Roosevelt 2009

ideas
10 for

defense
&
diplomacy
 10 Ideas for Defense and Diplomacy
Summer 2009

National Director
Hilary Doe

Chair of the Editorial Board

Gracye Cheng

Director of Center for Defense and Diplomacy

Reese Neader

Senior Fellows
Ayesha Siddiqui
Charsaree Clay

National Editorial Board

Clayton Ferrara
Frank Lin
Fay Pappas
Melanie Wright
Yunwen Zhang

The Roosevelt Institute Campus Network

A division of the Roosevelt Institute
2100 M St NW
Suite 610
Washington, DC 20037

Copyright 2009 by the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute.

All rights reserved.
The opinions and statements expressed herein are the sole view of the authors and do
not reflect the views of the national organization, its chapters, or affiliates.
 ideas
10
for

defense
and
diplomacy
This series was made possible
by the generosity of
Mr. Stephan Loewentheil.
 P
Table of Contents
Safe Water for Floating Communities: A Market-Based Approach 8
John Cheng, Corinna Li, Julia Buzon, Jennifer Downing, Olga
Musayev, Pooja Shethji, and Daniel Siegel

Pipeline to Safety: Resettling Iraqi Refugees 10

Matt Alhonte

Extend US Commitments to Nuclear Non-Proliferation & Disarmament 12

Sam Klug

From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication 14

Sonali Pillay

Protecting Community Food Security through Impact Studies 16

Laurel Averett, Rainbo Hultman, Jesalyn Keziah, Sara Mishamandani,
and Lauren Peterson

Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy Programs in Pakistan 18

Vrutika Mody

A New Resolve: US-Pakistan Strategy v. the Taliban 20

Talha Alvie and Justin Shrader

US-Sino Military Cooperation in Africa 22

Bradford White

Investing in Diplomacy: An Association of US Middle Eastern Studies 24

Nazir Harb

Empowering Kenya’s Youth: A Reconciliation Conference 26

Sigrid von Wendel and Mansur Tokmouline

Bonus Excerpt: Accountability in PEPFAR 28

Matthew Eldridge
p Letter from the Editor
E arlier this year, the Roosevelt Institute Campus Network adopted Think Impact, a
model that re-emphasized our organization’s founding goals of looking to young people
for ideas and action, twin forces necessary in the pursuit of change.

The ideas you will read about in this year’s first 10 Ideas series are the result of the ad-
mirable creativity, hard work, and scholarship of Roosevelters. These publications—on
Defense and Diplomacy, Economic Development, Education, Energy & the Environment,
Equal Justice, and Health—are also a testament to these authors’ engagement with the
world. In environments that can be insular, Roosevelters show a willingness to look out-
wards, to think critically about problems on a local, state, and national level.

But, to this end, these publications should only serve as a starting point of a greater
process. Roosevelters must be willing to act in the communities where these ideas can
most effect positive change. For concepts that you find inspiring, we hope that you are
motivated to leverage them for the benefit of your own campus, city or state, and that
you seek out channels and movements through which to bring these ideas to fruition.
And, in instances where you disagree, we hope that you are challenged to see how you
might improve on or adapt an idea.

Gracye Cheng
Chair of the National Editorial Board
 Strategist’s Note P
A progressive vision of U.S. national security stresses the use of ‘smart power’
that addresses the linkages between security and development. Smart power
implements a calculated balance between public diplomacy, sustainable devel-
opment, multilateral engagement, and rapid military response.

Roosevelt students across the country have been engaged in a host of projects
that reflect these ideals. Yale is engaged in directing a youth conference in Kenya
that promotes conflict transformation as well as working to assist “floating com-
munities” in Southeast Asia. Schools like MIT and Denison University are working
with local immigrant populations to encourage dialogue and integration. We are
establishing new chapters that seek to expand our knowledge base and access
to international resources: places like the School for International Training and
the United States Air Force Academy. During the spring semester we co-hosted
a speaking series with the prestigious National Security Network, sending high
profile representatives to burgeoning progressive centers like the Universities
of Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and Michigan. And the student pieces high-
lighted in this journal reflect a nuanced approach to sustained engagement in
overseas contingency operations.

The Defense & Diplomacy Policy Center will continue striving to convey the vi-
sion of progressive security by sponsoring events, publishing student research,
providing informational resources, and connecting passionate students with ca-
reer opportunities.

It is not easy to work in the field of international relations as a student. Perhaps

more than any other policy area, there seems to be a strong feeling of dislocation
between foreign policy research and formulation. But what is often lost by the
American public in debates over geopolitics and international affairs is that we
practice international relations every day. From consumer choices, such as fair
trade and divestment, to community outreach through interfaith dialogue, peace-
making, and conflict resolution, it is important to remember that we practice our
beliefs on a daily basis. If you believe in strengthening the virtue of your nation or
providing a hand in building hope for global prosperity, the power of transforma-
tion is in your hands. And we are here to help you.

Reese Neader
Lead Strategist for Defense and Diplomacy
Safe Water for Floating Communities:
a Market-Based Approach
John Cheng, Corinna Li, Julia Buzan, Jennifer Downing, Olga Musayev, Pooja
Shethji, Daniel Siegel, Yale University
As a component of its River of Life project, Lien Aid, a Singaporean NGO, has
constructed a water treatment plant that seeks to improve access to, and stimu-
late the demand of, safe drinking water in rural Cambodia by employing a sus-
tainable, market-based model.

The Chnouk Trou Commune of Kampong Chhnang Province, Cambodia is located on the
Tonlé Sap, a lake supporting a population of 3 million. Lake water is by far the primary
water source in this community, and inhabitants rely on visual clarity as an indicator of
quality. Furthermore, private plants provide water of unproven quality at high prices,
while public plants provide unsafe water at low prices.

Analysis Chnouk Trou Commune

Overall, the project relies on a de- • Project target population: 8677
mand-based strategy for increasing • High racial heterogeneity, with large minor-
water usage. Different product and ity Vietnamese and Cham communities.
pricing options are offered to entice • High infant mortality rate and short life ex-
consumers. There is price discrimi- pectancy.
nation based on purchase volume • 30-50% of the residents buy water at least
(there is a bulk discount) as well as occasionally, but the highly polluted lake
season (to accommodate the com- remains the primary source of water.
munity’s income fluctuation between • Over 90% of villagers surveyed expressed
the wet and dry seasons). A delivery willingness to purchase treated water.
option based on subscription con-
tracts is also offered. The mean tar-
get price of water is $0.10-0.15 USD per 20 L. Particular focus is put on a multi-prong so-
cial marketing strategy, utilizing name branding, peer education and the incorporation of
water and sanitation knowledge into school curriculum, and diffuse advertising – posters,
radio programs, and public showcases led by a celebrity ambassador. Importantly, ethnic
minorities are engaged in their own language and within their own cultural context.

Furthermore, the project employs a unique ownership, management and operational

structure. To maximize marketing effect and prevent mutual cannibalization, all water
plants in the community are consolidated under a single nonprofit management board.
The primary stakeholders in the project are the NGO, local government, management
board, local business consultants, and plant employees. The NGO provides initial mar-
ket research and capital expenditure on plant, ensures transparency of management,
and offers technical assistance when necessary. The local government aids NGO in
market research and the selection of the management board drawn from local entrepre-
neurs. The volunteer management board supervises day-to-day operations of all water
plants in community. Local business consultants provide feedback and modification of
marketing techniques based on local conditions on a voluntary basis. Finally, a commis-
sion system based on deliveries, incentivizes engagement and microentrepreneurship
among plant employees.

At the regional and international levels, the project provides a model for improving inter-
national security through addressing interethnic tension. By providing clean water to all
residents and explicitly employing a diverse, ethno-inclusive approach, existing tension
among the three ethnic groups, particularly between the Khmer and the Vietnamese, a
legacy of military conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, will be reduced.

