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CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS CENTRAL ISSUES In the United Kingdom, the important rules setting out the structure and

d powers of government and people s freedoms and r!g"ts are found !n several d!fferent sources, including: o Acts of arliament, o !udicial decisions, o con"entions, o European Union la#, and o international la#$ So man% rules, from "arious sources, are in #ritten form that it is a m!snomer to descr!#e t"e U$ const!tut!on as %unwr!tten& !t !s ho#e"er 'uncod!f!ed $ (or the first time, in )cto*er +,-- the go"ernment pu*lished a #r!ef account of t"e pr!nc!pal const!tut!onal rules as The Ca#!net Manual&

There is d!sagreement a#out t"e s!gn!f!cance and status of t"!s document$ Loo.ing at the const!tut!on as creat!ng a w"ole s%stem for go"ernment, the U$ const!tut!onal arrangements ha"e often *een descri*ed as 'the 'estm!nster model $ This refers to m!n!sters /the go"ernment0 *eing dra#n from mem#ers of (arl!ament& the U$ (arl!ament as the p!nnacle of t"e s)stem& and effect!ve procedures for m!n!sters to #e accounta#le to (arl!ament$ Man) c"anges to t"e const!tut!onal s)stem call !nto *uest!on t"e 'estm!nster model&

INT+ODUCTION Constitution1 rules *oo. and create s%stem of go"t1 legal aspect has to *e understood in political aspect 2uestions a*out the constitution of the United Kingdom are ne"er out of the ne#s, as these headlines sho#$ Const!tut!onal arrangements, "ow we are governed and w"at our r!g"ts and freedoms are,are often contro"ersial$

In this opening chapter, #e loo. at constitutions in general and the const!tut!on of t"e Un!ted $!ngdom in particular from two angles& o The f!rst is the idea that a constitution is a rule#oo-: for constitutional arrangements to #or. #ell, people need to .no# #hat the rules are and there also needs to *e *road consensus that the rules are right$ o The second is the idea that constitutions create s)stems of government$ This perspecti"e in"ol"es standing *ac. from the rule*oo. and tr)!ng to see t"e patterns. trad!t!ons. underl)!ng !deals. and pr!nc!ples e/pressed or !mpl!ed #) t"e rules0 it also re3uires an understanding of #hat "appens !n pract!ce

1w"!c" ma)#e d!fferent from t"e rules2& 4an% ep!t"ets ha"e *een used to tr% to encapsulate the UK constitution: it is a parl!amentar) democrac)& a const!tut!onal monarc")& and 'estm!nster model or '5estminster1 st%le constitutionalism6, The (alace of 'estm!nster is the *uilding in London that accommodates t"e 3ouses of (arl!ament 1t"e 3ouse of Commons and 3ouse of Lords2& 7ut it !s open to *uest!on "ow muc" of t"!s model "as surv!ved the significant constitutional de"elopments of the past 8, %ears$

u*lic la#%ers need to #e #road4 m!nded: man% of the most !mportant rules are not found !n leg!slat!on or case la# *ut in other sources& and the legal aspects of the const!tut!onal s)stem need to #e understood !n t"e!r pol!t!cal conte/t&

T3E CONSTITUTION AS A +ULE5OO$ Constitution1 important rules a*out structure and po#er of go"t 9E, L, :; and people6s right A #or.ada% def!n!t!on of a const!tut!on of a countr% is: a set of the most !mportant rules a*out the structure and powers of government and of peoples most #as!c freedoms and r!g"ts$ Ever) nat!on state has its own part!cular mi< of rules leading to their own d!st!nct!ve const!tut!ons$ At a "er% general le"el, most const!tut!onal framewor-s s"are s!m!lar c"aracter!st!cs$

There is an institution or set of pu*lic office holders that is the government, responsi*le for carr)!ng out t"e man) e/ecut!ve act!ons needed in a #ell1ordered societ%$ There is an institution descri*ed as a leg!slature, #hich is responsi*le for produc!ng laws !n accordance w!t" !ts powers& these da%s most legislatures consist of elected representati"es chosen in periodic elections$ Additionall%, constitutional frame#or.s generall% create a role for 6udges, though !udicial functions "ar% 3uite stri.ingl% *et#een s%stems$ Const!tut!ons also t%picall% conta!n statements of peoples #as!c r!g"ts and freedoms. reflecting the declarations in international human la# on these su*!ects that ha"e *een agreed /if not al#a%s respected0 since the -=>,s$

U$1 uncodified constitution #ithout a single legal document *ut has the 'commonl% understood6 constitutional order e"ol"e o"er time and continue to do so The United Kingdom of ?reat 7ritain and Northern Ireland /to gi"e the countr% its full *ut rarel% used name0 is #ell .no#n for not "av!ng one legal document sett!ng out t"e #as!c structures of government and people s freedoms and r!g"ts& Ca#!net Off!ce, The Ca*inet 4anual: o The UK does not "ave a cod!f!ed const!tut!on& o There is no s!ngle document that descri*es, esta*lishes or regulates the structures of the state and the #a% in #hich these relate to the people$ o Instead, the const!tut!onal order "as evolved over t!me and cont!nues to do so&

o It cons!sts of var!ous !nst!tut!ons, statutes, 6ud!c!al dec!s!ons, pr!nc!ples and pract!ces that are commonl) understood as 7const!tut!onal7$ o The UK does not "ave a const!tut!onal court to rule on the implications of a codified constitution, and the sovere!gnt) of (arl!ament !s t"erefore unrestra!ned #) suc" a court&&&

U$ const!tut!on1 not unwr!tten #ut uncod!f!ed #hich com*ination of legal@non legal rules #ithout entrenched and not in single instrument 5e la*el this state of affairs as 'the dispersed constitutional rule*oo.6$ The e<pression un#ritten constitution is often used *ut it is apt to *e misleading: certainl% it is true to sa% that some !mportant const!tut!onal rules of the United Kingdom are not wr!tten down !n one legal !nstrument #ut almost all rules are wr!tten down somew"ere& Most rules are reasona#l) clearA t"oug" there are some rules a*out #hich there is contro"ers%, either *ecause people d!sagree a*out #hat the rule actuall% is or *ecause there are d!sagreements a#out w"at t"e rule s"ould #e$

Bespite not ha"ing a codified document, plainl% the Un!ted $!ngdom "as a sop"!st!cated and reasona#l) well4organ!8ed s)stem of government, *roadl% spea.ing peoples fundamental freedoms and r!g"ts are respected, and pol!t!c!ans. 6ournal!sts. and academ!cs d!scuss t"e %5r!t!s" const!tut!on&

?eoffre% 4arshall, o (our distinguisha*le senses of CconstitutionC 9$$$ ; #ould *e: the com#!nat!on of legal and non4legal 1or convent!onal2 rules that currentl% pro"ide the frame#or. of go"ernment and regulate the *eha"iour of the ma!or political actors& 9U$ "as: a s!ngle !nstrument promulgated at a particular point in time and adopted #) some generall) agreed aut"or!sat!on procedure under the title CconstitutionC /or e3ui"alent ru*ric such as C*asic la#C0& 9U$ "as no suc" C: the total!t) of legal rules, #hether contained in statutes, secondar% legislation, domestic !udicial decisions or *inding international instruments or !udicial decisions, that affect the #or.ing of go"ernment& 9U$ "as:

a list of statutes or !nstruments t"at "ave an entrenc"ed status and can *e amended or repealed onl% *% a special procedure$ 9U$ "as no suc" C: These are not mutuall) e/clus!ve def!n!t!ons: a countr) ma) "ave a const!tut!on !n some or all of these senses$ The United Kingdom has a constitution in meanings /a0 and /c0, *ut not /*0 and /d0$

5hether #ritten do#n or not is not the *ig issue, even wr!tten down. t"ere !s st!ll !mportant rules never wr!tten down Some scholars are sceptical #hether it ma.es much difference #hether or not there is a 'single instrument6 /or 'capital C6 constitution0, as (rofessor Ant"on) $!ng argues: o Constitutions$$ $are ne"erAto repeat, ne"erA#ritten do#n$ o The% might possi*l% in principle *e #ritten do#n, *ut in practice the% ne"er are$ o T"ere are. of course. wr!tten documents called ConstitutionsA #ith a capital CCCA#ut t"e) are never. ever coe/tens!ve w!t" all of a countr)7s most !mportant rules regulating the relations *et#een different parts of go"ernDment and those *et#een the go"ernment and the people$

o 7ut capital1C Constitutions 9single #ritten do#n; and small1c constitutions are ne"er the same thing, and somet!mes t"e relat!ons"!p #etween t"e two !s *u!te tenuous /even !f, in a gi"en countr%, the cap!tal4C Const!tut!on !s ta-en ser!ousl)0$ In the United Kingdom, #ith its dispersed constitutional rule*oo., w"ere s"ould one loo- for %t"e set of !mportant rules that form the constitutional frame#or.E

-$ T3E CA5INET MANUAL ;<==1 a guide to law, conventions and rules on operation of govt without legal enforcement )ne option is a pu*lication alread% referred to, namel% The Ca*inet 4anual, #hich is su*titled 'A gu!de to laws. convent!ons and rules on t"e operat!on of government $ It #as wr!tten !n ;<=<4== #) t"e Ca#!net Secretar) /the United Kingdoms most senior civil servant0 and has the endorsement of two (r!me M!n!sters,>ordon 5rown /in +,-, #hen a draft #as circulated for comment0 and Dav!d Cameron /#ho #rote a fore#ord to the first edition in )cto*er +,--0$

The Ca*inet Secretar%6s preface e<plains that : o 'it is primarily a guide for those #or.ing in go"ernment, recording the current position rather than driving change$ o It is not !ntended to #e legall) #!nd!ng or to set issues in stone$ o The Ca*inet 4anual records rules and practices, *ut is not intended to *e a source of an% rule$ It has ele"en chapters co"ering the main institutions and relationships in the 7ritish constitution and runs to -,F pages$

Negat!ve v!ew1 Gouse of Lords Constitution Committee1 transparenc% *ut gi"en undue influence1 should not used *% Ca*inet and appro"ed *% arliament The draft 4anual generated a great deal of interest among those #ho care a*out these things and #as cons!dered #) t"ree parl!amentar) select comm!ttees& o )n select committees, consisting of a doHen or so 4 s /in the Commons0 or peers /in the Gouse of Lords0, t"e!r role !s to scrut!n!8e government and !n*u!re !nto matters of pu#l!c concern& The reaction of t#o of the committees #as less t"an ent"us!ast!c$

The 3ouse of Lords Const!tut!on Comm!ttee concluded as follo#s$ o => In our "ie# the Ca*inet 4anual has l!m!ted value and relevance& o 5e ac.no#ledge that it prov!des greater transparenc) on certain aspects of the operation of go"ernment and it is to *e #elcomed in that conte<t$ o 3owever, this value has *een g!ven undue prom!nence #) t"e "elpful pu#l!cat!on of Chapter T#o in draft prior to the 4a% +,-, general election& the *enefits of the pu*lication of that chapter do not, on the #hole, e<tend to the rest of the 4anual$ As there is opinion that 2010 GE will end up in coalition govt

o =F$ In summar% #e conclude that the Ca#!net Manual !s not t"e f!rst step towards a wr!tten const!tut!on& it should *e renamed the Ca*inet )ffice 4anual and its greater relevance to off!c!als t"an to pol!t!c!ans emphasised& o it should onl% see. to descr!#e e/!st!ng rules and pract!ces& o it s"ould not #e endorsed #) t"e Ca#!net nor formall) approved #) (arl!ament& and it must *e entirel% accurate and properl% sourced and referenced$

Negat!ve v!ew1 Gouse of Commons u*lic Administration Committee1 #elcome the intention *ut onl% a guidance *ut not legall% enforcea*le The 3ouse of Commons (u#l!c Adm!n!strat!on Comm!ttee #as slightl% more positi"e /c5e welcome t"e !ntent!on #e"!nd the compilation and pu*lication of the draft Ca*inet 4anual0 *ut ec"oed the Constitution Committee s conclusions: o 'It should not *e construed as the start of a #ritten constitution and 'It follo#s that we do not cons!der that the Ca*inet 4anual s"ould #e endorsed *% either the Ca*inet or arliament$ o It is str!ctl) a gu!dance document for ministers and ci"il ser"ants$

(os!t!ve po!nt? Gouse of Commons olitical and Constitutional Reform Committee1 *e%ond E<ecuti"e part and !mportant for U$ unwr!tten const!tut!on, go"t and arliament de*ate should *e carried out 3ouse of Commons (ol!t!cal and Const!tut!onal +eform Comm!ttee? If !t !s s!mpl) a document #) t"e E/ecut!ve, a*out the E<ecuti"e and for the E<ecuti"e, then for (arl!ament to dec!de on !ts content would g!ve !t a status !t s"ould not "ave$ / aragraph 8,0 5ut the Manual seems in part to *e !ntended asAor might *ecome, #hate"er the intentionAthe *asis for a shared understand!ng #e)ond t"e E/ecut!ve of !mportant parts of t"e Un!ted $!ngdom7s prev!ousl) uncod!f!ed const!tut!on$ (arl!amentar) !ntervent!on would #e ent!rel) appropr!ate in such circumstances$

An official document, appro"ed *% the Ca*inet, #ill ha"e a status unli.e that of e<isting academic te<ts on the same su*!ect$ 5e intend to monitor closel% ho# the Ca*inet 4anual de"elops, and ho# it is used *oth #ithin and *e%ond ?o"ernment during the life of this arliament$ / aragraph 8-0 5hate"er the status of the Ca*inet 4anual as a document, it co"ers ground #hich is s!gn!f!cant enoug" to mer!t regular de#ate !n t"e 3ouse$ 5e therefore propose that, soon after the Ca*inet 4anual is finalised, the Gouse should ha"e the opportunit% to de*ate it as a #hole and should seet"e >overnment7s assurance that suc" a de#ate s"ould #ecome an annual f!/ture in the parliamentar% calendar$ Alternati"el%, the de*ate could occur t#ice during the course of a fi"e1%ear arliament 9$$$;$

