Sources Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968).

Frassanito, William A. Gettysburg: A Journey in Time (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975). Gallagher, Gary W, ed. The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992). Greene, A. Wilson. “From Chancellorsville to Cemetery Hill: O. O. Howard and Eleventh Corps Leadership.” The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership, Gary W. Gallagher, ed. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992): 57 – 91. Grimsley, Mark, and Brooks D. Simpson. Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999). Jacobs, Michael. “Meteorology of the Battle.” Gettysburg Star and Sentinel, August 11, 1885. Jacobs, Michael. Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg (Gettysburg: Times Printing House, 1909). Katz, Harry L., and Vincent Virga. Civil War Sketch Book: Drawings from the Battlefront (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012). Knowles, Anne Kelly, et al. “What Could Lee See at Gettysburg?” In Placing History: How Maps, Spatial Data, and GIS Are Changing Historical Scholarship (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2008): 235 – 65. Ladd, David L., and Audrey J. Ladd. John Bachelder’s History of the Battle of Gettysburg (Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1997). Ludlum, David M. “The Weather at Gettysburg.” Weatherwise 13.3 (1960): 101-130. Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003). Stewart, George R. Pickett’s charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959). Symonds, Craig L. Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company, 1992). Maps and atlases Laino, Philip. Gettysburg Campaign Atlas (Dayton, OH: Gatehouse Press, 2009). Sauers, Richard A. The John B. Bachelder Gettysburg Map Set (Dayton, OH: Morningside House, n.d.). Warren, G. K. and A. A. Humphreys. “Battle Field of Gettysburg.” Scale 1:12,000. Julius Bien, lithographer. 1874. National Archives and Research Administration, RG77, CWMF E105. Digital data National Elevation Dataset. U.S. Geological Survey, Earth Resources Observation Science Center. Accessed 31 May 2013. We wish to thank Major Paul N. Belmont III and Col. Gian P. Gentile, Department of History, United States Military Academy, for their assistance in researching key viewpoints during the battle.

BACKGROUNDER
No. 2821 | JULY 11, 2013

Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese PWarfare Challenge
Dean Cheng
Abstract

Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nation’s leaders and its populace—affecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. Indeed, the PRC’s psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conflict. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise.

Key Points
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Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare. To this end, the PRC released “political work regulations” for the People’s Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging “the three warfares”: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. The “three warfares” represent the PRC’s commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i.e., involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemy’s leadership, including through intimidation and coercion, alienation, and deception. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot, the U.S. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities, including strategic communications, public diplomacy, and media outreach capabilities, as well as dedicated psychological operations units.

■■

ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. The PLA is, first and foremost, the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCP’s grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state. At the moment, the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battlefield; it is also preparing to conduct “political warfare,” including what is termed the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the “three warfares.” It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives.1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponent’s psychology and cognitive capacities.

O

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This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

marginalized. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy. even some of his former supporters. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. social. During his year in office. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. aid.S. attach tighter strings to U. The U. but the U. authoritarian. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. Washington should attach tighter strings to U.S. He ruled in a secretive. By taking steps to preserve public order. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. PhD. and recalibrate the U.heritage. can be found at http://report. Clearly. . he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. The army.S. Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule.S. NE Washington. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. however. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state.BACKGROUNDER No.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. he arrogantly ignored. 2013 James Jay Carafano. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. and political problems. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy.S. 2824 | JULY 11. in its entirety. When challenged.

Under these conditions. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. 2 . Similar organizations in Libya. The next day. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party.” The Wall Street Journal. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. 2013. political leaders. Matt Bradley. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. and political problems. 2824 JULY 11. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders.000 injured.html (accessed July 8. and youth activists. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. Mohammed Badie. 2013 opposition political parties. a new Islamist group. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. July 6. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. a coalition of 1. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. leftist and liberal parties. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. Baradei. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. 2013). and Reem Abdellatif.wsj. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. On Monday.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. On July 3. had been sworn in as interim president. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. http:/ / online. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. Tamer El-Ghobashy. Yemen. the provincial capital.” Badie warned. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. mr. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). During his year in office. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. social. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. As a judge. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.BACKGROUNDER | NO.

The Nour Party. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. police. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. who supported the military intervention. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. and growing political polarization. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. American companies.BACKGROUNDER | NO. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. and rising sectarian tensions. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. widespread unemployment. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . the largest Arab country. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. particularly Islamist extremism. particularly in southern Egypt. It eagerly 3 U. embassy. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi.S. surging crime rates. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel.S. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. which will require considerable American and international support.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. Moreover. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. falling standards of living. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. bread riots. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. social turmoil. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. who form the shock troops for street protests. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. anti-Morsi political groups. and other Western companies. 2824 JULY 11. Left unchecked. labor strikes. a focal point for sectarian violence. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. which will require considerable American and international support. and the figure is much higher for young men. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. which has consumed more than 100. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. and government facilities. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power.

The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime. It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. Morsi. Attach tight strings to any U. support economic reforms to revive the economy. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. What the U.S. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 . Section 7008 of the Department of State. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. democratic. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. Army. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. aid to Egypt. However. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or. not leading a backlash against American policy. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process. Foreign Operations. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. aid. and Egypt in 2011. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months. angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime.S. 2012. Yet once in office. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair.5 billion in annual U. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. Secular.BACKGROUNDER | NO. which was headed for dictatorship. and abuses. power grabs. 2012. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. after the date of enactment of this Act. 2824 JULY 11. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority.S.S. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. and freedom of religion. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U. In any event. It is a sad sign that U.S.S. freedom of speech. Army War College in 2006.S.. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. for his part. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1.

