You are on page 1of 37

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS CASES: 1. 2. 3. Phil. Educ. Co., Inc. vs. Soriano, 39 SCRA 587; Tibajia, Jr. vs.

CA, 223 SCRA 163; Philippine Airlines vs. CA, 181 SCRA 557

construction given in the United States to their own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice. The weight of authority in the United Status is that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments, the reason behind this rule being that, in establishing and operating a postal money order system, the government is not engaging in commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for the public benefit. Some of the restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws and regulations usually provide for not more than one endorsement; payment of money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances. Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals [GR 49188, 30 January 1990] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 3 dissent in separate opinions where 4 joined Facts: On 8 November 1967, Amelia Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 71307). After trial, the CFI of Manila, Branch 13, then presided over by the late Judge Jesus P. Morfe rendered judgment on 29 June 1972, in favor of Tan, ordering Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to pay Tan the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damages, with legal interest thereon from Tan's extra-judicial demand made by the letter of 20 July 1967; P18,200.00, representing the unrealized profit of 10% included in the contract price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from 20 July 1967; P20,000.00 as and for moral damages, with legal interest thereon from 20 July 1967; P5,000.00 damages as and for attorney's fee; with costs against PAL. On 28 July 1972, PAL filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR 51079-R). On 3 February 1977, the appellate court rendered its decision, affirming but modifying the CFI's decision, ordering PAL to pay the sum of P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee. Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals to the trial court and on dates subsequent thereto, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Tan, duly opposed by PAL. On 23 May 1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution denying Tan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the judgment became final and executory and on 31 May 1977, judgment was correspondingly entered in the case. The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and on 2 September 1977, Tan filed a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. On 11 October 1977, the trial court, presided over by Judge Ricardo D. Galano, issued its order of execution with the corresponding writ in favor of Tan. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of Branch 13 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for enforcement. 4 months later, on 11 February 1978, Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied. On 1 March 1978, PAL filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to Tan through the deputy sheriff of the court, Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said Emilio Z. Reyes. On 3 March 1978, the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature, ordering the executing sheriff Reyes to appear with his return and explain the reason for his failure to surrender the amounts paid to him by PAL. However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff Reyes who had absconded or disappeared. On 28 March 1978, motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was filed by Tan. On 19 April 1978, Tan filed a motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution" with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution. On 1 May 1978, the Judge issued an order granting the motion, and issuing the alias writ of execution. On 18 May 1978, PAL received a copy of the first alias writ of execution issued on the same day directing Special Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario to levy on execution in the sum of P25,000.00 with legal interest thereon from 20 July 1967 when Tan made an extrajudicial demand through a letter. Levy was also ordered for the further sum of P5,000.00 awarded as attorney's fees. On 23 May 1978, PAL filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Reyes and that the judgment debt had already been fully satisfied by PAL as evidenced by the cash vouchers

Philippine Education Co. Inc. vs. Soriano [GR L-22405, 30 June 1971] Facts: On 18 April 1958 Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office 10 money orders of P200.00 each payable to E. P. Montinola with address at Lucena, Quezon. After the postal teller had made out money orders numbered 124685, 124687-124695, Montinola offered to pay for them with a private check. As private checks were not generally accepted in payment of money orders, the teller advised him to see the Chief of the Money Order Division, but instead of doing so, Montinola managed to leave the building with his own check and the 10 money orders without the knowledge of the teller. On the same date, 18 April 1958, upon discovery of the disappearance of the unpaid money orders, an urgent message was sent to all postmasters, and the following day notice was likewise served upon all banks. instructing them not to pay anyone of the money orders aforesaid if presented for payment. The Blank of America received a copy of said notice 3 days later. On 23 April 1958 one of the above mentioned money orders numbered 124688 was received by Philippine Education Co. as part of its sales receipts. The following day it deposited the same with the Bank of America, and one day thereafter the latter cleared it with the Bureau of Posts and received from the latter its face value of P200.00. On 27 September 1961, Mauricio A. Soriano, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office, acting for and in behalf of Post-master Enrico Palomar, notified the Bank of America that money order 124688 attached to his letter had been found to have been irregularly issued and that, in view thereof, the amount it represented had been deducted from the bank's clearing account. For its part, on August 2 of the same year, the Bank of America debited Philippine Education Co.'s account with the same amount and gave it advice thereof by means of a debit memo. On 12 October 1961 Philippine Education Co. requested the Postmaster General to reconsider the action taken by his office deducting the sum of P200.00 from the clearing account of the Bank of America, but his request was denied. So was Philippine Education Co.'s subsequent request that the matter be referred to the Secretary of Justice for advice. Thereafter, Philippine Education Co. elevated the matter to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, but the latter sustained the actions taken by the postal officers. In connection with the events set forth above, Montinola was charged with theft in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case 43866) but after trial he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. On 8 January 1962 Philippine Education Co. filed an action against Soriano, et al. in the Municipal Court of Manila. On 17 November 1962, after the parties had submitted the stipulation of facts, the municipal court rendered judgment, ordering Soriano, et al. to countermand the notice given to the Bank of America on 27 September 1961, deducting from said Bank's clearing account the sum of P200.00 representing the amount of postal money order 124688, or in the alternative, to indemnify Philippine Education Co. in the said sum of P200.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 8-1/2% per annum from 27 September 1961 until fully paid; without any pronouncement as to costs and attorney's fees." The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after the parties had resubmitted the same stipulation of facts, the appealed decision dismissing the complaints with costs, was rendered. Philippine Education Co. appealed. Issue: Whether the postal money order is a negotiable instrument. Held: Philippine postal statutes were patterned after similar statutes in force in the United States. For this reason, Philippine postal statutes are generally construed in accordance with the

1

signed and receipted by the server of the writ of execution, Deputy Sheriff Reyes. On 26 May 1978, Special Sheriff del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of PAL, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila, through its manager and garnished PAL's deposit in the said bank in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of 16 May 1978. PAL filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name operate to satisfy the judgment debt. Held: Under the initial judgment, Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by PAL. She filed her complaint in 1967. After 10 years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case. Almost 22 years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt. In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that "Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it." Further, Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides that "The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance." In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt. Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by consent of the obligee, a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of PAL's checks does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized. FORM AND INTERPRETATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS CASES: 1. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. CA, Feb. 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 169; 2. Caltex Phils. vs. CA, 212 SCRA 448 3. Ang Tek Lian vs. CA, 87 Phil. 383 4. PNB vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 170325, September 26, 2008 5. Philippine National Bank vs. Manila Oil Refining & By-Products Company, 43 Phil 44 6. Republic Planters Bank vs. CA, 216 SCRA 738; 7. Sps. Evangelista vs. Mercator Finance Corp., et al, August 21, 2003; 8. Ilano vs. Hon. Espanol, G.R. No. 161756, 16 December 2005

Facts: The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (MetroBank) is a commercial bank with branches throughout the Philippines and even abroad. Golden Savings and Loan Association was, at the time these events happened, operating in Calapan, Mindoro, with Lucia Castillo, Magno Castillo and Gloria Castillo as its principal officers. In January 1979, a certain Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited over a period of 2 months 38 treasury warrants with a total value of P1,755,228.37. They were all drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority and purportedly signed by its General Manager and counter-signed by its Auditor. 6 of these were directly payable to Gomez while the others appeared to have been indorsed by their respective payees, followed by Gomez as second indorser. On various dates between June 25 and July 16, 1979, all these warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings Account 2498 in the Metrobank branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were then sent for clearing by the branch office to the principal office of Metrobank, which forwarded them to the Bureau of Treasury for special clearing. More than 2 weeks after the deposits, Gloria Castillo went to the Calapan branch several times to ask whether the warrants had been cleared. She was told to wait. Accordingly, Gomez was meanwhile not allowed to withdraw from his account. Later, however, "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a "valued client," MetroBank says it finally decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the warrants. The first withdrawal was made on 9 July 1979, in the amount of P508,000.00, the second on 13 July 1979, in the amount of P310,000.00, and the third on 16 July 1979, in the amount of P150,000.00. The total withdrawal was P968,000.00. In turn, Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account, eventually collecting the total amount of P1,167,500.00 from the proceeds of the apparently cleared warrants. The last withdrawal was made on 16 July 1979. On 21 July 1979, Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury on 19 July 1979, and demanded the refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings in the Regional Trial Court of Mindoro. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Golden Savings, which, however, filed a motion for reconsideration even as Metrobank filed its notice of appeal. On 4 November 1986, the lower court modified its decision, by dismissing the complaint with costs against Metrobank; by issolving and lifting the writ of attachment of the properties of Golden Savings and Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo; directing Metrobank to reverse its action of debiting Savings Account 2498 of the sum of P1,754,089.00 and to reinstate and credit to such account such amount existing before the debit was made including the amount of P812,033.37 in favor of Golden Savings and thereafter, to allow Golden Savings to withdraw the amount outstanding thereon before the debit; by ordering Metrobank to pay Golden Savings attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P200,000.00; and by ordering Metrobank to pay the Spouses Magno Castillo and Lucia Castillo attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P100,000.00. On appeal to the appellate court, the decision was affirmed, prompting Metrobank to file the petition for review. Issue: Whether the treasury warrants in question are negotiable instruments. Held: Clearly stamped on the treasury warrants' face is the word "non-negotiable." Moreover, and this is of equal significance, it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, provides that "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: (a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer; (b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money; (c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time; (d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and (e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty." Section 3 (When promise is unconditional) thereof provides that "An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this Act though coupled with — (a) An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be debited with the amount; or (b) A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument. But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional." The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay "not

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals [GR 88866, 18 February 1991]

2

unconditional" and the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the exception on Section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is applicable in the present case. Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were "genuine and in all respects what they purport to be," in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The simple reason is that this law is not applicable to the non-negotiable treasury warrants. The indorsement was made by Gloria Castillo not for the purpose of guaranteeing the genuineness of the warrants but merely to deposit them with Metrobank for clearing. It was in fact Metrobank that made the guarantee when it stamped on the back of the warrants: "All prior indorsement and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Calapan Branch." Caltex (Philippines) vs CA 212 SCRA 448 August 10, 1992 Facts: On various dates, defendant, a commercial banking institution, through its Sucat Branch issued 280 certificates of time deposit (CTDs) in favor of one Angel dela Cruz who is tasked to deposit aggregate amounts. One time Mr. dela Cruz delivered the CTDs to Caltex Philippines in connection with his purchased of fuel products from the latter. However, Sometime in March 1982, he informed Mr. Timoteo Tiangco, the Sucat Branch Manger, that he lost all the certificates of time deposit in dispute. Mr. Tiangco advised said depositor to execute and submit a notarized Affidavit of Loss, as required by defendant bank's procedure, if he desired replacement of said lost CTDs. Angel dela Cruz negotiated and obtained a loan from defendant bank and executed a notarized Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit, which stated, among others, that he surrenders to defendant bank "full control of the indicated time deposits from and after date" of the assignment and further authorizes said bank to pre-terminate, set-off and "apply the said time deposits to the payment of whatever amount or amounts may be due" on the loan upon its maturity. In 1982, Mr. Aranas, Credit Manager of plaintiff Caltex (Phils.) Inc., went to the defendant bank's Sucat branch and presented for verification the CTDs declared lost by Angel dela Cruz alleging that the same were delivered to herein plaintiff "as security for purchases made with Caltex Philippines, Inc." by said depositor. Mr dela Cruz received a letter from the plaintiff formally informing of its possession of the CTDs in question and of its decision to pre-terminate the same. ccordingly, defendant bank rejected the plaintiff's demand and claim for payment of the value of the CTDs in a letter dated February 7, 1983. The loan of Angel dela Cruz with the defendant bank matured and fell due and on August 5, 1983, the latter set-off and applied the time deposits in question to the payment of the matured loan. However, the plaintiff filed the instant complaint, praying that defendant bank be ordered to pay it the aggregate value of the certificates of time deposit of P1,120,000.00 plus accrued interest and compounded interest therein at 16% per annum, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. On appeal, CA affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, and ruled (1) that the subject certificates of deposit are non-negotiable despite being clearly negotiable instruments; (2) that petitioner did not become a holder in due course of the said certificates of deposit; and (3) in disregarding the pertinent provisions of the Code of Commerce relating to lost instruments payable to bearer.

Issues: a) Whether certificates of time deposit (CTDs) are negotiable instruments? b) Is the depositor also the bearer of the document? c) Whether petitioner can rightfully recover on the CTDs? Held: The CTDs in question are not negotiable instruments. Section 1 Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, enumerates the requisites for an instrument to become negotiable, viz: (a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer; (b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money; (c) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time; (d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and (e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty. The accepted rule is that the negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the writing, that is, from the face of the instrument itself. In the construction of a bill or note, the intention of the parties is to control, if it can be legally ascertained. While the writing may be read in the light of surrounding circumstances in order to more perfectly understand the intent and meaning of the parties, yet as they have constituted the writing to be the only outward and visible expression of their meaning, no other words are to be added to it or substituted in its stead. The duty of the court in such case is to ascertain, not what the parties may have secretly intended as contradistinguished from what their words express, but what is the meaning of the words they have used. What the parties meant must be determined by what they said. Petitioner's insistence that the CTDs were negotiated to it begs the question. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof, and a holder may be the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. In the present case, however, there was no negotiation in the sense of a transfer of the legal title to the CTDs in favor of petitioner in which situation, for obvious reasons, mere delivery of the bearer CTDs would have sufficed. Here, the delivery thereof only as security for the purchases of Angel de la Cruz (and we even disregard the fact that the amount involved was not disclosed) could at the most constitute petitioner only as a holder for value by reason of his lien. Accordingly, a negotiation for such purpose cannot be effected by mere delivery of the instrument since, necessarily, the terms thereof and the subsequent disposition of such security, in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation, must be contractually provided for. Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-2516, 25 September 1950] Facts: Knowing he had no funds therefor, Ang Tek Lian drew on Saturday, 16 November 1946, a check upon the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of "cash". He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act. On 18 November 1946, the next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit of Ang Tek Lian on both dates being P335 only. Ang Tek Lian was charged and was convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict. Issue: Whether indorsement is necessary for the presentation of a bearer instrument for payment.

3

The fact that the singular pronoun is used indicates that the promise is individual as to each other." These entries were separated from the text of the notes with a bold line which ran horizontally across the pages. Consequently.00 with interest from 29 January 1981. The complainant was originally brought against WGMI inter alia. and hence the instrument is payable to bearer.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fee and the further sum equivalent to 3% per annum of the respective principal sums from the dates above stated as penalty charge until fully paid. Where an instrument containing the words "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more persons. for value received. — for instance. 4 .81 with interest at 12% per annum from 1 July 1981. need not have the holder identified. CORP. if the bank is not sure of the bearer's identity or financial solvency. But where the Bank is satisfied of the identity and/or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection.31 with interest from 29 January 1981. and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement.Held: Under Section 9(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. P40. persons who write their names on the face of promissory notes are makers and are liable as such. Under the Negotiable lnstruments Law.000. that the form of the check was totally unconnected with its dishonor. with costs against PMC. jointly and severally. Worldwide Garment Manufacturing. RPB appealed by a way of a petition for review on certiorari. but instead of WGMI. etc. Canlas is primarily liable as a co-maker of each of the notes and his liability is that of a solidary debtor. As to whether the interpolation of the phrase "and (in) his personal capacity" below the signatures of the makers in the notes will affect the liability of the makers. they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. The promissory motes are negotiable instruments and must be governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law. to which it is presented for payment. each of which were uniformly worded in the following manner: "___________. Herein. and P200. by the nine promissory notes with interest thereon. On 20 December 1982. jointly and severaIly promise to pay to the ORDER of the REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK. A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder.000.00 with interest from 27 November 1980.000. the sum of ___________ PESOS(. and not merely for his proportionate share. pay.91 with interest from 29 January 1981. when signed by two or more persons. It was returned unsatisfied because the drawer had insufficient funds — not because the drawer's indorsement was lacking. Republic Planters Bank issued nine promissory notes. Held [1]: Fermin Canlas is solidarily liable on each of the promissory notes bearing his signature. it will be protected in paying a bearer check. under another promissory note. A joint and several note is one in which the makers bind themselves both jointly and individually to the payee so that all may be sued together for its enforcement.00 with interest at 16% per annum from 27 November 1980 until fully paid. but it was later amended to drop WGMI as defendant and substitute PMC it its place.000. until fully paid. it is entirely reasonable for the bank to insist that the holder give satisfactory proof of his identity. “no matter what facts unknown to it may have occurred prior to the presentment. Inc.00 with interest from 29 January 1981 until fully paid. there is no denying that Canlas is one of the co-makers of the promissory notes. Canlas is solidarity liable with Yamaguchi on each of the nine notes. by the presence of the phrase "joint and several" as describing the unconditional promise to pay to the order of RPB.. The bank may therefore require. An instrument which begins" with "I" . at its office in Manila. a check drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not obtain any indorsement of the check. to pay the sum of P231. P281. a drawee bank to which a bearer check is presented for payment need not necessarily have the holder identified and ordinarily may not be charged with negligence in failing to do so. Issue [1]: Whether Fermin Canlas is solidarily liable on each of the promissory notes bearing his signature. Where a check is made payable to the order of “cash. that is." On the right bottom margin of the promissory notes appeared the signatures of Shozo Yamaguchi and Fermin Canlas above their printed names with the phrase "and (in) his personal capacity" typewritten below.We" . In three promissory notes. and "of WORLDWIDE GARMENT MFG. for its protection. and Canlas to pay. Inc. plus 1% of the principal sums as service charge. Inc. 21 December 1992] Facts: Shozo Yamaguchi and Fermin Canlas were President/Chief Operating Officer and Treasurer respectively. meaning that each of the co-signers is deemed to have made an independent singular promise to pay the notes in full. On 5 February 1982. but may pay it to the person presenting it without any indorsement. the same were in blank. Based on the above provisions of law.. or the creditor may select one or more as the object of the suit. P86.” Although a bank is entitled to pay the amount of a bearer check without further inquiry. At the bottom of the promissory notes appeared: "Please credit proceeds of this note to: "________ Savings Account ______XX Current". and conclusive. Philippines. Court of Appeals [GR 93073. RPB the sum of P367.000. without reason for ambiguity. a bank. one of several debtors bound in such wise that each is liable for the entire amount. it will pay the instrument without further question. the sum of P300. makes them solidarily liable.466. By making a joint and several promise to pay to the order of RPB. P166.. it is immaterial and will not affect to the liability of Canlas as a joint and several debtor of the notes.000.” the word “cash “does not purport to be the name of any person. By virtue of Board Resolution 1 dated 1 August 1979. "Account No. or "Either of us" promise to.130. Canlas assumed the solidary liability of a debtor and the payee may choose to enforce the notes against him alone or jointly with Yamaguchi and PMC as solidary debtors. On 20 June 1985. et al. By signing the notes.120.870.. jointly and severally. was apparently rubber stamped above the signatures of Yamaguchi and Canlas. (WGMI) noted to change its corporate name to Pinch Manufacturing Corporation (PMC).70 with interest from 27 November 1980. PMC and Yamaguchi were also ordered to pay jointly and severally. A joint and several obligation in common law corresponds to a civil law solidary obligation. jointly and severally." Of course. RPB the following sums with interest thereon at 16% per annum under 7 promissory notes. until fully paid and the sum of P331. It is the contention of RPB that having unconditionally signed the 9 promissory notes with Yamaguchi. so that no indorsement is required. of Worldwide Garment Manufacturing. Where a check is in the ordinary form. plus attorney's fees and penalty charges. PMC was ordered to pay PRB the sum of P140. the solidary liability of Canlas is made clearer and certain. the maker promises to pay to the order of the payee or any holder according to the tenor thereof.) Philippine Currency.00 with interest of 16% per annum from 29 January 1980 under another promissory note. (a) forgery of drawer's signature. ordering PMC (formerly WGMI). RPB filed a complaint for the recovery of sums of money covered among others. (c) raising of the amount payable. His contention was that inasmuch as he signed the promissory notes in his capacity as officer of the defunct WGMI. Yamaguchi. and that when he issued said promissory notes in behalf of WGMI.703. he was not an officer of PMC.97 with interest from 28 March 1981. and is payable to bearer. The court also ordered PMC. it is significant. RPB the sum of P100. Herein anyway.Yamaguchi and Canlas to pay. With or without the presence of said phrase. 1372-00257-6". Only Canlas filed an Amended Answer wherein he. Republic Planters Bank vs. PMC and Shozo Yamaguchi did not file an Amended Answer and failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference despite due notice.875. I/we. and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting. From the above decision only Canlas appealed to the then Intermediate Court (now the Court Appeals). The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of RPB. As such. he cannot escape liability arising therefrom. he should not be held personally liable for such authorized corporate acts that he performed. that the indorsement of the drawer — or of some other person known to it — be obtained. the name Worldwide Garment Manufacturing. The appellate court affirmed the decision of trial court except that it completely absolved Canlas from liability under the promissory notes and reduced the award for damages and attorney's fees. Shozo Yamaguchi and Fermin Canlas were authorized to apply for credit facilities with the petitioner Republic Planters Bank (RPB) in the forms of export advances and letters of credit/trust receipts accommodations. and is not negligent in failing to do so. the typewritten entries not appearing therein prior to the time he affixed his signature.00 which interest from 29 January 1981. (b) loss of the check by the rightful owner.. denied having issued the promissory notes in question since according to him. after date. it has the right to demand identification and/or assurance against possible complications. If the bank has no reasonable cause for suspecting any irregularity. A check payable to the order of cash is a bearer instrument.. P12.

