Militarv Review

The Professional Journal of the US Army October 1981

Yorktown: "The Bridge"

.. .see page 15


Secretary of the Army Commandant Deputy Commandant

Military Review


BRING BACK THE LRRP by Lieutenant Colonel Henry G Gole, US Army THE MAKING OF A TACTICIAN by Colonel Clyde J. Tate, US Army YORKTOWN: "THE BRIDGE" by Major John A. Rerchley, US Army OFFENSIVE SPIRIT: THE VITAL INGREDIENT by Lieutenant Colonel lgor D. Gerhardt. US Army THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGE COMPETENCE by Malor Kurt E Muller, US Army Reserve COHESION-FINDING THE KEY by Major (P) James P. lsenhower Jr.. US Army WILL AFGHANISTAN BECOME THE SOVIET UNION'S VIETNAM? by Major Terry L. Heyns, US Air Force TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE PRACTICAL SIDE by Malor Wriiram R. r/lcKrnney, US Army VULNERABILITY IS NOT AN ADEQUATE STRATEGY by Keith B. Payne and Neil Pickett REVIEWS the best from other journals LETTERS NEWS BOOKS contemporary readrng for the professronal

MILITARY REVIEW 15publtshed monthly In Engltsh and Spanlsh and quarterly In Portuguese Use of funds for prtntlng tnts publlcatlon approved by Headquarters. Department of the Army, 25 Aprtl 1980 Controlled c~rculatlonpostage pald at Leavenworth. KS 66048 and Topeka. KS 66606 English-language SubSCrlptlOnS $12 00 per year US and APOIFPO: $14 00 foretgn Slngle coples $1 50 US and APOIFPO $1 75 forelgn Address all mall to Mtlltary Revlew. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth KS 66027 T e l e ~ h o n e 1913) 684-5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642 Unless otherw~se stated. the h e w s here~n are those of the autnors and are not necessarrly tnose of tnc Deparlment of Defense al s l r l b ~ t ! o n ,s one per qeneral offlcer ana one per flve field or any element thereo' Basas of o f f t c ~ a grade off~cers of the Actlve Army, and one per headquarterslbattalton and htgherkof the Army Nattonal Guard and the US Army Reserve MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-830) US ISSN 0026-4148

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Command and Control Special Issue
From time to time, Military Review devotes an entire issue to a singlepubject instead of following the usual practice of publishing a variety of articles in each issue. November will be one of those occasions. The Military Review, for that month, will concentrate on various aspects of command and control. Th articles, written in response to. a request in the January 198 issue, present the varied views of commanders and staff officers as well as others commenting on the subject.



Command and control is an extremely complex matter and is critical to the success of any unit on the battlefield. It is a topic that demands the full attention of every commander a t every level. With technological advances being made every day and new equipment being fielded, it becomes increasingly more difficult for commanders to understand fully the capabilities of their units and the means by which the units can be best employed to accomplish their missions. This is why the November issue will explore different facets of the subject. Don't miss it.


US Army rn The Command and Control System of the Future-NOW Lieutenant Colonel Bernard L. Command and Control-Restoring the Focus Major Denn~s H.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MILITARY REVIEW U S ARMY COMMAND & GENERAL SWFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVEN WORT^^ KANSAS 66027 OFFICIAL BUSINESS POSTAGEAND FEES PAID DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY DOD 314 . Starry. - Articles to Watch For: Command and Control: An Overview General Donn A.I CGSC L B L 5 15 DEC 79 . US Army and David P. J. PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE S3W *I \ . US Army . Porreca . Long. Verdier..

tlce Depart rrwut of Defense or any other couernment office or ogmwy —Editor HE US Army force structure reveek a glaring gap. Gole. The combat intelligence and target acquisition capabilit y inherent in Iong-rsmge reconnaissance T 2 October .LRRP Lieutenant Colonel Henry G.cle are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the posi tmn of L)LP Department of the Army. US Army . The uzeu. expressed m thzs art.

Despite well-reasoned recommendations based upon rigorous research t~t the gap be filled. B. Edison and Robert S. Thw art!cls was prePared as an Occasional Carlisle Barracks. The gadgets did everything but produce victory. one of the most pressing is knowledge of the enemy in front of him or on his flauks~ and how that enemy cau affect the friendly commander’s mission. seismic and acoustical devices. This defect demands attention. Among the many concerns of a corps or division commander engaged in combat. and much reliance is placed upon gadgets to acquire targets in the enemy’s rear area. McNamara. the gadgets produced by American imagination and industry were fitted into military organizations in some sensible proportion. In Vietnam. defoliants. people-sniffers. those of the LRRP. particularly during the earliest phases of combat in Europe. Our unwillingness to provide LRRPs to corps and division commanders stems largely from two US military biases: overreliance upon gadgetry and aversion to elite organizations. patrols (LRRPs) has been almost totally erased since our Vietnam experience. outgunned and outmaneuvered. We have deprived him of one of the best sources of that knowledge. industry and in the wars we have fought. The author fears that the lack of an LRRP capability and the limitations of machines will mean that our Army in Earope will be outmanned.’ The continuing lack of an essential capability is a serious deficiency for which we will pay in blood. a people subconsciously convinced that the answer to most human problems can be found in a laboratory. From Benjamin Franklin through Samuel F. Improvisation in war is not the answer. we have been pragmatic fixers of problems. mixing men and the products of our highly developed technology. system or gadget. Gadgets Fascination with gadgets is deeply im- bedded in American culture and bas served us well in commerce. especially in the US Afmy in Europe. Thomas A. particularly in the critical early stages of war. probably out of frustration due to the inability of the nation which placed the first man on the moon to defeat an elusive enemy running around the jungle at night. The New York Times reported on the progress of the US 9th Division. Recently. Our NATO atlies and the Soviet Union maintained the LRRP capability because they appreciate this human source of combat intelligence. US Army War College. Pennsylvania PaPer at the Strat@91C Stud!es 1981 3 .LRRP The LRRP has been erased from the US Army’s force structure. A fence was built between the North and the South. no action has beet taken to provide combat commanders with the very best eyes and ems available to them. Morse. This so-called high-technology diviIn$tdute. all sense of proportion was lost. our commanders in Europe need LZRPS now. radas and sundry black boxes were tried and more bombs were dropped in Vietnam than on Adolf Hitler’s Germany. Until the war in Vietnam.

2 [n addition to demonstrating that the Army development system is not responsive to small-quantity specialized equipment needs. prepared to continue to exaggerate the capability of sensitive machines and to denigrate or ignore the reliability of the best gatherer and reporter–man with a good radio transmitter. Even the hardware a generation removed from Vietnam-era acoustical and visual equipment breaks down and requires maintenance. We are in danger of failing to make the critical distinction between equipping men and manning equipment.. Even when tolerated and given a place in our force structure. about organizations outside of the divisioneJ structure. This allegation alienated conventional officers who were dubious. They did jobs quite removed from their primary mission of training. equipment u~asbought off the shelf from a cmmrnercial radio supply store. while humidity or freezing temperatures play tricks on machines and operators. the latest technology must be exploited and employed to do things men cannot do as well as machines and to supplement human capabilities wherever possible.RRPs and the human dimension of combat intelligence and target acquisition: A battalion specializing in collecting e[ectrontc intelligence.’ but they were often maldeployed in Korea as ordinary line companies. the cited p-assage ascribes a kind of magic capability to the latest in scientific devices. and machines fail to function just when one has been conditioned to rely upon them. The US Army seems . the demise of reconnaissance units after the Vietnam experience was probably more than a case of throwing the baby out with the bath water. Thus. Special Forces units were severely reduced in number in the post-Vietnam years after establishing an admirable combat record doing the hazardous and dirty little jobs in Vietnam. motik. an expression more of a wish than a description of operational reliability. Some of its aeu.ating. and gathering infirrmatian by ground radar has already begun to run tests. equipping and leading dissident elements deep inside denied areas. the US Army has historically viewed elite troops with suspicion. For reasons not entirely clear (perhaps it is only to be expected of the developers of the assembly line and interchangeable parts). Certainly. in any event. Intelligence was mentioned in one paragraph of The NeuI York Times account and underlines the point of this plea by failing to mention I. Operators still become numb staring at screens and ccmcentrating on sounds. Human beings make mistakes. jammtng enemy communicatzorzs and radar.. MILITARYREVIEW siotr is engaged in a number of innovative trials to produce a force light enough for rapid strategic deployment and potent enough to sustain itself on a modern battlefield. The fact that some of the assigned dirty little jobs were not necessary contributed to the suspicion that Special Forces units in Vietnam were running their own shadow war. Elephants are confused with tanks and monkeys with men. Ranger units covered themselves with glory in World \Var 11. elite units were often misused. It was part of the attempt to purge the Army of 4 (lctober . The error we are inclined to make is to rely too heavily upon hardware when experience dictates that a mix of reconnaissance men and machines is the bes~ means for gathering and reporting combat intelligence.

Also. naissance missions. The po’int is that. We had great difficulty in deciding to leave that international badge of the paratrooper. hfeyer as he considers establishing something like the British Regimental System in the US Army. a prob. Recondo School at the Project Lklta compound in Nha Trang.of elite troops–Rangers. and created them. In the contest belween standardization an ~ excellence. a mission requiring special techniques beyond those normally found in US rifle companies. 1981 .” not led. Targets will be “serviced. Beginning in 1966. Project Delta. Men will be “managed. The Modern Volunteer Army prefers the American corporation to the Foreign Legion as its model. Uniqueness seems to violate somelhing ip the soul of US Army leadership. was tasked to train the divisional reconnaissance teams. the 75th Rangers would make their contribution to the reconnaissance mission in Vietnam for the divisions and separate brigades.LRRP all taints associated with that war. Special Forces and reconnaissance meh-rankied conventional officers. Elite units will be disbanded after our wars and resurrected as shots are fired in anger again. Westmoreland who formalized ad hoc arrangements between the divisions and 5th Speciaf Forces Group by creating the US Military Assistance Command. The Vietnam Lesson It did not take division commanders in Vietnam long to recognize that LRRPs would be required to find the enemy if the division was to fm and fight him. Some Special Forces soldiers were diverted to divisions to organize and lead LRRP units. Army leadership understandably devotes most of its attention to di&ions.’ LaLer in the war. Our Army wants tigers in combat but prefers docile pussycats in time of peace. We lament the absence of esprit among our troops while disbanding organizations which demonstrate high morale or stripping them of its outward signs. they were promptly disbanded in peace. commanders determined to remedy that deficiency from within their own resources. Vietnam. it was understood by General William C. Lacking an LRRP capatillity. a 5th Special Forces Group element which conducted in-country recon. lem understood by General Edward C. standardization wins every time. in war. One hopes that what he accomplishes will not be reversed by his successor to be born again under his successor’s successor. hut essential. To suggest that a rifle squad—even the best rifle squad in a company—possesses the resourcefulness required for Lhe exacting and hazardous r& connaissance mission is to fail in understanding the demands of such work. precision instruments in the LOO1box.but it erroneously neglects the less frequently used. bngzrdes and battalions. . w) needed LRRPs. This was clearly recognized by division commanders who demanded reconnaissance elements of their own.’ .” not destroyed. The self-confidence. The divisional soldiers brought a willingness and sense of adventure to Nha Trang and acquired there the techniques developed by Project Delta from experience on the ground. aggressiveness and competence . the red beret. a steady stream of reconnaissance trainees passed through Nha Trang to acquire those soldier skills necessary for the demands of the reconnaissance mission. where it belongs–on the trooper’s head.

he had difficulty in spotting tanks known to be at a given location. We cannot afford to be blind and outflanked. }Ie never d]d see them. They will move during periods of limited visibility and make good use of camouflage. in flying an A lO on a clear day over a range in the American South. There will be a paucity of reliable combat intelligence.MILITARY REVIEW Next Time The problem for the US Air Force and Army field artillery is less one of killing targets than acquiring them. Soviet movement at night and under the concealment provided by foul weather will compound the problem of finding the target. it is unlikely that commanders will be given the time to organize. An outmanned and outgunned US Army could be outmaneuvered as well. Gadgetry in Europe will suffer a high failure rate due to cloud cover and limited visibility. Also. Lack of combat intelligence and the absence of an LRRP capability in our divisions and corps in Europe will require our commanders to improvise again— next time. Thoee who would invest hope in Special . An Air Force colleague reports that. particularly in the critical first hours and days of combat when fast-moving and numerous Soviet forcee will confuse our efforts to find them so that they can be fixed and fought. Firepower is impotent if the target is not located. The same problems will become obvious m artiUery reaches out to the 35-kilometer range planned for our new indirect fire weapons. deceiving us with phony emissions and exercising great communications discipline. train and deploy reconnaissance teams in the early stages of the next war. the Soviete will play their strong cards by jamming our electronic. Furthermore. Without reliable information about enemy activity. Observed fire controlled by a human be ing remams tbe preferred method. we are in danger of making our already tenuous position worse. It is unlikely that he will be more successful against an enemy adept at concealment in a European environment characterizeckby frequent and protracted periods of limited visibility.

The Europeans invest quafity personnel and priority training in their reconnais- . The excel!ent Special Forces soldiers and Rangers are precisely the kinds of men who could do the LRRP job. tbe only true LRRP capability we currently oqjoy. intelligence and communications skills for combat in a specific corps area in Europe. train for other missions and will be neither available nor familiar with the terrain on which they might be expected to operate. are airbornequalified and cross-trained in medical. commanders in Europe need LRRPs in the force structure now. are unfamiliar with the headquarters wi~h which they will be required to ope] ate—if room on aircraft is found to get them to Europe in the critical early days of war in Europe. in time of peace. Our allies in Europe we fully aware of the need for LRRPs. The Bundeswehr assigns an airborne-qualified LRRP company to each of the three German corps deployed. Speciaf Forces elements me trained for and will be deployed in a strategic mieeion of little immediate interest to corps and division commanders whose tactical concerns will be with an enemy in their immediate neighborhood. so that they will be immediately available in the confused initial phases of combat and as the battle develops. however well-quafified to do the LRRP job. Belgian LRRPs consist of smrdl cells of highly skilled soldiers who remain in four-man teams for years. preparing for that highly speci~lzed role because of other operational requirements. too. but they are not. in fact. Active Army Ranger units. weapons. They. Our excellent Army National Guard Ranger units. The British Special Air Service troops are among the best in the world and prepare for the LRRP mission as do the French and our other European allies. They practice their skills in the area of anticipated combat. conduct excellent training and enjoy a degree of stability and team integrity almost unknown in the US Army.” In brief. They should be assigned to Europe so that commanders and staffs might learn how to use them on terrain and in an environment with which both parent units and LRRPs should be familiar.LRRP Forces or Ranger units to perform the LRRP mission are doomed to disappointment.

Totaf reliance upon gadgets is unsatisfactory to the Europeans and should be to us.4 execution of missions which me short and \. when thinking of Special Forces one should imagine units operating hundreds of miles in the enemy rear over a period of months. The reconnaissance battali6n of the motorized rifle division and tank diwsion includes a long range reconnaissance company designed to operate 100 kilometers behind the enemy forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The ambush. m]ght allow observers behind the enemy’s hnes to broaden the defender’s actions. provide new opportunities to the reconnaissance a role in the destruction of key targets. consisting of teams planned for use 350 kilometers from tbe FEBA. operations requiring daring and superb combat skills.ven among professional soldiers. ” Tasks F. They probably report on a planned schedule. Smaller European armies manage to find the resources to do the reconnaissance job and to do it well. involvement in target destruction—normally by air or indirect fire weapons–increases the probahllity of a team’s detection by the enemy.iolent. The Soviets SJSOhave an LRRP capability at army level. troop locations and movements. Either the enemy intercepts electronic emissions. except in an eqrergency. but also his command posts. Force could he brought to bear by reconnaissance teams effectively acting in a manner similw to those of an advanced or “jump’” command post. They get in. in the midst of a friendly indigenous force. petroleum. radar locations. artillery. even years. ammunition supply points. assenlbly areas. They are normally conducted no deeper in the enemy rear than tactical headquarters. Ranger and Special Forces operations are considered. oils and lubricants points. using short-burst transmissions to minimize detection. par. ‘J’heir main targets are our nuclear delivery means. nuclear delivery means and radar localmns. titularly precision-guided weapons. Reconnaissance men typically provide combat intelligence to higher headquarters to be acted upon by others. fixes the team’s location and attempts to destroy it. New capabibties. The Soviet Union also believes that LRRP teams are necesswy. At the risk of oversimplifying what it is these units do. do the Job and get out. or tbe enemy deduces the presence of a US reconnais- 8 Octobsr . These include not only the point of the enemy’s attack. reserves. aJlowing him to direct and control the destruction of targets he has acquired. howe~er. Tbe team’s con. Tbe team can perform either the intelligence function m. raid or prisoner snatch. there seems to be some blurring of mis-’ sions and roies as LRRP. The reconnaissance team doing the LRRP mission normally avoids direct engagement with the enemy. trol headquarters must sort out tbe LRRP’s priorities on a miss]on basis. command and control facilities. Rapid technological advances in defensive weapons. are the hallmark of Ranger actions. Team members are carefully selected and are subjected to rigorous physical and psychological training. Ranger forces arc characterized by the . The Special Forces soldier is a tough Leacher whose function is training and leading non-US irregular forces deep in the enemy rear.MILITARY REVIEW sance teams. However. a practice to be emulated by the US Army.

tivity when that enemy is mobile and powerful. sea or em. preferably in time of peace. and confidence of the reconnaissance men in those responsible for defining missions. the moJ likely means of positioning reconnaissance teams in the enemy rear would be by the stay-behind technique— that is. it requires close cooperation over time. Europe is the place to begin the return of the LRRP. In a confused battle environment.. the valuable assets in place are best used for the lower risk mission of gathering and reporting intelligence. self-discipline and self-reliance necessary to operate in an atmosphere of danger far from the flagpole. It will be less hazardous for teams which have trained together in the anticipated battle area than for improvised teams hastily put together or for rifle squads without special training. Risking the team’s survivaf is a function of the priority of the target to be destroyed and the difficulty of infiltrating t ms into the lucrative target area. One anticipa s that. ~ . if welltrairred. even fractions of a sec d. can report and. Staff knowledge of the LRRP’s capabilities and limitations in a specific area of operation earns the trust . When thi$rcan be done. . the courage. the reconnaissance mission will be extremely hazardous on a sophisticated European battlefield. .] 9 . We should not overlook a simple truth: Some me~ ihrive on such work. There is a profound difference between information fro’m such a skilled team reportingwhat is being seen in real time and the quality of information provided by a machine emitting squerds or depicting shadowy images. W’hen infiltration is particularly hazardous. trol headquarters. it is also qo~sible to infiltrate teams by land. Thie enhances the ability of headquarters to assess what is yielded by acoustical. Such men equipped with radios capable of trans itting short-bur~t messages lasting ju a few seconds. determination. in addition to providing infor% ation on the enemy to the tactical operations center. seismic or screen displays. the team remains in concealment as the attacker advances until the team is in the enemy rear. teams can be used to dwect target destruction.LRRP sance team by the precision of certain US combat actions. . The human source of combat i telIigence. Commanders desperately need accurate and reliable information on enemy ac. s 1 vive. This relationship does not develop among strangers. The US Army has always had 10 or 20 soldiers in each company-sized unit who prefer operating independently on hlghrisk missions to the often mind-numbing routine of most conventional units. But there is no reason to rely upon one or the other when the commander can have both. Conclusion Clearly. in a European war. It is difficult to believe that we cannbt provide at least one reconnaissance company to each of the two corps commander in Europe and a platoon of reconnaissance teems to each division commander. Of the soldiers inclined to independence and adventure. as well as the training of the teams. It should be obvious that enlightened use of LftRPs requires training and experience by the staff officers at the con. some also poseess the other requieite qualities of the good reconnaissance mar. also assists the 6perator of technical devices and his c6mmander by corroborating with human senses what is displayed on such devices.

NOTES t racks.“ De.o” a“d CO”lrOl of SD..000 men By ltle m!d 1970s.. ntea 0.m era S. that s. Cormrrm”d.. The ACMI system will be established on a 30-mile by 40-mile range on the northern edge of the White Sands Missile Range in the Alamogordo.” !....w Guard . a %.wd lIw w? between the racks a!. Puerto R. c!.. “ U“.” M. the ACMI system will track and display them instantaneously. tell.c Sludles Instrtule Pa. region.. . one comes cesof e. ” 4. the system will tell them the results instantly.!”!. 8“0 comma”.ed) Carlisle Bar W3vmg . cull IO bel.. .... !m 71 8i Halloran..!on.$ ...1 . ?. are currently no LRRP Force. ..t+e?e. 6 The. Called air combat maneuvering instrumentation (ACM I). .! rosa. US Army ... Cubic Corporation’s Defense Systems Division will fabricate.“ Vietnam to SW. w . US Army SPec$e! force.11...s ww down a w..a. slm..“ and 195.0 [.. and installation is to be completed by July 1982...c@! ?OrC..”* w. LRRP ““II. grouPs The Ranger story ... 1980s College con.m!ound d.locwrrmny by Rwger .2 million contract to provide a portion of an air-to-air combat simulation system for training F75 fighter pilots at Holloman Air Force Base. C.Delivery is scheduled for January 1982. 7 Sowef Arm.lar reactivated .al Force.. nro. check out and install the system.<t.0” The?. DePart .. M.!..ts . Urn.00 .S” . As the pilots maneuver their aircraft over the range in mock dogfights.. on “.$$3 Q. An $8...@l.r Strateg. g..”.xmwacm m me . ! 0... po. be!m+ where Ihe . New Mexico.traormnary w!omumce .AG 237 and 564. stand<..gan Army Guard we WW”I. has been awarded to Cubic Corporation by the Naval Air Systems”w and Threat A081ys I.mme+stely to mm 1.. 0.”.” Ih-e rocks o.mttcal wall that #slhe Lvw”l It e. de..s . IW cl)rnbed the rooes w.g the see..” groups and 10... US force Nat..“0 COrnC@ny F 4251h !“1.0 ffa”g...” . .r”es 22 December me”! 01 the Army.0. of 1.! was wh!le lmr” stood at the very edw 01 P. . act. ... E 65t D Inlant r”.“U me 1.. New Mexico.vlg.“ 1974— . Ing the war ..”.ter Comma”O 7980s 0. 3 O.atea . 0. DD 96 12021 a“d 170 5 A fate shared by SPec. d$er..t.0” M.. gzap o.tend..h!”@n D C 1973. 1979...“S”L II mall n. Olier..tcucture COW). nwJn w.. 0.s. anti se.s who. . the . !“lel!.* “o. cleared me top . the system will be utilized in training personnel of the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing in combat tactics.. strength Peaked d.led 10 the DO. US Ann.. a small Ieage awash *81h +Oarnmg water. e.G barbea v/If..t to Develop Rwd The N. o” 2 Richard L.z.Wnnat Q.. ”.. c..!..“ 1950. Range.ctlvated m . .. t.e”e Ih.. Army Work... Combat Simulator Purchaaed.. Arl. ng hooks 10 w). J Kel. e c.. recording their maneuvers on computer tape for later replay and study. Nat. # 10 October . 10!0 w crashing. bVa. men. t“ere were three SIIec.sw3”$ “.. o... a. 7961 1971. ””ce and Sec”r..”!. D.. !Aetn. 1)). l“la”try n. 4 Fri.. .. e wm.y.lh ... ce betwen maw these was ma remnstf.$80 L. .sd$!t.7... DO 27 and 5. SD. As they eimulate firing their missiles electronically. Hoe Iookmg 0.”.0. the seaward . [tie US Army War 102 and 1046 Wnclassrf...cet See Orga”..

In this article. Tactics. the individual must possess a com- B prehensive understanding of the meaning of tactics as well as other related factors. anticipating the future and gaining experience. This definition supapplies to all units —combat. This means ‘ f]e=ning the fundamentals. the author revieu. as well as those of the enemy. This translates into the orderly arrangement and maneuver of friendly units in relation to each other. co qset 1981 11 . in order to make full use of our own potential. reflecting on ths past. In order to build a foundation for becoming an accomplished tactician. ECOMING an accomplished tactician requires much knowledgs. thought and experience.s factors that must be understood and heeded by tactical leaders if they are to be saccessfkl on the battlefield.

but it is the tactical judgment that must be sharpened through in-depth thought. analysis and decisionmaking. One of the oldest # 12 October . Sensing when to decide is important. Capabilittcs a?zd limitations. since no one is perfect. 7erra~n. initative. He must also visualize how the enemy commander can use terrain in the immed]ate vicinity to negate his efforts. we must know as much as possible about the composition of the enemy forces facing us. the smarter commander knows when not to decide. mobility. Organization. Vulnerabilities appear in manY forms such as the misuse of terrain. They may result from equipment limitations or lack of logistical support. Techniques and procedures. Remember that. Decisiorrrnaking Use of the estimate of the situation brings about a logical decision concerning a particular tactical situation. He mrtst be able to look at a position and deter mine how the terrain can be used to hia best advantage. or they may even come about as a result of the enemy’s lo?ation on the battlefield in relation to our forces or to the terrain. A tactician must have a thorough understanding of the capabilitie~ and limitations of each unit–his own as well as those of the enemy. enemy viewpoint as a means of determm]ng just how effective the friendly positions really are. tools we have in the Armv ia the estimate of the situation— the t~ctical problemsolving procese. in the fog of war. fear and arrogance exist on the other side of the forward edge of the battle area too. sarily indecisiveness. avarlable troops and equipment. Itis not enough to know just the organization of umts..Making decisions faster than the enemy translates into aurprise. Before we can properly array our forces on the battlefield. Logical thinking. The opposite of being decisive is not neces. mistakes need to he made before they cost the lives of our soldiers. Innovation can lead to the shering of proven techniques and procedures that may or may port and combat service support – and includes all elements of combat power and the command and control capability nec essary to arrange and rearrange that power on the battlefield. Commanders and their subordinates must have the freedom to make mistakes in training. whether that training is in the classroom or in the field. The tact]cian must appreciate the terrain and the effects it can have on enemy as well as friendly forces. Leaders must be alert for indications of enemy vulnerabilit]es and be prepared to take advantage of the battlefield opportunities they present. procedures and processes essential to becoming a good tactician.These are enemy limits. mass.MILITARY REVIEW . It is relatively easy to train someone in the rules. take might be made. Additionally. The estimate is a timeteated guide that assists the tactician in approaching tough problems in a Iogicd manner. tions that exist due to shortcomings m his organization. Vu/r~erab~/tties. confusion. we must have a detailed knowledge of our ~rganization. It is amazing that so few people are permitted to make tactical decisions when a superior is concerned that a mis. . and so forth on the battlefield. and. They need decisionmeking experience in order to become proficient tacticians. It is necessary to be aware of the amount of time required to complete the decisionmaking process. Additional considerations for the tactician include examining and analyzing avenues of approach from the . On the other hand. doctrine and habits. there may be situations that will dictate that decisions not be made at a particular time. Sometimes. erroneous or incomplete reports.