It’s just that it will bankrupt them because they are going to be charged a huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that’s being emitted.ISSUE BRIEF P resident Obama recently released his Climate Action Plan.100 coal-fired generators at nearly 600 plant locations that generate 40 percent of America’s affordable. President Obama vowed to go around Congress to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. a prohibitively costly and technologically challenging requirement. Bankrupting Coal Hurts American Families. Without the addition of carbon capture and sequestration. but in his recent speech on climate change. reliable energy source— the effect of which is to drive up prices for American families and businesses. Nicolas D. and his war on coal. he said that if “someone wants to build a coal-powered plant. which would adversely affect coalfired plants the most. In case anyone thinks the Administration has since backed off from the anti-coal agenda.000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt of electricity generated. When Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama pushed his cap-and-trade plan in 2008. President Obama called on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to No. The Heritage Foundation modeled the effects of significantly reducing coalfired plants in America and found devastating economic effects. in its entirety. which is a continuation of the costly. with hundreds of thousands of lost jobs and $1.”1 Congress rejected his and other cap-and-trade plans. With 497 billion tons of recoverable coal in the United States—enough to provide electricity for 500 years at current consumption rates3—coal has the potential to be an important resource long into the future.5 Whether the final rule reflects the proposed rule remains to be seen.6 Last year. Kreutzer. It is this war on coal that would prove the most costly. Loris. The EPA’s constant attacks on coal threaten to close off access to this dependable energy source. In March 2012. reliable energy. The President’s recent announcement also threatens existing plants and would adversely affect the more than 1. These regulations are part of a broader effort from the President to significantly reduce coal as an affordable. they can. Obama climate advisor Daniel Schrag just this week said that “a war on coal is exactly what’s needed.org/ib3978 Produced by the Center for Data Analysis The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. the EPA finalized new mercury and air toxics standards that will force utilities to use maximum achievable control technology standards to reduce mercury emissions and other hazardous air . NE Washington.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. nice-sounding but too expensive efficiency mandates. the EPA proposed a rule that would prohibit new power plants from emitting more than 1.heritage. Dayaratna This paper. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. PhD. and Kevin D.47 trillion of lost national income by 2030.”2 In a speech on June 25. Regulations Pile On. 3978 | JUnE 27. ineffective policies from his first four years in office: Solyndra-style loan guarantees. can be found at http://report. 2013 Cost of a Climate Policy: The Economic Impact of Obama’s Climate Action Plan David W. reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new and existing power plants.4 the regulation would effectively ban the construction of new coal-fired plants.

BACKGROUNDER No.S. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. he arrogantly ignored. even some of his former supporters. 2013 James Jay Carafano. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. however.S. in its entirety. social.S. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war.heritage. . can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. and recalibrate the U. By taking steps to preserve public order. The U. He ruled in a secretive. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. Washington should attach tighter strings to U. PhD. Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. marginalized. can be found at http://report. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. 2824 | JULY 11. aid. authoritarian. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. Clearly. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. and political problems. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011. During his year in office. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy.S. attach tighter strings to U. The army. NE Washington. he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. but the U.S. When challenged.

S. and legal warfare. At the moment. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities. legal warfare. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nation’s leaders and its populace—affecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. first and foremost. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. 2013 Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge Dean Cheng Abstract Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. alienation.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. The “three warfares” represent the PRC’s commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot.” It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives. involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. public diplomacy..1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponent’s psychology and cognitive capacities. 2821 | JULY 11. the PRC released “political work regulations” for the People’s Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging “the three warfares”: public opinion warfare.heritage. and deception. and media outreach capabilities. including through intimidation and coercion. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemy’s leadership. the People’s Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare.BACKGROUNDER No. To this end.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. Key Points ■■ Over the past decade. ■■ ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battlefield. it is also preparing to conduct “political warfare. the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). the PRC’s psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conflict. psychological warfare. This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCP’s grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state. can be found at http://report.e. and psychological warfare. The PLA is. Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the “three warfares. Indeed. the U. including strategic communications.” including what is termed the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare. in its entirety. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise. as well as dedicated psychological operations units. NE Washington. O ■■ ■■ ■■ This paper. .

and political problems. The intervention was widely applauded by opposition political parties and the overwhelming majority of the millions of protesters who demanded that Morsi step down. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. even some of his former supporters. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. just as it removed Hosni Mubarak in 2011. to prevent growing civil disorder from undermining the power of the state and its own privileges within the state. Washington should attach tighter strings to U. . and exclusionary manner that derailed Egypt’s democratic experiment and alienated far too many Egyptians. The army.S. aid.S.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No amount of aid from Washington can resolve Egypt’s deep economic problems. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt.heritage. he focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. whose increasingly authoritarian rule was leading Egypt into a civil war. and demonized Key Points ■■ Egypt’s army was justified in ousting President Mohamed Morsi. aid and recalibrate the aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future.org/bg2824 Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. Clearly. The U. he arrogantly ignored.S. however. aid program to focus on fighting terrorism and preventing food shortages—the chief threats to Egypt’s future.BACKGROUNDER No. and recalibrate the U. marginalized. NE Washington. When challenged. authoritarian. PhD. but the U. By taking steps to preserve public order. is sitting on a volcano and knows it. and James Phillips Egypt: A Way Forward After a Step Back E gypt’s army recently ousted President Mohamed Morsi. ■■ ■■ ■■ Morsi’s Threat to Democracy ■■ ■■ This paper. Egypt was headed for a civil war as a result of a surging rebellion against Morsi’s increasingly authoritarian rule. During his year in office. the United States should press the Egyptian military to lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule as soon as possible. can be found at http://report. 2013 James Jay Carafano. social. President Mohamed Morsi was his own worst enemy.S.S. attach tighter strings to U. must recognize that Egypt is much closer to becoming a failed state or economic basket case than it is to becoming a genuine democracy. can encourage Cairo to undertake free-market economic reforms to rejuvenate its economy. To salvage the increasingly difficult situation in Egypt. 2824 | JULY 11. He ruled in a secretive. the military could help to salvage Egypt’s chances of making the difficult transition to a stable democracy. in its entirety.

