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62 Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S.

516, 3 March 1884] Matthews (J) Facts: The constitution of the state of California adopted in 1879, in article 1, 8, provides as follows: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county." In pursuance of the foregoing provision of the constitution, and of the several sections of the penal Code of California, the district attorney of Sacramento county, on 20 February 1882, filed an information against Joseph Hurtado, charging him with the crime of murder in the killing of one Jose Antonio Stuardo. Upon this information, and without any previous investigation of the cause by any grand jury, Hurtado was arraigned on 22 March 1882, and pleaded not guilty. A trial of the issue was thereafter had, and on 7 May 1882, the jury rendered its verdict, in which it found Hurtado guilty of murder in the first degree. On 5 June 1882, the superior court of Sacramento county rendered its judgment upon said verdict, that Hurtado be punished by the infliction of death, and the day of his execution was fixed for 20 July 1882. From this judgment an appeal was taken, and the supreme court of the State of California affirmed the judgment. On 6 July 1883, the superior court of said county of Sacramento ordered that Hurtado be in court on 11 July 1883, in order that a day for the execution of the judgment in said cause should be fixed. In pursuance of said order, Hurtado, with his counsel, appeared in court, and upon the court's inquiry, objected to the execution of said judgment and to any order which the court might make fixing a day for the execution of the same, upon the grounds (1) that it appeared upon the face of the judgment that Hurtado had never been legally, or otherwise, indicted or presented by any grand jury, and that he was proceeded against by information made and filed by the district attorney of the county of Sacramento, after examination and commitment by a magistrate of the said county; (2) that the said proceedings, as well as the laws and constitution of California, attempting to authorize them, and the alleged verdict of the jury, and judgment of the said superior court of said county of Sacramento, were in conflict with and prohibited by Amendments 5 and 14 of the constitution of the United States, and that

they were therefore void; (3) that Hurtado had been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district attorney of the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had been tried and illegally found guilty of the said crime, without any presentment or indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed would deprive Hurtado of his life or liberty without due process of law. Thereupon the court overruled the said objections, and fixed 13 August 1883, as the time for the execution of the sentence. From this latter judgment, Hurtado appealed to the supreme court of the state. On 18 September 1883, the supreme court of the state affirmed the said judgment. A review of which, by a writ of error, by the US Supreme Court was allowed. Issue: Whether Hurtado was denied due process by being tried and found guilty without being presented or indicted by a grand jury. Held: The clause of the 14th article of amendment to the constitution of the United States, provides that "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The phrase is to be construed by the usus loquendi of the constitution itself. The same words are contained in the 5th amendment. That article makes specific and express provision for perpetuating the institution of the grand jury, so far as relates to prosecutions for the more aggravated crimes under the laws of the United States. It declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." It then immediately adds: "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, "due process of law" was not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case. The conclusion is equally Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the 14th amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same sense and with no greater extent; and that if in the adoption of that amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the 5th amendment, express declarations to that effect. Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. In the fourteenth amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure. The 14th amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two states separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. Further, any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Herein, the Court is unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law. The Court found no error and thus affirmed the judgment of the supreme court of California.

Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919] En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code . Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind

sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases) I. THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless

arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

II. THE ISSUE 1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid? 2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid? III. THE RULING [The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.] 1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid. [S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x x x. Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists 2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid. [T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. 68 Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986] Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director,

Malacaang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. They suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette only. Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if their enactment is otherwise provided or effective immediately. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a

valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. Philippine International Trading Co. vs Angeleson November 20, 2010 263 scra 420

69 Philippine International Trading Corp. (PITC) v. Angeles [GR 108461, 21 October 1996] Second Division, Torres (J) : 4 concur Facts: On 6 August 1973, the Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) was created as a government owned or controlled corporation under Presidential Decree (PD) 252. On 9 May 1977, PD 1071 revised the provisions of PD 252, where the purposes and powers of the said governmental entity were enumerated under Sections 5 and 6 thereof. On 9 August 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 444, directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities) between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on 27 February 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) 133 reorganizing the DTI empowering the said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and investment activities." The PITC was

made one of DTI's line agencies. Sometime in April 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade and to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports during the period. Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, under which was specified the commodities to be traded between them. On August 1989, PITC issued Administrative Order (AO) SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for or 1:1 ratio. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. and Firestone Ceramics, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine-laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with PITC. They were granted such authority. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by PITC from Remington and Firestone, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. On 20 January 1992, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PITC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Makati Branch 58). On 4 January 1993, Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles (Presiding Judge) upheld the petition for prohibition and mandamus of Remington and Firestone (Civil Case 92-158), and declaring PITC AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its regulations null, void, and unconstitutional. PITC filed the petition seeking the reversal of Angeles decision. Issue: Whether AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 binds Remington and Firestone. Held: The PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-08-01 is not, however, a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original AO issued on 30 August 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in

