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DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS AND RECOVERY OF GAS DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
F Perschl.

G

Schmidt

Technixhe Universitllt Milnchen, Gemany

Abstract: T h i s paper describes an expert system for online fault detection and diagnosis o f gas transmission networks, combining model- and knowledge-based methods. It consists of a set o f hierarchically structured components which include signal processing, state observation, rule-based knowledge processing as well as an advanced user interface. In addition, an intelligent hypertext t o o l is integrated i n t o the user interface to support the operator during fault recovery. T h e diagnosis system was tested w i t h real measurement data f r o m a medium sized gas distribution network. I t s realt i m e capability and effectiveness for basic fault detect i o n purposes was demonstrated by industrial applications.

is highly flexible, configurable and based o n standard hardware and software components. Similar investigations i n real-time diagnosis and decision support systems are known f r o m the field o f electric power systems, as described for example in Okuda et al (2) and Sekine et al (3). Other papers, like Frank (4), concentrate basically on certain aspects o f a diagnosis system, such as state and parameter estimation. With respect t o gas transmission and distribution networks only a few papers and applications o f diagnosis systems are reported i n the literature, for example Lappus and Schmidt (1).

SYSTEM STRUCTURE
As shown i n Fig. 1 , the decision support system can be divided i n t o four main components. All necessary input data is provided by t h e Supervisory Control A n d D a t a Acquisition (SCADA) system installed i n t h e gas distribution network. Data consist mainly of analog pressure and flow measurements y, binary status signals
-z

INTRODUCTION
Modern distribution networks for natural or product gases are highly automated systems. Sensors gather information o n t h e network's states and computers cont r o l t h e network via actuators. As shown i n Lappus and Schmidt (l), the operator or dispatcher acts as a supervisor o f the t o t a l system and takes control actions when faults occur. With modern networks growi n g more complex, the operator's j o b becomes more difficult. Additional responsibilities are p u t o n the operator by safety and economic requirements. Introduction of a decision support system may support t h e operator i n his task, particularly i n abnormal situations. Goals o f t h e diagnosis subsystem are t h e early detection o f fault symptoms and the search for possible technical causes behind them. Fault causes considered here are measurement failures, as for example caused by instrument failures and drifts, plant failures such as leaks and pipeline blockages as well as operator faults. B y automatic supervision of t h e operator's control actions, t h e risk of causing new faults can be greatly reduced, particularly i n stress situations. Furthermore, a decision support system may help t o enhance network performance w i t h respect t o economy, reliability and availability. In order t o achieve these goals, a combined signal-, model- and knowledge-based approach was developed. T h e decision support system described i n this article is designed for real-time operation. For this reason, special requirements exist for its knowledge-based parts. In order to apply the decision support system t o different gas transmission networks, t h e program package

y

as well as analog and binary control signals g. g includes signals generated automatically by the control system as well as by the operator.

T h e signal-oriented component processes t h e signals and detects abnormal deviations such as outliers, etc. Methods used include filtering of measurement signals, limit and trend checking and statistical f a u l t detection. : . like "signal They generate symbolic fault symptoms y OK" and "signal MISSING', which are indications of measurement failures. M o s t o f this signal processing can also be carried o u t i n the SCADA system. Details on this component can be found i n Perschl and Schmidt

(7).

Symptoms ,y ' processed measurement data y ' and control signals g are transfered to t h e model-based component. T h i s level incorporates t w o dynamic state observers. Observer 1 reconstructs n o t directly available network states, i.e. flows and pressures, while observer 2 generates estimates for the measurements based o n the assumption t h a t no fault has occured. T h e residuals between b o t h observers are fault sympt o m s f o r slowly evolving measurement failures and plant failures such as leaks, pipeline or filter blockages and valve errors. Symptoms invoke the knowledge-based diagnosis component. This component transforms fault symptoms, which o n their own have only minor significance for the operator, by means o f rule-based infer-

'Intelligent Systems Engineering', 5-9 S e p t e m b e r 7994, Conference Publication No. 395, @ IEE, 1994