The Nour Party. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years.S. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. anti-Morsi political groups. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. who form the shock troops for street protests. a focal point for sectarian violence. police. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. which will require considerable American and international support. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. It eagerly 3 U. labor strikes. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom .BACKGROUNDER | NO. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. Left unchecked. which has consumed more than 100. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems.S. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. particularly Islamist extremism. and the figure is much higher for young men. and growing political polarization. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. falling standards of living. and government facilities. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. widespread unemployment. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. which will require considerable American and international support. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt. embassy. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. social turmoil. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. Moreover. who supported the military intervention. and other Western companies. the largest Arab country. 2824 JULY 11. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. particularly in southern Egypt. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi. and rising sectarian tensions. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. American companies. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. surging crime rates. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. bread riots. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system.

Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime. for his part.S. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1.S. However. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. Section 7008 of the Department of State.BACKGROUNDER | NO. It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. Foreign Operations.S. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. democratic. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. Morsi. support economic reforms to revive the economy. 2012. and Egypt in 2011. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime.5 billion in annual U.S. What the U.S. power grabs. 2012. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems. aid. Army War College in 2006. which was headed for dictatorship. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses. not leading a backlash against American policy. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. 2824 JULY 11. In any event. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 . aid to Egypt. Yet once in office. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair. after the date of enactment of this Act.S. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime.S. freedom of speech. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. Army. Secular. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. and freedom of religion. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months.. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. It is a sad sign that U. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. and abuses. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Attach tight strings to any U. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people.

including diplomatic efforts. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. but once the conflict is concluded. employing all the tools of communications. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. including the “Great Firewall of China. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. p. influencing the course of the conflict. between military and civilian. To be effective. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. from the context to the biases. it is not solely by killing the enemy. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. and exhaustion in an opponent. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. and similar outlets. 2821 JULY 11. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Instead. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. regret. can create a strong psychological impact. Finally. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. By employing various forms of strategic communications. “When one defeats the enemy. Ideally. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. and among strategy. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. fear. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. doubt. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. In addition. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and leaders. or winning a piece of ground. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels.BACKGROUNDER | NO. however. undermining their positions. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. and tactics. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. All the while. In wartime. terror. anxiety. Guo. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. At the same time. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. 14. operations. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. population.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. including various forms of media. 3 . one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals.

and exhaustion in an opponent.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. regret. population.BACKGROUNDER | NO. In wartime. however. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. from the context to the biases. At the same time. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. To be effective. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. undermining their positions. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. 3 . Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. and among strategy. p. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. or winning a piece of ground. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. including various forms of media. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. and tactics. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. but once the conflict is concluded. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. “When one defeats the enemy. Guo. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. including the “Great Firewall of China. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). can create a strong psychological impact. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. operations. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. between military and civilian. terror. In addition. All the while. including diplomatic efforts. Finally. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. it is not solely by killing the enemy. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. influencing the course of the conflict. anxiety. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Ideally. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. employing all the tools of communications. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. and similar outlets. and leaders. By employing various forms of strategic communications. fear. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. 2821 JULY 11. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. doubt. Instead. 14. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures.

2821 JULY 11. the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole.BACKGROUNDER | NO. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit. but also internally. 404. clerks. 5. and military realms. appropriately control the level of attack. Guo Yanhua. pp. Similarly. 154. precisely strike predetermined targets. and tactics. Efforts to secure information dominance. constrain. 3.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. 1. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. p. 2. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. Nanjing Political Academy. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. The interconnected nature of information. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. November 2005). operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). PRC: National Defense University Press. emotions. and even exploitation. 4 (2003). technical. Li Naiguo. as well as information systems. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. especially those who are making decisions.)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. affecting the 1. Military News Department Study Group. it targets externally. Because of the complex. etc. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. A product of the Information Age. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. it is applied against the enemy. p.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. information collection. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. In this context. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. whether in wartime or peacetime. operations. p. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. Yuan Wenxian. between military and civilian. manage.” This in turn requires the ability to collect. p. but also the human agents that interact with those data. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. economic. but also against friends. with effective coverage of many areas. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. 30. which is integral to information collection and transmission. information warfare is constant and ongoing. As one Chinese volume observes. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. 2008). but also the entire globe. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. it must deal with allied countries. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. Academy of Military Science. and among strategy. 2 . 77–79.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). 4.” China Military Science. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. therefore. 2005). whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. PRC: National Defense University Press. No. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations. 2004).

had been sworn in as interim president. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. social. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Under these conditions. and youth activists. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. On Monday. The next day. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations.” Badie warned. the provincial capital. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. and Reem Abdellatif. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour.html (accessed July 8. Tamer El-Ghobashy. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. a coalition of 1. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. a new Islamist group. July 6.000 injured. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president.wsj. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. Matt Bradley. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. http:/ / online. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. leftist and liberal parties.” The Wall Street Journal. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. Similar organizations in Libya. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Yemen. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. although he gave no indication of when they would be held.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. mr. As a judge. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Mohammed Badie. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. and political problems. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. political leaders. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. 2824 JULY 11. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. 2013). 2 . 2013. During his year in office. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. 2013 opposition political parties. Baradei. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. On July 3. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law).