The ?o"ernment should pu*lish a list of changes made to the 4anual during the preceding %ear to inform this de*ate$ As the Manual !s largel) a#out t"e conduct of t"e E/ecut!ve, we would e/pect t"!s de#ate to ta-e place !n >overnment t!me$ / aragraph 8+0, +elat!ons"!p to a wr!tten const!tut!on? The Ca*inet 4anual is not a #ritten constitution$ It "as. "owever. cons!dera#le overlap in content w!t" w"at m!g"t #e e/pected of a const!tut!on$ The Ca*inet Secretar% has suggested to us that !t would #e l!-el) to #e a start!ng po!nt for an% attempt to produce suc" a const!tut!on&

5) #r!ng!ng toget"er and pu*lishing the >overnment7s !nterpretat!on of e/!st!ng const!tut!onal rules and convent!ons, the >overnment "as alread) #egun to spar- de#ate a#out #ot" t"e nature of t"ese rules and convent!ons, and if and ho# the% should *e #ritten do#n$ T"!s !s a de#ate !n w"!c" (arl!ament needs to pla) a full part$ / aragraph >80

+esult: no de*ate carried out, 4anual is not sources of constitutional rules 7% Becem*er +,-+, no de#ate of t"e Manual "ad ta-en place& The one thing e"er%*od% seems to agree on is that the Manual !s not. !tself. a source of const!tut!onal rules$

;& T3E STATUTE 5OO$ A 3uic. *ro#se through the legislation #ill re"eal several Acts of (arl!ament t"at can #e descr!#ed as %const!tut!onal in the sense used *% King: the% include 'important rules that regulate the relations among the different parts of the go"ernment of a gi"en countr% and also the relations *et#een the different parts of the go"ernment and the people of the countr% In ;<<@, the Ao!nt Comm!ttee on the Draft C!v!l Cont!ngenc!es 5!ll drew up a l!st of statutes that could *e ta.en to *e %fundamental parts of const!tut!onal law

Magna Carta -+=I o roclamation of li*erties, including that no freeman ma% *e punished e<cept *% la#ful !udgment of his peers or *% the la# of the land& and that the Cro#n #ill sell to no man, #e #ill not den% or defer to an% man either :ustice or Right6

5!ll of +!g"ts =BCC o Re3uires parliamentar% appro"al for the Cro#n to le"% ta< and .eep a standing arm%& prohi*its e<cessi"e *ail, fines and 'illegall and cruell unishments inflicted6& affirms the right of trial *% !ur%& and in Art$ = pro"ides 'That the (reedome of Speech and Be*ates or roceedings in arl%ament ought not to *e impeached or 3uestioned in an% Court or lace out of arl%ament6Aa significant element of 'parliamentar% pri"ilege6

Crown and (arl!ament +ecogn!t!on Act =BCD o Confirms 5illiam and 4ar% as the la#ful .ing and 3ueen follo#ing the '?lorious Re"olution /see Chapter I0 and the "alidit% of la# passed in pre"ious parliaments$ Act of Settlement =E<< o Re3uires the monarch to *e a mem*er of the Church of England: see Chapter I$ Un!on w!t" Scotland Act =E<E o (ormation of ?reat 7ritain, as a union *et#een the .ingdoms of England and 5ales, and Scotland: see Chapter >$ Un!on w!t" Ireland Act =C<< (ormation of the United Kingdom of ?reat 7ritain and Ireland, #ith the addition of Ireland to the realm: Chapter >$

(arl!ament Acts =D==4FD Rules ensuring the primac% of the Gouse of Commons o"er the Gouse of Lords *% ena*ling the Commons to present a *ill for Ro%al Assent e"en if the Lords disagree: see Chapters -, and -J$ L!fe (eerages Act =DGC Creates a ne# t%pe of peerage, *ased on appointment rather than the hereditar% principle& these peers are mem*ers of the Gouse of Lords for life$ Emergenc) (owers Act =DBF Largel% repealed and replaced *% the Ci"il Contingencies Act +,,8$ European Commun!t!es Act =DE; ?i"es legal effect to the UK6s mem*ership of the European Union and all that entails: see Chapters K,-+, and -K$

3ouse of Commons D!s*ual!f!cat!on Act =DEG Limits num*er of ministers #ho ma% sit in the Gouse of Commons and e<cludes full1time professional !udges from *eing 4 s or mem*ers of the Gouse of Lords: see Chapters 8 and I$ M!n!ster!al and Ot"er Salar!es Act =DEG Rules a*out pa%ment of salaries to ministers: see Chapter I$ 5r!t!s" Nat!onal!t) Act =DC= 4ain piece of legislation on citiHenship$ Supreme Court Act =DC= /no# renamed Senior Courts Act -=K-0Sets out structure for courts of England and 5ales& protects !udicial independence *% ma.ing senior !udges remo"a*le from office onl% *% 'Ger 4a!est% on an address presented to her *% *oth Gouses of arliament>: see Chapter -8$ +epresentat!on of t"e (eople Act =DC@ Rules a*out elections to the UK arliament and local authorities in England$

>overnment of 'ales Act =DDC /no# superseded *% the ?o"ernment of 5ales Act +,,F0 The de"olution frame#or. for 5ales: see Chapter >$ 3uman +!g"ts Act =DDC '7rings home6 pro"isions from the European Con"ention of Guman Rights and (undamental Rights: see Chapters F and -I$ Nort"ern Ireland Act =DDC The de"olution frame#or. for Northern Ireland: see Chapter >$ Scotland Act =DDC /no# amenDded *% the Scotland Act +,-+0 The de"olution frame#or. for Scotland: see Chapter >$ 3ouse of Lords Act =DDD Ended the rights of hereditar% peers to ha"e an automatic seat in the Gouse of Lords& created rules ena*ling =+ to *e elected *% the hereditar% peers: see Chapter -J$ C!v!l Cont!ngenc!es Act ;<<F The frame#or. for go"ernment during a time of emergenc%$

Some under discussion and reform Se"eral of these Acts ha"e *een amended or repealed and, !n ;<=;. some are under d!scuss!on for reform /the Guman Rights Act -==K and the Gouse of Lords Act -===0: So !t would #e wrong to see t"ese Acts as set !n stone$

The Act did contain other rules other than constitutional one 4oreo"er, most of t"ese Acts conta!n relat!vel) tr!v!al rules as #ell as important ones, so it #ould *e #rong to thin. of them as containing constitutional rules and nothing *ut constitutional rules$

Constitutional statute after +,,J The list is also incomplete, as, s!nce ;<<@. Acts "ave #een put !nto t"e statute #oo- that are o*"iousl% or argua#l) of const!tut!onal importance: Const!tut!onal +eform Act ;<<G Reformed office of Lord Chancellor, created the UK Supreme Court /replacing the Appellate Committee of the Gouse of Lords0, and introduced ne# s%stem of !udicial appointments for England and 5ales: see Chapters J, 8 and -8$ Tr!#unals. Courts and Enforcement Act ;<<E ' Created a simplified tri*unal s%stem *ased on the (irst1tier Tri*unal and the Upper Tri*unal: see Chapter -8$ (arl!amentar) Standards Act ;<<D (ollo#ing a scandal a*out e<penses, created the Independent arliamentar% Standards Authorit% /I SA0 to manage e<penses and records of 4 s6 outside interests$

Const!tut!onal +eform and +eformed >overnance Act ;<=< prerogati"e po#ers *% putting the ci"il ser"ice on a statutor% footing and putting in place a statutor% frame#or. for parliamentar% appro"al of treaties: see Chapter =$ Local!sm Act ;<== Radical changes to local go"ernment in England, including referendums, directl% elected ma%ors, and a 'general po#er of competence6: see Chapter 8$ European Un!on Act ;<== Creates frame#or. for referendums on proposals to amend the EU treaties& section -K includes a declaration a*out the relationship *et#een national and EU la#: see Chapter -+$ Scotland Act ;<=;4 Amends the frame#or. of de"olution to Scotland gi"ing greater po#ers to the Scottish ?o"ernment and Scottish arliament, follo#ing recommendations *% the Caiman Commission: see Chapter 8$

Constitutional nature depend on #hether refer to con"ention or general principles of constitutional Acts do not come neatl) la#elled as const!tut!onal so it is a 3uestion of !udgement as to #hich ones should *e included on a list and there is room for disagreement: for e<ample, in +,,8 the committees list does not !nclude t"e Freedom of Informat!on Act ;<<< /gi"ing people in the United Kingdom a legal right to official information for the first time0, #hich some people would regard as of const!tut!onal s!gn!f!cance$ The most #as!c pro#lem #ith loo.ing at the statute *oo. is that !t does not prov!de a complete set of rules: it conta!ns onl) rules t"at "ave #een enacted #) (arl!ament and #ill s"ow l!ttle or not"!ng of rules !n ot"er forms. such as con"entions, or general principles$

There ha"e *een occas!onal references in Acts of (arl!ament to const!tut!onal convent!ons. e$g$ s$ - of the 3ealt" and Soc!al Care Act ;<=; alludes to !nd!v!dual m!n!ster!al respons!#!l!t) /The Secretar% of State retains ministerial responsi*ilit% to arliament for the pro"ision of the health ser"ice in England60 and to #road const!tut!onal pr!nc!ples, e$g$ s$ of the Const!tut!onal +eform Act ;<<G refers to t"e pr!nc!ple of t"e rule of law$

So, Constitutional statute as ordinar% statute no longer tena*le In Chapter + #e #ill return to the idea of constitutional statutes6$ In ort"odo/ legal t"!n-!ng, Acts deal!ng w!t" const!tut!onal matters are no d!fferent from Acts of (arl!ament on an% other su*!ect: an Act regulating the dentistr% profession has the same status as one dealing #ith the constitutional union *et#een England and Scotland, accord!ng to t"e most !nfluent!al n!neteent"4 centur) pu#l!c law)er 9D!ce): T"!s !s no longer a tena#le v!ew&

@& AUDICIAL DECISIONS Another part of the United Kingdom6s dispersed constitutional rule*oo. is to *e found in the la# reports$ Bespite the lac. of a designated constitutional court in the United Court, 6udges !n t"e t"ree separate 6ur!sd!ct!ons w!t"!n t"e Un!ted $!ngdom 1England and 'ales. Scotland. and Nort"ern Ireland2 "ave contr!#uted to t"e development of const!tut!onal pr!nc!ples$ The !udgments of the "!g"est court in ci"il matters are of o*"ious importance: until )cto*er +,,=, this #as the Appellate Committee of the Gouse of Lords& after then, under the frame#or. created *% the Constitutional Reform Act +,,>, it is the ne# U$ Supreme Court$

ECtGR, EC: and Bomestic :udges different "ie# on upholding constitutional principle #hile at the same time control L and E In Chapter J #e e<amine in more detail the role of the !udiciar% in the practical protect!on of t"e rule of law, and the controvers!es that e<ist a*out this: in *rief, "ie#s are strongl) d!v!ded as to "ow muc" !nfluence U$ 6udges. and 6udges s!tt!ng !n t"e two European Courts,t"e Court of Aust!ce of t"e European Un!on 1!n Lu/em#ourg2 and t"e European Court of 3uman +!g"ts 1!n Stras#ourg0Ashould ha"e in controll!ng t"e pol!c) opt!ons open to t"e U$ (arl!ament and the UK government$ The areas of counter4terror!sm measures. !mm!grat!on and as)lum. and pr!soners r!g"ts ha"e pro"ed to *e particularl% contentious *ut underl%ing these are deeper *uest!ons a#out t"e role of 6udges !n a const!tut!onal democrac)&

(or the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to introduce the two ma!n wa)s in #hich !udges contr!#ute to develop!ng and appl)!ng t"e const!tut!onal rule#oo-$

F!rst1 SI although seemed to *e su*ordinate *ut can ma.e sure constitutional principles is uphold The first is *% statutor% interpretation: ma.ing definiti"e rulings on the meaning of pro"isions in Acts of arliament and other legislation$ The orthodo< starting point is that 6udges are see-!ng to f!nd and g!ve effect to %t"e !ntent!on of (arl!ament as e<pressed in the #ords of the Act in 3uestion$ o In the landmar. case Pepper (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Hart 9-==J;, it #as held that courts ma%, in interpreting an am*iguous statutor% pro"ision, allo# a part% to refer to a minister6s statement during the passage of the *ill through arliament, reported in Hansard This ma% seem to !mpl) a rat"er l!m!ted, su#ord!nate role for 6udges *ut courts "ave developed pr!nc!ples that in some cases suggest a far more e/pans!ve funct!on$

(or e<ample, 6udges "ave #een e/tremel) reluctant to ta.e at face value statutor) prov!s!ons t"at oust t"e 6ur!sd!ct!on of the courts to rev!ew t"e legal!t) of go"ernment decisions$ o An!sm!n!c v Fore!gn Compensat!on Comm!ss!on 9-=F=; The% ha"e de"eloped the principle of legalit%6, #hich means that an Act of (arl!ament w!ll not #e !nterpreted as depr!v!ng people of common law r!g"ts e/cept #) t"e clearest words$ o (!erson v Secretar) of State for t"e 3ome Department 9-=KK; (arl!ament "as also c"anged t"e wa) !n w"!c" 6udges are e/pected to carr) out t"e tas- of interpreting statutes$ Sect!on @ of t"e 3uman +!g"ts Act =DDC places a ne# o*ligation on the courts: 'So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and

su!ordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compati!le with the onvention rights'$ E<actl% #hat this re3uires or permits a !udge to do has *een the su*!ect of much de*ate in court and in academic circles$ 4oreo"er, w"ere r!g"ts or !nterests protected #) European Un!on law are in issue, all courts and tri*unals in the UK must stri"e to read UK Acts of arliament to achie"e consistenc% #ith EU la# /#hich al#a%s has priorit% o"er national la#0$