petitioner alleged 1) her legal right not to be bound by the instruments which were 5 . then the spouses are jointly and severally liable with Embassy Farms. aside from the Continuing Suretyship Agreement subsequently executed to guarantee the indebtedness of Embassy Farms. and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Due to their failure to pay the obligation. and through the years. and are in the form of conclusions of law. The spouses allege that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and claim that since it was Mercator who provided the form. Held: The promissory note and the Continuing Suretyship Agreement prove that the spouses are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms. the spouses went up to the Court of Appeals. Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states that "Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that the elements of a cause of action are absent in the case and petitioner did not deny the genuineness or authenticity of her signature on the subject promissory notes and the allegedly signed blank ISSUE: In issue then is whether petitioner’s complaint failed to state a cause of action. Mercator Finance Corp. defendant ALONZO was able to gain the trust and confidence of [petitioner] and her family. Thus. The spouses Evangelista claimed being the registered owners of 5 parcels of land contained in the Real Estate Mortgage executed by them and Embassy Farms. one for revocation/cancellation of promissory notes and checks. CARMENCITA GONZALES. For even if some are not stated with particularity. Lamecs Realty and Development Corporation. Br. ESTELA CAMACLANG. petitioner is seeking twin reliefs. Having executed the suretyship agreement. the subsequent sale of the same parcels of land to Lydia P. the continuing suretyship agreement and the subsequent promissory notes restructuring the loan. Thus. ALONZO. a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. and the transfer of the titles to her name. There being no principal obligation on which the mortgage rests. the sale to it as the highest bidder in the public auction. the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged properties are valid. A surety is bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto. still this does not erase the fact that they subsequently executed a continuing suretyship agreement. then the ambiguity should be resolved against it. The promissory notes subsequently executed by the spouses and Embassy Farms. even if the spouses intended to sign the note merely as officers of Embassy Farms. It contended that since the spouses and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note as co-makers. and lastly.Evangelista vs. the issuance of the transfer certificates of title to it. but alleged that they are the present registered owner. ILANO VS HON. The spouses opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that because their personal liability to Mercator is at issue. The spouses cannot claim that they did not personally receive any consideration for the contract for well-entrenched is the rule that the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety. they assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings conducted by Mercator. ESTELITA LEGASPI. They alleged that they executed the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Mercator only as officers of Embassy Farms. VICTORIA J. Cavite. It. some had been dishonored due to “ACCOUNT CLOSED. Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter. LENIZA REYES. Lamecs admitted the prior ownership of the spouses of the subject parcels of land. DANILO CAMACLANG. Mercator admitted that the spouses Evangelista were the owners of the subject parcels of land. [GR 148864. is a trusted employee of [petitioner]. As reflected in the above-quoted allegations in petitioner’s complaint.78 and to secure the payment of the same and those others that the Mortgagee may extend to the mortgagor. While some of the allegations may lack particulars. the elements of a cause of action are present. the real estate mortgage is void. DOLORES L. that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and claim that since it was Mercator who provided the form. they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. She has been with them for several years already. Lydia P. The spouses allege. Defendant Alonzo was able to succeed in inducing the petitioner to sign PN through fraud and deceit. Salazar and Lamecs likewise assailed the long silence and inaction by the spouses as it was only after a lapse of almost 10 years from the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent sales that they made their claim. Salazar and Lamecs asserted that they are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. Besides. there is no genuine issue regarding their liability. But. The spouses’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. JANE BACAREL. then the ambiguity should be resolved against it.” and the allegations in the complaint are bare and general. NEMIA CASTRO. Salazar. 90. ANNILYN C." Further. A motion for reconsideration by the spouses was likewise denied for lack of merit. relying on the validity of the title of Mercator. CHERRY CAMACLANG. and the succeeding promissory notes[8] restructuring the loan. ALLAN CAMACLANG and ESTELITA LEGASPI likewise was able to induce plaintiff to sign several undated blank checks. the spouses executed a Mortgage in favor of Mercator for and in consideration of certain loans. That due to these trust and confidence reposed upon defendant ALONZO by [petitioner]. They did not receive the proceeds of the loan evidenced by a promissory note. restructuring their loan. Evangelista filed a complaint for annulment of titles against Mercator Finance Corp. contended that on 16 February 1982. they contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to them since they did not personally obtain any loan or credit accommodations. Salazar. inter alia. ESTELA CAMACLANG. ALLAN CAMACLANG. likewise prove that the spouses are solidarily liable with Embassy Farms. among other grounds for dismissal. defendant ALONZO in collusion with her co-defendants. in light of the promissory note signed by them. however. Mercator argued that petitioners had admitted in their pre-trial brief the existence of the promissory note. and/or other forms of credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee (Mercator) amounting to P844. there were occasions when defendant ALONZO was entrusted with [petitioner’s] METROBANK Check Book containing either signed or unsigned blank checks. among which are: The named defendants-herein respondents filed their respective Answers invoking. GLORIA DOMINGUEZ. EDITH CALILAP. and the other for damages. as all of it went to Embassy Farms. Salazar and Lamecs averred that petitioners are in estoppel and guilty of laches. there can be no dispute on the personal liability of the spouses. The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. and. the sale and transfer of the properties to respondent Lamecs Realty & Development Corporation. Inc. lack of cause of action. ILANO represented by her Attorney-in-fact. The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint for failure “to allege the ultimate facts”-bases of petitioners claim that her right was violated and that she suffered damages thereby. SABALE and several JOHN DOES FACTS: Defendant AMELIA O. The mortgage. an examination of the promissory note shows no such ambiguity. Thus. Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to the amount of damages. The spouses filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari. RTC of Imus.625. EDWIN REYES. for while the checks subject of the complaint had been issued on account and for value. MILO ANTONIO C. Issue: Whether the spouses are solidarily liable with Embassy Farms. assuming arguendo that there is an ambiguity. in her capacity as Executive Judge. there is no factual issue to be litigated. After pre-trial. there is a need for a full-blown trial. ESPAÑOL. Evangelista and Epifania C. With the void mortgage. hence. A surety is one who is solidarily liable with the principal. especially in those times when [petitioner] left for the United States for medical check-up. but again were unsuccessful. foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent sales are valid and the complaint must be dismissed. FLORA CABRERA. 21 August 2003] Facts: Spouses Eduardo B. the following rules of construction apply: (g) Where an instrument containing the word 'I promise to pay' is signed by two or more persons. AMELIA ALONZO.

become stale six (6) months or 180 days thereafter. the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment. (f) and (i). petitioner’s allegations in the complaint relative thereto.00 to Sesbreno. or (e) Designates a particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made. which was drawn against another account of petitioner. even if the holder of Check No. or in the form of conclusions. These two checks were not delivered to DBR or to any of its authorized representatives. Jr. does not as priorly stated call for the dismissal of the complaint. 5. With regard to the contempt charge. the source of the salary of Mabanto. release or convey to any other person except to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary checks. et al.. that De la Victoria became a virtual party to. as it did. engaging to pay DBR or order the amount of P1.00 and 384935. IFC Leasing 149 SCRA 448 De la Victoria vs. Jr. Hon. Hontanosas. Until that time the check belongs to the government. and that additionally there was no sufficient reason for De la Victoria to hold the checks because they were no longer government funds and presumably delivered to the payee. had already been released through De la Victoria by the Department of Justice duly signed by the officer concerned. the payee has no power over it. Jr. "the salary check of a government officer or employee such a s a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him.000. 2. Jr. This order was questioned by Mabanto. leaving a balance of P1. It is. On 4 February 1992 a notice of garnishment was served on Loreto D. Jr.. de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where Mabanto. its dismissal is not proper for the defendant may ask for more particulars. before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.02. indefinite. Jr. On the other hand. However. On 10 March 1992 Sesbreno filed a motion before the trial court for examination of the garnishees. Development Bank of Rizal vs.. Consolidated Plywood Inc. that upon service of the writ of garnishment. NEGOTIATION CASES: Read again: Sesbreño vs. Sima Wei. Sesbreno filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City Fiscal Bienvenido N.. the latter executed and delivered to the former a promissory note. Accordingly.000... credit. The rationale behind this doctrine is obvious consideration of public policy. or a forced intervenor in. is public funds. to pay P11.bereft of consideration and to which her consent was vitiated. even if lacking particularity. 3. 120 SCRA 864 De la Victoria vs. or that any value had been given therefor. With respect to above-said Check No. et al." The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the notice of garnishment concerning the salary checks of Mabanto.032. before the Court of Appeals. property or anything of value belonging to Mabanto. He further claimed that. for the amount of P550. For. On 24 November 1992 Sesbreno filed a motion to require De la Victoria to explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order of 4 November 1992. Burgos. Sima Wei issued two crossed checks payable to DBR drawn against China Banking Corporation. until delivered to him. 9 March 1993] Facts: In consideration for a loan extended by the Development Bank of Rizal (DBR) to Sima Wei. For Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: Section 6. Omission.” and “bad faith. every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. the trial court was not morally convinced of De la Victoria's guilt. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. or cash due or belonging to Mabanto. the case and the trial court hereby acquired jurisdiction to bind him to its orders and processes with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment.000. Issue: Whether a check still in the hands of the maker or its duly authorized representative is owned by the payee before physical delivery to the latter. however. they were still public funds which could not be subject to garnishment. 0084078. On 9 March 1993 the trial court denied both motions and ordered De la Victoria to immediately comply with its order of 4 November 1992. 12. Mabanto. It opined that the checks of Mabanto. Jr. For reasons not 1. The Notice directed De la Victoria not to disburse. As ordinarily understood. as such. vs. The decision having become final and executory.” respectively.” “defraudation. On 20 April 1993 the motion for reconsideration was denied. 0084078 would have filled up the month and day of issue thereon to be “December” and “31. 219 SCRA 736 Metropol (Bacolod) Financing vs. delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by the maker or the drawer with intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof. Jr.” and “with malice. As held in Tiro v.000.820. funds. CA. As Assistant City Fiscal. before there is actual delivery of the check. et al. Thus the trial court.” “abuse of confidence” “machination. 222 SCRA 466. seal. On 25 May 1992 the petition pending before the Court of Appeals was dismissed. or (d) Bears a seal. On 18 November 1983.00. following current banking practice. was then detailed. albeit the date of issue bears only the year − 1999. transfer. with respect to the questioned promissory notes that the present petition assumes merit. 4. However. monies. Jr.” “fraud. bearing respectively the serial numbers 384934. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to Mabanto. De la Victoria as custodian of the checks was under obligation to hold them for the judgment creditor.” “forgery. report showing the amount of the garnished salaries of Mabanto. Development Bank of Rizal vs. Under Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. within 15 days from receipt taking into consideration the provisions of Sec. He receives his compensation in the form of checks from the Department of Justice through De la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City and head of office. Sambok Motors Co. and 3) the act of the defendantsrespondents in procuring her signature on the instruments through “deceit. however. The said checks were allegedly issued in full settlement of the drawer's account evidenced by the promissory note. directed De la Victoria on 4 November 1992 to submit his 6 . or (b) Does not specify the value given. et al.. After trial Judgment was rendered ordering Mabanto.. finding no more legal obstacle to act on the motion for examination of the garnishees. conformably with the last sentence of Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. particular money.00 on or before 24 June 1983 with interest at 32% per annum. on 19 January 1993 De la Victoria moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money. 2000 was not affected. it would have. – The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that – (a) It is not dated. they did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. Sima Wei [GR 85419. in the possession of De la Victoria. under penalty of law.. for the amount of P500." As a necessary consequence of being public fund..450. 27 June 1995] Facts: Raul H. or (c) Does not specify the place where it is drawn or the place where it is payable. the trial court ordered its execution. Burgos [GR 111190. its validity and negotiable character at the time the complaint was filed on March 28. as appropriated by law. on motion of the latter. 2) the correlative obligation on the part of the defendants-respondents to respect said right. 245 SCRA 374. San Diego that "the functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects..” Where the allegations of a complaint are vague. on 15 January 1992 a writ of execution was issued. Held: Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the Judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.” “falsification. malevolence and selfish intent. pars. De la Victoria filed the petition. Sima Wei made partial payments on the note. The Court succinctly stated in Commissioner of Public Highways v.

(d) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless. Dr. anything which the respondents may have done with respect to said checks could not have prejudiced DBR. on motion. Further. Delivery of an instrument means transfer of possession. by indorsing the note "with recourse" does not make itself a qualified indorser but a general indorser who is secondarily liable. (b) that he has a good title to it." The maker. It had no right or interest in the checks which could have been violated by said respondents. The effect of such indorsement is that the note was indorsed without qualification. in the amount of P15. Herein. it agreed that if Dr. the total principal sum then remaining unpaid shall become due and payable with an additional interest equal to 25% of the total amount due.shown. Javier Villaruel executed a promissory note in favor of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co. Protest. However. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment. Issue: Whether Sambok is a qualified indorser of the subject promissory note. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. protest and presentment were all waived.02 on a promissory note executed by Sima Wei on 9 June 1983. relying on the assurance of Samson Tung. His liability becomes the same as that of the original obligor. hence. Metropol (Bacolod) Financing & Investment Corporation vs. it will pay the amount to the holder. because by such indorsement. numbered 384934 and 384935. Villaruel fails to pay the note. On the same date. these checks came into the possession of Lee Kian Huat. (BACOLOD) By: RODOLFO G. hence Metropol notified Sambok as indorsee of said note of the fact that the same has been dishonored and demanded payment. Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer to the payee. payable to DBR. the person secondarily liable thereon ceases to be such and becomes a principal debtor. Held: The normal parties to a check are the drawer. it is Sima Wei. All the drawer has to do when he wishes to issue a check is to properly fill up the blanks and sign it. dishonor. Ltd. the trial court rendered its decision dated 12 September 1973." Thus. represented by its Legal Liquidator. and under the same management as the former.. that being a qualified indorser. provides in part that "Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. During the pendency of the case in the trial court. The trial court granted the Motions to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Notice of Demand. who would have a cause of action against her co-respondents. Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Samson Tung. [GR L39641. Courts have long recognized the business custom of using printed checks where blanks are provided for the date of issuance. DBR..00 payable in 12 equal monthly installments. On 5 July 1986. on 24 October 1972 the lower court. Mary Cheng Uy. Except for Lee Kian Huat.032. the holder need not even proceed against the maker before suing the indorser. the sum equivalent to 25% of P15. Caloocan City. it never owned them (the checks) nor did it acquire any interest therein. General Manager. Sambok did not deny its liability but contended that it could not be obliged to pay until after its co-defendant Dr. Not satisfied with the decision. Metropol can go after Sambok. The words added by Sambok do not limit his liability. Without the delivery of said checks to DBR. the drawer. Ltd. in the alternative or otherwise. filed the Petition for Review by Certiorari. the name of the payee. It may be made by adding to the indorser's signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar import. Sambok. to pay the balance due on the promissory note. or both as the case may be. has been declared insolvent. Villaruel died. which governs checks. Cheng Uy. on two causes of actionL (1) To enforce payment of the balance of P1. Consequently. However. so must a negotiable instrument be delivered to the payee in order to evidence its existence as a binding contract.00 plus the legal rate of interest from 30 October 1969. a sister company of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co. the note shall be accepted or paid. Such an indorsement relieves the indorser of the general obligation to pay if the instrument is dishonored but not of the liability arising from warranties on the instrument as provided in Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. SAMBOK MOTORS CO. Sambok Motors Company. the payee and the drawee bank. Sima Wei. ordering Sambok to pay to Metropol the sum of P15. he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. whether against the drawer Sima Wei or against the Producers Bank or any of the other respondents. that it only warrants the following pursuant to Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be. Moreover. President of Plastic Corporation. Metropol formally presented the promissory note for payment to the maker. Held: A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. Sambok indorsed the note "with recourse" and even waived the notice of demand. has a cause of action against any or all of the defendants. Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation and the Producers Bank of the Philippines. so on 26 November 1969 Metropol filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. the mere fact that he has done these does not give rise to any liability on his part. and drawn against the China Banking Corporation. there can be no liability on the instrument.939. but rather confirm his obligation as a general indorser.00 plus interest thereon until fully paid. so on 30 October 1969. Dr. Villaruel failed to pay the promissory note as demanded. If at all. NONILLO. actual or constructive. dismissed the case against Dr. negotiated and indorsed the note in favor of Metropol Financing & Investment Corporation with the following indorsement: "Pay to the order of Metropol Bacolod Financing & Investment Corporation with recourse. of which a check is. from one person to another. until and unless the check is delivered to the payee or his representative. It is further provided that in 7 . case on non-payment of any of the installments.450. A negotiable instrument. and Presentment are hereby waived. the amount payable and the drawer's signature. such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument. Branch I. of the Producers Bank. if the allegations in the complaint are found to be true. the two (2) China Bank checks.939. "Recourse" means resort to a person who is secondarily liable after the default of the person who is primarily liable. and that if it be dishonored. as the intended payee of the instrument. Dr. founded on said checks. in the alternative or otherwise. beginning 18 May 1969. 28 February 1983] Facts: On 15 April 1969 Dr. Asst. dishonor. Villaruel defaulted in the payment of his installments when they became due. Villaruel. Branch Manager of the Balintawak Branch of Producers Bank. and to pay the cost of suit. protest and presentment. Issue: Whether DBR. Dishonor. instructed the cashier of Producers Bank to accept the checks for deposit and to credit them to the account of said Plastic Corporation. Just as a deed to a piece of land must be delivered in order to convey title to the grantee. Sambok failed to pay. after an instrument is dishonored by non-payment. that the transaction was legal and regular. Samboc appealed. were not delivered to the payee. filed their separate Motions to Dismiss alleging a common ground that the complaint states no cause of action. it becomes a qualified indorser. DBR has therefore no cause of action against said respondents.. and (2) To enforce payment of two checks executed by Sima Wei. with interest at the rate of 1% per month. Sambok's intention of indorsing the note without qualification is made even more apparent by the fact that the notice of demand. is not only a written evidence of a contract right but is also a species of property. it does not warrant that if said note is dishonored by the maker on presentment. to which DBR. Sambok argue that by adding the words "with recourse" in the indorsement of the note. et al. Thus. (c) that all prior parties had capacity to contract. On Metropol's motion for summary judgment. DBR filed the complaint for a sum of money against Sima Wei and/or Lee Kian Huat. who deposited the checks without DBR's indorsement (forged or otherwise) to the account of the Asian Industrial Plastic Corporation. Sambok Motors Co. at the Balintawak branch.. Villaruel pursuant to Section 21. inspite of the fact that the checks were crossed and payable to DBR and bore no indorsement of the latter.939. the former did not acquire any right or interest therein and cannot therefore assert any cause of action. Since DBR never received the checks on which it based its action against said respondents. the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to him.

and without notice that it had been previously dishonored.m. appealed." Although De Ocampo was not aware of the circumstances under which the check was delivered to Gonzales. et al. the said check to be for safekeeping only of Gonzales and to be returned to Gatchalian the following day when Gonzales brings the car and the certificate of registration. in payment of the fees and expenses arising from the hospitalization of his wife. 1987. Vicente R. CCPS 14-009467 in the sum of P2. a complaint for estafa against Gonzales based on and arising from the acts of Gonzales in paying his obligations with De Ocampo and receiving the cash balance of the check and that said complaint was subsequently dropped. And having presented no evidence that it acquired the check in good faith. 03 SCRA 596. Negotiable Instruments Law. Court of Appeals [GR 138074. When Gonzales received the check from Gatchalian under the representations and conditions above specified. IAC. 287078.should have put De Ocampo to inquiry as to the why and wherefore of the possession of the check by Gonzales. 4195-01165-2. the fact is that it acquired possession of the instrument under circumstances that should have put it to inquiry as to the title of the holder who negotiated the check to it. that the amount of the check did not correspond exactly with the obligation of Matilde Gonzales to Dr. No. Gatchalian. to look for a buyer of said car and to negotiate for and accomplish said sale.087M PCIB managers check in the amount of P4. Yang and Chandiramani agreed that the difference of P26K in the exchange would be their profit to be divided equally between them. 1987. Section 52. Anita C. Gatchalian drew and issued a check that Gonzales executed and issued a receipt for said check.m. Gonzales advised her that the owner of the car will not be willing to give the certificate of registration unless there is a showing that the party interested in the purchase of said car is ready and willing to make such purchase and that for this purpose Gonzales requested Gatchalian to give him a check which will be shown to the owner as evidence of buyer's good faith in the intention to purchase the said car. that the holder did not show or tell the payee why he had the check in his possession and why he was using it for the payment of his own personal account —.like the fact that the drawer had no account with the payee.R. 145 SCRA 497 De Ocampo vs. Gatchalian [GR L-15126. finding the price of the car quoted by Gonzales to her satisfaction.000. Yang vs.00. De Ocampo was guilty of gross neglect in not finding out the nature of the title and possession of Gonzales. The Court of First Instance of Manila. amounting to legal absence of good faith. payable to PCIB FCDU Account No. It was payee's duty to ascertain from the holder Gonzales what the nature of the latter's title to the check was or the nature of his possession. Gatchalian. it acquired the check in actual good faith.HOLDERS 1. In other words. requested Gonzales to bring the car the day following together with the certificate of registration of the car. 1987: Cely Yang and Prem Chandiramani entered into an agreement whereby Yang was to give 2 P2. R.25 representing the balance on the amount of the said check. was shown and offered a car by Manuel Gonzales who was accompanied by Emil Fajardo. CA. defines holder in due course as "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (a) That it is complete and regular upon its face.087. in the amount of US$200. instead of the presumption that payee was a holder in good faith. Yang and Chandiramani also further agreed that the Yang would secure from FEBTC a dollar draft in the amount of US$200K. Yang vs. for and in consideration of fees and expenses of hospitalization and the release of the wife of Gonzales from its hospital. Danilo Ranigo Ranigo was to meet Chandiramani at 2 p. On the other hand. 2. drawn on Chemical Bank. August 15. 30 November 1961] Facts: On or about 8 September 1953.such as the fact that Gatchalian had no obligation or liability to the Ocampo Clinic. (b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue.2 million both payable to the order of Fernando David. Mesina vs. the latter being personally known to Gatchalian. so that her husband would be able to see same. Vasquez. Issue [2]: Whether the rule that a possessor of the instrument is prima facie a holder in due course applies. 8 . presiding. 1987.show that holder's title was defective or suspicious. Makati where he would turn over Yangs cashiers checks and dollar draft to Chandiramani who. 2003. dated December 22. 4195-01165-2. under the circumstances of the case. de Ocampo. payable to PCIB FCDU Account No. and that the check had two parallel lines in the upper left hand corner. Issue [1]: Whether De Ocampo is a holder in due course. because the instrument is not payable to him or to bearer. placed upon it to show that notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances. payable to the order of Fernando David. On the failure of Gonzales to appear the day following and on his failure to bring the car and its certificate of registration and to return the check on the following day as previously agreed upon. Held [2]: The rule that a possessor of the instrument is prima facie a holder in due course does not apply because there was a defect in the title of the holder (Manuel Gonzales). De Ocampo subsequently filed an action for the recovery of the value of a check for P600 payable to De Ocampo and drawn by Gatchalian. December 22. accepted said check.087. and it may not be considered as a holder of the check in good faith. Gatchalian issued a "Stop Payment Order" on the check with the drawee bank. Yang procured the ff: a) Equitable Cashiers Check No. to be delivered to Chandiramani by Liongs messenger. 4771. December 22. b) FEBTC Cashiers Check No. The acts of acceptance of the check and application of its proceeds in the manner specified were made without previous inquiry by De Ocampo from Gatchalian. with legal interest from 10 September 1953 until paid. Relying on these representations of Gonzales and with this assurance that said check will be only for safekeeping and which will be returned to Gatchalian the following day when the car and its certificate of registration will be brought by Gonzales to Gatchalian. in the evening.75 thereof to payment of said fees and expenses and delivering to Gonzales the amount of P158. V. in turn. the stipulation of facts -. (c) That he took it in good faith and for value. if such was the fact. Ocampo Clinic. De Ocampo & Co. and why he used it to pay Matilde's account. the circumstances -.00. dated December 22. applying P441.000. Ayala Avenue. Held [1]: NO. and to pay the costs.: Yang gave the cashiers checks and dollar drafts to her business associate. 138074. G. New York. dated December 22. which practice means that the check could only be deposited but may not be converted into cash —. to say the least. Having failed in this respect.00. and c) FEBTC Dollar Draft No. through Hon. it cannot be stated that the payee acquired the check without knowledge of said defect in holder's title. 1987. it (payee) cannot be considered as a holder in due course.000. Albert Liong. at Philippine Trust Bank. Conrado M. Gatchalian who was then interested in looking for a car for the use of her husband and the family. of Hong Kong. in the amount of P2. Gonzales represented to Gatchalian that he was duly authorized by the owner of the car. he delivered the same to the Ocampo Clinic. 1987 1 p. 3. therefore. The burden was. Gatchalian. and for this reason the presumption that it is a holder in due course or that it acquired the instrument in good faith does not exist. De Ocampo vs. (d) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. 15 August 2003] Facts: December 22. On this request of Gatchalian. As holder's title was defective or suspicious. De Ocampo filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. sentenced Gatchalian and Gonzales to pay De Ocampo the sum of P600. likewise payable to the order of Fernando David. which Chandiramani would exchange for another dollar draft in the same amount to be issued by Hang Seng Bank Ltd.

