U.S. Should Warn Egyptian President Morsi Against a Crackdown
No. 3982 | JULY 1, 2013
gyptian opposition groups have called for massive demonstrations on June 30 to protest the ﬁrst anniversary of President Mohamed Morsi’s inauguration. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government has grown increasingly unpopular due to its authoritarian nature; growing curbs on political, social, and religious freedoms; and failure to effectively address Egypt’s worsening economic problems. The Obama Administration should drop its kidglove treatment of Morsi’s Islamist regime and warn Cairo that it risks losing all U.S. aid if it restricts the freedom and human rights of Egyptians, reduces its commitment to ﬁght terrorism, or violates its peace treaty with Israel. A Perfect Sandstorm. Egypt has plunged into political turmoil, economic depression, falling living standards, and social chaos since the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime in February 2011. Egypt’s army formed a transitional government that supervised the presidential election last year, which Morsi narrowly won. Once in office, the new president dropped any pretense of consensual politics and sought to ram through his Islamist
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/ib3982 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reﬂecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
agenda and maximize his own power and that of his Freedom and Justice Party—the political arm of the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood. After Egypt’s judiciary dissolved parliament because one-third of its members won their seats illegitimately, Morsi granted himself unprecedented powers unchecked by judicial oversight. Morsi’s drive to consolidate his own power provoked a mushrooming opposition coalition that has denounced him as a “new pharaoh” who has betrayed the original goals of the 2011 revolution. The opposition Tamarod (“Rebel”) movement claims that it has accumulated more than 15 million signatures on a petition calling for early elections. A recent opinion poll indicates 61 percent of Egyptians are unhappy with Morsi. But rather than reach out to the opposition, Morsi has further polarized Egypt’s politics by empowering the Muslim Brotherhood and cultivating support from even more radical Islamist extremists. Growing sectarian tensions whipped up by Salaﬁs—hardcore Islamic fundamentalists who demand the immediate imposition of Sharia (Islamic law)—have undermined public order. On Sunday, four Egyptian Shiites were dragged from their homes and beaten to death by a lynch mob incited by a local Salaﬁ cleric. Egypt’s Christian minority has also been targeted for mounting attacks, and Christians are ﬂeeing Egypt in growing numbers. Energized by widespread popular disaffection, the disjointed opposition has called for nationwide demonstrations on June 30 to protest Morsi’s misrule. The Muslim Brotherhood and its Salaﬁst allies announced that they will hold counter-demonstrations today and some have threatened to disperse anti-Morsi demonstrations by force.
deterrence needs ﬁrst and then choosing the number of weapons that would meet that need. This will require more nuclear weapons and a higherquality nuclear force than what the President says he wants. the White House issued a statement on how the President had adopted a policy that would change how the United States might employ nuclear weapons in the midst of a future crisis. allies. Not surprisingly.S. The result will be a nuclear arsenal that both quantitatively and qualitatively is insufficient to defend U. 2013
Disarm Now. rather than assessing U. nuclear arsenal appears to be driving U. Further.S. may do this unilaterally. vital interests. can be found at http://report. nuclear policy. are already controversially low. Ask Questions Later: Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
President Barack Obama’s declared goal of eliminating the U.S.
n June 19. The Administration’s backward approach to policymaking threatens to undermine the security of the United States and its allies. President Obama has apparently decided first to reduce the number of weapons in the U. in its entirety. NE Washington. 2826 | JULY 11. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study.2 The report provides evidence that President Barack Obama ﬁrst chose the reduced numbers in the U.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reﬂecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. Current levels. the NPRIS contends that the United States can safely reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third below the current levels. arsenal to meet his arms control objectives and then changed the policy to justify the lower number. appears to have resulted from choosing the amount of reduction ﬁrst and then justifying the number after the fact.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and then used the NPRIS to justify these numbers. which were set by the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).S.S.S. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study (NPRIS)1 has been a long time in coming. which recommends reducing the number of U.S.heritage.org/bg2826 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.BACKGROUNDER
No. the Obama White House released a fact sheet on its updated nuclear weapons policy.S. the NPRIS states that the U. instead of assessing U. The United States needs a nuclear force along with defensive and conventional strike weapons that can protect and defend the American people and U. requirements for deterrence ﬁrst and then choosing
While President Obama was speaking in Berlin on June 19 about taking a step toward total nuclear disarmament. but prefers to reduce through a negotiated agreement with Russia. 2013. strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.