Second1 appl% constitutional principle *% common la# method A second #a% in #hich !udges contri*ute to the de"elopment and application of the rule1 *oo. is t"roug" common law met"ods$ As this is the first point in the *oo. at #hich #e discuss 'the common la#6, some #ords of e<planation are called for$ The common la# is a term used to refer to the legal tradition that de"eloped in England after the Norman Con3uest in -,FF$ It #as su*se3uentl% transplanted to man% other countries during the era of the 7ritish Empire and is the root oflegal s%stems in, for e<ample, Australia, 7angladesh, Canada, India, Ne# Lealand, and the United States of America$ Bistinctions can *e dra#n *et#een common la# !urisdictions and those *ased on ci"ilian6 or Roman la#

traditions /in continental Europe and Latin America, for instance0$ Scotland is a mi<ed6 or pluralistic6 !urisdiction, dra#ing on *oth traditionsA*ut its pu*lic la# is *ased on common la#$ (or our purposes, the follo#ing are the most significant features of the common la# tradition: o there is no des!gnated const!tut!onal court separate from the main court s%stemAas is t%pical in ci"ilian !urisdictions& o in se"eral important and *road fields of la#, 6udges not onl) appl) rules #ut generate t"em !ndependentl) of (arl!ament t"roug" t"e appl!cat!on of precedentAinstead of *eing confined to the interpretation and application of a codified set of rules for a field of la# as in ci"ilian !urisdictions& o the st%le of !udgments in common la# s%stems tend to *e longer and contain more !ustification for the

rulings *ased on detailed discussion of pre"ious !udgments& o !udges ma% ma.e o*iter statements in !udgments: t"ese are d!scuss!ons of propos!t!ons of law t"at are not str!ctl) spea-!ng necessar) to decide the particular case *efore the court *ut are a #a% of !udges floating ideas and setting an intellectual agenda$ Audges "ave used o#!ter d!cta to d!scuss !mportant const!tut!onal pr!nc!ples, including parl!amentar) supremac). t"e rules of law. and t"e separat!on of powers& o !udges are appointed from mid1 career la#%ers in pri"ate practice Arather than at a relati"el% %oung age immediatel% after completing their legal studies as occurs in man% ci"ilian !urisdictions for the ordinar% courts or from academia for constitutional courts$

Through man% *ranches of la# uphold constitutional principles Chapters +, J, and -F #ill e<plore in more detail ho# and #ith #hat effect !udges in the UK ha"e added to the constitutional rule*oo.$ T"e) "ave done so t"roug" d!fferent #ranc"es of tort law. !nclud!ng trespass. negl!gence and m!sfeasance !n pu#l!c off!ce& (or e<ample, in the cele*rated case of Ent!c- v Carr!ngton, Lord Camden held that off!c!als "ave no general power to enter and searc" propert% unless aut"or!sed #) statute or common law&

Through :udicial re"ie# The other field of common law rule4 ma-!ng of const!tut!onal s!gn!f!cance is 6ud!c!al rev!ew& )"er the %ears, and especiall% o"er the past 8, %ears, the courts ha"e enunciated grounds of re"ie# chat ma% *e used to *uest!on t"e legal!t) of dec!s!ons #) pu#l!c #od!es and delegated leg!slat!on& The courts ha"e also e<tended their common la# !urisdiction to: o rev!ew d!fferent t)pes of dec!s!on /including those made *% ministers under authorit% of prerogat!ve powers 9"#H$ case; and non4statutor) #od!es 9e/ parte Dataf!n;0 o to "old m!n!sters !n contempt of court in the /admittedl% "er% rare0 situation #here a minister or an official acting in the ministers name !gnored underta-!ngs g!ven to a court or a court order$ M v Home office

Cr!t!cal T"!n-!ng: Court #ill set aside Act that undermined people right in democrac% ?oing against the grain of mainstream thin.ing, a num*er of senior !udges supported *% s%mpathetic academics loo. to the common la# *roadl% and argue that the *od% of case la# em*odies fundamental "alues of the constitution: the% suggest that, !n e/treme s!tuat!ons, 6udges would "ave t"e const!tut!onal dut) to set as!de an Act of (arl!ament t"at underm!ned democrac) or peoples #as!c r!g"ts in some profound #a%$ Consider, for e<ample, the follo#ing academic #riting *% Sir :ohn La#s, #hen he #as a !udge of the Gigh Court in England and 5ales$

Sir :ohn La#s: No# it is onl% *% means of compulsor% la# that effecti"e rights can *e accorded, so that the medium of rights is not persuasion, *ut the po#er of rule: the ver) power #hich, if m!sused. could #e deplo)ed to su#vert r!g"ts& 5e therefore arri"e at this position: the const!tut!on must guarantee #) pos!t!ve law such rights as that of freedom of e<pression, since other#ise its credentials as a medium of honest rule are fatall% undermined$ 7ut t"!s re*u!res for !ts ac"!evement #hat I ma% call a higher1order la#: a law w"!c" cannot #e a#rogated as ot"er laws can, #) t"e passage of a statute promoted #) a government w!t" the necessar% ma!orit% in (arl!ament$

)ther#ise the r!g"t !s not !n t"e -eep!ng of t"e const!tut!on at all& it is not a guaranteed r!g"t& !t e/!sts. !n po!nt of law at least, onl% #ecause t"e government c"ooses to let !t e/!st, #hereas in truth no such choice should *e open to an% go"ernment$ The democrat!c credent!als of an elected government cannot 6ust!f) its en6o)ment of a r!g"t to a#ol!s" fundamental freedoms$ If its po#er in the state is in the last resort a*solute, such fundamental r!g"ts as free e/press!on are onl) pr!v!leges& no less so !f t"e a#solute power rests !n an elected #od)$ The *%#ord of e"er% t%rant is C4% #ord is la#C& a democratic assem*l% ha"ing so"ereign po#er *e%ond the reach of curtailment or re"ie# ma% ma.e !ust such an assertion, and its electi"e *ase cannot immunise it from pla%ing the t%rantCs role$

ommentary To *e clear: this is controvers!al stuff and runs counter to ort"odo/ t"!n-!ng on t"e pr!nc!ple of parl!amentar) supremac) /under #hich courts are said to *e *ound to recogniHe as "alid la# an% Act of arliament0$ 5e return to these issues in Chapter +$

F& CONSTITUTIONAL CONHENTIONS The Ca#!net Manual7s description of the UK constitution ma.es plain the importance of constitutional con"entions6 as a source of rules$ It defines con"entions as 'rules of const!tut!onal pract!ce t"at are regarded as #!nd!ng !n operat!on #ut not !n law6$ Among the particular con"entions discussed in the 4anual are: o 7% con"ention, the Sovere!gn does not #ecome pu#l!cl) !nvolved !n part) pol!t!cs of go"ernment$ o The roles of t"e (r!me M!n!ster and Ca#!net are go"erned largel% *% con"ention$ o 7% modern con"ention, the (r!me M!n!ster alwa)s s!ts !n t"e 3ouse of Commons$

o There is a con"ention that an !nd!v!dual w!ll #e a m!n!ster onl) !f t"e) are a Mem#er of t"e 3ouse of Commons or t"e 3ouse of Lords$ o 7% con"ention, Ca#!net and Ca#!net comm!ttees ta-e dec!s!ons w"!c" are #!nd!ng on mem#ers of the ?o"ernment$ o The t#o Gouses of arliament ac.no#ledge "arious con"entions go"erning the relationship *et#een them, including in relation to pr!mac) of t"e 3ouse of Commons. f!nanc!al pr!v!lege and t"e operat!on of t"e Sal!s#ur)4Add!son convent!on o In +,--, the ?o"ernment ac.no#ledged that a convent!on "ad developed !n (arl!ament t"at #efore troops were comm!tted, the 3ouse of Commons s"ould "ave an opportun!t) to de#ate the matter and said that it proposed to o*ser"e that con"ention e<cept

#hen there #as an emergenc% and such action #ould not *e appropriate$ 5a% to identif% con"ention since it is non1legal and no codified It is eas) enoug" to !dent!f) rules set out in the form of leg!slat!on, *ecause the% ha"e *een made according to a defined process and a pu*lished in a prescri*ed format #ut "ow do we !dent!f) rules !n t"e form of convent!onsE (rofessor S!r Ivor Aenn!ngs /-=,J1 F>0 suggested a t"ree4part test$

Sir I"or :ennings: It is clear, in the first place, that mere practice is insufficient$ The fact that an authorit% has al#a%s *eha"ed in a certain #a% is not #arrant for sa%ing that it ought to *eha"e in that #a%$ 7ut if the authorit% itself and those connected #ith it *elie"e that the% ought to do so, then the con"ention does e<ist$ This is the ordinar% rule applied to customar% la#$ (ract!ce alone !s not enoug"$ It must #e normat!ve& (or e<ample, the fact that the monarch has refused a dissolution 9of arliament, for a general election to *e held; for o"er a centur% #hen ad"ised *% his Ca*inet does not in itself create a con"ention that the monarch must al#a%s accept the ad"ice tendered$ 9$$$ ;

Similarl%, the fact that the So"ereign has once *eha"ed in a certain #a% does not *ind him to act in that #a%$ 9$$$ ; Something more must *e added$ As in the creation of la#, the creation of a con"ention must *e due to the reason of the thing *ecause it accords #ith the pre"ailing political philosoph%$ It "elps to ma-e t"e democrat!c s)stem operate& it ena#les t"e mac"!ner) of t"e State to run more smoot"l)& and if it #ere not there, fr!ct!on would result$ Thus, if a con"ention continues *ecause !t !s des!ra#le !n t"e c!rcumstances of t"e const!tut!on, it must ha"e *een created for the same reason$

5e ha"e to as. oursel"es three 3uestions: o f!rst, #hat are the precedents& o secondl), did the actors in the precedents *elie"e that the% #ere *ound *% the rule& and o t"!rdl), is there a good reason for the ruleE A s!ngle precedent w!t" a good reason ma% *e enoug" to esta#l!s" the rule$ A #hole string of precedents #ithout such a reason #ill *e of no a"ail, unless it is perfectl% certain that the persons concerned regarded them as *ound *% it$

Commentar%1 *reach of practices does not mean *reach of constitutional principles *ut not con"ention The second element 9actor t"!nt"e) are #ound: in the :ennings6 test is helpful in d!st!ngu!s"!ng convent!ons from mere pract!ces that, although routinely follo%ed, do not reall) serve an) %good rd reason 9@ reason: rele"ant to the functioning of the constitution and #hich could *e changed #ithout *eing thought to *reach a constitutional rule$ E/amples of pract!ces that should not *e regarded as constitutional con"entions are: the (r!me M!n!ster spends t"e C"r!stmas "ol!da)s at C"e*uers /the rime 4inister6s official countr% residence0& that ministers6 official papers are transported in red leather1co"ered *o<es& and that rime 4inister6s 2uestion Time ta.es place for J, minutes at -+ noon on 5ednesda%s #hen the Gouse of Commons is sitting$

Bifferent #ith the la#1 la# is enforced *% the court Are con"entions different from la#sE Bice% dre# a sharp distinction *et#een la#s 'in the strictest sense6 and constitutional con"entions$ The difference *et#een the t#o categories la%, he stressed, in the role of t"e courts !n relat!on to enforcement of fa!lures to compl) w!t" t"e rules&

Bice%: 9$$$ ; the rules #hich ma.e up constitutional la#, as the term is used in England, include t#o sets of principles or ma<ims of a totall% distinct character$ The one set of rules are in the strictest sense 7laws7. since the% are rules #hich /#hether #ritten or un#ritten, #hether enacted *% statute or deri"ed from the mass of custom, tradition, or !udge1made ma<ims .no#n to common la#0 are enforced #) t"e courts& these rules constitute Cconstitutional la#C in the proper sense of that term, and ma% for the sa.e of distinction *e called collecti"el% Cthe la# of the constitutionC$

The other set of rules consist of convent!ons, understandings, ha*its, or practices #hich, though the% ma% regulate the conduct of se"eral mem*ers of the so"ereign po#ers, of the 4inistr%, of the officials, are not !n real!t) laws at all since t"e) are not enforced #) t"e courts$ This proportion of constitutional la# ma%, for the sa.e of the distinction, *e termed the Ccon"entions of the constitutionC, or constitutional moralit%$

Commentar%: different not decide on #hether #ritten or not *ut enforced *% court Ge also made clear that the d!st!nct!on was not related to w"et"er t"e rules were wr!tten or %unwr!tten , #ecause man) const!tut!onal convent!ons are e/pressed !n pr!nted rules $ Ge included in the categor% of con"entions 'the w"ole of our parl!amentar) procedure, #hich he said 'is nothing *ut a mass of convent!onal law

Argument: :enning1 no different in nature *ut important to .no# #here it falls The idea that it is possi*le, or helpful, to dra# a clear d!v!d!ng l!ne #etween rules !n t"e form of laws and t"ose !n t"e form of convent!on has long *een 3uestioned$ :ennings argued that 't"ere !s not d!st!nct!on of su#stance or nature *et#een la#s and con"entions, alt"oug" he #ent on to sa% that it is ' !mportant from t"e tec"n!cal angle to -now !nto w"!c" categor) a rule falls$

Argument: La# and Con"ention as a spectrum of social rules #hich are formalised *ut not separate categories of rules eg: 4inisterial Code *ecome reference to constitutional o*ligation

4ore recentl%, N$5$ 7ar*er argues that #e should "ie# laws and convent!ons not as separate categories of rules, *ut as a spectrum$

7ar*er: The difference *et#een la# and con"ention is one of degree& laws and convent!ons s"ould #e placed upon a spectrum of t)pes of soc!al rules, a spectrum gradated in terms of the formal!sat!on of rules$ Laws l!e at t"e most formal!sed end of t"!s spectrum, *ut there is no single, defina*le, point at #hich rules shift from *eing con"entions into *eing la#s$

Alongside this argument, it #ill *e contended that con"entions can *ecome la#s through !udicial inter"ention, and that con"entions can Ccr%stalliseC into la#s o"er time *% *ecoming increasingl% formalised$ 97% #a% of an e<ample, 5ar#er cons!ders t"e M!n!ster!al CodeA the set of rules govern!ng t"e conduct of m!n!sters !ssued *% the rime 4inister$; Since its pu*lication in -==+, the Code "as grown !n pol!t!cal strengt"& In recent %ears those alleg!ng m!n!ster!al m!sconduct "ave fre*uentl) argued t"at t"e Code "as #een v!olated& 5hen, for instance, it #as disco"ered that Tessa :o#ellCs hus*and had recei"ed a su*stantial sum from S!lv!o 5erluscon!. t"e c"allenge to "er !ntegr!t) was framed w!t"!n t"e Code$ 9At the time, she

