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Concessive Response 2 Since the Hellenistic origins of philosophy, thinkers from all ethnicities, schools of thought, and philosophical disciplines have looked for objective answers to our most debated philosophical problems. Problems in epistemology, ethics, and other philosophical pursuits have often been mistakenly presupposed to have objectively true answers; answers at which we can arrive through reason and the examination of our philosophical theorizing. Many, however, have argued for relativism in philosophy, the origins of which have been said to be the Sophist Protagoras.
These relativistic approaches arise out of constant conflict between opposing sides of debated philosophical issues. The relativist seeks to explain why there are so many apparent differences between philosophical theories, and attempts to step away from the debate to observe context and meaning. A close examination of the concessive response to skepticism and its semantic and relativistic components as advanced by NYU professors Peter Unger and Thomas Nagel reveals the philosophical problems of semantic relativism, discussions about Contextualism and Invariantism, and arguments for philosophical relativity.
New York University Professor Peter Unger first examined and explained the concessive response in his 1984 work entitled Philosophical Relativity. In this instrumental piece of modern philosophy, Unger outlines what has now come to be know as modern contextualism, and argues for philosophical relativity based on semantic relativity in classically unsolvable philosophical problems.
Concessive Response 3 Unger responds to such questions as, why are so many of philosophys major problems so seemingly unsolvable and why are there so many different explanations for the problem of knowledge? He believes that these quandaries arise from the presupposition that philosophical problems must necessarily have objective answers. So why, one may ask, are philosophical problems not objectively answerable? Unger replies with two possible explanations: philosophical problems are just too difficult for mans limited intellectual capabilities, or our general collective knowledge is not yet great enough to correctly answer these philosophical problems. Unger also recognizes an additional question; do philosophical problems actually have objectively correct answers?
Philosophers must ask themselves, why does philosophy presuppose that objective answers to problems like a priori knowledge or skepticism must necessarily exist? In sociology there is an oft repeated classic parable examining an issue of close proximity. Examine, for a moment, the lives of inhabitants of the poorest nations on Earth. Citizens in countries such as East Timor or Haiti live in what sociologists call absolute poverty, or rather, economic means in which they are unable to sustain the minimum requirements for life (i.e. necessities such as food, shelter, and water). Also consider those beneath the poverty line in the United States, which in 2001 was $9039 per individual. Sociologists would label their form of poverty as relative because although the individual is poor relative to American societal standards, they are still economically stable enough to provide themselves with the basic necessities to live. Strangely enough, sociological studies of deviance and micro level psychological studies have shown that those in absolute poverty are less likely to exhibit deviance from societal
Concessive Response 4 norms, as opposed to those in relative poverty. These studies concluded with findings that reinforced the power of media in society. Those in absolute poverty, when asked about their situation, consistently replied with positive answers such as No, I am not poor., while those in relative poverty consistently provided negative answers; answers which came to be explained by sociologists as resulting from constant reinforcement from media outlets of the luxuries of the wealthy.
Even though the poor man from East Timor can barely survive, the man in relative poverty in the United States feels that he has it worse according to a survey rating the mens levels of anxiety and low self esteem in relation to their poverty. In this instance it could be said that these two impoverished fellows are having an argument of semantic relativity, i.e. the definition they ascribe to the word poverty is based on the context from which it is viewed. The poor man in the United States explains the view of his current economic position as one that could be said to be sufficiently close enough to his understanding of the definition of the word poverty; and with this measure of sufficiently closeness witnessed, he can rationally ascribe the word poverty to his situation. The man from East Timor, on the other hand, does not feel as poor as the man from the United States. The man from East Timors understanding of the definition of the word poverty does not equal his understanding and observation of his current economic situation in life, and thus he rationally does not ascribe the word poverty to his situation.
Concessive Response 5 Peter Unger offers another similar illustration which could be summarized in the following way: Suppose that two groups of croquet players wish to play on fields cared for by a croquet field professional. This professional tells the first group, a group of amateur croquet players, that the field is flat. Consciously this croquet field professional believes that the field is sufficiently flat enough for the group of beginners to have an enjoyable time. The second group consists of professional croquet players, and for this group the croquet field professional finds the same aforementioned field not sufficiently flat enough for their skill level.
In this situation, the meaning of the word flat changes in relation to the skill level of the group addressed. This is where Unger draws his distinction between the semantic philosophies of contextualism and invariantism. In the case of the croquet field, the contextualist would note that the field is sufficiently close enough to being flat that nothing could ever be flatter. Unger expands on this by noting that although there was a minimal amount of speech conveyed (i.e. The field is flat), the implied contextual meaning behind the semantics is just as important. Unger claims that although the statement, The field is flat, is simple in form, the actual thing said is not itself any simple thing. Even though the speaker is stating in words that the field is flat, he is also sending an implied message (i.e. this field is flat enough for an amateur).