1987. Gold Palace Jewelry. they dishonored the payment by saying that payment has been stopped. Benares. He left the check in his desk and upon his return.00. with the understanding that upon approval by the GSIS of the compromise agreement with the spouses Ong. The bank manager then had it kept for safekeeping by one of its employees. Far East vs. Crisologo-Jose vs. 2. the presumption that he is a prima facie holder in due course applies in his favor. The holder of a cashier’s check who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce payment against the issuing bank which dishonors the same. Benares. 4. LIABILITY OF PARTIES CASES: 1. CA. and (2) David's failure to inquire from Chandiramani as to how the latter acquired possession of the checks. he said it was paid to him Lim. Mesina moved for the dismissal of the case but was denied.00 was replaced by Atty. Upon questioning. since at that time. However. said presumption may be rebutted." Herein. in accommodation of his clients. Santos did sign the check. the bank would of course have the right to refuse payment of the check when presented by payee. 1989. was the vice-president of Mover Enterprises. IAC 145 SCRA 497 FACTS: Jose Go purchased from Associate Bank a Cashier’s Check. Pushpa. Later. meaning a "payee or indorsee of a bill or note. Benares.: Ranigo reported the alleged loss of the checks and the dollar draft to Liong. thus resulting in David's intentional ignorance tantamount to bad faith. Oscar Z. Sept. 4771. Ang vs. Travel-On vs. Benares and Santos The 9 .2 million and a Hang Seng Bank dollar draft for US$200K in exchange but Chandiramani did not appear December 22. CA. or the bearer thereof. dated December 22. For these two times. the treasurer of Mover Enterprises was not available. 4195-01165-2 on the same date.000. Gonzales vs. who held FCDU Account No. Court of Appeals [GR 80599. issued Check 093553 drawn against Traders Royal Bank. 7. Atty. On 30 April 1980. Hence. Benares and by Santos When Crisologo-Jose deposited this replacement check with her account at Family Savings Bank. the name of Mesina was revealed. otherwise he cannot be deemed a holder in due course. he got US$360K from David. An information for theft was then filed against Lim. since the compromise agreement was not approved within the expected period of time.. Mayon Branch. He refused to disclose how and why it has passed to him. Chandiramani was able to get hold of the instruments Chandiramani delivered the 2 cashiers checks to Fernando David at China Banking Corporation branch in San Fernando City. If a payee of a cashier’s check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud. Rani Reynandas. Associated Bank. Hence. the spouses Jaime and Clarita Ong. drawn upon the Chemical Bank. the spouses Ong. 210 SCRA 352. Yang posits that the last two requisites of Section 52 are missing. which he left on top of the manager’s desk when left the bank. who is in possession of it. Agro-Conglomerates Inc. HELD: Petitioner cannot raise as arguments that a cashier’s check cannot be countermanded from the hands of a holder in due course and that a cashier’s check is a check drawn by the bank against itself. 2008 Crisologo-Jose vs. Benares with another Traders Royal Bank check bearing 379299 dated 10 August 1980. in the same amount of P45. and the president of the said corporation was Atty. 5. the check will be encashed accordingly. the aforesaid check for P45. He executed also an affidavit of loss as well as reported it to the police. and the loss was then reported to the police. The bank then received the check twice for clearing. Yang's challenge to David's status as a holder in due course hinges on two arguments: (1) the lack of proof to show that David tendered any valuable consideration for the disputed checks. Pampanga In exchange. Unfortunately for Yang. Hence. Sevilla.m. her arguments on this score are less than meritorious and far from persuasive. The check was issued to Crisologo-Jose in consideration of the waiver or quitclaim by Crisologo-Jose over a certain property which the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) agreed to sell to the clients of Atty. 05 September 2007. Liong. 6. Sadaya vs. 3. G. informed Yang. All the requisites provided for in Section 52 must concur in David's case. or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collect the check. the same was to be signed by its president. Inc. Oscar Z. August 20.would deliver to Ranigo a PCIB managers check in the sum of P4.R. and his mother. However. since the bank was aware of the facts surrounding the loss of the check in question. which he deposited in the savings account of his wife. this presumption arises only in favor of a person who is a holder as defined in Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Benares prevailed upon Santos to sign the aforesaid check as an alternate signatory. 168274. Atty. The weight of authority sustains the view that a payee may be a holder in due course. In sum. thereby preventing David from being considered a holder in due course. A case of interpleader was filed by the bank and Go moved to participate as intervenor in the Facts: In 1980. However. incharge of marketing and sales. what is vital to the resolution of this issue is whether David took possession of the checks under the conditions provided for in Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. 348 SCRA 350. When asked by the police on how he possessed the check. also payable to Crisologo-Jose. Since the check was under the account of Mover Enterprises. in the amount of P45. 15 September 1989] MESINA V. a lawyer contacted it demanding payment. New York for US$200K in PCIB FCDU Account No. Jr. vs. and the treasurer of the said corporation. Petitioner failed to substantiate that he was a holder in due course. RCBC. dated 14 June 1980. Yang requested FEBTC and Equitable to stop payment on the instruments she believed to be lost Both banks complied with her requestYang filed against David and ChandiramaniCA affirms RTC: in favor of David Issue: Whether David was a holder in due course. A subsequent redepositing of the said check was likewise dishonored by the bank for the same reason. it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Ricardo S. 19 SCRA 924. Lim and the check were gone. the same couldn't be found and Go was advised to request for the stoppage of payment which he did. After the second time. Benares. No. it is not disputed that David was the payee of the checks in question. he admitted that he got the check from Lim who stole the check. complaint for damages. When Go inquired about his check. CA. Santos.000. This replacement check was also signed by Atty. However. The trial court ruled in the interpleader case ordering thebank to replace the cashier’s check in favor of Go. Held: Every holder of a negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie a holder in due course. 29 November 2006. Atty.000. Crisologo-Jose through counsel was constrained to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22) with the Quezon City Fiscal's Office against Atty. The employee was then in conference with one Alexander Lim. He refused to disclose the name of his client and threatened to sue. Inc. It simply means that he has notice of the defect of his title over the check from the start. 1987 4 p. 15. in turn. 124 with the United Coconut Planters Bank branch in Greenhills He also deposited FEBTC Dollar Draft No.00 payable to Ernestina Crisologo-Jose.

19 SCRA 924 FACTS: Sadaya. in whatever capacity such accommodation party signed the instrument. After trial. Varona was the only one who received the proceeds of the note. Sadaya cannot proceed against Sevilla for reimbursement. Sadaya and Sevilla both signed as co-makers to accommodate Varona. Varona couldn't had reason to seek reimbursement from either Sadaya or Sevilla. A joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said promissory note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker without first directing his action against the principal debtor provided that a. After all. the court a quo.investigating Assistant City Fiscal. whether primarily or secondarily. without receiving value therefor. the complainant in that criminal case. Issue [1]: Whether Santos. Sevilla. acceptor. Held [1]: Section 29 (Liability of accommodation party) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker.00 with the Clerk of Court on 14 August 1981. it has been held that in lending his name to the accommodated party. acceptor. which is right and just as the latter was the only one who received value for the note executed. Thus. Thus. This right springs from an implied promise to share equally the burdens they may ensue from their having consented to stamp their signatures on the promissory note. Quezon City. Santos encashed the aforesaid cashier's check and subsequently deposited said amount of P45. he is liable to a holder for value as if the contract was not for accommodation. from his co-accomodation maker. A principal debtor is insolvent. 10 . drawer. Alfonso Llamas. He made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand b. A joint and several accommodation maker of a negotiable promissory note may demand from the principal debtor reimbursement for the amount that he paid to the payee 2. and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Based on the foregoing requisites. Nevertheless. or indorser. holding that it was "not persuaded to believe that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil Code is applicable to this case. subject to conditions imposed by law.00 dated 10 April 1981 to Crisologo-Jose. as an accommodation party. he differs from the ordinary concept of a debtor therein in the sense that he has not received any valuable consideration for the instrument he signs.00. The following are the rules: 1. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value. and (3) sign for the purpose of lending his name for the credit of some other person.000." Consequently. Meanwhile. the proceeds of the loan went to Varona alone. a solidary accommodation maker—who made payment—has the right to contribution. (2) not receive value therefor. Crisologo-Jose refused to receive the cashier's check in payment of the dishonored check in the amount of P45.000. It was never shown that there was a judicial demand on Sadaya to pay the obligation and also. Hence. Sadaya vs." rendered judgment dismissing Santos' complaint for consignation and Crisologo-Jose's counterclaim.000. From the standpoint of contract law. directing the trial court to give due course thereto. Consequently. or indorser. Crisologo-Jose filed the petition. it was never proven that Varona was insolvent. Santos tendered cashier's check CC 160152 for P45. Sevilla and Varona signed solidarily a promissory note in favor of the bank. to be considered an accommodation party. notwithstanding such holder. Benares and given to Santos to be applied in payment of the dishonored check. The administrator resisted the claim on the ground that Sevilla didn't receive any proceeds of the loan. had payment been made by Varona. accordingly filed an amended information with the court charging both Benares and Santos for violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case Q-14867) of then Court of First Instance of Rizal. before Assistant City Fiscal Llamas. Varona failed to reimburse. the appellate court reversed and set aside said judgment of dismissal and revived the complaint for consignation. On principle. Sevilla died and intestate estate proceedings were established. the cashier's check adverted to above was purchased by Atty. Thereafter. Sadaya filed a creditor’s claim on his estate for the payment he made on the note. On appeal and on 8 September 1987. knew him to be only an accommodation party. the accommodation party is in effect a surety for the latter. signing as maker. the obligations of Varona and Sevilla to Sadaya cannot be joint and several. HELD: Sadaya could have sought reimbursement from Varona. the bank collected from Sadaya. The trial court admitted the claim of Sadaya though tis was reversed by the CA. in the absence of agreement to the contrary between them. at the time of taking the instrument. Incidentally. Surely enough. There is an implied contract of indemnity between Sadaya and Varona upon the former’s payment of the obligation to the bank. it is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any valuable consideration when he executed the instrument. a person must (1) be a party to the instrument. drawer. For indeed. is liable thereon under the Negotiable Instruments Law. during the preliminary investigation of the criminal charge against Benares and Santos.

on Antonio Ang Eng Liong and Tomas Ang. which was then granted. 1990 Petitioner Tomas Ang filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim. by the bank's actions. respectively. Tomas Ang offered in evidence several documents. Moreover. it was the bank which completed the notes upon the orders. neither is the fact that the holder knew him to be only an accommodation party. much less a holder for value or a holder in due course. 11 . ordering the former to pay the latter: The decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.33 On January 5. respondent Bank claimed that the defendants failed and refused to settle their obligation. he is considered as a solidary debtor who is primarily liable for the payment of the promissory notes.638. even in the excess. 1994. Despite repeated demands for payment. did not indorse the notes to the Asset Privatization Trust despite the execution of the Deeds of Transfer and Trust Agreement and that the notes continued to remain with the bank until the institution of the collection suit. dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. 1991. This financial statements were actually not updated to show that there was indebtedness on the part of Miranda. the court set the pre-trial conference between the bank and Tomas Ang. Citing Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). This was being refuted by Miranda by saying that he actually paid for his obligations. filed a Motion to Dismiss19 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case in view of the alleged finality of the February 21. He contended that Sec.18 who. 1988 and September 9. The fact that Tomas Ang never received any moneys in consideration of the two (2) loans and that such was known to the bank are immaterial because. the bank posited that absence or failure of consideration is not a matter of defense. the bank knew that he did not receive any valuable consideration for affixing his signatures on the notes but merely lent his name as an accommodation party." Instead. The Court of Appeals observed that the bank. he accepted the promissory notes in blank. as certified by the notary public. one of whom is declared in default. It concluded that despite the execution of the Deeds of Transfer and Trust Agreement.31 All the documentary exhibits were admitted for failure of the bank to submit its comment to the formal offer. resulting in a total indebtedness of P539. Rule 18 of the old Rules sanctions only one judgment in case of several defendants. Tomas Ang elected to withdraw his petition in CA G. in his Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. respondents. In answering the lone issue. Petitioner alleged that Miranda procured tickets from them which he paid with cash and checks but the checks were dishonored upon presentment to the bank. on June 3. 1990. Only clear and convincing evidence and not mere self-serving evidence of drawer can rebut this presumption. There is a prima facie presumption that a check was issued for valuable consideration and the provision puts the burden upon the drawer to disprove this presumption. Trial then ensued between the bank and Tomas Ang. upon whom a final and executory judgment had already been issued.20 Tomas Ang maintained that he is released from his obligation as a solidary guarantor and accommodation party because.32 Thereafter.8 He interposed the affirmative defenses that: the bank is not the real party in interest as it is not the holder of the promissory notes. 1994 and May 30. And also. He procured tickets on behalf of others and derived commissions from it. Miranda was unable to relieve himself of this burden. it posed for resolution the issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money for lack of cause of action as the bank was said to be not the "holder" of the notes at the time the collection case was filed. 1991 Decision. as the payee. notice was given to the fact that the checks were issued after a written demand by the company regarding Miranda’s unpaid liabilities TOMAS ANG. the latest of which were on September 13. vs. instructions. Miranda failed to show that the checks weren’t issued for any valuable consideration. and news clippings from the Manila Bulletin dated May 18. 1986. in turn. the Court of Appeals held that the bank is a "holder" under Sec. SP No. the court accordingly issued a writ of execution on April 5. respectively. Petitioner filed a collection suit against Miranda for the unpaid amount of six checks. FACTS: On August 28. 1996. Upon the bank's ex-parte motion. the trial court rendered judgment against the bank. He argued that the checks were for accommodation purposes only. HELD: Reliance by the lower and appellate court on the company’s financial statements were wrong.96 as of July 31. or representations of his codefendant. Antonio Ang Eng Liong was again declared in default for his failure to answer the cross-claim within the reglementary period. The RTC and CA held Miranda not to be liable. as an accommodation maker. The appellate court disregarded the bank's first assigned error for being "irrelevant in the final determination of the case" and found its second assigned error as "not meritorious. 191 of the NIL. 1991. 34840 before the Court of Appeals.R. The trial court rendered against defendant Antonio Ang Eng Liong and in favor of plaintiff. which included a copy of the Trust Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the Asset Privatization Trust. respondent Associated Bank (formerly Associated Banking Corporation and now known as United Overseas Bank Philippines) filed a collection suit against Antonio Ang Eng Liong and petitioner Tomas Ang for the two (2) promissory notes that they executed as principal debtor and co-maker. The company was entitled to the benefit conferred by the statutory provision. 4.24 After the trial. The company needed to show to its Board of Directors that its accounts receivable was in good standing. petitioner. The best evidence that the courts should have looked at were the checks itself. to see if Miranda was liable or not. with only the printed provisions and the signature of Antonio Ang Eng Liong appearing therein. CA 210 SCRA 351 FACTS: Petitioner was a travel agency involved in ticket sales on a commission basis for and on behalf of different airline companies. the Asset Privatization Trust cannot be declared as the "holder" of the subject promissory notes for the reason that it is neither the payee or indorsee of the notes in possession thereof nor is it the bearer of said notes. ASSOCIATED BANK AND ANTONIO ANG ENG LIONG. Upon the latter's motion during the pre-trial conference. Miranda has a revolving credit line with the company. The checks were clear by stating that the company was the payee and not a mere accommodated party.9 respondent Bank countered that it is the real party in interest and is the holder of the notes since the Associated Banking Corporation and Associated Citizens Bank are its predecessors-in-interest. In its Reply.17 Thereafter.TRAVEL ON V. he is now precluded from asserting his cross-claim against Antonio Ang Eng Liong.

Citing Sec. unless the contract expressly requires 12 .83 As in the instant case. in issuing the two promissory notes. passiveness. counsel for the bank.80 It is no defense to state on his part that he did not receive any value therefor81 because the phrase "without receiving value therefor" used in Sec. without receiving value therefor. Section 29 of the NIL defines an accommodation party as a person "who has signed the instrument as maker.61 As petitioner acknowledged it to be. the Court of Appeals held that Tomas Ang is accountable therefor in his capacity as an accommodation party. he is a solidary co-debtor. the relation between an accommodation party and the accommodated party is one of principal and surety – the accommodation party being the surety. openly admitted that it was under the trusteeship of the Asset Privatization Trust. Moreover. a surety may pay the debt.With the bank as the "holder" of the promissory notes. instead of directly communicating with the bank for its settlement. According to the appellate court. and that otherwise.85 Regrettably. had the authority to file and prosecute the case. it was the Asset Privatization Trust which had the authority to enforce its claims against both debtors. a surety becomes liable to the debt and duty of the principal obligor even without possessing a direct or personal interest in the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom. and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. signing as maker." As gleaned from the text. it is immaterial so far as the bank is concerned whether one of the signers. True. if applicable. and dispose of it to his benefit. that he is only an accommodation party. hence. he is directly and equally bound with the principal. subrogate himself in the place of the creditor with the right to enforce the guaranty against the other signers of the note for the reimbursement of what he is entitled to recover from them. the surety's liability to the creditor is immediate. or indorser. 29 of the NIL means "without receiving value by virtue of the instrument" and not as it is apparently supposed to mean. he is liable to the bank in spite of the latter's knowledge.63 he is considered in law as the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter since their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. hence. petitioner as accommodating party warranted to the holder in due course that he would pay the same according to its tenor. The foregoing notwithstanding. acceptor. readily subscribe to petitioner's insistence that the case must be dismissed. constitute no defense at all for the surety. none of these were prudently done by petitioner.62 As such. since the liability of an accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value. penalty and overdue charges as well as attorney's fees on the ground that the promissory notes made no mention of such charges/fees. Nonetheless. this Court can not. or that he merely acted on the belief that the first loan application was cancelled. he. upon the maturity of the note. he lackadaisically relied on Antonio Ang Eng Liong. Atty. the consideration for the note as regards its maker is the money advanced to the accommodated party. or the fact that he did not enforce the guaranty or apply on the payment of such funds as were available. Notably. the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release him because as far as a holder for value is concerned. at the time of taking the instrument. if there be any. Roderick Orallo. during the pre-trial conference. a sum of money was received by virtue of the notes.57 The Asset Privatization Trust. that the issue had been rendered moot with the occurrence of a supervening event – the "buy-back" of the bank by its former owner. even if the accommodated party receives an extension of the period for payment without the consent of the accommodation party. an accommodation party is one who meets all the three requisites.88 this Court held: x x x The mere delay of the creditor in enforcing the guaranty has not by any means impaired his action against the defendant. or delay in proceeding against the principal debtor. particularly petitioner. has or has not received anything in payment of the use of his name. is it the bank or the Asset Privatization Trust? Based on the above backdrop. it stands without refute. viz: (1) he must be a party to the instrument. Significantly. sometime in October 1993. Sellner. His mere inaction indulgence. he is deemed an original promisor and debtor from the beginning. the creditor is under no obligation to display any diligence in the enforcement of his rights as a creditor. and (3) he must sign for the purpose of lending his name or credit to some other person. (2) he must not receive value therefor. the bank reclaimed its real and actual interest over the unpaid promissory notes. as a co-maker who agreed to be jointly and severally liable on the promissory notes. drawer. the Court of Appeals agreed with the bank that the experience of Tomas Ang in business rendered it implausible that he would just sign the promissory notes as a co-maker without even checking the real amount of the debt to be incurred. that if the creditor had done any act whereby the guaranty was impaired in its value. Tomas Ang cannot validly set up the defense that he did not receive any consideration therefor as the fact that the loan was granted to the principal debtor already constitutes a sufficient consideration. but it must be born in mind that it is a recognized doctrine in the matter of suretyship that with respect to the surety. it is apparent that he was negligent in falling for the alibi of Antonio Ang Eng Liong and such fact would not serve to exonerate him from his responsibility under the notes. By such re-acquisition from the Asset Privatization Trust when the case was still pending in the lower court.64 Although a contract of suretyship is in essence accessory or collateral to a valid principal obligation.86 Thus.59 An accommodation party lends his name to enable the accommodated party to obtain credit or to raise money. acceptor. 1990 against Antonio Ang Eng Liong and petitioner Tomas Ang.87 In Clark v. at present. drawer. the defendant. who represented that he would take care of the matter. "without receiving payment for lending his name. demand the collateral security. such an act would have wholly or partially released the surety. At the time the complaint was filed in the trial court. 29 of the NIL."82 Stated differently. knew him or her to be merely an accommodation party. or indorser. respondent Bank does not appear to be the real party in interest when it instituted the collection suit on August 28. Further. primary and absolute. ISSUE: who is the real party in interest at the time of the institution of the complaint. both in the pleadings as well as in the evidence presented during the trial and up to the time this case reached the Court. Furthermore. Leonardo Ty. when a third person advances the face value of the note to the accommodated party at the time of its creation. In fact.84 Under the law. it could rightfully qualify as a "holder"58 thereof under the NIL. at the time of taking the notes. which should have been represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. petitioner cannot now claim that he was prejudiced by the supposed "extension of time" given by the bank to his co-debtor. It is enough that value was given for the note at the time of its creation. will be personally responsible for the payment. or discharged.60 The accommodation party is liable on the instrument to a holder for value even though the holder. or.66 Consequently.65 As an equivalent of a regular party to the undertaking. he receives no part of the consideration for the instrument but assumes liability to the other party/ies thereto. the Court of Appeals denied the claims of the bank for service. It should not be lost sight of that the defendant's signature on the note is an assurance to the creditor that the collateral guaranty will remain good. as if the contract was not for accommodation. When he was first notified by the bank sometime in 1982 regarding his accountabilities under the promissory notes.