#as Secretar% of State for Culture, 4edia and Sport$; 3er cr!t!cs argued t"at t"!s was a g!ft. and s"ould. under t"e Code. "ave #een reported to "er (ermanent Secretar) 9the senior ci"il ser"ice in her department;$ The (r!me M!n!ster 9Ton% 7lair; concluded. after an !nvest!gat!on *% the Ca*inet Secretar%, that *% the time Aowell -new of t"e mone) t"e Inland +evenue "ad classed !t as earn!ngs, and it conse*uentl) d!d not need to #e declared under t"e Code$ On #ot" s!des of t"e controvers). the Code was accepted as t"e source of t"e relevant const!tut!onal o#l!gat!on& The Code has *een in"o.ed in a similar fashion in other recent political *attles$

Contro"ersies surrounding Lord Sains*ur%Cs loans to the La*our art% 9he #as a minister in the Bepartment for Trade and Industr%;, Ba"id 7lun.ettCs inter"ention in an application fora "isa 9he #as Gome Secretar%;, and :ohn rescottCs sta% at a ranch and receipt of a Mco#*o% outfitM 9he #as Beput% rime 4inister;, ha"e all *een fought out #ithin the conte<t of the Code$ The focus of pol!t!cal attent!on on t"e Code suggests the emergence of a ne# con"ention: one of the rules of ministerial responsi*ilit% now places a dut) on M!n!sters to follow t"e rules set out !n t"e Code& Fa!lure to do so w!ll lead to pol!t!cal censure and ma) end w!t" t"e M!n!ster leav!ng off!ce$ This ne# con"ention does not f!t !nto our trad!t!onal model of const!tut!onal convent!ons$ It is a rule #hich !dent!f!es a formal!sed set of rules, and #hich,

*% recognising them, renders t"em const!tut!onall) o#l!gator)& The con"ention tells 4inistersAand those #ho #ish to cr!t!c!se t"em for fall!ng s"ort of t"e!r dut!esAthat the% should loo- to t"e Code for an aut"or!tat!ve statement of at least part of ministerial responsi*ilit%$

9 ; E"en if constitutional scholars *aul. at the claim that the 4inisterial Code is a legal s%stem, the Code has *ecome steadil% more la#1li.e o"er recent %ears$ It !s not a clear. or central, instance of a legal s%stem, *ut !t now possesses man) of t"e c"aracter!st!c features of a legal s)stem$ There ma% come a point, indeed, #e ma% e"en ha"e reached this point, #hen the Code 6o!ns t"e pac- of normat!ve s)stems t"at roam !n t"e penum#ra of law& Along #ith religious la#, international la#, le< mercatoria and other such entities, the Code prov!des an e/ample of t"e softness of t"e l!ne #etween law and ot"er formal!sed normat!ve s)stems&

Enforcement of convent!on? Bice% *reach of con"ention can lead to *reach of la# '"at "appens !f a pol!t!cal actor #reac"es a const!tut!onal convent!onI Bice% s ans#er is that in case of a *reach, the courts would not enforce compl!ance d!rectl), *ut that v!olat!on of convent!ons leads !ne/ora#l) to #reac" of t"e law /#hich the courts can enforce0$ Bice% considered t"ree poss!#!l!t!es$ o The first #as !mpeac"ment, an ancient procedure *% #hich an% person can #e prosecuted and tr!ed not !n t"e courts, #ut #) (arl!ament& Bice% dismissed this /in -=,K0 as an o*solete practice$

o Second, he said a current ans#er is, that o#ed!ence to t"e convent!onal precepts of the constitution is ensured #) t"e force of pu#l!c op!n!on& Ge thought that this #as an unsat!sfactor) answer *ecause if ta.en #ithout further e<planation, it amounts to little else than a re1statement of the "er% pro*lem that #hich it is meant to sol"e$ o Bice%6s t"!rd and preferred e<planation is as follo#s$

Bice%: o 9$$$ ; the sanction #hich constrains the *oldest political ad"enturer to o*e% the fundamental principles of the constitution and the con"entions in #hich these principles are e<pressed, is t"e fact that the #reac" of t"ese pr!nc!ples and of t"ese convent!ons #ill almost !mmed!atel) #r!ng t"e offender !nto confl!ct w!t" t"e courts and t"e law of t"e land$ Bice% ga"e se"eral illustrations of ho# this #or.ed$

E<amples of *reach of con"ention lead to *reach of la# If (arl!ament were not to meet for two )ears /contrar) to t"e convent!on that arliament assem*les annuall)0, no law would #e #ro-en, *ut t"!s #reac" of convent!on would "ave several conse*uences? although most ta<es #ould still come into the E<che3uer, large proport!ons of t"e revenue would cease to #e legall) due and could not #e legall) collected, #hilst ever) off!c!al, #ho acted as collector, #ould e/pose "!mself to act!ons or prosecut!onsC$

(urther, #hat #ould happen !f t"e government were to lose a vote of conf!dence in the Gouse of Commons, #ut refuse to res!gnE Bice% s ans#er is that the 3ouse of Commons would refuse to pass t"e annual Appropr!at!on Act /*% #hich legal aut"or!t) !s g!ven to m!n!sters to spend mone) from the Consolidated (und, into #hich ta< re"enues are paid0, mean!ng t"at government e/pend!ture would cease to #e legal and could #e c"allenged !n t"e courts&

Argument? Not e"er% *reach of con"ention lead to *reach of la# eg1 ministerial responsi*ilit% Aenn!ngs was cr!t!cal of this anal%sis$ Ge pointed to man) !nstances in #hich a #reac" of a convent!on would not lead to a #reac" of law Afor e<ample, 'all the con"entions relating to: o the conduct of #us!ness !n t"e 3ouse of Commons o a departure from t"e convent!on of collect!ve m!n!ster!al respons!#!l!t)&

Argument: Con"ention cannot enforced *% court does not mean con"ention cannot used *% the court to interpret the statute and de"elop the common la# 4ore recentl%, some scholars ha"e *egun to argueA against constitutional orthodo<%Athat there are circumstances in #hich the courts can, and should, #e prepared to enforce const!tut!onal rules d!rectl)$ The follo#ing e<tract is the conclusion dra#n *% (rofessor Trevor Allan at the end of a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canadas !udgment in +e? +esolut!on to amend t"e Const!tut!on& The Federal >overnment of Canada wanted to repatr!ate t"e Canad!an const!tut!on$ Up to that point, the statute law that formed t"e #as!s of Canada s const!tut!on was an Act of t"e U$ (arl!ament /the 7ritish North America Act -KFI0, reflecting Canada

s histor% as a dominion of the United Kingdom$ Some prov!nces !n Canada were opposed to t"e repatr!at!on proposals and challenged the planned resolution of the t#o Gouses of arliament in Canada /#hich #as to *e in the form of an address to the 2ueen, re3uesting this reform0$ The prov!nces opposed to t"e c"ange argued that an% amendment to t"e const!tut!onal s)stem could not occur w!t"out t"e consent of the pro"inces of Canada$ The ma6or!t) of t"e court accepted that there #as a convent!on t"at prov!nces consent, *ut "eld t"at t"e powers of t"e two Canad!an 3ouses of (arl!ament were unl!m!ted as a matter of la#$ Allan d!sagreed w!t" t"!s approac"&

Allan: The present argument en"isages that the "alidit% of a statute might properl% gi"e #a%, in an e<treme case, to the force of con"ention$ )n one "ie#, the fundamental nature of the con"ention threatened in the Canadian patriation case #ould !ustif% that result$ Such a result #ould o*"iousl% *e rare$ There is no reason, ho#e"er, #h% legal remedies should not *e granted in support of a con"ention, #here that con"ention en!o%s a firm foundation in principle$ In su*stance, the Crossman Biaries case ac.no#ledged that possi*ilit%

As a source of law, a const!tut!onal convent!on could rarel) preva!l over t"e e/pl!c!t terms of an Act of (arl!ament: leg!slat!ve supremac) !s !tself a ma6or component of our convent!onal moral!t)$ 9$$$; the authorit% of arliament to legislate for Canada could not *e constrainedAas a matter of English la#A*% an% con"ention re3uiring dominion consent$ 3owever, It does not follow that convent!on ma) not #e an !mportant source of law govern!ng t"e !nterpretat!on of statute. or !nfluenc!ng t"e development of t"e common law&

Cont!nu!ng argument? Legal remed% can *e pro"ided for *reaching con"ention #hen in"ol"ement of application of legal doctrine Allan? As a practical matter, the enforcement of an) part!cular convent!on must normall% !nvolve t"e appl!cat!on of e/!st!ng legal doctr!ne !n order to prov!de a su!ta#le remed)$ The e*u!ta#le doctr!ne protect!ng matters of conf!dence. in Crossman, and t"e rules of natural 6ust!ce, in >C3J, were "arnessed to suppl) a legal remed) for #reac" of convent!on o Crossman was t"at "e #reac" t"e CM+ at t"e same t!me aga!nst e*u!ta#le doctr!ne protect!ng matters of conf!dence 9legal doctr!ne: t"erefore remed) can #e prov!ded

Cont!nue Argument: Allan1 distinction of la# and con"ention in recognised *% court no longer sustained, it is important sources for the la# The s"arp lawKconvent!on d!c"otom), ho#e"er, neglects t"e sense !n w"!c" recogn!t!on of convent!on #) t"e courts has a normati"e aspect$ It !mports an appl!cat!on of pol!t!cal pr!nc!ple$ The trad!t!onal ort"odo/) !s wort" contest!ng #ecause !t o#scures t"e !mportant sense in #hich const!tut!onal moral!t) !s a leg!t!mate source of law& It rests on a separat!on of legal from pol!t!cal pr!nc!ple #hich, in the last anal%sis, cannot #e susta!ned& o Convent!on alt"oug" pol!t!cal. #ut cannot #e separated w!t" legal aspect w"en needed to

!nterpret t"e statute and develop t"e common law

Concordats. codes. etc: Agreement in #ritten form to create con"entions 4ostAperhaps almost allA convent!ons now e/!st !n wr!tten form of "arious .inds$ Bifferent parts of the go"ernment s%stem ha"e, from time to time, set down !n wr!t!ng t"e pr!nc!ples and -e) aspects of pract!ce govern!ng t"e!r relat!ons"!p, called %memoranda of understand!ng or %concordats $ These are in essence agreements to create a convent!on or set of convent!ons to regulate a part!cular relat!ons"!p& The dr!v!ng force for t"e creat!on of a concordat ha"e often *een const!tut!onal reformA devolut!on. c"anges to t"e off!ce of Lord C"ancellor. and alterat!ons !n t"e role of local aut"or!t!es&

E<amples include: In )cto*er -===, the UK go"ernment and go"ernments of Scotland, 5ales, and Northern Ireland signed a memorandum of understanding /latest "ersion in 4arch +,-,0, agreements on the #or.ing of the :oint 4inisterial Committee, and concordats on issues such as coordination of EU polic% and financial assistance to industr%$ In :anuar% +,,8, Lord 5oolf /Lord Chief :ustice0 and Lord (alconer of Thoroton /Lord Chancellor0 negotiated arrangements on the principles that should go"ern the future relationship *et#een the !udiciar% of England and 5ales, and the minister responsi*le for !udiciar%1 related matters$ In Becem*er +,,I, the UK go"ernment and Local ?o"ernment Association agreed the 'Central1Local Concordat6 to esta*lish ca frame#or. of principles for ho# central and local go"ernment #or. together to ser"e the pu*lic in England and 5ales$

Concordats as political *ut not enforcea*le *% court These concordats are regarded as pol!t!cal in character and #ere not env!saged #) t"ose w"o made t"em to #e enforcea#le *% the courts$ (or e<ample, the de"olution memorandum of understanding states that it '!s a statement of pol!t!cal !ntent, and should not *e !nterpreted as a #!nd!ng agreement& It does not create legal o#l!gat!ons *et#een the parties$ It is !ntended to #e #!nd!ng !n "onour onl)$6 5hether concordats turn out to *e a no1go area for courts ma% *e open to 3uestion: the courts might "ie# as unattract!ve an argument t"at one part) to a carefull) negot!ated agreement s"ould #e a#le to #reac" !t w!t" !mpun!t) $

onstitutional status of concordats: 4ore detailed and specified than old con"ention, is a codification of go"ernmental process 9in present case is de"olution issue; 5hat is the constitutional status of concordatsE In the follo#ing e<tract, (rofessor +!c"ard +awl!ngs considers the use of concordats !n t"e conte/t of devolut!on$ Richard: There is currentl% e"ol"ing another species of pseudo4contract, #hich is of ma6or const!tut!onal s!gn!f!cance& Be"olution to Scotland, 5ales and Northern Ireland spa#ns a raft of !nter4!nst!tut!onal adm!n!strat!ve agreements *et#een the U$K$ ?o"ernment and the de"ol"ed administrations$

In fact 7concordatr)7, to adopt the 5hitehall term, const!tutes one of t"e ma!n p!llars of t"e novel devolut!onar) 9!n t"!s case: arc"!tecture of the Un!ted $!ngdom$ It is soft la# or Cadministrati"e 3uasi1 legislationC par e<cellence$ The new st)le pseudo4contract is not the old st)le const!tut!onal convent!on& Far more spec!f!c and deta!led, the concordats represent a further step do#n the road of !uridification in the form of C*ureaucratic la#C$ The% in"ol"e esta*lishing the ground rules for administrati"e co1operation and e<changes of information: in la#%erCs parlance, a form of 7cod!f!cat!on7 of t"e 1prev!ousl) !nternal2 processes of government$ The purpose, according to 4inisters, is to preserve t"e good wor-!ng relat!ons"!ps t"at e/!sted under

t"e old '"!te"all model !ncorporat!ng terr!tor!al departments$ 9$$$ ; Concordatr% in"ol"es a rewor-!ng of t"e !nformal c"aracter of t"e 5r!t!s" Const!tut!on$ The use of pseudo1contract is thus a minimum response to the demand for intergo"ernmental structures and processes that is the ine"ita*le conse3uence of de"olution$ The great stress on fle/!#!l!t) and scope for institutional learning is indicati"e of an e"olutionar% approach$ The current de"elopment ma% in this #a% pro"e an em*r%onic form of intergo"ernmental relations$ D!fferent #ut related !s t"e close f!t #ith the adm!n!strat!ve and const!tut!onal values of co4 operat!on, co1ordination and partnership t%picall% associated #ith the general Ne# La*our pro!ect of

modernisation and ne#l% te<tured democratic culture$ The preference for soft la# techni3ues represents a deli*erate constitutional choice$ Nie#ed in comparati"e perspecti"e, the United Kingdom is thus seen at the end of a spectrum of s%stems of intergo"ernmental relations$ The classification is the standard legal one of formal structures and institutional processes *% reference to the sources of authorit%$ Constitutional status, statutor% underpinning, !udicial recognition, and pure soft la#: the categories ser"e to illustrate the propensit% of different s%stems to "arious com*inations of mi< and match$ The *lan.et use in the United Kingdom of pseudo1contract is the more stri.ing in "ie# of the 3ualitati"e differences in the territorial models of de"olution$

