. Petersen, past chief executive officer and president of Ford Motor Company, believes the United States must act boldly to reverse the unmistakable decline in the health of our economy. His and John Hillkirks premise in A Better L&a is their conviction that all organizations can make tremendous improvements in productivity, efficiency and quality by transforming the workplace from one where employees hate to work to an environment of trust, cooperation and respect. Beginning at the micro level, Petersen and Hillkirk describe the underlying problems with American employees and provide corrective measures. Although initially fausing on Ford, the authors skillfully broaden their scope to include nearly every




US industry and the military. For bottom line readers, ample case studies are provided of what can happen when employees are given a sense of their importance and a reason to take pride in their work. The authors also prescribe methods for improving US competitiveness at the macro level. They cite startling examples of the extermination of entire US industries by the aggressive tactics of foreign governments, most notably the Japanese. They provide insights into correcting our serious problems in the areas of education, medical services, politics and government. Petersen recommends three specific techniques to improve an organization. First is the statistical process control. Petersen became a disciple of the statistician and management consultant, W. Edwards Deming, who told him, If you can make a real change in a huge company like Ford, you can have a major positive effect on this country. Second is employee empowerment, involvement and teamwork. Employees need to be given the power to correct the problems they find. Involving employees in the dayto-day operations of the company and in long-range planning will instill a sense of pride and produce results that will amaze the establishment. Demings philosophy of making employees responsible for their own quality control fosters trust and a sense of ownership in their work. The focus is on improving quality, not simply cost cutting. The process starts by asking employees, What do you think? or How can we improve? Third is participative management. Hand-in hand with employee involvement, participative management is simply a style of operating in which you give your peers and subordinates an opportunity to say what they think, and you include their ideas in the overall decisionmaking process. The goal is to eliminate redundant layers of management, empower lower-level managers and then push decision making responsibility down to the lowest possible level. The authors offer solid, proven advice designed to turn any organization into a winner and to reestablish the United States as a competitor on the world market. Although not written specifically for the military reader, any student of the leadership challenge will enjoy this book. MAJ Charles E. Roller, USA, University of Missouri al Kansas C@, Missouri

and times of John A. Lejeune, the 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Tmcing Lejeunes ancestral lineage as far back as the 1730s, Bartlett establishes the roots of this young mans upbringing on a sugar plantation in Louisiana, his parents desire to educate their only son, his successhd career as a US Marine Corps officer and, in his later years, his tenure as president of Virginia Military Institute (vMI). His first exposure to the military occurred at Louisiana State University, where he was a student and a cadet for three years. Unfortunately, due to post-Civil War economic conditions, Leje&es parents could not afford to continue sending him to the university. However, Lejeune was able to secure an appointment to the US Naval Academy and, in 1884, begin his studies at Annapolis, Maryland. Lejeune soon discovered that his life was not oriented toward the life of a sailor but, rather, that of a Marine. He was an excellent student and, as such, was expected to become a US Navy officer.

Due to the ideology of that era, the best academic students were destined for the fleet; the also rans were commissioned as Marine officers. After a bitter controversy regarding this matter, Lejeune was finally granted a commission as a US Marine Corps second lieutenant in 1890.
Lejeune participated in several skirmishes in the Caribbean Basin, but he really gained prominence in 1918 when he took command of the Fourth Marine Brigade in France during World War I, blazing a trail of glory for the Marine Corps and the American Expeditionary Forces. Quickly rising to command a division and pinning on a second star, Lejeune witnessed the end of the war in November 1918 and reverted to occupational duty in Germany until 1919. On 30 June 1920, Major General Lejeune was administered the oath of office as the 13th commandant. Bartlett presents a detailed account of these years in office and the many trials and tribulations accredited to Lejeunes legacy. Retiring in 1929, Lejeune was offered the helm of VMI, where he appli&l his renowned leadership to its bettermen~.- Lejeune retired from VMI- on 1 October 1937, and he passed away on 20 November 1942.