Talking Points Next Steps

• Though the majority of the community can afford Going forward, important
safe drinking water, its low prevalence is due to the measures will be undertak-
fact that existing water providers are poorly man- en at the local and interna-
aged and their product quality is either unsafe or tional level. At the local
unproven. Second, inhabitants perceive safe water level, there will be continu-
as a luxury rather than as a need. ous modification of mar-
• Central points of organizational strategy: keting techniques based
• Multilateral engagement: ensures incentivization on local conditions. The
of all affected groups. effectiveness of the collec-
• Transparency: price clarity and organizational ac- tive management model
countability as priorities. will also be assessed. For
• Entrepreneurship: effort made to use plant op- the purposes of both com-
erations as means of bolstering entrepreneurial munity welfare and project
mindset and capacity of community. replicability, the long-term
financial sustainability of
the water plants must be
demonstrated. As a solution to the possible capital shortage, a mechanism to allow in-
terested parties to invest in the plants will be developed. Finally, provided the previous
measures prove successful, an attainable middle-term goal is the replication of this man-
agement and marketing model in other floating communities in Cambodia and around
the world.

The most important long-term aspect of the business model is that it provides a sustain-
able and replicable solution to the water problem in other developing areas.

Sources
“Hygiene Promotion.” IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. 3 Feb. 2009 <http://www.irc.nl/page/7903>.
Kar, Kamal, and Robert Chambers. “Handbook on Community-led Total Sanitation” Community-led Total Sanitation. 2008. Institute of Develop
ment Studies. 16 Feb. 2009 <http://www.communityledtotalsanitation.org/sites/communityledtotalsanitation.org/files/cltshandbook.pdf>.
Lockwood, Harold. “Scaling Up Community Management of Rural Water Supply.” IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre Thematic Over
view Paper (2004). 24 Mar. 2009 <http://www.irc.nl/redir/content/download/9525/141513/file/ScalingUp_CM.pdf> .
Millar, Micheline. “Clean Water for Tonle Sap’s Poor.” ADF Making an Impact -- Cambodia. Asian Development Bank. 17 Feb. 2009 < <http://www.
adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/Impact/CAM/200802.asp>.
“Rural Water and Sanitation Supply.” Water and Sanitation Program. 16 Feb. 2009 <http://www.wsp.org/index.cfm?page=page_disp&pid=1570>.
“Southeast Asia.” Global Water Partnership. 16 Feb. 2009 < http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=132>.
“Tapping into the Private Sector?” WaterAid International briefing note No.7 (2005). 13 Dec. 2008
<http://www.wateraid.org/documents/plugin_documents/private_sector_briefing_note_final_7new.pdf>.
“Tapping the Market -- Private Sector Engagement in Rural Water Supply in the Mekong Region. (Water and Sanitation Program field notes).”
Water and Sanitation Program East Asia and the Pacific (2004). 20 Mar. 2009 < http://www.wsp.org/publications/eap_Mekong.pdf>.
“Tapping the Rural Water Market in Cambodia.” Id21 Rural Development communicating development research. 21 Feb. 2009 <http://www.id21.
orgrural/r4ds1g1.html>.
“The Right to Water.” WaterAid International. 15 Dec. 2008 <http://www.wateraid.org/international/what_we_do/policy_and_research/the_right_to_
water/default.asp>.

9
Pipeline to Safety:
Resettling Iraqi Refugees
Matt Alhonte, City University of New York

The federal government should create a pipeline program that helps direct Iraqi
refugees resettled under the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program into language
instruction jobs.

Many Iraqis who helped U.S. forces found themselves targets of insurgents. Last year,
America opened its doors to its overseas allies. However, the transition has been diffi-
cult for many of them, particularly when it comes to employment. Even highly educated
Iraqis have a hard time in the U.S. labor market, as most American employers do not
recognize Iraqi credentials. At the same time, the U.S. government faces a critical short-
age of Arabic speakers, both in operational capacities and as language instructors. These
problems appear tailor-made to solve one another.

The shortage of Arabic translators in

government is a critical national secu- Key Facts
rity issue. However, the sensitivity of • Six hundred Iraqis who worked US forces
these positions means that the man- or subcontractors have been resettled
agement at the respective agencies since the SIV program began in 2008,
are reluctant to recruit recent immi- with provisions for 5000 more to be is-
grants, even ones who have worked sued every year until 2012.
with U.S. forces in the past. Whether • Student interest is also massive, with en-
these concerns are grounded or not, rollment in Arabic courses in universities
the tension is likely to still exist. In increasing by more than 125% between
addition, the best long-term strategy 2002 and 2006 according to the Modern
to insure our diplomatic, intelligence Language Institute.
and military apparatuses are well-
stocked with Arabic-speakers is to
systematize their training. This would be best accomplished by an investment in con-
necting the people who want to learn Arabic with those who want to teach it, as well as
some training on formal language instruction.

This would involve relatively little spending on the government’s part. Enrollment in Ara-
bic courses in universities has increased by more than 125% between 2002 and 2006.
The bottleneck is with personnel, not funds. There is no shortage of students willing to
pay for Arabic instruction. There are simply not enough qualified instructors to teach all
of the interested students. Arabic was not commonly taught outside of large universities
until very recently. Programs have been expanded, and many universities started teach-
ing Arabic when they had not before. The post-9/11 surge in demand has overwhelmed
both, resulting in overcrowded classes, students unable to register, or more commonly
both. The number of instructors is also unlikely to increase on its own soon. While Arabic
has become a popular language to learn, few students take it long enough to become
instructors themselves, when compared to other foreign language programs.
While the jobs themselves will be provided by the educational market itself, the state
could facilitate this with teaching training that addresses the particular needs of the Iraqi
refugees. Simply speaking a language does not qualify one to teach it. However, it is
certainly easier to train a native Arabic-speaker to be a decent language instructor than
to train an existing instructor fluent Arabic.

Idea Origin
This idea was suggested by an Iraqi refugee who I met last fall. He was employed as part
of a high school maintenance staff, though he was the head engineer of a water treat-
ment plant in Iraq. He expressed interest in training U.S. soldiers to speak Arabic. He
suggested that many Iraqis refugees were having similar issues finding employment, and
that they would likely enjoy the opportunity to be language instructors.

Stakeholders
The federal government would be the best body to handle this, presumably either
through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, or the
Department of Education. It is, how-
ever, very easy to imagine individual
Talking Points agencies which have their own edu-
• Native speakers are the bottleneck pre- cational facilities tapping the pool of
venting the Arabic language market from Iraqis to meet their own translation
reaching equilibrium. instruction needs ahead of the larger
government effort. For example, the
Department of Defense’s Defense
Language Institute, or the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, which train cur-
rent soldiers and diplomats respectively, would both benefit from adopting this policy
on their own terms.

Next Steps
The next step would be cataloguing which institutes need additional Arabic instructors
the most, using metrics such as overcrowded classrooms and over-tally requests. Prior-
ity would be given to institutions that have the funding readily available but desperately
require instructors, as well as institutions with well-established programs for bringing
their foreign language students into government work such as Monterey Institute of Inter-
national Studies. Afterwards, a curriculum should be drawn up, addressing the specific
needs of Iraqi immigrants. Then, bureaucratic channels should be established that inform
current and future Iraqi refugees about language instruction opportunities.

Sources
1. Huang, Carol. “Why the Pool of Arabic Speakers is Still a Puddle.” May 17, 2007.http://www.csmonitor.
com/2007/0517/p13s01-legn.html (accessed April 10th 2009).
2. Redden, Elizabeth. “Hype vs. Reality in Arabic Enrollment Boom” November 29, 2007 .http://www.inside
highered.com/news/2007/11/29/arabic (accessed April 10th 2009).
3. Sebti, Bassam. “Iraqi Dreams Lost in America” February 28, 2008.http://www.thelistproject.org/
blog/2008/02/iraqi-dreams-lost-in-america.html (accessed April 10th 2009).
4. Masis, Julie. “Jobs in mind, students look for classes in Arabic.” May 6, 2007.http://www.boston.com/news/
education/higher/articles/2007/05/06/jobs_in_mind_students_look_for_classes_in_arabic/ (accessed 4/30/09).

