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1 Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State-Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia1 Dan Slater slater@uchicago.


Chapter 1 To Extract and to Organize

I. The Problems, the Puzzles, and the Arguments ne!!ecti"e States and #naccountable $egi%es n !ra%ing a go"ern%ent which is to be ad%inistered by %en o"er %en, the great di!!iculty lies in this: you %ust !irst enable the go"ern%ent to control the go"erned& and in the ne't place oblige it to control itsel!() *a%es +adison, Federalist No. 51 ,he post-colonial world is riddled with go"ern%ents that re!lect what %ust ha"e been +adison-s worst political night%are: ,hey are neither enabled to control society, nor obliged to control the%sel"es( +ore than hal! a century a!ter the !loodgates o! global decoloni.ation started swinging wide open, e!!ecti"e and accountable public authority re%ains a rare co%%odity throughout Asia, A!rica, /atin A%erica, and the +iddle 0ast( Post-colonial states ha"e en1oyed considerable success at securing their borders, than2s to international nor%s supporting their territorial integrity(3 But they !re4uently !ail to assert any recogni.ably national interest 5 not only at the geographic %argins o! the territory they ostensibly rule, but also in the !ace o! particularistic pressures !ro% societal elites in their own capital cities( +ost notably, precious !ew states in the de"eloping world ha"e e'hibited the capacity to %obili.e signi!icant re"enue through direct inco%e or corporate ta'es on econo%ic elites, who hold the lion-s share o! wealth in de"eloping societies(6 ncapable o! !unding the%sel"es, such states ha"e pro"en incapable o! per!or%ing "irtually e"ery "irtuous tas2 that %odern states are e'pected to !ul!ill(

,his is still 1ust a penulti%ate dra!t o! %y dissertation-s opening chapter( Please do not cite or circulate( Other dra!t chapters are a"ailable upon re4uest( 3 7erbst 3888( 6 /ieber%an 3886(

3 De%ocrati.ation has %ade greater headway than state-building in the post-colonial world, especially since the end o! the Cold 9ar( :et the third wa"e); o! de%ocrati.ation has been !ar %ore une"en in its i%pact than the %etaphor i%plies( 9hile indeed rese%bling that %ighty %etaphor in so%e regions <i(e( /atin A%erica, Southern 0urope, and 0astern 0urope=, it has loo2ed li2e nothing %ore than a !aint ripple in others <i(e( Central Asia, >orth A!rica, and the +iddle 0ast=( >or ha"e de%ocratic transitions ser"ed as any panacea !or the "ast array o! political and econo%ic woes that plague %ost o! the post-colonial world, such as ende%ic corruption, steep ine4uality, crushing po"erty, recurrent "iolence, and shoddy public in!rastructure( But by pro"iding electoral chec2s on arbitrary state power and by sub1ecting political leaders to %ore critical %edia e'posure, de%ocrati.ation has at least %odestly increased so%e states- public accountability, pressuring the% to i%pro"e their per!or%ance and curtail their %ost wanton, predatory abuses( Stateness and de%ocracy ha"e thus pro"en elusi"e in the post-colonial world, but not entirely unattainable( Why have some states proven so much more capable, particularly at mobilizing tax revenue, than others? And hy have some authoritarian regimes proven so much more durable than others? Since the durability o! authoritarian regi%es has been con"incingly traced to the robustness and consolidation o! ruling political parties,? the regi%e 4uestion in"ol"es an inter"ening party 4uestion: Why have some authoritarian regimes constructed more po er!ul and cohesive ruling parties than others? ,his dissertation co%%ences with the assertion that these three political pu..les 5 the state pu..le, the regi%e pu..le, and the party pu..le 5 can be use!ully portrayed as three distinct %ani!estations o! a %ore !unda%ental pu..le: Why are elites more e!!ectively organized in some political systems than in others? States cannot e!!ecti"ely assert and broadcast central authority, ruling parties cannot reliably channel support to authoritarian regi%es, and such regi%es are highly "ulnerable to collapse a%id pressures !or de%ocrati.ation, unless the o!!icials who co%%and these institutions can generate elite collective action( By o!!ering an e'planation !or why le"els o! elite collecti"e action "ary so dra%atically across countries, hope to gain
; ?

7untington 1@@1( ,he classic proponent o! this "iew is 7untington <1@AB=, reiterated in 7untington <1@@1=( ,he i%portance o! party institutionali.ation in authoritarian durability has been supported in recent 4uantitati"e testing by Ceddes <1@@@=, %y own 4ualitati"e study o! +alaysia in co%parati"e perspecti"e <Slater 3886=, as well as a %i'ed-%ethod co%parati"e analysis o! +iddle 0astern and Southeast Asian cases by Brownlee <388;=( Dor a slightly %ore s2eptical "iew which %irrors this dissertation-s concern with the conditions o! contention that surround party !or%ation, see B( S%ith <3886=(

6 signi!icant and si%ultaneous analytic le"erage on the social and coalitional !oundations o! parties, states, and regi%es in the post-colonial world( +y o"erarching argu%ent is this: Di"ergence in elite coalitions and political institutions has been pri%arily produced by di"ergent patterns o! contentious politicsA 5 i(e( labor stri2es, ethnic riots, rural rebellions, student protests, and separatist insurgencies( n contrast to %ost scholarship on state-building, argue that internal con!licts can %a2e the state)E as surely as international war!are 5 but only when they ta2e especially threatening and challenging !or%s( Since these types o! contentious politics help build states by helping to !oster elite collecti"e action, they !acilitate the !or%ation o! broad-based parties and the durability o! authoritarian regi%es as well( elaborate and assess this causal !ra%ewor2 through a co%parati"e-historical analysis o! se"en countries in a region that e'hibits tre%endous "ariation in party strength, state capacity, and authoritarian durability: Southeast Asia( Dro% Dactions to nstitutions 0lite collecti"e action is as elusi"e as it is ele%ental( On the one hand, the cohesion o! the political elite is the crucial ele%ent in the search !or political stability()B But strong elite coalitions are e'tre%ely di!!icult to construct and consolidate on a national scale( n %ost places and under %ost circu%stances, elite politics is ri!e with !actionalis% and parochialis%( 0lites are neither congenitally attracted to large-scale organi.ations, as Da"id ,ru%an once i%plied, nor naturally inclined toward indi"idual rather than collecti"e action, as +ancur Olson !a%ously countered(@ $ather than ,ru%an-s habitual 1oiners or Olson-s ato%istic loners, elites are %ost typically cli4uish( 9hene"er institutions arise to organi.e elite collecti"e action on a national scale, there is a political pu..le to be e'plained( 7ow is elite !actionalis% o"erco%e, and elite collecti"e action gainedF Or, to state this 4uestion in ter%s o! the speci!ic institutions under the analytic %icroscope here: 7ow can state