L~ElJSl13 A Marines Life, 1867-1942 by Merrill L. Bartlett. 214 pages. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC. 1991.$24.95. Merrill L. Bartlett, a former Marine, has conducted an excellent background study into the life

n-is is an excellent, well-documented and hardhitting book. The author provides vivid insight into the political and military giants of that era, detailing how they used their power and influence to effect national policy. It covers a period when the United States was at a crossroad in its place in world affairs,deciding what role its military establishment would play. / COL C. E. Hatch, USMC,
Mmne Barracks, Yokosukq Japan






HAIGS COMMAND A Reassessment by Ilmis Winter. 362 pages. Vikin~ Penguin, New York. 1991. $27.95. One of the great mysteries to students of military history is the large number of books written about World War II as compared to those relatively few written about World War I. Perhaps World War I was so horrible it tends to be forgotten. Historically, this is a pity because World War II was really art extension of World War I, which ended with an armistice and a treaty (Versailles) that served Adolf Hitler very well for a political start. This book on the stewardship of Field Marshal Douglas Haig during his tenure of command of the British Army is instructive. According to Denis Winter, the author, the recent public release of many official records provides a rich lode to be mined to determine exactly how the war was fought at the

highest levels of the civilian and military leadership. The documents, now available, present a different view than those espoused by the principal actors, long since dead. Winter categorically states: Haig had systematically falsified the records of his military career, underpinning the most important years with a diary written for circulation in his own cause during the war, and rewritten in his own favor der it. . . . The official record of the war-political as well as military-had been systematically distorted both during the war as propaganda, and after it, in the official history . . . Huge gaps in the wars documentation remain. . . . A glimpse of how much we are missing in the areas is offered by the National Archives at Washington, which holds a magnificent collection of documents copied by the American

Official History Tam during-the 1920s. . . What we are missing is suggested by the records of the Austra-

Putting together a concise history of the American Civil War inHISTORY OF THE CIVIL terspersed with interesting paintings is a daunting project. UrkortunateWAR by Richard Humble. 264 pages. Iy,this book misses the mark, The research will mislead the new student 1#9~~ Press,Philadelphia,PA. 1991. and turn off the historian. Many of the paintings chosen portray fiction. . alized accounts of the battles they represent. Either Time-Lifes Brother Aguimt Brother or The Civd Wm: An MustrutedHistory by Geoffrey
Ward, et al,, is a better choice for anyone interested in this type of book.-MAJ David A. Rubenstein, USA, Me&xd Service Corps, Falls Church, Viinia THE ILLUSTRATED

COMANCHE 6: Company Commander, Wetnarn by James L. Estep. 254 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1991.$19.95.

Of his four tours in Vietnam, it was during his 19671968 tour with the 1st Air Cavalry that the author was known as Comanche 6, C Company commander. Estep faithfdly recreates much of his wartime dialogue in this highly readable and occasionally humorous chronicle. The books leadership situations are stereotypical, yet instructive. Comanche 6 is a good war story, unimpeded by the many conundrums of the Nam. MAJ Wflliam R. Grewe, USA, O@ce of the Chk?f of Army Reserves, Washington, D. C. Ir-korrnative and highly readable, this campaign history covers the four decades tier the American Civil War when the regiment helped subjugate the Indians of the Northern Plains, chased (Jacob S.) Coxeys Army, suppressed mine and railroad strikes, fought the Spanish in Cuba and took on Emilio Aguinaldos insurgents in the Philippines. Because of its diverse experiences, the 22d epitomizes the US Army, as a whole, during this era. The author relies heavily on excerpts from soldien diaries to build his narrative, especially Colonel Jacob E Kreps journal, which makes the book both more entertaining and more memorable than the conventional campaign history.-MAJ Arthur T. Coumbe, USAR, Florida Army Nolional Gw~ Homes@ad, Floridk

COMBAT DIARY Episodes from the History of the Twenty Second Regiment, 1866-1905 by A. B. Feuer. 184 pages. Praeger Publishers, New York. 1991, $29.95.