but even he recognizes that the American people will reject an attempt to go directly to zero nuclear weapons. U. Commits to reducing the number of U.5 Asserts that the United States will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.org/research/reports/2010/09/twelve-ﬂaws-of-new-start-that-will-be-difficult-to-ﬁx. nuclear weapons policy. 2nd Sess.S. Senate. nuclear weapons in the pursuit of his aspiration for zero nuclear weapons is bolstered by a statement by the then-Commander of U.
.” The White House. which the fact sheet reafﬁrms in its ﬁrst paragraph. The fact sheet further states that the U. Chilton.S. “Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix. Accordingly. http:/ /www.foreign. General Kevin Chilton testiﬁed about the proper relationship between the numbers and deterrence capabilities:
I do not agree that [the number of nuclear weapons in the U. Barack Obama. it states the U. This likelihood that President Obama is foremost concerned about reducing the number of U.” June 19.BACKGROUNDER | NO. http:/ /www. 2466.S. nuclear weapons.
geopolitical concerns that might…cause us to need more weapons deployed. Speciﬁcally. 3. 2013. 2.whitehouse. 2012).gov/thepress-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university (accessed May 29. testimony in The New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111th Cong. The fact sheet states this determination was made after a comprehensive review of the requirements for nuclear forces. March 26.S. 2010. June 16.
According to the fact sheet.whitehouse. intends to seek the reductions in negotiations with Russia. Yet as detailed in the next section of this paper. the preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that the scope of the reduction was chosen ﬁrst and the NPRIS was pursued to justify it. September 16.S. 2010. Code § 2573. Committee on Foreign Relations. Indeed.”3 Since meeting deterrence and military requirements was clearly not foremost in President Obama’s mind when he chose these numbers. President Obama indicated his thinking more than a year ago in a speech at Hankuk University in Seoul.S. the NPRIS:
Reaffirms the President’s goal of achieving “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.heritage.” Clearly. 2013). http://www. strategic nuclear weapons. And I say this in light of—when we talk about the nondeployed portion of the arsenal—it is sized to be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any
1. See 22 U.S. we can already say with conﬁdence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. “Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. 2012. 2013).senate.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states (accessed June 19.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.S. 111–5): Views from the Pentagon. 2013
the numbers of nuclear weapons that would meet the requirements.. 2826 JULY 11. Strategic Command during President Obama’s ﬁrst term. http:/ /www.gov/hearings/the-new-start-treaty-treaty-doc-111-5views-from-the-pentagon (accessed May 8. video ﬁle.4
His testimony sharply contrasts with the assertion in the NPRIS that U.. nuclear weapons may now be reduced further. These numbers look about right as an intermediate step between what is permitted by New START after its execution and zero. what was? The overwhelming evidence suggests that he was focused on reaching his declared goal of zero U. The second most important aspect of the NPRIS is the commitment to reduce the number of U.S.S. strategic nuclear weapons by up to onethird below New START levels. 2
5. arsenal] is more than is needed.S. In July 2010. South Korea: “But even as we have more work to do. 4. the true number he desires is zero. “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University. but fails to indicate that an agreement with Russia is in any way necessary or that any agreement with Russia will be concluded as a treaty in accordance with the law. General Kevin P. nuclear posture will remain
The White House. this has been and remains President Obama’s highest priority in U. the numbers recommended in the NPRIS were essentially chosen for aesthetic reasons. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. in contrast to the commitment to disarmament. Baker Spring.S.