,his rather !ashionable concept has e%erged !ro% a collecti"e e!!ort by leading theorists o! social %o"e%ents and re"olutions to situate their respecti"e areas o! study within a co%%on analytic !ra%ewor2( One o! these lu%inaries describes contentious politics as broader than social %o"e%ents but narrower than all o! politics,) and pri%arily de!ines it as public, collecti"e, episodic interactions a%ong %a2ers o! clai%s whenG(at least so%e o! the interaction adopts noninstitutional !or%s) <,arrow 3881: E=( Although re!er at ti%es to social con!lict, class con!lict, internal con!lict, %ass %obili.ation, and ci"il war, see all o! these as sub-types o! the u%brella ter% contentious politics( E ,his language deri"es !ro% Charles ,illy-s !a%ed, pithy phrase on 0uropean state-building: 9ar %ade the state, and the state %ade war) <,illy 1@E?: ;3=( B Brown 1@@6: 111( @ See ,ru%an <1@E1= and Olson <1@E1=(

; o!!icials be induced to wor2 together to e'tract signi!icant direct ta'es !ro% econo%ic elites, and to channel those re"enues to a central treasury, rather than cutting sel!-ser"ing side-deals with !actional allies in the pri"ate sectorF 7ow can those econo%ic elites be con"inced that resistance to such direct ta'ation is either !utile or sel!-de!eatingF ,a'ation clearly represents a %assi"e collecti"e action proble% 5 not only !ro% the perspecti"e o! indi"idual ta'payers with ob"ious incenti"es to !ree-ride, but !or go"ern%ent o!!icials who %ust construct <or ac4uiesce to the construction o!= e!!ecti"e state organi.ations to %a2e direct ta'ation ad%inistrati"ely plausible in the !irst place( Collecti"e action proble%s plague party !or%ation and authoritarian regi%e %aintenance as seriously as they hinder state-building( 7ow can authoritarian rulers bring a wide range o! societal groups into cooperati"e relations with their regi%e, and pre"ent the% !ro% assu%ing acti"e oppositional rolesF Building broad-based ruling parties would appear to be the best approach( But it is inherently ris2y( Such parties %ight ulti%ately be used as "ehicles !or replacing the leadership rather than supporting it( 9hy not 1ust depend on a narrow range o! personal loyalists instead, particularly in the %ilitaryF 0"en when a regi%e rests on %ilitary rather than party power, elite collecti"e action re%ains essential( ! %ilitary o!!icers are not in loc2step in their willingness to use !orce against de%ocratic protestors, the regi%e beco%es highly "ulnerable to collapse in the !ace o! antiregi%e %obili.ation( ,o pose the regi%e pu..le) in the broadest ter%s: 9hy would any !orces in society pro"ide reliable support to a regi%e that does not countenance the prospect o! its own re%o"alF 0'isting theoretical literature pro"ides three %ain argu%ents !or the e%ergence and continuation o! elite collecti"e action o"er ti%e( One perspecti"e highlights the role o! external threats in generating elite collecti"e action at the national le"el( Another assu%es that widely shared economic bene!its are necessary both to bring and to 2eep elites together( A third "iew is that nationalist sentiment is the necessary binding agent !or otherwise !ractious elites( All three perspecti"es ha"e %erit( :et none pro"ides %uch le"erage in e'plaining the e%pirical pu..le that dri"es this dissertation: the dra%atic di"ergence in political institutionali.ation that appeared throughout Southeast Asia a!ter 9orld 9ar , and has continued to sculpt the region-s political landscape until the present day(

? Contentious Politics and 0lite Collecti"e Action in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia presents a perple'ing political patchwor2( $egion-wide processes o! wresting national so"ereignty !ro% 9estern and *apanese control in the years and decades !ollowing 1@;? produced what He"in 7ewison has described as a remarkable range of political forms.10 The postwar period has seen the region incubate e'tre%ely strong states <i(e( Singapore= and e'tre%ely wea2 states <i(e( South Iietna%=& "ery robust party syste%s <i(e( +alaysia= and "irtually party-less polities <i(e( the Philippines=& highly durable dictatorships <i(e( Bur%a= alongside highly !ragile authoritarian regi%es <i(e( ,hailand=& as well as a se"enth country < ndonesia= that has displayed state, party, and regi%e institutions o! inter%ediate capacity, robustness, and durability( As Barbara Ceddes has rightly noted, selecting cases !ro% a single region !re4uently entails selecting on the dependent "ariable& but choosing cases in Southeast Asia presents no such %ethodological pit!all(11 ,he three institutional outco%es o! interest are tabulated !or all se"en cases in ,able 1: Table 1: Institutional Outcomes in Southeast Asia: States, Parties, and Regimes 13 ountr! ases "alaysia #ingapore $hilippines #outh %ietnam &hailand 'ndonesia (urma
18 11

State a"acit! Strong Strong 9ea2 9ea2 nter%ediate16 nter%ediate 9ea2

Part! Strength Strong Strong 9ea2 9ea2 9ea2 nter%ediate 9ea2

Authoritarian #urabilit! Durable Durable Dragile <1@BA= Dragile <1@E?= Dragile <1@E6, 1@@3= nter%ediate <1@@B= Durable

7ewison 1@@@: 33;( Ceddes 1@@8( 13 Parenthesi.ed years re!lect the year when bureaucratic-authoritarian rule collapsed( 9hereas such regi%es in ,hailand, ndonesia, and the Philippines yielded to de%ocratic successors, South Iietna% su!!ered not 1ust regi%e collapse, but state collapse, "ia %ilitary de!eat( Ade4uately e'plaining this de!eat re4uires the analytic tools o! %ilitary science as %uch as political science( 9hereas %y hypotheses ai% to e'plain the wea2ness o! all three o! these states in the !ace o! do%estic insurgency, they do not ai% to e'plain why co%%unist insurgents in South Iietna% were so %uch %ore potent than co%%unist %o"e%ents in the Philippines and ,hailand( ,he logic o! %y argu%ent suggests, howe"er, that i! Philippine or ,hai co%%unist %o"e%ents had beco%e as power!ul as the Iiet +inh, they would ha"e had an e'cellent chance o! winning power outright( Dor an e'cellent analysis o! co%%unist success and !ailure in Southeast Asia, see Coodwin <3881=( 16 As e'plain in Chapter @, the ,hai state only pro"ed stronger than its Philippine and South Iietna%ese counterparts because o! earlier legacies o! nineteenth-century state-building( /i2e these wea2) cases, the inter%ediate) ,hai state e'perienced no signi!icant or sustained increase in institutional capacity upon the establish%ent o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in the late 1@?8s, which is the outco%e o! pri%ary interest here(