10. 1032-1034)89 Neither can petitioner benefit from the alleged "insolvency" of Antonio Ang Eng Liong for want of clear and convincing evidence proving the same. 05 September 2006. Philippine National Bank vs. HELD: An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. Further. Philippine National Bank vs. 143 SCRA 20. The check was thereafter cleared. he also did not exercise diligence in demanding security to protect himself from the danger thereof in the event that he (petitioner) would eventually be sued by the bank. Metrobank vs.90 In sum. CA. 1988. However. 2000 Decision and December 26. every government office or agency is assigned checks bearing different serial numbers. 5. 9. although at times couched in different terms and explained more lengthily in the petition. DEFENSES CASES: Salas vs. CA. BA Finance. 15 August 2004. This theory. 1996. CA. Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Demands unheeded. CA. the Court notes that these were the very same questions of fact raised on appeal before the Court of Appeals. CA. The fact that petitioner stands only as a surety in relation to Antonio Ang Eng Liong is immaterial to the claim of the bank and does not a whit diminish nor defeat the rights of the latter as a holder for value. 1. 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. whether petitioner may or may not obtain security from Antonio Ang Eng Liong cannot in any manner affect his liability to the bank. PNB alleges that the alteration was material since it is an accepted concept that a TCAA check by its very nature is the medium of exchange of governments. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 2009. CA. 06 December 2006. As a safety measure. the October 9. 393 SCRA 89. The name of the government agency issuing the check is clearly stated therein. is not generally accepted and the courts almost universally consider it essentially inconsistent with the relation of the parties to the note. There is in some decisions a tendency toward holding that the creditor's laches may discharge the surety. Subsequent debits were made but Capitol cannot debit the account of Abante any longer for the latter had withdrawn all the money already from the account. CA. Metrobank vs. The check was deposited by Abante in its account with Capitol and the latter consequently deposited the same with its account with PBCOM which later deposited it with petitioner for clearing. when sued on an instrument by a holder in due course and for value. But this contention has to fail. PBCOM followed suit by doing the same against PNB. (21 R. have been satisfactorily passed upon and considered both by the trial and appellate courts. March 14. instrumentalities and agencies.diligence and promptness on the part of the creditor. Therefore. CV No. the alleged material alteration was the alteration of the serial number of the check in issue—which is not an essential element of a negotiable instrument under Section 1. it filed an action against PBCOM and the latter filed a third-party complaint against petitioner. 256 SCRA 491. being factual. 7. there being no material alteration in the check committed. it is not our function under the rule to examine. In this case. the check’s drawer is sufficiently identified. petitioner PNB returned the check on account that there had been a material alteration on it.. 4. Associated Bank vs. To sanction his theory is to give unwarranted legal recognition to the patent absurdity of a situation where a co-maker. This prompted Capitol to seek reclarification from PBCOM and demanded the recrediting of its account. on a relevant date. Jai-Alai vs. 4 December 2009 Philippine National Bank vs.C.91 WHEREFORE.L. The check’s serial number is not the sole indicia of its origin.R. Gempesaw vs. 150228. 6. Assuming it to be true. International Corporate Bank vs. 12. Thus. Suffice it to say that the same. 66 SCRA 29. Save for the most cogent and compelling reason. G. 350 SCRA 446. Ebrada. July 31. 3. 53413 are AFFIRMED. Philippine Racing Club. 11. It is doctrinal that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It means an unauthorized change in the instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of the party. rendering redundant the referral to its serial number. Samsung Construction vs. No. Ilusorio vs. BPI.R. In other words. MWSS vs. 13 . 14. 8. a material alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of the NIL. which is not the case in the present action. January 31. 256 SCRA 491 FACTS: DECS issued a check in favor of Abante Marketing containing a specific serial number. July 20. PNB could not return the check to PBCOM. Republic vs. 2. Quimpo. CA. 15. 13. evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties all over again. It should pay the same. the said remedy is a matter of concern exclusively between themselves as accommodation party and accommodated party. Far East Bank. February 9. January 22. 1993. drawn against PNB. 1990. Cabilzo. however. can escape liability by the convenient expedient of interposing the defense that he is a merely an accommodation party. meaning by laches a negligent forbearance. 1975. Bank of America vs. Court of Appeals. as regards the other issues and errors alleged in this petition.

With the exception of the first check (dated 17 January 1978). the manager denied having given Pangilinan preferential treatment on this account. the drawee bank can recover the amount paid on the check bearing a forged indorsement from the collecting bank. The drawee bank's duty is but to verify the genuineness of the drawer's signature and not of the indorsement because the drawer is its client. The collecting bank. the PNB manager demanded reimbursement from the Associated Bank on 15 May 1981. The bank knows him. After trial on the merits. having guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements. that he has a good title to it. So even if the indorsement on the check deposited by the banks' client is forged. PNB and Associated Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. for lack of merit. Court of Appeals [GR 107612] Facts: The Province of Tarlac maintains a current account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Tarlac Branch where the provincial funds are deposited. The allotment checks for said government hospital are drawn to the order of "Concepcion Emergency Hospital. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto on 30 September 1992." Jesus David. Hence. the payee hospital) is essential to transfer title to the same instrument. the checks were order instruments. The bank on which a check is drawn. the Provincial Treasurer wrote the manager of the PNB seeking the restoration of the various amounts debited from the current account of the Province. It was then discovered that the hospital did not receive several allotment checks drawn by the Province. Court of Appeals [GR 107382. cannot debit the current account of the Province of Tarlac because it paid checks which bore forged indorsements. Where the instrument is payable to order at the time of the forgery. Concepcion. However." He cannot interpose the defense that signatures prior to him are forged. A collecting bank where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee bank.00 from PNB. The loss incurred by drawee bank-PNB can be passed on to the collecting bank-Associated Bank which presented and indorsed the checks to it. Concepcion Emergency Hospital.300. with the Associated Bank acting as collecting bank. Associated Bank. and that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.000. on the third-party complaint. If PNB negligently delayed in informing Associated Bank of the forgery. impleaded Associated Bank as third-party defendant.Associated Bank vs. In effect. shall be liable to PNB for 50% of P203. third-party complaint and fourth-party complaint. However.00 and dated 10 February 1981. as well as for 28 other checks of various amounts and on various dates. The fact that there were now two persons collecting the checks for the hospital is an unmistakable sign of an irregularity which should have alerted employees in the Treasurer's office of the fraud being committed. the Provincial Treasurer requested the manager of the PNB to return all of its cleared checks which were issued from 1977 to 1980 in order to verify the regularity of their encashment. Hence the consolidated petitions which seek a reversal of the appellate court's decision. Moreover. the lower court rendered its decision on 21 March 1988. Tarlac" or "The Chief. If both drawee bank-PNB and drawerProvince of Tarlac were negligent. When the holder's indorsement is forged. PNB. due to the negligence of the Province of Tarlac in releasing the checks to an unauthorized person (Fausto Pangilinan). After the checks were examined. The court also dismissed the counterclaims on the complaint. that all prior parties had capacity to contract. including that 14 . The infirmity in the questioned checks lies in the payee's (Concepcion Emergency Hospital) indorsements which are forgeries. is such an indorser. PNB.00. In addition.00 were encashed by one Fausto Pangilinan. the Province of Tarlac. was no longer connected with the hospital. collected the checks from the office of the Provincial Treasurer. The last check negotiated by Pangilinan was for P8.00 and shall be liable to the PNB for 50% thereof. After nearly three years. Held: The present case concerns checks payable to the order of Concepcion Emergency Hospital or its Chief. the Treasurer's office was still releasing the checks to the retired cashier. in favor of PNB and against Associated Bank ordering the latter to reimburse to the former the amount of P203. his address and history because he is a client. the signature of its rightful holder (here. On 19 February 1981. If the drawee bank delays in informing the presentor of the forgery. Checks issued by the Province are signed by the Provincial Treasurer and countersigned by the Provincial Auditor or the Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. in allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive the checks for the payee hospital for a period close to three years and in not properly ascertaining why the retired hospital cashier was collecting checks for the payee hospital in addition to the hospital's real cashier. Checks having forged indorsements should be differentiated from forged checks or checks bearing the forged signature of the drawer. Concepcion. ordering the latter to pay to the former. share the burden of loss from the checks bearing a forged indorsement. While he admitted that his wife and Pangilinan's wife are first cousins. the drawee bank. The Court finds that the Province of Tarlac was equally negligent and should. a drawee bank has the duty to promptly inform the presentor of the forgery upon discovery. In January 1981. the collecting bank is made liable because it is privy to the depositor who negotiated the check. Associated Bank can. in the amount of P5. After forging the signature of Dr.300. Hence. the Province brought suit against PNB which. The Province of Tarlac permitted Fausto Pangilinan to collect the checks when the latter. having already retired from government service. the Provincial Treasurer learned that 30 checks amounting to P203. the same was ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action as against Adena Canlas and lack of jurisdiction over the person of Fausto Pangilinan as against the latter. the manager of Associated Bank. therefore. However. 31 January 1996]. The drawee bank is not similarly situated as the collecting bank because the former makes no warranty as to the genuineness of any indorsement. in favor of the Province and against PNB. liable. They were properly issued and bear the genuine signatures of the drawer. He claimed to be assisting or helping the hospital follow up the release of the checks and had official receipts. thereby depriving said presentor of the right to recover from the forger. the sum of P203. It is liable on its warranties as indorser of the checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan. some of the aid allotment checks were released to Pangilinan and the others to Elizabeth Juco. Fausto Pangilinan. on the fourth-party complaint. the former is deemed negligent and can no longer recover from the presentor. is under strict liability to pay the check to the order of the payee. It has taken a risk on his deposit.300. in turn. the new cashier. In turn. all parties prior to the forgery may raise the real defense of forgery against all parties subsequent thereto." The checks are released by the Office of the Provincial Treasurer and received for the hospital by its administrative officer and cashier.00 with legal interests thereon from 20 March 1981 until fully paid. Tarlac. it forfeits its right to reimbursement and will be made to bear the loss. known as the drawee bank. if the Province of Tarlac as drawer was negligent to the point of substantially contributing to the loss. Pangilinan was able to withdraw the money when the check was cleared and paid by the drawee bank. such as the checks in the case. Pangilinan followed the same procedure for the second check. Issue: Whether PNB was at fault and should solely bear the loss because it cleared and paid the forged checks. on the basic complaint. fraud or irregularity in the indorsement.300. the books of account of the Provincial Treasurer were post-audited by the Provincial Auditor. Herein. On 26 February 1981. the Province of Tarlac can only recover 50% of P203. As both banks resisted payment. The latter then filed a fourth-party complaint against Adena Canlas and Fausto Pangilinan.00 and dated 20 April 1978. the manager of Associated Bank refused and suggested that Pangilinan deposit the check in his personal savings account with the same bank. All the checks bore the stamp of Associated Bank which reads "All prior endorsements guaranteed Associated Bank. Pangilinan sought to encash the first check with Associated Bank. who was the administrative officer and cashier of payee hospital until his retirement on 28 February 1978. An indorser of an order instrument warrants "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be. also Philippine National Bank vs. A portion of the funds of the province is allocated to the Concepcion Emergency Hospital. He did not find as irregular the fact that the checks were not payable to Pangilinan but to the Concepcion Emergency Hospital.300. thus depriving the latter of the opportunity to recover from the forger. alleged that Pangilinan made it appear that the checks were paid to him for certain projects with the hospital. the collecting bank is bound by his warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the defense of forgery as against the drawee bank. The bank is also in a better position to detect forgery. in turn. There is also evidence indicating that the provincial employees were aware of Pangilinan's retirement and consequent dissociation from the hospital. all the checks were issued and released after Pangilinan's retirement on 28 February 1978.00 with legal interest thereon from 20 March 1981 until fully paid. the loss should be properly apportioned between them. then the drawee bank PNB can charge its account. hold the forger.300. It turned out that Fausto Pangilinan. the Province contributed to the loss amounting to P203. Adena Canlas who was chief of the payee hospital.000. At the time of their indorsement.

246. to Ramon R. Ebrada filed a Third-Party complaint against Adelaida Dominguez who. Issue [1]: Whether the existence of one forged signature in a negotiable instrument will render void all the other negotiations of the check with respect to the other parties whose signature are genuine. CA. there were 15 . she didn't carefully examine the same to double-check her payments. Republic Bank was then requested by the Bureau of Treasury to refund the amount of P1. A party whose signature was forged was never a party and never gave his consent to the instrument. Republic Bank was later advised by the said bureau that the alleged indorsement on the reverse side of the aforesaid check by the payee. respondents Facts: Petitioner is a prominent businessman who. It was also shown that even if the checks were crossed. at the time material to this case. Lorenzo to Adelaida Dominguez. it can be safely concluded that it is only the negotiation predicated on the forged indorsement that should be declared inoperative. This means that the negotiation of the check in question from Martin Lorenzo. as well as the right of the estate of Dominguez to file the fourth-party complaint against Tinio.08.08 at the main office of the Republic Bank at Escolta. Finding no sufficient basis for plaintiff's cause against defendant bank. the same cannot be enforced against him even by a holder in due course. Ebrada filed her answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that she was a holder in due course of the check in question. until fully paid. It was also Eugenio who verified and reconciled the statements of said checking account. Applying this principle to the case. Petitioner then requested the respondent bank to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed but respondent refused. plus the costs in both instances against Ebrada. should be considered valid and enforceable. Petitioner in this case has relied solely on the honesty and loyalty of her bookkeeper and never bothered to verify the accuracy of the amounts of the checks she signed the invoices attached thereto. should be declared of no effect. the trial court DISMISSED the case. 135 Iowa 670. it was held that it is only the negotiation based on the forged or unauthorized signature which is inoperative. petitioner entrusted to his secretary.634. On the same date. 31 July 1975] Facts: On or about 27 February 1963. forged indorsements thereon. Farrel. that it is in estoppel. She paid her suppliers through the issuance of checks drawn against her checking account with respondent bank. Private respondent. Held [1]: In the case of Beam vs. Dr. the third indorser. Gempensaw didn't bother herself in verifying to whom the checks were being paid and if the issuances were necessary. where a check has several indorsements on it. with an aggregate amount of P119. Dante Razon. filed on 14 September 1966 a Fourth-Party complaint against Justina Tinio. 590. So Republic Bank sued Ebrada before the City Court of Manila. and for Dominguez against Tinio.246. Aggrieved. his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks. also lodged a complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents against Eugenio on the basis of petitioner’s statement that his signatures in the checks were forged. Manila Banking Corporation. Manila. Prior to signing of the checks. On 21 March 1967. barring any claim of forgery. As he was then running about 20 corporations.08. The checks were then indorsed. the Manila Banking Corporation. but Ebrada refused to do so. An exception to this rule is when the drawer is guilty of negligence which causes the bank to honor such checks. Petitioner did not bother to check his statement of account until a business partner apprised him that he saw Eugenio use his credit cards. where a partial stipulation of facts was submitted. Ebrada appealed. the intended payees didn't receive the amount of the checks. She didn't even verify the returned checks of the bank when the latter notifies her of the same.of the chief of the payee hospital.246. Petitioner completed the checks by signing them and thereafter authorized Galang to deliver the same to their respective payees. Between the dates September 5. in turn. through an affidavit executed by its employee. ordering Ebrada to pay Republic Bank the amount of P1. a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been forged cannot debit the account of a drawer for the amount of said check. Lorenzo. From the judgment of the City Court.W.34. and from Adelaida Dominguez to Ebrada who did not know of the forgery. 1981. On 11 July 1966. The check was issued by the Bureau of Treasury. Republic Bank vs. He was a depositor in good standing of respondent bank. Court of Appeals [GR 92244. the City Court of Manila rendered judgment for the Republic Bank against Ebrada. incidents shown that the amounts paid for were in excess of what should have been paid. petitioner vs. And though she received her bank statements. Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her personal account about seventeen (17) checks drawn against the account of the petitioner at the respondent bank. and was going out of the country a number of times. petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Gempesaw vs. HELD: Forgery is a real defense by the party whose signature was forged. Ebrada. Based on the stipulation of facts and the documentary evidence presented. with interest as the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on 16 June 1966. Ebrada took an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. the second indorser. Eugenio. Her signing the checks made the negotiable instruments complete. 113 N. Since his signature doesn’t appear in the instrument. or at the very least. Petitioner didn't exercise reasonable diligence which eventually led to the fruition of her bookkeeper’s fraudulent schemes. In the signing of the checks prepared by Galang. CA Ramon Ilusorio. has acquired her rights from a holder in due course and therefore entitled to the proceeds thereof. To recover what it had refunded to the Bureau of Treasury. As a rule. Republic Bank made verbal and formal demands upon Ebrada to account for the sum of P1. Petitioner fired Eugenio immediately. Adena Canlas. She also alleged that the Republic Bank has no cause of action against her. but the negotiation of the aforesaid check from Ramon R. During her two years in business.246. This prompted Gempensaw to demand the bank to credit her account for the amount of the forged checks. Associated Bank was also remiss in its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the payee's indorsement. "Martin Lorenzo" was a forgery since the latter had allegedly died as of 14 July 1952. encashed Back Pay Check 508060 dated 15 January 1963 for P1. Katherine E. 1980 and January 23. Mauricia T. there was no valid contract yet. for Ebrada against Dominguez. reserving therein the right of Ebrada to file whatever claim she may have against Dominguez in connection with the case.ndent refused. In the case at bar the checks were filled up by petitioner’s employee Galang and were later given to her for signature. Ilusorio vs. the original payee. or so negligent as not to be entitled to recover anything from her.08. The drawee bank cannot charge the account of the drawer whose signature was forged because he never gave the bank the order to pay. the trial court rendered a decision. The bank refused to do so and this prompted her to file the case against the bank. Ebrada [GR L-40796. and instituted a criminal action against her for estafa thru falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. was the Managing Director of Multinational Investment Bancorporation and the Chairman and/or President of several other corporations. The checks were prepared by her bookkeeper Galang. 9 February 1993] FACTS: Gempensaw was the owner of many grocery stores.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 1996 is REVERSED. Jong learned of the encashment of the check. o Cabilzo demanded that Metrobank re-credit the amount of P91. which had referred the check for investigation to the NBI. while the checks remained in the custody of the company’s accountant.500. Laboratory. maintained a current account with defendant Far East Bank and Trust Company (“FEBTC”) at the latter’s Bel-Air. The Bank Manager reputedly told Jong that he would be reimbursed for the amount of the check. The sole signatory to Samsung Construction’s account was Jong Kyu Lee (“Jong”). as his sales commission check was presented to Westmont Bank for payment who indorsed it to Metrobank for appropriate clearing After the entries thereon were examined. and based on the applicable laws and jurisprudence. a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against Sempio before the Laguna court. Metrobank vs. The following day Kyu. it is wholly inoperative. On the other hand. Confirming the identity of Gonzaga. Syfu authorized the bank’s encashment of the check to Gonzaga. or to give a discharge therefor.Appeals by way of a petition for review but without success. she concluded that Jong’s signature had been forged on the check. Metrobank cleared the check for encashment in accordance with the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules November 16. 1994: Cabilzo’s representative was at Metrobank when he was asked by a bank personnel if Cabilzo had issued a check in the amount of P91K to which he replied in negative That afternoon: Cabilzo called Metrobank to reiterate that he did not issue the check o He later discovered that the check of P1K was altered to P91K and date was changed from Nov 24 to Nov 14. and no right to retain the instrument.500.00) had been encashed. Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states: When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be. in paying a forged check. Satisfied with the genuineness of the signature of Jong. presented Senior NBI Document Examiner Roda B. in filing an estafa case against petitioner’s secretary. who vouched for the genuineness of Jong’s signature. (“Samsung Construction”). irrespective of its good faith. SO ORDERED. and the latter presented three (3) identification cards. A bank is liable.00 to P91. Kyu Yong Lee (“Kyu”). Perez. (Emphasis supplied) The crucial fact in question is whether or not the check was forged. 1995: Through counsel sent a letter-demand for the amount of P90K CA affirmed RTC: Favored Cablizo ISSUE: W/N Cablizo can recover from Metrobank HELD: YES. Makati branch. 06 December 2006 FACTS: Samsung Construction vs.000 drawn against his Metrobank account to Mr. payable to cash and drawn against Samsung Construction’s current account.000. Makati . 15 August 2004 FACTS: Plaintiff Samsung Construction Company Philippines. She testified that her findings showed that Jong’s signature on the check was genuine. Marquez. FEBTC on the other hand. a document examiner from the PNP Crime        November 12. the check was altered so that the amount was increased from P1. Cleofe exercise the bank procedure in encashment using check. 432100 to the bank’s branch in Bel-Air. The check. who then proceeded to the bank. On 19 March 1992. Cabilzo (Cabilzo) issued a Metrobank Check payable to "CASH" and postdated on November 24. Samsung Corporation. 1994 in the amount of P1. said that it was still conducting an investigation on the matter. Samsung Construction filed aComplaint on 10 June 1992 for violation of Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Manila . the fact that Manila Bank had filed a case for estafa against Eugenio would not estop it from asserting the fact that forgery has not been clearly established. both sides presented their respective expert witnesses to testify on the claim that Jong’s signature was forged. presented Rosario C. Branch 9.00 and the date was changed from 24 November 1994 to 14 November 1994.000. In this case. Subsequently. its Project Manager. Costs against respondent. discovered that a check in the amount of Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P999. and realized that his signature had been forged.The bank officer Syfu also noticed Jose Sempio III (“Sempio”). or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto. During the trial. The bank teller. Unsatisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Jong in the subject check was forged? RULING Upon examination of the record. a certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for payment FEBTC Check No.00 to his account June 30. dated 25 April 1994 is REINSTATED.1994: Renato D. Inc. Far East Bank. issue: (2) whether or not private respondent. The latter issue becomes relevant only if there is need to weigh the comparative negligence between the bank and the party whose signature was forged. WHEREFORE. Branch 9. was in the amount of Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P999. Flores. and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. which had sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Indeed there was forgery in this case. not whether the bank could have detected the forgery. She then asked Gonzaga to submit proof of his identity.000. indeed there was forgery.00). The appellate court held that petitioner’s own negligence was the proximate cause of his loss. FEBTC. CA Affirmed  In the case at bar. we reverse the Court of Appeals decision. unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. Sempio said that the check was for the purchase of equipment for Samsung Construction. the Petition is GRANTED. who supported the claim of Gonzaga. the assistant accountant of Samsung Construction . Cabilzo. Petitioner cannot hold private respondent in estoppel for the latter is not the actual party to the criminal action. She testified that based on her examination. Kyu perused the checkbook and found that the last blank check was missing. He reported the matter to Jong. Held: On the second issue. Jong proceeded to the police station and consulted with his lawyers. is barred from raising the defense that the fact of forgery was not established. Syfu showed the check to Sempio. including the availability of funds and the authenticity of the signature of the drawer. can be acquired through or under such signature. 16 .