lian and Canadian corps, retained by those bodies from 1916 and, therefore, immune from the Cabinet Offices mincing machine. Some very important lessons may be derived from reading the book: . The relationships between and among senior statesmen and senior military officers must be profoundly professional, . The relationship between an Army commander and his corps commanders must be professional, as well as personal. . Professional soldiers who are overly concerned about their memoirs assuredly should not be concerned about their place in history, at least, not if their historical stature is to be in any way favorable. . Raising, provisioning, maintaining, sustaining, training and resourcing a conscript Army is a study and a profession unto itself.

. The game of politics in high places is not the sport of amateum Harry S. Tmman said, If you want a friend in Washington, buy yourself a dog. This book suggests that the London and Paris of World War I could easily be substituted for the Washington of Tmmans time. . If you end Up commanding an Army that suffers casualties in the millions, do not be surprised if the government does not offer you the job of secretary of veterans affairs in the postwar period. . One step toward being a successful commander is respecting your allies, as well as having an understanding of joint and combined warfare, not just the operational aspects, but particularly the logistical and administrative finctions. It also helps if you have a modicum of understanding of the internal and external economic and political dynamics of your friends and enemies.

MUST~G ACE Memoirs of a P-51 Fighter Pilot by Robert J. Goebel. 226 pages. Pacifica Press, Pacifica, CA. 1991.$24.95.

While not of major literary or historical significance, this book is better than most fighter jock books. It exposes a 19yeardd pilots mortality, his exploits and growing pains during the tempest of World War 11. From basic flying training, to escorting B-24s and El 7s over the Balkans, to that final realization in September 1944 that his war was over, Robert J. Goebel intersperses his memoirs with the many technical intricacies of flying propeller+kiven aircraft. While definitely overpriced, the book is hard to put down.<~ Marvin W. Wlerenga Jr., USAF, 410 LQg&tic Suppmt Squa&on, K. I. Sawyer AU Force Base, Michigan


American Foreign Policy and the Disintegration of the USSR. Edited by Michael Mandelbaum. 120 pages. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. 1991. $14.95 paperback.

Despite the fact that their presentation predated the August 1991 coup
by nearly 10 months, these five papers presented at a symposium on Soviet nationalities and US foreign policy in October 1990 retain much of their relevance in the postcoup environment. The authors, noted Soviet experts from academia, all predicted the breakup of the Soviet Union. The collections strength is its careful blend of historical analysis with insightfd recommendations for the fhture direction of US policy in dealing with the collapse of the Soviet Union.MAJ James F. Gebhard$ USA, Retied, Leavenworth, Kansas

T. Wesolowski and Tom DeVoe. 266 pages. The Emperors Press, Chicago, IL. 1991.$30.00.

This superb book focuses on a very narrow topic of the Napoleonic era. The authors have provided a very complete historical work on the Polish and Saxon armies that fought extensively during the period. This book lays out the organization, unit and uniform details, as well as the major personalities in the Polish militaty structure. It is superbly illustrated, including 16 pages of beautifd color uniform plates. In short, this book has everything you always wanted to know about these armies of the Napoleonic wars but could not find anywhere else .MAJ Gary D. Rhay, USA, Combal Studies Ins@u&,


August 1992


. Finally, if Haig was the best of a bad lot of British generals, there is a message for politicians to be careful before making decisions to fight without qualified engineers to drive the trains. Winter is particularly savage toward the fighting qualities and abilities of Americans in general and General John J. Pershing in particular. Having stirred the pot, Winter may have put too much hot pepper in the soup to have this repast be palatable

to the friends and fxs alike of both Haig and Pershing. One can imagine the resulting clamor if the book had been written while some of the players were still alive. Perhaps someone will be challenged to explore further Winters allegations and judgments of this period of history.
LTG Richard G. Ikefry, USA, Retired, Cl@On, Viqynia