9hat accounts !or this stri2ing institutional di"ersity within a single world regionF +y central argu%ent is that a !ourth, relati"ely unrecogni.ed causal !actor 5 contentious politics 5 can shape elite collecti"e action and subse4uent institutional pro!iles at least as pro!oundly as the e'istence o! e'ternal threats, the abundance o! econo%ic bene!its, and the a"ailability o! shared nationalist sy%bols( Iariation in the type and timing o! contentious politics e'plains national "ariation in elite collecti"e action, and hence in the robustness o! state, party, and regi%e institutions( 0"en when geopolitical conditions ha"e been per%issi"e, patronage resources ha"e been scarce, and nationalist .eal has been lac2ing, political leaders ha"e generated i%pressi"e le"els o! elite collecti"e action when !acing physically threatening and administratively challenging types o! %ass %obili.ation( ,o be sure, not all se"ere bouts o! internal con!lict produce signi!icant and sustained elite collecti"e action( n a political world go"erned by agency as well as structure, it is always possible that elites will utterly !ail to respond to organi.ed challenges, thus unwittingly ushering in their own political e'tinction( ,o assu%e that threats auto%atically produce e!!ecti"e responses would be to engage in crude and discredited %odes o! !unctionalist reasoning( :et this does not %ean that threats are irrele"ant& it only suggests that they are not su!!icient conditions !or the outco%es o! interest, a standard that precious !ew independent "ariables can %eet( ,he causal logic presented here does suggest, howe"er, that se"ere threats to elites- property, pri"ileges, and persons are a necessary condition !or the intrinsic challenge o! elite collecti"e action to be o"erco%e( Ci"en their propensity !or parochialis%, elites will not dee%phasi.e their narrow !actional interests on behal! o! broader class or national interests e'cept under e'tre%e duress( But how do we 2now e'tre%e duress) when we see it, without succu%bing to the sort o! post hoc reasoning that de!ines the se"erity o! the threat by the seriousness o! the responseF sub%it that so%e !or%s o! contentious politics are syste%atically %ore threatening and proble%atic than others( 9hile identi!ying the di!!erence independently o! the responses that such con!licts elicit is certainly tric2y, it is not i%possible( ,here are two 2ey !actors( Dirst, do state and societal elites percei"e contentious politics to be endemic or episodicF Second, do they percei"e such upswings in %ass %obili.ation to be manageable with e'isting institutional arrange%ents, or unmanageable gi"en e'isting le"els o! state !rag%entation and political opennessF ,he source o! such perceptions is di!!icult to !or%ali.e, and depends to so%e degree

E on the historical speci!ics o! the case in 4uestion( But in the Southeast Asian conte't 5 and, %ore tentati"ely suggest, elsewhere 5 there see%s to be a discernible causal pattern at wor2( Both the type and ti%ing o! con!lict are "ital( n ter%s o! ti%ing, the 2ey consideration is whether contentious politics erupts be!ore or a!ter the inauguration o! bureaucratic-authoritarian regi%es(1; n ter%s o! the type o! con!lict, outbrea2s o! contention will be percei"ed as %ost physically threatening and ad%inistrati"ely challenging when class con!lict a!!licts urban areas and e'acerbates communal tensions( 9here this type o! con!lict erupted be!ore the introduction o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, new elite coalitions arose in acti"e support o! both increased state centrali.ation and open-ended authoritarianis%, as the i%perati"e o! the social and political order ca%e to outweigh the percei"ed long-ter% ris2s o! gi"ing !ree rein to a potentially predatory state(1? Such high le"els o! elite collecti"e action ser"ed as the social !oundation !or highly cohesi"e ruling parties, states with considerable !iscal power, and authoritarian regi%es o! particularly long duration in +alaysia, Singapore, and to so%e degree ndonesia( By contrast, where class con!lict be!ore bureaucratic-authoritarianis% was %uted in intensity, e'clusi"ely rural, or too2 place against the bac2drop o! less politici.ed ethno-religious di"isions 5 as in the Philippines, South Iietna%, and ,hailand 5 elite groups percei"ed the danger to their property, pri"ileges, and persons to be relati"ely episodic and %anageable( ,hey thus pro"ided %ore tepid and te%porary support !or authoritarian rulers- pro1ects o! statebuilding and regi%e %aintenance( Dli%sy coalitions produced !li%sy institutions: +ilitary1;

,he ter% is O-Donnell-s <1@E6=, although he ne"er de!ines it concisely( choose to use it in part because o! the si%ilar ti%ing o! anti-de%ocratic reactions in /atin A%erica and Southeast Asia& in part because it connotes a regi%e that ai%s to hold power inde!initely rather than acting as a te%porary national guardian until party politics can be sa!ely re-established& in part because it aptly connotes the coerci"e de%obili.ation o! popular sectors& and in part because it suggests an alliance between state <bureaucratic= and regi%e <authoritarian= that "ery %uch wish to capture( 9ith its socialist ideology and re1ection o! !oreign in"est%ent, post-1@A3 Bur%a !its the concept %ore uneasily than the other cases discussed here( Sultanistic) regi%es such as +arcos- in the Philippines also !all short o! the bureaucratic-authoritarian ideal <see ,ho%pson 1@@?=& but suggest that this personali.ation o! power re!lected not %erely these autocrats- personality traits, but the constraints i%posed upon the% by wea2 social and institutional support !or their rule( t is precisely this wea2 support that ai% to e'plain( 1? ntense internal con!lict so%eti%es spurs elites to de%ocrati.e, not deepen anti-de%ocratic rule( As $ustow !a%ously argued, the dyna%ic process o! de%ocrati.ation itsel! is set o!! by a prolonged and inconclusi"e political struggleG(not a lu2ewar% struggle but a hot !a%ily !eud) <1@@@ J1@E8K: 3E, 3@=( +y ai% here is not to e'plain the brea2down o! se%i-de%ocracy throughout Southeast Asia between the 1@?8s and 1@E8s& but the 4uestion o! why elite coalitions united around an anti-de%ocratic agenda in this era is well worth pursuing( Dor the classic historical argu%ent on /atin A%erica-s retreat !ro% de%ocracy during this period, see O-Donnell <1@E6=& !or a %ore conte%porary analysis o! the role o! wor2ing classes in these brea2downs, see Ber%eo <3886=( +y own argu%ent would be that elites tend to !a"or authoritarianis% when $ustow-s necessary bac2ground condition !or de%ocrati.ation 5 a sense o! national unity 5 is %issing( than2 Da"id 9aldner !or pressing %e on this point(

B bac2ed leaders en1oyed precious little success at building robust ruling parties, ta'ing upper groups- inco%es, and securing their regi%es- long-ter% sur"i"al in the !ace o! cross-class antiregi%e %obili.ation( n all three cases, contentious class politics loo2ed dra%atically %ore threatening a!ter the birth o! bureaucratic-authoritarian regi%es than be!orehand( n short, authoritarian regi%es in +alaysia and Singapore 5 and to a lesser e'tent ndonesia 5 en1oyed %ore success at ordering power) than their counterparts in ,hailand, the Philippines, and South Iietna%( Power was ordered) both in the sense o! being extracted !ro% society, especially through ta' re"enue& and in the sense o! being organized into political institutions, especially centrali.ed states and ruling parties( 0lite collecti"e action produced stronger party, state, and regi%e institutions in the !irst set o! cases, while elite !actionalis% ha%strung these sa%e institutions in the second set( ,he Deducti"e /ogic o! Ordering Power: Con!licts, Coalitions, and nstitutions 0'plaining the "ariation in political order between these two sets o! cases is the pri%ary tas2 !or this dissertation( ,o be both deeply con"incing and broadly applicable, howe"er, any such e'planation should be e'pressed in ter%s o! deducti"e, theoretical reasoning that transcends regional speci!icities( ,his dissertation indeed atte%pts to e'plain institutional outco%es "ia a deducti"e !ra%ewor2 that can be applied to other world regions( Dollowing Da"id 9aldner, sub%it that political institutions re!lect the strength o! social coalitions, which the%sel"es represent legacies o! historical con!licts <see Digure 1=(1A As ha"e argued thus !ar, contentious politics <con!lict= shapes patterns o! elite collecti"e action <coalitions=, which %old parties, states, and regi%es <institutions= in turn( De!ining coalitions in ter%s o! collecti"e action is not an ob"ious %o"e, howe"er( n %ost analyses, a coalition is portrayed as the set o! groups that bene!its !ro% go"ern%ent policy, and is e'pected to support incu%bent leaders in e'change(1E :et the de!ining !eature o! any coalition, in %y "iew, is that it acti"ely pro"ides political support 5 not that it