Strategic Command. Indeed. policy is to narrow the requirements for its nuclear employment and targeting policy. was founded on the principle of liberty. However.BACKGROUNDER | NO.S. The NPRIS states that U.S. 2012.. in the form of a directive to the Department of Defense. would result in a dangerously weak U. the most effective nuclear deterrent for the U.S. follows from the wide variety of ﬂaws in the report’s recommendations. particularly in relation to such weapons deployed in Europe.S. 2826 JULY 11. Notes that the President has directed the DOD to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency plans with the new guidance and to implement them over the course of the next year. The fact sheet states that NPRIS did not set out to address this matter. against a repressive regime would be a “counterforce policy” that targets the regime’s internal security forces and strategic military forces. because the U. The accompanying DOD employment report acknowledges that the DOD has received this guidance document.9 No U. and its allies. not for deterrence and defense.
The most signiﬁcant ﬂaws are: Flaw #1: An obscure targeting policy. it values the security and prosperity of its people. to redesign the U. the President is in a rush.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. including the U. deterrent.S. 2013
Defers the question of reducing the disparity between the U. against a repressive regime would be a “counterforce policy” that targets the regime’s internal security forces and strategic military forces. http://www. 4
. drive a review of the U. not strengthening the overall U.S. 1. This is problematic because a countervalue targeting policy is not compatible with the values of the U. 9.S.heritage. November 30. not just directly but in short order. The fact sheets states that the President has directed the Department of Defense to use the new guidance resulting from the NPRIS to begin updating and aligning its directives and contingency plans in order to implement this policy over the next year. States that the U. is focused on maintaining and improving strategic stability with both Russia and China. Finally. must remain vulnerable to nuclear attacks by either Russia or China. This requirement is designed to force the Department of Defense.S. nuclear posture in a year’s time. which go beyond the numbers themselves.S.S.S.S. and Russia in short-range nuclear weapons.S. Presumably.” targeting populations and economic centers. Instead. that pose an ideological threat to their repressive regimes. and its allies. as a free country and therefore is not compatible with a credible deterrent.
recommendations. The NPRIS is accompanied by a guidance document.S.S.S. history suggests that foreign tyrannies do not value their people. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century. the reduced number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons will drive the U. while protecting and defending the populations and economic capacity of the U. This is the inevitable result when arms control and disarmament goals. they value the means of repressing their populations and of threatening free nations.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century. if followed. in the direction of “countervalue targeting. nuclear force. Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring.8 For whatever reason. deterrence posture for both the U. and its allies.S..
Ibid.S. this further codiﬁes the earlier stated policy that the U. Thus. 2747. particularly U.S. the
The evidence in the NPRIS fact sheet supporting the argument that the numbers were chosen for reasons of arms control and disarmament. p. These
Evidence of Arms Control and Disarmament-Driven Numbers
The most effective nuclear deterrent for the U. Further. Deferring this issue represents a presidential repudiation of his commitment to the Senate to address the matter. President would choose to use nuclear weapons to cause widespread death and destruction in an enemy country in which the population is repressed and poses no signiﬁcant threat to the U.
” Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council Occasional Paper No. many of them hardened against attack with reinforced bunkers. 4. 2012). The fact sheet asserts that a disarming strike against U. arsenal than proposed by the Obama Administration have openly argued for a “minimal deterrence” nuclear posture based on countervalue targeting.pdf (accessed June 18. 2011.C. The NPRIS fact sheet says nothing about why it relies on the target sets that are shrinking enough to permit reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by one-third from the 1. admittedly under the questionable assumption that such a targeting policy would present a strong deterrent posture toward current and future U.S.550 accountable warheads under New START. which are fairly described as classic counterforce targets. The Obama Administration apparently has chosen to gloss over this apparent contradiction in the NPRIS. strategic nuclear force less survivable. The plan included targets that are hardened and deeply buried facilities. faces a coalition of strategic enemies made possible by proliferation. Kristensen. the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads found necessary by the George W. 11.S.S. The problem becomes even more pronounced if the U.S.11 These advocates understand that a countervalue targeting policy
would permit a signiﬁcantly smaller nuclear force.10 Accordingly. 5
. the problem with the NPRIS is that a counterforce employment and targeting policy requires a larger and more capable force than the one the NPRIS recommends. “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. enemies.” November 14. For example.mccain.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Flaw #2: Insufficient survivability for the U. http:/ /www. see Hans M. and Ivan Oelrich. Accordingly. Consequently. the fact sheet fails to identify clearly the nature of the connection that the NPRIS makes between its suggested targets and its recommended number of weapons. 2012).S.200 deemed necessary by the Bush Administration.12 An attachment to his letter states that these cuts could eliminate the ICBM leg of the triad. whereas the counterforce targeting policy identiﬁed in NPRIS must lead to relatively high numbers of nuclear weapons. The reductions recommended by NPRIS would likely make the U. “Statement by Senators McCain and Graham on Secretary Panetta’s Letter Detailing ‘Devastating’ Impact of Sequester. in press release. whether such a strike will remain exceedingly remote would depend on the future structure of the U.” p.gov/public/index. dedicated advocates of lower numbers of nuclear weapons in the U. The NPRIS provides only vague overall numbers. nuclear force. April 2009. they present larger numbers of targets.700 and 2.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch explained the link between preservation of the ICBM leg and survivability in a speech in Washington.S. Indeed. “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy.S. For example. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how automatic spending cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011 could affect the defense program. By way of reference. not to mention the 1. in a letter to Senator John McCain (R–AZ) on November 14. The repressive regimes that the U. strategic nuclear forces is “exceedingly remote. needs to deter maintain multiple levers of internal repression and strategic military capabilities to threaten the nations of the free world.S. D.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.700 to 2.fas. letter to Senator John McCain.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice. Bush Administration to meet the requirement to defeat strategic attacks and deter them was between 1. Leon Panetta. Norris. 12.
Secretary Panetta identiﬁed elimination of ICBMs as a plausible result of President Obama’s defense budget policies. PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a4074315-fd3e-2e65-2330-62b95da3b0e9 (accessed July 11. than would be presented by population centers under a countervalue targeting policy. strategic nuclear posture. This contradiction exists between the White House guidance to the Department of Defense and the DOD nuclear employment report and within the DOD employment report. Robert S.senate.” However.. 2013
accompanying DOD report ﬁnds the argument in favor of countervalue targeting so weak that it categorically denies the guidance from the White House requiring that the DOD to pursue it. 7. Department of Defense.S. 2826 JULY 11.200. 2011. http://www. U.
The yield of a speciﬁc nuclear weapon is critical to maximizing its deterrent effect under different circumstances. Further. itself. higher accuracy permits lower yields in a counterforce targeting plan. allies is also essential because these forward-deployed nuclear forces are tangible means of bringing U.BACKGROUNDER | NO. security assurances. The NPRIS fact sheet does not mention these requirements. A key variable in addressing the yield question is the accuracy of the overall weapon system.S. Speed and reliability of communications are key considerations for modernizing nuclear command
and control systems. This is a dangerous assumption.
Flaw #8: The NPRIS defers consideration of the deterrence value of short-range weapons. highly precise delivery of weapons against time-sensitive targets. Disturbingly. such as ICBMs mounted on mobile launchers. By outward appearances. and neither does the Department of Defense employment report. nuclear force to the point that maintaining any such force can no longer be justiﬁed.S. The existing U. Maximizing the effectiveness of the deterrent is even more important than the question of the relationship between accuracy and yields. However. nuclear weapons deter strategic attacks not only against the U. which is called extended deterrence. nuclear posture is considered weak by some allies and friends. 2013
Flaw #5: The fact sheet offers no commitment to modernize nuclear delivery systems. it does not address the yield question whatsoever. if a President ﬁnds the yield to be too high to permit its use under a given circumstance. assurances about and the commitment to their security. Further. nuclear delivery systems that can rapidly and precisely attack targets will be of little value if not supported by a command and control system that is integrated with the global reconnaissance strike system. but also against U. The overall capabilities of the nuclear command and control system are essential to determining the overall survivability of the force. Generally speaking. the broader command and control structure should be integrated with the global reconnaissance strike system. Forward basing short-range nuclear weapons to address strategic threats to U.S. U. particularly with ballistic missile submarines at sea.S. Higher yields do not always strengthen deterrence.S.