now merged with herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Makati for sum of money and damages against Asianbank and Bitanga.” Without the indorsement or authority of his co-payee BA Finance. it is entitled to the entire proceeds of the check. holding that Asianbank was negligent in allowing Bitanga to deposit the check to his account and to withdraw the proceeds thereof. and petitioner allowed the deposit and release of the proceeds thereof. Branch 137 of the Makati RTC. Court of Appeals. On Bitanga’s claim. authorized. Malayan Insurance issued a check payable to the order of “B. he mortgaged his car to respondent BA Finance. BA Finance eventually learned of the loss of the car and of Malayan Insurance’s issuance of a crossed check payable to it and Bitanga. a collecting bank stamps the back of the check with the phrase “all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed” and. ostensibly ignoring the fact that the check did not. however. was negligent when it allowed the deposit of the crossed check. the banking business is imbued with public interest such that the highest degree of diligence and highest standards of integrity and performance are expected of banks in order to maintain the trust and confidence of the public in general in the banking sector. drawn against China Banking Corporation (China Bank).500. but despite demands. bank must be a high degree of diligence. if any. Bitanga’s loan became past due. BA Finance. it bears repeating. BA Finance thereupon demanded the payment of the value of the check from Asianbank but to no avail. despite the absence of authority of Bitanga’s co-payee BA Finance to endorse it on its behalf. In the meantime. he may enforce the payment thereof according to its original tenor. ISSUE: The petition fails. and noting the claim of Malayan Insurance that it is its policy to issue checks to both the insured and the financing company. Metrobank vs. all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others. As has been repeatedly emphasized. treats the check as a negotiable instrument. if not the utmost diligence o Surprisingly. finding that Malayan Insurance was not privy to the contract between BA Finance and Bitanga. This is because in indorsing a check to the drawee bank. petitioner. he failed to settle it. Metrobank failed to detect the above alterations which could not escape the attention of even an ordinary person  "NINETY" is also typed differently and with a lighter ink  only 2 asterisks were placed before the amount in figures. held that Malayan Insurance cannot be faulted for negligence for issuing the check payable to both BA Finance and Bitanga. Asianbank in this case.000 as actual damages. The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law and underlying jurisprudential teachings on the black-letter law provide definitive justification for petitioner’s full liability on the value of the check. Clearly. through its employee. The appellate court. Alteration of instrument. except as against a party who has himself made. To be sure. for all intents and purposes. Section 41 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners. is separate and independent from the liability of Metrobank to Cabilzo.A. “summarizing” the errors attributed to the trial court by Asianbank to be “whether…BA Finance has a cause of action against [it] even if the subject check had not been delivered to…BA Finance by the issuer itself. it is avoided. carry the indorsement of BA Finance. 4 December 2009 FACTS: Lamberto Bitanga (Bitanga) obtained from respondent BA Finance Corporation (BA Finance) a P329. a collecting bank.” held in the affirmative and accordingly affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the award of P20. – Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon. Bitanga subsequently withdrew the entire proceeds of the check. assumes the 17 . prompting it to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Petitioner’s argument is flawed. is an indorser. BA Finance has a cause of action against petitioner. it violates the terms of the check. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Bitanga alone endorsed the crossed check. But when the instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course not a party to the alteration.and assented to the alteration and subsequent indorsers. despite the lone endorsement of Bitanga. The check was crossed with the notation “For Deposit Payees’ Account Only. The corollary liability of Westmont Ban's indorsement. The trial court. The car was stolen. hence. found Asianbank and Bitanga jointly and severally liable to BA Finance following Section 41 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and Associated Bank v. Bitanga deposited the check to his account with the Asianbank Corporation (Asianbank). without his co-payee BA Finance having either indorsed it or authorized him to indorse it in its behalf. Undoubtedly. . Section 124. Neither did he assent to the alteration by his express or implied acts o There is no showing that he failed to exercise such reasonable degree of diligence required of a prudent man which could have otherwise prevented the loss. Is petitioner liable to BA Finance for the full value of the check?     Cabilzo was not the one who made nor authorized the alteration. effect of. where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the drawee bank. inter alia.280 loan to secure which. alleging that. while 3 asterisks were placed after such amount  "NINETY" are likewise a little bigger when compared with the letters of the words "ONE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY" When the drawee bank pays a materially altered check. The payment of an instrument over a missing indorsement is the equivalent of payment on a forged indorsement or an unauthorized indorsement in itself in the case of joint payees. and of Bitanga’s depositing it in his account at Asianbank and withdrawing the entire proceeds thereof. as well as its duty to charge its client’s account only for bona fide disbursements he had made. Finance Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga” for P224.

ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY CASES: 1. vs.” The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip. 1986. In early December 1985. Upon arraignment. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account active and funded beyond the ninety-day period. Wong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violations of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. February 2. however. Petitioner. Far East Realty vs. The agents would get the purchase orders of customers and forward them to LPI.These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers who failed to issue post-dated checks.500. Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18. Jr. ordered the bank to stop payment. which he duly acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with his wife. the parties agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner’s unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to P18. February 2. Blg. 1988. On November 6. 2001] LUIS S.P.00. Thus. 17 July 2006. without any valid cause. 22 provides: [G.07.00. vs. Far East Realty Investment. Blg. one who credits the proceeds of a check to the account of the indorsing payee is liable in conversion to the non-indorsing payee for the entire amount of the check. Instead. Blg. Allied Banking vs. the trial court finds the accused Luis S. 142641. the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B. Without Asianbank’s warranty. 1985 maturity date. Blg. 166 SCRA 256. 8. generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of prior indorsements. 217 SCRA 32.00.P. 1987. State Investment House vs. as the collecting bank or last indorser.warranty of an indorser. There are two (2) ways of violating B. Gueco. Inc. CA. 117857. Hence. October 5.P. and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. 2001. 3. BA Finance Corporation. Asia Banking Corporation vs. No. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5) banking days. B. 22. 9. 2. following company policy. 200 SCRA 637. LPI refused to accept the checks as guarantees. 11 July 2006 On August 30. Blg. LPI would print sample calendars. LPI waived the P52. Nyco Sales Corporation vs. ISSUE: whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under B. GG Sportswear.00. Petitioner. After printing the calendars. Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5.375. G. People of the Philippines. International Corporate Bank vs. LPI deposited the checks with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. or 157 days after the December 30.P. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. Section 2 of B. Accordingly. LPI would ship the calendars directly to the customers. The checks were returned for the reason “account closed. Hence. 6. No.P. 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI. the agents would come around to collect the payments. and not as guarantee. petitioner’s customers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders. CA. 1986. This flawed argument has no factual basis. FACTS: Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. 22 under three separate Informations for the three checks amounting to P5. 5. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Wong vs. WONG.P. on June 5. Arceo. vs.” Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to apply for account or for value. the argument has no legal basis. and P6. As to the second element. for what B. complainant through counsel notified the petitioner of the dishonor.P. 2001. CA.077. CA. 4. for the same reason had not the drawer. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded. respondents. On June 20. However. then give them to agents to present to customers. Thereafter. CA. the drawee bank (China Bank in this case) would not have paid the value of the subject check.R. had a history of unremitted collections. 1990. Likewise. Wong pleaded not guilty. the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections. the maker’s knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. all dated December 30. Trial ensued. Blg. However. petitioner reneged on his promise. (LPI). 1986. P3. 44 Phil 777. The appellate court affirmed the the trial court’s decision in toto. Javier.R. Sps. Before the maturity of the checks. 7. a manufacturer of calendars.07 difference.025.P. petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of B. February 12. He attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual “cut-anddried” B. petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. petitioner.410. 18 . 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already paid.

should not be paid. however. and P25. presentment is sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof. counterclaims or suits for damages.000. Desi Tomas. the Gueco spouses initiated a civil action for damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise.) Issue: Whether the bank was negligent in opting not to deposit or use the manager’s check. Gueco and Ma. and to pay the cost of suit. The bank filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Gueco went to the bank and talked with its Administrative Support Auto Loans/Credit Card Collection Head. Spouses Gueco GR 141968. we find no error in the respondent court’s affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. (Short facts: In the meeting of 29 August 1995. Luz E. Upon his failure to do so. In other respect. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. the RTC held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the reduction of the amount of indebtedness and the release of the car but said agreement did not include the signing of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of the compromise. the Bank filed on 7 August 1995 a civil action (Civil Case 658-95) for "Sum of Money with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City. Gueco instructed the bank to disregard the "hold order" letter and demanded the immediate release of his car. Branch 33. a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months. therefore. After some negotiations and computation. presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue. and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. As found by the trial court.00. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court. On 29 August 1995. An essential element of the offense is “knowledge” on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was reversed. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost.00 as attorney's fees. issued the decision. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. the car was detained inside the bank's compound. In consideration thereof. dated 4 September 1995. Dr. a representative of the bank However. with costs against the bank. nowhere in said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. The negotiations resulted in the further reduction of the outstanding loan to P150. Under the negotiable instruments law.00. denying the petition for review on certiorari and affirming the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City. Gueco delivered a manager's check in the amount of P150. Gueco anytime.” To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application. Branch 45.000.The making. Branch 227.00 as moral damages.000. The court further ordered the bank to return immediately the subject car to the spouses in good working condition. However. A stale check is one which has not been presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue.00. drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank. P25. he was made to execute a statement to the effect that he was withholding the payment of the check. There is.” By current banking practice. LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. 1989 Model. security for the notes. petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof. the amount was lowered to P154. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish. in Civil Case Q-97-31176.000.Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. Dr. In its decision. the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the checks that were dishonored. Dr. Gueco refused to sign the joint motion to dismiss. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. the Bank's Assistant Vice President demanded payment of the amount of P184. On 25 August 1995. While there is controversy as to whether the document evidencing the order to hold payment of the check was formally offered as evidence by the bank. since Dr. the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check “is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. Dr.000. Branch 227 of Quezon City. Subsequently. the court affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 33. Francis Gueco was served summons and was fetched by the sheriff and representative of the bank for a meeting in the bank premises. After the checks were dishonored. an instrument not payable on demand must be presented for payment on the day it falls due. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof. Jefferson Rivera. It is not an element of the offense. The Spouses defaulted in payment of installments.000. as a result of the non-payment of the reduced amount on that date. in toto. On 28 August 1995. However. the Spouses executed promissory notes which were payable in monthly installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as 19 . pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. Said check was given to Mr. In the case of a bill of exchange. A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue. the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check.00 which represents the unpaid balance for the car loan. private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon. Dr. to which the former replied that the condition of signing the joint motion to dismiss must be satisfied and that they had kept the check which could be claimed by Dr. -. When the instrument is payable on demand. and to pay the spouses the sum of P50. 12-2000. It is valueless and. And despite petitioner’s insistent plea of innocence. or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Gueco obtained a loan from petitioner International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank of the Philippines) to purchase a car — a Nissan Sentra 1600 4DR. insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard operating procedure in their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing of claims. 2000. After several demand letters and meetings with bank representatives.00 but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss. 12 February 2001 Facts: Spouses Francis S. sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. which on 17 February 2000. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. the usage of trade or business with respect to The International Corporate Bank (now Union Bnak of the Philippines) vs. the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Held: NO. Desi Tomas. which took effect on November 21. on record. Rivera. It is the contention of the Gueco spouses and their counsel that Dr." regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument. Rather. the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. Gueco delivered a manager's check representing the reduced amount of P150.000.00 as exemplary damages. when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. and in determining what is a "reasonable time. vice president of the bank. Gueco need not sign the motion for joint dismissal considering that they had not yet filed their Answer. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions. “a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. in a letter addressed to Ms.000. Consequently. the Bank. or 180 days. it appears from the pleadings that said check has not been encashed.

she was responsible for the dishonor of her checks. Moulic withdrew her funds from the drawee bank. is a ground for the discharge of the instrument as against a holder in due course. it is a bill of exchange drawn by the cashier of a bank upon the bank itself. issued as security. (c) By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder. so that Notice of Dishonor would be futile. the payee. however. Since MOULIC failed to get back possession of the post-dated checks. (c) When the drawer is the person to whom the instrument is presented for payment. not hindering or hampering transactions in commercial paper. Correspondingly. does not totally wipe out all liability. A cashier's check is a check of the bank's cashier on his own or another check. as security for pieces of jewelry to be sold on commission. has not been accepted or has not been paid.R. much less shown that they or the bank which issued the manager's check has suffered damage or loss caused by the delay or non-presentment. the check involved is not an ordinary bill of exchange but a manager's check. under the specific circumstances of the certain cases constituted unreasonable time as a matter of law. Consequently. 2 post-dated Equitable Banking Corporation checks in the amount of P50. In fact. MOULIC may not unilaterally discharge herself from her liability by the mere expediency of withdrawing her funds from the drawee bank. Moulic. pal debtor." Indeed. The act of destroying the instrument must also be made by the holder of the instrument intentionally. there are exceptions under Section 114 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. could no longer be retrieved as they had already been negotiated. Issue [2]: Whether the requirement that SIHI should give Notice of Dishonor to MOULIC is indispensable. The test is whether the payee employed such diligence as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs.000 each. 142641. 1231 of the Civil Code which enumerates the modes of extinguishing obligations. if the check had become stale. After withdrawing her funds. was no longer MOULIC's creditor at the time the jewelry was returned. In this case. SIHI elevated the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals. burning it. She is thus liable as she has no legal basis to excuse herself from liability on her checks to a holder in due course. SIHI could not expect payment as MOULIC left no funds with the drawee bank to meet her obligation on the checks. such withdrawal renders the drawer. the trial court dismissed the Complaint as well as the Third-Party Complaint.such instruments. On 26 May 1988. JR. the acts which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money under paragraph (d) are determined by other existing legislations since Section 119 does not specify what these acts are. Thus. Failure of a payee to encash a check for more than 10 years undoubtedly resulted in the check becoming stale. Section 114 (When notice need not be given to drawer) provides that "Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the drawer in the following cases: (a) Where the drawer and the drawee are the same person. There is an implied representation that funds or credit are available for the payment of the instrument in the bank upon which it is drawn. before their maturity dates. She simply withdrew her funds from her drawee bank and transferred them to another to protect herself. 217 SCRA 32 Facts: Nora B. a holder in due course of the checks. Failure to present on time.00 for attorney's fees. Thereafter. The holder who takes the negotiated paper makes a contract with the parties on the face of the instrument. and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance. Thus.000. In effect. The check becomes the primary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. On the other hand. The Court saw no bad faith or negligence in this position taken by the Bank. and the facts of the particular case. e. and that the party notified is expected to pay it. Nor should it be brushed aside in order to meet the necessities in a single case. She also instituted a Third-Party Complaint against Corazon Victoriano. Issue [1]: Whether the alleged issuance of the post-dated checks as security is a ground for the discharge of the instrument as against a holder in due course.g. SIHI sued to recover the value of the checks plus attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. failure to present for payment within a reasonable time will result to the discharge of the drawer only to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. This is because the nature and theory behind the use of a check points to its immediate use and payability. In addition. (d) By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money. No. the intentional cancellation contemplated under paragraph (c) is that cancellation effected by destroying the instrument either by tearing it up. (b) When the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract. (b) By payment in due course by the party accommodated. Moulic contends that she incurred no obligation on the checks because the jewelry was never sold and the checks were negotiated without her knowledge and consent." Obviously. the drawer would be the maker and in which case the holder need not prove presentment for payment or present the bill to the drawee for acceptance. but the appellate court affirmed the trial court on the ground that the Notice of Dishonor to Moulic was made beyond the period prescribed by the Negotiable Instruments Law and that even if SIHI did serve such notice on Moulic within the reglementary period it would be of no consequence as the checks should never have been presented for payment. Jr. none of the modes outlined therein is applicable in the instant case as Section 119 contemplates of a situation where the holder of the instrument is the creditor while its drawer is the debtor. (e) Where the drawer had countermanded payment. (e) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. liable to SIHI. Herein. the fact that a specified instrument. It is really the bank's own check and may be treated as a promissory note with the bank as a maker. she could not have expected her checks to be honored.Upon presentment for payment. hence. Held [2]: The need for notice is not absolute. Herein. She did not retrieve the checks when she returned the jewelry. In other words. so she returned them to the payee before maturity of the checks. G. the bank held on the check and refused to encash the same because of the controversy surrounding the signing of the joint motion to dismiss. In a case. The mere issuance of it is considered an acceptance thereof. Held [1]: Section 119 of the Negotiable Instrument Law outlined the grounds in which an instrument is discharged. the original obligation to pay certainly has not been erased. it becomes imperative that the circumstances that caused its non-presentment be determined. the said statute should not be tampered with haphazardly or lightly. a check payable on demand which was long overdue by about two and a half (2-1/2) years was considered a stale check. or writing the word "cancelled" on the instrument. although Moulic avers that no such notice was given her. SIHI filed the petition for review. Definitely. A manager's check is one drawn by the bank's manager upon the bank itself. It has been held that. 17 July 2006 FACTS: 20 . even a delay of 1 week or two (2) days. thus. It is similar to a cashier's check both as to effect and use. and ordered SIHI to pay Moulic P3. MOULIC'S actuations leave much to be desired. vs. upon proper proceedings taken. Even assuming that presentment is needed. ARCEO. The checks. (SIHI). one dated 30 August 1979 and the other. Herein. Consequently. PACIFICO B. State Investment House vs. the checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Moulic failed to sell the pieces of jewelry. On 20 December 1979. On 6 October 1983. there was no need to serve her Notice of Dishonor. either verbally or by writing. the withdrawal of the money from the drawee bank to avoid liability on the checks cannot prejudice the rights of holders in due course. the Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted for the purpose of facilitating. People of the Philippines. MOULIC may only invoke paragraphs (c) and (d) as possible grounds for the discharge of the instrument. which is simply bringing to the knowledge of the drawer or indorser of the instrument. (d) Where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the instrument. the legal situation amounts to an acknowledgment of liability in the sum stated in the check. the Gueco spouses have not alleged. Moulic issued to Corazon Victoriano. SIHI allegedly notified Moulic of the dishonor of the checks and requested that it be paid in cash instead. In her Answer. Corazon Victoriano. If treated as promissory note. the intentional cancellation of the said checks is altogether impossible. Herein. CA.. But. who later assumed full responsibility for the checks. where the instrument is made or accepted for his accommodation. Art. the payee negotiated the checks to the State Investment House Inc. The provision states that "A negotiable instrument is discharged: (a) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the princiWhether the post-dated checks. Again. 30 September 1979.