9aldner <3883= calls this con!licts-coalitions-institutions trinity a standard e'planatory pattern) !or the origins o! state institutions( !ind this !ra%ewor2 so co%pelling in Southeast Asia that apply it to party and regi%e institutions as well( :et tread care!ully around 9aldner-s bold assertion o! his %odel-s portability to all conte'ts( Dor now, a% %ore co%!ortable with Scharp!-s notion o! a !ra%ewor2,) which our prior scienti!ic and pre-scienti!ic 2nowledge about what to e'pect in the pro"ince o! the world that is o! interest to usG( the 4uestions that are worthwhile as2ing, the !actors that are li2ely to ha"e high e'planatory potential, and the type o! data that would generally be use!ul in supporting or in"alidating speci!ic e'planations) <1@@E: 3@-68=( 1E 9aldner hi%sel! e'presses this general consensus when saying that coalitions are typically constructed by %eans o! side-pay%ents) <1@@@: 6;=(

@ necessarily recei"es econo%ic bene!its as an i%petus to do so( 9hen see2ing to deter%ine what 2ind o! coalition e'ists in an authoritarian setting, we should as2 not what the go"ern%ent does !or its coalition& we should as2 what the coalition does !or its go"ern%ent(

$I%&RE 1: Ex"lanator! $rame'or( )or State*+uilding ,-aldner .//.0




7ow well authoritarian leaders !are at capturing the strategic resources that di!!erent social groups possess depends on the types o! contentious politics that presage the ad"ent o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule( 9here such con!licts are widely percei"ed as both ende%ic and un%anageable, as de!ined abo"e, authoritarian regi%es en1oy an e'cellent opportunity to cra!t what call a protection pact: a pro-authoritarian coalition lin2ing upper groups on the basis o! shared perceptions o! threat <see Digure 3=( At their broadest, these coalitions enco%pass !our sets o! elites: <1= state o!!icials, !ro% the top leadership to %id-le"el bureaucrats, including the police and ar%ed !orces& <3= econo%ic elites, such as %a1or industrialists, !inanciers, %erchants, and landlords& <6= %iddle classes, including pro!essionals, petty %erchants, uni"ersity students, and intellectuals& and <;= co%%unal leaders, especially religious elites, as well as top !igures in ethnic associations( At their strongest, protection pacts institutionali.e support !ro% all !our o! these groups by the% into broad-based ruling parties(


$I%&RE .: Elite ollecti1e Action in Southeast Asia on)licts oalitions Institutions

ontentious Politics2

Protection Pact

State Po'er Authoritarian #urabilit! Part! Strength

* Between 1945 and the inauguration of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule ,+urma 134.5 Indonesia 13445 6ala!sia 13435 Phili""ines 137.5 Singa"ore 13485 South 9ietnam 13885 Thailand 138:0
Power!ul post-colonial protection pacts ha"e arisen only rarely& but when they ha"e, as in +alaysia and Singapore, they ha"e per%itted states and regi%es to e'tract considerable co%pliance and resources !ro% their elite partners( +ore precisely, economic elites ha"e paid higher ta'es and supplied %ore generous political !inancing to authoritarian leaders and their political "ehicles( "iddle classes ha"e re!rained !ro% 1oining popular sectors in anti-regi%e %obili.ation, helped pro"ide intellectual 1usti!ication !or non-de%ocratic rule, !or%ed the social bac2bone o! authoritarian political parties, and e"en directly assisted go"ern%ent !orces in crushing political dissent( )ommunal elites ha"e granted authoritarian regi%es a critical i%pri%atur o! legiti%acy, %obili.ed !ollowers to help suppress regi%e opponents, and allowed state institutions to insinuate the%sel"es into tithing and other internal processes( ,hreatened state o!!icials ha"e pro"en %ore loyal to ruling party or %ilitary institutions, %ore ready to i%pose coerci"e %easures on regi%e opponents, and %ore li2ely to i%ple%ent highly e'tracti"e ta' policies in a coherent and e!!ecti"e %anner( ,he ideal-typical protection pact is one in which all !our o! these upper groups reliably play these roles, pro"iding their strategic resources to incu%bents and withholding the% !ro% the opposition( Such coalitions endow states and the regi%es that run the% with a near %onopoly on

11 what A%itai 0t.ioni describes as the three sub-types o! power: <1= coerci"e, <3= re%unerati"e, and <6= sy%bolic(1B ,he %ore o! these power sources regi%es lac2, or lose o"er ti%e, the %ore "ulnerable they beco%e to anti-regi%e %obili.ation and de%ocratic transition <see Digure 6=( n su%, di!!ering patterns o! contentious politics initiate di"ergent paths o! party, state, and regi%e de"elop%ent because they produce di!!erent types o! coalitions(

$I%&RE ;: Ordering Po'er ,Part I0: Extracting Po'er )rom Protection Pacts
State Personnel Coerci"e 0cono%ic 0lites $e%unerati"e +iddle Classes Sy%bolic Co%%unal /eaders
,he Iirtues o! nter%ediate Cases: Partly Ordered Power in Bur%a and ndonesia ,hus !ar ha"e depicted the di"ergent coalitional and institutional conse4uences arising !ro% di!!erent types o! contentious class politics in +alaysia and Singapore on the one hand, and the Philippines, ,hailand, and South Iietna% on the other( 7owe"er, %y causal !ra%ewor2 ai%s not 1ust to capture the star2 contrast in outco%es between these two sets o! cases( t also endea"ors to e'plain why patterns o! elite collecti"e action in Bur%a and ndonesia produced %ore %uddled institutional pro!iles( As shown in ,able 1, Bur%a-s authoritarian regi%e has e'perienced e'traordinary durability, in spite o! the absence o! either a strongly e'tracti"e central state or a robustly organi.ed ruling party( And authoritarian institutions in ndonesia pro"ed to be neither