I I I I I I leak detection and lwalization residual-basedfault delection state observer I state observer 2 I I 1 AL processed data 11. I I I signal-based diagnosis component I I I I I- . State observer 2 on the other hand is only weakly connected to t h e measurement signals y' and slowly keeps track o f any changes. Other model-based procedures make use of t h e estimated values for detect i o n and localization of leaks. Details o f the various components are discussed i n the following sections. represent the dynamic processes in the fault-free network. which uses a hypertext/hypermedia environment. of not measured states supervisionof operator actions temporal reasoning I I I state obseNer 2 (fault-free model) I II detectionof unknown failures 1 knowledge-based diagnosis component Figure 2: Structure o f model-based component. See t h e t i m e charts i n Fig. This task is accomplished by an advanced dialog component. y. T h e estimated measurements $2. &.E' signul-b. Based on this information. and lumped parameter subsystems. For reasons o f economy. see Lappus and Schmidt (5). In some cases a detailed diagnosis may need additional information n o t available f r o m t h e SCADA system.l*ed fault detection signal filterina raw input data g . In this type o f networks considered. which has been demonstrated in various industrial applications in the past. diagnosis results will be refined and the operator will be assisted w i t h respect t o the recovery f r o m the detected faults and failures. MODEL-BASED FAULT DETECTION A N D DIAGNOSIS COMPONENT T h e purpose o f t h e model-based fault detection component is the computation o f residuals by use o f dynamic process models. 1. only a small number o f sensors is installed i n a network. Therefore. A n additional task o f the model-based component i s 4 . T h e residuals can be consid- T h e rapid and slow observer response is accomplished by choosing appropriate gain values for observer error feedback. They can be modelled by a set o f nonlinear hyperbolic partial differential equations. T h e success o f this approach depends on the high quality and stability o f the network model. T h e resulting system o f nonlinear equations is iteratively solved by a Newton-Raphson method using sparsematrix techniques. dynamics are essentially caused by gas flow through t h e pipelegs.443 operator 4 4 hypertext dialog component support for failure handling suppon for diagnosis of unknown failures knowledge-based f decision support component symbolic residual generitor leak detection(mass balance) State observer I reconstruct. ence i n t o understandable messages. 7. This information can be retrieved f r o m the operator by the first layer o f the knowledge-based decision support component. representing transient pressure and flow in long pipelegs. safety relevant activities receive special attention.-b SCADA system / network Figure 1: Basic structure o f decision support system. state observer 1 reconstructs n o t directly measured signals This observer is tuned so t h a t it rapidly follows any changes i n the control and measurement signals g and 2'. Particularly. 2. T h e diagnosis component provides as a result causes for various faults. W i t h i n the framework o f t w o Luenberger-type state observers a high order network state model is incorporated. representing compressor. T h e basic structure of this component is shown i n Fig. ered as indications o f plant failures. Since dynamic effects o f the lumped parameter subsystems can be neglected. At the same t i m e information about network state is compressed and redundancy is reduced. This model consists o f distributed parameter subsystems. as an example of a typical plant failure. they can be incorporated in the model as stationary nonlinear algebraic equations T h e numerical solution o f the whole set o f model equations is achieved by space and t i m e discretization using a modified Crank-Nicholson difference scheme. symptoms for measurement failures y' 1 model-based diagnosis component -. Supervision of operator activities is carried o u t concurrently. regulator and valve stations.