MAKING OF A TACTICIAN not be found in our doctrine. IArtrinr Doctrine is that which nor. . tech.. leader must think quickly and decide rapidly. vances in t$chnolog~ currentlv u nderwav. It takrs vears of . we must share with each other methods that work. and.uatio}z Although staff coordination and tactics are not the same. it takes time to revise the doctrinal base f3ecause of this dvnamic nature of our profession.nncentrated studv and r. hut the conten. third of the time for the leader and the remaining two-thirds for the suhordinatcs. appllc8t10n I actlcs m a thinking process. avoid set-p]ece SOIU. now long will it take to a~semhle the unit’? What route will he used? Ilow will the unit deplov at the new location’? These m-e all important questions to hr answered. This does not mean that l~adw-s cannot demand. The heart of our strength is t he <oldirr If is courage IS unquestioned. and ]t is authoritative in nature.its . ‘f’here is o limit to u hat a soldier can st and when he is under enemv fire and cwpericnrinc the mortal fear of combat.Staff roord. Another dimension of time and space involves ensuring that there is sufficimrt battlefield space to permit actions that v ill result in a Yavorable situation Thr human dimrnsion. Tacticians must he a~. If the 3d Battalion is given a reinforcing mission. Estimates and orders are products of staff pmcrdures. This is the most important factor on the battlefield. and staff cuorcf ination is the frame t hat h~}lds it toget her Time mana~crnrnt Leaders ond staff officers must think In terms nf tinw management so their subordinates w ill have sufficient time to react properlv A rough guide for allocation of time is readers of military histnrv i’fany lessons are to he found there w hick can prevent us from making the sa]nc mistakes a secnnd time. A leader who diligently employs the factors discussed here as a basis for making sound decisions takes the best ad\. he can do remarkable things. In some cases. It is not as sireple as issuing as order with a wa~..orks best and requires jud~nwnt in its application. Doctrine is not dogma Th$ key point is that judgment mu~t be used i. Use of warning orders. With the large number of doctrine changes and ad. Tactics is the picture.antage of the opportunities for wccess on the battlefield and is a tactician in the 1981 13 . stren~thencd bv all th. thev are closely entwined. A soldier’s coura~c ia battle n>u~t be reborn daily. given the right leadership. tions and apply proven fundamentals . Timr and ~pocr factors Everv tactical decisirm and everv tactical move must be considered in terms of time and space fac- tors. the tactician must consider the route {Who else mav be on the road to be used by the 3d Battalion’>l and the time required for movement (M’ill the battalion get there before the arrival of the enemy’s reserve?). ronnot pu<h or cannot lead }Vhat it does mean is that leaders must know the limits of their solrflers. mallv w.ffort plus n lot of dedication and personal time. niques and procedures merely supplement the doctrine.e of the hand and expecting the id) to he crm]pleted. “be prepared”’ missions and the like help suhnrdinates anticipate accions and priorities. not a mechanical exercise Tacticians must be innoirative.. Chances for success can be improved by choosing the correct techniques and procedures.~ leadership techniques wr have come to know and appreciate in our pr(~fession The study of tactics is an art. judgments and values placed on various alternatives and the suhstanm of the decisions are tactics. . ‘f’act]cs also include respondin~ in timw J sensitive execution situations whmr 111[.

f!. @ 1981. however.wl II i? S fr.d C[vd~J Tat.ded .. 01.{ tic. is also included in this program. deploying northIooking OTH-B and spaced-based radar. To protect the eastern and western approaches to North America.f ~ffm 7<. .. mmn. “ .thorrfi tile artlr[r ‘.a. essence of tactical judgment arid apply it can result in better training... rh. efforts in FY 1982 will concentrate on the continued development and possible deployment of two large Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars—one on each coast.4f’GS~ H<.4 ..—DMS Aerospace Intelligence. rvcw. analvze decide.V?!. with the chances of success on the battlefield being greater. The upgrade of the Alaskan radars. “.. H.. According to preliminary Air Force plans. (’Omm.McJ1. W o. ” rc!i 2?.... <. 1lS . .>l ..000 nautfcal miles. clear and unambiguous indication of a Soviet bomber or air-surface missile attack. the DEW Line will be reduced from 31 to 13 sites during FY 1982 and maintained at this level until a decision on OTH-B capabilities can be made this fall. the service plans to place a significant emphasis on the modernization of its warning and surveillance systems to provide reliable. f)ortn. of the [ !SAIW.?C St Man.lrtar? F@ie* Air Defense Upgrsde Programs.. it may not be a technically feasible solution for north-looking warning and surveillance because of the frequency of ionospheric disturbances in northern Canada. To improve surveillance of the northern approaches.i w...l’@<. [LS.~vd o. !?rcl! 0. According to initial Fiscal Year (FY) 1982 US Air Force planning documents.nrnt of Tact.MILITARY REVIEW . ho. c<>.~~ ..t.. The ability to understand the ~OICV.. Since this radar depends on the scattering of radar waves by the ionosphere. These radars can detect large aircraft with a high degree of certeinty at ranges on the order of 1.800 to 2. an extension of the DEW Line to the west. uSA (WSC f{. the Mu?< r! lv<vl %I..t...<... men? of Tart./)..?Of the l)r~.ltW [)cparf.. These include upgrading and gap-filling the current Distant Early Warning System (DEW Line).. font. the l)c~f. we must strive to develop tacticians who can think... d 14 . the Air Force reports that several options are under active consideration. ~ truest sense of the word.< d. In all our efforts.ZII \ 1% ’or Coil.’s COllccr of Marvland and ~’ o mui.

. Reichley."The ~idge" Major John A. The "final act" o f the American Revolution came in October 1781 with the defeat o f British forces in fhe Battle o f Yorktown. US Army . This article recounts various aspects o f that historic encounter and considers its significance to all American:.

Washington (of the blue side) had tried in vain to persuade the French to participate in a combined American-French land and naval assault against Clinton's forces in New York. For openers. he was able to move a t will against the Americans. with some 4. it was more correctly a seige than a battle although we know it as the "Battle of Yorktown. but Clinton. with 11. living off the land and Loyalist support. but. He selected a place and then discarded it in favor of a small tobacco port on the York River just off Chesapeake Bay. In the spring of 1781. Cornwallis unilaterally decided that Virginia was the key to the subjugation of the South and moved his army there without informing Clinton. Most Americans know it was the last battle of the Revolutionary War. however. decide to send Admiral Count Franqois Joseph Paul de Grasse WASHINGTON October . But his move into Virginia added a new and dangerous dimension to the war: It brought the Southern conflict nearer to the Northern field and thus to Washington's capability to influence it. to be so optimistic as to predict that. Washington. rather. in New York. his superior. ordered him to establish and operate from a base on the coast that could be resupplied by sea. This article. concerned T about logistics. The final site selection was called Yorktown.MILITARY REVIEW H I S month marks the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Yorktown which stands as a bridge between the Declaration of ~ n d e ~ e n d e n cand e fhe United States Constitution. They did. on New Year's Day of 1781. American General George Washington in New York and British General Earl Charles Cornwallis in the Carolinas would meet at tiny Yorktown in Virginia in the engagement that would determine the outcome of the American Revolution. The French refused. Cornwallis had been running loose through the Carolinas with 6. within the year. a recount ing of some of the littleknown events leading up to it and its significance. For several months.000 troops.000 men. did not see eye to eye on many matters.000 men. is not an in-depth analysis of the battle. but few are aware of the many interesting and unique aspects of the battle. was opposing General Sir Henry Clinton. He and Clinton. by a nonprofes sional historian. Neither protagonist commander dreamed of fighting a decisive battle there." Few persons in America would have dared. Cornwallis wanted t o continue t o operate inland.

200 French soldiers to bolster the allied forces. de Grasse had no idea Cornwallis' army would he anywhere near there.YORKTOWN on the high seas. Concurrrntly. Spain was not involved in the American conflict. de Grasse and 24 ships were available for a temporary duty trip to American waters. the British navy was superior to that of France. Clinton was quietly left in a lurch in New York as Washingt. The Chesapeake Bay area was chosen although. to set sail to attack either Barras or de I Grasse. the captain made the decision to literally "deepsix" it. a fruitful international coalition and luck. This prompted the British Fleet in New York. and. Unfortunately for the red forces. confronting Graves with so significant a force that he decided to return to New York to refit. When he reached Chesapeake Bay. he discovered to his dismay that de Grasse was already there and had debarked 3. When intelligence made a fix on Harras." The situation presented was the great surprise of the Revolution and was enhanced by skillful strategy on Washington's part that resulted from excellent intelligence. the sloop ran into Amerlcan privateers. De Grasse sailed out to meet Graves. covering more than 400 miles. In the late summer of 1781. Enter fate: Graves sailed in a wrong direction based on incorrect information. Revolutionary War hero Revolutionary War musket history books regard as "blind fortune. while their inconclusive battle occurred off the Virginia Capes. at the time. 4 n y British resupply of Yorktown-or escape-by sea was now impossible. De Grasse then broke contact and slipped back into the bay.on left a strategically placed token force to bottle him up while he slipped away to hopefully fall on Cornwallis at a time and place where assistance could not reach him. Here is another of Yorktown's significances: Washington's movement of his army from the Hudson River to the York River was the longest march of the war. Graves thus obviously did not find Barras Powder horn of Israel Putnam. and. rather than have the dispatch captured. The stage was thus set by what some and his men-of-war from the West lndies to the Chesapeake Bay area. In 1781. bat inferior to the combined navies of France and Spain whose courts were in alliance. llistorians are divided on whether . Barras' fleet sailed unhindered into Chesapeake Bay. the eight-ship French Fleet in America under Admiral Paul F r a n ~ o id s e Barras sailed south from New York. under Admiral Thomas Graves. but its alliance with France enabled its navy to spell some French ships in other parts of the world for temporary servike in America. a sloop of war was sent with a dispatch for Graves with the correct information.

found the topography to be "very favorable for the prosecution of a siege. his previously elusive quarry was where he wanted him. cheerfulness. So. it would have been a prime time for soldierly humor at the expense of the haplesslooking Americans. One report stated. but the water barriers were interspersed with stretches oi wooded ground which could be easily traversed. Vigilance. As the smartly dressed French soldiers mingled with their rather ragtag Continental and militia compatriots. "' Washington's engineers. it was a one-street town of some 70 hmses."2 To the troops closing in around Yorktown. perhaps it should have been: In the View of Yorktown from the York R~ver (a sketch drawn by a Brltlsh officer about 1754) . it was the only port from which Virginia planters could ship their tobacco to England. the mutual respect of professionals engaged in a common cause emerged. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. vigor. Windmill and rn'ormley Creeks hindered movement toward Yorktown from some directions. It is more likely that he was both skillful and opportunistic and operated under sound and tried military principles. In one of the rare "pure" cavalry engagements of the war between French and British cavalry. lost his horse in a freak mishap and had to withdraw his legion from the field."? The Battle-rather. Whatever the reason. Before the war. siege-of York town was conducted in the best traditions of Vauban siege warfare." he commented. the town had escaped the ravages of war.about 10 miles from its mouth. had an inspiration or was a prophet. something seemed to be in the air. Until Cornwallis' arrival. The site was not a textbook example of good defensible terrain. Yorktown had been established by the Act for Ports which required certain plantation owners to sell land for use as town sites. most of which contained small streams.MILITARY REVIEW Washington had advance information about Cornwallis' designs. To the south and wist. as he wrote years later. Instead. but. In 1781. The ravines offered excellent covered approaches to the very outskirts of the village. This was not the case. and skillful management will bring success. Something was in the air. the notorious but efficient British cavalry officer. the terrain was cut by several ravines. "Nothing hut the hope of relief. "The French and Americans vied with each other in industry. Cornwallis never anticipated the contingency of a siege. Everywhere the highest spirits prevailed. energy. "would have induced me to attempt its defence. on the other hand. located on a bluff overlooking the south bank of the York K~ver. and exposure to danger.


Fate? Luck? On 19 October 1781.8-to-1 is quite less than today's standard to assure success to the attacker. British staff officers began negotiating the terms of surrender. was the tougher nut to crack. now refitted. was granted the honor. Perhaps to salve national honor. His second battalion of the second brigade of Lafayette's Light lnfantry Illvision charged with fixed bayonets and unloaded muskets and captured the redoubt. coats from capitulation. Cornwallis' com- .000 troops for the relief of Yorktown. The actual siege began on 6 October. However.000 French troops-on land. in New York. Some accounts say Washington personally fired the first cannon shot t o begin the siege. built of stone. Cornwallis' only hope was to escape across the river into a thinly held American line. General Marquis de Lafayette gave the mission to one of his French battalion commanders. Washington's forces.000 Americans and 8.000 British versus 9. to ' W'ashington.MILITARY REVIEW French wing. Unfortunately for Cornwallis. For such an analysis. with the Americans on the right and French on the left. Fate? Luck? On 17 October. On the night of 14 October. the British launched one counterattack-which proved futile. So. serving a s an aide t o Count Jean Baptiste Rochambeau. That same day. . The net drew tighter until only two British redoubts (18th-century term for strongpoint) separated the red. worked for three weeks digging siege lines and bombarding the redcoats (red force) with shot and shell. in writing. sailed with a reinforced fleet and 7. This rough combat power ratio of 2. An American battalion commander serving with Lafayette's forces objected. was one Marquis de Vauban! A tactics student analyzing the operation a t the US Army Command and General Staff College would cite it a s a textbook employment of the principles of war of offensive.old Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton. mass and maneuver. A storm during the night of 16 October precluded this attempt. With their loss. when yo% add significant combat multipliers such as the French Fleet in Chesapeake Bay. The forces arrayed included some 6. 24year. Admiral Graves. objective. Most of the casualties of the entire operation occurred in the assault on these two positions. odds did favor the "blue" forces. Redoubt 10. these were attacked. former aide to Washington. surprise. He cited t h a t he was scheduled to be the officer of the day for that night and felt he should have the Some accounts say Washington personally fired the first cannon shot to begin the siege I honor of commanding the assault. the student would receive an A. he was not able t o fight outnumbered and win.

Cornwallis wrnt on to hrcome governor of India. the offirers who fought therr were far frorn losers. IIe was secretary of the treasury for a while and was later killed in a famous duel with Aaron Burr. 1.incoln The saber was ceremoniouslv accepted. hlajor General Benjamin I. Among the An~ericans. and nine of his junior officers berani? general5 d u r ~ n g their career5 On the French side. wounded and missing. commander of Washington's artillery brigade. Cornwallis claimed to be ill and sent his saher to he surrendered by his second in command \\'hen the officer approached Washington. Ur~gadier General Anthony Wayne earned more stars and the nickname "Mad. ton's second in command. Washington becarne president. served later as a major general and as secretary of war." The commander of the American troops who received the British colors was. of course. The British reported losses of 552 killed. then returned. So. Yorktown represented much more to the American people than a military victory.ouis Alexandre Berthier became a marshal under Napoleon. Today. for him." Brigadier General Henry Knox. American casualties during the siege were about 100 killed and wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton left the Army to serve in politics. pnrticularlv on the British side. often losing. In addition to serving as a bridge between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. the US Army Armor Center at Fort Knox. Kentucky. French losses were 260. the youngest commissioned officer in the American Armv. an 18-vear-old ensign named Wilson. Although York-town ended the war for all intents.YORKTOWN mand marched out of Yorktown to the old British tune "The W'orld Turned Upside Down. it taught the young nation the meaning and value of cooperation between Army and Navy and betwe'en nations. There is a contemporary correlation between The surrender of Lord Cornwallis' forces at Yorktown. war. is named. it ended six vears of a frustrating. 19 October 1781 I . he was waived to Washing. appropriately enough.

Several units i n today's Army date from the Revolution. (iermrrny and the Cj~zlrrrenfal S~U~ B ILLILLIIL I L ~ ~ T I CI ~ and ~ I the I ) ~ Departmen1 o f Tartzr>.\ua~~rl l ~ Utzrt ~ n r t and o{ the L'SAC'tiS(' f f c h u s ar.MILITARY REVIEW the Army i n 1781 and 1981: Both were comprised o f volunteers.atgnrnrnta rn Kurea.rr.n A L I ~ U ~ L ~ L an Slat'.SAC'tiS( . four modern units trace their lineage directly t o the Battle o f Yorktown: the 1st III o uonety uf orrnur and pubhr ufkrra au. 5th Artillery. Yorktourn represents both the struggle and the success of the Reuolution. the last survivor of the Revolutionary War died in April 1869. According t o the Department o f the Army.1)rorbtun." and "ilrmrrrrce IJuy" uhich appmred I n the Mllltary Revlew rn rhe May ond Nuurmbrr 1YXOrsaues re~peclruely \ \ . I f Bunker Hill rGpresents a resolution made t o resist parliamentary aggression to the end. t f e rt. was not achieved at Yorktown alone. Kansas: the 198th Signal Battalion.' A s a postscript. Dirrcturutc u{ Acodcmrc L p ~ m t t o .a rr lth the I'lun. It should be regarded as a representative and crowning uictory-the end of a six year's contest. . almost 88 years after the last cannon's echo over the quiet York River.o*dil~s 1787 Harpel I 1862 Coast Monsoe Va 1927 pp 16 17 2 ram D 122 4 ~ o n n s t o nOD CII D 12 Washington's sword f hlajv~ Johtr 4 lfrrrhla) . Ulirf~d I'lernum. U S A ( % S ( : Ifr ib thruurhuruf"Hrrt rn Pruce A r l t n g t u ~ ~ ('erneler?.llery Scnool Foil 3 RoDerl ~ r t n ~ lee r Sreger of vor*rorm .du buclzelur's UP ~I ~ IM +I bl~AY from dcgrce [m. . the 116th Infantry. the following quote from a centennial book about the battle is most appropriate: The Reuolution.olhers N r 186) p 106 I Arl. . Yorktou~n represents that resolution kept. r s U. Virginia Army National Guard: and the 175th Infantry.787 . For a meaningful close and summation of the significance o f Yorktown. Fort Riley. of course. . NOTES ~ e n ' yP ~ohngton The vorkyarn Campalgo an0 m e Sur render 01 Co. the last and most brilliant of a series o f blows delivered in spite of blou~ssustained.r.lorl. blaryland Army National Guard. Delaware Army National Guard.rett. and it was during those formative years tnat many o f today's traditions and ceremonies evolved. v ~r o g r n d ~ ~ u t p . and Onrrultu~r.

Gerhardt. M y center is yielding. individually and collectively. and the efficiency of offense depends on the warlike souls o f those conducting it.Offense is the essence o f combat. In war. The essence of the offensive spirit is best expressed in the words of one of the most offense-oriented generals in his- W tory-Marshal Ferdinand Foch: Hard pressed on my right. Patton Jr.' General George S. I t Lieutenant Colonel Igor D. US Army . the only sure defense is offense. The author contends that there is too much emphasis today on the defensive aspects o f combat and fhat not enough attention is being given to the offensive in preparing our forces for future combat missions. Victory cannot be achieved through purely defensive action. I N N I N G in b a t t l e when outnumbered demands that soldiers. be i ~ b u e d with an offensive spirit and the wlll to win. Situation excellent. I am attacking.' Offensive spirit is not easy to define. Impossible to maneuuer.

force evaluation studies or war games. His plan required taking a calculated risk by withdrawing most of the German troops facing one of the Russian armies in order to concentrate his forces against the other. developed a plan to entrap and destroy one of the Russian armies. General Erich von Ludendorff. Blenheim.Prittwitz was immediately relieved of co~nmand and replaced by General Paul von Hindenburg. analytical decisionmaking matrices. General Rlax von I'rittwit~. was conduct~ngan elastic defense and delay in the face of two Russian armies. However. and. We do not know how to deal with these intangibles in our flow charts. The history of war abounds witb examples of a smaller force defeating a larger one. Jackson's Valley Campaign and Chancellorsville. Hindenburg. the victorious smaller forces shared common bonds which included audacious planning and timely. Lieutenant Colonel Max Hotfmann. Among these classics were the Battles of Rlarat!~on. war garners and combat of staff.' So. bold and wolent execution of an attack. Adopting a more offensive spirit in our tactical doctrine will have far reaching implications for all facets of the Army. a German army commander. The result was a resounding vlctory now widely known as the Rattle of Tannenburg in which the Iiussians lost an army of more than 125. Less than five days after Prittwitz's aborted decision to withdraw. In fact.000 men and 500 artillery pieces. surprise and deception. ably assisted by h ~ s . Cannae. Hindenburg attacked. Cbdlons. I t is the sum total of the commander's tactical know-how and the capability of his soldiers to fight. Syracuse. tanks and artillery pieces. and ch~ef ot operations. we can compare the numbers and types of units. In each case. we see that where one commander perceived disaster and defeat. I t is also important to note that offensive spirit is as necessary while fighting in a defensive posture as it is during the offense. One of the most important analytical tools available to us in the Army today is war gaming. Arbela. In all these examples. in near panic. I t must be nurtured continually and not allowed to diminish. Xletaurus. Waterloo. Consequently. The Germans war gamed before the October . but we have not been able to measure a host of other less tangible combat multipliers such as courage. daring. Following an unsuccessful attack against one of the Russ~ail armies.' On an Eastern European battlefield in 1914. the commander of the smaller force took calculated risks to concentrate his forces at the decisive time and place in order to attack.MILITARY REVIEW includes all the attitudes and actions that enable a military force to take the initiative and attack a t every opportunity. Playing out the battle before it actually takes place is a technique that has been used effectively for centuries. For example. weapons and vehicles on the battlefield. another saw the opportunity to attack with risk and win. defensive operations should be viewed as a temporary action taken while awaiting the opportunity to attack. the intangibles of war are usually acknowledged and applauded as pivotal elements in combat but are then quickly set aside while we get on with the business of counting battalions. Offensive spirit is a vital ingredient to winning. audacity. there are obstacles to overcome in translating an intangible-like offensive splrit-into terms that are meaningful to analysts. Prlttwltz not~fiedthe chief of the German General Staff of his decision to withdraw to the west and a w a t reinforcen~ents.

qualitative judgments can be made regarding combat engagements. daring. or deception. War gaming also has enormous potential for evaluating the effectiveness of various Army force structures. it is still fruitless to attack a numerically superior force regardless of the ferocity and cunning of the offense. it is a shortcoming or limitation in our current gaming techniques which must be rec- . and their success forced the French into adopting war gaming as a military tool. However. and he gains no advantage from using more tangible assets such as electronic or psychological warfare. we still have a considerable way t o go. Now. Rather.OFFENSIVE SPIRIT Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71. War-gaming techniques have been improved greatly in recent years and are much more realistic t h a n ever before. as well as the more obvious quantitative comparisons of comI" bat power. The Japanese war gamed prior t o their war with Russia. In our current war gaming. This problem is not the fault of any individual or group. types of equipment and tactics. The war game commander who attacks when outnumbered soon learns that he gets no credit for surprise.

Picking up the whistle. knife and a police-whistle. Because offensive spirit is impossible to measure. Add t o this the defensive nature of our posture with NATO. And the science of war can be learned by professional soldiers by studying the works of the greatest (and most successful) military thinkers: Karl van Clausewitz. and our defensive mind-set becomes reinforced. In reality. the weapon syitems and equipment used by these forces. as combat developers. let us consider the case of the college student who was enrolled in a course in experimental biology. but there is one major pitfall. before war is an . he gathered the necessary analytical tools: a calibrated test range. Henri Jomini. when we did attack. The roots of the defensive orientation of our Army are borne in our national policy of not wanting to be considered an aggressor in any conflict. having jumped 3 and 2 feet on the third and fourth tries respectively. the frog was now a basket case. and the opportunities to develop the artistic skills of tactical creativity and ingenuity in combat are seldom realized. He placed the frog a t the zero line on the test range and blew the whistle. He was told by his instructor t o use scientific methods to observe a frog's reaction to stress under varying conditions and stimuli. J. jumped. Excited by this discovery. y e rely heavily on the science of war and often only pay lip service to the art of war. But few of us are artists. To do this. As a result of this inexperience. the frog jumps 10 feet. this is not a bad approach. He placed the helpless frog on the starting line and fiercely blew the whistle. with his knife. pencil. He picked up the frog and. and their training. paper.6 We must be careful that we do not make the same mistake as our college friend and reach incorrect conclusions when using our analytical tools.MILITARY REVIEW ognized as such by each of us. October . it would be only when fate or circumstance allowed for an appropriate combat force ratio. finally. we would be forced to design an Army that was defensively oriented. Again. we often fail to consider its importance and contribution in winning any battle. He recorded the results: With three legs. We would seldom. However.alytical tools and the science of war. it is a science. He repeated the procedure until. Under the old rnili- . cut off the frog's left front leg. C. The conclusions we reach by relying on the scientific approach may differ drastically from the realities of the battlefield where nonquantifiable actions and attitudes often prevail. F. The defensive mind-set that so many of us have did not come about because of war gaming. the frog did not move. the frog jumps 5 feet. use analytical results daily t o help shape the structure of forces. The frog. Of course. and many more. We. the frog becomes deaf. Fuller. if ever. there are countless historical examples that would strongly suggest that. the results or conclusions reached from analytical tools must be kept in their proper perspective and not allowed to wholly dictate the future direction of the Army. and. To illustrate what 1 mean about pitfalls associated with an overreliance on an. If we were to believe and follow the results of strictly analytical tools. he made a shrill and piercing sound and watched for the frog's reaction. His mission was to see how far a frog could jump ' under varying conditions. the college student threw down his whistle. picked up his pencil and wrote: Without legs. The student recorded on his pad: With four legs. rather startled. While many would argue that war is an art rather than a science. he placed the frog on the test range.

or even to our advantage in some circ~lmstances. the combined NATO military forces are preparing t o conduct the largest defensive effort in history. There are those in the Army today who would argue that it is foolhardy to attack when outnumbered. Numerical superion'ty. the defender loses the advantages associated with taking the initiative and choosing his place of battle. For example.& Adopting an offensive spirit would not only require increased emphasis in our doctrinal literature. one of the principles of war. General Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson had this to say: Never take counsel of your fears. The fact that you are attacking induces the enemy to believe that you are stronger than he is. our current How to Fight manuals present doctrine for the offense by analyzing and comparing our offensive operations to the enemy's defense.OFFENSIVE SPIRIT tary committee policy of massive retaliation and the newer strategy of graduated response. The enemy is more worried than you are. while useful. Defense is not. and never was. and there are many more who would require an overwhelming mathematical advantage in force ratio before assuming the offensive. One might Students of the US Army Command and General Staff College participate in a war gaming exercise . is not vital to successful offensive action. The only thing wrong with this approach is that it will not lead to victory. While defensive operations may be unavoidable from time to time. To the overly cautious around him. but it could mandate more changes in the organization of our ground forces and the quantity and types of equipment they would use.

as . our concern must be in having hlghly mobile ground forces that can acquire point targets rapidly at ranges up to 2. this is not the case. Thick armor protection and its resulting weight limitations will have to give way to a lighter. This would result in a considerable reduction in the size of the umbilical cord connecting the attacking force to its logistical base. The infantryman of the future must attain mobility with armor protection and striking power through an improved fighting vehicle. present interesting problems for both sides. The role of the infantryman with his 1 1 . These characteristics are essential objectives if the attack force is designed ultimately to ravage the enemy's rear area. Within that brigade. Each commander has the latitude to make decisions regarding the conduct of operations in his area of responsibility. All munitions must. 1 1 6 rifle would also have to be reexamined on the mechanized battlefield. Soviet doctrine stresses offense. whether a force is on the offensive or defensive becomes the perception of the commander concerned. the distinction between offensive and defensive operations a t corps and division level is reduced. The infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles now under development recognize this requirement. allowing the gunner to seek out and engage several targets In the same time it would take to guide a single missile to one target.MILITARY REVIEW get the impression that we attack only when the enemy is defending. The most significant stride in doctrine in the last decade has been the introduction of the active defense concept which emphasires the need for offensive actions during defensive operations. Obviously. materiel and training. more mobile form of tank killer. A NATO corps conducting an active defense could have the majority of its maneuver battalions on the attack. The active defense is a blend of offensive and defensive actions. An intersecting and likely offensive action that needs to be addressed is the situation in which our attacking force drives deep into the enemy rear just at the time the enemy is doing the same thing to us. Aside from allowing greater flexibility on the battlefield. We must develop lighter and more mobile tanks and armored vehicles that require less maintenance and fuel consumption. . one brigade might be defending by holding the shoulder of a penetration. emphasis must be on attacking the enemy at every opportunity. the active defense gives commanders from compagy to corps greater freedom of action. of necessity. one battalion might be attacking to widen the gap. and the most likely confrontations on the battlefield will result from meeting engagements between attacking forces. In any case. Because of the nature of the active defense concept. Within the attacking division.000 meters and have a high probability of a first-round kill on each target. In effect. while another defends along the front and a third moves to concentrate with other battalions as part of a corps attack force. one of his divisions could be attacking. A great deal is now being done 50 improve the offensive capability of our ground forces. Improvements have taken place in doctrine. With regard to organization and equipment. While a corps commander is conducting defensive operations as part of a NATO force. However. employ the fire-and-forget technology. The Soviet main battle tanks weigh one-third less than ours and are rapidly approaching our technology and capability in target acquisition and gunnery. These attacking forces. passing each other in the night.