State and Party nstitutions o! the BureaucraticAuthoritarian $egi%e

0t.ioni 1@A1(

13 as robust as those o! the ordered) cases, nor as %oribund as parties, states, and regi%es in the disordered) e'a%ples( 9hat do these inter%ediate cases tell us about the e'planatory "alue o! the deducti"e !ra%ewor2 1ust introducedF Con!ronting these challenging cases !orces two i%portant re!ine%ents to the causal %odel( Dirst, Bur%a !orces %ore e'pansi"e thin2ing about the varieties o! contentious politics that %ight shape elite coalitions and political institutions( Class con!lict %ay ha"e been the %ost ubi4uitous !or% o! contentious politics in Cold 9ar Southeast Asia, but it was not the only type( And the ndonesian case !orces a %ore disciplined analysis o! the mechanisms o! reproduction that sustain coalitional and institutional legacies o"er the li!e o! an authoritarian regi%e(1@ ,o understand coalitional contours and institutional outco%es in Bur%a, !irst o! all, it is necessary to loo2 beyond class con!lict, and consider the causal i%plications o! another type o! contentious politics that has ra"aged so %uch o! the post-colonial world: regional rebellions, or "iolent struggles o"er the establish%ent o! central authority) %ar2ed by pro"inces rebelling against control by the capital()38 ,here is co%pelling reason to suspect that %ass %o"e%ents ai%ing to escape the state will tend to build "ery di!!erent elite coalitions than %obili.ation geared toward capturing the state( 9hereas class-based con!licts can spur a wide range o! elites to percei"e a shared interest in !or co%%on class protection, regional rebellions present little i! any direct physical threat to econo%ic elites, %iddle classes, and co%%unal elites, who are %ostly huddled in capital cities( ! such peripheral "iolence spar2s increased collecti"e action a%ong any elite group, it is %ost li2ely to be %ilitary leaders, who shoulder the actual responsibility o! 4uelling regional dissent( thus hypothesi.e that regional rebellions will syste%atically tend to e'hibit a uni!ying e!!ect on the national %ilitary, but not upon the other elite groups who can potentially constitute a !ull-blown protection pact( ,he %ost li2ely institutional result is a highly uni!ied but %ilitari.ed state with wea2 lin2s to societal elites and 5 gi"en %ilitary o!!icers- chronic disinterest in the details o! ci"il go"ernance 5 wea2 ad%inistrati"e capacity to boot( :et the relati"e cohesion o! %ilitary elites will still contribute to the possibility o! a durable authoritarian

1@ 38

Dor the best analysis o! %echanis%s o! reproduction in historical-institutional analysis, see ,helen <1@@@=( Centeno 3883: A3( ,his de!inition thus enco%passes ar%ed struggles !or regional autono%y as well as outright separatis%(

16 regi%e, so long as the state-s coerci"e apparatus re%ains willing to use "iolence to co%pensate !or the regi%e-s lac2 o! social support( Bur%a pro"ides the consu%%ate e'a%ple o! such causal dyna%ics in the Southeast Asian conte't( $egionalis% raged !ro% independence in 1@;B until the establish%ent o! open-ended %ilitary rule in 1@A3, and ci"ilian authorities- chronic incapacity to deal with such ar%ed %o"e%ents pro"ided a pri%ary rationale !or the %ilitary-s political inter"ention( As in +alaysia and Singapore, un%anageable contentious politics in Bur%a on the e"e o! bureaucraticauthoritarian rule helped produce a tight, cohesi"e elite coalition( ,he boundaries o! this coalition ha"e been no broader than the boundaries o! the %ilitary apparatus itsel!, howe"er, as upper groups in urban areas ha"e ne"er had reason to percei"e the %ilitary as a necessary protector !ro% any organi.ed societal ri"als( 9ith no potential social !oundation !or either a strong central state or a broad-based ruling party, Bur%a-s %ilitary leaders ha"e e!!ecti"ely bun2ered the%sel"es in, sustaining their illegiti%ate regi%e with the %ain weapon at their disposal 5 organi.ed "iolence( ,he elite collecti"e action necessary !or authoritarian durability is not e'pressed through the sort o! e!!ecti"e state and party institutions that order power) in +alaysia and Singapore& but what sustains Bur%ese %ilitary rule is elite collecti"e action nonetheless( ,he Bur%ese e'ception is thus broadly consistent with the basic causal !ra%ewor2 introduced here, so long as one the di!!ering coalitional logics that arise !ro% di!!ering types o! contentious politics( ,he distinction between contentious class politics and contentious regional politics is also critical in co%prehending inter%ediate patterns o! political de"elop%ent in ndonesia( Care!ul analysis o! the ndonesian case shows that the country con!ronted a combination o! class and regional con!licts a!ter 9orld 9ar that 2nows no parallel in Southeast Asia 5 or perhaps anywhere( One cannot understand the dra%atic %ilitari.ation o! state politics that co%%enced in the late 1@?8s without the uni!ying e!!ect that regional rebellions had on the ndonesian ar%y( :et these rebellions ne"er pac2ed the separatist punch o! Bur%a-s border wars, and had been e!!ecti"ely curbed be!ore bureaucraticauthoritarianis% was installed in the %id-1@A8s( t was instead the dra%atic rise o! contentious class politics in the early-%id 1@A8s, "ia the %obili.ation o! a power!ul, grassroots co%%unist party, that spurred a re%ar2able increase in elite collecti"e action upon the birth o! the Suharto regi%e(

1; ,his layering o! class and regional con!lict e'plains why %ilitary rule in ndonesia was inaugurated with %uch broader elite bac2ing than %ilitary rule in Bur%a( ,his pro"ided regi%e leaders in ndonesia with the social !oundations necessary !or building a relati"ely robust ruling party and dra%atically i%pro"ing the per!or%ance o! the central state( ndeed, !ew authoritarian regi%es ha"e e"er ordered power) %ore i%pressi"ely than ndonesia-s >ew Order) go"ern%ent during the late 1@A8s and early 1@E8s( :et the !act that the ndonesian %ilitary ca%e to power by completely annihilating its co%%unist ri"als had a critical unintended conse4uence( 9hile the le!tist threat was widely percei"ed as e'tre%ely se"ere upon the establish%ent o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule 5 thus !acilitating the construction o! a broad coalition and %ore e!!ecti"e state and party institutions 5 it was not widely percei"ed as endemic a!ter the co%%unists had been wiped out( ,he 4uartercentury !ro% the >ew Order-s pea2 o! strength in the early 1@E8s until the Suharto regi%e-s collapse in 1@@B in"ol"ed nu%erous political twists and turns, but it also displayed a secular long-ter% decline in the tightness o! the ruling coalition( Dro% a base o! social support that initially al%ost appro'i%ated the +alaysian and Singaporean protection pacts, ndonesia-s bureaucratic-authoritarian coalition slowly withered to %ore closely rese%ble the !li%sy coalition o! the +arcos-era Philippines( ,he ndonesian case thus ser"es as a "irtuous and "ital re%inder that path-dependent causal e'planations cannot si%ply stop with the critical 1uncture) when coalitional and institutional patterns are initially established( $ather, it is essential to speci!y the %echanis%s o! reproduction) that sustain such structural conditions o"er ti%e( By doing so, we not only gain le"erage in e'plaining structural change in ndonesia& we should also co%e to better understand the i%pressi"e le"els o! structural continuity witnessed in the other si' cases considered in this dissertation, and gain insights into how those historical legacies %ight so%eday be bro2en( n brie!, argue that contentious politics be!ore the onset o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule e'hibits long-ter%, path-dependent e!!ects on authoritarian political structures through two distinct %echanis%s o! reproduction: an institutional %echanis%, and an attitudinal %echanis% <see Digure ;=( ,he %ore power!ul %echanis% is institutional& %erely by actors in particular ways at the outset o! a new political dispensation, leaders create structures that assu%e so%ething o! a li!e o! their own( 0'pectations con"erge, relationships are !orged, and interests adapt to pre"ailing institutional !ra%ewor2s( ,here is thus a strong bias toward continuity in

1? political institutions, which is precisely why path-dependent causal e'planations are considered so power!ul and re%ain so popular in political science and sociology(

$I%&RE <: Ordering Po'er ,Part II0: Organizing Po'er in Authoritarian Institutions State Strength ontentious Politics Ruling Part! Strength
nstitutional 0!!ect Attitudinal 0!!ect

Authoritarian #urabilit!