11
Extend U.S. Commitments to Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Sam Klug, Columbia University

The US should commit itself to strengthening nuclear nonproliferation treaties by

pressuring other nuclear weapons states to sign these treaties and by reducing
the US’s own arsenal.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the only multilateral nuclear treaty signed by
the U.S., established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors the
nuclear activities of each signatory state, and expresses the twin goals of global disarma-
ment and non-proliferation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in 1991,
calls for verification of all U.S. and Russian nuclear sites. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions of 2002 requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear stock-
piles to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the end of 2012. The ratification of these
treaties demonstrates that U.S. policymakers consider nuclear arms control to be criti-
cal to national interests. The positive reception of recent overtures by the current U.S.
administration to Russia regarding
the extension of START I, which
expires on December 5, 2009, im- Key Facts
plies that further non-proliferation • The NPT recognizes five nuclear weapons
efforts are politically feasible. states (U.S., UK, France, China, and Russia)
and makes a distinction between the rights
The cost of this proposal to the of these states and those of all other states.
U.S. is minimal. With mechanisms • India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are
in place and resources devoted the “unrecognized” nuclear weapons states,
to dismantling our nuclear weap- as they have all successfully created nuclear
ons, furthering this policy would programs outside the NPT.
only project the cost of our cur- • The U.S. and Russia both currently have
rent policy (a minute proportion of between 3,000 and 3,500 operationally de-
the Defense Department’s budget) ployed strategic nuclear warheads; no other
into the future. In the long term, country has more than 350.
this proposal would reduce the • China is the only one of the five recognized
annual cost of maintaining such a nuclear weapons states still building nuclear
large nuclear arsenal and keeping weapons.
so many weapons on high alert.

Security benefits of further disarmament to the United States lie in the strength such a
policy would give to the NPT and its mission of disarmament and non-proliferation. By re-
newing their commitment to Article VI of the NPT (outlining the goal of disarmament), the
five nuclear-weapon states would demonstrate the importance of full compliance and ex-
pose states, such as Iran, that are not in compliance with Articles II and III, which govern
non-proliferation. Any action taken against a rogue state after some form of disarmament
by the five recognized nuclear-weapon states would benefit from broader international
support, and thus could have more wide-reaching effects than the narrow sanctions on
individuals currently levied against Iran.
Recommendations
• The U.S. should attempt to turn both of its bilateral treaties with Russia into mul-
tilateral treaties that include all recognized nuclear-weapon states.
• The U.S. must include the unrecognized nuclear-weapon states in START I and
the Moscow Treaty, making disclosure of their nuclear programs a pre-requisite for
joining negotiations.
• Working with Russia to extend the Moscow Treaty beyond 2012, the U.S. should
set a short-term target of reducing arsenals to 1,000 weapons by 2016.
• A long-term agreement with Russia that sets a goal of reducing stockpiles to no
more than 500 weapons should constitute the U.S.’s final goal.
• The United States should seek to include all other nuclear-weapon states in a
new provision of the Moscow Treaty that, outside of the NPT, calls for countries not
to expand their arsenals under any circumstances.

Next Steps
Talking Points Regular monitoring by the
• Increased confidence in Israel’s accounting for of
IAEA to verify that all coun-
its nuclear weapons would reduce temptation for
tries that have signed these
other Middle Eastern countries, all of whom act
treaties are living up to their
under the assumption that Israel possesses nucle-
commitments would be nec-
ar weapons, to seek their own nuclear arsenals.
essary. Regular meetings
• Because current nuclear threats to the U.S. most
among all nuclear weapons
likely come from rogue states or terrorist groups,
states to reaffirm their com-
a large stockpile of nuclear weapons is no longer
mitments to these treaties
a strategic deterrent.
and to discuss the potential
• Even at the height of the Cold War, “it was widely
for further cutbacks would
agreed that 400-500 weapons on target would
help to validate the princi-
assuredly destroy the Soviet Union’s vast eco-
ples of non-proliferation and
nomic and military potential.”
disarmament internationally.

Sources
“The Logic of Zero.”
U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” 31 July 1991. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. <http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/text.htm#top>.
U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.” 24 May 2002. Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/
control/sort/index.html>.
U.S. Department of State, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 1 July 1968. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/www/
global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>.
Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” The Wall Street Journal Online. 15 Jan 2008
<http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html>.
“U.S. Nuclear Stockpile.” Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/
nuclearstockpile.html>.
Laalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. “The Logic of Zero.” Foreign Affairs. November/December 2008 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64608/ivo-
daalder-and-jan-lodal/the-logic-of-zero>.
“Just How Low Can You Go?” The Economist Online. 27 Mar 2008 <http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_
id=10926586>.
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008)
and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” International Atomic Energy Agency. 15 Sep 2008 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/
report/2008/iran_iaea_gov-2008-59_081119.htm>.

13
From Poppies to Red Gold:
An Alternative Approach to Eradication
Sonali Pillay, Columbia University

Substituting saffron for poppies should be pursued as part of a US strategy to re-

duce the Afghanistan drug trade, reduce funding for insurgents and the Taliban,
and stabilize the region.

According to Richard Holbrooke, the $800 million the U.S. spends per year on counter-
narcotics is “wasteful and ineffective.” In 2005 the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) was
created with the help of United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S.
State Department. These eradicators have been ambushed by Taliban forces and tar-
geted by suicide bombers. Furthermore, eradication does not address the reasons why
poppy growing has become so widespread: farmers depend upon poppies because they
are a high-value, low-risk crop with established trade routes. Farmers are also indebted
to predatory moneylend-
ers who claim a percent- Key Facts
age of their next harvest; • Afghanistan produces 93% of the world’s opiates.
thus they cannot surrender • The opium trade provides Taliban and insurgent
their crop without default- groups between $100 million and $400 million per
ing on loans. year.
• The UN and NATO believe insurgents get roughly
When the western Af- 60% of their annual income from drugs.
ghanistan Agricultural Ad- • The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has
ministration introduced said that the Taliban made about £50 million from
saffron in a pilot program, opium in 2007.
a 40-hectare plot yielded • Opium poppies and saffron yield $5,200 and up to
320 kilograms of saffron, $8,000 per hectare respectively.
and farmers filed hundreds • 80% of personnel at the Ministry of Interior ben-
of applications for saffron efit from the drug trade and 100,000 members of
corms. the Afghan government benefit directly from drug
trade, whether it be from transportation fees, bribes
As one of the most expen- or profits.
sive spices in the world, saf-
fron has been nicknamed
“red gold.” Saffron has a farmgate value of up to $8,000, making it perhaps the only crop
that competes with the poppy, which yields $5, 200 per hectare. Saffron is a high-profit,
low-risk crop suitable to climatic conditions in Western Afghanistan, which borders Iran;
Iran has a long history of growing the best saffron in the world. In fact, saffron harvests in
the Herat province, bordering Iran, have set the international record for most productive
yield.

To make this crop substitution feasible, donor nations must provide funding for corms
(saffron seeds) to farmers in order to avoid artificial price inflation, packaging supplies
for distribution, storage facilities so that farmers can avoid price fluctuations in any given
year, machinery with which farmers can conduct International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) testing to ensure their product’s viability on the international market, and
basic, secure transportation to markets. These services and inputs should be provided to
capitalist cooperatives that allow farmers to have access to goods that would otherwise
be too expensive for them to access. The capitalist cooperatives should be provided
with an endowment with which than can create microfinance schemes tailored to Islamic
banking. In addition, organizations such as the International Center for Agricultural Re-
search in Dry Areas (ICARDA) should train Afghans on proper farming techniques for
saffron in order to produce a successful, profitable crop.

Next Steps
Talking Points As the Obama
• Saffron is a high-profit, low-risk crop based on the crocus
Administration re-
flower, the highest quality of which is produced in Iran and
views U.S. policy
Afghanistan. It is perhaps the only viable crop that competes
toward Afghani-
with the poppy for economic returns.
stan and Pakistan,
• Afghan saffron can replace embargoed Iranian saffron in
it should directly
Western markets.
address failed at-
• To circumvent government corruption, aid to farmers should
tempts to restrict
be provided through private, capitalist cooperatives oper-
A fg h a n i s t a n’s
ated on a financially sustainable basis.
drug trade and
• Cooperatives should concentrate on maximizing economies
corresponding
of scale, providing inputs, stockpiling facilities, ISO standard
income for the
quality testing, securing access to markets, and providing
Taliban and other
secondary microfinance.
insurgent groups.
Congress should
be engaged in this
initiative to ensure that this strategic change is fully implemented and sufficiently funded.
The DEA should work with ICARDA to ensure that saffron farming cooperatives are
properly established and secure, with all the necessary inputs and adequate funding in
order to run their own microfinancing schemes. Donor agencies can also provide exper-
tise on microfinance and management skills to the cooperative managers.
Sources
BBC News Online. “Envoy Damns US Afghan Drug Effort.” Published 3/21/09. Viewed 3/24/09. http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7957237.stm
Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newy
orker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson
Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newy
orker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson
Governor Muhammad Ghulab Mangal of Helmand. News Hours with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09
Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peace
building in Afghanistan.”
Brigadier General John Nicholson. News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09.
The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be
stopped?”
Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peace
building in Afghanistan.”
Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to
Opium Poppy Cultivation
ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan.
T. V. Padma. “Dropping the Poppy Habit.”