THE CERTAIN TRUMPET: Maxwell Taylor and

the Experience in Vtetnam by Douglas Kinnard. 252 pages. Brasseys(US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991.$22.95. Maxwell D. Taylor is a readily identifiable historical figure whose career invites controversy and Opinions of his motives and heated discussion. character vary greatly. Douglas Kinnards new book adds to this controversy. S. L. A. Marshall once wrote that Taylor was interested in power for its own sake, implying Taylor was constantly trying to increase his own influence and stature. The schoolof-thought on the Vietnam War associated with General Bruce Palmer Jr. and Colonel Harry Summers blames Taylor, to a large degree, for the governments use of incrementalism in dealing with North Viemam and for a host of other faults. Andrew Krepinevich even went so fm as to indicate that Taylor folded on the issue of introducing troops into Vlemam in 1965. Krepinevich thus holds that Taylor did not have the courage of his convictions to stand up to President Lyndon B. Johnson and resist what Taylor knew was a bad policy decision. Taylors son, and recent biographer, claims that Taylor strove to do his duty in accordance with his military credo, but the problems involved with Vietnam finally got the best of Taylor as they did so many other strong historical figures. The book is not a biography of Taylor, Instead, it is a book about Vietnam using Taylors life as a prism to tell thg story of the wars high-level deci;ion making. Unfort&ately, it is a be~er biography than analysis of the war. Kinnard makes his biggest contributions in his discussions of Taylors time as chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Taylors time as ambassador and, in the final chapter, where he pres-

ents a none-too-flattering interpretation of Taylor. Kinnard states that he once worked for Taylor and, fi-om then on, dealt with Taylor throughout his career. The books tone indicates these dealings were not pleasant. Kinnard does not appear to have any respect for Taylors capabilities; throughout the work, Kinnard slips in pejorative comments indicating his distaste for the general. Kinnard has used almost every source of primary material available in his search for information about Taylor and his role. Numerous interviews were conducted with the major playexs and junior staffers that moved through his life. Moreover, Kinnard obviously spent a great amount of time and effort poring through the files of the John E Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson presidential libraries, as well as Taylorspapers at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Yet, for all of this, there are only two or three chaptem that add new material to the historiological issues surrounding Taylor. There are mechanical problems with the book as
well. Sources are not always indicated in a fashion that allows for an independent verification. And, in a number of locations, Kinnard falls back on the journalistic trick of quoting an unnamed source for unflattering and antagonistic comments. This is not an acceptable or ethical practice for historical

writing and- brings into qu&tion several of the points Kinnard tries to make. Kinnard presents Taylor as an aloof, power oriented historical figure with flexible ethics that benefited him in a politicized military environment. It is not a flattering portrait. Yet, Kinnards book is a worthwhile contribution to the material on Taylor. The book should be read . . . but with these caveats in mind. It is not the final word on Taylor, only one viewpoint that has a number of flaws.
MAJ Michael W. Cannon, USA, Heudguun%, US Army Forces Commar@ Fort McPherson, Georgid

BURNSIDE by William Marvel. 514 pages. The University of Norrh Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC. 1991. $29.95. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, so ofien portrayed as a bumbling incompetent, has long deserved this more balanced treatment offered by William Marvel. The careers of few figures in the American Civil War offer more breadth. Burnside initially helped secure a Iodgrnent along the North Carolina coast; commanded a corps at the battle of Antietam and, later, the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg; was transferred to the Western theater and fought the campaigns around Knoxville in 1863; and, then, returned to the Army of the Poto-