The invariantist would, however, claim that the field is perfectly flat, and what is said is directly related to the sounds of the speech and not based on context or any implied meaning (i.e. A statement is a statement is a statement, wholly related only to the
Concessive Response 6 meanings of the words conveyed in the statement). Invariantism does not account for sufficient closeness or anything of the sort, but maintains that a field that is stated as flat is in fact perfectly and absolutely flat.
This distinction, between the semantic philosophies of contextualism and invariantism, is irrelevant according to Peter Unger. The nature of the hypothesis of semantic relativity itself alludes to the irrelevance of both contextualism and invariantism. According to semantic relativity, there is just no possible way to be certain of the full semantics of relevant expressions (DeRose 250). Thus, because of this realization, the semantic differences between contextualism and invariantism are inconsequential. Thus Unger clearly illustrates: According to this thesis, there simply is no fact of the matter as to the (full) semantics of the relevant expressions. It is not that there is some very difficult discovery to be made, as to which position is right, a finding that will always remain beyond our all too limited reach. That other situation often obtains, of course: What was the blood type of Thales? Turning to matters of language and behavior: What was the thousandth to the last (Greek) word that Thales spoke? These questions, I presume, do have genuine answers; we will never, I also presume, have those answers. The difficulties are (rather purely) epistemological ones. In the case of these two questions, epistemological problems occur to an extremely great degree. As concerns to the (full) semantics of flat, however, the problems are not (just) epistemological, however extreme (DeRose 250). The differences between contextualism and invariantism, as Unger examines, are in the usage of semantics and contrasting groups of expressions. Most of our predicates, Unger notes, are typically vague terms used to express to what degree an object has a certain property. In phrases like the ball is red, red is a vague term used to express the extent to which the ball has the color which the term red represents. In other cases of
Concessive Response 7 supposed vague terms, terms like flat, certain, empty, and dry, the situation of their interpretation is complex.
Peter Unger notes: An invariantist may well emphasize the differences, apparently at the expense of the similarities: True enough, he says, we use flat to get across the idea of how flat something is, but that it is really the idea of how close to being absolutely flat it is (DeRose 253). Words like flat, empty, and certain can be called absolute terms in the sense that they only appear vague. When one states, That bottle is empty, one can imagine an empty bottle as a cognitive standard by which to refer. Consequently, words like red or bumpy can not be referred to a cognitive standard (it would be absurd to imagine absolute red or perfectly bumpy) and thus are vague.
The contextualist, on the other hand, would contend that while both types of terms (vague and absolute) are vague, one set of terms (the set that includes words like empty, flat, or certain) has certain special context-sensitive semantic features. Examining the contextualist perspective, Unger states that these special context-sensitive semantic features are a special sort of vague term with contextually assigned limits for their temporary operation (DeRose 255). These limits, i.e. the field is flat enough for an amateur but not a professional, are contextually assigned limits implied in the seemingly simple statements posited.
To examine his hypothesis of semantic and philosophical relativity, Unger applies these concepts to classically unsolvable philosophical problems like epistemology. In the
Concessive Response 8 classical idea of Cartesian epistemology, knowledge is generally logically examined as S knows P based on J; whereas S is the subject acquiring knowledge, P is the item to be known, and J is the justification for knowledge. The skeptic, however, usually denies or argues against J and the subjects justification for knowledge. This denial of J and the counterexamples against Ss justification for knowledge are usually seen as one of the classically unsolvable problems in epistemology, but according to Peter Unger this problem is merely a case of philosophical relativity. On this idea Unger notes: For the skeptic, an invariantist account of the semantics of know will prove most congenial. On such a semantics, sentences of the form S knows that p will have as a logically necessary condition some such severe proposition as this: S is in a position to rule out as untrue, according to a single invariant standard for ruling out that can never be transcended, all propositions that are (at least fairly obviously) logically incompatible with p (not just those competitors relevant for this or that person to consider, in this or that context). Semantically, the invariantist thus contends, it makes no difference what alternatives to p are relevant for those involved with a given use, of a given sentence of this form (DeRose 265). If the skeptic is willing to try invariantism as a means of semantic relativity, then rest assured that the non-skeptic will look to contextualism for his or her own answer. Contextualism thus follows a more commonsensical point of view and holds that sentences using the word know have complex context-sensitive semantics (i.e. sentences also transmit implied contextually relevant thoughts). Thus it could be said that the contextualist prefers contextualism because the word know could possibly mean, I believe that I have come to know p based on information received through a reliable process, but I can not account for the oft chance that I may possibly be a brain in a vat, and therefore does not have to affix itself to the limiting idea of something similar to:
Concessive Response 9 K !" JTB ~J .: ~K, whereas K is equal to knowledge and JTB is equal to justified true belief or whatever stringent requirement for knowledge is popular at the time being.