15
Protecting Community Food Security
through Impact Studies
Laurel Averett, Rainbo Hultman, Jesalyn Keziah, Sara Mishamandani, Lauren
Peterson, University of North Carolina

Impact studies executed prior to new construction in Durham, NC should include

provisions that address the food security of the affected community as defined
by USDA guidelines.

After two years of deliberation, the Durham Town Council decided to widen Alston Av-
enue in order to alleviate traffic in downtown Durham. This construction will result in the
elimination of Los Primos, the primary grocery store for most residents in the area. This
will reduce competition for the second-closest grocery store in the area, a Food Lion,
simultaneously endangering the access to and affordability of nutritious food for many.

This situation demonstrates food insecu-

rity escalated by construction, reflecting Key Facts
the need to protect Durham’s food supply. • Downtown Durham is losing one of
Moreover, it shows a national food securi- its two grocery stores, raising its food
ty crisis as grocery stores resist opening in insecurity index from 3 to 5.
urban areas due to perceptions of crime, • 11.4 % of Durham lives below the pov-
economic hardship and lack of transporta- erty line.
tion. Therefore, closing an urban grocery • 37.9% of single-mother households in
store eliminates a valuable economic asset Durham live below the poverty line.
that is unlikely to return. In addition, food-
poor areas (i.e. areas that lack adequate
access to affordable, nutritious, and culturally appropriate food) have a higher risk of
diet-related diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Due to its impact on
every facet of community life, food security is drawing attention from community activists
and local governments in urban areas such as Oakland, Detroit, and Dallas.1,2 However,
most approaches focus on enhancing a community’s food security by attracting new busi-
nesses, creating urban agriculture initiatives, and expanding food stamp programs. Mean-
while, there are no policies aimed at protecting the food security of a community from
construction-related threats such as those that are closing Los Primos in Durham.

Studies have shown that urban areas may be underserved by groceries by as much as
25%.1 This vacuum is not readily filled by new businesses due to difficulty implementing
the typical supermarket business model in space- restricted inner cities, compounded
by perceptions of crime. This not only decreases accessibility to stores, but it drives up
prices due to lack of competition. Since the average cost of the USDA’s Thrifty Food
Plan (TFP, the most cost-effective way to fulfill nutritional needs) would use 34% of the
monthly income of someone living at the poverty line,4, 5 high food prices in urban areas
are unsustainable. In Durham, NC, where 11% of residents live at or below the poverty
line, community food security is a critical problem.6

Food insecurity has profound effects on all facets of community life. Children affect-
ed by nutritional deficiencies can have impaired cognitive development.7 Studies have
found that food security-related poor nutrition can lead to diet-related diseases such
as diabetes, heart disease, and obesity.8, 9 Indeed, the food-insecure are twice as likely
to be obese as the food secure.10 Such health problems can burden inner-city econo-
mies through added health care costs and reduced work efficiency. Also, a 2002 study
showed that vitamin deficiencies increase violent behavior by as much as 25%, which can
exacerbate crime, already a problem in urban areas.11

A study performed last fall by Ramses consulting that developed a heuristic to analyze
potential threats to food security concluded that the current food security threat level
due to availability and affordability in the neighborhood was a 3 on a 1-5 threat index (with
5 being the least food secure).12 This meant that there existed one or more stores carrying
at or above the national average of number of items listed on the TFP. However, the elimi-
nation of the Los Primos grocery store would elevate the threat index to a 5, indicating
that both affordability and availability of items on the TFP are threatened due to distance
to and lack of competition with the remaining local grocer. Our analysis suggests that by
performing a food security impact assessment prior to future construction projects, such
dramatic increases in food insecurity can be avoided.

Next Steps
We propose that the Durham county commissioners execute Community Food Security
Impact Assessments (CFSIAs) prior to construction and development projects as one
aspect of a comprehensive food security initiative. We propose that the Durham city
commissioner consider including a food security provision in future impact studies for
construction and development projects as one part of a comprehensive food security
plan. Considerations of food security would fit well into the previously established en-
vironmental justice goal that seeks to limit adverse affects on low-income and minority
groups. A CFSIA could be modeled after common environmental impact assessments,13
which are conducted in environmentally-sensitive areas prior to development project
approval. Likewise, a CFSIA would be performed prior to development in food security-
sensitive areas, and would involve three main steps: 1. Establish baseline food security of
the area; 2. Predict impact of development on food security; 3. Make recommendations,
including possible mitigating actions. To measure the local food security, the USDA food
security assessment toolkit3 should be used. Further, we advise that data on food secu-
rity be gathered annually and included in models developed for transportation.

Sources
1. Pothukuchi K (2005) Attracting Supermarkets to Inner-City Neighborhoods: Economic Development Outside the Box. Economic Development
Quarterly 19:232.
2. Pothukuchi K (2004) Community Food Assessment: A First Step in Planning for Community Food Security. J. Plann. Educat. Res. 23:356-377.
3. Cohen B (2002) Community Food Security Assessment toolkit, (Economic Research Service U).
4. Anonymous (2008) Food Security in the United States, (Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion U).
5. Anonymous (2009) USDA Food Plans: The Cost of Food, (Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion U).
6. Anonymous (2006) Income Characteristics, 2000 Census Samples (Durham), (Development OoEaW).
7. Anonymous (2001) Nutrition and Cognitive Development (University of Mississippi), (Institute NFSM).
8. Stamler J (1982) Diet and Coronary Heart Disease. Biometrics 38:95-114.
9. Seligman HK, Bindman AB, Vittinghoff E, Kanaya AM, & Kushel MB (2007) Food Insecurity is Associated with Diabetes Mellitus: Reuslts from
the National Health Examination and Nutrition Examination Survey. Journal of General Internal Medicine 22(7):1018-1023.
10. Adams EJ, Grummer-Strawn L, & Chavez G (2003) Food Insecurity is Associated with Increased Risk of Obesity in California Women. Journal
of Nutrition 133:1070-1074.
11. Gesch CB, Hammond SM, Hampson SE, Eves A, & Crowder MJ (2002) Influence of supplementary vitamins, minerals, and essential fatty acids
on the antisocial behavior of young adult prisoners. The British Journal of Psychiatry 181:22-28.
12. Morgan S, Gager P, Johnson D, Wenzel K, & Miller A (2008) A Comprehensive Analysis of Potential Threats to Food Security Using Durham as
a Heuristic. (The Univeristy of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill).
13. Anonymous (1997) Guidelines for Conducting Environmental Impact Assessment, (Authority NRC).

17
Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy
Programs in Pakistan
Vrutika Mody, Middlebury College

The U.S. State Department should invest funds and personnel skills to improve
public diplomacy programs in Pakistan, specifically addressed at Pakistan’s
middle class. Namely, initiate interaction between low-level Pakistani and U.S.
officials and increase American education opportunities for Pakistani youth.

Post 9-11, negative civilian opinion towards U.S. behavior has developed due to three rea-
sons : 1) popular belief the U.S. is solely concerned with its own interests in the region, 2)
U.S. favorable and asymmetrical relationship with India, underscored by the 2008 U.S.-In-
dia Civilian Nuclear Deal, and 3) U.S. government emphasis on Pakistan’s military capabili-
ties, sidelining economic and development assistance. Pakistani newspapers have strong-
ly critized American negligence in killing civilians, “American drones in Pakistan between
January 14 2006 and April
8 2009 kill[ed] 14 wanted Key Facts
al-Qaeda leaders, perishing • In a June 2005 PEW opinion poll, only 23% of Pak-
[sic] 687 innocent Pakistan istanis expressed a favorable view of the United
civilians. The successful per- States. This was the lowest percentage rating of
centage of the U.S. predator any country surveyed. In June 2007, favorable rat-
strikes thus comes to not ings declined to 15%.
more than six percent.” • Public diplomacy programs account for 4% of
State Department’s budget. The US spends equal
The precarious security situ- amounts as Britain and France, despite being 5
ation in the region discour- times larger with deeper global involvement. Pub-
ages American foreign direct lic diplomacy officers (2,500 in 1991) have been re-
investment. However, in- duced by half. 49% of the U.S. Embassy’s Informa-
creased face-time between tion Resource Center (IRCs) on American culture
American and Pakistani local and policies is not open to the public or is open by
officials and students outside appointment only.
the realm of government is
critical. Encouraging coop-
erative ventures will educate Pakistanis of U.S. policy and result in candid conversation
about policy improvements. Economic cooperation will counter Pakistani resentment of
US FDI and development programs in neighboring India.