which can be calculated f r o m the pressure measurements. Generation o f symbolic symptoms is performed by comparing t h e residuals w i t h predefined limit values. T h e sum o f Amdif. hereafter referred t o as nodes. Fig. When applied t o small sub-networks. Symbolic fault symptoms in this context have values like "pressure HIGH". Ill1 --I long term mass balance me. Am2 is calculated f r o m t h e stored gas mass i n the network. The bold line in Fig. Symptom grouping Fig. Since division i n t o sub-networks is restricted by t h e structure o f the process model used i n t h e state observers. dure allows a rough estimation o f leak location. was implemented. T h e corresponding residuals j are translated i n t o symbolic values H I G H and LOW (pressure) as shown in the diagram. "pressure OK" or "pressure L O W ' . Symbolic fault symptoms as well as estimates o f leak rate and location are results o f t h e model-based fault detection component. j b LOW 1 Figure 4: Example of mass balances considered for leak detection. 4 shows typical developments of b o t h mass balances over time. In case o f filter clogging the dashed pressure profile would be measured and estimated by observer 1. when working w i t h s y m p t o m groups. Amsum= ZAmdjff.Am2 is called short term mass balance. k. . O n t h e other hand. t h e value o f Amdill is a direct measure o f the leak rate. and t h a t t h e cause for all symptoms o f one group is a single failure. exact localization is n o t possible. T h e difference Amdiff = Am. leaks and wrong valve positions. LOW posilion symbolic residuals Y. let us consider t h e pressure profile o f a long pipeleg shown in Fig. KNOWLEDGE-BASED NENT DIAGNOSIS COMPO- As an example o f fault detection on this level. This profile is calculated by observer 2. it m a y be assumed t h a t a direct physical relationship exists between them. fault symptoms in a network are grouped w i t h respect to their local neighbourhood. 5 shows an example o f s y m p t o m grouping.444 mk d I shon term mass balance -). M o s t o f the diagnosis operations make use o f search algorithms.e. 1 : HIGH \ HIGH . i. 'Leak detection forms another module o f the modelbased component.e. These algorithms perform best. based o n a binary representation o f faults i n a network graph. Then processing can be restricted consequently on this groups. understandable terms for t h e knowledge-based diagnosis component. over t i m e is called l o n g term mass balance. when the difference between the averages mk and m l or the difference between t h e gradients o f b o t h regression lines sk and sl is greater than a predefined limit a t current time t a c t . t w o mass balances for consecutive t i m e steps are computed. t o identify plant failures like pipeline and filter blockages. . rep/ . it is assumed t h a t n o causal relationship exists between them. 3. A to E represent measurement locations. In case o f a leak however. A dust filter is located between nodes B and C. even for large gas transmission networks. g. This component makes use o f the symbolic fault sympt o m s j . This will be zero when no leak exists. the same proce- I Figure 5: S y m p t o m grouping i n a network . Here. which analyze the existence o f a given fault pattern i n the network. Mass balance Am. &. While t h e short t e r m mass balance Amdiff provides a reliable indication o f higher leak rates. i. 3 represents the pressure profile under normal operating conditions. I t s computing t i m e is very short. Figure 3: Fault s y m p t o m pattern for filter clogging the transformation o f the numerical residuals ij = i n t o symbolic fault symptoms i. All subsequent diagnosis steps are based o n s y m p t o m groups. if t w o or more fault symptoms in a network are separated by one or more measurement locations (nodes) without fault symptoms. T h e problem o f grouping can easily be solved by means o f a graph theoretical approach. In order t o save computing time.)sured profile (obferver I ) L. If t w o or more fault symptoms appear a t neighbouring nodes i n the network. the long term mass balance indicates lower leak rates. results f r o m t h e t o t a l gas flow through the network as measured a t gas supplies and offtakes. A recursive algorithm.\ A leak is detected.

Stored fault situations are also used for analysis o f the unknown failures mentioned earlier. the stored situations are retrieved and compared t o the current situation. They m a y draw certain conclusions on possible fault causes based on the evolution o f a fault situation over t i m e and space. fault patterns m u s t be defined: Considering again the example i n Fig. There are certain control actions which are n o t permitted i n certain network states. for example. In this case t h e diagnosis system needs more information than available f r o m the SCADA system t o come up w i t h a correct diagnosis. Opening o f the valve would cause a high velocity of gas resulting i n high frictional energy. & this filter is probably clogged. Some o f the missing information can be obtained through a dialog w i t h the operator. M o s t f a u l t situations are handled properly by this type o f f a u l t pattern search. which should be open according t o t h e SCADA system. For example. b o t h pressure and flow profiles are used simultaneously t o generate appropriate fault patterns. which will be processed by the decision support system. the diagnosis system includes special rules which take care o f operator control actions. need t h e definition of more complex fault patterns i n order t o elaborate a proper diagnosis. drifting sensor signals or spreading o u t o f fault situations around the network because o f transient gas flow. I t s value is increased when the associated fault situation occurs repeatedly and it i s decreased when t h e fault situation disappears. or a blockage i n a nearby pipeleg. a message is generated and the action will n o t be carried o u t until the operator confirms his decision and ignores the warning o f the diagnosis system. In these cases. If an action is considered to be inadmissable. In this case t h e algorithm searches for neighbouring HIGH and LOW symptoms i n a s y m p t o m group. the operator can enter additional facts. When new fault situations occur. This problem m a y also be due t o missing information. 3. Second. KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPONENT DECISION SUPPORT Detection of unknown failures If fault situations occur. T h e operator would first t r y t o find detailed information about the pipeleg. B o t h methods are implemented i n the decision support component by means o f a hypertext tool.445 resenting small sub-networks Detection of plant failures Before t h e search algorithm can be started. limited support can be given by special rules. S u m m i n g up. If the stored fault symptoms are identical or a t least a subset o f t h e current symptoms. W i t h this method. particularly failures close t o supply or offtake nodes. . Some special cases. detection o f plant failures is achieved by coding each f a u l t pattern in a set of generic rules. Supervision of operator actions T h e knowledge-based diagnosis component also deals w i t h supervision o f operator activities. there are certain failures. which i n turn would lead t o the valve being severely damaged or even destroyed. the decision support system offers t h e operator t h e contradicting results together w i t h explanations and further background information. First. A similar problem arises when more than one fault cause for the same situation is found. T o date. However. all fault situations and t h e detected f a u l t causes are stored in the knowledge base o f the used expert system t o o l for every t i m e step. t h e following conclusion can be drawn: L f a HIGH pressure s y m p t o m and a LOW symptom can be found a t neighbouring nodes and a filter is located between b o t h nodes. which do n o t fit a predefined fault pattern. then a causal relationship between old and new fault situation may exist w i t h some probability. t h e diagnosis system is capable o f detecting sudden failures. If a fault pattern matches the fault symptoms in the groups. These rules together w i t h t h e above-mentioned search algorithm are applied t o every s y m p t o m group detected. Let us discuss a typical example: A fault situation has occured and the diagnosis system concludes. it may be extremely dangerous t o open a closed valve i n a high pressure gas transmission network if the pressure difference between inlet and outlet is higher than a certain l i m i t . Then the operator can draw his own conclusions based on his knowledge and experience and he can take appropriate counteractions t o correct the failure. then an appropriate message w i t h the diagnosis result is generated. This method is often successful i n localizing t h e fault origin a t least. A stored situation is deleted when the history factor is below a certain l i m i t . To avoid this type of situation. t h a t the fault cause may be a closed control valve. If there is a hand-operated valve in this pipeleg and if the operator knows t h a t there was a pressure test some days ago Temporal reasoning T o handle this kind of problem. w i t h slowly developing efFects. Similar fault patterns can be derived f r o m other failure types. slowly evolving fault situations can be handled properly. T w o possibilities exist t o resolve this type o f ambiguity. A history factor between 0 and 1 is assigned to each stored situation. As already mentioned in t h e preceding section unknown failures may appear f r o m t i m e t o time.