August 1992



mac under Ulysses S. Grant in 1864, where he again commanded his Ninth Corps in the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor and Petersburg. The image of BurnSide lefi by many contemporaries and by historians has usually been a tarnished one: a BurnSide whose tardiness in attacking the Confederate right at Antietam prevented a decisive victory; whose tactical blunders wasted thousands of lives in a gamble at Fredericksburg; whose delays around Knoxville prevented reinforcement of the fkderal army defeated at Chickamauga; and whose illconceived attack at the Battle of the Crater wasted even more lives in the trench lines around Petersburg. Marvel, however, goes beyond these often superficial analyses to show BurnSide as a man of some gifts. In his independent command of the expedition against the North Carolina coast, BurnSide planned, supplied and commanded a complex and risky joint venture that provided one of the few federal successes in the winter of 1862. In each of his commands, BurnSide proved himself to be a leader who selflessly bore the responsibility for failure but willingly shared the glory for success with subordinates. His concern and respect for his soldiers was returned by the men who served in his Ninth Corps. BurnSide was also a dedicated professional who ofien drove himself to the brink of exhaustion in the performance of his duties. By examining the roles of his subordinates and superiors in each key campaign, Marvel tries to dismantle the myth of Bumside the Incompetent. Marvels approach of diverting the blame for failure, however, only partially exonerates, for the BurnSide who emerges from this study is never a great commander. Marvel finds his dedication and concern admirable, yet rightly criticizes him for trusting subordinates who so often proved incapable. This is a man who reached his level of competence as a corps commander. BurnSide, to his credit, recognized this and did not seek higher levels of responsibility for which he was unprepared. Bumside was indeed a most honest and loyal comrade, a good and hardworking man who served with dedication. It was his misfortune to serve in an era when a man of his limitations was forced to deal with weak subordinates and unsupportive superiors. In sum, Marvels wellwritten and carefdly researched study of Burnside is a necessary and useful piece of the rich history of the American Civil War. Moreover, accounts such as this, which examine the lessthangreat captains, can offer useful insights for modem serving professionals. he wonders how a man of BurnSides talents and dedication would fare in our modem Army, buttressed by

trained and competent subordinates and superiots LTC John I. Boxberger, USA, Nutionul Tnzinzng Centefi Fort Irwin, California

PEMBERTON: A Biography by Michael B. Ballard. 250 pages. University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, MS. 1991. $29.50. General John C. Pemberton was one of a few Northern-born officers who sided with the South. His wife, a Virginian, is felt to have had a great influence in his decision. But this loyalty would make life difficult both professionally and personally. His switch in allegiance brought enmity from his hometown and birthplace-Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-and the North as a whole, and it caused distrust among many in the South. Michael B. Ballards treatment of his subject, based on in-depth research and covering Pembertons lifespan, allows us to fully understand the man and his reaction to the events in which he participated. Pembertons moral courage is unquestionable, and his strengths and weaknesses were clear to those who chose to see them. His early US Army career was one of a garrison soldier and staff officer-he preferred a more comfortable life than that of a campaign. He was not a leader who led from the front but one who orchestrated from the rear. It is here that his true talent as an organizer is best seen. With independent command, Pemberton mishandled or misdirected his assets. Had he been subordinate to another providing a clearer vision of purpose, his efforts would have been more productive and beneficial to the cause. Another of Pembertons failings was his inability to grasppolitical issues and deal with politicians. The fi-iction thus caused brought about a lack of confidence in his abilities, which ultimately led to his being removed from South Carolina and sent to Mississippi. In Mississippi, Pembertons organizational abilities were once again manifested. He even learned a few lessons in handling politicians. As the campaign began and developed, General Ulysses S. Grant was successful in disguising his intentions to the detriment of the southern forces ability to concentrate. In short, Pemberton was outmaneuvered and out thought by Grant. Pemberton became bottled up in Vicksburg, lost his force, the city and access to the West. He never divined that a force in being, aggressively handled, was the best defense. The fall of Vicksburg to Grant in July 1863 was a crushing blow to the South, an event so, bitter that Vicksburg did not celebrate the Fourth of July again until 1944. Grants reward as victor was the command of the Army of the Potomac. Pembertons ,.