BACKGROUNDER | NO. Nearly one-quarter of Egypt’s workers are unemployed. Egypt is imploding in a bitter political struggle fought amid economic collapse. Egypt has fallen into dire economic straits. American companies. Egypt’s economic woes have created a huge reservoir of unemployed youth who are vulnerable to the siren call of radical ideologies. it could devolve into an even bloodier version of Algeria’s civil war. and rising sectarian tensions. widespread unemployment. is a bellwether for the Arab Middle East. bread riots. it cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. as it did between Mubarak’s fall in February 2011 and Morsi’s purge of top army leaders in August 2012. which formerly generated the bulk of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings and provided jobs to about one of every seven workers. 2013 Islamist militants will likely soon expand their attacks beyond the Sinai region to include army. Washington also has a humanitarian interest in preventing food shortages if Egypt’s social fabric continues to unravel. police. Morsi further sabotaged the tourism industry by appointing as governor of Luxor Province a member of the Islamist terrorist group that massacred 62 tourists in Luxor in 1997—not exactly a reassuring signal for nervous tourists. which will make it difficult to pay for wheat imports. and government facilities. a focal point for sectarian violence. The political turmoil and rising crime rates of the past two years have severely hurt tourism. who supported the military intervention. The Nour Party. The United States has a national interest in stabilizing Egypt.000 lives since the Algerian Army stepped in to avert an Islamist election victory in 1991. particularly Islamist extremism. Other Islamists will likely increasingly criticize and ostracize the Nour leaders. and the figure is much higher for young men. Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Egypt’s army is sitting on a volcano and knows it. 2824 JULY 11. and political stability will likely be elusive until the country’s worsening economic situation is reversed. about 10 percent of Egypt’s more than 80 million people. The Obama Administration has been asleep at the switch for much of the past two years. and symbols of “foreign conspiracies” such as the U. which will require considerable American and international support. The splintered Islamist movement is by no means unified in support of Morsi.S. the largest Arab country. and preventing the eruption of a full-blown civil war on the scale of Algeria’s in the heart of the Arab world. It eagerly 3 U. will likely become even more of a lightning rod for terrorist attacks. which provide nearly half of Egypt’s food consumption. surging crime rates. which will require considerable American and international support. particularly in southern Egypt. The army can only do so much to repair Egypt’s dysfunctional political system. It inevitably will lose popular support the longer it rules. Foreign currency reserves are nearly exhausted. falling standards of living. joined non-Islamist opposition parties in pushing for early elections. who form the shock troops for street protests. labor strikes. preventing the rise of an Islamist totalitarian state. social turmoil. a Salafist movement that favors the immediate imposition of Sharia law and resented Morsi’s high-handed efforts to monopolize political power. There will likely be a surge in anti-Christian attacks. Left unchecked. The army cannot stabilize Egypt without resolving Egypt’s worsening economic problems. Sitting on a Volcano Egypt. Islamists charge that Egypt’s ancient Christian community was complicit in inciting protests to bring down Morsi. and other Western companies.S. An outburst of violence by Islamist extremists could open a dangerous new chapter in Egypt’s unfinished revolution. Islamist extremists will likely target tourists once again to undermine the new government. which has consumed more than 100. symbols of the anti-Morsi revolution such as Tahrir Square. Help Needed in the Struggle for Freedom . Moreover. The imminent bankruptcy of Egypt’s state-dominated economy could quickly lead to catastrophic food shortages. embassy. The army needs to put Egypt’s house in order quickly and then get out of the way. and growing political polarization. anti-Morsi political groups.

and freedom of religion. Many protesters demonstrating against Morsi before the coup also carried signs protesting President Obama’s support for the Morsi regime. as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. and Related Programs Appropriations Act. democratic.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Should Do In addressing Egypt’s deepening crisis. Egypt’s military leaders are much more likely than Morsi’s cronies to advance freedom in Egypt. and Egypt in 2011. but the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties should be allowed to participate only if they publicly choose a path of nonviolence. 2012.S. The Administration gambled that the practical responsibilities of governing would dilute the hostile anti-Western ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.S. aid. and abuses. policy toward Egypt has gone off the rails. Foreign Operations. a coup d’état or decree ■■ 4 .S.5 billion in annual U. the rising persecution of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. the crackdown on pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that the Mubarak regime formerly tolerated. after the date of enactment of this Act. President Mansour has laid out a vague timetable for a constitutional referendum in four and a half months and parliamentary elections in six months.. Army War College in 2006. 2013 embraced Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated government and was surprised that Egypt’s people so quickly became violently opposed to Islamist rule. not leading a backlash against American policy. In any event. and play a stabilizing role in the volatile Middle East. General el-Sissi’s “road map” for a democratic transition included no dates. 2824 JULY 11. and the restrictions that the Morsi government placed on freedom of the press. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s latest coup will succeed in salvaging Egypt’s dim democratic prospects. Washington should urge the interim government to adhere to this timetable. aid to Egypt. bars “any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or. It should also find an inclusive way of writing a new constitution to establish the rules of the political competition before elections. The fact that Egyptians resent the Obama Administration’s courting of the Muslim Brotherhood should be a wake-up call for the White House. The Obama Administration has stopped short of calling the army’s intervention a coup to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. This led Egypt’s secular and liberal opposition to turn to Egypt’s army in despair. Section 7008 of the Department of State. It is a sad sign that U. in which case he may have absorbed the professional standards and nonpartisan apolitical tradition of the U. The United States should support freedom in Egypt to advance its own interests as well as those of the Egyptian people. What the U. The Obama Administration’s enthusiasm for the Muslim Brotherhood led it to turn a blind eye to Morsi’s power grabs. power grabs.S. support economic reforms to revive the economy.S. felt no need to compromise with the opposition or temper his Islamist ambitions because the Administration was reluctant to use the leverage afforded by $1. freedom of speech. The Administration has called for a transparent and inclusive political transition process. and liberal Egyptians opposed to an Islamist takeover should be natural allies of the U. for his part. However. the United States should: ■■ Press Egypt’s army to hold elections and step aside as soon as possible. Attach tight strings to any U. angry that the Obama Administration uncritically supported the Morsi regime. The lack of a shared understanding of the rules of the game enabled Morsi to stage a power grab. The Obama Administration failed to publicly criticize Morsi’s excesses.S. Morsi relentlessly expanded his own power in a winner-take-all manner while neglecting Egypt’s festering economic problems. 2012.S. Yet once in office. Egyptian advocates of freedom should know that Americans support their efforts and do not side with an Islamist authoritarian leader who is hostile to American values and policies. Military coups have advanced the prospects for democracy at least two times in the past: Portugal in 1974. General el-Sissi reportedly was a student at the U. which was headed for dictatorship. Secular. The interim government established by the army has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a democratic transition than did Morsi’s regime. Army. Morsi.