Harper [Rovr Publlsners lnr N Y 1977 ~ 9 d 2 5 Tne lrog 3lary *a5 glren l o m e Dy my good Ifmeno a*a mfan try colleague Lieutenant Colonel Rlcnrnona Henrrques 6 Ouoie~ for me Mllllary W r ? f r r 1910 op crf D a 1 7 Maitln Blumenson and James L Stokesbury M a s l e r ~ 01 Ihe A r t 01 Command. In the final analysis. t a r r013 lo! tnelr ~ o n t r ~ b v t ~ oto n stnis article ~n ats hlstalscal persnec tlves 4 R Ernest Dupuy an* Trevor hl D u ~ u y me tncyc. and those of us most affected have a vested interest in thy outcome. Naturally. The resulting "tankfantry" vehicle would possess high mobility and a longrange antitank capability and would carry a small infantry force of four to six soldiers armed with antipersonnel and armor-piercing weaponry. The Commanderk Decrsron"appeared m the August 1980 M~htaryReview. The truth lies more precisely in Marshal Maurice de Saxe's observation that "It is not the big armies that win battles.910 OItlrr of the Chlel ut In I Quotes for me M ~ l f I a r y tormat8on uepartmenf of the nrmy ~ a s h ~ o q f oD nC 1970 p 2 7 4 2 Colonei Robert Debs Helm Jp D.onel Herr. the classic battles of history offer important doctrinal lessons for tacticians of today and tomorrow. some of these thoughts might bring a swell of anger or protest from certain quarters.S from the Unruersrty of Southern Calzfornta and IS a graduate o f the Armed Forces StaffiCoNege He has servpd lerth the 25th Infantry Drursion." history has many times proven him wrong. [JSMA He rec~ived a B S from the USMA. the size of a military force is not a prerequisite to its success. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. The most important lesson is that an unfavorable force ratio in itself should never be allowed to dictate use of. Vtetnam: and wtth the Combrned Arms Combat Development Activity and the Department of Tactics. After all.for the armor or infantry is a monumental step. \ . it will be necessary to make even more changes and sacrifices now.opebxa 01 Md."' NOTES Wrlrer . ~ o u g n l o n M8tll. and i t is time we acknowledged this point. it is the good ones.ons Navai lnstllute Press 'Annapolis M a 1966 D 21 3 1 am indebted la Maic# Blana Gulhr~e and Co. commanders should seek every opportunity to turn the defense into a bold and audacious offense. I t is not a change t o take lightry or make quickly. However. While Frederick t h e Great believed that "God is on the side of the big battalions. Instead.cllonary a1 Mdilary and Naval Ouotar. Accepting change is a lot easier said than done. In summary.the defense. if winning on a future European battlefield is what we really want to plan for. The foundation for a winning army is its offensive capability. but parochial interests must inevitably give way to the best interests of the total force. a change in role . an M. we may end up with a mix of the best features of the tank qnd the armored personnel carrier.n Co Boston Mass 1975 D 146 ' f Lreutenant Colonel Igor D Gerhardt r s z r t h the Department o f Mechanics. Kansas Hrs article " R i s k .we look fulther into the future. as an a d u r s ~ rto the Metnamese Regional Farce m Quang Tn Procmce. The first change an3 probably the easiest t o make will be an acceptance by the entire military community of the need tb put more offense in the offerse and more offense in the defense. \ J .rary Htstory.

The Military Significance of Language Competence Major Kurt E."' Whether one accepts Clausewitz's observation as realpolitik or shudders at the identification of war with politics makes little difference. US Army R e s e r v e ERHAPS no other profession outside that of diplomacy is as concerned with the relationship between a nation and its neighbors near dnd far as is the military. It seems clear that the October . Miiller. In his classic text on the art and science P of warfare. The common interest of the two is not surprising. Karl von Clausewitz writes that "war is nothing but a continuation of political relations with the addition of other means. of course. t o the student of armed international conflict.

the Central Intelligence Agency relied on information supplied by French and Hungarian sources that the North Vietnamese were not conducting an allout advance on Saigon. But the foreign policy of the United States has suffered severe setbacks because o f precisely the inability to acquire and interpret raw intelligence. we are told. operations.intelligence. logistics. military. intelligence. we had discovered that not all the information available t o us was accurately interpreted. A glance at several issues of the professional journals and informational publications that circulate among our Armed Forces officers (for example. military buildup by adversaries and relations with allies. it is time to close the lar~guage gap. surc~it. Earlier in our tactical experience in South Vietnam.alskills and community relations-must be recognized as necessary to the nation's security. it is not without attendant problems. In national defense. During a period. it is even more obvious ghat we must train a number o f service members to understand the enemy's language well enough to comprehend his radio transmissions and thereby acquire military intelligence. both devour whatever information is available on political developments in other countries.' munications during the military maneuvers of a potential adversary. The Officer and Commanders I Call) reveals an interest on the part of the editors in international affairs.LANGUAGE COMPETENCE The use o f foreign languages in the nation's Armed Forces has been limited primarily to one specialty. of hostilities.. would follow with intense scrutiny the attitudes of its neighbors toward its own actions. Military Review. the appreciation of language skill is indeed acutely noticeable in the intelligence community. Too. The contributions o f foreign-language competence to the nation's military capability-in command.. it would be foolish not to eavesdrop on radio com. This problem and that o f a dearth o f language and area expertise have been met by relying on the Reserve components. In an age o f electronic sophistication. Readers' comments demonstrate their acceptance of these topics as appropriate issues for professional concern. Readers are presented with articles on potential forces o f deshabilization. While fhis reliance has worked well in the last few years. In the minds o f most casual observers. I t seems that some of the Vietnamese we were using as interpreters did not want to displease their American em- . moted as a general professional skill and that part o f the rationale for the lack o f language study within the services is based on the fear that it is not possible to predict uihich Ianguages will be needed most. as well as the diplomatic arm o f any government. The author contends that language fluency has not been adequately pro. the military significance o f foreign-language competence is pigeonholed into the category of military intelligence-strategic and tactical. O f our last experiences in Vietnam. I t $as been our unfortunate experience that foreign-language capability in the US Armed Forces has been restricted primarily t o only one sphere of military activity. In practice.

or precluded from. President Nixon was able to speak ulith the Chinese leaders in Peking o n l y through their interpreters. they edited the information in their translation. the E m b a s s y learned that strong Communist-inspired anti.v interpreted cverything to sound rosy. up to 20 political officers spoke Farsi. That was merelv inconuenience. all translating was done b y natives. an Associated Press story reported: Until the first American trained especially for Indoazesian d u t y was assigned to thc Embassy in 1949. On 2 February 1979. only one of the US Embassy's political officers in Teheran could read and speak Farsi. Without the capability t o operate in a given culture. the successful completion of their mission. realize only limited success. For I saw a battalion badly bloodied once because nobody could understand what an excited Korean was trying to say-that a strong Red force was lying in ambush. Among units stationed overseas. the humiliation-and perhaps damage-continues on American soil. just beyond the hill" The acquisition and processing of tactical intelligence depends on the skill with which an interrogating team questions local civilians and captured prisoners. October . we bad the opportunity to question a defecting Soviet soldier who had sought asylum in the US Embassy in Kabul. the. In a 1953 newspaper column. the utility of knowing the language of an area of interest is not limited to strategic intelligence. We failed t o exploit t h i s opportunity.)' Not all our apparent'linguistic ineptitude is costly. Major units of the US Army report that improved relations with the host country contribute to the success of their mission. required all commanders at battalion level . B u t ~rphen American area and language experts began to read Indonesian neiclspap. to the United States. Europe (CINCUSAREUR). T h e New York Times wrote: In 1972. In t h e mid-1970s the commander in chief. On 29 December 1952.MILITARY REVIEW ployers by relaying news the Americans probably did not want to hear. an operational unit will find itself alienated from its environment.American feeling was suveping thp c o ~ n t r y . B u t i t can lead to tragedy too. Some is only embarrassing. US Army. Consequently. In intelligence collection. At worst. intelligence specialists are impaired in." the interpreter who accompanied Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China on his visit . news stories relating to the US military presence. for the advice of the local commander. the Department of State had suffered the same misfortune in Indonesia. Only 20 years and attend scssions of the National Legislature. a unit or an individual will. (In the Soviet Embassy. as we had no one on the'embassy staff who could speak to the defector in R ~ s s i a nThe . prior to the 1978 revolution in Iran. blocked a t every turn because I could not speak the language. But waiting for translations i s a problem. at best. Harold Martin relates its tactical importance as well: I'ue spent m a n y a harassed hour in foreign lands. ~ press has also told us that. ~ After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. pro-American. however. T o please their employers. public affairs officers have long labored a t translating. Language ability also makes a longer term contribution to the acquisition of area intelligence: Fluency in the local language leads to an understanding of the culture in which the language is embedded. Without language facility. Seven years later. Chi. T h e New York Times editorialized on "The Indispensable Mr.

This Gateway program consists of four successive 40 to 80-hour b l o c ~ of s instruction and is available to all officers and to senior enlisted personnel (E7 through E9). reports on a notable break in tradition in the assign. . In an article published in Military Review. however. If one could imagine a division of foreign troops landing at Kennedy Airport in New York. Damage to crops. community relations only supplement a commander's task. buildings. USbased military units deploying to Europe for NATO maneuvers (known as REFORGER (return of forces to Germany)) have been supplementing their battalion. Blanchard relates the well-known circumstance of the succession of commanders who." A different dimension to the problem of host country relations exists for units based in the Continental United States that are deployed overseas for maneuvers or that may be sent to a trouble spot as a rapid deployment force. deployed to Germany on a NATO REFORGER exercise.LANGUAGE COMPETENCE and higher t o undertake a series of courses in the language of the area in which they would be stationed. General George S. wrote that the Active Army was deficient in language and area expertise and that the Reserve FAOs "were the cornerstone of effectiveCivil-Military Operations during Reforger 77. ment of commanders. New Jersey. . elements from the 1st Infantry LXvision at Fort Riley. roads. The mayor explained that the press sent a reporter at 0900 every morning to see who was in the tank. former CINCUSAREUR. homes and vehicles costs NATO millions of dollars in these annual exercises. He describes a change-ofcommand ceremony at which the break in tradition was in the incoming commander's delivery of a portion of his opening speech in German. and he offered to release any Americans an hour earlier if the commander would send his provost marshal for them. Observers have noted that the employment of such officers has greatly improved relations with the local populace and that the Army would have difficulty deploying large numbers of troops if there were no access to language and area expertise."' In subsequent maneuvers with different units. Central to . Civil-military operations ensure that public support for military preparedness does not degenerate to the point of threatening the alliance. Colonel Isaac D. Reporting on the employment of officers proficient in the language and familiar with the culture. one would anticipate the public relations effort necessary to minimize public objections. Smith. manning military hardware in Bayonne. the divis i o n ' ~chief of staff. Supplementing the division was a contingent of Reserve foreign area officers (FAOs) who were to assist units in establishing rapport with the local communities that would be affected by the maneuvers. proceeding by convoy through cities as large as Newark and through small suburban towns en route to maneuvers to take place in New York state parks. In 1977. the use of language-proficient officers has been increased. At best. The surprised mayor invited the newly arrived officer to his office for coffee the following day and proceeded to show him a source of embarrassment for the unit: the town drunk tank. brigade and division staffs with Reserve officers proficient in German. Since 1977. Blanchard. are able to say "auf Wiedersehen" when-bidding farewell to the mayor of the local community. on departing from a long tour of duty in Germany. monuments. Kansas. The conduct of a REFORGER exercise entails a disruption of civilian life to a degree unknown in the United States.

was instituted nonetheless. i t may prove to be a decisive element on any potential NATO battlefield. ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] programs and OCS [Officer Candidate S c h o o l ] . Operations. The Navy had had a practice since 1922 of sending selected officers to Tokyo for a three-year course of study in Japanese. He writes: "Language interoperability is not just a nice-to-have professional skill. In time of war. a deputy chief of staff for administration and logistics blamed inefficiency in NATO operations on language barriers between member states. the language schools of the Army and the Navy had t o be augmented through the development of various programs established at colleges and universities across the country-for example. maneuver in concert with adjacent units and supply his troops with materiel. . of . In his article in Military 'Reuiew.o f required a n d e l e c t i v e language courses in the history and cultural traditions of host nations. . the former CINCUSAREUR writes: Language interoperability is the key and the base on which any operating sense o f cooperation should be built For.MILITARY REVIEW the commander's success is his ability to obtain intelligence. emphasizes changes in the military environment since the nation's last general mobilization and concludes that we can no longer depend on a mass buildup of military capability to be mounted only after mobilization." Because he recognizes monolingualism as a major obstacle to the execution of a military mission in NATO commands. there will be no time to request a translation o f a fire mission or go directly to a dictionary to discover what Angriff means. those composed of units from several nations-had historically posed problems for the Western Allies: Students of military history had praised the unified operations conducted in World War I by the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. . effective in the fall of 1980. Rlanchard called for the: . While the Office of the Assistant Secretary considered the imposition of such a measure a deterrent to recruitment. the Army Special Training Program IASTP). This legacy remains. Likewise. Reserve affairs and logistics consider the institution of a language requirement for recipients of ROTC scholarships. a one-year requirement. while language barriers poseit problems for British. Strategists recognize that the security of Western Europe relies on a multinational defense team. French and US troops. Early in NATO's history. institution in theprecammissioning enuironment-seruice academies." Unified commands-that is. . in the heat of battle. personnel qualifications do not lend themselves to "quick-fix" training programs. General Blanchard expands this concept of mutual support to include the use of more than one language.'= The outbreak of war." In Congress. Separate national in."g Blanchard s t r e s s e s t h e implausibility of approaching the defense of Western Europe from a unilateral national viewpoint. the Civil Affairs Training Schools aed the Navy Schools of Military Government and Administration. During World War 11. the House Appropriations Committee agreed on the contribution of language study to the development of an officer's skills and suggested that the assistant secretary of defense for manpower. The Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-5. terests have hampered NATO efforts at promoting interoperability of weapons and munitions. In support of such a strategy.

brought the necessity of seeking instructional economies and of intensifying language study. and this loss is reprehensible. Foreign Lan guage Center. Those who are precluded by the language barrier from enjoying off-duty activities and local cultural riches feel abandoned in an alien environment. Belgium. or inappropriate assignment of job tasks to. The latter occurs often in stateside units that have little need t o use linguists in garrison. language-maintenance programs for individuals have received low priority. By contrast. US Army. and such an attitude has led to drug and alcohol abuse. Linguists in such units often become "fifth wheels" or general-purpose "jeep washers. which included area study a s part of its curriculum and was conducted at 55 institutions of higher education. While i t . Europe. Troops are encouraged t o study the local language for sound management reasons. from the perspective of training-funds management. In a 1979 account to the House Appropriations Committee. boasts of 70 language laboratories. In the last few years.LANGUAGE COMPETENCE course. Self-instructional programs and group study or self-paced instruction with a teacher are available in Germany. is accomplished in eight weeks after basic training. began its program of instruction with a two-term schedule (nine months on an academic calendar). Subsequent unit training concentrates on developing or preserving the military skills acquired for the primary specialty. the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that 116. (In 1946. DL1 has begun t o develop Technical Extension Courses. courses to maintain proficiency in a language are far from adequate. but. in general.and hence to lack of productivity. By anticipating 14-hour days." In such circumstances. the program in Japanese had become a 14-month course of study.I3 The current basic courses a t the Defehse Language Institute (DLI). range from 24 weeks for French to 32 weeks for German tb 47 w e e k for Russian. Armed Forces recruits spend from eight t o 10 xeeks in basic training. This figure did not include those taking resident instruction at DLI. Familiarity with the language lowers the barrier and contributes to productivity." Still.'^ Two reasons for this high turnover rate need to be investigated: Short periods of active use of language facility with little maintenance of skills between assignments in linguist positions. When it became apparent that the resulting proficiency was inadequate. The loss is worse.) The ASTP. language skills undergo attrition. the Navy proposed to reduce the program of study to 12 months. the Netherlands. Italy. Underutilization of. Greece and Turkey. The availability of language-maintenance training varies considerably by location.000 servicemen and family members would be studying foreign languages in Fiscal Year 1980. language specialists. The initial training period of an Army officer who receives a commission through ROTC or the US Military Academy requires two to three months: OCS takes about half a year. however. They then proceed to training in a military specialty in programs whose length varies by specialty: Infantry training. A background paper prepared for the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies pointed out that turnover rates ' for enlisted personnel in inilitary specialties requiring foreign-language skills (linguists) are far higher than for other special tie^. a third term was added. for example. six days a week.

we need only multiply by a factor to account for assignment turnover and career progressions to determine the number of service members who need to develop and maintain their proficiency. If the management information system identified only those positions in which a language has t o be used routinely. a t 5 percent of the budget. Thirty percent of DOD personnel needs-45 percent of the Army's-are met. Rut there is ample reason to doubt the accuracy of the figure.874 figure is correct. it .123 enlisted). it seems reasonable to assume that they were tallied by the DOD management information system when it was asked for language-des~gnatedpositions (1. Given the increased importance of Reserve linguists.'" U'e must admit that a combat force or a tactical intelligence unit would find it difficult to determine the languages in which it needs to develop and maintain expertise. Of these. the maintenance of the more expensive skill.797 positions were in the Army 11. the General Accounting Office IGAO) accounted for 13.takes longer t o acquire minimal competence in a language than t o train for most military occupations. 973 were in the Navy (34 officer: 939 enlisted) and 594 were in the Marine Corps (54 officer: 540 enlisted). The Active components are finding it increasingly difficult to attract linguists. Should highly mobile units maintain fluency in several languages? In practice.DPs). The cost of language training in the military is the major reason for emphasizing language study in the schools and colleges prior to an individual's entry into t h e Armed Forces. In 1980. the Active force can draw on only those'indlviduals with the qualifications needed for a particular mission. DL1 reported in 1978 that it was having more difficulty teaching i t s students since fewer of them were able t o drjiw on previous exposure to languages for support in learning a language at the in. by Reserve component personnel. The R2d Airborne Division might as easily profit from skill in Arabic or Korean as in German. augmentation by Reserves is extremely costeffective. 2. Finally. the assistant secretary of defense for manpower reported there were authorized positions for 10. this question has been answered by augmenting Active units with Reserves as in NATO exercises. There are several reasons for this reliance on the Reserve components. and less emphasis placed on." While the report does not specify the means used to identify these positions. there is less opportunity for. t h e c o n t r a s t between t h e language-essential positions and t h e number of participants in the Defense Foreign Language Program causes us t o question the applicability of the lower figures t o an appreciation of the need for language fluency. stitute. If the-10. Since the pool of expertise is large.632 enlisted).874 qualified linguists. Regardless of which tally is the more reliable (and even if the disparity is attributable t o an increased authorization that was effected between the two tabul a t i o n s ) .510 were in the Air Force (387 officer: 2. it is time t o look a t the requirements for language-qualified personnel in both the Active and Reserve components and at the training they receive to acquire and maintain their language skills. T h e decline of academic language study since 1968 has been felt in the various services. 6. especially in the enlisted ranks where most language-designated positions are.597 authorized language-essential positions in DOD.165 officer: 5. In 1979.

035 Active Army F A 0 billets. serve as commanders. In 1979.165 Army officersreported b y DOD as requiring language facility reveals a discrepancy in the need for languagequalified officers. and language proficiency when required. and military aspects. attaches. it is. Commissioned OfficerSpecialty Classification System. and instructors in the conduct o f actiuities inuoluing political. the program coordinator for the Reserve component F A 0 program reported that t h e U S A r m y Military Personnel Center accounted for 1. and 135-11. Granted that this one specialty obviously requires language skills. Part o f the discrepancy in estimates o f the requirement for language-qualified officers is attributable t o the personnel coding o f positions for which a language . one whose practitioners account for a very small percentage o f the Army's officer students at DLI. staff officers. socioeconomic. only one specialty. tary araareness.LANGUAGE COMPETENCE would have missed many positions for which language qualification is a prerequisite or for which one o f several languages'is acceptable or for which a language is not specified but should be. cultural. politico-mil[. T h e specialty is described in Army Regulations 61 1-101. .'" Language facility o f at least level 3 is required for the specialty although the the 1. Early in 1978. A s an example o f the first o f these three categories. nevertheless. Foreign Area Officer Program/Reserue Component: A Career Program: language need not be used in every FAOdesignated position.'" A comparison o f this figure with The Foreign Area Officer specialtv encompasses positions in which officers possessing critical skills associated with the basic branch qualifications togcther with foreign area expertise. the Office o f the Deputy Chief o f S t a f f for Operations and Plans at the Department o f the Army initiated a review o f requirements for F A 0 positions that resulted in requests for a 45-percent increase in personnel authorization. we shall offer the Army's advanced career specialty for FAOs. adcrisors.

The degree to which LDPs are filled by individuals with the required skill differs from one language to the next. He estimated a mobilization requirement of 2.2o In response to such information. An observer could easily imagine that. the compliance rate is surprisingly low. even if all 1. the area of expertise for each pasition might well not be coded as the gualifications of an individual for a particular position may depend on the distribution of area expertise among the other staff members.some languages.703 Reserve F A 0 positions and a shortfall of 1.22 GAO investigators found positions that did not require a language but for which language facility was essential. the coordinator of the Army's Reserve component F A 0 program reported a requirement for 1. the existing pool of language-qualified officers is encouraging. In 1979.259. We mentioned earlier that the need for capability in various languages has led t o greater reliance on the Reserve components.576 positions requiring facility in Russian. In the specialty just mentioned. In. for example. An example would be regional security officers who must deal with the local police. what training is available? Military intelligence units are authorized to send unit members to civilian colleges for language study in lieu of attend- . but would draw on foreign-language reading ability as a necessary resource in conducting research. however. they will not be counted in a tabulation of LDPs. to preserve a degree of flexibility in personnel management.224 officers to fill these positions. when the Navy Department found that only 12 officers in the entire Navy were fully competent in spoken and written J a p a n e ~ e . we should be asking ourselves if the nation is situated as it was in December 1940. The program manager noted.739 officers. The GAO claimed that language requirements are understated and that the systems for designating language positions are inadequate. Despite the shortfall. for which there was a shortfall of 2. ~ ' Worse than instances of individuals in LDPs who do not have the requisite language qualification is the matter of underestimating requirements. The Army's Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center had identified 1.100 were selected. the federal government has accounted for 4. Ruchti of the Department of State tallied only 2. an incumbent may not need to use the language actively. James R. and how do those with limited language facility (both officer and enlisted) improve their skills-in short. If we expect to rely on the Reserves for language skill. we had better ask about the size of the pool of qualified personnel and about the measures taken to ensure that language skills remain current. But how do they keep their skills current. In an office of. say. these positions are not coded for a specific language. In a background paper prepared for the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies. that. In the "defense-security" occupations. there are positions that call for politico-military skill as a primary qualification. 10 politicomilitary staff officers. on such a staff. If.MILITARY REVIEW may be a prerequisite though not routinely used or in which one of several languages is acceptable.100 officers whose backgrounds made them eligible for selection for the specialty. security officials and others in host countries.039 incumbents who possessed the language qualification required. there would still be a shortfall of 50 percent of the mobilization requirement.

In 1977. ~ ~ Washington Post paraphrased an officialo f the Soviet Defense Ministry as commenting that the lecture was delivered in good Russian but that the upcoming exchange lecture. . At the Fuhrungsakademie. In comparison with our allies. So far as we know. individual language students must pay for their own books and tapes ' to support their language study. somewhat severe. pay and retirement points are earned as i f the reservist were attending a drill session. describes one o f the embarrassments Americans suffer on account of their monolingualism and one o f the advantages accruing to the polyglot: In May and June of 1978. the Armed Forces have made an effort to overcome the image of monolingual dilettantes dabbling in global affairs without the resources t o do so. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko invited the United States delegation to meet with the Soviet delegation at their embassy. but these have been hampered in the last few years by reductions in faculty and in the number of students allowed to take refresher training. Those who do are permitted to study Russian in~tead. During the fi7st days of the Reserve unit drills. the equivalent o f an all-service command and general staff college. Representative Paul Simon. for example. In The TongueTied American: Confronting the Foreign Language Crisis.~' In the last few years. The Washington Post reported on a visit to the Soviet Institute of Military History by Brigadier General John C . to be delivered by a Soviet officer before the US Army and Naval War Colleges. decorated Kremlin-style-plain. the development of a system for granting retirement points must become a DOD priority. an outspoken critic of the nation's lack of interest in foreign languages. That General Bard lectured in "good Russian" was a point for the United States that we have seldom been able to score. The officialbeing interviewed was obviously playing for propaganda points. News items in professional publications report on voluntary sessions for language study that are conducted in addition to unit drills. The Soviets usually score points for training their overseas representatives in the appropriate language. met t h e w at their building. all officers study English. officersare exempted from the study o f English i f they can demonstrate suitable proficiency. we have a long way to go to overcome the perception o f the "ugly American. While correspondence courses are available at government expense for most military specialties. I served as one of the United States delegates to the United Nations Session on Disarmament. Since this study is in lieu of inactive duty training. .23 Language refresher training is available in two-week intensive coursekconducted by the First and Sixth US Army Area Intelligence Schools. commandant o f cadets at the US Military A ~ a d e m y The . There is no system in place for granting credit to individual reservists who wish to maintain their language proficiency. This provision for military intelligence detachments is the only such formal measure we have encountered for language training during inactive duty." In the Federal Republic o f Germany. Bard. W i t h the increased dependence placed on the Reserves by the Active forces. was better prepared.J respondence courses. these individual language courses do not grant extension course credit as do other military cor. but there is no indication o f how widespread this practice is. Our delegation. headed by thenSecretary of State Cyrus Vance and former Governor Averell Harriman.

was put t o good use b y those Americans who had learned Vietnamese and w h o were captured during t h e course o f t h e V i e t n a m W a r . spoke and tozderstood English. fluency in a language other than English is a valuable tactical and strategic component o f national security that needs t o be recognized as such b y t h e executive and C 40 October . described above. ings oLvr and o t v r agarn land not jrcst rvith the Sorlietsl. t h a n k s t o t h e language barrier. remarks o f substance also I say 'through our interpreters' becactse I don't believe anyone in orrr group spoke or understood Russian. I wish I could enter a uigorotcs debatc on the floor of the l i o u s e ri. rr7ith Amerirans r~nable to communicate directly T h e polyglot's advantage. In s u m .or. but most o f the Soviet delegation.MILITARY REVIEW Through our interpreters rL'e exchanged pleasantries and a feu. One can easily i m agine how much easier it is t o plan an escape or t o inform fellow prisoners o f current events and impending changes i f one's captors think t h e y can speak among each other openly. A n d yct u hat took place in 1Vew York Qt? betuseen our trio delegations occurs in similar--meet.ith those kinds of odds stacked in m y far. logistics. but it gives 'the opposition' in a n y such dialoglie additional time t o prepare for the proper reply. in survival skills and i n community and officialrelations. inc l u d i n g Foreign M i n i s t e r G r o m y k o . It m a y appear to be o minor matter. intelligence. operations. T h e arguments presented here have claimed that facility in a foreign language contributes t o t h e nation's military capability in command.