At one and the same time, there is a formal s%mmetr% and a real su*stanti"e as%mmetr% in the relationships #ith central go"ernment$

To push home the point, the argument for statutor% underpinning or flan.ing measures ma% *e said to carr% greater force in the case of 5ales, precisel% *ecause of the strong dependenc% of the National Assem*l% under the scheme of e<ecuti"e de"olution$ 5a"ing a piece of paper is not al#a%s apt to inspire confidence$ Concordats ma% *e designed to foster co1operation and good#ill *ut are also *% their "er% nature highl% dependent for effecti"e operations on there *eing concord$ In e"aluation, it is important to *ear in mind the strong d%namics in the ne# modalities of intergo"ernmental relations, and, further, the different mi<es in concordatr% of political and administrati"e in"ol"ement$ 9$$$;

onstitutional significance: Concordat pro"ided the principle to the legislation and needed to *e refer *ac. the part #hich Act did not co"er, and su*!ect to e"ol"e to ne# circrumstances In :ul% +,,I, the 3ouse of Lords Const!tut!on Comm!ttee considered the concordat relat!ng to 6ud!c!ar)4government relat!ons? -J Soon after that announcement 9in :une +,,J, that the go"ernment planned to a*olish the office of Lord Chancellor, Lord 5oolf /then Lord Chief :ustice0 and Lord (alconer /then Lord Chancellor0 started negotiations o"er the .e% principles and principal arrangements that should go"ern the new s!tuat!on in #hich the Lord C"!ef Aust!ce rat"er t"an t"e Lord C"ancellor would #e "ead of t"e 6ud!c!ar)$ The outcome of t"ose tal-s #as set out in :anuar% +,,8 in an agreement .no#n as Mthe ConcordatM /formall% entitled MThe Lord ChancellorCs !udiciar%1related functions: roposalsM0$

Man) aspects of t"e Concordat #ere put on a statutor) foot!ng #) t"e C+A 9Constitutional Reform Act +,,>;, *ut it is clear to us that the Concordat cont!nues to #e of great const!tut!onal !mportance& -8$ Lord (alconer agreed #ith this: Mit seems to me to *e a document of constitutional significance *ecause, alt"oug" muc" of !t was t"en enacted !n t"e Const!tut!onal +eform Act, #ut !t sets out t"e #as!c pr!nc!ples on w"!c" t"e 6udges and t"e e/ecut!ve w!ll relate to eac" ot"er !n t"e future$ I ha"e never -nown an) p!ece of leg!slat!on to #e utterl) compre"ens!ve& there are *ound to *e issues that come up in the future w"ere !t !s t"e pr!nc!ple t"at matters rather than precise detailed legislation and I *elie"e the Concordat w!ll #e !mportant for t"atM /2 8-0$ Similarl%, the current Lord Chief :ustice, Lord hillips, told us: MI

would l!-e to t"!n- !t "as an entrenc"ed *ual!t) a#out it$ It has certainl% *een treated as if it #ere a const!tut!onal document la)!ng down t"e d!v!s!on of funct!ons, no# largely of course overta&en !y the 'ct #ut not e/clus!vel), and w"ere t"e Act does not cover somet"!ng one needs to go #ac- to t"e ConcordatM /Appendi< K, 2 F0$ ->$ )n the 3uestion of #hether the Concordat might *e amended in the future, rofessor Ro*ert GaHell of the UCL Constitution Unit suggested that M!t "as t"e status of a const!tut!onal convent!on, and all constitutional con"entions are l!a#le to evolve overt!me !n t"e l!g"t of e/per!ence and new c!rcumstances, and I #ould *e "er% surprised if the Concordat did not itself e"ol"e partl% in its interpretation, as other con"entions ha"e e"ol"ed, #ut partl) !t could #e rev!s!ted. and I "ope at some po!nt !t w!ll #e rev!s!ted, and possi*l% this in3uir% could pro"ide the trigger for that$

I do not t"!n- m)self !t !s wr!tten !n ta#lets of stoneL /2 8IJ0$

Code: not from negotiation *ut from go"t Another #a% in #hich con"entions ma% *e #ritten do#n is as a code $ These d!ffer from concordats in that the% are not t"e su#6ect of negot!at!on *et#een different institutions or office1holders, #ut pu#l!s"ed #) one part of government& E<amples include: The M!n!ster!al Code. govern!ng t"e conduct of m!n!sters, issued *% the rime 4inister and The Code of ractice on Consultation, sett!ng out "ow t"e U$ government w!ll consult t"e pu#l!c and !nterested organ!8at!ons a#out proposals to c"ange pol!c)&

>$ EU+O(EAN UNION LA'1 E! law has supremacy over domestic law when there are conflicts The United Kingdom has *een a mem*er state of #hat is no# the European Union since :anuar% -=IJ$ A conse3uence of mem*ership of the European Union is that e/ecut!ve. leg!slat!ve. and 6ud!c!al dec!s!ons on man% f!elds of pol!c) are now made t"roug" or !nfluenced #) EU !nst!tut!ons$ 5e e<amine this in Chapter K /e<ecuti"e po#er0, Chapter -+ /legislation0, and Chapter -K /EU la# in the courts of the United Kingdom0$ (or the purposes of the present discussion of the United Kingdoms dispersed constitutional rule*oo., !t !s suff!c!ent to note t"at EU mem#ers"!p "as c"anged #hat is argua#l) t"e most #as!c rule of t"e U$ const!tut!on$

(r!or to =DE@, it #as clear that Acts of t"e U$ (arl!ament were t"e "!g"est form of law recognised in the constitutional s%stem$ Almost a decade *efore the United Kingdoms access!on to t"e European Econom!c Commun!t) 1t"e forerunner of t"e EU2, the court of the EEC had ruled in a landmar. !udgment that European Commun!t) 1now EU2 law "as supremac) over nat!onal law, w"ere t"ere !s a confl!ct #etween t"e two& (rom the #ord go, mem#ers"!p "as t"erefore *ual!f!ed ort"odo/ !deas of parl!amentar) supremac)& The UK court s%stem faced up to the practical conse*uence of t"!s new rule in the -==,s, #hen for the f!rst t!me 5r!t!s" 6udges were as-ed #) a part) 1Span!s" owners of f!s"!ng vessels. argu!ng t"at t"e) were #e!ng d!scr!m!nated aga!nst on grounds of t"e!r nat!onal!t)2 to suspend t"e operat!on of an

Act of (arl!ament /the Merc"ant S"!pp!ng Act =DCC2& B& INTE+NATIONAL LA' A final place to tr% to locate rules rele"ant to the United Kingdoms dispersed constitutional rule*oo. is in international la#$ Unt!l t"e =DG<s, the su*!ect matter of international la# #as largel% confined to high1le"el agreements *et#een the go"ernments of nation states that had little impact on either internal constitutional arrangements or the rights of indi"idual citiHens$ In the past fift% %ears, this has changed dramaticall%$ 5hat happens #ithin national constitutional s%stems is *ecoming !ncreas!ngl) !nfluenced and constra!ned #) transnat!onal !nst!tut!ons and agreements #etween countr!es& The term glo*aliHation is used to descri*e the momentous and

comple< changes in the #a% in #hich #e li"e and do *usiness$

Reason for de"eloping national la#1 technolog% and glo*al mar.et and de"eloping of uni"ersal human right One strand in the phenomena is tec"nolog): electronic communications and air tra"el ha"e transformed the a*ilit% of people and *usiness enterprises to reach each other$ A second strand is the de"elopment of a single glo#al mar-et$ ?oods and ser"ices are increasingl% traded across national frontiers$ The 5orld Trade )rganiHation /5T)0 #as esta*lished in -==J to enforce a s%stem of free trade agreed *et#een the ma!orit% of the #orld6s countries$ A t"!rd thread is the rise and acceptance of the not!on of un!versal "uman r!g"ts and the esta*lishment of international !udicial *odies to protect them$

The treatment of people *% national go"ernments is no longer regarded as a purel% domestic matter& instead, people are v!ewed as un!versall) "av!ng r!g"ts #) v!rtue of #e!ng "uman and t"ese r!g"ts cannot #e w!t"drawn #) t"e nat!onal laws of an) state$

Collecti"e polic% *% multinational organiHation, and no one state is isolated >lo#al!8at!on also descri*es the fact that mult!nat!onal organ!8at!ons are increasingl% determining the collect!ve pol!c!es to #e followed w!t"!n nat!on states, especiall% in defence and securit% matters through *odies such as the United Nations /UN0, the North Atlantic Treat% )rganiHation /NAT)0, and the 5estern European Union /5EU0$ This is a recognition that, !n a world !n w"!c" nuclear and #!olog!cal weapons e/!st, no s!ngle nat!on state !s an) longer capa#le of fulf!ll!ng t"e most fundamental need of its citiHens for ph%sical protection$

olicing citiHens too, is *ecoming a matter for international cooperation and collecti"e decision1ma.ing through *odies such as Interpol: no nat!on state !n !solat!on !s now capa#le of deal!ng #ith drug smuggling& mone% laundering, terrorism, or international fraud$ Our const!tut!onal s)stem,and t"e c!t!8ens w!t"!n !t,are not "ermet!call) sealed off from t"e rest of t"e world& There are two ma!n forms of !nternat!onal law: customar) !nternat!onal law and treat!es&

Internat!onal law =: Customar% international la# Shaheed (atima:1 (us cogen) a must for every state instead of single nation +$-J Customar) !nternat!onal law 9$$$; has t#o constituent elements: o the actuall) w!despread and cons!stent conduct of states /7state pract!ce70 and o the #el!ef t"at suc" conduct !s re*u!red *ecause a rule of law renders !t o#l!gator) /7op!n!o 6ur!s70$ +$-8 To constitute state practice for the purpose of creating a rule of customar% international la#, the rule must "ave endured over t!me and ac"!eved a w!de level of cons!stenc) and acceptance& There is no specific time limit for #hich the practice must e<ist *efore it can *e ele"ated into a rule of customar% international la#$

Instead, this #ill depend on, for e<ample, the su*!ect matter of the rule, the nature of the state practice and the e<tent of its o*ser"ance$ 9$$$ ; +$-> Op!n!o 6ur!s is the *elief, *% states, that the relevant conduct !s re*u!red #ecause a rule of law renders !t o#l!gator)& +$-F 5ithin rules of customar% international la#, certa!n pr!nc!ples "ave t"e status of (us cogens Aus cogens. or peremptor) norms of customar) !nternat!onal law, are principles of an ac-nowledged super!or!t): those #hich refer to the o*ligations of a state to the !nternat!onal commun!t) !n general, rather than one to a group of states, also .no#n as o*ligations erga omnes$ E<amples of !us cogens include the pro"!#!t!on of genoc!de , the pro"!#!t!on of torture and t"e r!g"t to self4determ!nat!on&

7efore a rule can *ecome a peremptor% norm it must *e esta*lished as a principle of international la# and also accepted as part of 6us cogens&

Customar% international la# ma% incorporated into domestic court directl% #ithout the Act of arliament *% principle 'modernise the old principle6 9if other#ise, domestic la# #ill *ecome outdate;, ho#e"er, Act of arliament can o"erruled it Customar) !nternat!onal law !s a source of Engl!s" common law and ma%*e relied on in the UK courts$ Evel)n Ell!s: -$-IJ The remaining part of international la#, Ccustomar% international la#C, deri"es li.e the common la# from long usage and !udicial decisions$ There has *een, and still is, some de*ate a*out the precise #a% in #hich such customar% international la# influences the content of English la#$

1st view" incorporated directly The or!g!nal v!ew #as that customar) !nternat!onal law #as automat!call) !ncorporated !nto Engl!s" law$ This t"eor) owed muc" to t"e not!on of 7natural law7 #hich #as considered in medie"al times to #e t"e ult!mate source of #ot" t"e common law and t"e law govern!ng relat!ons *et#een one so"ereign and another& each #as a manifestation in its o#n sphere of the la# of nature$

2nd view" wait for #arliament, but will become outdate 3owever, dur!ng t"e =Dt" and ;<t" centur!es, this approach ga"e #a% to a more reluctant adm!ss!on of customar) !nternat!onal law *% the English courts$ International la# #as *% that date regarded as re*u!r!ng transformat!on !nto Engl!s" law, #hich meant that !t re*u!red an act of pos!t!ve acceptance #) t"e courts or #) (arl!ament$ Lord At.in encapsulated this "ie# in Chung Chi Cheung " R 9-=J=;: o C9S;o far, at an% rate, as the Courts of this countr% are concerned, !nternat!onal law "as no val!d!t) e/cept !n so far as !ts pr!nc!ples are accepted and adopted #) our own domest!c law& o T"ere !s no e/ternal power t"at !mposes !ts rules upon

our own code of su*stanti"e la# or procedure$ o The Courts ac-nowledge t"e e/!stence of a #od) of rules #hich nat!ons accept amongst t"emselves$ o )n an% !udicial issue the% see. to ascertain #hat the rele"ant rule is, and, ha"ing found it, t"e) w!ll treat !t as !ncorporated !nto t"e domest!c law, so far as !t !s cons!stent w!t" rules enacted #) statutes or f!nall) declared #) t"e!r tr!#unals$C -$-I8 The pro#lem presented #) t"!s second v!ew is that, !f followed slav!s"l), !t could em#ed !n Engl!s" law an outdated vers!on of an !nternat!onal rule$