reward was shame, recrimination and a struggle to redeem his reputation. Following the surrender, Pemberton requested and received a demotion to lieutenant colonel of artillery so that he could continue to serve and try to restore his reputation. For all his efforts, he is and will be known as the man who surrendered Vicksburg. MAJ Wllliarn T. Bohne, USA, Nutiomd Simulation Cente~ CombinedAnns Command-Tmirung, Foti Leavenworth, Kansas

of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1991. $ 40.00. Bernard Brodie was the United States foremost civilian student of and writer about nuclear warfare. His accomplishments and his shortcomings in dealing with this phenomenon say a great deal about US strategists and strategy. If Brodie could not solve the key conundrum-what do we do with nuclear weapons if deterrence ever fails ?has anyone of us, at any level of authority, come to grips with the weapons we possess? Barry H. Steiner tells us that Brodie was an eloquent, brilliant and penetrating critic; however, he was not a great military theorist because he might criticize all policies on the table. In effect, he selected none of the above. In the 1950s, when

strike capability. It also meant, according to Brodie, prevention, through deterrence, of escalation. Hence, Brodie would etiorce limits on war with threats to expand war. He would use what other Americans cursed: the great lack of certainty (to put it mildly) that we could keep anything larger than a border skirmish nonnuclear. What would happen, however, if the United States relied on nuclear deterrence and nuclear deterrence failed? To Brodie, of all people, . . . this was not a far-fetched academic exercise. He, in particular, always emphasized that mankind will be molded by a range of rational, semi-rational, and nonrational judgments or impressions charged with emotion, oken unconscious, and that passion and fear are inseparable from war. How stable are the hands on the nuclear triggers? So far, so good. But as Thomas Schelling, another civilian strategist wrote: There is no cheap, stie way of using nuclears that scares the wits out of the Russians without scaring us too. Steiners Iwok makes it very clear that Brodie never solved this problem. Neither has anybody else. Michael D. Pearlman, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

massive nuclear retaliation was the primary US strategy, Brodie dissected and exposed the errors in the doctrine of the Strategic Air Command. It proposed using thermonuclear weapons in the same way conventional bombs were used in World War II. Brodie quite sensibly worried that, in the nuclear age, the standard military desire to accomplish decisive results as quickly as possible [could] quickly degenerate into pure terroristic destruction. He wrote in the mid-1950s, War has an inherent and almost necessary tendency to be orgiastic. But that does not argue that we must always surrender to that tendency. US diplomacy will have to be backed by a more conventional and diversified kind of force. People who listened to Brodie in the 1950s assumed power in the 1960s. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the John E Kennedy administration then enhanced conventional military forces so that the United States would have some practical alternatives to strategic weaponry. Brodie, however, criticized them for reducing the power of the threat of nuclear warfare to deter conflict between the superpowers He maintained that the thermonuclear balance of terror was both stable and useful. More nuclear weapens meant less possibility for a first

IN MORTAL COMBAT: Ko~, 1950-1953 by JohrI Toland. 624 pages. William Morrow& Co., Inc., New York. 1991.$25.00. John Tolands latest book has all the strengths and weaknesses of his earlier, popular histories of World War 11 such as The Rising Sun, Infamy, The But& of the BuJge and Adolf I-Ma. He writes a
strong &irrative ~f events wi~ an eye for detail and adds comments from a fascinating range of characters who participated in those events. Not content with the US side of the story (told better by Clay Blair in his The Forgotten War and by Roy E. Appleman in his series of books on Korea), Toland assembles stories from Chinese volunteers, North Korean prisonem of war and war correspondents, as well as US soldiets This personal touch adds much realism to the conflict and provides, especially in the various Chinese and North Korean accounts, unique perspectives on a multifaceted war, now no longer forgotten. The weaknesses are just as apparent. He lists sources at the end of the book, but his lack of footnotes challenges the reader to match the borrowed quote from the unique account and glean the primary source account from the secondaty. His penchtit, as well, of relying upon the Setiationai accounts of journalists and the personal anecdotes of their own reactions under fire-surely a case of