446 i n this part o f the network. 7. One complete cycle o f simulation. IMPLEMENTATION ISS U ES A major part o f t h e development and experimental evaluation o f the fault detection and diagnosis system was accomplished by using data collected i n real gas transmission networks.5 sec on a SUN Sparc 10 work station. like plans o f t h e network. Hypertext links allow j u m p i n g between documents and background information. described i n Lappus and Schmidt (5). for example the exact location o f t h e faulty network elements. For communication between the processes. it will be possible t o use t h e hypertext t o o l as a special information retrieval system. incorporated in the kernel as well as t h e simulator are written i n Fortran. T h e required knowledge is stored in individual hypertext documents which are loaded o n demand. B o t h observers. T h e t o t a l pipeline length is about 170 k m . Fig. This is accomplished by use o f a hierarchical combination of . such as leak detection and localization. T h e hypertext documents are written in standard HTML ( b p e r L e x t M a r k u p Language). t w o state observers. Now t h a t t h e fault cause is isolated. In the knowledge-based diagnosis component. 7) or through small icons. which may consist o f graphical representations. They are based o n the well-known programs G A N B E O and GANESI. which will automatically generate indices o f hypertext topics and support a graphical representation o f the document structure. one measurement updating cycle is 15 sec. around 100 generic rules are implemented. an arrow symbol for further text information and other symbols for graphical information. it will reduce t h e "lost i n hyperspace" problem and allow the user t o backtrack his path through the different documents t o specific information or conclusions. T h e diagnosis subsystem can be connected t o the system bus and makes use of the process data available i n the S C A D A system's database. It consists o f five processes: the diagnosis system kernel. user interface and hypertext tool. standard UNlX interprocess communication techniques based o n TCP/IP are used. then he would probably conclude t h a t someone forgot to open the valve after the test. T h e implemented hypertext viewer is a stand-alone program which communicates through messages w i t h t h e main body o f the diagnosis subsystem. Diagnosis results are visualized through the user interface. for example. shown in the upper part o f a hardcopy o f the operator's interface i n Fig. tables and even audio or video sequences. In the network 34 pressure and 17 flow measurements are made. 6 shows t h e integration o f the decision support system i n t o a modern S C A D A system. 7. T h e complete system is currently implemented on a UNlX work station. T h e user interface and t h e hypertext t o o l are implemented in C and use X-Windows (Open Look). names o f the persons responsible. the rule-based part i n Pamela-C. a fast forward chaining expert system tool. CONCLUSIONS T h e gas network diagnosis system described i n this paper is capable o f detecting major measurement failures. This allows an average throughput o f gas o f about 100. safety considerations. In comparison: i n real-time. lists. etc.000 m3 per hour. Furthermore. Parts o f the described diagnosis system. the decision support system can display step by step actions t o support fault recovery. T h e diagnosis system kernel receives its inputs either f r o m a network simulator or f r o m a file which contains real measurement data. These suffice t o detect leaks or blockages in every pipeleg. see left window i n Fig. T h e diagnosis system kernel is partially programmed in C. for training or documentation purposes. available staff. as forced by t h e data aquisition system. 2 main supply stations and 15 offtake nodes. With this system. diagnosis and visualization for the gas transmission network. Some details o f the user interface are reported in the next section. wrong valve positions. for example. As an example. It distributes oxygen a t a pressure level o f about 40 atmospheres. and they support localization o f unknown fault patterns and supervision of operator actions. see Barachini (6). ystem 1 gas transmission network Figure 6: Implementation of the decision support syst e m as part o f a S C A D A system. takes less than 1. T h e examined network consists of 109 nodes w i t h 11 valve stations. plant failures and operator faults i n real time. Otherwise t h e problem is probably related t o t h e control valve itself. A t this point further background information is needed. were tested i n an industrial gas distribution network. Currently a special hypertext development system is under developement. as proposed by Hollender (8). Links are marked in the hypertext viewer by underlined text (No i n Fig.