Next Steps
U.S. state and local representatives should offer city/town planning guidance to Pakistani
officials:
• Civically-engaged Americans on city councils and school boards cooperate with
Pakistani city officials on issues of local governance (i.e. sewage systems, public
safety, primary education, environment protection). Local U.S. officials will recog-
nize particular infrastructure, cultural and economic needs of Pakistan encouraging
domestic led reform instead of enforcing ‘Americanization.’
• Invite Pakistani delegations to observe successful small U.S. towns and cities.
 Direct interactions will provide Pakistan with state-building knowledge. Interac-
tions will also create opportunities for state-to-Pakistan trade and educational ven-
tures.

The State Department’s Civilian Response Corps offers a blueprint in which volunteer
diplomats, public health officials, engineers, and economists are deployed in a crisis zone
within 48-72 hours. However, the goals of a Pakistan-oriented civilian corps should in-
clude multiple interactions over time and incentives offered to Americans (i.e. trade op-
portunities).

U.S. policy should emphasize educational exchanges between U.S. and Pakistani stu-
dents:
• Relaxing Bush adminstration’s strict quotas on foreign students from Islamic coun-
tries.
• U.S. embassy in Pakistan should provide financial support for small batches of
local Pakistani students to attend certified American schools (i.e. Karachi American
School, Lahore American School).
• The embassy should also strenghten the ‘American Studies’ department in local
Pakistani universities. Incentives to choose this major could include internship op-
portunities with U.S. businesses.

These policies will provide

Talking Points Pakistani youth with oppor-
• Pakistani Muslims responded to polls by agreeing tunities to learn about U.S.
“the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were not politics, history, society, and
about democracy. [Instead], they were about re- culture in an academic set-
moving certain threats to the United States.” ting. Pakistanis from a young
• Increasing rates of anti-American sentiment in Paki- age will have a stake in im-
stan challenge the effectiveness of U.S military and proving U.S.-Pakistan rela-
economic policy in the region. The US will need to tions. The practical benefits
continue aggressive strikes to attack al-Qaeda and for them will include higher -
the Taliban in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas. How- education opportunities and
ever, these tactics will be futile if America’s pres- richer career prospects. The
ence itself is rejected by the Pakistani population, State Department’s Youth
especially the country’s nascent middle class. Exchange and Study (YES)
program provides 300 slots
for Muslim youth to spend
one year in American high schools. However, because funding has been redirected to
other programs, contact with youth is often lost and students are not provided with tan-
gible skills or job opportunities for use after graduation.

Sources
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Hearing: Global Polling Data on Opinion of American Policies, Values and People. 110th
Congress, 1st session. Mar. 14 2007.
http://mountainrunner.us/files/sfrc/Time_to_Get_Back_in_the_Game_LIVE.pdf
Hussain, Touqir. “U.S Pakistan-Engagement Special Report. The War on Terrorism and Beyond” U.S Institute for Peace. August 2005.
USC Center of Public Diplomacy, Allerton Mir, Amir. “60 drone hits kill 14 al-Qaeda men, 687 civilians.” The International News. 10 Apr. 2009.
http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21440
Kerry, John F. “US Public Diplomacy – Time to Get Back in the Game.” Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Feb. 13, 2009.

19
A New Resolve:
US – Pakistan Strategy v. the Taliban
Talha Alvie and Justin Shrader, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

As Taliban influence spreads in Pakistan, the United States must refocus its ef-
forts toward a joint endeavor, providing the Pakistani military with adequate
means to combat the militancy and promoting socio-economic development in
the country’s troubled northwestern regions.

After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, many Taliban fled to Pakistan’s autonomous Fed-
erally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and continued to carry out attacks on NATO
forces. Much of the aid Pakistan received to stop the attacks was diverted to other proj-
ects, such as boosting the military on the Indian border. Meanwhile, the Taliban were
able to spread to neighboring areas, and by April 2009, had reached districts just 100 km
away from the capital Islamabad.

The U.S. must push for Pakistan to

take military action in the Swat Valley
and must give the Pakistani military
the weapons, equipment, and logis-
tical support appropriate for such
action. Instead of providing loosely
monitored money as it has in the
past, the United States should sup-
ply up-to-date hardware to increase
the effectiveness of the Pakistan mili-
tary and minimize civilian casualties.
The Pakistan Frontier Corps, a criti-
cal element in anti-militancy efforts,
suffers from a lack of communication
systems, modern equipment, and
training. All of these can be provided
by the U.S., without the concern for
misuse that arises with money.
Key Facts
• Pakistan has received $6 billion in military
aid since 2001 to combat terrorism, much
of which has been misspent.
• Pakistan receives only $75 million per year
in development aid.
• The Taliban have invaded districts sur-
rounding their stronghold in the Swat
valley, despite a deal with the federal
government implementing Sharia (Islamic)
law in Swat in exchange for peace.
• The government, though hesitant to re-
spond, has launched a military operation
in the Buner and Lower Dir districts.

The U.S. military should also increase intelligence-sharing with Pakistan, an endeavor
made easier with new pro-U.S. commanders in Pakistani intelligence agency. U.S. drones
can be used to relay information about Taliban activity to Pakistani commanders on the
ground. Unilateral drone strikes by the U.S. strain relations but, if necessary, they should
be coordinated with Pakistani commanders to maximize their effectiveness.

Extremism in Pakistan must be viewed through a socio-economic lens. Pakistan’s north-

west remains largely underdeveloped and would benefit from basic infrastructure such
as schools, hospitals, and running water. Extremist ideologies spread easily among de-
spondent and marginalized populations, and the U.S. should begin to invest more in
these areas to help increase economic opportunities. Special emphasis must be placed
on training and equipping civilian law enforcement agencies so that security can become
self-sustaining.

Analysis
• Military action against the Taliban stronghold in Swat will further reduce the ca-
pabilities of the Taliban.
• A more supportive approach by the U.S. will increase the capacity of the Paki-
stani military to combat extremism.
• Providing appropriate weapons, equipment, and information instead of money
will prevent misuse of military aid.
• A coordinated effort will also serve as a trust building exercise between the two
countries.
• Most of the Taliban’s recruits have been poor, jobless young men. Combining an
economic aspect to the solution will harm support for the Taliban and isolate them
from the rest of the population.

Talking Points Next Steps

• The United States should urge Pakistan to
take military action in the Swat Valley.
• The U.S. Must support Pakistan’s opera-
tions by providing the tools needed to
combat militancy.
• The U.S. must also refocus its efforts in the
region as whole and increase economic
investment and development to stem the
spread of extremist ideologies.
Military action must be taken in Swat
as soon as possible. In the meantime,
however, the U.S. military should
better coordinate with its Pakistani
counterparts on drone attacks and
through intelligence-sharing in order
to reduce further damage to inter-
governmental relations and to main-
tain support in Pakistan.

Sources
United States Government Accountability Office. “Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Account
ability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Funds.” June 2008.
Johnson, Thomas; Mason, Chris. “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 41-47.
Khan, M. Ilyas. “Doubts Remain as Sharia Bill Signed,” BBC. April 15, 2009.
“Pakistan Launches Taleban Strikes,” BBC. April 28, 2009.
“US Aid ‘Diverted’ in Pakistan.” BBC. December 27, 2007.
Paracha, Abdul Sami. “Buner Falls into the Hands of Swat Taliban,” Dawn (Pakistan). April 22, 2009.
Oxford Analytica: Global Strategic Analysis. “PAKISTAN: Corps is Ill-Equipped for ‘War on Terror’.” December
11, 2007.
Perlez, Jane. “Pakistani Military Names Spy Agency Chief,” The New York Times. September 30, 2008.
Johnson, Thomas; Mason, Chris. “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 41-47.
Abbas, Hassan. “From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread their Grip in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel. Vol. 1,
Issue 10. September 2008.