:et political structures can brea2 down or wither o"er ti%e, as the ndonesian case so elo4uently testi!ies( 9hy %ight a protection pact elapse or erode, depri"ing an authoritarian regi%e o! the coerci"e, re%unerati"e, and sy%bolic power that help it sur"i"eF 7ere is where the attitudinal %echanis% o! reproduction co%es into play( ,his entails elite perceptions o! earlier historical episodes o! contentious politics, and e"ol"ing "iews o! the probability that such %ass unrest could ree%erge i! authoritarian controls were li!ted( Such indi"idual <but shared= perceptions are certainly %ore !luid than tangible political organi.ations, but they are potentially 4uite conse4uential !or authoritarian durability( ! state and societal elites co%e to belie"e that an authoritarian leader-s protestations o! apr*s moi, le deluge) are nothing but hot air, they beco%e at least attitudinally a"ailable to the political opposition during ti%es o! crisis( t is a long and

1A di!!icult path !ro% such attitudinal shi!ts to the coalitional and institutional shi!ts necessary to physically o"erthrow an authoritarian regi%e 5 but it is an i%portant start(31 Authoritarian rulers ac2nowledge the i%portance o! attitudes as well as institutions in sustaining their rule when they tru%pet the "iew, ad nauseum, that their regi%es pro"ide the only protection elites en1oy !ro% utter chaos( ,heir goal is to con"ince social !orces that they ha"e %ore to !ear !ro% each other than !ro% the state, thus nipping potential cross-class de%ocratic coalitions in the bud( Iirtually all authoritarian regi%es try to %a2e this case( But they are not all e4ually con"incing( 9hen bureaucratic-authoritarian rule is preceded by types o! contentious politics that are widely percei"ed as un%anageable and ende%ic, anti-de%ocratic attitudes will be relati"ely easy to sustain o"er the long ter%( n short, so%e authoritarian regi%es en1oy !ar better historical raw %aterial with which to construct threat perceptions than others( ,he o"erall causal logic is %ost succinctly e'pressed by the te%plate pro"ided in Digure ;( Contentious politics is the independent "ariable( States and ruling parties are dependent "ariables arising !ro% contentious politics, as well as inter"ening "ariables that in!luence authoritarian durability in turn( ,he causal relationship between contentious politics and authoritarian durability is thus both direct <"ia the attitudinal %echanis%= and indirect <"ia the institutional %echanis%, or its e!!ect on states and parties=( II. Research #esign and Ri1al Ex"lanations Path Dependence, Critical Antecedents, and Case Selection 0"en the %ost elegant and parsi%onious theoretical hypothesis will ha"e little "alue i! it !ails to withstand e%pirical scrutiny( n the chapters to !ollow, sub1ect the argu%ents ha"e 1ust introduced to a rigorous e"identiary test( Dirst, analy.e instances o! contentious politics between 9orld 9ar and the inauguration o! bureaucratic-authoritarian regi%es in Southeast Asia between the %id-1@?8s and early 1@E8s( e'pect the character o! such con!lict to deter%ine the strength o! pro-regi%e coalitions, as %ani!ested in the authoritarian leadership-s e!!ecti"eness at extracting strategic resources !ro% econo%ic elites, %iddle classes, co%%unal elites, and state o!!icials, and at

,he trend in social-%o"e%ent theory to eschew consideration o! indi"idual attitudes in !a"or o! organi.ational attributes has been a welco%e one, but also !eel it has gone too !ar( n %uch the sa%e way that criticis% o! threatbased e'planations !or collecti"e action o"ershot by portraying such logic as !atally !lawed, when really they si%ply !ailed to pro"ide a su!!icient causal e'planation, e'planations !or %ass %obili.ation that rested on indi"idual attitudes o! !rustration were not so %uch incorrect as insu!!icient(

1E organizing these elites into coherent state and party institutions: a dual political e!!ort re!er to as ordering power() ,o assess %y argu%ent that these coalitions in!luenced long-ter% regi%e durability, will then e'a%ine the role played by all !our elite groups during %o%ents o! %a'i%u% regi%e "ulnerability, pri%arily in the 1@B8s and 1@@8s( e'pect to !ind consistent patterns o! de!ection and resistance in the cases o! de%ocratic transition, and the relati"e absence o! such de!ection and resistance in cases o! authoritarian retrench%ent( n the tradition o! path-dependent causal analysis, %y study presents an argu%ent regarding not only hy these institutions di"erged, but hen the seeds o! this di"ergence were initially planted( argue that national "ariations in patterns o! contentious politics bet een World War '' and the birth o! bureaucratic+authoritarian rule pro"ide the best e'planation !or national "ariations in !iscal power, ruling party strength, and authoritarian durability throughout Southeast Asia( n the parlance o! co%parati"e-historical analysis, a% suggesting that this ti%eperiod represents the critical 1uncture) during which the subse4uent causal patterns o! interest were initially produced( :et whene"er we social scientists del"e into history, our analyses %ust ine"itably rec2on with the sort o! %essiness) that historians accept as an integral part o! their cra!t( ,ry as we %ight to co%%ence our analysis in the period o! interest, and not a %o%ent be!ore, we 4uic2ly !ind that e"ents and conditions preceding the critical 1uncture) co%e to see% critical in their own right( Path-dependent studies ostensibly subsu%e such bac2ground conte't into the category o! antecedent conditions,) which Da"id Collier and $uth Berins Collier de!ine as a Lbase lineagainst which the critical 1uncture and the legacy are assessed()33 ,o produce a true base line,) howe"er, scholars would need to select cases with identical %easures on all antecedent conditions( Since such control is di!!icult to gain in co%parati"e analysis, scholars need tools to discern whether antecedent cross-case "ariation should be properly "iewed as <1= irrele"ant, <3= directly responsible, or <6= indirectly responsible !or the "ariation o! interest( Unfortunately, existing research is vague on the place of antecedent conditions in causal historical analysis. My own approach in this dissertation is as follows: When factors operative before the critical juncture have no direct influence on either the independent variable (contentious politics) or the dependent variables (party, state, and regime institutions), they should be excluded from discussion, for the sake of parsimony and clarity. When such factors

Collier and Collier 1@@1:68( Dor a recent study that gi"es signi!icant consideration to the long-ter% causal i%portance o! antecedent conditions, see +ahoney 3881, Chs( 6-;(

