You are on page 1of 19

BACKGROUNDER

No. 2824 | JULY 11, 2013

James Jay Carafano, PhD, and James Phillips

Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back

E

gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi, just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011, to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. By taking steps to preserve public order, the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. Clearly, Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible, attach tighter strings to U.S. aid, and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. He ruled in a secretive, authoritarian, and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians, even some of his former supporters. During his year in office, he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic, social, and political problems. When challenged, he arrogantly ignored, marginalized, and demonized

Key Points
■■

Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi, whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. The army, however, is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The U.S. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt, the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Washington should attach tighter strings to U.S. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems, but the U.S. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy.

■■

■■

■■

Morsi’s Threat to Democracy

■■

■■

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

however. By taking steps to preserve public order. Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. The army. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. Clearly. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible.S. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war.BACKGROUNDER No. NE Washington. he arrogantly ignored. he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. can be found at http://report. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. aid. and political problems. but the U. During his year in office. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt.S. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. authoritarian.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. . attach tighter strings to U. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. Washington should attach tighter strings to U. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. When challenged. The U. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. in its entirety.S. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. PhD. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.heritage. and recalibrate the U.S. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy. 2824 | JULY 11. He ruled in a secretive. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. marginalized.S. even some of his former supporters. 2013 James Jay Carafano. social. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future.

undermining their positions. Instead. p. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. population. By employing various forms of strategic communications.BACKGROUNDER | NO. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. 3 . highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. doubt. and tactics. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. Guo. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. it is not solely by killing the enemy. terror. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. from the context to the biases. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Finally. influencing the course of the conflict. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. 14. including diplomatic efforts. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. 2821 JULY 11. In wartime. At the same time. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. and leaders. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. In addition. employing all the tools of communications. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. including the “Great Firewall of China.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. between military and civilian. Ideally. including various forms of media. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. but once the conflict is concluded. can create a strong psychological impact. To be effective. however. and exhaustion in an opponent. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. and similar outlets. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. operations. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. regret. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. anxiety. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. All the while. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. “When one defeats the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. and among strategy. or winning a piece of ground. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. fear. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion.

org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. During his year in office.S.heritage. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. aid. but the U. he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. By taking steps to preserve public order. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011. PhD. authoritarian. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. he arrogantly ignored. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. marginalized. The army.S. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. Clearly.S. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. can be found at http://report. Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. social. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. even some of his former supporters. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. . in its entirety.BACKGROUNDER No.S. and political problems. and recalibrate the U.S. When challenged. NE Washington. 2824 | JULY 11. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy. however. 2013 James Jay Carafano. attach tighter strings to U. He ruled in a secretive. Washington should attach tighter strings to U. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. The U. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy.

” including what is termed the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. To this end. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nation’s leaders and its populace—affecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the “three warfares. the PRC’s psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conflict. ■■ ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. Key Points ■■ Over the past decade. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. including through intimidation and coercion. and deception. in its entirety. the People’s Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. first and foremost. 2013 Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge Dean Cheng Abstract Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. the U. alienation. This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCP’s grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state.1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponent’s psychology and cognitive capacities. can be found at http://report. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot. as well as dedicated psychological operations units. public diplomacy. the PRC released “political work regulations” for the People’s Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging “the three warfares”: public opinion warfare. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities. NE Washington. the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battlefield. and psychological warfare. The “three warfares” represent the PRC’s commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i. involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political.BACKGROUNDER No. At the moment.e.. The PLA is.heritage. Indeed. legal warfare. . and legal warfare. the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). it is also preparing to conduct “political warfare. and media outreach capabilities.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. 2821 | JULY 11. psychological warfare. O ■■ ■■ ■■ This paper. including strategic communications.” It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemy’s leadership.S.

authoritarian.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down.S.S. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. By taking steps to preserve public order. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. social. but the U. he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. even some of his former supporters. The U. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. 2013 James Jay Carafano. Clearly. . Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule.S. can be found at http://report. During his year in office. in its entirety. PhD. He ruled in a secretive. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. 2824 | JULY 11.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt.BACKGROUNDER No. When challenged. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Washington should attach tighter strings to U. NE Washington. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy. and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. and recalibrate the U. he arrogantly ignored. The army.heritage. aid. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. attach tighter strings to U. and political problems. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy.S. however.S. marginalized.

who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 2013). “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. http:/ / online. On Monday.wsj. social. Tamer El-Ghobashy.BACKGROUNDER | NO. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat.html (accessed July 8. leftist and liberal parties. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. and youth activists. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward.” The Wall Street Journal. On July 3. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. mr.000 injured. political leaders. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. a new Islamist group. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. 2 . 2013.” Badie warned. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. 2824 JULY 11. Under these conditions.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. and Reem Abdellatif. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. the provincial capital. During his year in office. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. 2013 opposition political parties. The next day. had been sworn in as interim president. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. Baradei. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. and political problems. a coalition of 1. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. Mohammed Badie. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). Matt Bradley. July 6. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Similar organizations in Libya. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. As a judge. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. Yemen.