21
U.S.-Sino Military
Cooperation in Africa
Bradford Waldie, United States Air Force Academy

The U.S. and China both have vital interests in the stability and development
of African nations; training of African Peacekeeping forces provides an ideal
overlapping interest for the simultaneous improvement of African States as well
as U.S.-Sino relations.

Now is the time for cooperation. For the U.S., China and Africa, a mutually beneficial op-
portunity for collaboration exists in the potential for military cooperation on the African
continent. All parties involved have security, economic, and political interests tied to
African stability and have declared their willingness to pursue security as a prerequisite
to attaining that desired stability. Through combining the strengths of America’s military
experience with China’s growth and development competence, the burden of undertak-
ing substantial security develop-
ment becomes more manageable Key Facts
for all involved. Joint operations • In October 2007, the U.S. established the
in states such as Rwanda and Li- new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) with
beria, and dialogue through mul- a focus on sustaining African security; since
tinational regional organizations that time China has deployed over 1,400 mili-
such as the Economic Community tary, police and observers as peacekeepers
of West African States (ECOW- in Africa.
AS) can provide a platform for • The U.S. and China have both committed
the development of professional, Navy vessels to fight pirates in the waters off
well equipped African militaries the Horn of Africa.
with the ability to support peace- • In the past decade the percentage of Official
keeping roles and stabilize central Development Assistance funds controlled
governments. Cooperative devel- by the Pentagon has increased from 3.5% to
opment would aid the ability of 22%, while the amount of Chinese foreign aid
African states to increase peace- devoted to activities in Africa rose to 44%.
keeping operations and improve
the relationship between the U.S.
and Chinese militaries.

Recent events in Liberia have shown the value of establishing security as a fundamental
component of stability. In 2003, at the end of the Second Liberian Civil War, the U.S., UN,
regional African Coalitions intervened in Liberia, and committed themselves towards
modernizing the Liberian Army as a tool to develop a strong central government. While
the U.S. worked with the military, U.N. forces trained Liberian police, providing an ex-
ample of how international actors can collaborate to improve security.

Analysis
The monetary investment required to train and equip African military forces would be
substantial, but with pledges from both the U.S. and China to increase aid to Africa, find-
ing the funding is feasible. Liberia serves as an example for the potential price tag on mili-
tary training. The U.S. contributed $162 million bilaterally and $179 million through UNMIL
in 2008 to that nation’s rebuilding efforts. The current U.S. administration plans to double
foreign assistance to Africa from $25 billion in 2008 to $50 billion by 2012. Additionally,
China’s current assistance funding to Africa is estimated at a modest $1-2 billion per year,
but Beijing has vowed earlier this year to increase aid to African Nations. The U.S. State
Department should engage the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in bilateral talks to en-
sure that sufficient funds are allocated by both nations to support African military training
missions, and equipment purchases. Added security will usher in increased wiliness by
private companies to make substantial investments in Africa, bringing the financial capital
needed to promote long term growth.

Next Steps
Talking Points
Coordinating training missions and
• Despite a lack of China’s transparency
funding within the U.S. government
in many African initiatives, Beijing has
as well as with Beijing will prove to be
openly stated its support for cooperat-
the greatest challenge to implement-
ing and training African military forces.
ing this policy. The first step would
• Engaging the Chinese military as part-
be to work through U.S. established
ners in efforts to train African forces
State Department organizations such
adds much needed manpower and re-
as the International Military Education
sources to U.S. efforts.
and Training (IMET) Program and the
• Many African nations, such as Liberia,
Africa Contingency Operations Train-
present more options for improving
ing and Assistance (ACOTA) Program
U.S.-China cooperation than hot button
in identifying Chinese counterparts
issues that negotiate the parameters of
to work with in planning out training
Chinese sovereignty such as North Ko-
operations that would lead to the in-
rea or Taiwan.
creased capability of African nations.

Sources
Bacon, Ken. “Huffington Post Reshaping the U.S. Military Policy in Africa.” http://www.refugeesinternational.
org/press-room/oped/huffington-post-reshaping-us-military-policy-africa.
China View. “Chinese president vows to increase aid to Africa.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng
lish/2009-02/13/content_10810653.htm.
“China’s African Policy.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.
Dietzman, Roy. Interview by author. USAFA, CO, April, 13, 2009.
Lapierre, Daniel. “Liberia’s President Johnson-Sirleaf, U.S. General Ward Attend Historic Activation of Liberian
Military Unit.” United States African Command. http://www.africom.mil/ getArticle.asp?art=2011.
Lum, Thomas et al. “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.” Congressional
Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf
Swan, James and Thomas J Christensen. “China’s Involvement in Africa.” http://foreign.senate.gov/testimo
ny/2008/SwanTestimony080604a.pdf.
“The Obama-Biden Plan.” http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/foreign_policy/#onafrica.
Vause, John. “Reports: China Sending Ships to Fight Pirates in Africa.” Cable News Network. http://www.cnn.
com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/17/china.pirates/index.html

23
Investing In Diplomacy:
An Association of US Middle Eastern Studies
Nazir Harb, Princeton University

Investing in diplomacy means investing in language training. The establishment

of a National Association of U.S. Middle Eastern Studies would facilitate en-
hanced Middle Eastern language training and area expertise, and would dem-
onstrate the U.S.’s commitment to approaching the region in a culturally appro-
priate manner.

The NSA—in charge of Signals Intelligence—is overwhelmed with information that needs
to be sifted through by speakers of Arabic, Farsi, Dari, Pashto, Kurdish, and others. The
bar has been raised from the Cold War standard of a minimum of level 2 fluency (out of 5,
where 5 is believed to be attainable only by native speakers) to 4 and 5 by most agencies
and departments under the Bush administration. However, there is a significant discrep-
ancy between what is now required and what is being done to cultivate such levels of
proficiency among Americans. There is only one government-backed title VI Language
Resource Center in the entire country focused on Middle Eastern languages, which has
only been around since 2002.

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile

Crisis and amidst Cold War tensions,
President Kennedy, in 1961, enacted
the Alliance for Progress, a program
that allotted funds to address illit-
eracy and poor education, as well as
promote and aid economic integra-
tion, growth of the market economy,
technical training, and Peace Corps
programs. Post 9/11, we have yet to
see developments that even begin
to approximate these efforts. While
current international education funds
exceed those of the 1960s in number,
1960s funds surpass current appro-
priations by far in real dollar value.
Key Facts
• Arabic language education is up 25% in
colleges and universities since 9/11—re-
flecting the difference between 3500 and
4200 students.
• Since 9/11, less than 40 U.S. undergradu-
ate degrees in Arabic language on aver-
age are granted per year.
• The U.S. State Department has 54 em-
ployees who demonstrate some level of
skill in Arabic—eight are willing to partici-
pate in media debates or discussions in
Arabic on Arab television or radio.

Analysis
The U.S. government, in accordance with Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1958,
needs to establish a National Association of U.S. Middle Eastern Studies Programs
(NAUMESP). This federally and internationally funded NAUMESP will: 1) represent the
serious domestic and foreign policy reforms required to improve the U.S. image abroad,
2) enhance cross-cultural understanding, 3) create more and higher-quality critical lan-
guage specialists, 4) provide a training institute for U.S. educators seeking to create Mid-
dle Eastern and Islamic studies programs at their schools, and 5) serve as a consultative
body that advises the State Department upon request.
This initiative requires a tentative annual budget of $63 million from Congress. NAUMESP
will work with partner nations of the Middle East to build matching exchange programs
for U.S. students to study abroad in the Middle East. Funds will be provided by the U.S.
federal government and matched by the government of the host nation.