Lt'ashmgton. I t is time to end our disadvantage by closing the language gap. Number 11. p 47 23 see. . PP 46 47 .n Forelgo Languages Needed bv Federal Personne. p 105 9 Elanchard oo o r . or see Asroclaltoo a1 DeDarrmenls of Forergo Languages Bu~lelln. p 216 Thvs traoslallon >s mv 0%" 2 As cited try VYtlham R Parker. . we have shown ourselves t o be far behind both our allies and our adversaries in our preparation for conflict on an international battlefield. 27 October 1977. and the 5th Infantry D~uision - J . note 1 14 . para 1 2 19 tnlormalron Paper aateo 16 July 1979 20 Ruchll.Washington D C . eattea try Wolfgang PlckerI and Wcrhelm Rltter won Schramm Roaonlt M u n l ~ h . General Accounttng Otlice. Worung Overseas. Army Reserve Maganne. 5 September 1974 p 1 1. 'Language Inleroperabllily-A xey for tnrreasea Elfecllveness tn NATO. Forefgn Area Ollraer Program1 Reserve Componenr A Career Program. 1980. Department of Slate ~ u b l ~ c a t m n 7324. The Tongue Tea Amencan C0nlronl. D 58 10 lala.GE 1963. U S Army Resenw. 1979. mobzl~ratron desrgnee assignment ra as bcrrror Znstrurtor for German at the first U S Arm. Continuum Publlshlng Corp N Y 1960. This article has argued for the development of software for Armed Forces personnel to improve their repertoire of skills. Headquarters. p 59 11 Reported by Colonel Samue' Slapleton then commandant Defense Language I n s t ~ l u l e Fureign Language Cenler belore Ine PreS.Good News. Mmtsrr Revte* Oc tooer 1978 p 60 7 Cltea by Malor &:Ionso Troche The Forelgn Area Oltlcer P~ogramlReserveCompooenl ACareer Program M a n v s c r l ~ t0 8 8 clted by parher OD c t l . Mass 22 Noverntrer 1980 7. f 5 -. "US General Talks Taclrcs at S o v l ~M stllule ' The Wasnlngfon Post." Manuscript. US Army. Europe. Washtnglon.n the ~rmeS d ervrces Thel. language and Ares S I ~ d l e Ihe Forelgo Language Crrsrs. p 3 17 "Foreign Language Tralolng .n IneDepartment of Defense A ~ e p o r 10 l lhe Commtttee on Appropnat#ons. Future Signllirdnce Commtss#onon lmpll cattons o l Armea Services Eaucat~onal Programs Amerlcan Couo csl on Eauca18on Washlnglon D C 1947 D 16 13 l ~ n dp 53. t the Cornmlttee on ADDropnailons House of Represent J alwes March 1979 p 5 15 James R Rucnl~. Thlra Eahl~on. 1978." Manuscript. Pane2 VOus April 1979 5 Cllea by Parker op crt p 107 The rlory aDDesrea 4 Oclotrel 1953 6 General George S Blancnara." Arrn Intellrgence School Fort B r a g s "rl'orth Carolrna t i e has serued on actrve duty tratntng as a fore~gnarea offacer IL tth the Office 01 t h Deputy ~ Chwf o f S f n f f f o rOperatrons and I'lana. hlujor Kurt E Yom Knege. Boston. D C 15 Aprll 1960. D A18 26 Paul Stmoo.sslon on Forelgn Language ana Intelnal~onal Stuates 23 February 1979 12 nooert John Mattnew. 5 June6 July 1978 p 67 l ~lllaw In 25 an Fisher.-Foreqn ~anguage Tralnmng 8 n the Denarlment of Delense A ~ ~ p 0 to . I S us>rsrant drrector of Forergn L a ~ y u a g eProgrorn. Superrnfenaent 01 Documents.LANGUAGE COMPETENCE legislative branches of our federal government. p 26 24 Caplam5 P C Marcum an0 K V Montgomery "Foreign Area Officer ~ r j R p eport Bunaeswehr. OP C I P I217 21 Mallhew 00 01.House of Represent at8ves:' op nl p 2 18 ~ r m y Regubatlon 135 11. ID 80 31. USGovernrneot Prmt tn4 Ofl<ce. for the Modern Language Assorrat~onof Arncnra. Supertnrenaent ot ~ o c u m e n tUS ~ Governmen1 Prmtlng 01 frce. September 1973. D 108 3 Speecn or Sena!or Paul Tsongas belore the 4merlcan t n u n Cll on the Teaching of Farelgn Languages.aenl s Comm. p 9 16 Suggelea Topics tor Dascuss>on by the Preaaent's Com m$sslonon Forelgn Language and lnternatlonal Sludlec Fmm the Defense Language tnslltute Forecgn Language Center. and monagzng rdttor of the A s s o c l a t l o n o f D e p a r t m e n t s o f F o r e ~ g nL a n guages B u l l e t i n Ife recerrzed a P h U from Rutgem Unrrw-sttv and 1s a former member u f the faculty of the Defense Language Ir~strtvte FIE. 1962. NOTES 1 Karl von Ckausew. example "The 404th MID Unpald Meef~ngs.' Tne ~ a S h r n ~ l ~ b24 "~~l 4 MarqutsCOllas. The Nallonar Inrerest and ~oretgn Languages. Despite the growing sophistication we have demonstrated in the production of weaponry. Washlnglon D C ."The Unllea Slates Governmenl R e ~ v l r e men15 for Foretgn Languages' Presrdent's Comrntssron on Foreqn Language and mlernaz~onalSIud~es Bscmground Papers and St~dtes. A'eu h r k . by the general public and by our educational institutions.. p 203. P 14 22 ore Competence . to. D ('.

T h e implications o f General Kerwin's remarks are profound. signaled in his retirement speech several years ago a clear warning t o the military W C 42 Octeber . therefore.' W i t h these words. identifies what the author sees as factors contributing to a past decline in unit cohesiveness and presents recommendations for re-establishing this aspect o f Army life. kerwin Jr. but on the hard values of the battlefield. be-a special attitude or frame o f mind which forges a sense o f unity within an Introduction E FACE a dilemma that armies have always faced withzn a democratic society. General Kerwin went on t o explain how the Army displayed a sense o f communit y spirit when he entered active duty in the early 1930s. Isenhower Jr.. not on the values o f our liberalized society.. it is necessary t o clarify the term "community spirit." He defines spirit as "a special attitude or frame o f mind characterizing an individual or group. US Army in general and the Army in particular. Army vice chief o f s t a f f . The values necessary to defend that society are often at odds with the values of the society itself To be an effective servant of the people.. General Walter T . a sense he has seen we'aken over the years. This article examines the level o f cohesion in today's Army." Webster's defines community as "a body o f individuals organized in a unit with an awareness o f some unifying trait. T o understand them fully. the A r m y must concentrate." A proper definition o f community spirit might. Major (P) James P. however.

General Edward C. often mentioned. the Army seemed slow to realize it. our history is replete with shining examples of its ability to do so. cohesion within the Army became one of its foremost objectives. Beyond that. Through World War 11. commonly known as the Doolittle Board. with an aim toward recovering that sense of communitv spirit General Kerwin addressed. into a cohesive fighting force. ' The results of the Army's involvement in combat since World War 11.COHESION organized body of individuals. indicated that the foundations of cohesiveness in the Army have been substantially eroded. while filled with numerous examples of individual braverv and instances of heroic unit performances. Although much of the board's effort was truly . from all backgroudds and all walks of life. A review of developments concerning unity within the Army since World War I1 reflects the basis of remarks'made by both Generals Kerwin and Meyer. of both cause and effect. noncommissioned officer pay raises and new peacetime awards. willingly drilled into cohesive unit organizations by sound Ie~Jership at all levels. The Doolittle Board studied officerenlisted relationships and recommended to the secretary of war changes which i t considered necessary t o improve relationships between the two groups. Many occurrences. There is another kev element. The purpose of this article is to identify this element and highlight its importance to the Army of the 1980s. No doubt this is what General Kerwin had in mind-the binding of a group of individual sbldiers. is broad and diverse It includes cohesive unit training programs. "The most modern equipment in the world is useless without motivated individuals. That this is a critical goal is clearly evident in an article by the Army's chief of staff. just to mention a few. however. 0n"e of the first was the 1946 secretary of war's Board on Enlisted Men-Officer Relationships. Meyer."' The spectrum of proposals and plans to improve cohesion under study by the Armv. to win decisively the land battle. do not indicate the Armv possesses the psvchological strength to withstand the stringent requirements of protracted combat on the modern battlefield. While General Kerwin's remarks had far-reaching implications. the picture becomes less clear. Our institution appeared satisfied to retain the "status quo" until only recently when improving The Decline o f Cohesion in the US Army The suacess of our Army is generally measured by its ability to wage war effectively-that is. but all too often ignored. possible implementation of policies similar to the British regimental system.? Rut will these proposals alone accomplish the objective? It is my contention that they will not.

because of militarv rank . The number of general courts-martial prosecuted for disrespect and refusal to obey a lawful order tripled from 1966 to 1971: In 1971 alone. several of its recommendations can be singled out as catalysts for deteriorating cohesion within the Army. They include: I The abolishment of all statutes. October . so much so that units formed separate companies for those refusing to go on combat operations.' The result of attitudes fostered thereby was realized during the 1950s in a more "outward-looking" military and in first indications of widespread commingling within the uniformed services and military-civilian communities. An offensive against the Reserve Officers' Training Corps swelled on the country's campuses. the 1960s. Two stand out.' The situation in the rest of the Army civilians be encouraged and rnaintazned A maximum of military personnel living in civilian communities rather than on Army posts u d l assist in accomplishing this. "Fraggings" of commissioned and noncommissioned officers increased every year. 145 underground newspapers challenged the military establishment.MILITARY REVIEW wofthwhile." Not long thereafter. Even members of the nation's legislature played a part as evidenced in a May 1971 incident during which a congressman led a contingent of soldiers in booing their brigade commander as he attempted to communicate with them over grievances? Effects have also been witnessed in the military judicial system where many are quick to blame courts too concerned with individual rights. They became more ominous as time progressed toward the next period of interest. customs and traditions 1c9hich discourage or forbid social associations of soldiers of similar likes and tastes. I t seems proper to conclude that these were the first signs of the Army's weakening con?munity spirit. Concern over this practice is noted in the following viewpoint expressed by an experienced jurist: Courts uill soon have to decide to what extent they will allou. As the Army became involved in Vietnam. individual rights and military efficiency to limit each other. The first occurred in August 1969 when a rifle company of the America1 Division refused to attack when so instructed. a similar incident occurred when two platoons of an armored cavalry troop refused to move out when ordered by unit officers to retrieve a was not much better. many events clearly indicated the extent of deterioration. Refusals to fight became commonplace. regulations. assisted by as many as 26 offpost coffee houses and 14 soldier dissent organizations.= Such indications of discord continued throughout the conflict. and That close contact and association with disabled vehicle between Lang Vei and the Laotian frontier.

. Hou~euer. However. The leveling process is more profound than that. '" These events. The Soldier's Integration Into Society Few periods of US history have seen more sociological change than the past several decades. as well as the military's acceptance of the volunteer soldier. consumerism. competition. I t rejects ulhat it sees to be the operational zdeals of American society: materialism. it must be remembered that the majority of them still recall the draft and its impact upon the nation. therefore. . in response to an accumulation of social changes. In addressing this problem. Compounding this situation is the deterrent role that has been our military's mainstay since World War 11. yet this would be inaccurate and incomplete. it might be easy to describe this as the rise of the enlisted soldier. Although today's soldiers are volunteers. . Some key element which forges cohesion is lacking in today's Armv. The volunteer soldier is a product of this era. developments and attitudes represent only a portion of the period of our national development on the soldier. The results of this were highlighted in a 1972 study: During the 60's. very few are old enough to have witnessed the United States in a state of national mobilization. officer and enlisted alike. the day is rapidly approachrni rrshen the courts rr%ill have to decide ~c~hether ftcrthcr expansion of indir~idrlal rights rc-ill imperil thc cffectiueness of our national dcfrnsc. in fact. They have. it is necessary to examine the volunteer soldier's approach to the military. observed just the opposite-a nation attempting to fight a war for which there was little or no substantial changes experienced by the Army during the past three decades Yet they clearly evidence the extent of the problem which General Kerwin addressed and which is being examined here.13 In the military. warrant close study. Anincreasingly popular idea a m o n g young .'~ Such development over the past several decades can best be defined as a social undercurrent.COHESION The current trend is tou7ard indi~>idlral rights. General Mever asks an in J teresting question uhen he writes "have we eroded essential values?"" Was this not what General Kerwin was intimating? To answer both questions. one moving superiors and subordinates closer together. and m~litarism. The effects of this support a t home. This decision must be grorrnded on a proforrnd rtndervtanrling of the nntrrrr of militarv discipline. the traditional youth culture developed rapidly in the direction of an opposition stand toward the institutions and ways of the adult uorld. and then evaluate the dynamics of group cohesion. The impact from the same forces act on both. I t affects all subordinates.

When one combines these perceptions with the overall degradation the Army's image suffered during the 1960s and 1970s. There is a special sensation about esprit. in the words of an early manual. for it can become a substance of vitality which fosters faith. pride. This phenomenon must be addressed further. it is correct to assume that today's to the abolition of the draft. therefore. There are two which must always be present-esprit and morale. Yet this sensation cannot be realized unless the proper level of morale exists within the unit. I t is the primary driving force which. confidence. in order. The Soldier Today dynamics is. This same model clearly underpins the philosophic rationale of the 1970 Report of the Presi. "have we eroded essential values?. then. not just our strategic triad. hardly as a profession and certainly not as a calling. that the response t o the chief of staff's profound question. brought on by the soldier's attitude toward his job. " ' Morale produced by two elements-confidence . Charles C." is in the affirmative. This concept is especially damaging to the Army as deterrence is normally perceived by the general public in terms of militarywide application.Americans is that the military functions not so much as a fighting machine. We must then ask: What values have been eroded which most directly degrade cohesion? A brief s t u d y of group soldier enters the Atmy with expectations unlike any held by those preceding him. Moskos indicates that the dominant trend in contemporary military social organizations. is the decline of the institutional format and the corresponding ascendancy of the so-called occupational model. fraternity and even a feeling of invincibility within the group. unity. "keeps your hands and feet working when your ~ is head says i t can't be d ~ n e ." There are those today who feel the soldier looks upon the military primarily as a job. Moskos Jr. but as a deterrent to fighting. Morale is the mainspring of the Army. I t is clear.dent's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force Ithe Gates Commission Report) which was-one of the first actions leading The establishment of cohesion among a group's members addresses an interpersonal phenomenon involving many facets of group dynamics. Dynamics of Group Cohesion The result of the evolution desciibed above is that many have fallen into the habit of viewing our soldiers as civilians in disguise. loyalty. reduces this theory to the level of the individud soldier.

Morale is essential t o establishing unit cohesion. On the other hand. discipline is the most important since. Discipline is essential t o maintaining morale. a measurement which has never been applicable to combat forces. The major difference between these two positions is found in the third leg of our concept-efficiency. therefore. is crucial to an objective response to this question. Can today's soldier accept military discipline? An understanding of its role in the organization. I t is evident. The Army recognizes that group cohesion has been . moralc and efficiency t o a fighting organization. as well as an evaluation of its current state in our organization. Whereas proper discipline is expected t o result in morale and efficiency in the military. j The Role of Discipline business world. it can induce both morale and efficiency. The efficiency required by the military expects a soldier t o accomplish tasks which a more capricious individual might not perform. This conflict pits proven success against societal changes that directly challenge the Army's capability t o be successful in the future. business efficiency is usually recognized in terms of quantitative productivity. properly employed.'% While morale may provide the foundation t o disciplining t h e cannot be disciplined-at least not in the traditional sense. for discipline is applied in the business world according to a different ideology from that in the military. Reflection indicates that portions of the Army may not have realized this fully as many are quick to point out that the volunteer has cohtributed significantly to this problem. common business practice presupposes that a high state of morale will result in discipline and organizational efficiency." Although the sum of the three normally equals success. Recognition of this fact is critical. that disciplining the Volunteer Army is concomitant to regaining our sense of cohesion. Conclusions Leadership of military forces is generally recognized as a three-legged concept emphasizing the importance of discipline. Yet discipline is one of the most often misunderstood and misapplied terms in the military.COHESION and effective discipline. it is not advisable t o hold this view in the military. There is no doubt that current affection for the oc'cupational model A perspective analysis of the entire evolutionary process since World War I1 concludes that the Army currently faces a conflict which it has never faced previously.I6 That discipline has come to the forefront is not merely a coincidence.

fair and impartigl discipline is the cement which binds a unit together. Discipline damental spills over into almost every facet of a military organization. October . Not only does effective discipline add to the challenge. and whose existence denotes an acceptance of a specified code' of ethics or behavior. tlefield. We must not follow this easier wrong if we are to regain the level of unit cohesion necessary to succeed on the battlefield. but reflected in the collective att~tudes of those who compose a group. effective only when there is an overriding desire to respond in a certain manner. the military as a politicized organization. Effective discipline must be everyone's concern. The key word is attitrrde. the general level-of discipline enforced in the Army today does not encourage the cohesive- must be an attitude. Yet it is now composed of volunteer soldiers. In my opinion. This article has established that discipline has taken a back seat in reaction to societal attitudes. many of whom view the service as a job. While there are many who think the volunteer soldier cannot be disciplined in the traditional sense. Yet they all contribute directly to the author's principle that discipline is an attitude which is optimum when it promotes an individual's appropriate freedom of thought and action while at all times ensuring his sense of responsibility to the group.MILITARY REVIEW fundamental to its former successes in battle. It is simply a copout.") The elimination of the Army's dilemma depends upon the realization that tough. It is THE most vital element to ensuring group solidarity. somewhat different for each individual. if this type of discipline is not present. Recommendations The Army must examine the current state of military discipline. Such an examination is crucial to maintaining the image of'a challenging organization. and motivation and performance criteria mostly from the standpoint of material reward. each facet is somewhat affected. it also is essential to our success *in combat. there is no evidence to confirm this theory. an easy path around an unusual leadership challenge. a phenomenon fully supported-even enhanced-by the prevailing penchant for the occupational model Need this have occurred? The answer is a resounding NO! Furthermore. This one funness necessary to foster the mental stamina needed on the modern bat. Conversely."' Indicators of good discipline are many. it is not too late to rectify the situation. All soldiers must clearly understand that discipline is a state of mind or attitude. Many of the Army's proposals currently under review or in?plementation will help regain it. but only our full realization that discipline is the long-term key to cohesion will enable the Army to retain it at an acceptable level.

simultaneously. . al he hos hude.r. 1974 P 36 14 Cnarles C Mo3kos Ji Tienos .et Aimv Tln?es 77 July 1978 u 14 2~ ~ e n e r a ts. Korea ond thc ( L n t ~ . o mrcka. t e bSfate5 Nauar rnr1.n Mil. i t must.Z hrL aprL71ng ~n Eurupt~. I aprrptary of the G e n ~ r oStoffi l srun i M e c h a n t ~ e d l . r e n army NO F ~ Y U I 10 the suid.nrnondrd a bngudp hcod. There need be no dilemma between discipline and the volunteer soldier. n d ~ n O e n l 01 Do~vmenls 115 Government Prlntlng Olllre WaShlnqlon D C lq75 0 179 16 C v o w s Morale A Comb. Fort R ~ l e y .l y ~. ~ P d d no 0 Oiorr Research A n a .ce$ ~ o ~ r n tntr. a f ~ o " ~ n ~ lThe i i l n l a n l r ~ Journal P r e t i Wasnlnglon D C June 1946 D 30 5 Hu'51 Faes and Pete! Arneti Tola to Move Agdl" On 6tn ~ s a oDav l ~ Cornnanr A Re?ur?% r n r N e .on M c ~ e a nva 3972 0 65 9 ~ e f n l The C O I I ~ C 01 S~ the Armea Forces Armea forces J D U r n d i lntel"drlOndr 10 i e m y F Foreman Relsg.onar a i 7 June 1971 DD 3 0 3 ' 8 R V V Rae Sironen B Foreman an0 H o w r a C D l ~ e nFuiure l m ~ a c 0.COHESION disciplined. yuartcrs company. n . enrr$leb wan f l e .rure P ~ O C P n Pq~.err S ~ n n q 1971 0 101 1 1 Meier OD c . fietnam.on ol~D~~r~o1mne an0 Con fidence Canadian Arm* Journal Januarr 1952 D 29 17 C O I O " ~James < J Foio Mml~9arvR e r e a July 4968 a 59 C O B I I I C . puny and un autatron company ' l ~ - / .nai. ! 05 12 ~ a e rema man ana olsen op tit D 30 1 3 j a r n e ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~n. Rev.~er Suoe. t a r v~ e v . i . General Kerwin has issued this warning and.~ar1. 1980 0 4 3 cohesroo ~r0005a15*avant+ ~ r m y i r r n e ~ 1 7 hl0vemDer 1980 D 1 4 The Re0011 0 1 tre Sec~erarv or war i Roriro an Olrlce. e i r JUS.ltzod ~ n f u n t r y corn.on C o n s i ~ e n i ea i d Mm'. a challenge of gigantic proportion.rara l C Mew ~ e a ~ e s A ~R n e. i s s C o r ~ o r a 1. hn.srmo~. vor* lam-r 16 ruqu+l 1969 D i 6 ~ o b e r t D nelni JI Oraltees vs ~ ~ f eLUSP. Even though the volunteer soldier is motivated by different factors than his predecessor of 30 years.r troop c l p e n e n e e rn both ~tzfontr?nlld ~ 1 ~ 1 tlon units and has co. Our capacity to withstand psychologically the rigors of modern warfare depends on it.oaar 3 Mar 1'371 D 19 7 Robert D ~ e l n i JI The Colta~se o i Ine Arrnea Folces ~rrneu Fo. ~ ~o ~fS i c a d e r ~ h D 18 ram 0 63 19 Maurv D Fela r*e Sf uciure ol ~ .ar IIe rcrertrcd a B S from the L'SblA and rs o g r u d ~ ~ a tof e the Armed Forcrs Staff (Lllogc I.ons ~"oaleano "age number 15 QrmeO Forces 011. 5 IS A r m y Mozaie Armed iorcei journal Internst. Nor~rnbe. It is our responsibility to accept that challenge fully and reinstate deep-seated cohesiveness within our organization by insisting on tough but fair discipline. o r e o c r Armes Forcer as Socra~S ~ s f e m i s age Puei~cat~ons ~ n c Beverly * a l i ~ Cdht 1977 D 78 20 Saiiuel B n a v 5 T l * q Commano S t a c x ~ o Books i~ Hap 1~5Durg Pd 1967 D 188 00 ili DD 31 34 f h l o ~ o r IPI Jnmp5 P Iscnhouer J r r s the 1st Infantry U I I .nln~ t e r in" a l ~ y ' o t ~ n ~ F eW e C~ P ~ .:% ~ . n to Be>.xrta. In fact. ~ m t L1nrtedStarea. Summary The Army can still regain the sense of unity that has stood it so well in the past. 1 D I S C I D ~ .larv Orqan :al. he can withstand the mental severities of combat-if he is properly NOTES 1 ~erwxn ~ . b e r a i .nai.tarr Dlh~lplcne Mllrlary l dr.

particularly with regard to the Kremlin's motives behind the move.Will Afghanistan -. U S Air Force Soviet actions in Afghanistan have attracted worldwide attention. political and sociopsychological factors o f the Soviet involvement and compares the Russian experience with that o f the United States in Vietnam.' Heyns. military. the -- . Some observers have suggested that the Soviets may be facing a situation similar to that experienced by the United States in Vietnam. This article examines the geographic. Become I. soviet -union's Vietnam? Major Terry L.

The guerrilla fighters are said to be engaging in hit-and-run tactics and inflicting casualties upon Soviet forces trying to transit the highways and roads. elusive and very mobile enemy. All of this type of reporting we have seen before. These issues may be grouped into four categories: geographic. 1 Soviet forces are pictured as being plagued by a determined. Kandahar for Danang. If the assumption is made that the total cost of . this is an arbitrary grouping. the Department o f D r f e n ~ e or a n y other government agencv -Edrtor " RESS reports of Soviet military action in Afghanistan have been accompanied by commentary comparing Soviet involvement in that country with the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. "Is this comparison accurate?" Is Afghanistan really going to be the Soviet Vietnam? Or are Western journalists seeing the invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan through P a perspective colored by the US Vietnam experience? The answers to these questions are extremely important. The resistance forces are reported to be in control of the mountain passes. Indeed. But one must ask. and so forth. opinions on Vietnam are as divided today as they were 12 years ago. . and this is the main purpose of this article. just as US forces were increaSingly bogged down in Vietnam. The most striking and obvious fact of geography is that Afghanistan borders the Soviet Union while Vietnam is onehalf a world away from the United States. also been heard from official sources in the US government.AFGHANISTAN The uzeus expressed rn thzs arttcle are those of the author and do not purport to reflect theposzfron o f the Department of the Army. and they are said to use these areas as bases of operation from which they sally forth to harass and inflict casualties upon their enemy below. military.' In terms of the total effort of the United States in Vietnam. Some newspaper analyses of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan read almost exactly like the newspaper analyses of the Vietnam War. it would be interesting to compare the cost involved in transporting the men and materiel necessary to fight the war with the total cost of the war itself. Soviet troops are said to control the cities rather than the countryside. Pakistan for Kampuchea (in the case of sanctuaries). But. The popular press has consistently implied that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan will become ever more bogged down. they are not only relevant to Afghanistan and the Soviet experience there. The experience of the United States in Vietnam is still very much open to debate and scholarly analysis. I propose to examine and discuss some issues which might be useful in comparing the Soviet situation now and the US situation in the past. in any comparison between Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and US involvement in Vietnam. Yet a start must be made. political and sociopsychological. but it is a start. Of course. A clear analysis of the United States' experience in Vietnam is yet to be found although there have been many fine studies of some of the relevant issues iiivolved. This point of view has. on occasion. but we can safely conclude that the cost of transport was indeed substantial. In fact. let us begin with some geographic considerations. for the most part. it seems we are forced to proceed from the unknown to the unknown. No reliable comparison exists. So. I t seems that reporters have only to substitute Kabul for Saigon. but also are relevant to the United States' experience in Southeast Asia.

There are other geographical considerations to be made in addition to that of distance. This disagreement continued throughout the conflict and is still a source of heated discussion today. On the other hand. the "search" part may be easier. limiting the cost in both material and lives.MILITARY REVIEW Soviet operations in Afghanistan will equal the total cost of US operations in Vietnam over an equal length of time. swamp and river impediments? The Americans in Vietnam conducted massive "search-and-destroy" operations. carried the conflict into the countryside. Resistance fighters can be more easily seen and attacked by such air forces. Afghanistan is an arid. What can the Soviets do with the resources not needed for supply and transportation? One possible answer is that they can put more cornbat forces into those areas which they feel need "pacification. While the Soviet forces may face enormous difficulties when they come to the "destroy" part of that equation. ation. US forces were to have occupied and held key areas along the coast and selected strategic points located not much further inland. however. The enclave strategy essentially ceded the countryside to the insurgents-the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. however. Marshes." Another possible answer is that they might decide not to expend such resources. will the Soviets be more successful than the Americans in conducting airmobile operations? Will Soviet forces find ground transportation easier in the absence of marsh.? There are many nuances involved in this debate. Critics of the Vietnam War. there was disagreement as t o how military operations were to con tribute to the security of the South Vietnamese. at the same time. In spite of the fact that both do share mountain topography which affects transportation and communication lines. Whereas Vietnam is a tropical country bordering on an ocean. Not only key and strategic areas were held. Guerrilla forces can more easily conceal and conduct their operations in heavy jungle. There is no canopy of jungle 300 feet high to help conceal troop movements. . Early on in the conflict. and this would mean tha) the cost of their Afghan operation would be less than that of the US operation in Vietnam. Searching for and destroying t h e enemy may not be as important to a successful military operation as is the overall strategy and plan which guides that oper. Soviet forces do seem to be moving toward the use of helicopter attack gunships and lighter armored units. the air operations of the occupying forces pose a more serious danger for guerrilla forces operating without a thick jungle canopy. . Due to the general lack of cover in Afghanistan. cite a lack of overall agreement on both strategy and tactics as one of the factors which led to the final US withdrawal. marsh lands or swamps to imbede movement in Afghanistan. There are no rivers. landlocked country. the overall geographical disparity between the two countries cannot help but affect military operations. The pacification progrKm. even those within the military. while such impediments do exist in Vietnam. the Soviets will not have to use nearly the amount of resources that the Americans were forced to use for transportation and supply. Like the Americans in Vietnam. The objective of the enclave strategy was t o preserve US presence and influence in the area while. but we will look at only two: the enclave strategy and the pacification program. swamps and rivers are more likely to aid resistance forces thadoccupying forces.

lt was both. The fighter-bomber aircraft were withdrawn and replaced by helicopter gunships. This adjustment in the Soviet forces better tailored their military units to cope with insurgent forces. what is Afghanistan today? At present. The cost in this type of operation was greater in terms of both materiel and lives. Images of the Green Berets. Soviet forces do venture out from the population centers and conduct military operations: even relatively extensive operations.' The "Tet offensive" also may have fallen into the classifica tion of conventional warfare. those units withdrawn were exactly those units which were not appropriate to insurgency warfare. and so forth all come to mind. Also involved in the pacification program was the question of the type of warfare and the resultant tactics which were used. At other times. the evidence suggests that the conflict in Afghanistan is cleariy an unconventional war.' And the enclave forces only venture into the countryside to conduct operations directly affecting the security of the enclave itself. small teams of lightly armed soldiers fading in-) to the jungle. The T72s left and were replaced by more mobile t r o o p s armed with lighter weapons. But Soviet forces as yet have not had to cope with an enemy armed with the heavy weapons which are typical . at the same time. the Vietnam War assumed the form of unconventional war characterized by insurgency operations. helicopter reconnaissance missions. Was Vietnam a conventional or unconventional war? In the opinion of many." The insurgent forces cannot clear the enclaves without resorting to conventional tactics. I f one is forced to choose between the pacification program and the enclave strategy and apply one or the other to Afghanistan. a case can be made that Soviet tactics and operations in Afghanistan today are closer to an enclave-type strategy than a pacification program. however. if his was Vietnam.~ press photos in that c ~ u n t r y Occasional and television films have shown T72 tanks sitting near a major Soviet installation or being used as artillery pieces which are fired a t fleeting targets in the mountains. This brings us back to the question of the enclave strategy previously mentioned. . The Soviets did not take long in announcing that they were withdrawing some of their units from Afghani~tan. The very idea of pursuing an enclave-type strategy is to limit both cost and casualties and. Well.AFGHANISTAN but villages and even entire sections of the country were to be taken from or denied tio the insurgents. Press reports indicate that the Soviets moved conventional forces into Afghanistan only to find them ill-suited to the type of conflict . the final b a ~ tle seemed to be more con\entional in nature: mass troop assaults supported by tanks driving on military strongpolnts and civilian centers. The result is a standoff.~ Of course. small-scale attacks at night. Both sides used conventional tactics (mass troop maneuvers with tank and artillery support such as in World War 11) and unconventional tactics (guerrilla opehtions involving hit-and-run attacks designed to harass the enemy). lawlessness and urban guerrilla assaults. maintain a presence in the regional area. The enclave strategy assumes conditions characteristic of a n insurgency-type conflict where there are no large conventional forces which could be maneuvered to threaten or attack the enclaves. assuming that the occupying forces can control the population within the enclave and effectively cope with riots. Indeed. depending on what time period in that long war is focused upon.