$odern view% &$odernise the old principle' to update the customary international law without Act of #arliament The approach therefore ta.en toda% appears to *e that adopted *% the ma!orit% of the Court of Appeal in Trendte< Trading " 7an. of Nigeria, namel% to ac.no#ledge that the rules of customar) !nternat!onal law c"ange w!t" t"e t!mes and that it is the modern man!festat!on of an old rule #hich is to #e appl!ed #) t"e courts$ In the #ords of Lord Benning 4R: o CSeeing that the rules of international la# ha"e changedA and do changeAand that t"e courts "ave g!ven effect to t"e c"anges w!t"out an) Act of (arl!ament, it follo#s to m% mind !ne/ora#l) t"at t"e rules of !nternat!onal law. as e/!st!ng from t!me to t!me. do form part of our Engl!s" law&7

Act of #arliament can overruled it however -$-I> 5hate"er the mechanism *% #hich international la#, #hether customar% or treat%1 *ased, f!nds !ts wa) !nto t"e su#stant!ve content of Engl!s" law, as Lord At-!n po!nted out !t !s certa!n t"at !t can alwa)s #e ousted #) an Act of (arl!ament&

Internat!onal law ;: Treaties Aames Crawford?4 agreement under international law cover wide range of area A treat) !s an agreement under !nternat!onal law, usuall% *et#een states *ut also *et#een other su*!ects of international la#, in particularl% international organiHations$ There is no specific re3uirements of form, though the Nienna Con"ention on the la# of Treaties of -=F=A the accepted statement of the la#Asa%s that a treat% should *e in #riting$ E<changes of notes ma% constitute a treat% and the name of the document is not decisi"e$ 3ow part!es conclude treat!es !s also left for t"em to agree$ Treat!es ma% *e *inding on signature or prov!de for su#se*uent rat!f!cat!on$

It is normal for multinational treaties to re3uire ratification or, for non1 signatories, accession$ 9$$$ ; Treat!es address a vast range of top!cs, from *ilateral interstate relations to the regulation of the world pol!t!cal and econom!c order$ 4ost su*!ects of international concern are no# regulated *% multilateral treat% and the num*er of multilateral treaties has increased correspondingl%$ The Consolidated Treat% Series contains some 8FF multilateral treaties from -KF8 to -=-=& the League of Nations Treat% Series and the United Nations Treat% Series include J,8F+ multilateral treaties in force$ 9$$$;

Sometimes the ma!or instruments are regional, as #ith economic integration agreements /the treaties co"ering the European Union, the North American (ree Trade Agreement, and so on0$ In the field of "uman r!g"ts muc" standard sett!ng !s done #) un!versal agreements, #ut the most important !mplement!ng mec"an!sms are reg!onal /Europe /-=>,0, the Americas /-=F=0, Africa /-=K-00$ ommentary% Note the use of the term %reg!onal & International la#%ers use the term to refer to parts of t"e world /such as Europe0& constitutional la#%ers use the term for parts of a nat!on state /such as 'nort"4east England 0$

UK as dualistic s%stem1 #ait for arliament to incorporated into domestic court Constitutional s%stems "ar% in terms of ho# the% recogniHe treaties$ 7roadl%, there are two poss!#le arrangements$ In monist systems, a treat% entered into !y the government of the state is self)executing in the national legal system and *ecomes a source of la# that ma% applied *% the national courts$ In %dual!st s)stems /such as the United Kingdom0, treat!es #ecome a source of law recogn!8ed #) t"e nat!onal courts onl) !f, and to the e<tent that, the% are e<pressl% !ncorporated !nto domest!c law #) nat!onal leg!slat!on& The const!tut!onal rat!onale for this is that the govt e/erc!s!ng t"e prerogat!ve power of s!gn!ng and rat!f)!ng treat!es. should not *e a#le to create laws t"at "ave not

#een agreed to #) t"e U$ (arl!ament$ Some treat!es are never !ncorporated /*ecause there is no need to create an% domestic la# to support their implementation0& and t"ere ma) also #e a gap !n t!me #etween t"e government rat!f)!ng a treat) and t"e U$ (arl!ament enact!ng leg!slat!on /for e<ample, the ECGR #as rat!f!ed !n =DG=, *ut #as not gi"en legal effect in national la# until )cto*er +,,,, #hen the 3uman +!g"t Act =DDC was #roug"t !nto force0$

Argument: there are other informal #a%s incorporated into domestic court, eg$ 'refer to it6 in the domestic statute Lord 5oolf et$ al: It !s wrong to t"!n- of !ncorporat!on as a s!ngle p"enomenon& a treat% ma% *e recei"ed into and gi"en effect in the la# of England and 5ales in more t"an one wa)& The most straightfor#ard situation is #here an Act of arliament is enacted to *ring a treat% into English la#, *ut e"en here there are "arious drafting techni3ues$ In some Acts, the te<t or part of the te<t, of a treat% has *een Mcopied outM& in others parliamentar% counsel ha"e used English statutor% language to gi"e general effect to the treat% /*ut #hich ma%, upon proper interpretation, confer rights that are narro#er or *roader than those contained in the treat%0$

T"ere are ot"er wa)s of *ringing a*out incorporationAincluding #hat ma% "ariousl% *e called M!nd!rectM or Lfor pract!cal purposesM or an Minformal modeM of incorporation$ Thus. s& ; of t"e As)lum and Imm!grat!on Act -==J pro"ides, under the heading M rimac% of the Con"entionM that MNot"!ng in the immigration rules 9made under the Immigration Act -=I-; shall la% do#n an% practice #hich would #e contrar) to t"e #onventionMAa reference to the Con"ention and rotocol relating to the Status of Refugees$

Continue: the interpretation method 9not so important; If a treat% has *een incorporated /*% #hate"er techni3ue0 into domestic la#, the 3uestion then is ho# should the courts approach the tas. of interpreting the treat%$ The language of treaties is often *roader and more open1te<tured than the precise #ording that is the earmar. of English statutor% drafting$ The Nienna Con"ention on the La# of Treaties -=F=, especiall% Arts J-1JJ, pro"ides the *asic guidelines$ ?enerall%, it can *e said that: ->- the start!ng po!nt is the language and structure of the te<t in 3uestion& words s"ould #e g!ven t"e natural and ord!nar) mean!ng, a"oiding o"er1sophisticated anal%sis and Mprolonged de*ate a*out the niceties of languageM& treaties ma% contain implied as #ell as e<press pro"isions&

#here a prov!s!on !s am#!guous, Mthe interpretation #hich is less onerous to t"e State ow!ng t"e Treat) o#l!gat!on !s to #e preferredM and regard ma% *e had to the tra"eau<preparatoires; good faith is re3uired in the interpretation and performance of a treat%& the pro"isions Mmust *e read together as part and parcel of the schemeM of the treat%& rele"ant reser"ations and derogations must *e considered& and, a*o"e all, a #road. purpos!ve !nterpretat!on !s re*u!red& The court must not lose sight of the fact that it is an international legal instrument that is *eing interpreted, and that its concepts ha"e a meaning that is autonomous of the particularities of a domestic legal s%stem$ Interpretations reached *% courts in other national s%stems is of persuasi"e authorit%& ine"ita*l%, ho#e"er, courts in different legal s%stems ma% reach interDpretations that are difficult to reconcile$

Unincorporated treaties ma% *e used to interpret the am*iguous #ord in statute 9not a clear, e<press ho#e"er; and pu*lic *od% *ound *% assurance Un!ncorporated treat!esAthose that ha"e not *een e<pressl% enacted into national legislationAare not ent!rel) !gnored #) t"e courts !n t"e Un!ted $!ngdom$ If a court !s !nterpret!ng an am#!guous word or concept in legislation and there is a treat%A #hether incorporated or unincorporatedAcover!ng t"e same area of pol!c), it #ill *e assumed t"at t"e leg!slat!on was !ntended #) (arl!ament to conform to t"e Un!ted $!ngdoms international la# o*ligations$ o e/ parte 5r!nd An un!ncorporated treat% ma% also create a ground of re"ie# called 'leg!t!mate e/pectat!on !n w"!c" a cla!mant ma) argue t"at a pu#l!c #od) 1"ere. a m!n!ster2 !s #ound #) an assurance /here, an% assurances set out in the unincorporated treat%0

o E/ parte A"med T3E CONSTITUITON AS A SNSTEM The preceding section focused on the constitution as pro"iding a rule*oo.$ 5e no# need to stand *ac. from the rule*oo. to see #hat patterns. trad!t!ons. and values can #e d!scerned e/pl!c!tl) or !mpl!c!tl)Afrom the rules$ The starting point for man% accounts of the U$ const!tut!on is the %'estm!nster model or '5estminster constitutionalism6$

5estminister 4odel1 ?o"t from G)C, arliament is suprement, and go"t accounta*le to arliament This refers to a set of arrangements in #hich: o The government of t"e countr) !s drawn from t"e 3ouse of Commons /so, not a presidential s%stem, as in man% other countries0& o the UK (arl!ament !s at t"e p!nnacle of t"e const!tut!onal s)stem, #ith unl!m!ted leg!slat!ve competence /so, no constitutional or supreme court #ith po#ers to stri.e do#n Acts of arliament0& and o there are effect!ve s)stems for ensur!ng t"at m!n!sters are pol!t!call) accounta#le to parl!ament *et#een elections$

=& T3E 'ESTMINSTE+ MODEL The follo#ing e/planat!on of t"e 'estm!nster s)stem was set out !n a government '"!te (aper on reform of the Gouse of Lords, issued *% the go"ernment during Ton% 7lairs6 premiership$ o ''"!te (aper is a document #ritten *% ci"il ser"ants in the name of a minister and formall) pu#l!s"ed as a LCommand (aper under t"e aut"or!t) of (arl!ament& t%picall% t"e) are used to set out pol!c) plans Oou #ill see that reference is made to 'the Crown : #e #ill e<amine the meaning of 'the Cro#n6 in more detail later, *ut here it is sufficient to note that, up to the se"enteenth centur%, in relation to e<ecuti"e functions, it generall% meant the .ing or 3ueen& in modern times, most powers of t"e Crown are e/erc!sed #) t"e (r!me M!n!ster and ot"er sen!or m!n!sters$

In relation to the ma.ing of Acts of arliament /the Cro#n in arliament0, the Cro#n6s role is to gi"e ro%al assent to 7ills passed *% arliament& this is done formall% in the name of the monarch$

The Gouse of Lord: Completing the Reform: arliament supreme in 5estminster 4odel T"e 3ouse of Lord? Complet!ng t"e +eform 9+,,-;: -J$ The Un!ted $!ngdom !s a (arl!amentar) democrac)& Sovere!gnt) rests w!t" t"e Crown !n (arl!ament& La# ma.ing rests #ith the tripartite so"ereignt% of Cro#n in *oth Gouses of arliament$ -8$ In practice, the powers of t"e t"ree parts are uneven&

1Gistor% po#er from Lord to Common The histor% of the de"elopment of our democrac% has *een the histor% of the gradual gro#th of the po#er of the Commons compared to the other t#o elements$ The Cro#n, or E<ecuti"e, has o"er the centuries *ecome increasingl% accounta*le to arliament for its e<ercise of its po#ers$ 5ithin arliament, power "as transferred from t"e Lords to t"e Commons& The Commons has from as far *ac. as the ->th centur% asserted t"e sole r!g"t to grant or w!t""old suppl) o In other #ords, to g!ve legal perm!ss!on to t"e government to spend mone) from funds collected t"roug" ta/at!on or *orro#ing$

1?o"t need mone% therefore arliament demand accounta*ilit% The changes to the pu*lic finances since the -Ith centur%, #ith the end of the practice of granting the %ield of certain ta<es for life, coupled #ith the !ncreas!ng need of t"e >overnment for mone) as t"e demands on it rose, ena#led t"e Commons to turn t"at r!g"t !nto a form!da#le weapon to demand accounta#!l!t)&

1Lord tr% to get the po#er *ac. #ill lead to reduction more po#er Since -FIK, #hen the Commons formall% resol"ed that Mall aids and supplies, and aids to Gis 4a!est% in arliament, are the sole gift of the CommonsM, the Lords "as rarel) even attempted to c"allenge t"at pos!t!on$ On t"e most famous occas!on w"en !t d!d so. !n =D<D. t"!s led d!rectl) to reduct!ons !n !ts powers&

4 Effecti"e democratic 4Representati"e of people form the Common, ma!orit% in Common form the go"t to carr% out manisfesto, and go"t accounta*le to common ->$ The *asis on #hich the Commons asserted its right #as al#a%s its position as the representat!ve #od) of t"e people, e"en in the da%s #hen the people #ho elected it comprised a small minorit% of e"en the adult male population$ 7eginning #ith the -KJ+ Reform Act, the gradual e<tension of the franchise increased the authorit% of the Commons$ It !s now elected on a un!versal franc"!se and ena*les the people to gi"e a clear and une3ui"ocal ans#er to the 3uestion M5hom do %ou choose to go"ern %ouEM The UKCs political s%stem is *uilt around that principle$

-F$ The 3ouse of Commons has thus long since *een esta*lished as the pre4em!nent const!tut!onal aut"or!t) w!t"!n t"e U$$ The >overnment !s formed #) t"e (art) w"!c" can command t"e support of the Gouse of Commons$ A ?o"ernment #hich loses t"e support of the peopleCs elected representati"es !n t"e Commons cannot rema!n !n off!ce& ?eneral Elections return indi"idual 4 s #ho are e<pected to loo. to the interests of their constituents irrespecti"e of art% affiliation ,$ The% are also contests *et#een political parties "%ing for supremac% in the Gouse of Commons$