Next Steps
Talking Points
The NAUMESP will work toward
• The Defense Department and the Ameri-
achieving the goals of transforma-
can Council on the Teaching of Foreign
tional diplomacy as indicated by the
Languages published a report stating that
State Department, as it would func-
foreign languages form “a core academic
tion in partnership with the Middle
subject” in national security.
East, rather than in a relationship of
• The Bush administration planned on add-
paternalism. The State Department
ing 600 Arabic speakers to its staff by
should immediately begin to imple-
2008—with less than 1% of the nation’s
ment this plan starting with 100 par-
students involved in Arabic language pro-
ticipants with the intention of fully
grams, this was impossible.
executing this policy recommenda-
• University of California at Santa Barbara
tion within 18 months.
surveys indicate that an average student
of Arabic language requires 2200 hours
The U.S. economic recession in addi-
of instruction to reach a “relative” level of
tion to the sharp decrease of support
fluency, placing Arabic among the most
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
difficult languages in the world in which to
signify that the Obama administration
achieve proficiency.
must act swiftly in allaying fears and
restoring hope for prosperity and
peace. With less than 1% of American
students studying Arabic currently and less than 40 Arabic majors awarded per year,
significant measures need to be taken. NAUMESP is one of these critical measures.

Sources
http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/democracy/homelandsecurity/Whitman4report.htm
http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1493
Ibid
Title VI (1958) acknowledges that foreign language training tied closely to matters of defense as well as the
quality of our education system. Title VI also allows Congress to appropriate funds to language centers and
area studies associated with public research institutions and later was expanded to encompass support for
outreach activities and for businesses as well as government-sponsored grant programming, such as the In
ternational Education Program Service. IEPS is responsible for programs such as the Institute for Interna
tional Public Policy and the Undergraduate International Studies and Foreign Language Program. It would
seem that many of the kinds of needed organizations are present, but a major restructuring is in order
if these programs are to prove effective. (http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1062, http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ope/iegps/index.html).
http://nmelrc.org/
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/history.html
Ibid
This number is based on the amount of money allotted for Russian language studies in the US during the Cold
War—it is adjusted for current prices and subject to Congressional review.

25
Empowering Kenya’s Youth:
A Reconciliation Conference
Sigrid von Wendel and Mansur Tokmouline, Yale University

The following is an outline of a conference developed jointly by Roosevelt at Yale

and our partner NGO in Kenya. The original idea for a reconciliation conference
was developed in consultation with Kenyan students at Yale in the Spring of
2008.

Violence stemming from post-election ethnic tensions in 2008 in Kenya led to the deaths
of 800 people and the displacement of several hundred thousand. By some accounts,
Kenyan youth were involved in 90% of the post election fighting. In other words, the Ke-
nyan youth were not just affected by the ethnic violence, they were the ethnic violence.
This outbreak of fighting has motivated the Center for Security and Foreign Policy of
the Roosevelt Institution at Yale to partner with a Kenyan NGO in Nairobi to create a
Reconciliation and Empow-
erment Conference. The Key Facts
Conference aims to reduce • The methods used in this conference are endorsed
ethnic tensions and foster by some of the world’s leading experts on conflict
a unified Kenyan identity resolution.
amongst its teenage par- • The initial conference will host a diverse group of
ticipants. It will accomplish teenagers from Nairobi Province in Kenya. If the
its objective by bringing the first pilot conference is successful, plans will be laid
youth together and engag- for a much bigger and truly national conference to
ing them in conversations be held one year’s time from the initial date.
about issues they are con- • 43% of Kenya’s population is under age 14; only 37
fronted with in their daily other countries have a greater proportion of their
lives. The conference will population under 14.
address issues common to • Approximately 1,200 women were raped by youth
all Kenyans, not individual gangs in the post-election violence, and public
ethnic groups. Through health officials estimated that “85 percent of males
this technique, the partici- who carry out gang rape will ultimately succumb to
pants will unite in realizing AIDS.”
a common Kenyan identity
and begin to address issues
that face the nation as a whole.

Main Activities and Topics

Students break up into small groups and discuss the following topics: Urban Sprawl, Em-
ployer Bias, Drug Use, Agriculture/Trade, Youth Empowerment, and the Justice System.
Each group is given a specific scenario on one of these topics and will be asked to answer
the included questions. Discussions will be lead by a conference facilitator such that they
center around resolutions to the issue assigned without delving into tribal identification.
In this manner, the Kenyan youth will avoid tribal or ethnic conflicts and unite around a
common goal, namely solving the problem posed to them.
One Example: Drug Use
John is 19 years old. As a child, he lived on the streets of Nairobi after his parents died
and he no longer had family to live with. When he was 11, John began smoking cigarettes
and later developed an addiction to drugs. Not fully aware of the consequences of his
substance use, John became more and more addicted and started doing deals for local
dealers in exchange for drugs until he was arrested by authorities. After his arrest, John
was assigned a probation officer with whom he regularly met with to monitor his drug
use. John’s state improved greatly; because of his young age, instead of being impris-
oned, John was taken out of his troubled neighborhood and lived in a probation hostel in
which he learned about the consequences of drug use and how to overcome his young
addiction. After a year of rehabilitation, John was reunited with a distant family member
located by his probation officer and is now drug-free and working at a local store. While
John eventually overcame his drug problem, he was undoubtedly hindered by his early
addiction and illegal activities that prevented him from going to school and developing
healthy relationships. In addition, there are many young adults and children addicted to
drugs who have not been helped in the way that John has been.

• How could John’s drug addition have been avoided in the first place?
• Who is responsible for John’s drug addition?
• What was the most successful part of John’s rehabilitation (i.e. not going to prison,
probation officer, probation home, moving out his old neighborhood) ?

As we can see in this example, the conference will avoid confronting ethnic and tribal
issues head-on. It will concentrate its efforts on giving Kenyan youth an opportunity to
agree on something and solve some sort of problem together. More importantly, the fo-
cus on drug use as a national issue, not just a personal one, will instill a sense of patriotism
in the participants. The ultimate aim is to steer Kenyan youth toward a shared identity
and shared goals and away from divisive differences and conflicts.

Conclusion and Post Conference

Each of the smaller groups will present to the entire conference and share a summary of
their discussion and possible resolutions to their assigned issue. Finally, it is crucial that
the conference end on a note of unity so that students remember their experiences and
go back to their schools with a hopefully new and progressive perspective.

The organizers of the conference will also develop post conference activities to encour-
age continuation of progress made at the conference. Theses activities might involve par-
ticipants establishing student groups at their schools to continue discussion on various
Kenyan issues or participants being paired up with a pen pal from the conference to stay
in touch and continue dialogue with. It is our hope that this first batch of students will go
back to their communities with a greater sense of Kenyan identity and fewer antagonisms
against groups considered “others.” If we can develop those two qualities in the next
generation of Kenyans, then this East African country will not ever have to endure ethnic
violence of the kind it saw last year.
Sources
http://www.kimmediagroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=332&Itemid=671
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/10/country_facts/main3352035.shtml
http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/charity-news/1-000-new-hiv-infections-blamed-on-kenya-unrest.htm
27
 Accountability in PEPFAR
Matthew Eldridge, Virginia Tech

The following is an excerpt of a longer article. To view the content in full,

including the author’s final recommendations for PEPFAR systems, please visit
rooseveltcampusnetwork.org

Independent Criticisms of Current Accountability Mechanisms

Much of the existing commentary on PEPFAR accountability comes in the form of criti-
cisms from independent sources either as NGO issued reports or academic papers.
While the topics discussed by independent entities regarding PEPFAR and current U.S.
government efforts to combat global health issues is extensive, there are only a few no-
table publications which have addressed the accountable dispersion of funds.

Congressional Oversight
One of the primary ways in which PEPFAR is ‘held accountable’ is its reports to Con-
gress. As demonstrated by the 2007 report and others before it however, OGAC has
provided very limited guarantees that the funding is actually being distributed in an ac-
countable manner. Increased congressional oversight appears a necessary action and
several pieces of legislation are currently proposing as much (and are discussed further
below) but some caution against overdoing congressional oversight.

Some take issue in that for example that “for PEPFAR, achieving its globally-set program-
matic targets and its accountability to Congress take precedence over any other feature”
threatening accountability to other stakeholders. So while one might be encouraged to
view PEPFAR’s congressional oversight as a strength (safeguarding the interests of the
taxpayers who fund it) it may also be seen as a negative if PEPFAR becomes too focused
on accountability to Congress and ignores accountability to recipients.

Transparency in Supply Change Management System (SCMS)

The SCMS is a PEPFAR implementing partner and is funded by PEPFAR to “strengthen
or establish secure, reliable, cost-effective and sustainable supply chains to meet the
care and treatment needs of people living with or affected by HIV and AIDS.” SCMS
works closely with clients to “reduce the price of essential medicines” through “[planning]
future procurement, pooling orders to buy in bulk, establishing long-term contracts with
manufacturers and purchasing generic alternatives whenever possible.”