about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. who form the shock troops for street protests. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. bread riots. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. embassy. particularly Islamist extremism. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. a focal point for sectarian violence. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. The Nour Party. labor strikes. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. which has consumed more than 100. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. the largest Arab country.S. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. and rising sectarian tensions. and growing political polarization.S. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. falling standards of living. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. American companies. and government facilities. who supported the military intervention. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. 2824 JULY 11. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . anti-Morsi political groups.BACKGROUNDER | NO. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. which will require considerable American and international support. widespread unemployment. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. Moreover. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. police. and the figure is much higher for young men. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. and other Western companies. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. social turmoil. surging crime rates. It eagerly 3 U. particularly in southern Egypt. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. which will require considerable American and international support. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. Left unchecked.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists.

Psychological Warfare Knowledge. p. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. and leaders. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. and among strategy. To be effective.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. Instead. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Guo. In addition. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Finally. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. including the “Great Firewall of China. fear. and exhaustion in an opponent. “When one defeats the enemy. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. terror. including various forms of media. regret. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. employing all the tools of communications. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. undermining their positions. doubt. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. All the while. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity.BACKGROUNDER | NO. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). 3 . since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. from the context to the biases. and similar outlets. At the same time. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. influencing the course of the conflict. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. or winning a piece of ground. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. operations. including diplomatic efforts. anxiety. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. 2821 JULY 11. and tactics. In wartime. between military and civilian. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. however.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. By employing various forms of strategic communications. but once the conflict is concluded. 14. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. can create a strong psychological impact. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. Ideally. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. population. it is not solely by killing the enemy.

the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. Li Naiguo. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. but also the human agents that interact with those data. whether in wartime or peacetime. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit. A product of the Information Age. As one Chinese volume observes. 30. affecting the 1. Similarly. clerks. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. and tactics. p. it must deal with allied countries. but also internally. Yuan Wenxian. 1. and among strategy. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. 4 (2003). 404.)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. 2821 JULY 11. appropriately control the level of attack. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. manage. etc. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. 4. 2. it targets externally. 2 . appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. between military and civilian. Guo Yanhua. PRC: National Defense University Press. operations. especially those who are making decisions. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. economic. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. p. information warfare is constant and ongoing.” This in turn requires the ability to collect. 3. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. constrain. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. Efforts to secure information dominance. whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. precisely strike predetermined targets. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. 2008). in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. it is applied against the enemy. and even exploitation. with effective coverage of many areas. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. 5. p. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. emotions. No. therefore. PRC: National Defense University Press. Nanjing Political Academy.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. which is integral to information collection and transmission. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. but also the entire globe. technical. 154. 77–79. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. In this context. Because of the complex. 2004). but also against friends. Academy of Military Science.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. information collection. p. pp. 2005). The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). Military News Department Study Group.BACKGROUNDER | NO. and military realms. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations.” China Military Science. November 2005). The interconnected nature of information. as well as information systems.

psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. terror. operations. 2821 JULY 11. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. and tactics. including various forms of media.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. “When one defeats the enemy. p. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. between military and civilian. 3 . especially among senior military and civilian leaders. or winning a piece of ground.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. doubt. and leaders. fear. regret. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Instead. In addition. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. Finally. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. By employing various forms of strategic communications. In wartime. including the “Great Firewall of China. and among strategy. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. including diplomatic efforts. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts.BACKGROUNDER | NO. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. can create a strong psychological impact. and exhaustion in an opponent. At the same time. 14. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. from the context to the biases. population. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. To be effective. but once the conflict is concluded. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). All the while. Ideally. influencing the course of the conflict. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. employing all the tools of communications. undermining their positions. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. however. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. it is not solely by killing the enemy. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. anxiety. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. Guo. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. and similar outlets. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance.

Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic.000 injured. a coalition of 1.wsj. and political problems. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. Mohammed Badie. had been sworn in as interim president. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations.” The Wall Street Journal. Similar organizations in Libya. On Monday. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Baradei.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. and youth activists. On July 3.html (accessed July 8. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. a new Islamist group. mr. During his year in office.” Badie warned. social. The next day.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended.BACKGROUNDER | NO. the provincial capital. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. 2013). Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. 2013. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. Yemen. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. Tamer El-Ghobashy. As a judge. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. Matt Bradley. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. leftist and liberal parties. political leaders. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. 2824 JULY 11. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. Under these conditions. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. 2013 opposition political parties. http:/ / online. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. and Reem Abdellatif. 2 . July 6.