Soviet forces have thus far enjoyed the luxury of pursuing an enclave-type strategy which enables them to maintain considerable presence in Afghanistan with relatively small costs. There is always the danger that limited conflicts can become unlimited in situations of - ' . while the Soviet forces operate under a single command element. Chinese or Vietnamese Communist expansion? The Sino-Soviet dispute continued and even intensified during the course of the war. this lack of a clear and concise policy was reflected on the battlefield. In Afghanistan. Without clear and precise guidance. the Americans were never able to outline their political objectives in a clear and concise manner.MILITARY REVIEW of conventional ~ a r f a r e . It was the 4mericans and the South Vietnamese forces that ran into difficulty as far as coordination of their operations was concerned. Afghan resistance fighters are not being supplied extensively by outside sources. As the dispute continued. Before leaving this discussion o E military considerations. ~ h l s then. But. however. apd the Chinese may have even blocked or delayed Soviet weapons cargoes which were transiting Chinese territory. Perhaps this is the reason that the war increasingly involved the rest of the Southeast Asian area. the Afghahistan and Vietnam situations seem exactly opposite. The question of intervention necessarily must revolve around political rather than military issues. Both sides engaged in a heated polemic. of the reasons why the Americans intervened in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a result. any such supply will be far more difficult given Afghanistan's geographical position away from an ocean. In Vietnam. When it comes to a coordinated command establishment to direct military forces. limits are difficult to establish. the Afghan resistance fighters are in the position of trying to solve the problems which result from the lack of an overall command structure. Military leaders did not have clear guidance as to what political objectives the war was supposed to have accomplished. were the Americans containing Soviet. Yet the United States never reacted to the possibilities which presented themselves in the Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese relationship. for. In addition. In addition. ~ Whether Soviet forces will have to face a more heavily armed enemy in the future is open to question. the guerrilla forces enjoyed the advantage of a command establishment which was able to coordinate overall operations effectively. In the case of Vietnam. however. Until now. if a unified command structure is important. This lack of a clear and concise policy with regard to the US involvement in Vietnam may be the most salient reason for the American withdrawal. Would a more concise policy which clearly delineated objectives have enabled the United States to take better advantage of this triadic relationship? Possibly. The North Vietnamese were able to take advantage of this situation by at first playing one side off against the other. Was the United States containing Communist exuansion? If so. it would seem that the Soviet forces are at an advantage in this area of command. Poor relations between the Soviet Union and China were reflected in both word and deed. unlike Vietnam. of more importance is the purpose for which it ex. we must also look at the issue of a coordinated command structure. leads us to a discussion ists. control and the coordination of military operations. North Vietnam came to rely more on Soviet aid and Soviet weapons.

is t o understand clearly the reason for Soviet behavior in world affairs and in Afghanistan. for the Soviets have never had difficulty in taking pragmatic advantage of situations if they felt it was in their interest to do so. however. implying that such a request from a "friendly and progressive" government could not be refused. Could a similar situation in regard to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan pose the danger that the conflict might spill over into other neighboring countries? To investigate this question.AFGHANISTAN i . An effective Western response can then be mounted while. the fact that we cannot find a clear Soviet policy statement regarding their objectives in Afghanistan is not as important as the lack of such a clear declaration of objectives from the Americans in Vietnam. Before concluding. but with Czechoslovakia. that there is one main difference between the Afghan intervention and the Vietnam intervention: The Soviets have followed in the footsteps of their czarist predecessors. Fears were expressed that the Soviets were thrusting toward warmwater ports or that Soviet forces were flanking lran and taking up positions which would better enable them . at the same time. political ambiguity. This does not mean. at least in my opinion. Is the Soviet invasion another Czechoslovakia. What is necessary.I0 Press and television reports emanating from Moscow point out that Soviet forces were sent at the invitation of the Afghan government. to use the vernacular of the time. hence the con tinual escalation of the conflict and. reducing the risks of a dangerous international confrontation. as to just what these official Soviet pron o u n c e m e n t s really mean. the Soviets have also had a' historical interest in the territory which is now Iran. I believe. Given l h a t 1 believe to be this crucial difference. we must examine the political reasons for the Soviet invasion. however. US actions and aims had no historical guideline. there is one additional area which must be addressed in . We find differing conclusions. even the president of the United States expressed shock about the invasion. is that the Soviet troops were moved into Afghanistan in order to "save" that countryjust as US troops were sent t o "save" Vietnam. Official Soviet statements regarding the intervention in Afghanistan are not any more precise than the statements of the US government regarding Vietnam1 Probably the safest conclusion one can make. not with Vietnam. Indeed. Thus." Western scholars have pondered long and hard over Soviet statements which justify and explain the intervention. Soviet intervention and interference in these countries cannot be ruled out. Pakistan and India. that the Soviet threat to the region is diminished. however. all this is in the realm of possibility. however. or is the invasion something new?I3 Indeed. Certainly. the everreceding light at the end of the tunnel. The Soviet Union. to intervene in that country. has had a history of involvement (if not outright intervention) in the Afghanistan region since the time of the British raj. on the other hand. while the Americans found themselves entrapped in a conflict they never really bargained for and from which they found it increasingly difficult to withdraw.12 S o m e Western reviewers of these pronouncements compare Afghanistan. and a number of US government officials expressed the opinion that Soviet actions in Afghanistan constituted something entirely new and certainly very dangerous to world peace and the East-West relationship.

The Vietnam conflict was a media event. Indeed. Red army soldiers guarding the ~ala'ldbdd. Names and places such as Danang. Saigon. I t is the sociopsychologicaJ impact peculiar t o the American and Soviet population at home. The impact of this media coverage on the course of the war is still being debated. Even the final withdrawal of the remaining Americans from the US Embassy in Saigon was covered and reported in full. For our purposes here. The issues involved here also provide an important contrast between the two conflicts. Western reporters have long been banished from the country. In sharp contrast to the extensive coverage of the Vietnam War. television and the press brought the battlefield to the American living room every evening. During the Vietnam conflict. not only the population of the United States.~abul road beside their B M P l Right. I believe that we can agree the media coverage certainly had a significant impact on the course of the Vietnamese conflict. the DMZ (demilitarized zone) and the Mu Gia Pass were all well-known to the American public. A review of the media coverage of the Vietnam War certainly will provide material for an interesting study of the events there in terms of historical reference. but the population of the world had access to what was happening in Vietnam. B M P l s of the Red army guarding a ministry In Kabul comparing the Vietnam conflict to that in Afghanistan. October . Those who believe that American involvement in the war was wrong from the very start believe that the press coverage helped LO end the American involvement there. Those who believed that the involvement of the United States in Vietnam was necessary tend to have very negative feelings about the press coverage. as well as in regard to the impact and influence of the press in that whole affair. Dramatic photos and live-action film of battles and their aftermath were shown weekly. This included the population of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Kontum. and it was this footage which ap- ' .MILITARY REVIEW Left. if not daily. there is virtually no coverage of what is going on in Afghanistan. they managed to film fleeting glimpses of the Soviet buildup a t Kabul airport. the Mekong. Even as they left.

Soviet management of the Afghan intervention goes beyond the media. If a Soviet citizen is suspicious about his government's pronouncements. of course. most of what has appeared from Afghanistan has been from Soviet sources except for a few journalists who have infiltrated into the country with the Afghan resistance fighters. And if they are not sure about Afghanistan. Soviet forces are shown involved in civic action projects which the narrator says are designed to improve the conditions of the Afghan people. Thus far. Western press reports indicate that the Soviet wounded are flown to hospitals in East Germany to receive medical care. the Soviet intervedtion has not produced a chain of events which . even if this risk is taken. the chances that there would be any type of real impact upon gwernment policy are not high. everything is. And. What alternative do they really have? Even if the official line is not believed. for the most part. Soviet convoy in a guerrilla ambush in the outskirts of Kabul Right. In fact. t h e Soviet authorities can further mitigate the impact of the war at home. Left. what can they do t o make their feelings known to their government? The risk for any Soviet citizen who opposes official Soviet policy is indeed great. to follow the official government line.'"n t h i s way. for the most part. Thase soldiers killed in action are flown back to the Soviet Union but are not . what other source of information does he have to rely upon? Those Soviet citizens who have contact with Westerners are said. however. Soviet coverage of the Afghan intervention is carefully managed for domestic consumption. even if they have doubts.AFGHANISTAN P . Since then. Afghan troops equipped with Sovietmade J62s Photos coonely of Cmund Uelenre Internonunof peared on American television screens. Soviet citizens will stand behind their country's interest or what they perceive to be their country's interest. effectively dealing with). Except for a few troublemakers and problems caused by a criminal element in the country (which the Soviet forces are. buried in cemeteries near their home village. remarkably calm. the Soviet media which is directed a t Soviet citizens concludes that there is no conflict in Afghanistan.

In addition. and so on. Interna tionally. more consideration must be given to the reasons why the Soviets went into Afghanistan in the first place. and the boycott itself may or may not have been a success. therefore. the United States. Kandahar. The less concern about what is going on in Afghanistan. At present. But. partially dictate the expense involved in the Afghan intefvention and also the military tactics employed. structured their forces accordingly and are not concerned with the problems and difficulties arising from the threat implicit in battles typical of a more conventional war. We have now examined only a few of the issues relevant to Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Soviet government. Witness the debate in the United States regarding the Olympic boycott. the Soviets may find themselves in a more limited and defined situation than the Americans found themselves in Vietnam. Afghanistan is just not salient t o the American population.MILITARY REVIEW would have a significant impact on the Soviet people. This is a situation far different from that facing US military forces in Vietnam. has not been able to define clearly the political objectives of the Afghanistan invasion. Certainly. more could be said and needs to be said. there is again a striking contrast between Vietnam and Afghanistan. These factors. The Soviets have. there also was a considerable debate. the Soviets appear to be preparing for a long stay in Afghanistan. This expands the parameters of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan as far a s their civil and mihtary actions are concerned. the event would have to be of a proportion significant enough to penetrate the veil of media management and censorship. During the Vietnam period. the ordinary citizen of Western Europe. Certainly. Without such extensive coverage in Afghanistan. In terms of the impact of the media on the world population. the United States and even of the Soviet Union cannot make his own independent assessment about events there. Reports from Kabul indicate that large and permanent buildings are being constructed for Soviet advisers and their . we have mentioned some geographical disparities between the two countries such as the climate and the proximity to the intervening country. the more freedom there is for the Soviet forces to conduct their civil and military operations in that country. Djeallabad. . At present. The Soviets are at an advantage in this regard. the fictional novel by James Michener. like the US government in Vietnam. there is the question of media coverage. there is a far different situation when it comes to an awareness of what is going on in Afghanistan than there was when we look back to the Vietnam period. there was extensive news coverage of what was going on in all of Southeast Asia. During this brief discussion. Perhaps only a few who niay have read Carauans. in turn. for any event to have such an impact. Finally. In the United States. A clear analysis of the reality of the intervention must be made before any coherent Western response to the Soviets can he formulated. Soviet forces are mainly concerned with countering an enemy whose forces are engaged in military attacks characteristic of insurgent warfare. because of their previous historical experience in the region. how many people recognize such names as Kabul. Thus. They need not be as concerned with the reaction of world public opinion nor with the reaction of the population of their chief adversary. Herat.

cu e ~ ~b) l Ine Udrnocldl c RepUO 1c o f Algnantslan nn ch stillrn lnat me rea. PoII~~cBI LO* ~ n l e n ~ Contl8c1~ ~ ! ~ Parameters September 1980 Tar. I March 1980. 19 25 Julv t980.sf.scale carefully organma provoca 11005 by tne forces o t mpertalosm ana negeman~sm m e undeclared mar against revolutionary Afgnantetan has become part o f the oeneral otlenslve tnal Ine carno o f lmoerlallsrn has launched ag. . As a! 10.15 In.fary an0 Clvlilan 1 . 8 Febrvarr 1981. slates tnat the Soviet commano 8 s naveng trouble controlling the brharsOl Of 115 Own trOOD5 Kan 8 A c c o r d l n ~lo Finx OP rd. an M A from the Unruersrty of Kansas and I S a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College H e has serued m Southeast Asia and in West Germcny and as assrstant pmfessor ofpolrtrcal scrence at the US Air Force Academy. ~ ~ S C Y S S the ~ Sterm mlervenllon as 8 1 8s used a n the peloratwe sense I" contrast 1 0 sell (lelense mtutary mterventcon requwes specla1 mold' and legai iusfltlcailon to be acceptable Other wlsr the lntervenllonlst forces may be regarded as unreasonably lmposlng their wlll on people beyond then aombnson I 0 Breihnev speech. Soviet troop strength seems to have stabilized at around 85.families. power Savlet casvaltles were esl8mated to be ailproxlmatelv 1000 rlmea and 5000 wounded n Econom. lzveslrya 18 October 1980 Alghan 1518" has been faced a l l h large. Natronnl Secunty Affarrs Institute. menllons that 5000 10 8000 ie5ervmst5 sere oulled out and replaced by crack unal~ Also. July August 1980 and J W vatenfa. Fall 1980 dtscusses both Czecho~~ovak and ~ a Atgnanmstan 14 Such reporls nave appeared tn Tlme Newswee* and U S N ~ W S 8 world ~ e p o r ta5 well as ~n The Nelr rork r l m p s and m e Cnnstran Science Monttor Verlftcat8on 3s d~flocull $ 5 Amertcan forces 8 n Vletnam numbered as many as 554000 tn \ Major Terry L Heyns is assigned to the Research Drrectorate o f the Natronal Defense Un~uersrty. by holding the major cities and transportation strongpoints. RUSS~X B Co. ' Av~af~o wee*.sI 10 16 January 1981. I980 "4 Donalo E F t n h Afghan lnvaslon Lmhened to 1988 Art8on. they can manage the insurgency mounted by Afghan guerrilla forces. "Why the Russians Inradea. Washmgtan. the Soviets ~n o c ~ u p v m g aanai Kabui and Herat are said to controt cmtmer tnat once held 70 percenr 0 1 the country s popv8atmon Constralnt5 on US lnlerventlon 8n 9 Davmd W Tar?.lost the forces ot llberatlon and peace" AS found The Lessons 01 Ylelnam. Number 2 Summer 1980 13 Flnh. Number 2.000.ence ol Random House Inc N Y 1965 3 See Stephen T nosmei We F d l r or Sourn Velnarn Slalemenfs by Vefnamese Mll. Fort Lesley J McNair.'Omrs Volume 24.n as well as grealer a." Nalron. op crt.lllct. n 14 ~ u l y 1980 pp 2023 5 An Nuem ~n Econom.Crane. Robert S McNamara staled "We seek an lodependent non~ommuncst South Vletnam ' Hewenlontosay'unlesswecanachreveth s o b ~ecttve. D C He recpzued an A B from St Louis Uniuersrty. 1977 pp 11 12. ammun#l#on an0 lhgnler armor were sent . where he is the deputy drrector.almost all o f southeast Asla well plobablr fall under com munlst dommance ' II P r d ~ o a u n 2 ~ a n u a l f1[180 ~ u p o ~ l u o a ~ t a l e m ss. Volume 5. Wllltam Grtlflth. sees the > n ~ t $lnrasson al as a Carbon copy of Clecnoslovahla ~ l r Valenta t From Prague lo ~ a b u s jnterna tronal Secunty. ealtea by W Scott lhompson and D D F r ~ u e l I .auy event. ~ndccafeatnal Snrmet IO res nare learned to cope wltn the guerrilla war they are facsngano Inat the* naresealeoolltne P a r m a n borderw8tnanew type 01 mine 7 Stuart Auerbdcn The Warn. NOTES 1 A brrel arllcle 8 n rsme l o March 1980 D 32 polnted o u l some 51mllalllle~ and a l l t r r r n c r s between Vletnam and Afghanlslan I hare erpanaed the d#scuss#on and hopefully added some new ~ons~aera~~ons ~g l e w s o n v ~ e t n acanbe m 2 ~wooppos~n found In ~1dmv2n~lymn W!tnesi ro vlel Nam Canlll B Co Inc Dobas Ferry N l 1988 and Davla Halberlfarn The Mahvnq 01 a Ouaqm. '11 <!all ass sf. Crane Rus5ah 8 CU N Y . D 3. nriY rifles.000 men although some reports in the press still place the number of Soviet troops at 100. N Y . Afghanistan is and will remain a source of tension and danger for East and West for now and for the foreseeable future.r d e r r . The Sovtel lnvas~on 01 Afghanlslan. The Impllcatlons ot Alghanlstan.51a~esthat Sov8et 6 An 11em8 troop strength 1% blaced at 85000 men It furthe.ngron Porf.' Surv!val. frunl I l l ? -SSR has 4 conrca. the Soviets may have concluded that. limit Soviet casualties to an acceptable level and remain in Afghanistan ever grawtng armed lncurslons an0 provocatmns by the Afghan people s lorelgn enerntes and world 8mper8altsm whlrh clearly wanted to restore the older order to power 12 Several recent arllcles provlae an analysls o l the Sovlel tn teiventlon Jerry Hough.

in and o f thernselces. As Major William D. maybe only the realization of a maniac's dream of destruction. They combine the essential elements o f combatmaneuver and fire support-but with such rapid deployment capability that they can be looked upon as a type o f nuclear strike force. the specter of it looms on the N Major William R.Nuclear strikes. US Army . McKinney. controversy prevails on the tactical use of nuclear weapons. Within the U S Army. Tlte author n~aintairtsthat US Army doctrinal literature today does not contain enough rules. horizon a s Warsaw Pact and XATO forces stockpile various nuclear weapons for possible future use on the integrated battlefield. principles and guidelines for tactical nuclear ujarfare. Brown wrote in Militury R r l ~ i c ~"there u ~ . Herein. he presents his concept forplartnir~g a buttaliori task force deliberate attack using nuclear uleapons. is the remaining uncertainty and concern that we Introduction UCLEAR warfare has b e y described a s "maybe a treasure house. are a unique form o f combat power." Nevertheless.

though. Furthermore. I t employs conventional tactics on the most unconventional of all battlefields. destroy or disable equipment. U S Army doctrine partially recognizes this concept in FM 100-5. To date. this article will present a concept for planning a battalion task force deliberate attack using nuclear weapons. For example. the following must suffice: "The battalion task force will fight on the nuclear battlefield essentially the same as on the conventional battlefield. in and of themselves." Major Brown urges all levels of the Army "to come to grips with the realities of the nuclear environment in order to visualize such a battlefield effectively. tactical nuclear strikes could be employed as an element of combat power in an econotny-of-force role. a single 1-kiloton weapon against troops in foxholes or tanks will inflict a lethal area coverage 20 to 30 times greater 'than one volley of conventional fire from an entire division artillery force. They could destroy enemy forces counterattacking along corridors leading into the flanks of friendly forces who are.envisions tactical nuclear weapons accomplishing battlefield missions within an integrated scheme of fire and maneuver. Within limitations of brevity. in turn. despite their lethality. They combine the essential elements of combat-maneuver and fire support-but with such rapid deployment capability that they can be looked upon as a type of nuclear strike force. For example. Nuclear strikes provide this unique combat capability because of their awesome effects. and generally disrupt operations. Operations: While not a substitute for strong conventional forces. nuclear weapons prouide the commander the capability to generate instantaneous combat power of enormous magnitude. other doctrinal literature describes nuclear weapons as the "same as any other weapon-to produce casualties. . the article offers the concept that nuclear strikes are. in Field Manual (FM) 71-2."" The nuclear strike force concept . Decisive results will still be achieved primarily . as a strike force. principles and guidelines for tactical nuclear warfare in the U S Army doctrinal literature. the next sentence emphasizes that combat service support and command. a unique form of combat power.' Yet. . The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Rat~alion Task Force. this article outlines the principal battalion-level command and staff actions that must occur on t h e integrated battlefield in preparing for a deliberate attack using nuclear weapons. assaulting deep into enemy rear areas. nuclear weapons alone will probably not be decisive on the battlefield. "3 IIowever." To correct "this nuclear malaise. but doing so much more independently than conventional firepower. For example. This guidance is neither instructive nor detailed enough for the in ) tegrated battlefield. control and communications will be disrupted: that the task force and company teams will be more isolated: and that units should mass only when absolutely necessary. Nuclear Strike Force Central to the tactics presented here is the idea that nuclear strikes by a US force are an element of combat power far different than mere fire support. there is a paucity of rules. "' As a step toward that visualization.TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS do not understand what would really occur in tactical nuclear warfare."' Seemingly in a contradiction.

consequently. - The Concept The scenario: Friendly forces are conducting conventional offensive operations to restore the international boundary. a brief review of today's doctrine for t h e "nuclear weapons package" will amplify how it can be framed around the nuclear strike force concept: First. if employment constraints permit. but these strikes must still be executed as part of the corps package. Several low-yield. the doctrine of division sub. "Now maneuver is accomplished not only by troops and fire."' Although arr~vedat independently of Sidorenko. describes a nuclear strike as one: . my concept of the nuclear strike force is an important element in the battalionlevel tactics to be employed in the deliberate nuclear attack. A. Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures: "The key to successful nuclear operations lies in detailed planning: coordination. but also by nuclear strikes. . packages reinforces the nuclear strike force concept since it does enable the maneuver task force commander to employ his weapons as strikes that are oriented toward achieving his tactical goals. October . the task force commander will issue his planning guidance. strengthen his defensive capability and permit movement of additional forces forward to launch a counterattack. . which makes it an element of the combat power equation that must be accounted for as other than mere fire support. a nuclear strike possesses an area of lethality. Sidorenko. to ensure full integration of nuclear strikes within the scheme of fire and maneuver.^ Weapons from this package will support the battalion task force deliberate nuclear attack by way of division subpackages. However. higher level planners are prepared to refine their aim points. Lastly. and shock action of the troops seem to merge into one and. The aggressor has employed riuclear weapons to delay this offensive action. zn which the fire. Before outlining the task force com- mand and staff actions for a deliberate nuclear attack. aggressive exe~ution. The Soviet military theorist. a "nuclear package of discrete weapons" is planned for employment in a specified area over a short time period to support the corps tactical mission. The employment of nuclear weapons by friendly forces has been authorized t o assist in operations to penetrate aggressor defensive positions in zone. coupled with the ease and speed of delivery and depth of deployment. and decentralized."~ Upon completing his mission analysis and determining that tactical nuclear weapons could be employed.MILITARY REVIEW through the integration of conventional firepower and maneuver and nuclear strikes. . These points all fall within the doctrine as stated in FM 101-31-1. maneuver. to fit the task force commander's desires. the capability to accomplish a mission independe~gly in the destruction of one enemy force or another. the task force commander must be able to execute it. A. He must fully understand the importance his guidance will have on the eventual outcome of his tactical opera- . However. Second. It ensures that weapons are used in a manner within political and military constraint^. cannon-delivered nuclear weapons are planned for use in the battalion task force zone of action." He further states.

maneuver will remain as one of the most important aspects of the nuclear offensive. Mobility will preserve freedom of action. This control measure will capitalize on the greater mobility of mechanized forces and facilitate bypassing zones of contamination. incur less vulnerability to enemy nuclear strikes. reduce vulnerability and permit seizing the objective quicker and with To this end. They can rupture his defense line and create conditions that favor a swift assault to overcome him and continue the attack deep into his zone. The attacking force should be strong initially and capable of striking deep into the enemy zone. that an armor-heavy assault force runs the risk of being prematurely expended if there is insufficient destruction of the enemy in depth. defeat counterattacks and support commitment of our reserves into the battle.TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS tion. Define the defeat criteria or damage expected on the target in consonance with criteria guidance from higher headquarters. This includes his concept for the subsequent use of weapI. his reserves or his quclear delivery means. it will be capable of rapidly exploiting the nuclear strikes by attacking at high speeds and penetrating to greater depths. His artillery and antitank weapons. While the mechanics of making the operations estimate do not change. though. While some items may be part of the field standing operating procedure (SOP).'~ attack is a control measure for maneuver likely to be employed in the deliberate nuclear attack. As such. while lessening the requirement t o concentrate mass on a narrow frontage prior to the assault. control and communications facilities. while. Every unit's action must be coordinated with the nuclear strikes so that they are all directed toward exploiting the results. at the same time. r u p t u r e t h e enemy's defensive positions or fix his reserve so that it can be woven into his scheme of maneuver. ons. his guidance must provide the full range of his expectations for employing nuclear weapons to a staff that may likely be inexperienced in nuclear strike planning. It is important to realize. Furthermore. Probably more so than at higher levels of command. conventional and nuclear fire support can help prevent the enemy's withdrawal and consolidation on new positions. he must: State the result expected from nuclear s t r i k e s . Provide essential elements of intelligence that will aid in target acquisi I tion. Identify the limiting requirements for obstacles to prevent their interference with the tactical movement scheme. While nuclear fire support will be awesome. Outline the risk he is willing to accept on his troops plus the collateral damage preclusion criteria as specified by the corps SOP. Further- . The task organization must include armor so that the assault force will possess maneuverability and firepower. it will maintain dispersion and not present a lucrative nuclear target while penetrating the defense simultaneously on a broad front. His command. Consequently.t h a t is.'" Fire support throughout the offensive should seek to attack the following targets: The enemy's nuclear attack delivery systems. the 5 3 must recognize that some facts do take on a different perspective. the direction of fewer 10sses. Nuclear strikes can destroy the strongest points in the enemy's defense." The staff can now earnestly begin making estimates and developing courses of action.

there IS the possibility that maneuver elements and combat service support units may have to bypass. Additionally." In planning fire prepararion and support. to seal the enemy's possible counterattack route in the vicinity of ZZaaaa. as the offensive develops. while it must be held somewhat farther to the rear and more dispersed than normal to avoid creating a lucrative massed target. one SRC. Most important. effects on his forces and the radiation status of his' units. 1 ' . thus provid~ng flank and rear security. 1-kiloton nuclear round. enemy actions. control and communications will become more complicated. This will help ensure tactical surprise. 1-kiloton nuclear round. using one SRC (short-range cannon). the reserve can be moved to overwatch positions as the attack progresses. an unevenness across the mancuver front is likely to occur.'" As a result of these command and staff actions. Shielding electronic components from the effects of the electromagnetic pulse is particularly important. Also. negotiate or cross areas of tree blowdown. The enemy will not be able to re-position his reserves and will have less time to strengthen his forces and defenses in front of the main assault. the commander must order that proper personal protective measures be taken. 1-kiloton nuclear round. to destroy the enemy's forward positions in the vicinity of ZZxxxx. a scheme of maneuver employing a direction of attack will permit a rapid attack from multiple routes immediately following the nuclear strikes that will advance swiftly into the enemy's rear to seize objectives throughout the entire zone of action. Also. the course of action for the task force attack using the nuclear strike force concept might be expressed as follows: The task force attacks DTG (date-time group) with one team in the direction of Hills XXX-YYY-ZZZ to seize Hill AAA: one team in the direction of Hills BBBCCC-DDD to seize IIill MMM. The reserve. the degree of contamination he expects to encounter. If the decision is to cross. paralyze its maneuver capability and hinder its preparation for a counterattack.nuclear strikes to protect the attack echelon as it penetrates to its initial objective. weather'and terrain. and command. Yet disadvantages are incurred with this technique. A combined nuclear and conventional artillery preparation is even more important now since the entire depth of the tactical defenses must be taken under fire to ensure success later during the highly mobile assault.more. Also. If multiple directions of attack are used. His decision will be based on his mission. lower morale and disrupt the enemy's tactical depth." The flank security problem can be somewhat reduced by properly employing . The task force commander must decide whether to cross a contaminated zone and when. can be given "be prepared" security missions. this will complicate control. The flanks of the attacking forces will be less secure. to destroy the enemy's reserve force in the vicinity of ZZyyyy: and retaining one SRC. The reserves must be broughl under fire to inflict losses. the elements must avoid being held up in the contaminated zone by either enemy action or obstacles. the staff should understand that nuclear weapons employment will permit a shorter artillery preparation. fires and radioactive contamination. The staff must also concern itself with protection from the effects of a nuclear strike. they must still be close enough together to render mutual assistance by fire and maneuver if necessary.