A 2006 statement by the Ecumenical Pharmaceutical Network (EPN) found growing con-
cerns with the operation and management of SCMS – particularly with regard to trans-
parency. The EPN statement even alleged that the “SCMS contract has the potential to
undermine, rather than increase, long-run and sustainable local capacity for managing
supplies; lacks avenues for civil society participation; and will increase the brain-drain
which is debilitating Africa’s health care systems.”
When specifically addressing transparency and accountability concerns, the EPN state-
ment noted that SCMS suffers from the “lack of involvement of key stakeholders in target
countries” and the “lack of transparency in sharing any clear strategy…that there are inter-
national plans for establishing long-term capacity and sustainability at the local level.” In
short, the EPN and the Center for Health and Gender Equity which issued a supporting
statement were concerned with the lack of transparency and accountability resulting
from the closed nature of the decision-making system adopted by SCMS.

Streamlining Accountability
The phrase “streamlining” or creating “uniform” policies with regards to anything related
to international development funding must be viewed cautiously as on-the-ground cir-
cumstances often differ so widely that applying the same cookie-cutter strategy every-
where can prove disastrous. Yet, on the other hand, there are benefits to creating some
clear standards in terms of accountability because mismanagement of funds has negative
effects universally and using a variety of guidelines or mechanisms for accountability
creates disunity, confusion, and allows the system to break down. Other programs have
subscribed to the belief of adopting uniform or at least similar accountability expecta-
tions: “Funding provided to community groups in Uganda by the Global Fund…did not
have similar accountability requirements, and Global Fund grants were suspended in
2005 due to concerns that the money had been misused.” As PEPFAR accountability
requirements are unclear, it is impossible to comment as to whether they are currently
streamlined or at least similar or if instead they vary widely between projects.

Collecting and Publicly Disclosing Data

Transparency is essential to monitor how well PEPFAR adheres to accountability mecha-
nisms. Unfortunately, OGAC has repeatedly failed to make information regarding fund-
ing decisions public. Furthermore, OGAC has even failed to publicly establish the guide-
lines used when making those funding decisions.

One report drew a sharp contrast between the transparency of PEPFAR and that of
the Global Fund: “accountability requires publicly disclosing collected data and working
with governments to strengthen national monitoring and evaluation systems” to this goal,
“PEPFAR has the most comprehensive financial data capture system but does not pub-
licly share most data” rendering independent outside evaluation difficult. On the other
hand “the Global Fund publicly discloses the largest share of its financial data” and as a
result it gains high marks on its financial transparency.

Financial accountability is clearly an area where public disclosure of data is lacking for
PEPFAR. However, OGAC is very open when it comes to releasing figures relating to
substantive accountability in terms of clinics opened, medicine distributed, new indi-
viduals placed on drug-treatment programs, etc. Yet some outside sources are even
criticizing this data as being unclear and misleading. Take for example the claim that in
2006 PEPFAR reached 822,000 individuals with treatment. These individuals are bro-
ken down into two categories: upstream and downstream treatment support.

The first category – “upstream systems-strengthening” – “includes those supported

through contributions to national, regional, and local activities such as training, labora-

29
tory support, monitoring and evaluation, logistics and distribution systems, protocol and
curriculum development.” On the other hand “downstream site-specific” support “refers
to…instances where [PEPFAR] is providing all or part of the necessary components for
quality services at the point at which services are delivered.” The 293,700 people listed
as receiving upstream support are receiving “no more than systems-strengthening sup-
port from the United States.”

Even among the 528,300 people receiving downstream support, it is not clear how many
are receiving “all” and how many are receiving “part” of their treatment support from
PEPFAR. It is possible given this ambiguity that the vast majority are receiving only 10%
of their funding needs for treatment from PEPFAR. While the figures may likely show
that PEPFAR is playing a significantly larger role, the PEPFAR report gives no evidence to
back up this assertion and observers are left to make their own conclusions. Some critics
have argued that “since the goal of treating 2 million people in the 15 focus countries by
2008 was designed to significantly increase access to treatment, PEPFAR should be re-
sponsible for the full costs of treatment for 2 million people.” Furthermore, the PEPFAR
report gives no explanation as to the process which was used to generate these figures.
The methodology used to arrive at these figures is a complete mystery and throws into
question their very validity.

While it is a stretch to claim that these figures are intentionally misleading and used
merely to allay congressional concerns and guarantee more support and funding, these
discrepancies and vagueness’ do certainly demonstrate a poor grasp of substantive ac-
countability. Better documentation and representation of these figures – broken down
into specific categories for instance – might generate more confidence in them.

Current Congressional Legislation

The sheer size of PEPFAR’s funding allocations and the vague and poorly defined ac-
countability mechanisms currently in place have encouraged legislators to propose two
identical bills aimed at improving transparency and accountability in PEPFAR. The two
pieces of legislation – one in the House and the other in the Senate – outline a method
to improve accountability within PEFAR so that it is held congressionally and publicly
accountable in a transparent manner.

The senate bill S. 2584 was proposed by Sen. Clinton of New York on January 31, 2008
and was read twice before being referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Simi-
larly the corresponding house bill, H.R. 5485, was proposed by Rep. Miller of North Caro-
lina on February 25, 2008 and was also referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The Act, labeled the PEPFAR Accountability and Transparency Act, seeks to amend the
Global AIDS Act which created PEPFAR by adding on to the end certain measures de-
signed to promote accountability and transparency within PEPFAR. The Act authorizes
the Global AIDS Coordinator to use funds provided by the Global AIDS Act to:

(1) Improve the coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and accessibility of

services provided under this Act;
(2) Establish the cost-effectiveness of program models;
 (3) Assess the population-level impact of programs implemented, including
the impact of programs on women, children, and other at-risk or vulnerable
populations;
(4) Ensure the transparency and accountability of services provided under
this Act;
(5) Disseminate and promote the utilization of evaluation findings, lessons,
and best practices in the implementation of the programs receiving financial
assistance under this Act;
(6) Encourage and evaluate innovative service models and strategies to op-
timize the delivery of care, treatment, and prevention programs financed by
the United States Government; and
(7) Strengthen ongoing program monitoring and enhance program quality
through routine program evaluations, such as midterm and final program
evaluations.

The Act sets a deadline of 90 days after its enactment for the Coordinator to submit a
report detailing the funds used for “monitoring, operations research, and impact evalu-
ation research during the 5-year period ending on September 30, 2008.” This report
will be followed by another which the Global AIDS Coordinator should submit no later
than 1 year after the Act’s enactment which will detail his plans for using funds regarding
the aforementioned areas of monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation re-
search for the next 5 years. Additionally, the Act provides a long list of possible research
priorities for the Coordinator to investigate such as “ensuring a safe blood supply” and
“promoting the most effective models for scaling up care and treatment access.”

S. 2584 and H.R. 5485 request that the Coordinator consult with other government agen-
cies including NIH, USAID, and the CDC while drafting this 5 year strategic plan. Impor-
tant for transparency, the Act also would require that OGAC holds “a public meeting at
which the public may present its views on the current needs and gaps in program moni-
toring, operations re eventually pub search, and impact evaluation research” followed by
a period where OGAC collects and lishes public comments. Following the completion of
the strategic plan it will be presented for comment to Congress as well as to the public
through a meeting and through publication online.

This legislation currently being considered within the Committees on Foreign Relations is
a positive step because it introduces needed accountability mechanisms into the Global
AIDS Act which should have been included to begin with. In her introduction of the bill
on the floor of the Senate, Sen. Clinton said that she was presenting a bill “that will in-
crease our ability to research and identify the most effective interventions in combating
global AIDS.” She also suggested that as Congress had demonstrated commitment to
PEPFAR by reauthorizing and increasing its funding, Congress should likewise “maximize
[its] investment in programs that have been found effective in preventing infections and
delivering care to as many people as possible.”

To read the full analysis and final recommendations for this piece, please visit
rooseveltcampusnetwork.org

31
 your ideas.
your leadership.
your issues.

it’s the new

student activism.

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Rooseveltcampusnetwork.org