. The U. the Strategic Posture Commission noted an emerging perception among some U.S.S.S.S. improved command and control systems for nuclear weapons are about more than survivability.S.
De-alerting is an effective step for artiﬁcially reducing the value of the U. allies and friends that U.S. nuclear arsenal.S. they are not sufficient for this purpose by themselves. Speed and precision of the new delivery vehicles should be key considerations in the modernization effort. particularly for extended deterrence. weakness in non-strategic nuclear weapons was undermining their conﬁdence in U. these forward-deployed weapons can ﬁll in rungs in the escalation ladder. which if left out would result in a relatively weak deterrent. This suggests that they assume that the yields of the current array of weapons are appropriate in every instance and will remain so for the indeﬁnite future. needs to modernize the delivery systems for its nuclear forces for reasons that go beyond the need to replace the aging delivery systems. Accordingly. According to the fact sheet. While U. who are less conﬁdent in U. For example. allies around the world. The U. In fact. the NPRIS fact sheet does not discuss the preferable yields for a full array of different weapons in the U. forward-deployed nuclear forces increase the ﬂexibility of the overall nuclear force and add to the military effectiveness of the broader nuclear force.S. allies into the overall deterrence posture. Accordingly. strategic nuclear forces are essential to strengthening extended deterrence. which identiﬁes strategic targets and rapidly and precisely directs weapons against the target. both the NPRIS fact sheet and the DOD employment report fail to recognize the broader issues related to nuclear command and control.S. Flaw #6: The fact sheet mentions no recommendations for appropriate yields of the weapons in the arsenal. Finally. the NPRIS addresses neither issue. it will detract from deterrence if a potential enemy calculates in advance that the President will recognize this problem. Flaw #7: Command and control problems are not seriously addressed. 2826 JULY 11. in its 2009 report. needs new systems that can ensure the timely.S.
and nuclear forces for strengthening deterrence. nuclear forces will also come down. nuclear forces will be integrated with defensive forces and conventional strike forces. weakness in non-strategic nuclear weapons was undermining their conﬁdence in U.S. the Administration cannot honestly assert that the overall cost-effectiveness of the nuclear force will increase under the NPRIS. non-strategic forces in Europe are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and that modernized U. can present would balance defensive forces and conventional strike forces with nuclear forces.S.S.S. Flaw #9: The NPRIS fails to explain how U. not complements to. DC: United States Institute of Peace. This means all three types of forces must be integrated in order to reinforce each other./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance in the face of Russia’s nuclear renewal.usip. The Administration is all too happy to switch the subject and assure the America people that they will live in a world free of nuclear weapons. 2013
Speciﬁcally the report states. He has not done so. the fact sheet indicates that the NPRIS sees U. the Administration is asserting that the U.S.pdf (accessed June 25. 20.S..”16
The Strategic Posture Commission noted an emerging perception among some U. in short-range nuclear forces. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. The NPRIS recommendations reduce the cost of the U. its early warning capabilities will provide not only added ﬂexibility to the nuclear and conventional strike forces.S. and the fact sheet acknowledges that the NPRIS did not address this matter in any substantive way. this disparity in short order.S. but to onethird below New START levels. p. Flaw #11: The NPRIS provides no assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the recommended nuclear force.