.oo iask force OD crr p G 1 5 Fleld Manual 6.8 12 58aorenk0. the binders hold 12 issues and are still only $5. p G I 3 Fleld Manual 100 5 O~erahoor Department ot the Army Washington. Orders should be sent to Military Review. p 6 3 \ 9 Flela Manual 101 31 1.oepartment 01 foe Army ~ a s h ~ n g t o n June 1977. Wasnlngton D C SPptember 1977 . Innovative tactical thinking and planning plus daring exe'cution will be required to overcome even that most commonly acknowledged difference of mass versus dispersion on the two battlefields. SuDrrenlena ent 01 Documents. Flre SupDorl m Combmed Aims Opera I~ons.o\ or1 ~ r ~ s f rtor u c w t f h the J Military Review Binders. Frre S u ~ o o n !n Cornerned Arms Opera lions Departmen1 of the Army. 129 and FM 6 20 Fire Supporr m Corn Dmed Arms Operal!ons. Mli~fary Revdew January 1980 pp 4653 2 Field Manual 71 2. K o r ~ a He recrtved a B S from the USMA. Beyond this need.utr. . Keep your back issues of the Military Review in a sturdy. KS 66027. . be essentially the same as on the conventional one. (. S?oul.lea to Tactmcal Nuclear Warfare7. The lank and MecOanrzea lnlanrry Bat D . 58 ana 96 13 Ibld. D C . a n hI S from the Unrliersrty o f Cblorodo and Is a graduate of the (ISACGSC He hob serrzed as an tnfor~trycompany curnmo?~der. I. US Government Frlntlng Oflsre Washlnglon I \ \ Mujor ilillzom R h<rKtnney zr uzth the US D e f e n s ~Attache Office.50 until January 1982. op o f .20. P 4 10 Ibib. NOTES D C 1970 p 41 7 rbld p 58 8 Field Manual 8 20. hard-covered binder. OP c!.DD 41. ld8. P b6 5 A A S. Vtetnam and I?an. rather. ond u. though. I t is not merely heavier artillery but. U S Embassy.TACTICALNUCLEAR WEAPONS Conclusion T o m o r r o ~ 'fight ~ on the nuclear integrated battlefield will not. D C July 1976 D 109 4 Fleld Manual 71 2. March 1977. m e Tank and Mecnanlzea lnfaolry Bat lal. OD clr p 4. '.00 rash Fo~ce. a unique form of combat power with inhercnt fire support and maneuver properties that meld it into a strike force by itself. p 9 11 Slaorenxo. op ell.C .oor-n*o me Oliensrve m sower vrew. in contradiction of today's doctrinal literature. a rethinking of just exactly what is a nuclear weapon is demanded. pp 59 60 14 IDId DD 174 76 15 lbld [I 121 1 Major Wlllkam D Brown 'Whatever Happe. ~n Koreo. Fort Leavenworth. Available i n maroon with gold lettering. US Army Command and General Staff College. Stall Ollrcers' Field Manual Nuclear weapons Emp8Oymenf Doclnne and PraCedures Department of the Army Washington.

Keith B. had its roots in the limited nuclear war notions discussed in and around Rand Corporation during the late 1950s and early 1960s' and the "flexible options" doctrine sometimes espoused in the early 1960s by Robert S. are those o f the authors and do not purport to reflect the posztron o f thc Department of thp Army.This article considers the effect o f Presidential Directive 59 on the overall strategic defense posture." Indeed.~ Nevertheless. Payne and Neil Pickett The u1elr. That doctrine. M~Namara. They feel that the addition o f a defensive system is necessary to provide the United States with a credible deterrent. it repeats many of the principal themes of the socalled "Schlesinger Doctrine" of 1974. PD 59 appears to em- 66 October .s expressed In thrr artlclc. in turn. the Department of Defense o r a n y o t h ~ r g o ~ e r n m e n t office or agency -Edrtor RESIDENT Jimmy Carter's decision in late July 1980 to approve Presidential ~irectiv' 59 (PD 59)'points to the slowly increasing sophistication of the'American theory of deterrence. The authors contend that current emphasis on offensive capabilities results in uulnerability to a Soviet strategic attack. PD 59 should hardly be viewed as a "new P nuclear strategy.

' The Soviet Union is governed by a highly centralized regime which relies on rigid political control to stay in power. As IIarold Brown has made clear: In the interests of deterrent. because of this. In stressing the deterrent value of US threats against Soviet politico-military assets. insofar as ure might be able to do so. Such targets would presumably include Soviet party elites (command bunkers: police and KGB (Committee of State Security) barracks: and command. the new presidential directive does not move the US theory of deterrence away from its questionable and potentially tragic basis.VULNERABILITY phasize even more than its predecessors the US requirement for countermilitary (including both hard targets and projection forces) capabilities and a high degree of targeting fle~ibility. in fact. control and communications links). despite the sophistication of PD 59 a s a targeting philosophy (we will say nothing here of the'difficulties the United States will face in actually implementing PD 59. especially in the current strategic environment6). although the United States has changed the nature of its declared threat against the Soviet Union. It is the recognition that the Soviets are most likely to be deterred from aggression against the West by the potential loss of politica!l. The Soviets know from historical experience (Napoleon through Adolf Hitler) that they can suffer an enormous number of casualties and lose a large portion of their industry and not merely survive. (This theory has become famous as "MAD. ~ However. accept as "stabilizing" the vulnerability of urban centers. it is the most progressive. we maintain enough strengths to repel any attack on the United States or its allies. In the interests of stability.control in their domestic and extended empire. ule must be quite udling-as w e have been for some time-to accept the pn'nci~le of mutual deterrence. 'there . it continues t o allow and." for mutual assured destruction. The threat to destroy Soviet cities or economic recovery targets (as emphasized in the Schlesinger Doctrine) could be unconvincing and certainly would be unproductive if implemented. but actually come out ahead by the end of the war. The strategic logic supporting PD 59 argues that. That is to say. From a purely deterrent Political Control PD 59 hss one characteristic which is perhaps the most important-certainly. In addition. in the final course.) However. anddesign our defense posture in light of that principle. attacks) against this control apparatus. its basis lies in what we call the "Armageddon Syndrome" or the continuing acceptance of wholesale US vulnerability to Soviet strategic attack. The prospect of large-scale societal I destruction seems unlikely to deter Soviet leaders from nuclear war should they believe that the final "systemic war" between capitalism and socialism had arrived. it would be highly vulnerable to threats (or.' In short.~ would be attacks on Soviet military power-the ultimate source of t h e authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet U n i ~ n . we avoid the Cap@ bility of eliminating the other side's deterrent.' There has been no indication that US acceptance of that principle has been affected by PD 59. PD 59 does transcend the longheld concept that the only stable basis for US-Soviet mutual deterrence was a condition in which both sides were vulnerable t o urbanlindustrial destruction.

The United States could have escalated the crisis with the clear anticipation of victory at whatever level of conflict circumstances dictated.. The Soviet attainment of parity (or. given the particular values of democratic societies. they have encouragedthe mainienance of wholesale US vulnerability However. Despite its best efforts to avoid conflict. the assured destruction threat is effective against a country like the United States. deter nuclear war. unnecessary to provide strategic forces capable of significantly limiting damage to the American homelands. the Soviets now appear willing to challenge Western interests in the Third World more boldly than at any time in the recent past. a crisis could lead the United States into an acute nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Ethiopia and Afghanistan suggest. And because US policymakers have tended to see no other use for strategic weapons than to. The 1980s However. the chances of nuclear war were rather remote. quality and probable performance results). Moreover. The past 36 years of nuclear peace are no real indication of the reliability of deterrence. as Soviet actions in Angola. the strategic environment will be vastly different in the 1980s. This increasing Soviet assertiveness at some future point may well prompt a US-Soviet confrontation. The stability of deterrence may actually be tested only bnce every 20 years. the US government is responsible for providing for our common defense.' At that tinle. even then.MILITARY REVIEW point of view. and the Soviets should have far less motivation to back down and fewer disincentives to escalate a crisis. The closest the world has come to such an event was probably the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Deterrence did not fail. as many analysts would argue. the balance of conventional and strategic capabilities forced the Soviet Union to anticipate defeat at any level of conflict. in large part. According to all public information. superiority) nullifies US escalation dominance. thew has b e ~ nno serious test qf the stabilitv of deterrence during the nuclear era. a n adequate US strategic posture cannot be based solely on offensive forces and planning. the US government cannot responsibly assume that deterrence will never fail and that it is. . The Soviet Union had no choice but to conciliate. therefore. The US decision to accept societal vulnerability completely fails to recognize the fact that deterrence could break down. However. or once exxery50 years. In contrast. but. People can choose to build their homes in flood or earthquake zones." they have agreed-in fact. because the United States had "escalation dominance" resulting from its superior strategic forces and locally deployable conventional forces (in numbers. I t is responsible for the security of the American people and does not have the luxury of taking such chances with our survival. As the guardian of our safety. Individuals in a free society have the luxury of not preparing for potential disasters if they are so inclined. the Soviets could not have mounted a successful nuclear attqck on the Continental United States and would have faced a massive response had they tried. Nor can the government afford to accept the doomsday theorizing of some analysts that nuclear war cannot be survived and so there is no use in trying.

if not-impossible. How'ever. a light BMD system should cover key US cities. In addition. no US president should escalate a European conflict to central war if the result of that escalation could not be in the US in terest. as well a s the realities of geopolitics. The United States is in a situation virtually devoid of attractive options given the current Soviet advantages in conventional and theater nuclear forces. That type of deterrent threat could be credible only ~f it came from an irrational person or government. An extended deterrent based upon the threat of escalation t o central war cannot be credible in the absence of effective I defensive forces. what ap- . including the three most important from a Western perspectiveEurope. The US strategic nuclear guarantee to its allies could not be carried out by a responsible president given the potential for selfdestruction involved in such an action. The possibility that the US homeland could be vulnerable to warheads from a variety of sources (including the People's Republic of China) within the foreseeable future argues strongly that. the United States indeed could not survive a nuclear war waged to decision. the United States would be placing itself in a more precarious position by escalating any regional crisis than if it allowed the crisis to remain below the level of central War. Recent tests of the Chinese CSS-XI intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) illustrate the probability that the United States will become increasingly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack from non-Soviet quarters over the next two or three decades. Japan and the Persian Gulf. the United States may simply find the prospect of an enduring vulnerability t o any ballistic missile attack intolerable. Obviously. the essential distinction between the superpowers and other nuclear powers may reside in the capability for strategic defense. the threat of US escalation t o strategic nuclear war is intended to d e ~ e rSoviet attack on US allies-that threat ("extended deterrence" in the jargon) is the basis of the US guarantee to NATO and Western security. - Long-Term Perspective From a long-term perspective. However. This line of reasoning admittedly is similar to the anti-Chinese rationale offered as the justification for the US Sentinel BMD system. The Soviet Union is physically closer than the United States to many potential areas of conflict.VULNERABILITY The arguments that offensive weapohs alone constitute an adequate strategic force posture. that US urban vulnerability is stabilizing and that the United States could not survive a nuclear war are mutually reinforcing and ensure a type of self-fulfilling prophecy: If we do not deploy forces for strategic defense. Unless the United States could anticipate surviving the escalation process i t unleashed. And the proliferation argument in the near-term probably is more relevant for air defense capabilities than it is for ballistic missile defense (BMD). However. at the very least. as the basic offensive technology of the early nuclear era becomes more widely dispersed. US forces would face the difficult. task of trying to defeat the Soviets on the local battlefield while Washington could not credibly threaten to (nor should it in actuality) escalate a crisis in these regions to central war. the likelihood that long-range ballistic missile technology will become much more widespread even within three decades is questionable.

The United States must resolve to defend the American population to the extent feasible. civil defense.MII-ITARY REVIEW peared as a weak argument in 1967 may contain much more integrity in coming decades.with earlier Sentinel or Safeguard systems. and com. advances in BMD technology render it possible that the United states could begin deployment of a BML) system covering much of the US homeland bv the late 1980s or earlv 1990s. or national extinction.range ICBM interceptor capability for the now deactivated Safeguard . data processing and exoatmospheric multiple nonndclear kill vehicles. The Sprrnt provided short. optical. Space-based laser BMD may be able to perform a number of vital defensive missions such as a' light-area defense for the United States and defense of Strategic Air Command bases: the national command authority. In addition. much smaller and less costly radars and interceptors. a space-based laser BMD system could provide the initial layer of a multilayered BMT) system." An MX system rendered invulnerable through mobility. The proper combination of selective counterforce strikes. deceptive basing and perhaps active defense (via the Low. This suggests that the offense may not always have the edge in the costexchange ratio. and that should be a considerable degree of protection. by the mid-1990s. control and communications facilities. air defense and BMD should provide a significant degree of damage limitation for the US homeland and population in the event of central war. endoatmospheric intercept could occur as close as 2 kilometers from warhead impact. signal. mand. Such low altitude engagement allows maximum exploitation of atmospheric discrimination and minimizes system vulnerability to maneuverable reentry vehicle technology. The use of space for such defen3ive missions offers the hope of a much more balanced approach to offense and defense in the US strategic force posture.'" In addition. in particular. Analyses of civil defense over the last 20 years point to the fact that civil defense preparations could mean the difference between the survival 2f the vast majority of the US populationperhaps more than 200 million peopleand recovery.sensor. These compact and relatively cheap ground-based components could be made survivable through proliferation. concealment or mobility. Developments in the areas of electro. have rendered both hard-point and area BMD options more attractive than was the case. Innovations of endoatmospheric defense technology include the use of preferential defense techniques and harder. It is possible that.

Altitude Defense System) would make a substantial contribution to US defensive efforts. However. The small phased-array radar and the missile interceptor launch tube will break through the top of the shelter to engage attacking missiles. the US. or even apply. no matter how sophisticated. What the "Armageddon Syndrome" does ensure is a continuing disinclination on the part of the US govern- . survivable hardtarget counterforce capability t h a t should provide an effective "firebreak" against Soviet crisis escalation. it is wholly inadequate as the basis for US strategic doctrine because. i t does not provide the necessary basis for extending US deterrent coverage to distant allies and friends.offensive threat cannot ensure that deterrence will operate. a survivable MX system should defeat Soviet strategy. US targets by destroying their ' ICBMs prior to launch. The M. Given the requirement of the Soviet "theory of victory" that US strategic forces be drawn down decisively in pre-emptive counterforce operations." Selective counterforce strikes by MX cauld also serve the vital defensive purpqse of reducing the Soviet ability t o atta. The successive layers of defense. from hard-target counterforce t o active and passive defense. forever. should function synergistically to provide a significant degree of protection to the US homeland. The concept of deterrence based entirely upon offensive planning continues to dominate US strategic theory and planning. A suitably invulnerable MX system should make clear t o Kremlin planners that US strategic forces could not be attacked successfully.Y wouid give the United States an effective.This artist's conception depicts the horizontal configurationof a Low-Altitude Defense Unit designed to defend the proposed MX iCBM force.

publrshed m I979 Nerl Prckett zs asststant to Herman Kahn. Deoarrmen! or Delense I n n u a t Reoorr SIrarrgv and !he MZ Hersfage Foundallon CrltlCal Issues Washlllgton D C 1980 For a dlscusslan ol the tcrce draw dawn requirements In ine Sovlel Iheory ot v8ctory.vers#tv P t e i i Bdllmmole MO 1979 DD 143 51 3 See the speech b r Secretary a? Defense Harold Brown COQ cernlnE PreS8aentcaI Drrect. Callrqe 20 August 1980 US D e ~ a r t m e nof l De'ense News Release Nvm0i. He has been a journalist rn Washmgton. because of its official endorsement. a t the present time.MILITARY REVIEW ment to deploy those forces necessary to defend the American the Correlatbon o f Forces 8 n NuLlear Weaoons Vorennava Mvsr. 1979 pp 109 16 1 1 For a recent d8SCuSslon of the maturat8on 01 Da111511C m15511e detense ternnoiogy see Bsil. Fllrres Whsl Can Be Done' Na lmonal Strategy inlormatton Center N Y . D C . Seplember October 1979 pp 55 65 an0 Pntlsp Klass. the otscvss8on ~n T K Jones.c M15srreDeleose-d Oorc* Loo* d~s~s~me LA n lUR80 1578 Ofl#ceof Plannlng and Analysls Lo5 Alamos Siientlflc Laboratory.reo Srrafeq~c h d i POIIPO by Klaus Knorr and Thornlo. Leon S q a l Retnlnklng the Unthinkable. 8 Thss 1s a dom. 16 June 1980. New Yorh l l e recerued an M A from the Unruerstfy of Southern Colrfornro School of International Relatrons He taught graduate and undergraduate courses at the Uniuersrty o f Southern Calrfornra and he co-authored Nuclear Strategy Flextbll~ty and Stabdtty. LOSAlamos N M June 1980. The ~ a n n s~og*mns un. Earr. \ ' L J October . c y Number 39 Sbmrnei 1980 DD 13 27 6 A u ~ e t u dm%cugs~nn l 01 some of the ~ro01ems~ n r o ' v e din po~rt c al iontrol targeting 8s devre.prouidrng research and edrtorial assrstance for Mr Kahn's projects. 1967. Crotun-un~lfudson.#st#cM#ss#teDetense TeitsSet d n a tion Week B Soace Technoiogy.m. Stale men1 by Valor General Gavson Tare Status or ?heBallrsttc Mlsstre DerenSe Research and Deveropment Program. Underlying the deterrent theorizing illustrated by PD 59 is the popular. pp 213 18 12 See Colln Gray.j!ari. Ironic as it sounds. o n Merapnois and Scenarros Praeger Pilbl8sners N Y 1965 puts the Cuban m 1 5 5 1 1 e c r # $ t ion rung 9 ol a 44 rui g escalation ladder 10 See 10. Year 1980 Department of Deten$r Wasbmgtoo D C 25 January 1979 p e l 10. Further. ~ o u s e of Represent S l r d l r g i c Opt~ons lor !he almves Subcommltlee on Defense Cornm#ttee on Approprlatlons. ~no n ~ s c a i a r .amcle heimao Karin S o m ~ Comments on Con trolled war L.o me Nvciear Age eurted by L Mart. an idea does not become reasonable because of the frequency of its repetition or even NOTES i see for e. 2 J f Kerth 59 at me Naval Wa. Slrategv Volume 2 Number 3 1980 DD 223 38 7 Harold Brown.9 N Y 1962 01) 3266 2 See Henry Ruvren The tvulullon ot Slraleglc N u i l e a l Doc trlne S i r a i r g c Though! . Croton-on-Hudson. and. 'Bai.r 344 80 70 August 1980 00 5 9 4 One 01 the Sorlel declared categormes o f w r rs a final L V S ~ P ~ *ar ~ C b e t w e n the soc#a1. However. Payne is a polrtiral screntist a t the Ifudson I n s t z t u t ~ .nani vlew #nmestern slraleglc Illeralure See ezdmp8e. W<lltam Davis 'Current Tecnnlcal Status of U S BMD Programs Naflonar Delense. Cerll or Oelewes # n Wlll#am R Van Cteave an0 W Scott Thompson. indeed orthodox. Number 8. DC 1 1 June 1980. h ~ chief s responsrbilrty is in the area of national secunfy affarrs. chairman and d ~ r e c t o r o f the Hudson Instrtute.srn on War and arm" !A Sovie. notion that absolute US vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack is an acceptable situation. view! Superantendent 0 1 Documenls US Government Prlntlng 0 1 tlce WaSn#nytOr D C 1974 D 70 5 See the 08scusslon of Sov8et ~ulnerablill es ~nColin S Gray and l(e(th Payne VICIO~Y I S P01~8ble f o r e ! g n P o ~ . SDrlna 1979 9 example ~ e r & n ~ a n n . T ~ ~ c h r l s o n rne Dnerrmas ol Co~nleroawerTaigetlnq Comosrar. FPD Number 0112!68 11 ~ u i y 7968 f d f . US Governmen! Prsntlng O t l ~ r e Wasn8nglon . New Yorh l i e 1s a gradvate o f Brandels Liniuerszty. it ensures the most horrendous consequences should deterrence ever fail. The wholesale vulnerability of U S territory degrades the credibility of the US deterrent by making it an unbelievable threat. see Malor General I Number 34.Straregy Ihsrd Ealilon translatea and ealtea b r Yarrmet Fantscott Crane RusSak & Co N v 1975 o 183 a n a v K u l a ~ o r e i a1 Marxrrm Lenrn. example.Read Plae9el Pu01150e.".51 and capitalist b'ors Sucn a Y. Fore~gn aCrUralny 10 the Sarrcts would hare the oecls ve poltllcal e l feet 0 4 ~ o s t e r ~ n q a g l o btrans1110" al $0 $oelailsm s e ~ v D Soho~ou 5 h y Sovle! ~>. we must finally begin to realize that absolute vulnerability is not an adequate basis for our security. Record verslon Second Sesslon 96th Congress Superlnlenaent ot Documents.

Gone is the emphasis on human rights. a coherent and planned strategy of selective alliance building would provide the structural framework for orderly evolution in the world. First and foremost. In short. investment and environment stressed by the Carter administration. the pursuit of human rights must presuppose the prior satisfaction of elementary states' rights. in fact. development. In the eyes of the realists. trade." Therefore. The United States would enjoy advantages due to its economic and technological power in playing the new games in the new arena. 1980 Although the Reagan administration has held the reins of US foreign poljcy for only a few months. internationalist foreign policy on a foundation of firmly held and articulated values. The advocates of realpolitik. a pursuit which results in ceaseless overseas tommitments t o unstable clients and uItimately . The most basic value premises of the nation. O'Leary./ I\ World Order. i t appears as if the United States is moving from world order strategy under Carter to a realpolitik strategy under Reagan. O'Leary sees the retrenchment model advocating neoisolationism. Only when given the prior lstructural) guarantees of uital security interests can states then pursue the kind ofglobab/processuaN community building which the World Order position prescribes. the United States must not pursue the obsolete scenario of realpolitik. tradiction with any world order involvement. . by transnational corporations and other nongovernmental institutions on the side and bv interna- tional or regional institutions and interstate bargaining arrangements from aboue. contend that the real problem for the United States is attributable largely to an absence of strategy and design in a world yet manageable by the "willful exercise of power. welfarism. Pluralistic cooperation among nations is likewise incapable of solving pressing problems since states themselves are unable to define their national interests. From the analysis of Dr. Retrenchment. O'Leary sees the preceding strategies as two of the three which will vie for dominance in the 1980s. Number 3. transgouernmental bureaucratic alliances from below. a definite shift in strategy is crystallizing. O'Leary Comparatrve Strategy. . Catholic University of America. James P. All such adventures amount to little more than a pursuit of unilateral American advantage. the United States must forge anew its alliances to meet the primary threat-the Soviets-before embarking on other involvements with Third World states. These interests are increasingly determined by: . or Realpolitik?Options for United States Strategy in the Nineteen-Eighties By J a m e s P. This school would deny the capacity of the nation to base an activist. on the other hand. The world order model perceives the contemporary world as rendering the "power realist" obsolete due to the increasing cost and decreasing usefulness of military force by major powers. are in con-. Volume 2. there exists the retrenchment model advocating a neoisolationist posture. Along with the world order strategy and the realpolitiki strategy which prioritize involvement in the world.