journalists as newswill test the patience of the military reader. The fact that most of his US soldiers narratives seem to have been those gathered by journalists (and mostly of US Marines at that) seems to indicate that Toland has adopted an anecdotal approach to war. This anecdotal approach so common to popular histories-leaves the reader begging for more analysis of what each quote or story means. They are too often taken at face value. A more serious problem is Tolands seeming acceptance, at face value, of numerous Chinese or North Korean stories. In more than one instance, for example, Toland repeats North Korean and Chinese assertions about atrocities committed by US and Republic of Korea soldiets against their prisoners of war but does not attempt to answer these charges. In addition, he deliberates for a page or two on Chinese accusations that the United States used biological warfare (BW) and states, research in Japan and the United States has subsequently confirmed many of the essentials of the Chinese charges. Although he later backs away and concludes that it is difficult for me to believe that BW was waged by the United States, or that, conversely, the Chinese leadership did not sincerely believe they were the victims of BW. Such tossing off of charges and research results without listing any reputable sources highlights the essentially journalistic nature of this book. Despite its faults, this book is still worth reading. It does have a wide variety of personal accounts from the Chinese and Korean perspective that pose questions to any student of the war, although many such accounts must be read with a jaundiced eye. It could be wished, however, that Toland had stuck closer to his title and presented more combat narratives of soldiers on both sides of the conflict. The title, after all, gives the reader the impression that the book is mainly about combat rather than high level politics and international wrangling. For the US Soldiem side of the story of the Korean War, I recommend that the reader stick to Blair. Richard W. Stewart Cmmnand Historiim, US Army Special Opemtions Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

academic, rather than prescriptive and partisan. This book uses a survey approach, initially very

successfully, to exmine the r~lationships be&veen world physical geography, terrain analysis, the geography of battle horn the tactical or operational perspective, motives and behavior of those who start wars and classic spatial ploys. This seemingly simple approach is effective and builds a common basis for further analysis. The narrow focus of this book is both a blessing and a drawback. It is a blessing in that OSullivan fames on the effects of weather and terrain. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, @rations, identifies weather and terrain as having more impact on battle than any other physical factor, including weapons, equipment, or supplies . . . . Indeed, most battles have been won by the side that used terrain to protect itself and to reinforce fires to destroy the enemy. To be effectual, commanders must understand the nature, uses and reinforcement of terrain. The drawback to this approach is that the author may assign more weight to geographical factors in an analysis of effectiveness than would normally be considered. For example, he offers that the blitzkrieg into the Soviet Union failed because of the Soviet defensive use of the terrain and the winter. Tme enough, yet, he does not adequately address shortcomings of the Welwrnaclulogistic system. OSullivans analytical focus works particularly
well in two sections. First, in War in Cities, he clearly points out shortcomings in FM 90-10, MiliHis tary Operations on LMxznizedTmuin (MOUT). simple, straightforward approach leads the reader to conclude that this FM needs review and updating, a point on which OSullivan agrees. Second, his

TERRAIN AND TACTICS by Patrick OSullivan.

182 pages. Greenwood Press, Inc., Westport, CT. 1991. $42.95. ,. The chair of the Department of Geography at Florida State University, Professor Patrick OSullivan has produced his latest work on military geography. In this book, he concentrates on the significance of location, distance, landscape and climate in determining the outcome of war. The book is analytic and

chapter analyzing the interaction of geopolitics, strategy, tactics and terrain in Northern Ireland effectively integrates his previous work and focuses on the impact of terrain on the current situation. I found myself wanting a little of the prescriptive approach to some of the shortcomings OSullivan identified. I also wish he would have used the tactical-, operational and strategiclevel approach to his work. He tends to go suddenly from the perspective of the foxhole to the geopolitical approach without considering the appropriate operat ional level concerns.
Out of this work emerges a constant theme: Awareness of the terrain is critical to success. The value of terrain analysis is reinforced. The need for study and understanding of the terrain is clearly driven home. I recommend this book for operationally oriented planners. MAJ Joseph A. Ketch Jr,, USA, US Atlantic Comma@ Norfolk, Virginia