#73/S0299. Thereafter. ALLIED demanded payment from all the respondents based on the Letters of Guaranty and Surety executed in favor of ALLIED. the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. to have the export bill purchased or discounted.52 and the receipt of which was acknowledged by the latter in its letter dated June 22. Corporation (GGS). HELD: The Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense. 1992. BDO-81002 in the amount of US $20. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check. [Cenizal] executed on January 20. obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the amount of P100. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. Manila (ALLIED) purchased Export Bill No. which is what is involved in this case. credits and/or obligations. holding themselves jointly and severally liable on any and all credit accommodations. The bill. [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that he would replace the check with cash. CA. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. advances. [Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal.[9] The surety also contained a clause whereby said sureties waive protest and notice of dishonor of any and all such instruments.000. as the beneficiary of the export bill. payment was refused due to some material discrepancies in the documents submitted by GGS relative to the exportation covered by the letter of credit. credits and/or other obligation that may be granted by the petitioner ALLIED to respondent GGS. Thus. 1981. Hence. holding themselves liable on the export bill if it should be dishonored or retired by the drawee for any reason. Unless the bill is promptly presented for payment at maturity and due notice of dishonor given to the indorser within a reasonable time. (issuing bank). Sportswear since the respondents held themselves liable upon demand in case the instrument was dishonored and on the surety. Before ALLIED agreed to purchase the subject export bill. loans. 1992. Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. guaranteeing payment of any and all such credit accommodations which ALLIED may extend to GGS. ALLIED credited GGS the peso equivalent of the aforementioned bill amounting to P151. [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.[10] These letters of guaranty and surety are now the basis of the petitioner’s action. [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50. 1981. 21 . petitioner himself admitted that he issued the check. On the same date. respondents refused to pay. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16. 163255. [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. So. informed [Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on the documents. petitioner Allied Bank.00. respondents Nari Gidwani and spouses Leon and Leticia de Villa executed Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety. holding them liable on demand. Sportswear Mfg.G. in case the subject export bill was dishonored or retired for any reason. instruments.On March 14. 1992 before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. He never denied that the check was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Respondent GGS. he will be discharged from liability thereon. the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check. they even waived notice of dishonor as stipulated in their Letters of Guarantee.[15] On the other hand. Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period. he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution. GG Sportswear. the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established.. Subsequently. not its content.G.[17] Therefore. it required respondents Nari Gidwani and Alcron to execute Letters of Guaranty. went to petitioner ALLIED. the spouses Leon and Leticia de Villa and Nari Gidwani also executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety (surety.00 from respondent G. The contract of indorsement is primarily that of transfer. the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto ISSUE: WON petitioner is held liable for the dishonor of the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. 1991. 1992. [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. for brevity). loans. Several weeks thereafter.00 from [Cenizal]. When his patience ran out. the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months. Thereafter. this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27.[8] Likewise. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check.000. drawn under a letter of credit No. (Alcron) executed their respective Letters of Guaranty. petitioner was found guilty as charged. relied on by respondents. 1991 came. postdated August 4. When ALLIED negotiated the export bill to Chekiang. Hongkong. After due investigation. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5. There are well-defined distinctions between the contract of an indorser and that of a guarantor/surety of a commercial paper. 1991. Moreover. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Nari. Here. De Villa and Alcron are liable under the Letters of Guaranty and the Continuing Guaranty/ comprehensive Surety notwithstanding the fact that no protest was made after the bill. a foreign bill of exchange. for P150. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. The export bill was issued by Chekiang First Bank Ltd. respondents Nari Gidwani and Alcron International Ltd. When August 4. the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.[14] The liability of a guarantor/surety is broader than that of an indorser. BB640549 covered Men’s Valvoline Training Suit that was in transit to West Germany (Uniger via Rotterdam) under Cont. The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. 11 July 2006 FACTS: On January 6. except where required by the provisions of the contract of suretyship. As a consequence. is not pertinent to this case.085. Consequently. advances. Quezon City. was dishonored HELD: Section 152 of the Negotiable Instruments Law pertaining to indorsers. at Cenizal’s house located at 70 Panay Avenue. a demand or notice of default is not required to fix the surety’s liability. Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16. Allied Banking vs. However. According to current banking practice. 1991.00. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.[16] He cannot complain that the creditor has not notified him in the absence of a special agreement to that effect in the contract of suretyship.474. prompting ALLIED to file an action for a sum of money. [petitioner].000. while the contract of guaranty is that of personal security. With the purchase of the bill. instead of going to Chekiang First Bank Ltd. no protest on the export bill is necessary to charge all the respondents jointly and severally liable with G. The trial.

Failing in this Bataan Cigar vs. Failing in this respect. Subsequently. (b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue.00 as and for attorney's fees.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 24 February 1981 until fully paid. 5. BCCFI issued on 30 March 1979. (SIHI) On 19 July 1978. 1979. the checks were issued with the intention that George King would supply BCCFI with the bales of tobacco leaf. In view of this agreement. G.000. CA. 63 Phil 711.) State Investment House vs. There being failure of consideration. is a holder in due course. dismissing the complaint. George King was simultaneously dealing with State Investment House.DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENTS CASES: 1. Subsequently. 2.500 bales of tobacco leaves. SIHI is not a holder in due course. PNB vs. December 19. such circumstance should put the payee on inquiry and upon him devolves the duty to ascertain the holder's title to the check or the nature of his possession. CA. Inc. and without notice that it had been previously dishonored. contrary to Sec. The latter agreed to grant the same subject to the condition that the former should wait until December 1980 when he would have the money. really. drawn by BCCFI in favor of George King. these checks were dishonored by reason of "insufficient funds". the latter was declared in default. the latter failed to pay the same necessitating the former to file an action for collection against the latter and her husband before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (Note: It does not mean. the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) reversed the lower court's judgment in its decision. however. SIHI can collect from the immediate indorser.00. a holder of crossed checks. BCCFI. naming George King as payee to SIHI. 52(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. "stop payment" and "account closed". Valencia. The only disadvantage of a holder who is not a holder in due course is that the instrument is subject to defenses as if it were non-negotiable. when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was 22 . (NSWII) requested for a loan from Harris Chua.00. under Section 59 every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course. 2009. despite the supplier's failure to deliver in accordance with their earlier agreement. naming only BCCFI as party defendant. Nos. 9. Security Bank & Trust Company vs. Issue: Whether SIHI. JY Brothers. Hence. a second indorser. But the Court has taken cognizance of the practice that a check with two parallel lines in the upper left hand corner means that it could only be deposited and may not be converted into cash. BCCFI cannot be obliged to pay the checks.000. 1979 respectively. New Sikatuna Wood Industries. The trial court pronounced SIHI as having a valid claim being a holder in due course. June 17. 175 SCRA 311. When the three checks issued by Pena Chua were allegedly deposited by SIHI. New Pacific Timber vs. Stelco Marketing Corporation vs.00. However. (d) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. to deliver 2. respectively. 1992. that SIHI could not recover from the checks. Held: The Negotiable Instruments Law states what constitutes a holder in due course.450. 148211. including check TCBT 551826. Branch XXXVII (Civil Case 82-10547).91 under a deed of sale. 4. (c) That he took it in good faith and for value. In as much as George King failed to deliver the bales of tobacco leaf as agreed despite BCCFI's demand. In consideration thereof. 1978. both in the amount of P100. Nite. Issue [1]: Whether SIHI is a holder in due course as to entitle it to proceed against the spouses Chua for the amount stated in the dishonored cross checks. ordering them to pay jointly and severally to SIHI P 229. Salazar vs. The spouses Chua filed a third party complaint against NSWII for reimbursement and indemnification in the event that they be held liable to SIHI. if such was the fact. It further said that the non-inclusion of King Tim Pua George as party defendant is immaterial in the case. 15 September 2006. CA. i. Equitable PCI vs.U.00.402. 175 SCRA 311 Facts: Shortly before 5 September 1980. CA. P 29. since he. stop payment was also ordered on checks TCBTs 608967 & 608968 on September 14 & 28. it instituted the case for collection on three unpaid checks. BCCFI agreed to purchase additional 2. "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (a) That it is complete and regular upon its face. post dated 31 March 1979. Admittedly. the holder is declared guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal absence of good faith. Hon. engaged one of its suppliers.000. The total value of the postdated checks amounted to P 299. Consequently. SIHI filed the petition for review. State Investment House vs. 284 SCRA 643. Section 52(d) provides that in order that one may be a holder in due course. Held [1]: NO. to be able to collect from the drawer. he sold at a discount check TCBT 551826 bearing an amount of P164. Villanueva vs. BCCFI. On the other hand. SIHI claimed that despite demands on Peña Chua to make good said checks. acquired the title as holder in due course. On the third party complaint. as payee. Inc. 7. it is necessary that "at the time the instrument was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person negotiating it." Section 59 of the NIL further states that every holder is deemed prima facie a holder in due course. Seneris. 25 July 2006. National City Bank of New York. Crossing of checks should put the holder on inquiry and upon him devolves the duty to ascertain the indorser's title to the check or the nature of his possession. Bataan Cigar vs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.450. and the costs of suit. On appeal filed by the spouses (AC-GR CV 04523). Inc. George King. 3. (BCCFI). post dated September 15 & 30. A. RCBC. 6. the former assigned and discounted with SIHI 11 postdated checks including the 3 postdated checks issued by Peña Chua to NSWII.R. 10. 20 October 2010 defective. the Negotiable Instruments Law regulating the issuance of negotiable checks as well as the lights and liabilities arising therefrom. drawn by BCCFI. he again sold to SIHI checks TCBT 608967 & 608968. No. payable sometime in September 1979. Again BCCFI issued postdated crossed checks in the total amount of P1. with costs against SIHI. 230 SCRA 648. due to George King's failure to deliver the tobacco leaves. the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims. Ong. King Tim Pua George (George King). does not mention "crossed checks". Efforts of SIHI to collect from BCCFI having failed. During these times. a stop payment order on all checks payable to George King. on 13 July 1978 issued crossed checks post dated sometime in March 1979 in the total amount of P820. January 30. 170984 & 170987. CA. For failure of NSWII to answer the third party complaint despite due service of summons. and as such the consensus of authority is to the effect that the holder of the check is not a holder in due course. Anita Pena Chua (Harris Chua's wife) issued 3 crossed checks payable to NSWII all postdated 22 December 1980. respectively. G. 8. the lower court rendered judgment against the spouses. NSWII entered into an agreement with State Investment House. Papa vs. NSWII was ordered to pay the spouses all amounts said spouses may pay to SIHI on account of the case. Relying on the supplier's representation that he would complete delivery within three months from 5 December 1978.00. Because.e. a corporation involved in the manufacturing of cigarettes. Section 52(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Law defines a holder in due course as one who takes the instrument "in good faith and for value". is not an indispensable party. On December 19 and 26. Inc." However.047. Herein.000 bales of tobacco leaf starting October 1978. BCCFI filed the petition for review. BCCFI's defense in stopping payment is as good to SIHI as it is to George King.000. (SIHI) whereby for and in consideration of the sum of Pl.R. Consequently. On 30 April 1984. 230 SCRA 648 Facts: Bataan Cigar & Cigarette Factory. 1980.100.945.

170325 September 26. They maintained savings and demand/checking accounts. The PEMSLA checks issued for these loans were then given to the spouses for rediscounting. RODRIGUEZ and NORMA RODRIGUEZ. PEMSLA was likewise a client of PNB Amelia Avenue Branch. 25 July 2006 Equitable PCI vs. and that tThe payment made to a person other than the banker or institution shall not exempt the person on whom it is drawn. Ong. the appellate court said that when SIHI rediscounted the check knowing that it was a crossed check he was knowingly violating the avowed intention of crossing the check. Meanwhile. Salazar vs. the spouses would replace the postdated checks with their own checks issued in the name of the members. Cebu City. 15 September 2006 PEMSLA regularly granted loans to its members. 20 October 2010 23 . 810480-4 under the account name Erlando T. Nite. 148211. and the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose. 2008 THIRD DIVISION PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK. that such instruments are mentioned in Section 541 of the Code of Commerce. No. hence no loan was made. were deposited by the spouses to their account. without the knowledge or consent of the latter. Relying on the ruling in Ocampo v. hence the three checks are without consideration as per Section 28. Petitioner.2 The Facts The facts as borne by the records are as follows: Respondents-Spouses Erlando and Norma Rodriguez were clients of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB). ERLANDO T. that his failure to inquire from the holder. G. The PEMSLA checks. and PNBig Demand Deposit (Checking/Current Account No. NIL). The spouses were engaged in the informal lending business. Spouses Rodriguez would rediscount the postdated checks issued to members whenever the association was short of funds. No. Respondents.. that being not a holder in due course. In line with their business. SIHI was subject to personal defenses. To subvert this policy. The association maintained current and savings accounts with petitioner bank. if the payment was not correctly made. the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). 30 November 1961). The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. G. prevents him from being considered in good faith and thus he is not a holder in due course. In return. DECISION WHEN the payee of the check is not intended to be the true recipient of its proceeds. JY Brothers. This was an irregular procedure made possible through the facilitation of Edmundo Palermo. Jr. PNBig Demand Deposits (Checking/Current Account No. the check may be negotiated only once to one who has an account with a bank. that NSWII negotiated the three checks in breach of faith in violation of Section 55. the Rodriguez checks were deposited directly by PEMSLA to its savings account without any indorsement from the named payees.R. Naturally. It was PEMSLA’s policy not to approve applications for loans of members with outstanding debts. Negotiable Instruments Law. the spouses issued their personal checks (Rodriguez checks) in the name of the members and delivered the checks to an officer of PEMSLA. otherwise he is not a holder in due course. vs. an association of PNB employees.respect. such as lack of consideration between the spouses and NSWII (no deposits were made. As was customary. treasurer of PEMSLA and bank teller in the PNB Branch. is it payable to order or bearer? What is the fictitious-payee rule and who is liable under it? Is there any exception? These questions seek answers in this petition for review on certiorari of the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). which is a personal defense available to the drawer of the check. Rodriguez). Villanueva vs. NSWII. the purpose for which the three checks were cross despite the warning of the crossing. correctly elucidated that the effects of crossing a check are: the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank.R. 810624-6 under the account name Erlando and/or Norma Rodriguez). Amelia Avenue Branch. the payee is declared guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal absence of good faith and as such the consensus of authority is to the effect that the holder of the check is not a holder in good faith. The officers carried this out by forging the indorsement of the named payees in the checks. They took out loans in the names of unknowing members. Further. namely. some PEMSLA officers devised a scheme to obtain additional loans despite their outstanding loan accounts. they had a discounting3 arrangement with the Philnabank Employees Savings and Loan Association (PEMSLA). It appears that this became the usual practice for the parties. on the other hand. Gatchalian (GR L-15126.

000.For the period November 1998 to February 1999. PEMSLA approached the plaintiffs-appellees for the latter to issue rediscounted checks in favor of said applicant members." The corresponding Rodriguez checks. and other businesses: (a) Consequential damages. hence. Consequently.804. in view of the foregoing. and that such was a regular practice by the parties until the defendantappellant discovered the scam. the checks were negotiable by mere delivery. Alarmed over the unexpected turn of events. PEMSLA allegedly issued postdated checks to its qualified members who had applied for loans. PNB violated its contractual obligation to them as depositors.00.345. 2004. Checking/Current Account No. 810480-4 of Erlando T.00 or reinstate or restore the amount of P775.00 in the PNBig Demand Deposit. The court a quo declared: We are not swayed by the contention of the plaintiffs-appellees (Spouses Rodriguez) that their cause of action arose from the alleged breach of contract by the defendant-appellant (PNB) when it paid the value of the checks to PEMSLA despite the checks being payable to order. Rather. because the PEMSLA checks given as payment were returned. Based on the investigation of the defendant-appellant.4 Petitioner PNB eventually found out about these fraudulent acts. Being checks made to fictitious payees which are bearer instruments. 3. in the total amount of P2. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Rodriguez (plaintiffs). the spouses issued sixty nine (69) checks. and petitioner PNB. However. to PEMSLA.00. (c) Exemplary damages in the amount of P500.570.00. The amounts were duly debited from the Rodriguez account. The defendant PNB is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following reasonable amount of damages suffered by them taking into consideration the standing of the plaintiffs being sugarcane planters. meanwhile. as follows: 1.804. and not from spouses Rodriguez. and the amount of P1.000. the CA reversed and set aside the RTC disposition. PNB closed the current account of PEMSLA.000. Other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed. as a result of their having incurred great dificulty (sic) especially in the residential subdivision business. Thus. Rodriguez and/or Norma Rodriguez. (b) Moral damages in the amount of P1.000. is that the checks were never meant to be paid to order. PNB’s Answer included its crossclaim against its co-defendants PEMSLA and the MCP.00 in the PNBig Demand Deposit Checking/Current Account No. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE. PNB paid the wrong payees. because of PEMSLA’s insufficiency of funds.337. the obligation should be considered as discharged. It also appears that the teller who accepted the said checks was PEMSLA’s officer. All counterclaims and cross-claims were dismissed. the Multi-Purpose Cooperative of Philnabankers (MCP). the PEMSLA checks deposited by the spouses were returned or dishonored for the reason "Account Closed. The logical conclusion. the RTC denied PNB’s motion to dismiss. but instead. spouses Rodriguez incurred losses from the rediscounting transactions.00 considering that this case does not involve very complicated issues. They sought to recover the value of their checks that were deposited to the PEMSLA savings account amounting to P2.345. plus legal rate of interest thereon to be computed from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. Since there was no demand from the said payees.5 PNB claimed it is not liable for the checks which it paid to the PEMSLA account without any indorsement from the payees. residential subdivision owners.000. We thus find no breach of contract on the part of the defendant-appellant. In its Answer. however. It ruled that PNB (defendant) is liable to return the value of the checks. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the total amount of P2. In an Order dated January 12. and for the (e) Costs of suit.00. PNB argued that the claim for damages should come from the payees of the checks.6 CA Disposition PNB appealed the decision of the trial court to the CA on the principal ground that the disputed checks should be considered as payable to bearer and not to order. therefore. The bank contended that spouses Rodriguez.000. These were payable to forty seven (47) individual payees who were all members of PEMSLA. the makers. which was not pushed through and the contractor even threatened to file a case against the plaintiffs. In a Decision7 dated July 22. the cross-defendants should be ordered to reimburse PNB the amount it shall pay. 2000. After trial. (d) Attorney’s fees in the amount of P150. the Court hereby renders judgment. were deposited as usual to the PEMSLA savings account. the payees were considered as "fictitious payees" as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). To put a stop to this scheme.345. The CA concluded that the checks were obviously meant by the spouses to be really paid to PEMSLA. According to plaintiff-appellee Erlando Rodriguez’ testimony. RTC Disposition 2.467. this arrangement allowed the plaintiffs-appellees to make a 24 . the spouses Rodriguez filed a civil complaint for damages against PEMSLA. This is the only obvious explanation as to why all the disputed sixty-nine (69) checks were in the possession of PEMSLA’s errand boy for presentment to the defendant-appellant that led to this present controversy. realtors. The spouses contended that because PNB credited the checks to the PEMSLA account even without indorsements. PNB moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. Rodriguez. it should bear the loss. unearned income in the amount of P4. praying that in the event that judgment is rendered against the bank. we are more convinced by the strong and credible evidence for the defendant-appellant with regard to the plaintiffs-appellees’ and PEMSLA’s business arrangement – that the value of the rediscounted checks of the plaintiffs-appellees would be deposited in PEMSLA’s account for payment of the loans it has approved in exchange for PEMSLA’s checks with the full value of the said loans.804. As a result. 810624-6 of Erlando T.00. actually did not intend for the named payees to receive the proceeds of the checks.

Thus. Sections 8 and 9 of the NIL states: SEC. Now to the core of the petition. They also argued that their cause of action is not only against PEMSLA but also against PNB to recover the value of the checks. According to the appellate court. thus they do not require indorsement for negotiation. drawer. which constrained respondents to seek legal action. The highest degree of diligence must go into the study of every controversy submitted for decision by litigants. Issues The issues may be compressed to whether the subject checks are payable to order or to bearer and who bears the loss? PNB argues anew that when the spouses Rodriguez issued the disputed checks. correct its judgment with the singular objective of achieving justice for the litigants. amendment of decisions is more acceptable than an erroneous judgment attaining finality to the prejudice of innocent parties.8(Emphasis added) The CA found that the checks were bearer instruments. or (f) The holder of an office for the time being. and that PNB committed a breach of contract when it paid the value of the checks to PEMSLA without indorsement from the payees.9 The CA ruled that the checks were payable to order. A check is "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. The Court does not sanction careless disposition of cases by courts of justice. in view of the foregoing premises. PNB is liable for the value of the checks which it paid to PEMSLA without indorsements from the named payees.804 with interest at 6% per annum from 14 May 1999 until fully paid. the check is considered as a bearer instrument. Where the instrument is payable to order. 2. motu proprio or upon motion of the parties.000. Hence. the last paragraph and fallo of which read: In sum. judgment is hereby rendered by Us AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION the assailed decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3. 8. Further. or (c) The drawee. Moral damages in the amount of P200. and 4. Every issue and factual detail must be closely scrutinized and analyzed. the CA in Cebu in this particular case. The spouses Rodriguez moved for reconsideration. PNB failed to present sufficient proof to defeat the claim of the spouses Rodriguez that they really intended the checks to be received by the specified payees. The payees in the checks were "fictitious payees" because they were not the intended payees at all. They were able to achieve this conspiracy by using other members who had loaned lesser amounts of money or had not applied at all. Only in this manner will errors in judgments be avoided. a word of caution to lower courts. A court discovering an erroneous judgment before it becomes final may.345. as set forth in the immediately next preceding paragraph hereof. and that spouses Rodriguez and PEMSLA conspired with each other to accomplish this money-making scheme. the CA reversed itself via an Amended Decision.profit by issuing rediscounted checks. before the promulgation of every judgment by the court. despite the fact that they were disqualified for one reason or another. the present recourse under Rule 45. the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty. or (b) The drawer or maker. They argued. inter alia. 25 . Attorney’s fees in the amount of P100. they are bearer instruments that could be validly negotiated by mere delivery. Costs of suit. The award for damages was deemed appropriate in view of the failure of PNB to treat the Rodriguez account with the highest degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. It may be drawn payable to the order of – (a) A payee who is not maker. testimonial and documentary evidence presented during trial amply proved that spouses Rodriguez and the officers of PEMSLA conspired with each other to defraud the bank. Thus. they did not intend for the named payees to receive the proceeds. or (d) Two or more payees jointly. Our Ruling Prefatorily.10 However. and SETTING ASIDE Our original decision promulgated in this case on 22 July 2004. WHEREFORE. that the checks on their faces were unquestionably payable to order. while the officers of PEMSLA and other members would be able to claim their loans. Actual damages in the amount of P2. is in order. we rule that the defendant-appellant PNB is liable to the plaintiffs-appellees Sps. Rodriguez for the following: 1. On October 11. or (e) One or some of several payees. and all the applicable laws judiciously studied. When payable to order. 2005."11 It is either an order or a bearer instrument. – The instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order. when the payee is fictitious or not intended to be the true recipient of the proceeds.000. As a rule. SO ORDERED. or drawee. x x x. 99-10892.