The (art) w"!c" secures a ma6or!t) has the right to form a >overnment and, su*!ect to sustaining its arliamentar% ma!orit%, to carr) t"roug" t"e programme set out !n !ts elect!on Man!festo$ M!n!sters are cont!nuousl) accounta#le to t"e 3ouse of Commons through de*ates and "otes& a process formalised and fortified *% the role of the non1 ?o"ernment arties in forming an )pposition, #ith the largest non1 ?o"ernment art% occup%ing the position of )fficial )pposition$ ?o"erned largel% *% con"ention, 7ritainCs constitutional practice is fle<i*le enough to accommodate alternati"e arrangements, including coalition ?o"ernments formed *% the ma!or political parties& *ut these ha"e occurred onl% in e<ceptional circumstances /including the t#o 5orld 5ars0, and e"en then the Gouse of Commons has continued to perform its functions of legitimising the ?o"ernment, enacting legislation and holding 4inisters to account$

-I$ This constitutional frame#or., founded on the pre1eminence of the Gouse of Commons, has prov!ded 5r!ta!n w!t" effect!ve democrat!c >overnment and accounta#!l!t) for more t"an a centur), and fe# #ould #ish to change it$ 9$$$ ;

Accounta*ilit% *% go"t A .e% principle in the 5estminster model is the idea and practice of 'accounta*ilit%6$ 5e return to e<plore this in Chapter I and for no# the follo#ing e<planation #ill suffice$

(ailure in accounta*ilit% lead to sanction Andrew Le Sueur: Accounta#!l!t) is a principle #hich re3uires pu#l!c aut"or!t!es to e/pla!n t"e!r act!ons and *e su#6ect to scrut!n)& It ma% also enta!l sanct!ons. suc" as res!gnat!on from off!ce or censure$ Effecti"e accounta*ilit% depends on a comm!tment to open government and r!g"ts to freedom of !nformat!on& The news med!a and pressure groups also pla% "ital roles in ensur!ng t"at accounta#!l!t) !s ac"!eved&

4 Election ma.e periodic accounta*le onl%, period *t# election need de*ate, selecti"e committee to ensure accounta*ilit% In a democrac%, the ult!mate form of pu*lic accounta*ilit% is t"roug" elect!ons$ In the UK, for e<ample, 4 s sit in the Gouse of Commons and councillors ser"e on local authorities$ Go#e"er, elect!ons can onl) prov!de per!od!c and part!al opportun!t!es for calling those in po#er to account *ecause muc" pu#l!c sector act!v!t) !s carr!ed out #) unelected off!c!als and appo!ntees& (ol!t!cal accounta#!l!t) #etween elect!ons !s t"erefore !mportant$ In s%stems of parliamentar% go"ernment, m!n!sters are mem*ers of parliament and "old off!ce !nd!v!duall) and collect!vel) for onl) so long as t"e) en6o) t"e

conf!dence of their fello# mem*ers of the legislature$

M!n!sters are "eld to account on a da)4to4da) *asis t"roug" parl!amentar) *uest!ons /#ritten and oral0, in de#ates on the floor of the cham*ers of parliament, and through the #or. of polic% scrut!n) comm!ttees /called 7select comm!ttees7 in the UK arliament0$

4 Independence Court can ensure accounta*ilit% *% !udicial re"ie# Courts too ma) #e regarded as mec"an!sms for secur!ng accounta#!l!t)$ Indi"iduals, groups and *usinesses ma% use 6ud!c!al rev!ew procedures to c"allenge t"e lawfulness of act!on ta-en #) pu#l!c aut"or!t!es$ Especiall% #here human rights are at sta.e, there is a gro#ing Cculture of !ustificationC in #hich go"ernment must present cogent e<planations for its actions to the courts$ Oet, 3uis custodiet ipsos custodesE A7w"o w!ll watc" t"e watc"menI7

It is sometimes said that the principle of 6ud!c!al !ndependence prevents 6udges from #e!ng "eld to account for t"e!r dec!s!ons$ Certa!nl) !t would #e const!tut!onall) wrong for government to !mpose sanct!ons on courts w"!c" made pol!t!call) unpalata#le dec!s!ons$ (owever, 6udges and courts are su#6ect to accounta#!l!t) !nsofar as t"e) must e/pla!n and 6ust!f) t"e!r dec!s!ons /for e<ample, *% gi"ing reasoned !udgments in pu*lic0$ 9$,$ ;

Accounta#le mec"an!sm def!c!t: reduce pu*lic confidence, su*!ect to international institution and pri"atiHation ma.e less accounta*le Some commentators complain that the Caccounta*ilit% re"olutionC has gone too far$ Rather than promoting the legitimac% of pu*lic institutions, !t now r!s-s underm!n!ng pu#l!c conf!dence !n t"em& )thers e<press different concerns, for e<ample, that changes in the #a% #e are go"erned has created an accounta#!l!t) def!c!t& >lo#al!8at!on "as s"!fted dec!s!on4ma-!ng !n some sp"eres to !nternat!onal !nst!tut!onsAsuch as the European Union, 5orld Trade )rganisation, and the United Nations$

(r!vat!8at!on "as resulted !n some pu#l!c funct!ons #e!ng carr!ed out #) non4governmental #od!es /including *usinesses and charities0$ )n *oth these conte<ts, it is open to *uest!on w"et"er ade*uate accounta#!l!t) arrangements ha"e *een esta*lished$

;& (+O5LEMS 'IT3 T3E 'ESTMINSTE+ MODEL Man) const!tut!onal sc"olars, commentators, and acti"e participants #ould d!sm!ss an account of t"e const!tut!on #ased on t"e 'estm!nster model in the terms set out in the 5hite aper The Gouse of Lords: Completing the Reform, on pp$ +I1K$ as a fiction /not. as t"e government presuma#l) !ntended. a factual account0$ T"ere are certa!nl) grounds for cr!t!c!8!ng t"e 'estm!nster model as a real!st!c e/planat!on of ho# the modern 7ritish constitution operates in practice$

?o"ernment control of the Gouse of Commons (irst, the 5estminster model presents a picture of the go"ernment *eing held in chec. *% arliament$ The realit% is more t"at (arl!ament 1espec!all) t"e 3ouse of Commons2 !s controlled #) t"e government, not the other #a% around$ E)cept for the occasional private members *ill, the government "as e/clus!ve use of t"e leg!slat!ve procedures to steer t"roug" t"e leg!slat!on t"at !t "as drafted$ The government controls t"e agenda and t!meta#le follo#ed *% the Gouse of Commons, #ith !nade*uate opportun!t!es for M(s outs!de government to !n!t!ate de#ates and call m!n!sters to account& It is 3uestiona*le ho# #ell the procedures for as.ing ministers 3uestions #or.$

Strong rime 4inister ma.e up his@her o#n go"t instead of Ca*inet one eering inside go"ernment, it is also possi*le to detect changes in the role of t"e (r!me M!n!ster and t"e Ca#!net /the committee of t#ent% or so senior ministers selected *% the rime 4inister to gi"e political leadership to go"ernment departments0$ The e<periences of go"ernment during the tenure of Margaret T"atc"er /-=I=1=,0 and Ton) 5la!r /-==I1+,,I0 are interpreted *% man) commentators as per!ods of pr!me m!n!ster!al. rat"er t"an collect!ve Ca#!net government$ *ohn Ma(or /-==,1=I0 and "ordon +ro%n /+,,I1+,-,0 are often seen as administrations in #hich the Ca#!net "ad more !nfluence over government dec!s!onma-!ng$ The Conservat!ve4L!#eral Democrat coal!t!on government formed after the +,-, election has

re*u!red a more colla#orat!ve approac" #) Dav!d Cameron& Lots of Belegated legislation as result of ad"ice of ci"il ser"ant instead of arliament #hich also less scrutiniHed *% arliament As #e shall see in Chapter --, the vast #ul- of leg!slat!on !s now made !n t"e form of delegated leg!slat!on #) m!n!sters /on the ad"ice of ci"il ser"ants0 rather than *% Acts of arliament$ The role of t"e U$ (arl!ament !n scrut!n!8!ng t"e ma-!ng of delegated leg!slat!on !s far more l!m!ted than it is in relation to primar% legislation, calling into 3uestion the idea that elected representati"es are the heart of the legislati"e process$

4ultile"el go"erning: European integration and de"olution1 5estminster arliament no longer the sole legislator and e<ecutor Another challenge to the idea of the 5estminster model is multile"el go"erning$ In recent decades, t"e U$ (arl!ament and t"e U$ government "ave ceased to #e t"e sole leg!slat!ve and e/ecut!ve #od)& In -=IJ, the United Kingdom #ecame a mem#er of t"e European Econom!c Commun!t) 1EEC0, #hich, in the ensuing %ears, has transmogrified into the European Union$ Dec!s!on4ma-!ng. leg!slat!on. and court rul!ngs in man% fields of polic% are now strongl) !nfluenced #) EU law&

5ithin the United Kingdom, in -==K, a programme of decentral!8!ng e/ecut!ve and leg!slat!ve powers to new !nst!tut!ons !n Scotland. 'ales. and Nort"ern Ireland #as started$ As has often *een remar.ed, devolut!on !s a process not an e"ent and there ha"e *een almost constant de*ates a*out the transfer of greater powers to t"e government s)stems !n t"ese t"ree parts of t"e Un!ted $!ngdom$ Against this *ac.ground, t"e 'estm!nster model can no longer prov!de a sat!sfactor!l) compre"ens!ve account of t"e ma!n features of t"e modern 5r!t!s" const!tut!onal set4up&

:udges has the po#er from EC: and ECtGR and also inherent po#er to re"ie# the go"t decisions A further de"elopment that calls into 3uestion the traditional account of the 5estminster model is the dramat!c r!se of t"e powers of 6udges !n t"e const!tut!onal s)stem$ As a result of European integration, !udges in t#o international courtsA the European Court of 3uman +!g"ts /*ased in Stras*ourg, (rance0 and the Court of Aust!ce of t"e European Un!on /*ased in Lu<em*ourg0Aha"e !nfluence over t"e development of pu#l!c pol!c) !n t"ose f!elds of law over w"!c" t"e) "ave 6ur!sd!ct!on$ The Guman Rights Act -==K and the European Communities Act -=I+ re*u!re domest!c courts to looto t"e case law of t"e two European courts&

Lea"ing the influence of the t#o *ranches ofEuropean la# to one side, 5r!t!s" 6udges "ave. in the past 8, %ears, used t"e!r powers to develop t"e common law to create a modern s)stem of 6ud!c!al rev!ew of e/ecut!ve action and delegated legislation$

An institutional crisis1 pu*lic lose confidence A final difficult% for the 5estminster model is the cr!s!s of pu#l!c conf!dence t"at "as enveloped t"e U$ (arl!ament$ Turnouts of voters at elect!ons "ave decl!ned and there are ver) low levels of trust !n pol!t!c!ans& This came to a head during +,,=, after re"elations in the ne#s media a*out the e/penses t"at M(s and peers were cla!m!ng$ Some cla!ms were d!s"onest and *ro.e the criminal la#& some #ere clearl% contrar% to the rules in place at the time& others #ere e/cess!ve or unnecessar)$ 7% international standards, this #as not ma!or corruption$ Nonetheless, a ;<<D IpsosKMor! op!n!on poll found t"at E= per cent of t"e pu#l!c were

d!ssat!sf!ed w!t" "ow (arl!ament was do!ng !ts 6o#$ After much feet1dragging, and then an unseeml% rush, the (arl!amentar) Standards Act ;<<D was enacted to create an !ndependent #od) to deal w!t" future e/penses cla!ms #) M(sAa ma6or const!tut!onal !nnovat!on *ecause, until that time, !t "ad #een regarded as !mportant t"at t"e U$ (arl!ament s"ould #e self4 regulat!ng& (urther, in 4a% +,,=, the 3ouse of Lords too- act!on. unprecedented !n modern t!mes. to suspend two peers from mem#ers"!p for s!/ mont"s after the% #ere found to "ave offered to use t"e!r !nfluence !n return for f!nanc!al pa)ment& Against this *ac.ground, the !dea of plac!ng t"e U$ (arl!ament at t"e centre of t"e const!tut!on ma) not #e as attract!ve as !t was !n t"e past&

@& '3AT IS T3E FUTU+E OF T3E 'ESTMINSTE+ MODELI If it is true to sa% that the old 5estminster model of t"e 5r!t!s" const!tut!on !s !ll. d)!ng. or dead, #hat should *e doneE The ans#er is contro"ersial, and politicians, commentators, and scholars disagree$ In this section, #e outline fi"e sets of proposals that ha"e, in recent times, *een placed on t"e pol!t!cal agenda, aimed at: o attempting to rein"igorate the 5estminster s%stem& o creating opportunities for people to participate more directl% in go"ernment decision1ma.ing& o em*racing a more legal constitution in #hich !udges #ould ha"e a greater role& o the disintegration of the United Kingdom as a single nation state& and o disengagement from the processes of European integration$

/i0 Rein"igorating the 5estminster s%stem (arl!ament s roles !nclude susta!n!ng t"e government and "old!ng t"e government to account& In recent %ears, there ha"e *een a ser!es of reforms of t"e wa)s !n w"!c" t"e wor- of t"e Commons !s organ!8ed /and to an e<tent, also the Lords0, designed to gi"e arliament more opportunities to call government to account$ These reforms include: o the creat!on of a %parallel c"am#er in 5estminster Gall to allow more t!me for de#ates on !ssues ra!sed #) select comm!ttees /#hich scrutiniHe the policies and performance of central go"ernment departments0&

o %top!cal de#ates on the floor of the Commons to ena#le M(s to call m!n!sters to account for matters of current concern& o reforms to the leg!slat!ve process, such as allow!ng comm!ttees of M(s to ta-e e/pert ev!dence on t"e su#6ect matter of 5!lls #e!ng scrut!n!8ed& o the government pu#l!s"!ng some 5!lls !n draft form some mont"s a"ead of the start of the formal start of the legislati"e process, to ena#le #etter consultat!on and scrut!n)0 o elect!on of c"a!rs of select comm!ttees #) secret #allot of all mem#ers /rather than *eing chosen *ehind closed doors *% 'the usual channels6Athe term used for the *usiness managers in the main political parties0&

o the creat!on of a 5ac-#enc" 5us!ness Comm!ttee in the Gouse of Commons to cons!der representat!ons from M(s on top!cs for de#ate !n t"e parl!amentar) t!me set as!de for non4government #us!ness& and o the Const!tut!onal +eform and >overnance Act ;<=< gi"es the UK arliament a more formal role in relation to scrut!n) of treat)4 ma-!ng& It remains to *e seen to #hat e/tent reform of t"e U$ (arl!ament can re#u!ld pu#l!c conf!dence !n t"e nat!onal pol!t!cal s)stem$