the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., PD 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. It was only on 30 March 1992 when the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.The fact that the amendments to AO SOCPEC 89 08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. Further, the Administrative Order, without force and effect due to the lack of publication, thus cannot exact any obligation from Remington and Firestone, specifically, charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service. Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de Leon [GR 121245], and Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297] Second Division, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 on leave Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Paraaque. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizcondes maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested

by Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the RTC Paraaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb,, of their right to fair trial. Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion. 81 Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Resolution En Banc, Puno (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior opinion, 1 concurs in result Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 )

Narratives (Berne Guerrero) of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in

court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. 85 Roxas vs. Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001] First Division, YnaresSantiago (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and accordingly, the public bidding was held on 14 September 1990. The lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only 1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections made by a A Technical Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids and Awards Committee, however, voted to award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which offered Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the Bids and Awards Committee reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its choice to the two brands recommended by Gen. Tanchanco and, by majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared. Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the amount of P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the bid price of Tahei Co. was only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the Purchase Order was P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire trucks. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the

bidding, awarding and purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint on 12 February 1993 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman, against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP, (3) Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.), (5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos, and (12) Ms. Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where the accused submitted their respective counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15 April 1993. Accordingly, the appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included among the accused. However, upon motion of Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without any notice to or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation, while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order dated 10 Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

February 1994. Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. Issue:Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the issuance of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. Held: It is not material either that no new matter or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any rate, Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956.

complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntays counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari. Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be cancelled. Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact,

87 Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc, Padilla (J) : 9 concur Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the

such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntays suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice. 92 Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964] En Banc, Paredes (J): 8 concur, 2 took no part Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 31 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Facts: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other non- residential customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August 1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31 August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an

audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission on 21 November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of proper notice and hearing in administrative cases. Held: The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 32 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.

and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court that on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women. Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The classification made the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Discrimination in this case is

96 PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L81958, 30 June 1988] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 12 concur, 2 on leave Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLEs Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic

justified. Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not all Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment.

Held: Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code constitute one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, the Supreme court has never in the past convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports (US vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; US vs. Baldello, 3 Phil. 509, US vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155), the defendants therein were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes peace officers. The ingredients of a crime form Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )

98 People v. Hernandez [GR L-6025-26, 18 July 1956] Resolution En Banc, Concepcion (J): 4 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, were accused of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged with rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The lower court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on 28 December 1953, which was denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated 2 February 1954. A similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on 26 June 1954 and renewed on 22 December 1955. Issue: Whether Hernandez is entitled to right to bail.

Narratives (Berne Guerrero) part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in war and committing serious violence among its essential elements, thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein. National, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. The policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty. Further, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Although the Government has, for the past 5 or 6 years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. Furthermore, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of

guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. Thus, in conclusion, under the allegations of the amended information against Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 101 Nunez v. Sandiganbayan [GR L-50581-50617, 30 January 1982] En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part. Facts: Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21 February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a day later, and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Constitution. Issue: Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan visa-vis regular courts.

Held: The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan, with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment." If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Case Digest on People v. Armando Gallardo January 25, 2000 On July 28, 1991, Edmundo Orizal was found dead in the rest house of Ronnie Balao. The victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back. The two suspects Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. They were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal. The trial court rendered decision finding accused Armando Gallardo y Gander and Alfredo Columna y Correa guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal. Held: Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with. It would have been different if the accused were merely asked if they were waiving their Constitutional rights without any explanation from the assisting counsel. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao

107 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995] Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave. Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarez himself approved on 6 October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15 February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCIs ReplyAffidavit was a copy of Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-based organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28 November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of the National

and Local Government Roads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted a preliminary investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending the prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as amended. On 16 February 1994, the information was filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February 1993, Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez does not refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18 February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for his temporary release. On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a reexamination and re- assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of Olivarez's refusal to enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance), Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the proceedings conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty" entered in his record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the case due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for another reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned to SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 9 December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another

group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December 1994 directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January 1995, Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation. The latter motion was denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCIs application for license. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran- based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter- application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether Olivarez was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any

charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI. 108 Tiu v. Court of Appeals [GR 127410, 20 January 1999] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur Facts: On 13 March 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law Republic Act 7227 ("An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.). Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges, such as tax exemptions and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment to business enterprises and residents located and residing in the said zones. On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued Executive Order (EO) 97 clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. On 19 June 1993, the President issued EO 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-andduty-free privilege was operative (i.e. the secured area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base). On 26 October 1994, Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws, inasmuch as the order granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. In a Resolution dated 27 June 1995, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular 1-95. Incidentally, on 1 February 1995, Proclamation 532 was issued by President Ramos, delineating the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227, holding that EO 97-A cannot be claimed to be unconstitutional while maintaining the validity of RA 7227; that the intention of Congress to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and other areas rely on the deliberations in the Senate; and that the limited application of the tax incentives is within the prerogative of the legislature,

pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest. Tiu, et. al.s motion for reconsideration was denied, and hence, they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether there was a violation of the equal protection of the laws when EO 97-A granted tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denied such to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Held: The EO 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. It was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the legislative purpose. There are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs, and on the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off, to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling. The classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there

are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. Herein, anyone possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.

coconut oil refiners vs. torres Facts: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital andequipment. It reads: The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)]. Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside.

The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition. Issues: (1) Statutory Construction; Political Law; Taxation Law: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause. (2) Political Law: Whether or not the case can be dismiss due to lack of the petitioners legal standing. (3) Remedial Law: Whether or not the case can be dismissed due to unreasonable delay in filing of the petition. Held: (1) The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and the present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly

any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. (2) No. Anent the claim on lack of legal standing, respondents argue that petitioners, being mere suppliers of the local retailers operating outside the special economic zones, do not stand to suffer direct injury in the enforcement of the issuances being assailed herein. Assuming this is true, this Court has nevertheless held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. (3) No. With respect to the other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering the importance to the public of the present case and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution 109 International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing [GR 128845, 1 June 2000] First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave, 1 on leave Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's domicile? (b) Where is one's home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic allegiance? (d) Was

the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than localhires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and localhires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought relief from the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires. Held: That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts

Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the localhires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local- hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.

Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government 403 SCRA 559 G.R. No. 143076 Facts: On May 23, 2000, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 or the National Electrification Administration Decree who are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). P.D. No. 269 provides the electric cooperatives exemption from payment of income taxes, national and local government and municipal taxes and fees among others. Also, under the loan entered into by the Philippine Government with the government of theUnited States in favor of electric cooperatives including petitioners, it contains similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. Section 6.5 of A.I.D. Loan provides that (t)he borrower covenants and agrees that this Loan Agreement and the Loan provided for herein shall be free from, and the Principal and interest shall be paid to A.I.D. without deduction for and free from , any taxation or fees imposed under any laws or decrees in effect within the Republic of the Philippines xxx. Petitioners contend that with the passage of the Local Government Code, their tax exemptions under P.D. No. 269 and the aforementioned loan agreements have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail that Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code discriminate against them in violation of equal protection clause, there being a distinction between cooperatives registered under P.D. No. 269 and those registered under R.A. No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States Government. June 10, 2003

Whether or not Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code are unconstitutional for being in violation of the equal protection and nonimpairment of rights clause Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no violation of the equal protection clause because there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 with respect the capital contribution of its members and extent of governmental control over cooperatives. Electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 have their members make equitable contributions to the capital required and maintain autonomy from the State. On the other hand, electric cooperatives under P.D. No. 269 do not require equitable contributions to capital and grants the National Electrification Administration the power to control and take over the management and operation of cooperatives registered under it upon the happening of certain events. Secondly, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. Section 193 of the Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing powers upon local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. InMactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, (GR No. 120082, September 11, 1996) the Supreme Court held that the limited and restrictive nature of tax exemption privileges under the Local Government Code is consistent with the state policy to ensure autonomy of local governments and the objective of the Local Government Code to grant genuine and meaningful autonomy to enable local government units to attain their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. There is no violation of non-impairment clause. The loan agreement does not grant any tax exemption in favor of the borrower or the beneficiary either on the proceeds of the loan itself or the properties acquired through the said loan. It simply states that the loan proceeds and the principal and interest of the loan, upon repayment by the borrower,


shall be without deduction of any tax or fee that may be payable under Philippine laws as such tax or fee will be absorbed by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds. This only means that whatever taxes imposed by the Philippines, if any, will be paid by the borrower and cannot be shifted to the lender. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by the petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.