The US Supreme Court held in Mueller that when the person making the check so payable did not intend for the specified payee to have any part in the transactions. a transferee’s lapse of wary vigilance. there is a "commercial bad faith" exception to UCC 3-405. Liberty Insurance Bank. However.12 (Underscoring supplied) The distinction between bearer and order instruments lies in their manner of negotiation. the payee is considered a "fictitious" payee and the check is a bearer instrument. existing. 26 .972. This rule is justified for otherwise.13 A review of US jurisprudence yields that an actual.14 Thus. or (d) When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person. the payee is considered as a fictitious payee. He then successfully drew the funds from Liberty Insurance Bank for his own personal profit. Court rulings in the United States are a logical starting point since our law on negotiable instruments was directly lifted from the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States. This usually occurs when the maker places a name of an existing payee on the check for convenience or to cover up an illegal activity. under Section 9(c) of the NIL. Thus. it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery. When the corporation filed an action against the bank to recover the amount of the checks. x x x Such a test finds support in the text of the Code. it is treated as a bearer instrument that can be negotiated by delivery. It is unrefuted that the 69 checks were payable to specific persons. and such fact is known to the person making it so payable. it is negotiated by delivery. Inc. checks issued to "Prinsipe Abante" or "Si Malakas at si Maganda. regardless of whether prior indorsements were genuine or not. the US Supreme Court held that Liberty Insurance Bank. When faced with a check payable to a fictitious payee. a check payable to a specified payee may nevertheless be considered as a bearer instrument if it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person. will work to strip it of this defense. 9. and living payee may also be "fictitious" if the maker of the check did not intend for the payee to in fact receive the proceeds of the check. on the other hand.SEC. which omits a standard of care requirement from UCC 3-405 but imposes on all parties an obligation to act with "honesty in fact. in case of controversy. and such fact is known to the person making it so payable. existing. a check made expressly payable to a non-fictitious and existing person is not necessarily an order instrument. he must have intended for the instrument to be negotiated by mere delivery. A bearer instrument. Commercial bad faith is present if the transferee of the check acts dishonestly. v. Martin drew seven checks payable to the German Savings Fund Company Building Association (GSFCBA) amounting to $2.15 The fictitious-payee rule is best illustrated in Mueller & Martin v. If the payee is not the intended recipient of the proceeds of the check. applicable when the transferee "acts dishonestly – where it has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that amount to bad faith. Thus. or any transferee of the check for that matter. The exception will cause it to bear the loss. or (b) When it is payable to a person named therein or bearer. What constitutes negotiation. are bearer instruments because the named payees are fictitious and non-existent. A showing of commercial bad faith on the part of the drawee bank. the drawer of the check will bear the loss.18upheld the fictitious-payee rule. Due care is not even required from the drawee or depositary bank in accepting and paying the checks. If payable to bearer. It is negotiable by mere delivery. as drawee. one of its authorized signatories. and living persons who were members of PEMSLA that had a rediscounting arrangement with spouses Rodriguez. thus itself becoming a participant in a fraudulent scheme. it will be most convenient for the maker who desires to escape payment of the check to always deny the validity of the indorsement. And since the maker knew this limitation. What remains to be determined is if the payees. 30. The effect is that a showing of negligence on the part of the depositary bank will not defeat the protection that is derived from this rule. Likewise." x x x19 (Emphasis added) Getty also laid the principle that the fictitious-payee rule extends protection even to non-bank transferees of the checks. – An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. and is a party to the fraudulent scheme. does not require an indorsement to be validly negotiated.16 In the said case. or (e) Where the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank. The rule protects the depositary bank and assigns the loss to the drawer of the check who was in a better position to prevent the loss in the first place. the drawee bank is absolved from liability and the drawer bears the loss. However. It is for this reason that We look elsewhere for guidance. it is uncontroverted that the payees were actual. When payable to bearer. was authorized to make payment to the bearer of the check. A check that is payable to a specified payee is an order instrument. American Express Travel Related Services Company.50 against the account of the corporation without authority from the latter. there is a commercial bad faith exception to the fictitious-payee rule. were "fictitious" in its broader context. The underlying theory is that one cannot expect a fictitious payee to negotiate the check by placing his indorsement thereon. Rather. This despite the fact that the fictitious payee was purposely named without any intention that the payee should receive the proceeds of the check. In a fictitious-payee situation. At the back of the checks. the claim was denied. Said the US Supreme Court in Getty: Consequently. Martin placed the rubber stamp of the GSFCBA and signed his own name as indorsement." who are well-known characters in Philippine mythology. if payable to order. The check is then considered as a bearer instrument to be validly negotiated by mere delivery. Martin was also an officer of the GSFCBA but did not have signing authority. an order instrument requires an indorsement from the payee or holder before it may be validly negotiated. though existing persons. The provision reads: SEC. We have yet to discuss a broader meaning of the term "fictitious" as used in the NIL. or (c) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person. the corporation Mueller & Martin was defrauded by George L. In the case under review. Thus. disregard of suspicious circumstances which might have well induced a prudent banker to investigate and other permutations of negligence are not relevant considerations under Section 3-405 x x x. – The instrument is payable to bearer – (a) When it is expressed to be so payable.17 The more recent Getty Petroleum Corp. Under Section 30 of the NIL. the Rodriguez checks were payable to specified payees. Martin.

Court of Appeals. Considering that moral damages must be understood to be in concept of grants.20 PNB was remiss in its duty as the drawee bank. The checks were presented to PNB for deposit by a representative of PEMSLA absent any type of indorsement. as the drawee bank.23 In a checking transaction. criminal. forged or otherwise.000. the drawee bank has the duty to verify the genuineness of the signature of the drawer and to pay the check strictly in accordance with the drawer’s instructions.22 For this reason. The Rules expressly provide that failure to file an answer is a ground for a declaration that defendant is in default. It does not dispute the fact that its teller or tellers accepted the 69 checks for deposit to the PEMSLA account even without any indorsement from the named payees.00. the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. i.24 In the case at bar. respondents-spouses were the bank’s depositors.25 this Court cautioned thus: Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. Because of a failure to show that the payees were "fictitious" in its broader sense. care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. This lack of knowledge on the part of the payees.29 WHEREFORE. Since they could not encash the PEMSLA checks. the appealed Amended Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award for moral damages is reduced to P50. the drawee bank bears the loss. however. the bank should be held liable.000.27 PNB’s argument that there is no loss to compensate since no demand for payment has been made by the payees must also fail. was not tantamount to a lack of intention on the part of respondents-spouses that the payees would not receive the checks’ proceeds. the RTC dismissal of PNB’s cross-claim has no basis. the RTC failed to sanction the failure of both PEMSLA and MPC to file responsive pleadings. A bank that regularly processes checks that are neither payable to the customer nor duly indorsed by the payee is apparently grossly negligent in its operations. had the responsibility to ascertain the regularity of the indorsements. PNB was obligated to pay the checks in strict accordance with the instructions of the drawers. 27 . SO ORDERED. Thus. banks are minded to treat their customer’s accounts with utmost care." These PEMSLA checks were the corresponding payments to the Rodriguez checks. banks are enjoined to be extra vigilant in the management and supervision of their employees. but to PEMSLA. For obvious reasons. It should charge to the drawer’s accounts only the payables authorized by the latter. Considering that respondents-spouses were transacting with PEMSLA and not the individual payees. in violation of banking rules of procedure. This is because. respondents-spouses were unable to collect payments for the amounts they had advanced. Verily. and the genuineness of the signatures on the checks before accepting them for deposit. At most. The bank failed to satisfy a requisite condition of a fictitious-payee situation – that the maker of the check intended for the payee to have no interest in the transaction. Thus. permitted the invalid deposits of checks to the PEMSLA account. Being issued to named payees. confidence.alf-ITC Moreover.28 Yet. Otherwise. not punitive or corrective in nature. PNB failed to present sufficient evidence to defeat the claim of respondentsspouses that the named payees were the intended recipients of the checks’ proceeds. it is understandable that they relied on the information given by the officers of PEMSLA that the payees would be receiving the checks. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. MPC.e. PNB. Consequently. Lastly. or administrative action PNB might take against PEMSLA. it became involved in the controversial transaction not of its own volition but due to the actions of some of its employees. Damage was caused to respondents-spouses when the PEMSLA checks they deposited were returned for the reason "Account Closed. One Last Note We note that the RTC failed to thresh out the merits of PNB’s cross-claim against its codefendants PEMSLA and MPC. as found by both lower courts. The checks were drawn against respondents-spouses’ accounts.For the fictitious-payee rule to be available as a defense.21 This Court has recognized the unique public interest possessed by the banking industry and the need for the people to have full trust and confidence in their banks. We resolve to reduce the award of moral damages toP50. the checks are to be deemed payable to order. PNB was negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. it paid the values of the checks not to the named payees or their order. A bank that has been remiss in its duty must suffer the consequences of its negligence. this judgment shall be without prejudice to whatever action the bank might take against its codefendants in the trial court. the bank’s thesis shows that the payees did not have knowledge of the existence of the checks. The trustworthiness of bank employees is indispensable to maintain the stability of the banking industry. PNB must show that the makers did not intend for the named payees to be part of the transaction involving the checks. Thus. to the named payee in the check. The facts clearly show that the bank did not pay the checks in strict accordance with the instructions of the drawers. Verily. PNB should be held liable for the amounts of the checks. the drawee will be violating the instructions of the drawer and it shall be liable for the amount charged to the drawer’s account. The records are bereft of any pleading filed by these two defendants in answer to the complaint of respondents-spouses and cross-claim of PNB. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility. the subject checks are presumed order instruments. It bears stressing that order instruments can only be negotiated with a valid indorsement. To PNB’s credit. Indeed. respondents-spouses. In fine.00. Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden. the fictitiouspayee rule does not apply. and the employees involved. PNB was duty-bound by law and by banking rules and procedure to require that the checks be properly indorsed before accepting them for deposit and payment.26 PNB’s tellers and officers. when it is the gross negligence of the bank employees that caused the loss. and honesty. Instead.. and that this is without prejudice to whatever civil. a third party to the transaction between the drawers and the payees.

defendants defaulted in the payment of their rentals.R. The RTC declared petitioners as builders in good faith and upheld their right to indemnity. consisting of 36. Beginning January 2001. On June 1. . the lessor may eject (sic) and treat the lease as rescinded and sue to eject the lessee (C. vs. Court of Appeals and Ramon Ibarra. Inc. 708-01. Panlilio is its Senior Executive Vice President. 2002. 3. At the time of the renewal of the lease contract. in the alternative. This right of retention does not apply to a mere lessee. The court is convinced by the evidence that indeed. No. for the construction and operation of a hotel building. 53 Phil. Inc[. Respondent computed the arrears of petitioners in the amount of twenty-six million one hundred eighty-three thousand two hundred twenty-five pesos and fourteen centavos (P26.2 reversing the November 29.. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years. The facts are as follows: Respondent Nayong Pilipino Foundation. Inc. At most.]. VACATE the subject premises and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff. Chua and Co Sio Eng vs. The RTC modified the Decision4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City which ruled against petitioners and ordered them to vacate the premises and pay their arrears.. respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Pasay City. . 2001. INC. Upon the failure of the lessee to pay the stipulated rentals. There is no provision of law which grants the lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on that ground.14). 2. . NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION. 2001. PAY plaintiff the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P725. (PVHI).183. On February 26. such will not defeat the right of the plaintiff to its property as the defendants failed to pay their rentals in violation of the terms of the contract. i. Article 448 of the Civil Code.] De Pamintuan v. known as the Nayong Pilipino Complex. is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasay City. . 170923 January 20. or until May 1996. and/or PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL. is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. 109840. Under the new agreement. . a government-owned and controlled corporation. Lim of the Nayong Pilipino Foundation. ordering the latter to: 1.e. 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental. petitioner PVHI was bound to pay the monthly rental on a per square meter basis at the rate of P20. Respondent. 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Civil Case No. or. No.00) per month starting from August 2001 and every month thereafter by way of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. applies only to a possessor in good faith. Thus. The addendum was signed by petitioner Jose Marcel E. . formerly called Sulo sa Nayon.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION On September 5. one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.225. Vda[. to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon. It is renewable for a period of 25 years under the same terms and conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the intention to renew at least 6 months before its expiration. They agreed to the renewal of the contract for another 25 years.780. which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. 1).780. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE." Although the Contract of Lease stipulates that the building and all the improvements in the leased premises belong to the defendants herein. G.R. defendants can only invoke [their] right under Article 1678 of the New Civil Code which grants them the right to be reimbursed one-half of the value of the building upon the termination of the lease. petitioners sent respondent a letter notifying the latter of their intention to renew the contract for another 25 years. the monthly rental amounted to P725. PAY plaintiff its rental arrearages in the sum of TWENTY SIX MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS AND 14/100 (P26. Respondent repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. 2001. 1995. xxx . 74631 and December 22.183. the parties executed a Voluntary Addendum to the Lease Agreement. 28 . to be known as the Philippine Village Hotel.289 square meters. 02-0133. it would always be in his power to "improve" his landlord out of the latter’s property (Jose L. as of July 31. 2001. Panlilio in his official capacity as Senior Executive Vice President of the PVHI and by Chairman Alberto A. Petitioner Philippine Village Hotel. On July 4. and JOSE MARCEL E.: On appeal are the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) October 4. which shall be subject to an increase of 20% at the end of every 3-year period. the MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent. It ruled. Inc. 2009 . January 21.225.00.00 per square meter. premises considered. Civil Code).Petitioners. SULO SA NAYON. otherwise. DECISION PUNO. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Nayong Pilipino Foundation. . 2005 Resolution. on March 7. . like the petitioners. 1657.J. The Supreme Court has occasion to address a similar issue in which it ruled that: "The fact that petitioners allegedly made repairs on the premises in question is not a reason for them to retain the possession of the premises. to remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to make reimbursement. 1975. SP No. or until 2021. the lessor may rescind the lease. thus: G. It is basic that the lessee is obliged to pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated (Art. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Improvements made by a lessee such as the defendants herein on leased premises are not valid reasons for their retention thereof. in relation to Article 546. INC. Tiglao. respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex. recover the back rentals and recover possession of the leased premises. C. Petitioner Jose Marcel E.14) incurred as of July 31. 1999). and all persons claiming rights under it. and against the defendant Philippine Village Hotel. The last demand letter was sent on March 26. For non-payment of rentals. PANLILIO. 1995.

76 Phil. as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code when it held that petitioners were builders in good faith and. PAY plaintiff the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50.00) by way of attorney’s fees[. . The dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC reads as follows: WHEREFORE. as stated. 5. As it is. . it is undeniable that the improvement of the hotel building of appellants (sic) PVHI was constructed with the written consent and knowledge of appellee. xxx .6 Respondent appealed to the CA which held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession. appellants fail to pay for the land (Ignacio vs. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Directing the plaintiff-appellee to desist and/or refrain from doing acts in the furtherance or exercise of its rights and demolition against appellants unless and after having selected the option of compulsory sale and appellants failed to pay [and] purchase the land within a reasonable time or at such time as this court will direct. upon payment of proper indemnity consonant to Art. 605). 3. it is glaring error on the part of the RTC to apply the aforesaid legal provisions on the supposition that the improvements. SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED. PAY the costs of suit. cannot validly claim that they are builders in good faith in order to solicit the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code in their favor. They were even explicitly allowed to use the improvements and building as security or collateral on loans and credit accommodations that the Lessee may secure for the purpose of financing the construction of the building and other improvements (Section 2. a time frame was setforth (sic) with respect to the duration of the lease initially for 21 years and renewable for another 25 years in order to enable the appellants-lessees to recoup their huge money investments relative to the construction and maintenance of the improvements. Thus. 2001 in the amount of P26.7 29 .00 per month. . Hence. This. immensely engender the application of Art.. . 546 of the Civil Code. Hilario.183. and pursuant to Article 448 in relation to Art. it could not be denied that appellants were builders in good faith. Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not strip the petitioner of its right to avail of recourses under the law and the lease contract itself in case of breach thereof. . The said defendant’s counterclaim however is likewise dismissed as the complaint does not appear to be frivolous or maliciously instituted. .000. this appeal. 2002 as follows: 1. it has no right of removal or demolition against appellants unless after having selected a compulsory sale. The appellants were also unequivocally declared in the Lease Agreement as the owner of the improvements so constructed. The CA held: By and large. to appropriate the improvements upon payment of proper indemnity or compulsory sale of the land whereon the hotel building of PVHI and related improvements or facilities were erected. xxx Considering therefore. To grant the respondents the right of retention and reimbursement as builders in good faith merely because of the valuable and substantial improvements that they introduced to the leased premises plainly contravenes the law and settled jurisprudential doctrines and would. respondents are admittedly mere lessees of the subject premises and as such. Branch 45 of Pasay City rendered on February 26. and in view of the foregoing. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay to plaintiff-appellee the unpaid monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the premises pending this appeal from July to November 2002 only at P725. 546 of the Civil Code may apply with respect to their rights over improvements. It held that: . Neither does it deprive the petitioner of its right under Article 1678 to exercise its option to acquire the improvements or to let the respondents remove the same. The only remaining and most crucial issue to be resolved is whether or not the appellants as builders have acted in good faith in order for Art.e. Panlilio is hereby dismissed for lack of cause of action. The fourth and fifth directives in the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision including that the last paragraph thereof JME Panlilio’s complaint is hereby affirmed. these. 546 or compel the appellants to purchase the land whereon the building was erected. had been introduced on the leased premises with the permission of the petitioner. however. Accordingly. judgment is hereby rendered modifying the decision of [the] MTC. ." Lease Agreement). In fact. 448 of the Civil Code.225. pars. it was precisely the primary purpose for which they entered into an agreement.4. plaintiff-appellee has the sole option or choice. 2. The complaint against defendant Jose Marcel E. the elements of permanency of the construction and substantial value of the improvements as well as the undispute[d] ownership over the land improvements. . Until such time that plaintiff-appellee has elected an option or choice. thus.14. 4. 448 in relation to Art. "A" to "B. Moreover. which are of substantial value. and] 5. allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor out of its property. Ordering plaintiff-appellee to submit within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this decision a written manifestation of the option or choice it selected. 6. either to appropriate the building. i. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay plaintiff-appellee [their] arrears in rent incurred as of July 31. it is clear and undisputed that appellants-lessees were expressly required to construct a firstclass hotel with complete facilities. have the right to indemnity.780. is without prejudice from the parties agreeing to adjust their rights in some other way as they may mutually deem fit and proper. The parties are directed to adjust their respective rights in the interest of justice as they may deem fit and proper if necessary.5 Petitioners appealed to the RTC which modified the ruling of the MeTC.