1B exhibit a direct causal influence on the independent variable, they should be included in the analysis, as what I call critical antecedents. Their impact is too important to ignore, but not determinative enough to be the main story. If antecedent conditions have a direct influence on the dependent variables, they should not be considered antecedent at all. They should be considered the true independent variables, and the historical period in which they emerged should be considered the true critical juncture. In such an instance, the initial argument positing a later critical juncture should be considered seriously impugned, if not altogether falsified.36 As I argue at greater length below, Southeast Asias contemporary divergence in political institutions cannot be directly traced to prewar factors. Yet the social cleavages that helped define the impact of postwar mass mobilization were indeed shaped before the Japanese invasion, thus indirectly (but critically) influencing the outcomes of interest. Specifically, this studys seven cases already exhibited three distinct cleavage structures before World War II: (1) territorially integrated plural societies in Malaysia and Singapore; (2) relatively homogenous national societies in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam; and (3) territorially fragmented plural societies in Burma and Indonesia. It is no coincidence that these prewar cleavage structures correspond exactly to the seven cases three broad postwar political pathways. They serve as critical antecedents that would help determine whether postwar mass mobilization would (1) exacerbate communal tensions, but not give rise to territorially based regional rebellions, as in Malaysia and Singapore; (2) mobilize stronger class grievances than communal or regionalist tensions, as in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam; or (3) confront new states with stronger initial pressures to escape the state altogether than to seize it outright, as in Burma and Indonesia. +y purpose in introducing such critical antecedents) is not to tell history !or history-s sa2e, but to lay the essential e%pirical groundwor2 !or %y co%parati"e causal argu%ent( ,o unra"el these causal relationships, %o"e beyond structured, !ocused co%parison) across cases, and e%ploy longitudinal, "ariable-based process-tracing) within all se"en countries(3; Beyond

,his approach is indirectly endorsed by Collier and Collier, who warn scholars positing that a particular critical 1uncture produced a particular legacy %ust also consider the ri"al hypothesis that i%portant attributes o! the legacy %ay in !act in"ol"e considerable continuity and,or direct causal lin-s ith the preexisting system that are not mediated by the critical .uncture) <1@@1: 68, e%phasis added=( 3; Ceorge and +cHeown 1@B?(

1@ e'panding %y total nu%ber o! e%pirical obser"ations, this %ethod helps %e deter%ine whether <1= the se4uence o! e"ents and <3= perceptions o! 2ey actors support or in"alidate %y causal assertions( $ather than generating and testing %y hypotheses in totally discrete stages, engage in the sort o! interacti"e processing,)3? or constant %o"e%ent bac2 and !orth a%ong cases, 4uestions, and theories,)3A that is a hall%ar2 o! co%parati"e-historical analysis( n this way, ai% to de"elop the %ost re!ined and con"incing hypotheses possible !or !urther testing in other world areas( operationali.e %y 2ey "ariables as !ollows( Contentious class politics includes any !or% o! %ass unrest that signi!icantly disrupts the operations o! an econo%y, society, and political syste%( e'pect its causal i%pact to "ary along an ordinal scale, with urbanMco%%unal e'hibiting the greatest e!!ect on %y dependent "ariables, !ollowed by ruralMco%%unal, urbanMnon-co%%unal, and ruralMnon-co%%unal( $egional rebellions include any %o"e%ent that uses "iolence to pursue de%ands !or regional autono%y or outright separation, with %o"e%ents pursuing the latter being percei"ed as %ore threatening and challenging than those pursuing the !or%er( Discal power is %easured by the ratio o! direct ta'es to total ta'es, and by the ta'MCDP ratio( $uling parties are considered strongest when they %obili.e a broad %iddle-class %e%bership, establish party control o"er %ilitary institutions, do%inate the process o! %a2ing appoint%ents to the ci"il ser"ice, and pro%ote leaders !ro% within rather than recruiting elite !igures !ro% outside the party apparatus( Authoritarian durability is %easured by the year when authoritarianis% ends, not by total years o! non-de%ocratic rule(3E n e'plaining the origins and consolidation o! these political institutions, will be aided by case-selection that attains signi!icant "ariation on all three dependent "ariables, while controlling !or con!ounding geographical e!!ects by li%iting the study to one world region(3B ,o control !or other plausible e'planations, pri%arily e%ploy a %ost si%ilar with di!!erent outco%es)
3? 3A

+cHeown 1@@@( Pierson and S2ocpol 3883 3E t was %uch harder to sustain an authoritarian regi%e in the 1@B8s or 1@@8s than in the 1@?8s or 1@A8s( ,he durability o! the Suharto regi%e in ndonesia is thus best captured by the !act that it didn-t collapse until 1@@B, not the !act that it wasn-t !ounded until 1@AA( 3B /i1phart <1@E?= calls this the co%parable-cases strategy) !or drawing causal in!erence( 7e argues that the 2ey to this %ethod rests on reducing possible causal "ariables through care!ul selection o! cases, rather than o"erco%ing degrees-o!-!reedo% proble%s through the inclusion o! as %any cases as possible( 9here di!!er slightly with /i1phart is in his assertion that as a byproduct o! the search !or co%parable cases, the nu%ber o! cases to be analy.ed will actually al%ost always be decreased) <1@E?: 1A6=( n !act, controlling !or all plausible theoretical e'planations typically re4uires the analysis %ore than 1ust a s%all hand!ul o! cases( +y selection o! these se"en country cases was guided by a desire to !ind the %ini%u% nu%ber o! cases necessary to control !or all %a1or alternati"e e'planations, yet without "iolating basic precepts o! unit ho%ogeneity(

38 <+SDO= approach(3@ ,his is %ost clearly e'pressed in %y analysis o! state-building( +y cases are 4uite si%ilar on a wide range o! possible e'planations !or !iscal power, such as centrali.ed ta' bureaucracies and si%ilar ti%ing o! national independence and incorporation into the global econo%y( 9ith the e'ception o! Bur%a, all cases also e'hibited positi"e econo%ic growth rates, anti-co%%unist ideology, capitalist de"elop%ent approaches, and pro-9estern alliances during the %ain ti%e-period in 4uestion( +y case-selection also gi"es %e added le"erage on the 4uestion o! !iscal power through a %ost di!!erent with si%ilar outco%es) <+DSO= pairing: ,hailand and the Philippines( As seen in ,able 3, both o! these states e'perienced substantial di!!iculty in ta'ing upper groups a!ter 9orld 9ar , both be!ore and during bureaucratic-authoritarian rule( ,his con"ergence is surprising in that, not in!re4uently, they were seen as the two most di!!erent JcountriesK in Southeast Asia) by regional specialists( ,he contrasts were e"ident up into the 1@A8s in political institutions, political culture and political econo%y()68 ,hese two countries- subse4uent con"ergence in state outco%es, argue, is due to a speci!ic cross-case si%ilarity: >either con!ronted un%anageable contentious class politics during the interlude between *apanese de!eat and the establish%ent o! open-ended authoritarian rule( ,he wea2ness o! +ill-s %ethods o! si%ilarity and di!!erence, howe"er, is that di!!erent countries are rarely as si%ilar <or as star2ly di!!erent= on as wide o! a range o! potential causal "ariables as the %ethods re4uire( ,his is especially so in Southeast Asia, a region e'hibiting so %uch "ariation in both outco%es and potential causes that it is essentially i%penetrable to the sort o! deep analogy) research design that is especially popular in /atin A%erican studies(61 9hereas state outco%es in Southeast Asia !it the +SDO and +DSO logics rather well, the cases cannot pro"ide control !or all alternati"e e'planations( t is there!ore necessary to consider potential e'planations on which the cases are not si%ilar, but do not !it the posited theoretical relationship( A!ter conducting this e'ercise !or state-building, then do so !or party strength and authoritarian durability( Dinally, %o"e %y attention !ro% institutions to coalitions, addressing the shortco%ings o! e'isting e'planations !or elite collecti"e action as well( $i"al 0'planations
3@ 68