Ideally. terror. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. operations. it is not solely by killing the enemy. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. Instead. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. and similar outlets. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Psychological Warfare Knowledge.BACKGROUNDER | NO. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. population. and among strategy. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. and tactics. 14. influencing the course of the conflict. including diplomatic efforts. from the context to the biases. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. including various forms of media. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. p. and exhaustion in an opponent. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. anxiety. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. Finally. however. All the while. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. 2821 JULY 11. Guo. In addition. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. By employing various forms of strategic communications. regret. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. “When one defeats the enemy. or winning a piece of ground. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. undermining their positions. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. To be effective. employing all the tools of communications. doubt. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. At the same time. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. fear. can create a strong psychological impact. between military and civilian. and leaders. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. In wartime. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. including the “Great Firewall of China. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. but once the conflict is concluded. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). 3 . One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making.

all of which make the use of coal power more expensive.7 In addition. “What Is the Role of Coal in the United States?” July 18. 2013). 3978 JUnE 27. Energy Information Administration. http:/ /www. Coal-mining jobs drop 43 percent. See the appendix for a description of the HEM and the methodology used in this paper. http://www. We look at the first 16 years of a 20-year phase-out of coal power: 2015–2030.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. http:/ /www. 34.pdf (accessed June 25. heritage.47 trillion. 2013).energyforamerica.cfm (accessed June 24. we find that by 2030: ■■ Employment falls by more than 500.S.S. U.000 jobs.com/nera-files/PUB_Smith_EPA_report_0811. 2013). Hayward.com/files/EPA_Scenario_Final_v2. http:/ /www.nera. January 17. This paper will analyze the economic impact of setting such a target.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/06/Energy-InventoryFINAL. Aaron Blake. Most recently. In particular. The analysis shows significant economic losses extend beyond the obvious areas of coal mining and power generation. June 25. and its total income drops by $16. Senator Barack Obama (D–IL).nerc.000 jobs. A family of four’s annual income drops more than $1. To date. 2013). By the agency’s own admission. “Obama Science Adviser Calls for ‘War on Coal.9 The attack on coal reaches well beyond power plant construction and operation. Under the proposed rule.10 Coal mining operations are subject to 10 federal environmental laws as well as state requirements and regulations. Environmental Regulations. those plants already in the permitting process would not be included. Nicolas D. 5.000 per year. Although not a new problem.500 over the period of analysis. North American Electric Reliability Corporation. http:/ /www. Perhaps even more problematic is how to dispose of the 15–20 super tankers’ worth of liquid carbon dioxide that widespread carbon capture would create.” December 2011.aei.washingtonpost. April 2011. Loris.com/ watch?v=DpTIhyMa-Nw (accessed June 26.” October 2010. 10. the rule will cost $10 billion by 2015 but have only $6 million in purported benefits from mercury reductions.S. http:/ /www. it seems clear that zeroing-out coal-fired electric power plants is a goal of this Administration’s environmental team.” NERA Economic Consulting. July 23. 2012. no one has successfully operated a utility-scale carbon-capture power plant. Emission of toxic pollutants has dropped as much as 96 percent since 1980.eia.pdf (accessed June 24. the Supreme Court granted the EPA’s request to review its cross-state air pollution rule. http:/ /www. Institute for Energy Research. 2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends. Steven F. Climate Policy and Coal. 2011. the EPA is also regulating coal combustion residues and cooling water intake structures and is considering more stringent smog standards. 2. 11. “Technical Comments on the Regulatory Impact Analysis Supporting EPA’s Proposed Rule for Utility MACT and Revised NSPS (76 FR 24976). Department of Energy. “The Assault on Coal and the American Consumer. “2010 Special Reliability Scenario Assessment: Resource Adequacy Impact of Potential U. American Enterprise Institute. 2013). Aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) decreases by $1. 4. 2 . 2013). August 3. interview with the San Francisco Chronicle editorial board. which would compel companies to retire three to seven gigawatts of electricity generation and retrofit up to 576 plants. 2008.’” The Washington Post.ISSUE BRIEF | NO. gov/energy_in_brief/article/role_coal_us. 9. p. Manufacturing loses over 280. 2013). Anne E. 2012.pdf (accessed June 24.com/blogs/ post-politics/wp/2013/06/25/obama-science-adviser-calls-for-war-on-coal/ (accessed June 26. air quality has improved significantly over the past several decades. Smith. regulations from the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement and the Mine Safety and Health Administration make building new coal mining operations or expanding existing operations increasingly difficult.8 In the absence of these new regulations. Electricity prices rise by 20 percent.org/research/reports/2012/07/the-assault-on-coal-and-american-consumers. 3.org/ files/2011/04/20/Hayward-almanac2011. 8. http:/ /www. 7. 2013 pollutants.pdf (accessed June 24. The analysis was carried out using the Heritage Energy Model (HEM). 2013. ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ The Energy Markets Respond.11 As coal-fired power generation is ratcheted 1. 6. and Natural gas prices rise 42 percent. “North American Energy Inventory. 2709. While it may not be clear exactly which policies will be used. U.youtube.