/ii0 ?reater emphasis on popular participationE A second de*ate o"er the future of the 7ritish constitution concerns #a%s in #hich the general pu#l!c could *e #etter engaged !n t"e process of govern!ng t"e countr)$ )ne of the themes in the La*our go"ernments :ul% +,,I ?reen aper "overnance of +ritain, pu*lished soon after ?ordon 7ro#n *ecame rime 4inister, #as the need to 'to in"igorate our democrac%, #ith people proud to part!c!pate !n dec!s!on4ma-!ng at ever) level $

4 CitiHens6 !uries discuss the communit% issue C!t!8ens 6ur!es were formed to d!scuss !ssues such as c"!ldren. cr!me. and commun!t!es. and t"e future of t"e Nat!onal 3ealt" Serv!ce$ ?ordon 7ro#n: The mem*ers of these !uries #ill *e c"osen !ndependentl)& articipants #ill *e gi"en facts and figures that are independentl% "erified, t"e) can loo- at real !ssues and solut!ons, !ust as a !ur% e<amines a case$ And #here these citiHens !uries are held the !ntent!on !s to #r!ng people toget"er to e/plore w"ere common ground e/!sts$

4 Localism Act +,--1 ena*le citiHen and local authorit% has greater influence o"er polic% The Coalition go"ernment formed in 4a% +,-, has also pursued policies aimed at empower!ng people and local commun!t!es to "ave greater !nfluence on pol!c)$ The slogans 'the 7ig Societ%6 and 'Localism> are used to encapsulate these initiati"es$ The Local!sm Act ;<== a!ms to renew local democrac)$ This is achie"ed *% conferring a 'general power of competence : no longer do local authorities ha"e to po!nt to a spec!f!c power !n an Act of (arl!ament aut"or!8!ng t"em to ta-e act!on& s$ - pro"ides that 'A local authorit% "as power to do an)t"!ng t"at !nd!v!duals generall) ma) do $

(art G of t"e ;<== Act, entitled 'Commun!t) empowerment creates a dut) to "old local referendums on council ta< increases if the Secretar% of State *elie"es the increase is e<cessi"e6$ Ele"en cities #ere re3uired to hold referendums on #hether there should *e directl% elected ma%ors /nine "oted 'No60 and in a separate initiati"e , since No"em*er +,-+ there are elected olice and Crime Commissioners #ith o"ersight duties o"er police consta*ularies in England and 5ales$

+oot of problems remain unsolved% o#er redistri*uted not from politician to the people In his +,,= *oo., The Ne# 7ritish Constitution, rofessor Hernon 5ogdanor places particular emphasis on the need for t"e pu#l!c to part!c!pate !n government& Ge argues that the c"anges !n t"e const!tut!on !n recent decadesA such as devolution, the (uman +ights Act 1,,-, and the .reedom of /nformation Act 2000A'"ave done l!ttle to counteract t"e w!despread d!senc"antment 9 : w!t" pol!t!cs that characteriHes modern 7ritain, as #ell as other ad"anced democracies6$ There are decl!n!ng turnouts at elect!onsAat local, national, and European le"els, espec!all) among )ounger peopleAcoupled #ith a stead) decl!ne !n mem#ers"!p of pol!t!cal part!es? 7ogdanor alleges that, some >, %ears ago, one in ele"en of the electorate *elonged to a political part%, #hereas no# it is one in eight%1eight$

Nernon 7ogdanor: The real achie"ement of constitutional reform is to ha"e redistri*uted po#er, #ut !t "as red!str!#uted power #etween el!tes. not #etween el!tes and t"e people& o It has redistri*uted po#er 7downwards7 to pol!t!c!ans in Edin*urgh, Cardiff, 7elfast and London, 7s!dewa)s7 to t"e l!fe peers in the Gouse of Lords and 7s!dewa)s7 to t"e 6udges interpreting the Guman Rights Act$ o The value of t"!s d!spersal of power s"ould not #e underest!mated& o It has made it eas!er for t"e power of government to #e made su#6ect to const!tut!onal control so that t#ent%1 first centur% 7ritain is muc" less of an elect!ve d!ctators"!p than it #as in the -=I,s #hen Lord Gailsham first produced his famous characterisation$

5ut constitutional reform "as not red!str!#uted power to t"e voter& It has not s"!fted power from t"e pol!t!c!ans to t"e people& That is the crucial #ea.ness in the constitutional reform programme, as it has so far *een implemented$ That is the central reason !t "as made so l!ttle !mpact on entrenc"ed att!tudes towards t"e pol!t!cal s)stem&

Solution -: open primar% election1 election contest for seat in Common1 part% cannot decide #ho is the candidate So #hat is 7ogdanor6s solutionE Ge #ants to see a ne# st%le of participati"e democrac% in #hich 't"e people are a#le #ot" to ma-e more dec!s!ons for t"emselves and also more effect!vel) control dec!s!ons made #) t"ose !n government 3e favours %open pr!mar) elect!ons , run *% political partiesAa step preced!ng t"e off!c!al elect!on contest for seats !n t"e 3ouse of Commons and ot"er elected #od!es$ Such a process #ould move dec!s!ons on cand!dates awa) from t"e pol!t!cal part) !n *uest!on /often, in realit%, a small committee of died1in1 the1#ool acti"ists0 to !nclude !nterested mem#ers of t"e general pu#l!c$

Solution +: Referendum1 mo"e legislati"e po#er to the people 5ogdanor? A further proposal is greater use of referendums So far its use has *een strictl% limited to those 3uestions defined as CconstitutionalC *% go"ernments, #hich ha"e often used it as a tactical #eapon$ A referendum in 7ritain remains a #eapon under the control of the political class, not, as in countries #ith codified constitutions, an instrument #hose use is determined *% the constitution$ 5ut t"e referendum can. !n pr!nc!ple. )!eld leg!slat!ve power to t"e people&

7)P -$- RE(ERENBU4CS GELB IN TGE UNITEB KIN?B)4 +,-- /5hole UK0 'At present, the UK uses the Qfirst past the postR s%stem to elect 4 s to the Gouse of Commons$ Should the Qalternati"e "oteR s%stem *e used insteadE /FK per cent "oted 'no60$

The European Un!on Act ;<== creates a re*u!rement for a referendum to *e held in the United $!ngdom !f t"e governments of EU mem#er states dec!de to amend or replace t"e #as!c treat) framewor- of t"e European Un!on$

Argument: Simplif% the comple< political issue, easil% to *e manipulated *% po#erful campaign D!rect democrac) !s not w!t"out !ts draw#ac-s , as the La*our go"ernment recogniHed in the follo#ing e<tract$ M!n!str) of Aust!ce? Birect democrac%, at the national le"el, in #hich the pu#l!c ma-es t"e dec!s!on rat"er t"an t"e!r elected representat!ve has some ad"antages, #ut !t !s not a panacea$ It can reduce comple/ nat!onal pol!c) dec!s!ons to s!mple c"o!ces #hich can result in ser!ous pu#l!c pol!c) pro*lems in the future$ National direct democrac% can #e vulnera#le to #e!ng man!pulated #) t"e wealt") and t"e powerful w"o can dom!nate s!ngle4!ssue campa!gns more easily than comple< la%ers of political acti"it% that characterise the operation of parliamentary democracy0

A #alance must #e struc- *et#een increasing the pu!lic,s participation in decision1ma.ing and maintaining the "overnment,s accounta!ility for its actions to the people, their representati"es in arliament and their #ill e<pressed in elections$

/iii0 A more legal constitutionE A different .ind of response to the failures of the 5estminster model !s to argue for a greater role for law. legal processes, and the 6ud!c!ar) !n t"e const!tut!on$ This #ould *uild on de"elopments that ha"e alread) occurred #ith the r!se of 6ud!c!al rev!ew, the 3uman +!g"ts Act =DDC, and the courts role in relation to enforc!ng EU law$ It is certainl% eas% to find e<amples of cases in #hich the courts ha"e had a ma!or impact of choices made *% politicians o ;<<F The Gouse of Lords held that the scheme for detention #ithout trial under the Anti1 terrorism, Crime and Securit% Act +,,- of foreign nationals #ho #ere suspected of in"ol"ement in terrorism, #ut w"o could not #e removed to t"e!r "ome countr!es. was !ncompat!#le w!t" t"e EC3+$

o M!n!sters responded #) #r!ng!ng forward a new sc"eme of %control orders , #hich, in turn, #as su#6ected to 6ud!c!al scrut!n) and t"e !mpos!t!on of procedural standards that ministers considered seriousl% undermined the scheme$

Argument: 4ore legalised1 end of democrac% In the follo#ing e<tract, Sir Christopher (oster, a former ad"iser to *oth La*our and Conser"ati"e go"ernments, s-etc"es out w"at t"!s m!g"t enta!l /ma.ing clear in his *oo. that he "ie#s this as an unattracti"e #a% for#ard0: 7% a more legal constitution i mean one #here some const!tut!onal convent!ons are replaced #) laws Aas #ell as some poor const!tut!onal laws #) #etter laws Aso that our constitutional arrangements are clearer and, #hen necessar%, legall) enforcea#le& 7roadl% there are two var!ants$ The more pragmat!c argument is that more la# is needed to sort out part!cular muddles and s"ortcom!ngs$ 9$$$ ; A more e/treme pos!t!on 9$$$ ; is *ased on such disillusionment #ith the present pol!t!cal s%stem

thatAcertainl% in its more thorough going formsAit #ants it largel) replaced #) legal process& In its less e<treme forms, it foresees a future in #hich e/tended "uman r!g"ts leg!slat!on and the courts would transform our pol!t!cal s)stem& 7ut it #ould *e the end of democrac) and, if reall% prefera*le, a tremendous indictment of our a*ilit% to reconstruct our political s%stem to accepta*le standards$

Legalised future1 4inister .eep ma.ing la#, Court ensure its compati*ilit% 9Sir Christopher goes on to speculate a*out the future$; The m!n!ster7s law4ma-!ng role then might #ecome t"at t"e) "ave t"e !deas w"!c" germ!nate !nto law$ As the recipients of grie"ances, concerns and polic% ideas from a mass of sources, t"e!r 6o# !s t"en some"ow to outl!ne new pol!c!es and !ntroduce new #!lls, #hich ma) well cont!nue confused and ot"erw!se #ad& Thereafter 6udges -noc- t"em !nto s"ape, ma-!ng t"em compl!ant w!t" prev!ous law and pre1 determined norms or CrightsC$ 9$$$ ;

Some of #hat permeates the thin.ing of la#%ersA3uite the most energetic #e ha"eA a*out our constitution future sees that as that of a participator% democrac%, in #hich arliament slides into the shado#s, and #here pu#l!c op!n!on !s consulted !n surve)s and focus groups #efore #e!ng reflected !n new laws. #hich are t"en tested #) t"e courts to ensure t"at t"e) are cons!stent w!t" ot"er law and do not !nfr!nge r!g"ts$ If t"e) are !ncons!stent or infringe primar% rights, then the courts ad6ust t"em accord!ngl)$ 5e return in Chapter + to the idea that there is a shift from a political, or 5estminster model, constitution to a more legal one in the conte<t of de*ates a*out the future of parliamentar% supremac% and the rule of la#$

/i"0 The disintegration of the United Kingdom coming in the future (ol!t!cal part!es e/!st !n t"e t"ree smaller parts of the United Kingdom A o Scotland /the Scottish National art%0, o 5ales / laid C%mru0, and o Northern Ireland /Sinn (ein0 T"e pol!c!es of w"!c" !nclude !ndependence or, in the case of Nort"ern Ireland. reun!f!cat!on w!t" t"e +epu#l!c of Ireland& Buring the first decade of the t#ent%1 first centur%, m!n!sters from t"e separat!st part!es were mem#ers of t"e devolved governments in all three parts of the United Kingdom$ T"e Scott!s" >overnment !s propos!ng a referendum on !ndependence !n ;<=F$

/"0 7ritain out of EuropeE1 seemed to *e not so soon Another response to the changing nature of the 5estminster model is campaigns for the Un!ted $!ngdoms part!c!pat!on !n t"e processes of European !ntegrat!on to end& In recent %ears, the United Kingdom Independence art% /U$I(2 "as won some support !n elect!ons. #ecom!ng t"e second largest part) !n t"e ;<<D U$ elect!ons for t"e European (arl!ament& In the past, important steps to#ards further integration #ere ta.en *% Conser"ati"e go"ernmentsA rime 4inister Ed#ard Geath signed the treat% *% #hich the United Kingdom *ecame a mem*er state of the then EEC in -=I+ and rime 4inister :ohn 4a!or signed the 4aastricht Treat%, #hich created the European Union$

The current Conservat!ve (art) leadership has adopted ant!4 !ntegrat!on!st pos!t!ons #ut rema!ns comm!tted to t"e Un!ted $!ngdom rema!n!ng a mem#er state&

CONCLUDIN> COMMENTS As a first step, this chapter has introduced the U$ const!tut!on from t"e perspect!ves of a rule#oo- and a s)stem of govern!ng$ 5e sa# that the United Kingdom has #hat ma% *e called an uncod!f!ed or %d!spersed rule#oo-: most rules are #ritten do#n, *ut not in a single document #ith legal authorit%$ o 5e #ill return in Chapter -= to consider the ad"antages and disad"antages of adopting a codified constitution$ The chapter mo"ed on to cons!der t"e 'estm!nster model and ho# this has pro"ided the dominant e<planation of ho# the #hole s%stem meshes together, *ut points out that this model now faces several c"allenges&

The remaining chapters in art I e<amine in more detail some of the functions of and principles underpinning the constitutional s%stem: parliamentar% supremac% /Chapter +0, the rule of la# /Chapter J0, separating and *alancing po#ers /Chapter 80, multile"el go"erning /Chapter >0 and protecting rights /Chapter F0$