Military failure and political weakness could not. This takeover was highly demoralizing to the Muslims. US foreign policy since World War I 1 can be visualized in these three scl~ools. This can be witnessed in the El Salvador policy. as a way o f life and as a political force has taken on a new dimension in the wake o f the Khomeini takeover o f the once stable and supportive oil capital of Teheran.MILITARY REVIEW t o Vietnam-like catastrophes and the reappearance o f the "imperial presidency. By the end o f World War I. In this model. the first priority of the United States must be to set its ouln house in order so that we stand as a beacon of democracy at home. It appears that the Reagan White House has again picked up the banner o f realpolitik. cries will increase in crescendo concerning priorities. Middle Eastern Studies. . it would be a mistake to believe that what is happening in the Arab world today is an erratic. the Europeans had consolidated their control over Arab lands.sioned public" stand? Donald E Nsase. moral. economically. Elie Kedourie. Combfned Arms Combat Dsvelopmsnt Acbwlv Modern Islam: Renaissance or Crisis? By Elie Kedourie NA TO'S Fifteen N a t ~ o n s . And it is essentially with this crisis and its overcoming that the October . A start in this direction can already be perceived in congressional calls for decreases in foreign aid and import restrictions on foreign goods. According to the author. the history of Islam with its brilliant and unparalleled military successes had served to persuade Muslims that political success was a signal proof of the truth o f the Prophet's message. Which o f these three models the United States ultimately adopts for the 1980s will rest with the will and determination o f Americans to support these worldwide commitments while watching their own standard o f living fall. The present turmoil in the Arab states is the result o f a long chain of events and reactions to the military power. Until Vietnam. since it showed that God prospered those who obeyed Him. but result in a far-reaching intellectual. the United States basically pursued the realpolitik option. . how much will a "bruised and oft-disillu. with priority being given to national security interests. From the second half o f the 18th century onward. As the domestic economy continues to slump and the nation's ability to influence foreign events wanes. professor o f politics at the London School of Political Science and also editor of the journal. The retrenchers have not yet had their "day in court" although they are certainly waiting in the wings. February-March 1981 (The Netherlands) The Islamic world is increasing in importance. while surrendering the dream o f proselytizing democracy abroad. therefore. but. is less bizarre than it might seem at first. Islam as a religion. as well as in the increased budgetary support for defense. Islam today is in transition. According to the author: . Future domestic social and economic claims will further doom such an approach. he believes that what is now occurring. became the strategy o f the Carter administration. After being "burnt" in Southeast Asia. and spiritual crisis. the world order model. when put into its historical context. and its future course will impact on the policies and alliances o f the countries professing a Muslim tradition. with its emphasis on human rights and deJente. In other words. the United States is unable to sustain such commitments. inexplicable phenomena. Muslim territories were under assault by Europeans." Not only will such a world engagement be unsuccessful due to the bankruptcy o f such a policy. In fact. economic activity and philosophies o f modern Europe.

have been relocated in "protected" areas. . in the sense that those exposed to E'esternization noul found themselves between tiuo worlds.. protection of the population from the weapons of mass destruction and other means of warfare. Third. If these trends are confirmed. since 1966..-SIK. Therefore.the Arab world tried to apprentice itself to Europe in order to acquire the secret of its military. Of the four aims. then the Muslim world will have embarked on a new course in its long history. . or simply as a reaction or a response to a crisis brought on by Westernization. spiritual. Professor Kedourie states that: Whcther these trends in contemporary Islam are to be seen as heralding a renaissance. MarchbApril 1981 (Federal Republ~c of Germany) Many times.*this crisis had many facets. as much as possible. it became obvious that the Muslim world was weaker vis-a-vis Europe after decades of Westernization. military and administrative leadership during the conflict. maintenance of the political. preparation for modern warfare should also involve an adequate civil defense. But.'ester~zpolitical ideas and institutions introduced in the Muslim urorld were unu9orkable in that u ~ r l d . The Soviets have recognized these facts and have begun to act accordingly. a more fateful. collectivism and egalitarianism. It was. issue. These Islamic teachings are being welcomed among masses bewildered and discomforted by leaders attempting to Westernize but are neither successful in bringing prosperity nor in building a just society. Dr. placed close to recently discovered raw materials . in the sense that Il. It was political. The Islamic solution for solving this crisis consists of returning to fundamentalism. Westernization nou8rc'idely came to be seen as itself involving Muslim socigty in a crisis. A t first. 60 percent of all new industries. after a century and more of attempts. Finally. These plants are. This experience led to a denunciation of I4'esternization as a corrupt sham and fraud by contemporary Muslim thinkers who called for a return to the virtues o f Islam. in a protracted nuclear conflict. Whether this course will succeed in ensuring the safety and prosperity of Muslims in a world whose military power and economic prosperity d e p e n d s o n c o n t i n u o u s technological innovation would seem a more important. as well as maintaining the essentials of life. maintenance of the economy and protection of human resources assume first priority. again. Second.I t usas also cultural. is too early to say. in the sense that the secular outlook spread by IVesternization was not compatible with the Prophetic revelation u~hich was the very origln and I basis of Muslcm society. i t is forgotten Chat. IIeinz Magenheimer notes that the Soviet civil defense program contains four objectives: First. According to the author. . . This type of defense is of greater import today as civilian populations are no longer immune from the horrors of war. maintenance of the economy during the conflict (especially those areas of industrial and agricultural production so vital to the war effort). much of the support and sacrifice of war will fall on t h e civilian population. In the economic realm. restoration of destroyed or damaged industries. Civil Defense in the Soviet Union By Heinz Magenheimer Osterreichische MilitBrrsche Zeitschrrft. technological and industrial superiority. their own traditional one and the alien European one.REVIEWS present-day Islamic movements are still concerned.

and in small or medium-sized cities. Since 1971, 56 such cities have been set up in western Siberia. Protection of the civilian population rests on two pillars: evacuation of nonessential personnel from target areas and the construction of civilian shelters. At present, there are shelters for only 20 to 70 percent of the urban populace and 24 percent of the employees of essential industries In the area of civil defense, the author emphasizes that Soviet sources do not always agree on these facts and figures. A prime example of these discrepancies can be seen in the estimates of probable casualties from a nuclear attack. 5 o m e Soviet authors contend that only eight to 16 million civilians will perish in the "holocaust," while others, including American researchers. predict that 66 million will lose their lives. The French. on the other hand, who have targeted all their missiles on urban centers, estimate that 20 million will die from their missiles alone. All segments of Soviet society receive civil defense training. At age 15, Soviet youth receive 38 hours of required t r a n ing, and 13 million youth (young pioneers) are now obtaining this theoretical, and practical civil defense instruction in 53.000 summer camps. The remainder of the population takes a 20-hour basic course covering the essentials of civil defense. Twenty million Soviet citizens are actively involved in civil defenke operations. with 1.6 million involved in evacuation procedures alone. This training also utilizes special "instructional cities" which exemplify destroyed urban areas and the problems encountered there. These "cities" provide "hands-on" training in debris removal and street-clearing operations. Larger civil defense exercises were first conducted in 1976 but have not yet produced the desired results. Magenheimer again notes that the state of civil defense training, based on differing accounts. must be punctuated with a large question mark. The Soviets also employ specialized civil defense units in their armed forces. Presently, the number of troops serving in this capacity is estimated at 85,000. These troops will be used to decontaminate infected areas and assist in reconstruction and removal of roadblocks. Magenheimer concludes that, although there are obvious weak spots in Soviet civil defense coordination, training and "hands-on" exercises, it is apparent that they have created the process. however weak it might be. Can one say the same for the Western democracies?
D o n a l d E Nease.
Comblned Arms Combal Development Acbvily

The Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat

By Charles Dlck Journal of the Royal Unlted Servlces for Defence Studies, March 1981 (Great Brltaln)

More than 60 years have passed since chemical warfare was employed on a large scale in a major conflict. In the meantime, chemical warfare and biological warfare have become personae non gratae in the Western arsenal. Why has this situation occurred:' Although one answer could be a repeat of the old proverb "out of sight. out of mind." Charles Dick, instructor of history and student of Soviet military affairs. sees other factors a s causal elements in this occurrence. First, the West has placed great faith in the legal and moral inhibitions against the possible usage of such weapons. This. paired with doubts about its effectiveness and possible enemy retaliation, has caused this lack of interest. I t is true, as Dick notes, that the Soviets have ratified both the Geneva Gas Protocol (1928) and the


Biological Weapons Convention (1972). I t is also true, however, that the Soviets have demonstrated little interest in the British Di.aft Convention on Chemical Weapons (1975) with i t s inspection clauses. I t is necessary to keep in mind that the Kremlin is not subject to Western-type public pressures and the West, therefore. cannot rely on the effectiveness of moral and legal deterrents. If the Soviet offensive were truly in jeopardy, all such considerations would be subordinated to military necessities, and one could expect the Soviets to employ chemical or biological warfare. At the same time, NATO's abiliby to wage chemical warfare would be very limited in a short conflict precipitated by a Soviet surprise assault. In NATO. only France and the United States have such capabilities, and it is considered doubtful if either has ample quantities in place in Europe. Since the Soviets may fear retaliation, they could employ it, according t o Dick. in the Korthern Army Group where there are few US troops. Employed in this manner, the Soviets may be able t o seize, within a few days, most of West Germany and thereby pre-empt a US nuclear decision. A surprise chemical strike coordinated with a strong frontal assault would severely hamper NATO defense efforts. The heaviest casualties would be borne by the infantry, and most of the antitank weapons are infantry weapons. Moreover, the combat efficiency of the survivors would be impaired by the necessity of wearing protective clothing and respirators. If the chemical agpnt employed were hydrogen cyanide, the Soviet motorized rifle troops would not even require respirators after a 10-minute interval between the chemical warfare strike and the assault. More persistent agents would severely hinder defensive efforts by requiring decontamination and the wearing of protective clothing. In the rear defensive areas, persistent agents would present a continuous contact and (locally) vapor hazard. No imagination is necessary to foresee the practical results of having to work under such conditions. All operations would be carried out less efficiently and expeditiously. Besides hampering the mobilization of European reserves, forces in the Continental United States ferried to the battle zone would have to land on contaminated runways and collect pre-positioned equipment from contaminated storage areas. If the location of reserves is unknown, persistent agents could be employed on the flanks of the Soviet advance to contaminate ground over which a counterattack might come. NATO formations would be forced to decontaminate themselves in order to advance. Dick concludes by emphasizing that NATO must attach greater importance t o chemical or biological warfare preparation. Chemical defence equipment must, as a matter of urgency, be supplied in quant i t y sufficient to cope with a saturation attack. Training in its use must become realistic, and not merely a matter of lip service. hloreouer, a significant offensive chemical capabzlity should be acquired. Only i f these steps are taken will the Soviets be deterred from playing their chemical card, whatever the circumstances.
Donald E . Nease. Comblned Arms Combat Development Activity


These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more deta~led accounts, readers should refer to the origlnal articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred.-Editor.

Author Regrets H e Won't Help Us Celebrate

We Stand Corrected

Thank you very much for sending me the three copies of the July edition of hfilitar,~ R evi~rh. The layout and presentation of my arti. cle, including the photographs, are excellent and a worthy reflection on the high standards of your publication. The only, very small, criticism I have was in 55. trying to find "Xianggang" right column, five lines from the bottom) o n m y map. I can only assume that this is a new Chinese name for Hong Kong. which was how it appeared in my original manuscript! I hope that my article may, in a very small way, help toward the stabilization of the all-volunteer Army. If it does, it will be a very small thank you for the great hospitality and friendship my family and I received in your magnificent country during our stay at Norfolk. In spite of our happy memories. I am not offering to return to take part in some celebrations I believe are planned for that area on 19 October of this year. Without that day. you may have had a British Regimental System today!
~t COI Robert S B Watson. Bnhsh Army. London. England

I have received a copy of the April edition of Military Heview in which my article, "The Development of the Cuban Army." was published. Although the article was very well laid out, I must bring to your attention a misprint from the article. In the second footnote (page 64).you stated that Cuba does not maintain a navy and air force. This is in error. My original manuscript stated that Cuba does maintain an air force and navy. I would appreciate it if you -could publish this correction. Thank you for your cooperation.
Capt Ern~ltoT. Gonzalez. USA. Arl~ngfon, Virg~wa

Good Idea, but Not for Everyone


(Lreuienant Coloncl Watson, u,hore artrcle "A Look ot the Bnttsh Regimrntol Svsfem"oppeared rn the ./ulv 1981 lccur rras a recrnt student at the Armed E'orcrr Staff College. Norfolk. Vrrgrn~oIIong Kong rs known as Xranggang tn Plnyin the officral C'hrnese rpellrng rvstcm The October celebrations menfroned by Lreut~nant Colonel Watson u.rllmark the200th annrLser?ary o f theBattleof Yorktoun and See Major the end o f the Amrncan Re~~olutron J o h n A Rerehlcv's "Yorktou,n 'The Bridge"' in thrs issur Editor1

Captain Rodney B. Mitchell's article. "Enhancing Unit Cohesion" (Military Review, May 1981), is outstanding. While there are many specific points that would require modification prior to implementation of his idea, the concept itself is excellent. The COHORT program is a first step. Captain Mitchell describes what our goal should be. My only critical observation concerns the repetitive, short, unaccompanied tours he recommends to eliminate the costs of large overseas dependent populations. As an idea, it has some good points. In reality, I doubt the Army could find many men or women willing to go "unaccompanied" for six or seven years in a 20-year hitch.
Ma) Duncan F. Stewart. USA, Fort McPherson, Georgra



Apr 1981. The detachment i s evaluating both fighter and attack capabilities. Navy and Marine Corps pilots have been flying the F78 most recently as part of an ~ n i t i aoperal tional test and evaluation program. California. No offlclal endorse ment of the vlews. Four Hornets currently are being flown and L The M111taryRenew. later this year. C h ~ n a Lake.UNITED STATES F18 PASSES 3.I ment and production modelsof the F 1 8 have been flying there since January 1979.000-flight-hour mark at the Naval Air Test Center. Further evaluations will take place next year at the Naval Weapons Center. the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no respons~bll~ty for accuracy of lnformat~on contalned ~nthe NEWS Sectlon of thls publlcatlon Items are prlnted as a servlce to fhe readers. Patuxent River. This is the first opportunity for the military t o evaluate the F18s in a squadron-like setting. Both full-scale develop. More in-depth evaluations wilr be flown for the fighter mission at Point Mugu. California. oplnlons or factual statements IS Intended -EdltOr supported by Navy and Marine Corps personnel from a Patuxent River detachment of the Navy's West Coast V X 4 evaluation squadron. .000- FLIGHT-HOUR MARK The F78 Hornet strike fighter (MR. the F78 will be tested in the attack mission. Maryland. At that trme. p 77) has passed the 3.

The system can combine the functions of a search radar and a tracking1 continuous. generators. The FLEXAR mob~le H A W K command post will fit into astandard 10 by 8 by 8-foot shelter and can be mounted on a 5-ton truck. as well as the personnel re. towlng and support vehicles. FLEXAR's hlgh data rate. developed and b u ~ lb t y the Radar Systems Group of Hughes Aircraft Company under contract from the US Navy. FLEXAR has an agile beam. savings. have been conducted at the Pacific Missile Test Center. by substant~ally reducing the numbers of radars. The van can also serve as the H A W K frre unlt's command post. October .MILITARY REVIEW . Test evaluations of FLEXAR prototype hardware.wave ~lluminatorradar Into one mobile van. qulred to operate the system. with greater cost . Thls appllcatron would need only half the present manpower and materiel requirements whlle increasing mobility a1 a s i g n ~ f ~ c a cost n t savlngs. preclslon track-while-scan feature will be compatrble w ith future air defense missiles with autonomous terminal guidance. cables and other appurtenant materlel. electron~cally scanned antenna and a multimode transmitter1 receiver capable of processing a wlde variety of wave forms.greater mobility. FLEXAR OFFERS MORE A new application for the FLEXAR (flexible adoptlve radar) fire control system proposes a nearly fourfold Increase In firepower for the Improved H A W K air defense network. This consolidation results i n .

and their utility in the target handoff role has been successfully demonstrated in recent postproduction field tests. . Both system are managed by the HellfrrelGround Laser Designator Project Office of the US Army Missile Command (MICOM). The LTD is a hand-held laser devlce configured slrnllar t o a shoulder-fired weapon. D & A. The GIVLLD is a man-transportable.. p 81). Its function is locating . primary function of the system IS to provide ground forces with a targdt hand-off capability to alrcraft equipped with a laser acqulslt~onl tracing system.round h i t s by laser terminal-homing weapon systems (such as Copperhead and Hellfire) during day and night operations. p 85) and Ground1 Vehicular Laser Locater Designators (G/VLLDs) (MR.NEWS TARGET DESIGNATORS BEING DELIVERED The US Army is accepting deliveries of the first-production Laser Target Designators (LTDs) (MR.. The LTD also has the capability of designating targets for laser guided munitions at limited ranges. The GIVLLD is currently in initial production. The. / GlVLLD LTD - and designating both stationary and moving targets with a laser signature on targets and achieving a high probab~lityof first. Both systems are being produced by Hughes Aircraft Company under contracts with the MIC0M. ground or vehicular-mounted system.-Army R. Apr 1981. Oct 1980. More than 100 pro' duction models have been delivered to the Army and Air Force.

MILITARY REVIEW UNITED KINGDOM NIGHT VISION DEVICE INTRODUCED The British firm lntergard Electronics recently introduced its Mk 2 second-generation night vision goggles for use primarily by hellcopter flight crews.000 tlmes.7 centimeters by 15 centimeters and weighs 700 grams.7-volt rechargeable battery. C $ 1981. The goggles can be fitted to any standard-size flying helmej by means of a bracket.of view using norma1 vision. This bracket also allows full interocular adjustment. It is powered by a 2. if required.-International Defense Revrew. The manufacturer considers these night vision goggles particularly su~table for helicopter crews in nighttime search-anddestroy and search-and-rescue operations. The unit measures 8. October . The goggles utilize a matched pair of second-generation imageintensifier tubes which amplify ambient l ~ g h tlevels up to 20. and. the goggles can be tilted back t o give the pilot a clear field.

000 meters and stationary targets at extended ranges. the FV4030 phase Ill and the Leopard 1 . s Chieftain tank fitted with IFCS . and Marconi claims it has a shorter response time than any other known fire control system. Feb 1981. 2 4 m x % B '. The IFCS is fitted to such tanks as the successor to the Chieftam. IFCS was originally desrgned for use in the British Chieftain tank (MR. The system has a high first-round hit probability against both fast-moving targets up to 1. p 87) but is now being adapted to a variety of other main battle tanks following successful firing trials. It IS extremkb accurate. The fire supremacy advantage the IFCS gives lies primarily in its extremely accurate automatic gunlaying ability. developed by Marconi Space and Defence Systems Ltd.. The fully integrated Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) for main battle tanks. is such a system. The battle tank that can fire the first round with maximum accuracy in the minimum amount of time becomes the more effective combatant.NEWS IFCS IS A DEFINITE HIT The successful outcome of most tank battles depends on fire supremacy.

SaabScania is acting as the main contractor. . The detect~on kit can detect and indicate the presence of existing chemical agents.<' 1981. The RBS15 system IS des~gned to be carrled as the matn armament by fast attack vessels and aircraft.5 kilograms. The misslie has an advanced homing head.MILITARY REVIEW SWITZERLAND NEW CHEMICAL DETECTION KIT The Swiss company Schletcher and Schuell has produced a new chem~caldetection kit whlch has recently entered service with both the SWISS army and Swiss civil defense. including sarin. An operator can be taught t o use the unit in about half an hour. ' The RBS75 long. .range a n t ~ s h ~ p missile system for the Swedish navy's Splca class fast patrol boats was presented for the flrst tlme at the Paris Air Show. The kit is enclosed in a box 21 by 10 by 15 centimeters In slze and welghs 1. six bottles of reagent and nerve and vesicant gas ~ n d ~ c a t o r s . The kit contatns a hand pump. SWEDEN RBS75 PRESENTED AT PARIS AIR SHOW : . a turbojet engine for long range and a heavy warhead for h ~ g h effect against all types of naval targets. z 84 October . and lead~ngSwedlsh defense tndustries are part~ctpating in this project.International Defense Rev~ew. An Important feature o f the RBS75 i s simple installation and Integration for both new shtps and retrofitt~ng of exlstlng shlps.

The tank will have a Continental AVDS17902C engine. 8 1981. APO and FPO $1. it has become necessary to increase subscription rates.NEWS ISRAEL M47 TANK Israel Military Industries add Urdan RKM have developed an upgrading conversion for Israeli M47 tanks. the 105mm gun and the new fire control equipment will be installed. is: '~ubscriptions English (US.tion Rates to Increase As a result of rising production costs. APO and FPO addresses) and from $14 to $16 (for copies mailed to foreign addresses).00 Binders $7. The cost of an English-language subscription will go from $12 to $14 (for copies mailed to US. a 105mm gun and 'a new fire control system. the engine will be replaced. the tank will be able to travel at speeds of up to 35 miles per hour.Subscril. for new or renewal subscri~tions that begin on or after 1 January 1982. English (Foreign) 16 Spanish (US and Foreign) 14 Portuguese (US and Foreign) (Quarterly) 5 Single Copies US.-International Defense Review. .50 Subscriptions are available only on a single-year basis.75 Foreign 2. The manufacturers claim that these additions will bring the tank up to the standard of the US M6OA3. a . The upgrading will take place in two phases. This will be the first price change for Military Review since April 1978. During the second phase of the conversion. With the new engine. In the first phase of the conversion. The complete new price schedule. APO and FPO) $14 . The converted tank will be designated the M47RKM.

In fact. Both battles October ." In John F. is virtually unknown. a historian and a biographer. . the pawn grew into a king'who so outshown his origins that even Papa Joe was forced to admit: "1 don't understand it. through singular physical and mental courage. Especially detailed are the legislative encounters and campaign strategies. "presided over an institution: Kennedy. the public and the private merged into one." Parmet is well-qualified as an author. including i t s devastating number of casualties. His theses are twofold. like the older brother he replaced. he is working on a second volume of Jack. . USA. Parmet says. film-clip narrative which is as enjoyable as it is informative. for almost two decades. This is the Battle of Stones River which was fought a t Murfreesboro. began as the. Both started with a surprise attack by the South a t the same time in the morning and from the same direction. as are the times from which they sprang. Herbert Parmet does more than iust retell: he questions. throughout all. Kennedy and the Camelot he created are gone. Parmet's concern is with the events from Kennedy's birth up to the 1960 presidential election. Not content with mere rehashing.~ as well as on his documentary investigations. Tennessee. As a result. probes and contrasts both the old and the new in am effort to establish firmly the man behind the myth. First. Jack is a useful addition to the literature of the Kennedy era. Kennedy by Herbert S Parmet 586 Pages Dlal Press N Y 1980 $18 9 5 . Kennedy. The value of this biography lies in his method. USMA STONES RIVER-Bloodu Winter In Tennessee Ov James Lee McDonougn 271 pages Un~verslty ot Tennessee Press Knoxv8lle Tenn 1980 $14 50 Shiloh! Among the many bloody battles of the Civil War. brought to life through a sequential. another Kennedy book?-because he and his times were of such stature as to demand. attractive in style and content.purposeful manifestation of his father's powerful ambitions. have had their day. Yet another battle that took place only nine months later that rivals Shiloh in many ways. I never could have done it. the behind-the-throne effects of the father and the family. then. And the mythmakers. the difficult political maturation: and. Department ot Englrsfi. Parmet has done considerable first-person interviewing for his work and has included extensive bibliographic notes on those interview. Shiloh stands out as one of the bloodiest. And. Kennedy. The comparison of the Battles of Stones River and Shiloh is natural. second. James L. their retelling for future generations. new light is shed on practically all facets of the pre-presidential years: the McCarthy weavings: the Profiles in Courage authorship debates: the romantic image. u a s the institution. McDonough has made a major contribution to the history of the Civil War in this outstanding work. too. beginning on 31 December 1862.JACK The Struggles ol John F. . . Why. Wellwritten and well-researched. John F. Ma] Wllllam A Randall. almost. Other presidents. . He's not like me at all.

Due to the preoccupation with Vietnam. The initial SAS plan. reported the battle to M7ashington as a Federal victor-v. however. Thus. his descriptions are vivid. with which the author was intimately concerned. For professional soldiers. The enemy had fallen back. General Braxton Bragg. When the South finally withdrew from the battlefield. The campaign did succeed. An information team. . Virtually every family had been touched bv its casualties. Seaor Army Adnser. But. USA. Instead. but also in placing the battle in its proper perspective. he allowed the North to reorganize its positions and to repulse a final attack that spelled the doom for the Southern forces. Many lessons that were learned on the battlefield of Stones River can be used on today's modern battlefield. was to develop the campaign on four fronts: An intelligence cell. This volume is the first modern documented historv of this battle. and it seemed to many that. unlike Shiloh. Enlisting Dhofar irregulars to fight for the sultan when possible. A few hours after the initial surprise attack. The author masterfully weaves the story from the viewpoint of both sides and from the general's rye view to the private's. Arkansas Nabonal Guard W~ll~dr KlmDei n SAS Operat~onOman by Colonel Tony Jeapes 243 Pages b Co ~ t d London t n g 1980 t 8 95 . the general public is only too aware of Oman's importance to the oil life line. McDonough ha3 done an outstanding job in this volume.BOOKS initially resulted in panic of the Northern forces. His writing is clear and crisp. This is the story of that conflict and the role of the British Special Air Service (SAS) in defeating that insurgency. Anybody who is at all knowledgeable in the counterinsurgency area will appreciate . and both ended in a Southern withdrawal from the battlefield. General William Rosecrans: . this book is most useful in understanding war. few others are better qualified to write on this subject as he . The maps and accompanying pictures and sketches are very helpful in understanding the battle. and the "historical inevitability" of victory for Communistinspired revolutions was exploded as the myth it is. is analyzed as being the primary reason for the South not pressing the attack when the North was in a positioil to be defeated. . the Dhofar War in the Persian Gulf region during the early 1970s did not attract much attention in the United States. Although thig is the first book written by Colonel Jeapes. Now. the history of the Battle of Stones River has remained hidden for some time. A veterinary officer. the South this time would press horne the attack and achieve a tremendous and overwhelming victory. This book deserves space on the bookshelf of all Civil War buffs. Col Earl E Perry. for some unknown reason. By the time the Battle of Stones River was fought. we can appreciate what could have happened if t h e Communist-inspired insurrection had succeeded.that this was a classical approach to defeat insurgency. The author has done a masterful job in not only relating the details of the battle itself. the euphoria of early Southern victories had worn out. the Northern commander. It is a story of bravery and determination-of lack of imagination I and of poor coordination The Southern commander. and the harsh realities of war were brought home to the South. and the hardships oEAthe Northern naval blockade were taking hold. but the Union General had not destroyed the Rebel army or gained any important territory. the right wing of the Northern forces was in flight.

it should be the subject of lifelong study.MILITARY REVIEW was personally involved in both the initial and concluding phases of the operation. First. third. Their battlefield prowess. with discussions of weapons. And. the growth of armies and the use of railways as military transportation. Col Ian R Cartwrtght. for it is. leadership. Across those conflicts strode a remarkable number of exceptional commanders: Charles XII. in either case. determination. Turenne. Combined Arms Jralning Developments Actlvity . And. for military men. and this book stands as a tribute to them. an examinatlon of campaigns and military strategies aims at developing judgment rather than telling one how t o act in a given circumstance. conditions that demonstrated that the so-called principles of war are not immutable. Col John G. Here also one can find the "fog of war. In that sense. I would strongly recommend that this volume be compulsory reading for students. During the 260 years of world history. Br~hsh Army Br~t~sh LJaJson OWcer. Napoleon understood this well: his operational dictum was: "Engage the enemy and see what happens.. Jeapes graphically describes the frustrations and pitfalls to be overcome when Westerners have to deal with deep-rooted religious and tribal traditions of another culture." sometimes the real enemy on a battlefield. the evolution of general staffs. than to gain less detailed appreciation of a dozen wars. find it at your local library. head of the Department of War Studies at Sandhurst m d author of the Campaigns of Napoleon. Chandler also includes some fascinating sidebars to his study. Grant. Napoleon. Gustaphus Adolphus (the "Father of Modern Warfare"). 1980 $29 95 War is such a complex art form that. as Clausewitz said. i t spans 260 dramatic years-from the Thirty Years' War in 1618 to the end of the RussoTurkish War in 1878-a period that saw wars change from wars of religion to wars of nationalism. there were some 375 years of warfare. while it is probably better to study one campaign in minute detail. studying counterinsurgency and for those involved in planning operations in the Middle East. one cannot help but be attracted to the Atlas of Military Strategy. he has accomplished this at a time when a great amount of attention is focused on the Middle East. Frederick the Great. Morale. fortification development. USACGSC ATLAS OF MILITARY STRATEGY by 3dvld G Chdnd'er 208 Pages Free Press N \. Moreover. the attractive arrangement of superb maps (over 200 of them) with the meticulously researched t&xtillustrates vividly the major developments in the art of land warfare during the period covered. it was written by one of the giants in the field. I believe Jeapes has made a classical contribution to the study of counterinsurgency. time well-spent. Lee and Moltke the Elder. weaponry and luck in battle all demonstrate that war is the realm of the unexpected. but money wellspent. Wellington. David Chandler. innovation and contributions to land warfare are appropriately treated by the author. Written in plain English and very easy to comprehend.USA." The book is expensive. Marlborough. If its price is beyond your means. siege warfare. Fowler Jr. However. Second. even excluding minor conflicts. de Saxe. Jeapes does demonstrate how these differences can be bridged with patience and understanding. One important factor was the special professional relationship which developed between the SAS soldiers and the Dhofari fighters. tactics. The period was exceedingly turbulent.