and vehicles would reduce the cost of meeting the energy cuts necessitated by the carbon policy. However. http://www.edu/opinions/2009/0203_climate_change_morris. 2013. Kreutzer. Dayaratna is Research Programmer and Policy Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. “The Hidden Costs of Wind Electricity: Why the Full Cost of Wind Generation Is Unlikely to Match the Cost of Natural Gas. Efficiency mandates actually increase the cost of meeting carbon reduction targets by forcing technologies whose cost is not fully offset by savings.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/Hidden-Cost.000 per year on average for the years 2015 to 2030. For instance.13 The attempt to soften the impact of energy cuts with efficiency mandates is like an employer trying to soften the impact of a 30 percent pay cut by telling employees that they have to shop at discount stores. At the same time. is a Research Fellow for Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis. Natural gas replaces more coal power than renewables do because gas is a generally cheaper option. 12.pdf (accessed June 26. The President’s Climate Action Plan employs the same wishful thinking on efficiency mandates as previous climate policies. Nicolas D.5 percent of the lost coal power. the adjustments do not fully compensate for the lost coal power and result in higher energy prices. 14. manufacturers make the costly efficiency improvements when the energy savings justify the additional expense. 2009.eia. The higher cost of electricity and natural gas increases the cost of production across most of the economy. —David W. HEM creates the least-cost adjustment to the lost power generation. PhD.aspx (accessed June 24. appliances. U. This combination reduces employment and national income.brookings. Increases in nuclear power close the gap about 3 percent. 2013 down. Loris is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. 2013). 2013). In addition. 2013). December 2012. Table 1.12 An increase in natural gas production and a diversion of natural gas from other uses replaces 74 percent of the lost coal power. The net loss in production and the associated higher prices for electricity force consumers to reduce usage. http:/ /www.pdf (accessed June 25. our analysis shows that the war on coal would cut GDP by $1. The increase in all renewable power generation replaces only 4. see George Taylor and Thomas Tanton. “Fuel Efficiency Standards: A Detour from the Cheapest Climate Protection. Department of Energy. “Monthly Energy Review. raise electricity prices by 20 percent. 13. For an explanation of wind power’s high cost. February 3. the energy used per real dollar of GDP has dropped by 48 percent since 1980. see Adele Morris. consumers have less to spend on non-energy items. Indeed.14 A Salvo in the War on Coal. By 2030. but this increase is from a very small base compared to coal power. This adjustment includes increases in natural-gas power and renewable electricity along with conservation as consumers respond to the higher energy prices.” Brookings Institution. and Kevin D. This perverse impact is known to both liberal and conservative economists. there is a surprisingly large increase in natural gas prices as this resource is shifted away from other uses (such as manufacturing) to power generation. 3978 JUnE 27. cut employment by over 500. but that leaves about 19 percent of the lost coal power with no replacement. The fallacy here is assuming that efficiency standards for buildings. there is already a robust demand for costeffective energy efficiency. Energy Information Administration. The logic of efficiency mandates assumes consumer indifference to energy efficiency.ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 3 . Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies. Though other aspects of the plan would add even more costs. the higher electricity prices induce a 42 percent increase in the amount of wind and solar power. Mandates Do Not Help.000 jobs. The President’s recently released Climate Action Plan continues his Administration’s war on coal.” American Tradition Institute.7.S.” June 25. A family of four would lose more than $1. Coal or Nuclear Generation. Likewise. and decimate the coal industry.atinstitute. However.gov/ totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec1_16.47 trillion. http:/ /www. Employees already shop at discount stores when it makes sense.

. assumptions. S. Ibid. conclusions.. pp. 16. the next group is solved similarly.15 NEMS is used by the Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy as well as various nongovernmental organizations for a variety of purposes. HEM’s Macroeconomic Activity Module makes use of the IHS Global Insight model. which is used by government agencies and Fortune 500 organizations to forecast the manifestations of economic events and policy changes on notable economic indicators. A Coal Market Module. HEM’s module does not make projections regarding commercial floor-space data of pertinent commercial buildings. “The National Energy Modeling System: An Overview. 14–25. An Industrial Demand Module. the methodologies. (2) American energy and the overall American economy. and a pertinent subsystem of equations and inequalities corresponding to each group is solved via a variety of commonly used numerical analytic techniques. 49 (2001). A Commercial Demand Module. Overarching the above modules is an Integrating Module that consistently cycles.gov/ oiaf/aeo/overview/pdf/0581(2009). A Renewable Fuels Module. Unlike NEMS. S. A Residential Demand Module. x2 . 3978 JUnE 27. conversion.” http:/ /www. 3–4.. a derivative of the National Energy Model System (NEMS). Unknown variables that are related (such as if they are a component of a particular module) are grouped together. The methodologies. using approximate values for the other unknowns. Energy Information Administration. An International Energy Activity Module. 2013 Appendix: Methodology Overview of Heritage Energy Model. xn ) R ber of diagnostic measures. Whitman.” Operations Research.18 HEM provides a num1 . A Petroleum Market Module.16 These modules include: ■■ ■■ An Electricity Market Module. conclusions. . and the process iterates. and P. ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ HEM is identical to NEMS with the exception of the Commercial Demand Module. Convergence checks are performed for each price and quantity statistic to determine whether subsequent changes in that particular statistic fall within a given tolerance. and A Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Module. In particular. Once these group’s values are computed. As with NEMS. Gabriel. pp. at cycle j. After all group values for the current cycle are determined. assumptions. ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ A Macroeconomic Activity Module. HEM focuses on the interactions among (1) the supply.S. Kydes. and opinions in this report are entirely the work of statisticians and economists at The Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis and have not been endorsed by and do not necessarily reflect the views of the developers of NEMS.17 A Transportation Demand Module. 17. HEM is based on well-established economic theory as well as historical data and contains a variety of modules that interact with each other for longterm forecasting. iteratively executing and allowing the various modules to interact with each other.ISSUE BRIEF | NO. including forecasting the effects of energy policy changes on a plethora of leading economic indicators. An Oil and Gas Supply Module. (3) the American energy market and the world petroleum market. 4 . 18. based on differences 15. This analysis uses the Heritage Energy Model (HEM). and opinions in this report are entirely the work of CDA statisticians and economists and have not been endorsed by and do not necessarily reflect the views of the owners of the IHS Global Insight model. a variety of n pertinent statistics represented by the vector j j n (xj is obtained. and (4) current production and consumption decisions as well as expectations about the future.. U. “The National Energy Modeling System: A Large-Scale Energy-Economic Equilibrium Model. A. A. 2013). Vol.pdf (accessed April 3. the next cycle begins. and demand of energy in its various forms. For example.eia. Department of Energy.