It eagerly 3 U. 2824 JULY 11. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. and government facilities. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. and growing political polarization. which will require considerable American and international support. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. surging crime rates. Moreover. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. which has consumed more than 100. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. Left unchecked. American companies. particularly in southern Egypt. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. particularly Islamist extremism.S. the largest Arab country. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. anti-Morsi political groups. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. labor strikes. which will require considerable American and international support. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed.BACKGROUNDER | NO. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. a focal point for sectarian violence. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. who form the shock troops for street protests. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. and other Western companies. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. and rising sectarian tensions. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. The Nour Party. social turmoil.S. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. widespread unemployment. and the figure is much higher for young men. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. falling standards of living. bread riots. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. police. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. who supported the military intervention. embassy. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks.

a coalition of 1. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.” Badie warned. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.wsj. 2824 JULY 11. 2013 opposition political parties. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. The next day.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. a hotbed of Islamist extremism.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. and political problems. Yemen. During his year in office. Mohammed Badie. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. political leaders. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime.000 injured. and Reem Abdellatif. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. On Monday. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. social. July 6. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. leftist and liberal parties.html (accessed July 8. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). a new Islamist group. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. mr. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. As a judge. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. 2013. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. had been sworn in as interim president. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. 2013). the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. Similar organizations in Libya. and youth activists. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. Matt Bradley.BACKGROUNDER | NO. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. On July 3. Baradei. 2 . Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Under these conditions.” The Wall Street Journal. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. the provincial capital. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. http:/ / online. Tamer El-Ghobashy.

The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. Secular. democratic. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. Yet once in office.S. after the date of enactment of this Act. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. In any event. and abuses. 2012. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority.S. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. Section 7008 of the Department of State. angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. for his part. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. Army. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East.S. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis. not leading a backlash against American policy. What the U. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. aid. and freedom of religion. freedom of speech. support economic reforms to revive the economy. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. Attach tight strings to any U. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process. aid to Egypt. power grabs. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or.. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems.S. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 . Morsi.BACKGROUNDER | NO.S. Army War College in 2006. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime.S. Foreign Operations.5 billion in annual U. 2824 JULY 11. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. 2012. However. It is a sad sign that U. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. and Egypt in 2011. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. which was headed for dictatorship.S.

coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. 14. Finally. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. Instead. however. can create a strong psychological impact. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. but once the conflict is concluded. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. “When one defeats the enemy. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. and similar outlets. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. and tactics. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. regret. and among strategy.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale.BACKGROUNDER | NO. and leaders. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. All the while. 3 . one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. anxiety. from the context to the biases. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. including various forms of media. employing all the tools of communications. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. terror. operations. In wartime. between military and civilian. or winning a piece of ground. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. In addition. it is not solely by killing the enemy. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. 2821 JULY 11. population. p. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. fear. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. including the “Great Firewall of China. To be effective. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. influencing the course of the conflict. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. including diplomatic efforts. At the same time. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. By employing various forms of strategic communications.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. and exhaustion in an opponent. Guo. doubt. undermining their positions. Ideally. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion.

population. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. including diplomatic efforts. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. including various forms of media. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. it is not solely by killing the enemy. between military and civilian. anxiety. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Ideally. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). regret. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. p. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Finally. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. In wartime. By employing various forms of strategic communications. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. In addition. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. however. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. “When one defeats the enemy. fear. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. doubt. undermining their positions. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. and among strategy. At the same time. Guo. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. operations. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. employing all the tools of communications. or winning a piece of ground. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. 14. and exhaustion in an opponent. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. including the “Great Firewall of China. can create a strong psychological impact. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. and leaders. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken.BACKGROUNDER | NO. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. and similar outlets. terror. influencing the course of the conflict. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. All the while.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. Instead. and tactics. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. 2821 JULY 11. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. from the context to the biases. 3 . To be effective. but once the conflict is concluded. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart.

announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. On July 3.BACKGROUNDER | NO. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. social. July 6. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. leftist and liberal parties.” Badie warned. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday.000 injured. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. 2824 JULY 11. During his year in office. Mohammed Badie. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. political leaders. The next day. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. 2013 opposition political parties. Baradei. and Reem Abdellatif. Tamer El-Ghobashy. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. 2013. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. which he linked to foreign conspiracies.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. Matt Bradley. and political problems. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court.wsj. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.html (accessed July 8. a coalition of 1. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. the provincial capital. and youth activists. http:/ / online. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). a hotbed of Islamist extremism. 2013). more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. As a judge. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. Similar organizations in Libya. On Monday. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. had been sworn in as interim president. 2 . many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. a new Islamist group. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward.” The Wall Street Journal. mr. Yemen. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. Under these conditions.

which will require considerable American and international support. social turmoil. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. widespread unemployment. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. surging crime rates. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. embassy. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Left unchecked. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. police. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. The Nour Party. American companies. and the figure is much higher for young men. which has consumed more than 100. and rising sectarian tensions. anti-Morsi political groups. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. and government facilities. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. which will require considerable American and international support. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. 2824 JULY 11. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. and other Western companies. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. and growing political polarization. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. bread riots. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. the largest Arab country.S. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. who supported the military intervention. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. who form the shock troops for street protests.BACKGROUNDER | NO. a focal point for sectarian violence. falling standards of living. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt.S. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. particularly Islamist extremism. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. Moreover. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. particularly in southern Egypt. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. labor strikes. It eagerly 3 U.