USACOSC THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY by Jacques S Gansler 346 Pages MIT Press Cambridge Mass 1980 $19 95 On 4 January 1981. this "prehistory. taken slowly.BOOKS CANADIAN AIRMEN AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR by S F Wlse 771 Pages Univers~tyof Toronto Press Buftalo N Y 1980 $35 00 With this book.S. and their wealth of varied experience ensured that the organization once started would prosper. The airmen of 1914-18 were the backbone of the later force. be it of air power. * That report and the increased interest that Congress and the nation are showing in preparedness make Jacques Gansler's analysis of the rnilitary-industrial complex (MIC) timely. He holds advanced degrees in political economy and economics." He has started the official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) with the era when the only employment for Canadian military fliers was with the Royal Air Force. I t concludes with a short chapter on the developments which were to lead in the mid-1920s to the slow growth of a professional air force in Canada. Richard Preston of Men i n A r m s ) to put together a team and direct the research. I t can serve the uninitiated admirably a s an example of the product of thorough historical research. The RCAF was fortunate to have a scholar of Wise's caliber (best known to the past two generations of army officers on both sides of the border as the co-author with Dr." I commend thls book. Wise has produced a clear and readable text. reported that: I n the event o f a war the U. I t can equally well give the historically sophisticated a most personal view of some of Bhe men who "got their reputation for unorthodoxy and wild rowdyism in a service where unorthodoxy and wild rowdyism were a way of life. Thus. Department of Jornt and Combined Operations. His study of the MIC is scholarly and balanced. of the Canadian forces or simply of men in battle. This is not a book for the dilettante. He examines the existing structure and func- . and i t needs a certain deliberateness of approach if the full scope of the narrative description is to be appreciated. to students of history. Gansler is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for materiel acquisition and assistant director of defense research and engineering. aims "to recover for Canadians a chapter of their history that has lain buried for over sixty years." but these were &ompletely disbanded by the end of 1920. The sense of buildup and of disappointment stand out clearly in Wise's narrative. The amount of research involved in this assembly of the facts presented here is simply staggering. in a scathing critique of the arms industry. defense industry u~ouldfind it impossible to expand i t s weapons production suddenly and dramatically in the numbers necessary to sustain a prolonged conflict. particularly in view of the years of neglect. This is no shrill attack on the MIC. Gansler approaches the MIC as a political scientist and economist. a special panel of the House Armed Services Committee. Canadian Army. Professor Wise has begun a project which. covers all the theaters of the war. ~ r o ~ e r lassisted y by photographs and maps. some squadrons of the Royal Air Force were designated "Canadian Air Force. I t deserves t o be read with scholarly respect. in the closing days of World War I. To be sure." in following the actions in which Canadians participated in significant numbers. Lt COI Wllllam K Megill. as he himself puts it. As befits a teacher of many years' experience.

It should be read by officers involved in procur"ement and research and development especially. Ma] David L. Gansler would concur with the Armed Services Committee report. They will find Paul Koistinen's The hlilitnrv-Irldustrial Complex: A Historical Pcrspectirv a useful companion to Gansler's analysis of the contemporary system. Nuclear Nightmares is not the raving of a rabid advocate of unilateral disarmament. Calder sets out to make the perils of expanding nuclear arsenals clear to the lay reader. with either a regional power or a terrorist group resorting to the use of the nuclear option. though hardly reassuring. t h a t expanding NATO's conventional capabilities might actually reduce the risk of nuclear war by reducing the temptation to cross the nuclear threshold to stop a massive Warsaw Pact onslaught. even of unilateral nuclear disarmament. His primary focus is the post-Vietnam period. surprising. the author sets forth some suggestions by which the world might retreat from looming calamity. The first of these is escalation of a conventional war in Europe into a strategic nuclear exchange. He succeeds in illuminating the subject in a brilliant. Combat Studies Inshtute. USA. He then devotes separate chapters to what he believes to be the four most likely routes t o nuclear disaster. Indeed. This well-written and provocative book should be read by every person with an interest in national security. by b g e l $ 1 0 95 NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES An lnvestlgatlon Into Posslble Wars Calder 168 Pages Viklnq Press hi Y 1980 Nigel Calder is a widely recognized British journalist and author whose specialty is the interpretation of science for the general public. in the other case. in some cases. ' Calder begins his discussion by exainining the scale of current nuclear stockpiles and some of the theories governing their potential use. In his analysis of the existing MIC. Other ideas include a ban on antisatellite weapons and the elimination of all nuclear weapons tests in order to limit further development of warhead technology. ~ o n s i b e r i n t~ he bleak picture he has painted. He suggests. Calder's third and fourth paths to catastrophe are variations of superpower use of the nuclear "surgical strike": in one case with the enemy's command and control system as the target and. research and development processes and procurement systems. The second is proliferation. Readers who seek a broader perspective on the evolutionary 'nature of the M I C and its problems will have to look elsewhere. rather. Counlerinlelligenc~Deparlment. manner. he concludes that its faults are systemic. In a short final chapter. Watkins. and. He then proceeds to outline and analyze seven broad alternatives and makes specific recommendations for improving the nation's defense industry. Despite the ahsence of a longer view.MILITARY REVIEW tions of the United States' defense industry. his missiles. In Nuclear Nightmares. Ma1 Robert K Grlllith Jr USA. this is an important book. his ideas are remarkably modest. a sober presentation of the facts surrounding the world's mushrooming nuclear arsenals and of the mortal peril in which they place civilization. and it ought to be must reading for senior officials in the Department of Defense. I t is. USACGSC . for instance. Ile has published numerous well-received books on topics ranging from space colon~zationto the weather and has developed several television science series for the British Broadcasting Corporation. he gives very short shrift to the evolutionary nature of the present hllC. Nllh US Army Area intelligence School October .

every Paraguayan has shared in the steady improvement in living standards. seemingly uncontrolled corruption and coercion. Lewis also provides a picture of the Latin society which. Messer. Stroessner has complicated the question of his succession. Stroessner's extension of influence from his military power base to include the Colorados. "There are passages that will make you laugh.BOOKS PARAGUAY UNDER STROESSNER by Paul H Lew~s 256 Pages Univers~tv01 North Carolina Press Chapel HIII N C 1980 $22 00 Durability is seldom the hallmark of authoritarian regimes. but also covers in great detail the caudillo's consolidation of absolute power." The author says his reason for writing this book was to persuade those who were against the Vietnam War that they were . By denying any single group or individual the power base t o successfully challenge his rule. use of patronage. he recounts events simply and factually. Paul Lewis offers us a rare insight into the career of one of this century's longest tenured dictators. The book describes not only Stroessner's rise to power in the countless intrigues endemic t o Latin-American politics. Paraguay's undisputed autocrat since 1954. prcud of his outfit and critical of the discipline and sloppy dress of other units. Professor Lewis has written an excellent analysis of the uses of power. The destructive factionalism which denies any longterm cooperation among those out of power will remind the reader of like situations existing from Caracas to Buenos Aires. It is a "soldier's story" of survival in battle: of dead and wounded comrades: of the inhumanity of the Vietcong and their atrocities: of battle fear. Paraguay's dominant political party. and a compliant Catholic leadership provide the underpinnings accounting for the durability of his regime. While unevenly distributed. Stroessner's very real and often impressive economic improvements are discussed in detail. Col John W. but ended his tour of duty on a "wooden revolving bed. Stroessner's conservative economic policies have kept inflation in check and stimulated industrial development. A typical soldier. USAR HALF A WORLD AWAY try Davtd Wesseler 96 Pages Vantage Press N V 1980 $6 95 ' This is a warts-and-all account of the experiences of a veteran who served in Vietnam for 18 months. nausea and disgust. The book dwells at some length on the dictator's manipulation of opposition movements. General Alfredo Stroessner. and some I hope will make you think. He writes." his back being broken by an explosion when his platoon was attacked and wiped out. He not only was involved in the 1968 Tet offensive. his characters come alive. Few military regimes have been able to maintain any semblance of economic stability-a fact which makes Stroessner's performance eyen more impressive. The book should be required reading for those charged with the creation and execution of our LatinAmerican policies. encourages and perpetuates authoritarian governments. The question is less one of who will succeed to the office than the degree of authority assumed by Paraguay's next strongman. in the view of E a n y observers. some will make you cry. . Lewis predicts a continuation of dictatorial power when Stroessner lays down the reins of power. Each has been brutally repressed at one time or another since 1954 and has now reached a n accommodation with I Stroessner. On the positive side. and incidents are portrayed vividly. Although his language is sometimes crude. of some bawdy adventure's as well as those in combat: and of opinions that are sometimes passionate and sometimes dispassionate.

Vietnamese. . Such views find warm receptions on the political right. "in history's chamber of horrors. rather than on a global naval and military presence to ensur'e the flow of supplies from abroad. a foreign policy based on defenses. Beilenson's polemical approach to nuclear-age policy seems to stem from a bleak view of mankind. no more efforts to prop up oppressive governments. During the Vietnam War. Soviet sponsorship of radicals and subversives in the IJnited States would increase as would Chinese. "mad rulers have been common throughout history". his time and effort will have been worthwhile. including the Soviet Union and China. our liberties and freedoms as protected in the Bill of Rights eroded because of the internal opposition to the war and the associated rise in terrorism." Other examples are: "Our intelligence process has proved unworthy of trust". this one will be more talked about than actually read. "As ye sow. Beilenson might have asked if the IJnited States is ready to withstand the retaliation in subversion that seems sure to follow the declared subversive war on communism he recommends. Edgar 0'6a~lanse SURVIVAL AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE by Laurence W Bellenson 169 Pages RegneryIGateway South Ben0 Ind 1980 $10 95 This book is important. Other Beilenson recommendations may appeal to the left: removing all US forces from Asia and Europe.MILITARY REVIEW wrong. Generals and senior staff officers whose memory of combat has dimmed over the years should push a s ~ d etheir staff memorandums for a short while and read this book to remind themselves of how it was in Vietnam. Czech and East German. and ending SALT and "sharpening our nuclear sword" to the point of clear superiority. if he persuades only one person. The conclusion reached was that "We were correct to have been in Vietnam. not diplomacy or treaties. Cuban. o r substitutes. and relying on stockp i l e s of v i t a l r a w m a t e r i a l s ." Terrorists disrupted American life in the 1960s and 1970s and would be far more dangerous with extensive foreign aid. He writes that. Survival aizd Peace in the Nuclear Age is a Conservative Book Club selection. These nations are no strangers to external subversion. "bribery is prevalent all over the world": and "the first rule of treaties has been that all nations have habitually broken them. reducing US support for NATO: ending defense commitments (treaties oblige us t o defend more than 40 nations)." Many will agree with that sentiment. so shall ye reap. I t s author advised the Reagan campaign and is now on the Foreign Policy Advisory Council. but we did not fight the war properly. Polish. What greater price will Americans be asked to pay for the massive external subversion war Beilenson wants to declare on communism? Reilenson's arguments for his other recommendations are equally imbalanced. rulers occupy most of the niches". Some of his recommendations will be as controversial overseas as a t home: providing nuclear weapons technology (or the weapons themselves) to West Germany and Taiwan and using subversion "as American as the fourth of July" to overthrow Communist governments. Beilenson makes heavy use of Biblical stories and phrases to make his point: one he might have applied here is. Some examples are: "Men are inherently selfish". His book should persuade many as it is both instructive and readable. Like many important books on nuclear policy. no more US bases overseas. Beilenson does not shy from controversial recommendations: a $50-billion to $100-billion civil defense shelter program (a total of $ 2 billion has been spent to date).

NATO and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Joseph E. while Parris Chang indicates that some accommodation is now underway between the PRC and the West European Communist parties. merely simple half-truths-a dark. a noted authority on European security issues. Triska and Stephen F. perhaps offers as many questions as answers in his essay. localized "recent phenomenon."our (US)influence. Capt Frank J Stech.'' is continued in the remainder of Part I with solid analytical essays by Professors Herbert S. Dinerstein. This. EUROCOMMUNISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST Fdlteo by Vernon V Aspalurtan Jm Vaienra and Davla P Burke 373 Pages Indiana Unlvers~ty Press Bioom~ngton Ind 1980 $32 50 ciothbouno $9 9 5 Pdpe~bOunO After promising "a different book on Eurocommunism" in their introduction. Both its proponents and adversaries. Aspaturian sets the stage for the widesweeping array of analytical contributions that follow with his contention that Eurocommunism is an "ambiguous. and its respective impacts on the USSR. Aspaturian asserts. All are recognized Western authorities on Communist affairs. amorphous. In light of recent events in Poland. which sets to rest the popular image of Eurocommunism as a rather spontaneous.. This historical theme. cynical view of the world from the bottom of a well-stocked fallout shelter. the eight contributions in Part I1 are particularly useful for their by-country profiles of Eurocommunism's effects on Eastern Europe. ." These are not falsehoods. this volume is still the most complete assessment of Eurocommunism undertaken t o date and deserves careful consideration for its incisive findings. depends on the Eurocommunists' relations with the Soviet leadetship a s coeditor Jiri Valenta suggests in his essay. Thach. the essays ex. elastic and elusive" label t o characterize a tentative concept still evolving amid the currently diverse atmosphere of international communism. Eastern Europe. costs us large sums with nothing tangible in return": "eyternal subversion. Co-editor Vernon V. if we have it. Jan F./ amine Eurocommunism as an emerging political concept. most of the contributors agree that the future might produce brighter prospects. Peter Berton's discussion of the anti-Soviet posture of the Japanese Communist Party as an Asian variant of Eurocommunism is also well done. have failed t o take the full measure of Eurocommunism as the most recent manifestation of the growing ideological pluralism within global communism since the end of World War 11. the impact of Khrushchev's "secret speech" t o the February 1956 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress and the Sino-Soviet split as major milestones along the way. Robert Osgood. Policy recommendations based on this kind of logic have every prospect of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. of course. Varying widely on analytical approaches and findings. . Although the general consensus is that its influence on ruling Communist parties' internal dynamics thus far has been very minimal. USAR I . the editors kept that promise with a collection of 15 timely and incisive essays which survey the topic in its broadest dimensions. Cohen. and "it would be misplaced optimism to deny the strength of the red tide. Ollice 01 the Assistant Secretary 01 Defense . This includes the Stalin-Tito schism. the PRC and Japan. its historical development and precedents. The last section assesses the impact of Eurocommunism on NATO. a t its best is foreign aid for freedom and a good deed". Although this is probably not the last word on the topic.

he shows how the tradition of leadership was born from an almost continuous string of victories. US Army Forces Command RESPONOING TO THE TERRORlSi THREAT' Security and C~ISISManagement €oiled by Rlcnard H Snultl ~r and Stebnen Sloan 261 Pages Pergamon Press Elmsford N Y 1980 $27 50 This is a timely. perhaps the most valuable. It was the erosion of such quality and an emphasis on past glories with no new ones that led to the lackluster Victorian-era navy. In this regard. the author moves to the larger question of what factors account for an effective leader's success. a long tradition of success. Horsfield examines the role the navy's leadership played. Westport. the author is concerned with finding those qualities of leadership peculiar to an age. However. He also searches for universal qualities. nor. before it shrank in size and import. The navy's rebirth in the combat of World War 1 was the result of relearning all the old lessons in leadership. his great revelation is that there must be a dynamic interaction between these traits and the environment in which a leader develops. a fine 18th-century naval officer maligned by the popular press. Vincent and Nelson. technical leadership and sheer size.ship. These lessons helped produce the few successes that navy had during the war. St. to the Royal Navy. the book is easily read and extremely informative. The text is a compact. Pubbc Informahon Oflicer. They demonstrate very clearly that. informative and wellwritten book which deals with a myriad of issues associated with political terrorism. he recognizes no set list of qualities which can explain a leader's success. coupled with a fine annotated bibliography. a brief overview of the nature of contemporary political terrorism is presented by Shultz and Sloan. makes fascinating reading. In Chapter 1. he carefully delineates the differences between naval and military ' leaders and the importance of the sailors being led. Rather. On another level. Here. Throughout this work. and to naval leaders. Headquarters. does he generate a list by which one can clone a generation of Nelsons. during the period 1968 through 1978. That era saw the Royal Navy attain a technical leadership in materiel but not men. this book enables the reader to use similar methodology to examine the leadership question closer to home.MILITARY REVIEW THE ART OF LEADERSHIP IN WAR' The Royal Navy From the Age ol Nelson to the End ol World War II by Jonn Horsfleld 240 Pages Greenwood Press. Warner Stark. Conn 1980 $25 00 England's Royal Navy had. Ife does find a few traits he believes are particularly British and some he holds as universal. "the international system has experienced a . While the achievement can be explained by economics. My only quarrel with the author is his cavalier treatment of Captain (really Admiral) Rligh. I t has extensive and valuable footnotes. The author does not follow Hook's great-man theory nor does he totally embrace Tolstoy who believed one man can do little to change the course of history. The Pax Britannica was a direct result of this tradition. more importantly. Did the Royal Navy's standards of leadership ensure victory? What special qualities did these leaders possess which contributed to such a long period of success? From these particulars. The combination of interesting profiles of important leaders such as Collingwood. Horsfield first reviews the Koyal Navy's foundations in the 18th century. comprehensive collection of 10 articles which provides both the specialist and the general reader insights into the phenomenon of terrorism. coupled with an investigation of how their interrelated naval experiences produced successful leade. It should be noted that the work is a result of deep research and refreshingly clear writing. On one level.

"Terrorism: An Objective Act. behavorial and administrative responses of police and military forces t o terrorist incidents. Management. USA. N Y 1981 $27 50 ctothbound $11 50 paperbound THE GENERATION OF 1914 by RoDert WOhl 307 Pages Harvard Untvers~tyPress. . Boulder. Economics. Colo 1981 DISORDER AND PROGRESS Bandits. A Subjective Reality. and Mexican Development by Paul J Vanderwood 264 Pages Unlverslty of Nebraska Press. His basic premise is that simulation exercises by themselves "cannot totally prepare authorities t o meet the continuing threat of terrorism'' but "can assist those who must be prepared to effectively respond to an actual incident. N Y 1980 $7 95 RONALD REAGAN: HIS Life and Rtse to ths Presidency by Blll Boyarsky 205 Pages Random House N Y 1981 $12 95 WINGED WARFARE by Lleutenanl Colonel W ~ l l ~ aA m B~shop 280 Pages Arco Publlshlng. Conn 1981 $25 00 THE MILITARY. Police. the psychological and policy implications associated with hostages. whether in the public or private sectors. Mass 1981 E l t 95 . Malor Abe Baum and Rlchard Goldhurst 283 Pages G P Putnam s Sons. The authors contend. however. N Y 1981 $11 95 COVERING ISLAM. that the ambiguities which surround an act of terrorism are in part "the result of the fact that there are no front lines" in the continuing battle against terrorism. Llncoln. Edlted by David R Jones 247 Pages Academ~clnternatlonal Press Gulf Breeze Fla 1981 SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN DILEMMAS: Coercion. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World by Edward W Sald 186 Pages Pantheon Books N Y 1981 $10 95 clothbound $3 95 paperbound SLAVE SOLDIERS AN0 ISLAM' The Genssis of a Military System by Danlel P~pes 246 Pages Yale Unlverslty Press New Haven. Subsequent chapters address a broad range of topics: restrictions encountered in responding to terrorist sieges." Shultz then presents in Chapter 2 an excellent discussion of a variety of US policyeresponses to prevent or limit terrorist effectiveness. West Hanover Mass 1981 $12 00 I THE MILITARY-NAVAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION' Volume 3. He cautions. The time one spends in reading this book will be very worthwhile! Col James B Motley. executive protection in the private sector. Boulder. and Technology. must take decisive action in response to an act of terrorism despite the ambiguity that may exist. Design and Find Them by James Dunn~nganWllllam Morrow & CO . Sloan presents in Chapter 6 . Cola 1981 $20 00 THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE: Setting the Stage 6y Edward Doyle. threats to civil nuclear facilities and the diffusiq~of transnational terrorism. and only rightly so. "Simulating Terrorism. Competi110% and Consent Edlted by Karen Dawlsha ana Phtl~p Hanson 226 Pages Holmes & Meler Publishers. which are based on his analyses of simulation exercises involving the tactical. In the concluding chapter. Samuel Llpsman and the Edltors of Boston Publlshlng o 191 Pages Boston Punllshlng Co Boston. Cambridge. Neb 1981 $21 50 clothbound $8 95 paperbound ARMS AND POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC by G Pope Atklns 158 Pages Westv~ewPress. N Y 1981 $12 95 THE COMPLETE WARGAMES HANDBOOK How to Play.BOOKS significant proliferation of terrorist incidents. Edlted by Robert M Mason and John E Creps Jr 211 Pages Westvlew Press. Mass 1979 $17 50 INFORMATION SERVICES." Shultz and Sloan suggest that senior policymakers. Responding to the Terrorist Threat is a valuable contribution to the expanding field of literature on terrorism and is highly recommended." His conclusions. The Theory of Land Warlare as Behavioral Science by Harry Halbert Turney-Hlgh 336 Pages Christopher Publlshlng House. "the successes have only been tacticalv-neither side lterrorist or US policymakers) has achieved its long-range goals. even though the responses have been extensive." some very enlightening policy questions which may confront authorities in their response to terrorism. National Delense Unlversily NEW BOOKS RECEIVED AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES by Martln Gllbert 368 Pages Holt Rlnehart & Wlnston N Y 1981 $15 95 RAID! The Untold Story of Panon's Secret Mlsston by Rlchard Baron. will find few dissenters. that.

Santa Barbara Call1 Volume 1 250 Pages. <" . An Oral his to^ 01 the Vielnam War bv ~h16-three American Soldlers Who Fought I t by Al ~antol. D C 1981 $11 0 0 THE EISENHOWER DIARIES. Edlted by Seueryn B~aler 441 Pages Westvlew Press Boulder Colo 1980 $35 00 clothboq~ld $15 00 paper bound THE SECURITY OF KOREA.n 1947-1953 by Paoio E Coletta 387 Pages Unlverslty of Delaware Press East Brunswlck N J 1981 $32 50 INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES. rls J MacGreqor Jr 647 Pages US Government Prln:lng Of t ~ c e Washlngton D C 1981 $17 00 ISLAM IN THE MODERN WORLO bv Ei~e Kedourle 332 Paoes Holl R~nehart& Wlnston hl Y 1980 $17 95 SILENT SEA by Harry Homeuood 368 Pages McGraw Hlll Book LO N Y 1981 $12 95 THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT Appl~cat~ons l or Amer~canExecutives by Rlchard Tanner Pascale and Anthony G Athos 221 Pages Slmon & Schuster hl Y 1981 $11 9 5 FRONTIERSMEN IN BLUE The Un~tedStates Army and the Indlan. N Y 1981 $17 95 EVERYTHING WE HAD. 1944-1945 by Russell F Welgley 800 Pages lndlana Unlverslty Presg Bloom~nglon Ind 1981 $22 50 THE EVOLUTION OF U. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. Stantoro.S. 1974-1979: A Personal Account by Samuel D Eaton 169 Pages Hoover lnstltutlon Press. Boulder Colo 1980 $23 50 THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.g m 3 Y October . U S and Japanese Perfpectives on the 1980s Edlted by Ftanklln B Welnsleln and Full Kamlva 276 Paoes WeSlVlew Press Boulder. Washlnglon D C 1981 $7 50" RETHINKING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE by Ross Babbage 312 Pages Unlverslty 01 Queensland Press N Y 1980 $30 25 THE ORIGINAL MAPS OF CUSTER'S BATTLEFIELD by W Ken1 King J M o r r ~ s & Assoc~ates Washlngton. A New Approach to International Securltq by John H Barton and Ryuklch~ lma! 328 Pages Oelgeschlager Gunn & Haln Cambridge. US Navy Reserve 200 Pages Naval Institute Press Annapolis Md I 9 8 0 $15 95 THE MIDDLE EAST AN0 NORTH AFRICA: The Challenge 10 Westerfl Security by Peter Dulgnan and L H Gann 141 Pages Hoover instltutlon Press Stanford. D C 1980 $5 00 TOMBSTONES FOR BLUECOATS New Insights Into the Custer Mystery Volume One by W Kent Klng 30 Pages J Morr~s & Assoc~ales Washlnqlon 0 C 1979 $9 90 BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY by Jane J Mansbrldge 398 Pages Baslc Books N Y 1981 $20 00 %Q Qr. Private Percentions Among Arabs and lsraells by John Eawln Mroz 214pages ~ e r g i m o nPress Elmsfora N Y 1980 $19 50 ClOthbOund $9 95 paper bound JANE'S WEAPONS S8 50 OdDerooind THE SECRET WARS A Guide to Sources In Enqhsh Volume I inleliigence. Forty Years on the Cultlng Edge Of History by Wllfred Burchett introduction by Harrlson E Sa'ls3urv 341 Paoes Tlmes Books N Y 1981 $15 00 COMING' ALIVE i h i n a Alter Ma0 by Roger Garslde 458 Pages McGraw Hill Book C O N Y 1981 $12 95 BEYOND SECURITY. 1939-1945. Edlted by Roberl H Ferrell 445 Pages W W Norton & Co Fl Y 1981 $19 9 5 WORLO WAR II ALMANAC. and Sscret Operations. 1848-1865 by Robert M Utley 384 Pages Unlverslty 01 NPhraSka Press Llncoln Neb 1981 $23 50 clothbound $9 95 paperbound THE TEHERAN CONTRACT sy Gayle Rlvers and James Hud son 260 Paoes DOubledav & Co N Y 1981 $12 95 UNiTED S T A ~ E S FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLO ORDER: Second EdltlOn by James A Nathan and J a m s K Dltver 467 Pages ilttle Brown & Co . 1775-1818 by Mary C Glllett 299 Pages Ceoter of Mliltary Hlstory. Boston Mass 1981 THE FORCES OF FREEDOM IN SPAIN. BLUE SEA: A Naval Aviator's Story by Captaln Rosar~o Rausa.1980 by John P Rose 252 Pages Westvlew Press. Westporl Conn 1981 $14 95 ATiDE OF DISCONTENT: The 1980 Elecllons and Their MeanIno Edited bv E I I I ~ Sanooz and Cecil v Crabb Jr 254 Paoes ~o"n~ress10nal Ouarterly. Propaganda and ~ s y c h o l o g i c a l Wartare. 1940-1965 Dy Mar. Calif 1981 NAM: The Vietnam War In the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There by Mark Barker 324 Pages Wllilaw Morrow & Co N Y 1981 $12 95 AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA' The Challenge to Western Securily by L H Gann and Peter Dulgnan 114 Pages Hoover InstltutlOn Press Stanford. Volume II' Intelllgsnce.MILITARY REVIEW ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES: The Army Medical Department. napol~s Md 1979 $17 95 AT THE BARRICADES. Callt 1981 $9 95 ARMS CONTROL II. Covert Operations. 265 Pages Random House. N Y 1981 $17 50 "REAGANOMICS"' Supply Side Economics i n Action by Bruce R Bartlett Foreworo by US Representative Jack Kemp 229 Pages Arllnglon House PUbllSherS. -. N Y 1981 $12 95 EISENHOWER'S LIEUTENANTS: The Campaigns of France and Germany.International Terrorism. Mass 1981 %97 r. Volume Ill. 1945. PrOleSsionai~smby Sam C Saikeslan 290 Pages Pergamon Press Elmsfcro hl Y 1981 $27 50 SOUTH AFRICA Time Running Out 517 Paqes Unlversltv of Ca81forniaPress Berkeley Call1 1981 $8 95 THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898 by Davld F TraZk 654 Paqes Macrnlllan Co N Y 1981 $29 95 PEACE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD Dv Matthew Meiko and Rlchard D Welge. a i u k j : z 2 P . A Study In the Thlrd World by Arthur Jay Kllnghotfer 229 Pages Westv~ewPress. 1980-81. Wasnlngton. Cal~t 1981 $11 95 ARTILLERY OF THE WORLO by Chr~stopher F Foss 176 Pages Charles SCrlbner s Sons. Resistance Movements. 1931-1945: A Political and Military Record by Robert Goralskl 486 Pages G P Putnam's Sons. 1945-1980. Edlted by Ronald T Pretty 934 Pages Franklin Watts N Y 1980 $125 00 GOLD WINGS. 223 Pages McFar'and & Co Jefferson V C 1981 $18 95 THE ANGOLAN WAR. 1968-1980 by Myron J Smlth Jr ABC-Cllo. Colo 1980 520 00 c otnuo. ARMY NUCLEAR DOCTRINE. Boulder Colo 1980 $22 50 A BLOODY WAR 1939-1945 by Hal Lawrence 193 Pages Naut~cal& Avsatlon Publishing Company 01 Amer~ca An. 1980 $42 50 Volume i l 389 Pages 1981 $67 50 Volume I l l 237 Pages 1980 $37 50 BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD The New Mliltary.