With both sides of the epistemological debate participating in semantic arguments, confusion as to which of the semantic positions is correct can occur. Unger concludes that under his hypothesis of philosophical relativity, the disadvantages and advantages of contextualism and invariantism cancel each other out, and neither semantic choice is objectively more proper (DeRose 267). Rather, semantic position can be said to be based solely on choice, as neither seems more correct than the other.
This idea, the idea that the advantages and disadvantages of both semantic philosophies nullify each other, is the basis of the concessive response to skepticism. Thomas Nagel, Peter Ungers intellectual cohort at NYU, furthers the aim of concessive philosophy in his article The View from Nowhere. In this interesting piece, Nagel advances the argument for relativity and concession in epistemology, based on the inability to achieve a gods eye view of the world.
According to Nagel, objectivity and skepticism are closely linked. Arguments for and against skepticism have often centered on the inability of one to leave his or her point of view to obtain an objective view of reality, or as Nagel calls it, the view from nowhere. Since we are incapable of leaving our bodies for the purpose of objectivity,
Concessive Response 10 the idea of the view from nowhere can only be taken as purely metaphoric. Thus, Nagel contends, the idea of objectivity undermines itself. The aim (of objectivity) is to form a conception of reality which includes ourselves and our view of things among its objects, but it seems that whatever forms the conception will not be included by it. It seems to follow that the most objective view we can achieve will have to rest on an unexamined subjective base, and that since we can never abandon our own point of view, but can only alter it, the idea that we are coming closer to the reality outside it with each successive step has no foundation (DeRose 273). Since we can never leave our first person cognitive perspective to view the world from nowhere within it, one could say that our epistemic decisions are limited by our base of subjectivity. Nagel believes that all epistemological theories spring from this issue, and thus divides them into three groups: skeptical, reductive, and heroic. Skeptical epistemological theories examine our ideas about the requirements for knowledge and attempt to conclude that we know nothing. Reductive theories, according to Nagel, emerge out of skeptical theories and try to reduce what we know in order to claim less, thus avoiding many problems which skeptics may present. Much like modern scientific theories, reduction attempts to explain a larger picture by examining the smaller components involved in its creation. Heroic epistemological theories, however, try to bridge the gap between actual knowledge and skepticism, a gap which has claimed the life of many an epistemological theory (i.e. Descartes dependence on the existence of god for justification of his epistemology, etcetera) according to Thomas Nagel. For the purposes of his argument, Nagel relies on the examination of the realist positions of skepticism (skeptic and heroic) because, as Nagel notes, there is a real world in which
Concessive Response 11 we are contained, and appearances result from our interactions with the rest of it (DeRose 272).
Since one could never leave his or her body for the purpose of an objective examination of the world, it could be said that the only way to achieve a significant closeness to objectivity is by getting outside of ourselves to form a detached idea of the world that includes us, and includes our possession of that conception as part of what it enables us to understand about ourselves (DeRose 274). But even in this detached idea of the world that includes our perspective one might think the mere fact that this detached idea includes us is sufficient proof that Nagels argument is circular. But the point Nagel is trying to convey is in fact that this type of reasoning is inherently circular. Expanded, the circularity of this argument for objectivity is more evident: 1. If I can get outside of myself to observer the world objectively, then I can achieve knowledge about the world. 2. I can not get outside of myself 3. Therefore I can not observe the world objectively. 4. But I can hone the skills of personal objectivity, thus partially removing myself from the picture. 5. But I can never truly remove myself from the equation enough to achieve complete objectivity, 6. Therefore I can not observe the world objectively.
Concessive Response 12 If one can not observe the world objectively as this argument concludes, then one must necessarily concede to classically unsolvable philosophical problems like that of knowledge. Epistemological theories will never be fully realized if even a hint of subjectivity remains to allow the skeptic a foothold. While it may be true that I am a brain in a vat, a purple dinosaur, or an insufficiently flat croquet field, none of these statements can be proven irrevocably true without an objective view of reality. The only way to alleviate these problems, it seems, is to concede.