Finally. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. including diplomatic efforts. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. In wartime. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. can create a strong psychological impact. it is not solely by killing the enemy. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population.BACKGROUNDER | NO. however. 3 . The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. population. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). terror. and similar outlets. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. employing all the tools of communications. At the same time. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. 14. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. To be effective. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. and among strategy. All the while. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. or winning a piece of ground. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. undermining their positions. By employing various forms of strategic communications.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. including various forms of media. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Ideally. between military and civilian. operations. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. In addition. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. Instead. from the context to the biases. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. and exhaustion in an opponent. fear. doubt. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. “When one defeats the enemy. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. including the “Great Firewall of China. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. Guo. and tactics. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. regret. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. 2821 JULY 11. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. and leaders. influencing the course of the conflict. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. anxiety. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. p. but once the conflict is concluded.

regret. and exhaustion in an opponent. operations. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. To be effective.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. anxiety. employing all the tools of communications. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. 14. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Finally. including the “Great Firewall of China. and among strategy.BACKGROUNDER | NO. it is not solely by killing the enemy. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. and leaders. but once the conflict is concluded. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and tactics. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. 3 . One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. or winning a piece of ground. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. undermining their positions. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. from the context to the biases. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. In wartime. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Instead. At the same time. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. however. All the while. terror. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Ideally. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. By employing various forms of strategic communications. 2821 JULY 11. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. including diplomatic efforts. fear. influencing the course of the conflict. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. In addition. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. doubt. population.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. can create a strong psychological impact. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. p. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Guo. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. between military and civilian. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. “When one defeats the enemy. and similar outlets. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. including various forms of media. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed.

2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. employing all the tools of communications. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. from the context to the biases. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. Guo. and among strategy. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. and leaders. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. 3 . PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. terror. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. but once the conflict is concluded. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. it is not solely by killing the enemy. and similar outlets. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. population. and exhaustion in an opponent. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Finally. p. undermining their positions. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. can create a strong psychological impact. including diplomatic efforts. influencing the course of the conflict. however. Instead. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. anxiety. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. or winning a piece of ground. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. At the same time. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. doubt. including various forms of media. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. All the while. operations. regret. including the “Great Firewall of China. Ideally. By employing various forms of strategic communications. and tactics. 14. fear. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. “When one defeats the enemy. In wartime. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. 2821 JULY 11.BACKGROUNDER | NO. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. To be effective. In addition. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. between military and civilian.

and tactics. constrain. but also the entire globe.BACKGROUNDER | NO. November 2005). p. and military realms. 4. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. it is applied against the enemy. 2004). information collection. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. and among strategy. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. The interconnected nature of information. affecting the 1.” This in turn requires the ability to collect. clerks. Efforts to secure information dominance. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. it must deal with allied countries. which is integral to information collection and transmission. with effective coverage of many areas. 2821 JULY 11. but also the human agents that interact with those data. pp. As one Chinese volume observes. between military and civilian. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. but also internally. technical. as well as information systems. PRC: National Defense University Press. whether in wartime or peacetime. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. Military News Department Study Group. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. Guo Yanhua. p. p. 1. the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. Academy of Military Science. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit. Similarly. precisely strike predetermined targets. 2. information warfare is constant and ongoing. 30. but also against friends. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent.” China Military Science. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. Li Naiguo. A product of the Information Age. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. 404. economic. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. therefore. Because of the complex. it targets externally. No. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. 4 (2003). 3. Yuan Wenxian. especially those who are making decisions. Nanjing Political Academy. In this context. operations. 2005). 154. emotions. and even exploitation.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. 5.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. 2 . whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). manage. etc. 77–79. PRC: National Defense University Press. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. appropriately control the level of attack. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. 2008). p. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng).)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations.

such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. or winning a piece of ground. undermining their positions. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. and among strategy. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. and tactics. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. 3 . 14. population. p. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. By employing various forms of strategic communications. Finally. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. from the context to the biases. it is not solely by killing the enemy. anxiety. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. however. and leaders. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. Instead. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. can create a strong psychological impact. In addition. between military and civilian.BACKGROUNDER | NO. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. and similar outlets. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. but once the conflict is concluded. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. “When one defeats the enemy. Ideally. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. Guo. To be effective. doubt. employing all the tools of communications. terror. including various forms of media. including diplomatic efforts. In wartime. All the while. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. At the same time. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. 2821 JULY 11. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. operations.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. including the “Great Firewall of China. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. influencing the course of the conflict. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. regret. fear. and exhaustion in an opponent.