However. we resolve the main issue of whether the rules on accession. The tenants must pay rentals which are fixed and which became payable in the past. There was. a notice or demand to vacate. . after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548. We have ruled that: . it is clear that the demand letter is intended as a notice to petitioners to pay the rental arrears. RTC and CA.225. we settle the issue of jurisdiction.14 within ten days from receipt by petitioners. The late Senator Arturo M. sowing or planting. and the one who sowed. sown or planted in good faith. the language of the demand letter is plain and simple: respondent demanded payment of the rental arrears amounting to P26. apply to the instant case. . Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. in effect. explains: This article [Article 448] is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds. The alternatives in this case are clear cut.10 and not to lands where the only interest of the builder. THUS BOTH PARTIES ACTED AS IF THEY ARE IN GOOD FAITH. INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE. THUS COMPELLING THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 546 OF THE SAME CODE. . II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT THE LEASE CONTRACT GOVERNS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTIES MAY BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE IMPLIEDLY WAIVED THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE INSTANT CASE. or sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title. he shall pay reasonable rent. requesting them "to pay the rental arrears or else it will be constrained to file the appropriate legal action and possess the leased premises. Second." Further. failing which they must move out. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. 546. The demand letter further stated that respondent will possess the leased premises in case of petitioners’ failure to pay the rental arrears within ten days. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. the proper rent. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. Art. V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURTS A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A NOTICE TO VACATE UPON PETITIONERS. the court shall fix the terms thereof. Article 448 and Article 546 provide: Art.8 First. Contrary to the claim of petitioners. planter or sower is that of a holder. In such case. or respondent will be constrained to file an appropriate legal action against petitioners to recover the said amount. since such demand is a jurisdictional requisite. as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT ALSO ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN IT DID NOT HONOR AND INSTEAD BREACHED THE LEASE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. INC. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. he was placed on notice to move out if he does not pay. The word "vacate" is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices.11 30 . 2001 was sent by respondent through registered mail to petitioners. Hence. We reiterate the ruling of the MeTC. a leading expert in Civil Law. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. IN COMPARISON THERETO. IV TO SANCTION THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 546 OF THE SAME CODE WOULD NOT ONLY WREAK HAVOC AND CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL INJURY TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL. documentary evidence proved that a demand letter dated March 26. when the petitioners demanded that either he pays P18. III ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.000 in five days or a case of ejectment would be filed against him. and a notice to vacate the premises in case of failure of petitioners to perform their obligation to pay. WOULD SUFFER ONLY SLIGHT OR INCONSEQUENTIAL INJURY OR LOSS. plants. We uphold the ruling of the CA.Petitioners assign the following errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH OVER THE SUBSTANTIAL AND VALUABLE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH THEY HAD INTRODUCED ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. such as a tenant. Tolentino. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement. The owner of the land on which anything has been built. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. WHILE RESPONDENT NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION. BUT ALSO WOULD CONSTITUTE UNJUST ENRICHMENT ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT AT GREAT EXPENSE AND GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS. petitioners’ argument that the demand letter is "inadequate" because it contained no demand to vacate the leased premises does not persuade.183. Thus. 448. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land.9 In the case at bar. Petitioners argue that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide the ejectment case because they never received any demand from respondent to pay rentals and vacate the premises.

entitled "Alfredo Yasay del Rosario. 153652 January 16. 74631 and its December 22. represented by Attorney-in-fact. assessment and others which the LESSOR may be entitled to. after 90 days from the receipt of notice or demand from the LESSOR. fees. Because of their compassion. Branch 77. the lessee may remove the improvements. the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. we find nothing in the above quoted provision that prohibits respondent to proceed the way it did in enforcing its rights as lessor. SO ORDERED. they contend that it is the lease contract that governs the relationship of the parties. 2004 Under Article 1678. Fourth Judicial Region. San Mateo. His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code. With regard to ornamental expenses.In the case at bar. the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the improvements which the lessee made in good faith. However. as well as all unpaid rents. while the monetary claim of respondent against them only amounts to a little more than twenty six-million pesos. Petitioners maintain that the lease contract contains a default provision which does not give respondent the right to appropriate the improvements nor evict petitioners in cases of cancellation or termination of the contract due to default or breach of its terms. in good faith. SP No. docketed as Civil Case No.respondents. On June 25. 67902. they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. We cannot sustain this line of argument by petitioners. the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement. It can rightfully file for ejectment to evict petitioners. Basic is the doctrine that laws are deemed incorporated in each and every contract. or. Jose and Concordia Manuel. whose house was destroyed by a strong typhoon. This was followed by repeated verbal demands but to no avail. They agreed that he could build thereon a temporary shelter of light materials.R. Costs against petitioners. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. He shall not. 1999. Rizal. respondents asked petitioner to vacate the lot. Ana. Patricia Ariola. as lessees. petitioner. Existing laws always form part of any contract. In case of cancellation or termination of this contract due to the default or breach of its terms. San Mateo. but he may remove the ornamental objects. which reads: Art. represented by Attorney-in-fact. such a situation would allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor out of its property. they allowed petitioner. and RTC. filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. IN VIEW WHEREOF. What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements. But without their consent. petitioner vs. Further. that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of respondent.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22. vs. 1678." On August 12. 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 1999. On the other hand. In fact. San Mateo. Petitioners assert that respondent committed a breach of the lease contract when it filed the ejectment suit against them. They allege that the value of the hotel and its appurtenant facilities amounts to more than two billion pesos. taxes. SP No. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith12 that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. PATRICIA ARIOLA. they should be considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent. cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. as it would amount to giving away the hotel and its other structures at virtually bargain prices. . . . and which have not altered the form and substance of the land. charges. spouses Jose and Concordia Manuel. Thus. JOSE E.R. Petitioners argue that to apply Article 1678 to their case would result to sheer injustice. without altering the form or substance of the property leased. useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended. Rizal a complaint1 for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Yasay del Rosario. San Mateo. petitioner. If the lessee makes. MANUEL and CONCORDIA MANUEL. The October 4. No.. Rizal. petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. They cite paragraph 10 of the lease contract. But the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount. Sps. the lease contract in the case at bar shows no special kind of agreement between the parties as to how to proceed in cases of default or breach of the contract. which are of substantial value. Fourth Judicial Region. 2005 Resolution are AFFIRMED. In 1992. the lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse. which are suitable for the use for which the lease is intended. provided no damage is caused to the principal thing. however. They alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 251 square meter lot located at Sta. 1360. J. and consequently. the parties may be considered to have impliedly waived the application of Article 1678. as it did before the court a quo. and the lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished. Otherwise. costs and expenses of litigation that may be incurred by the LESSOR in enforcing its rights under this contract or any of its provisions. to occupy their lot. the LESSEE will pay all reasonable attorney’s fees. if no time is fixed. respondents. We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. which provides that: 10. petitioners’ appeal is DENIED. ALFREDO YASAY DEL ROSARIO. SPS. the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. MTC. what he constructed was a house of concrete materials. 2002 in CA-G.R. even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. 31 . . Rizal. prompting them to bring the matter to the barangay. . Default shall automatically take place upon the failure of the LESSEE to pay or perform its obligation during the time fixed herein for such obligations without necessity of demand. DEFAULT.

he made an offer to buy the 60 square meter portion occupied by him and to spend for its survey. ordering him and/or all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject property covered by TCT No. Assuming arguendo that the petition before us is sufficient in form and substance. petitioner claimed that sometime in 1968. 33589 affirming in toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. WHEREFORE. in the instant case. thus: "WHEREFORE. and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs. dated September 21. 83-16128. Prior physical possession is not required. SO ORDERED. considering further that. express or implied. In illegal detainer. to pay P500. forcible entry and unlawful detainer. 2001 in CA-G. DE RAMOS. petitioner’s possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the respondents. considering finally that. threat. vs. both surnamed Limense. provided he would guard the premises to prevent landgrabbers and squatters from occupying the area. the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory. Rizal rendered a Decision dated May 10. they filed the instant complaint. depriving the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. respondents need not allege the same in their complaint. the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 20. hence. 2002. 67902. BENJAMIN RAMOS. Hence. CV No."2 On appeal. namely. On May 22. PAZ RAMOSPASCUA. strategy or stealth. 2001 affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court. We have held in a number of cases that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required to leave. The antecedent facts are as follows: 32 . Respondents. In this light. they agreed verbally to sell the portion on which his house was constructed. petitioner is not a builder in good faith. As found by the trial court. entitled to reimbursement under Article 448 of the Civil Code. threat. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use of said property from the date of filing of this Complaint on August 12. denying his first motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition for review filed the present petition only on 29 November 2001. namely: CONCESA LIMENSE. respondents allowed him to build his house on the lot. 1999 until the same is vacated and possession thereof surrendered to the plaintiffs and to pay the cost. Branch 15. Petitioners. the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract. He then informed them that he would first consult his children and they said they will wait. N-11399. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo. On September 22. In 1995. he must allege and prove prior physical possession. VIRGILIO DIAZ.. WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO. Instead. 2001. and DANILO and JOSELITO. In forcible entry. FELICISIMA RAMOS-REYES. the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force.6 Anent the second issue. premises considered. Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs-spouses Jose and Concordia Manuel represented by their attorney-in-fact Patricia Ariola and against defendant Alfredo Yasay del Rosario. Petitioner claimed that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case considering that there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents have prior physical possession of the lot and that they were ousted therefrom by force. RITA VDA. The petition raises the following issues: (1) whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case. TRINIDAD RAMOS-BRAVO. docketed as CA G. herein petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. Considering that he occupies the land by mere tolerance. when respondents visited this country. DECISION PERALTA. strategy or stealth.In his answer to the complaint. J. does not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal. We must distinguish the two kinds of ejectment. 152319 October 28. and JACINTA RAMOS. for having been filed out of time. No. that he will vacate upon demand. the petition is hereby DENIED. this Court resolves to DISMISS the instant petition for review. On November 29. RESTITUTO RAMOS. children.R.R. petitioner who had fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order dated 26 July 2001. 2009 HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. A year later."3 Considering that the petition with the Court of Appeals was not seasonably filed. 1990 in Civil Case No.5 He is bound by his implied promise. But what respondents wanted to sell was the whole area containing 251 square meters. Prior physical possession is not always a condition sine qua non in an ejectment case.4 What respondents filed is a complaint for unlawful detainer. he is aware that his occupation of the same may be terminated by respondents any time.R. the same would still be dismissed for lack of merit. 2000. IRENEO RAMOS. Surviving Spouse. in the absence of a contract. and (2) whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith. SP No. the instant petition should be dismissed outright. intimidation. to wit: "Considering the filing of the second motion for reconsideration is prohibited x x x hence.

12-D. 2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. the lots were adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters in the following manner: a. 12-C. 1983. on the other hand. on March 9. 12-D. After trial on the merits. and e. which remained in his name. the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles. Seventh Division. married to Isaac Limense. and Salud Lozada. Even when the division of the property occurred. 40044. Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. all surnamed Lozada. 12-A. 1927. duly represented by his Attorney-in-Fact. Joaquin Limense. and Salud Lozada. Manila. The Deed of Donation was registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on March 15. The parties failed to amicably settle the differences between them despite referral to the barangay.R.60 square meters. 1932. Teofista L. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin Limense's property in Lot No. 12. namely: Isabel. married to Francisco Ramos. married to Sotero Natividad. which was being occupied by respondents. It is admitted that this alley was established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property. married to Isaac Limense. In 1932. On October 1. married to Isaac Limense. the original owner of Lot No. 12. As a common alley. in lieu thereof. was cancelled and. Lot No. 12-D of the subdivision plan. 7036. elevated the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari14 raising the following issues: 33 .11 Aggrieved by said decision. and on the northwest by Lot No. the RTC rendered a Decision10 dated September 21. married to Sotero Natividad. the alley established by him continued to be used actively and passively as such. 12-C and. 40041. Lot No. 12-D in favor of Salud Lozada. however. Pertinent portions of the decision read as follows: The Court finds that an apparent easement of right of way exists in favor of the defendants under Article 624 of the Civil Code. It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley. Block No. 1074 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. during his lifetime. instituted a Complaint7 against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. married to Sotero Natividad. 968866 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-A in favor of Isabel Lozada. Frustrated by this turn of events. 40043. Salud.3 containing an area of 873. which was registered in his name. The existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to plaintiff who must respect the same in spite of the fact that his transfer certificate of title does not mention the lot of defendants as among those listed therein as entitled to such right of way. TCT No. 40044. 40042.Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. and 40045 were issued in favor of the donees. 12-D and 12-E. married to Francisco Ramos. OCT No.9who. 12-C. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina. Manila. Respondents. 12-B in favor of Catalina Lozada. petitioners. After subdividing the said lot. Pandacan. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the present. located in Beata Street. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969. The fence. Lot No. 12-E in favor of Isabel Lozada. on the southwest by Calle Beata. The records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals (CA). more or less. Thus. During the pendency of the appeal with the CA. CV No. namely: Lot Nos. however. could not be constructed because a substantial portion of respondents' residential building in Lot No. the lot continued to be used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel of land located at 2759 Beata Street.5 TCT No.4 he donated the subdivided lots to his daughters. 1932. 1990 dismissing the complaint of Joaquin Limense. Isabel Lozada. 12-C. Lot No. in CA-G. married to Francisco Ramos. Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. was bounded on the northeast by Lot No. c. one of the daughters of Dalmacio Lozada. Branch 15. 12-A. 12-C. and Salud. was issued in the name of its co-owners Catalina Lozada. It ruled that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. Pandacan.80 square meters. prayed for the payment of damages. 1969. married to Galicano Centeno. 40043.12 The CA. jointly and severally. attorney’s fees and costs of suit. except TCT No. to remove the portion which illegally encroached upon his property on Lot No. was married to Salud Lozada. in equal parts. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos. Dalmacio Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) lots. it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents. 12-B. Reyes. married to Francisco Ramos. 12-C. likewise. averred in their Answer8 that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos. By virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio Lozada. married to Isaac Limense. Joaquin Limense died in 1999. 1981. for removal of obstruction and damages. respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No. respondent ignored both oral and written demands. Joaquin Limense filed a notice of appeal. Joaquin Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area. which covered Lot No. 7036. married to Sotero Natividad. Lot No. as surviving heirs of Joaquin Limense. and Felicidad. he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley. Under the said Deed of Donation. married to Isaac Limense. 33589. respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. Lot No. Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9. adjacent to Lot No. and Felicidad Lozada. b. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as registration. more or less. These new TCTs were annotated at the back of OCT No. On May 16. 12-C. Catalina. Joaquin Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents. designated as Lot No. in its Decision13 dated December 20. Isabel. Isabel Lozada. It covered an area of 68. 7036 issued at the City of Manila on June 14. d. 12-C in favor of Catalina Lozada.

96886 in 1969. As defined. unlike Lot Nos. an examination of TCT No. Findings of fact of the CA. the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. as the use depends upon the acts of respondents and other persons passing through the property. Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. i. live or dead hedges. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. Petitioners countered that TCT No. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. 12-C. and his successors-in-interest. in the name of Joaquin Limense.. they are bound to respect the same. 40043. the easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. is the best proof of Joaquin Limense’s ownership over Lot No. It is a rule that the validity of a torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally. cannot be taken as proof that TCT No. is improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. Thus. must prevail over TCT No. Being an alley that shows a permanent path going to and from Beata Street. 12-A-3. 12-A5. the reliance on registered titles would be lost. if properly considered. modified. the same is apparent. Joaquin Limense. It is discontinuous. Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC."18 A reading of TCT No. it is possible that there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No. apparent or non-apparent. 96886 which would entitle them to enjoy the easement. 12-C between petitioners and respondents. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud. 96886 was obtained through fraud. TCT No. LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID. Further. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. The CA further ruled that a co-ownership existed over Lot No. corporeal and immovable. then one of these titles must be of dubious origin. it has been held that a certificate of title. 96886 would also reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT No. 12-A-2. the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal of obstruction and damages. on the other hand. an issue that this Court cannot pass upon in the present case. become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of title. Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence. at present. altered. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense. THAT THE PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D EXTENDING INTO JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND. modified. whether or not it was fraudulently issued. enlarged or diminished. for the benefit of another person or tenement.20 As with the present case. because their Lot No. respondents are questioning the legality of TCT No. ditches.17 In the present case. can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible. or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. as TCT No. Thus. Such defense is in the nature of a collateral attack. changed. which has been continuously used as an alley by the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada. IN FAILING TO HOLD. 96886 was registered in 1969 and respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or action to assail Joaquin Limense's title. 34 . misrepresentation or falsification of documents because the donees of said property could not possibly execute any valid transfer of title to Joaquin Limense. Isabel and Salud Lozada. 4886619and not TCT 40043. Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant. 96886. Hence. or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. was obtained thru fraud. without the intervention of any act of man.23 In the present case. In the case at bar. 96886. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "upon the expiration of said period of one year. 96886. and 12-A-6. The question now is whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way. as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense. allege that they are entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. therefore. i. may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls. As we see it. The title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. once registered. Otherwise. AS SUCH. because the registered owners of TCT No. 12-A-4. 12-C was covered by two TCT's. 12-D is not duly annotated at the back of TCT No.. Respondents allege that it was possible that TCT No. as the registered owner of Lot 12-C. may admit review by this Court if the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts that. being the only and best legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. THAT RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D HAS AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY OVER JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C? 2. would justify a different conclusion. and there was no evidence on record to show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure another title over an already titled property. According to the CA. 12-C. respondents' position that the issuance of TCT No. It cannot be altered. IN HOLDING. 96886. should not thereafter be impugned.e. misrepresentation or falsification of documents. TCT No. as they were already dead prior to the issuance of TCT No. issued in the name of Joaquin Limense. Respondents further allege that petitioners failed to produce proof substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 40043 and 96886. Apparently. he must respect servitudes constituted thereon. Respondents.21 However."16 It has. and if the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts. TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin. an easement is a real right on another's property. 40043 prior to the issuance of TCT No.15 Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.1. 12-C. was spurious because the Lozada sisters never disposed of the said property covered by TCT No.22 Easements may be continuous or discontinuous. Since petitioners are fully aware of the long existence of the said alley or easement of right of way. although the owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his property. 12-A-1. the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. SHOULD BE REMOVED? Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that since Lot No. which is not allowed by law. Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. the residents in the area and the public in general from 1932 up to the present. whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property. 12-C. 96886. TCT Nos. although generally deemed conclusive.e. 1529 provides that: [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. the CA's observation that TCT No. 40043 would readily show that there is an annotation that it has been"CANCELLED. Additionally. 96886. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina. 40043. 40043 were already dead prior to 1969 and could not have transferred the property to Joaquin Limense. 12-C. 96886. LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID. Due to the foregoing.

This is the alley? A: Yes. Witness. Reyes. in spite of the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not mention any burden or easement. It is undisputed that prior to and after the registration of TCT No. Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada. in this picture marked as Exh.26 this Court held that: Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do not mention any lien or encumbrance on their lots. "C-1" the alley is very apparent."27 In the case at bar.24 In the case at bar. Q: As a matter of fact. they were able to construct their house fronting Beata Street. However. does not contain any annotation that Lot No. Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. the same can be acquired only by virtue of a title. 96886. It is admitted that this alley was established by the original owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property the alley established by him continued to be used actively and passively as such. That was their mistake and they should be using Beata Street because they are fronting Beata Strret. they knew that said lots could serve no other purpose than as an alley. Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact. sir. x x x28 35 . Lot No. Q: And there are houses on either side of this alley? A: Yes. his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. issued in the name of Joaquin Limense. The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley. as a fact. they are using the alley and they do not pass through Beata Street. Q: And they have been using the alley since 1932 up to the present? A: Yes. Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. Q: And that house they have constructed on their lot in 1932 is still existing today? A: Yes. Q: As a matter of fact. that when respondents acquired the two lots which form the alley. the Court of Appeals found. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time. 96886. that "where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land. it is not only herein defendants who have been using that alley since 1932 up to the present? A: Yes. he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley. Rosel. sir. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as registration.Being a discontinuous and apparent easement. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of respondents and the public in general. Q: As a matter of fact. sir. Q: As a matter of fact. and as such have a right to demand from respondents some payment for the use of the alley. However. Q: They are using the alley? A: Yes. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. however. Q: And after the said property was adjudicated to his said children the latter constructed their houses on their lots. Teofista L.The existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to petitioners who must respect the same. they are purchasers in good faith and for value. sir they have been using the alley since that time. sir and they still used the alley in question and they are supposed to use Beata Street but they are not using Beata Street. 12-C. because the others have permit to use this alley and they are now allowed to use the alley but the Ramos's family are now [not] allowed to use this alley.25 In Mendoza v. the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles. all the residents on either side of the alley are passing through this alley? A: Yes. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over Lot No. sir. sir they are using the alley up to now. Tomacruz: Q: Mrs. Lot No. sir. sir. TCT No. by virtue of that Deed of Donation you claim that titles were issued to the children of Dalmacio Lozada namely Salud Lozada. Manuel B. We quote from the RTC's decision: x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. Thus: Atty. is that right? A: Yes. A: Yes. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. testified that respondents and several other residents in the area have been using the alley to reach Beata Street since 1932. the herein defendants have constructed their houses on the premises alloted to them since the year 1932? A: Yes. sir. It has been held. Even when the division of the property occurred.

even though no registration of the servitude has been made on TCT No. sown or planted in good faith. However. 12-D. However. he shall pay reasonable rent. and the one who sowed. cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to Sotero Natividad. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. we shall now discuss the respective rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house. in 1932. Respondents shall then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and. then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. the absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. 448. as in this case. an honest belief. In that case. 1932. Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provide: Art.33 The portions of Lot No.31 It is a matter of record that respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No.34 this provision was applied to one whose house. for instance. then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. Respondents being builders in good faith. plant or sow upon the land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. adjacent to Lot No. the grant to him. compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. 12-C. if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. 12-C. of legal age. nevertheless. We should determine whether respondents were builders in good faith. or (2) to sell the land to the builder. In such case. It implies honesty of intention. there was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and. It is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. all Filipinos. he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law. plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build. 12-C. but the encroachment was in good faith. the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length. petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No. may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. the proper rent. is preclusive.39 The raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated. x x x35 In other words. petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. if they so decide. However. the court shall fix the terms thereof. 12-C. Art. in equal parts.38 The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that. among other things. if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. He cannot. Abesia. and the situation is governed by the rules of coownership. when. the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. dated March 9. Geodetic Engineer Jose Agres. and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and. 546. respondents’ right to have access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually encroach upon the latter’s property. we are convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good faith when they built portions of their house on Lot 12-C. and it encompasses. the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith. respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house. Applied to possession. thus: 36 . ignorance of a superior claim. or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land. the co-ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of Joaquin Limense. 12-C. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. 12-C. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. instead of being outrightly ejected from the land. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. the stairs. despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner. particularly the overhang. Jr. Otherwise. hence. as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. The Deed of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio Lozada. after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548. and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition.29 In order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the encroachment. Of course. In case of disagreement. the parcel of land known as Lot No. one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. 12-C at the time the property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. testified on the encroachment of respondents' house on Lot No. 96886. at their own expense.36 The choice belongs to the owner of the land. Under the foregoing provision. However.30 Good faith is always presumed. therefore. petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents. this Court ruled: The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds. He must choose one. and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. Isabel Lozada married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada married to Francisco Ramos. In Spouses Del Campo v.Thus. specifically provides that: I hereby grant. overlapped with the land of another. and absence of intention to overreach another. when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition. and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 12-D. then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. In this case.37 Even as the option lies with the landowner. sowing or planting. in case of disagreement. The owner of the land on which anything has been built. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right. a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Using the above parameters. which he surveyed. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances.32 Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No.

12-C. it cannot simply be removed at respondents' expense. the petition is DENIED. planter or sower has acted in good faith. because his right is older. the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity. he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. for further proceedings without further delay to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. by the principle of accession. Manila. and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land.Where the builder. should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20. Such matters include the option that petitioners would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay. Branch 15. and because. although it may seem that the portions encroaching upon respondents' house can be considered a nuisance. CV No. This is because respondents built the subject encroachment in good faith. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. Anent the second issue. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court.R. 96886. SO ORDERED.41 this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. because it hinders petitioners' use of their property. WHEREFORE. 2001 in CA-G. 2. 37 . Dumlao.40] In accordance with Depra v. a conflict of rights arises between the owners. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced coownership. between petitioners and respondents. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option. or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. and the law affords them certain rights as discussed above. covered by TCT No. as prayed for by petitioner.