1990. preprints Vol. Proc. mile oressure level at node 2018 is lower than expected. 4. G. A k i m o t o . Schmidt. - 1. t h e developed methods get currently adapted and generalized for use i n chemical plants. Perschl. 459 474.. Design and industrial application of a large scale observer system. model-based and knowledge-based techniq ues . Y. Pressure level at node 6000 Is higher than cxoected. .. C. M . - 3. which monitors and controls a medium sized gas transmission network. Le Touquet. "Real Time Microcomputer Control o f Industrial Processes". . Kobe.. G. T. Symp. Fujii. 749 754.26. After detection and isolation o f failures.. as part o f a standard S C A D A system. Espoo. France. " IEEE International Conference on Systems.683. Geographical plan and location: Available staff 8 Safety: Do not open the valve. J . - 8.. (eds. G. Diagnosing faults co-operatively and i n context. K. 1992.433 2. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Model based approach t o the real-time fault diagnosis. o f the IEEE. Fault diagnosis i n dynamic systems using analytical and knowledge-based redunA survey and some new results. T h e implemented prototype demonstrated t h a t t h e diagnosis system can be applied online. Germany. Model. S.. .447 oul Pipeleg between node 6O00 and 2018 blocked Explanation: me diagnosis system has detected that the plpeleg between 6000 and ZOlE Is blocked. dancy Auto~matica. pressure estimated by observer 2 Figure 7: Hardcopy o f operator's interface. Kunugi. 1993. Because o f t h e encouraging results w i t h the diagnosis o f gas transmission networks. Barachini. T h e evolution of P A M E L A . 1991..G. Japan. M a n and Cybernetics". Expert Systems. Okuda. 117 122. 397 . G. 7. Gas should flow from 6000 to 2018. F.). N. 3. 673 . 1990.and knowledgebased fault detection and diagnosis of gas transmission networks. F.. 8. Schmidt..4 almospheres. Finish University of Technology. 1. Vol. Frank. where the pipeleg between nodes 6000 and Z018 i n t h e period f r o m a t o b is blocked signal-based. 817 822. Fault diagnosis of power systems. 1994. . 8 7 98.M. Munich. Detailed Layout: -"ere s a nand--operate0 valve in th s pipeleg Was inem any pressure re31or mantenance MR a l m s pipeleg our np tne ast 7 days If maintenance w r k or a pressure test had been carried out then probabk someone forgot to open the valve. w i t h major emphasis on supervision and diagnosis o f material flow subprocesses. - - 5. 1992.. Y . BayFORSYS" References 6. "Proc. 1987 "IFAC 10th World Congress o n Automatic Control". P. Acknowledgements: This work was partially supported by t h e " Bayerische Forschungsverbund Systemtechnik. Finland. Process monitoring and control o f gas pipeline networks. Pal. Sekine... Miyasaka. Hollender. Mechatronics and Manufacturing Systems". on Robotics. Please send someone Out la node 6000 to open the valve.. lfthe pressure difference behveen inlet and outletls more than 1. S. Lappus. M . 80. o f the IMACS/SICE Int.. Fukui. " IFAC-Symposium Safeprocess". an advanced hypertext t o o l supports the operator i n fault recovery.. Lappus. K . Schmidt. Fukui. G. Advice: Please inform Mr *)3( about this incident. in Tzafestas.