and would be more appropriately funded at that level instead of through federal gas tax user fees. advertising revenue. including $9. Privatize Amtrak: $950 million.gpo. Congress should require Amtrak to subject the operation of its lines to competitive contracting. “Chairman Mica’s New Amtrak Proposal Would Use the Private Sector to Reform Passenger Rail. Congress spends more out of the HTF than it collects in federal fuel tax revenues.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/ccs. Limit Highway Trust Fund (HTF) spending to level of revenue: $12 billion. To phase out the program.8 billion on capital grants.” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 2013. and scenic overlook construction. 2011. Consolidations. 3984 JULY 1. http:/ /www.pdf (accessed July 1. Wendell Cox.org/publications/commentary/privatize-faa (accessed July 1. Despite decades of subsidies. April 24. and revenue from the jurisdictions that it serves: Washington.issUe Brief | NO. which would improve service and lower its operating costs.5 billion on transit. and Savings” in the President’s budget requests for FY 2013 and FY 2014 at http:/ /www. to eliminate the need for taxpayer support and encourage productivity and competitiveness along the seaway. Ronald D. the House bill would spend $11. June 13. 3.5 ■■ ■■ Eliminate subsidies to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA): $125 million.” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. and Maryland. 2. .cato. it should be fully funded through fares (user fees). Full savings would be realized when this reform is fully implemented.. For FY 2014. January 31. Chris Edwards. Congress should follow the lead of Canada.” Cato Institute. http:/ /www. Congress should stop incurring new federal transit obligations. ferry boats. and gradually transfer gas tax revenues diverted to transit back to the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund to be distributed via normal formula funding. 2 4. which do not reduce traffic congestion. “Continuing the Effort to Curb Excessive FAA Salary Costs.org/research/reports/2007/09/continuing-the-effort-to-curb-excessive-faa-salary-costs. http:/ /www. Utt. Because WMATA serves truly local needs. 2013. http:/ /www.4 When compared to FY 2014 spending. D.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-CCS/pdf/BUDGET-2013-CCS. 2013). resulting in annual net losses and the need for massive federal subsidies. 5. Losses on Amtrak’s state-supported and long-distance routes overshadow its profitable routes and services (including the Northeast Corridor). 2013).org/research/reports/2011/06/amtrak-privatization-proposal-to-reform-passengerrail-service. which privatized its section of the Saint Lawrence Seaway in 1998. not a federal. or one-fifth of the FY 2014 appropriation. and its funds are earmarks targeted toward location-specific communities of the 13 Appalachian states. Utt.5 billion on transit formula grants and $1.C. Privatization would occur over the course of several years.29 billion. p. WMATA has performed poorly. offering unreliable service and suffering from mismanagement and high operating costs.29 billion. This community and regional development agency duplicates highway construction work done through the Department of Transportation. 2007. This worsens federal budget deficits and excuses federal spending on local programs such as bicycle and nature trails. “Transit Policy in an Era of the Shrinking Federal Dollar. 3290. Virginia. Assumed savings for the first year during phaseout are $2. See “Cuts. Ronald D. September 19.6 Congress should redeploy HTF money only ■■ ■■ ■■ 1. 2013 ■■ Close down the Appalachian Regional Commission and eliminate its funding: $3 million.” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. savings are $350 million in operating grants and $600 million in capital and debt service grants. fulfill existing obligations. priority. Privatize the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation: $31 million.heritage. Transit is a local. bailing out the HTF with cash transfers from the General Fund. 1622.heritage. at which point full savings would be realized.heritage. 3.whitehouse. 2763.org/research/reports/2013/01/transit-policy-in-an-era-of-the-shrinking-federal-dollar.pdf (accessed June 27. Terminate the Federal Transit Administration after phasing out the federal transit program over five years: $2. 2013) and http:/ /www. “Privatize the FAA!.

Spending should be reined in to bring the national debt—which is on course to increase by 50 percent during the next decade—under control. February 7.8 billion in FY 2013 to $1. Congress should eliminate the CDBG program altogether and devolve these activities to the states and localities.coburn. -built. The grants have been diverted to wasteful pork projects.org/research/reports/2013/04/highway-trust-fund-needs-to-be-reprioritized-to-improve-mobility. While the programmatic reforms discussed above cannot happen overnight.-owned. shipping and shipbuilding industries by subsidizing inefficient shippers and raising consumer prices.Serve&File_id=b7b23f662d60-4d5a-8bc5-8522c7e1a40e (accessed June 28. 656. and Ronald D. Emily Goff. 2013). The outdated maritime laws it enforces actually undermine the competitiveness of the U. 3984 JULY 1. Total Savings: $30. April 22.” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No.senate.6 billion in FY 2014. an antiquated law that requires U. 48. In separate legislation. See Senator Tom Coburn (R–OK).024 billion Slow the Spending Train. Wastebook 2012.cfm?a=Files.S.7 To their credit. —Emily Goff is Research Associate in the Thomas A. and inefficient spending. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Congress should repeal the Jones Act (authorized by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920).org/research/ reports/2005/02/presidents-plan-to-consolidate-federal-economic-development-programs-is-long-overdue. It has also strayed from its original purpose of providing housing assistance and encouraging economic development in low-income communities. 2013 to programs that cost-effectively improve mobility and safety or reduce congestion. http:/ /www.heritage.gov/public/index. but this program already received $16 billion from the Hurricane Sandy Disaster Relief bill. ■■ Close down the Maritime Administration (MARAD): $325 million. ■■ 6.issUe Brief | NO. Eliminate the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program: $1. 3 . 2013. MARAD was created in 1950 to provide domestic maritime commerce in the event of a national emergency. such as funding a pet shampoo company and issuing risky business loans. Utt. 2005. “President’s Plan to Consolidate Federal Economic Development Programs Is Long Overdue. 7.” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No.S.6 billion.heritage. 3919. p. House appropriators reduced this program’s funding by 58 percent from $3. The CDBG program duplicates other federal housing and economic development programs. http:/ /www. http:/ /www. lawmakers can take concrete steps in this year’s appropriations process to eliminate wasteful. The THUD bill is a good place to start. and -operated vessels to move goods between two locations in the U. “Congress Should Reprioritize Highway Trust Fund Money to Improve Mobility. poorly targeted.S.