15. “Some allies located near Russia believe that U. can easily be interpreted to mean that the overall cost of U.S. 2013). Needless to say. all three must work within the global reconnaissance strike system because it can provide vital supporting functions to each. which will reduce the capability of the force. allies and friends that U. the facts indicate otherwise. weapons infrastructure.S. 2826 JULY 11. These commitments served as the political and legal foundation for the Senate’s consent to the ratiﬁcation of New START and its permission to let the U. Flaw #10: The Obama Administration continues to walk away from its commitments to the Senate to modernize the U. Ibid.BACKGROUNDER | NO. the most powerful overall deterrent the U.org/reports/strat_posture_report.S.S. Now. the U. For example. military strategy. nuclear weapons.S.S. “Overall equivalence is important to many U. http://media.S. The NPRIS. allies in Europe. Russia has a multifold advantage over the U. defensive and conventional strike forces as replacements for. security assurances.S. nuclear force in meeting deterrence needs. nuclear weapons infrastructure.S. 2009). Indeed. 16. In a proliferating world.
At the moment.”15 The report further stated. but also initial cueing and tracking to ballistic missile defense forces. if not eliminate. such as accelerating construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. not only may safely reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to New START levels.S. The President is failing to keep some of his commitments to the Senate to modernize U. focused as it is on reducing the numbers of U. strategic nuclear force fall to the levels required by the treaty. 8
. nuclear force and its supporting elements by reducing the size of the force.S. conventional.
There is no evidence that NPRIS considered the synergistic effects of fully integrating defensive. However. Speciﬁcally. the fact sheet simply seeks to mislead the public. 21. the Administration is ﬁnding it inconvenient to acknowledge that it is producing a less effective nuclear force and a less effective deterrence posture. On this point. The President certiﬁed to the Senate during consideration of New START that he would address this matter and seek to reduce. p. Simply put. The United States should not cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in the U. America’s Strategic Posture (Washington.
At the same time. from the context to the biases. or winning a piece of ground. Guo. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conﬂict. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy.
PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. terror. and instill conﬁdence and support for the Party and the state. and among strategy. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy
6. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. but once the conﬂict is concluded. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. anxiety. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. In wartime. All the while. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. doubt.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. peacetime psychological operations are necessary.”
Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks
For the PLA. can create a strong psychological impact. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures.BACKGROUNDER | NO. including diplomatic efforts. however. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. population. inﬂuencing the course of the conﬂict. In addition. and similar outlets. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Instead. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. fear. 3
. and leaders. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. By employing various forms of strategic communications. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more speciﬁcally military targets and goals. undermining their positions. employing all the tools of communications. p. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. To be effective.
regret. operations. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. including various forms of media. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve inﬂuencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). and tactics. 2013
very perceptions that inform decision making. Such defensive measures require tight control of information ﬂows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. Finally. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. coupled with efforts to inﬂuence decision makers. 14. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. between military and civilian. and exhaustion in an opponent. including the “Great Firewall of China. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. “When one defeats the enemy. it is not solely by killing the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Ideally. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. 2821 JULY 11.
one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. but once the conﬂict is concluded. anxiety. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. doubt. can create a strong psychological impact. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. fear. and exhaustion in an opponent. Ideally. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. between military and civilian. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. and among strategy. or winning a piece of ground. it is not solely by killing the enemy. operations.
regret. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. “When one defeats the enemy. and similar outlets. including various forms of media. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy
6. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). including diplomatic efforts. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more speciﬁcally military targets and goals. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. All the while. At the same time. In wartime. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. 2013
very perceptions that inform decision making.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve inﬂuencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. from the context to the biases. including the “Great Firewall of China. and tactics. In addition. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. employing all the tools of communications. p. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. and instill conﬁdence and support for the Party and the state. 3
. friendly elements in the opponent’s society.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. 14. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. Guo. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Instead. Finally. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. population. inﬂuencing the course of the conﬂict. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Such defensive measures require tight control of information ﬂows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts.”
Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks
For the PLA. undermining their positions. however. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively.
PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. and leaders. coupled with efforts to inﬂuence decision makers. terror. By employing various forms of strategic communications.BACKGROUNDER | NO. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. 2821 JULY 11. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conﬂict. To be effective.