$agin 1@@A( 9ur!el 1@@@: 3( 0%phasis in original( 61 Dor a recent e'a%ple, see the co%parison o! Argentina and #ruguay in /Npe.-Al"es <3888=(

31 ,he ulti%ate test o! any research design is whether it allows a scholar to control !or alternati"e e'planations( ,his is the only way to instill con!idence in a s2eptical readership that the hypotheses o!!ered truly e'plain the outco%es o! interest( A "ariety o! alternati"e e'planations e'ist !or all three institutional outco%es o! interest here( +y case-selection allows %e to control !or these as !ollows(63 State a"acit! As 1ust discussed, the se"en cases under consideration here are generally 4uite si%ilar on a range o! possible e'planations !or !iscal power: i(e( capitalist de"elop%ent %odels, pro-9estern Cold 9ar alliances, positi"e growth rates, and centrali.ed rather than pro"incially based ta' collection( 0"en where these cases are not si%ilar, ri"al e'planations cannot pro"ide a better e'planation than %y own e%phasis on the causal centrality o! contentious politics( Antecedent 'nstitutions( Perhaps the %ost de"astating potential criti4ue o! %y hypotheses is that Southeast Asia-s intra-regional di"ergence in state power occurred be!ore rather than a!ter 9orld 9ar , when all o! the region e'cept ,hailand was still under colonial rule( 9hile ta' data !or Southeast Asia during the pre-1@;? period are spotty and inconsistent, it does not appear that British +alaya or Singapore had any appreciable edge on their neighbors be!ore the *apanese occupation( +alaya in particular was go"erned under a highly !rag%ented syste%, partly !ederated and partly un!ederated, which would see% to ha"e represented a serious obstacle to postwar centrali.ation( n !act, $ichard Stubbs, the pre-e%inent e'pert on post-colonial +alaysian state-building, has e'plicitly co%pared the !rag%entation o! political authority in +alaya be!ore 1@;B to the splintering o! power in the Philippines in the sa%e period(66 ! anything, the !act that ,hailand and the Philippines were already unitary rather than !ederal syste%s be!ore 9orld 9ar war period(6;

should ha"e gi"en each a head start on British +alaya in the post-

,o be clear at the outset, this e'ercise does not !alsi!y these alternati"e e'planations& it %erely highlights their insu!!iciency, at least in the Southeast Asian conte't( Since %a2e a probabilistic argu%ent regarding the causal signi!icance o! protection pacts, it would be dirty pool !or %e to hold these other hypotheses to a deter%inistic standard that do not %eet %ysel!( Dor an e'cellent discussion o! deter%inistic and probabilistic strategies o! causal assess%ent in s%all-n studies, see +ahoney 3888( 66 ,he go"ern%ental structure at the start o! the 0%ergency was relati"ely wea2( ,he "arious +alay states do%inated by regional elites, co%parable in so%e respects to the caci/ues o! the Philippines, had only been brought into a !ederal structure through the Dederation o! +alaya Agree%ent in 1@;B) <$ich and Stubbs 1@@E: 1;=( 6; 7utchcro!t <3888= argues that the contours o! the !rag%ented post-colonial Philippine state were !irst !or%ed during the !irst decade o! the twentieth century, under A%erican tutelage( !ully agree( But the pu..le !or the present analysis is why the co%%unist 7u2 rebellion in the Philippines <1@;@-?;= did not rema-e the Philippine

33 +ore i%portant e"idence o! the co%parability a%ong these cases- antecedent institutions deri"es !ro% the mix o! ta'es deployed be!ore the *apanese occupation( All depended o"erwhel%ingly on custo%s and consu%ption ta'es !or their ta' re"enues, rather than direct inco%e or corporate ta'es( n !act, %ost tellingly o! all, British +alaya and Singapore were the only e'a%ples a%ong these cases not to ha"e had direct inco%e and corporate ta'es in place when *apan con4uered the region in 1@;3( ,his strongly suggests that whate"er !actors e'plain +alaysia and Singapore-s 4ualitati"e di"ergence !ro% their neighbors in ter%s o! !iscal power, they appear to ha"e been operati"e in the i%%ediate postwar period( ndeed, according to #nited >ations data o! the ti%e, direct ta' collections in British +alaya rose !ro% so%ewhere between 1-3O o! total ta' re"enue in 1@;E to le"els ranging !ro% around 1?-38O throughout the 1@?8s( Singapore-s direct ta' collections si%ilarly leaped !ro% under ?O in 1@;E to a range o! appro'i%ately 68-;8O in the subse4uent decade(6? And this re%ar2able 1u%p in !iscal power occurred during the ti%e o! the co%%unist-inspired +alayan 0%ergency, when "iolence was %ore intensi"e and protracted than in any other colonial territory in the decoloni.ation era()6A ,his does not %ean, howe"er, that antecedent conditions can si%ply be ignored( 9hile they do not o!!er any better e'planation !or the "ariation see2 to capture than %y own independent "ariable, they pro"ide essential bac2ground !or understanding that independent variable itsel!: elite perceptions o! the %anageability o! contentious class politics a!ter 9orld 9ar ( n the chapters that !ollow, ai% to show that historical !actors uni4ue to each case %ay a!!ect the outco%es o! interest, but only indirectly, through the %echanis% o! the causal process speci!y( 0eadership and Agency( Be!ore considering how %y e'planation !or state power stac2s up against the range o! structural e'planations in the literature, it is !irst necessary to address a nonstructural e'planation: "i.(, the potential causal in!luence o! leadership in o"erco%ing structural obstacles to state !or%ation( 7istory boo2s are replete with Creat +an) theories e'ploring the role o! power!ul, a%bitious, and charis%atic personalities li2e Peter the Creat, >apoleon Bonaparte, +usta!a He%al, and Por!irio Dia. in crushing internal ri"als and state power( n Southeast Asia itsel!, historiography o!ten turns to hagiography when considering !igures such as Singapore-s /ee Huan :ew, +alaysia-s +ahathir +oha%ad, and ,hailand-s
state in the sa%e way that Stubbs argues the 0%ergency period in +alaya <1@;B-A8= re%ade the +alayan state( 6? #nited >ations, "arious years( 6A 9hite 1@@A: @E(

36 %onarchs, +ong2ut and Chulalong2orn( By contrast, the !ailure o! Derdinand +arcos to build a stronger Philippine state is co%%only attributed to the greed and sultanistic) tendencies o! his con1ugal dictatorship) with his notorious wi!e, %elda( a% not so %uch o! a structural deter%inist as to assu%e that such personalities %a2e no di!!erence whatsoe"er( $uler agency is al%ost entirely ignored in this analysis, not because wise leadership is unnecessary, but because it is grossly insu!!icient to account !or "ariation in state per!or%ance( ndeed, in no instance ha"e !ound a highly capable leader o"erco%ing the sort o! structural constraints that highlight here( +ost notably, the Philippines- highly charis%atic and widely ad%ired de!ense secretary and president, $a%on +agsaysay, was stonewalled in his e!!ort to re%a2e the Philippine state in the 1@?8s( +eanwhile, +alaysia-s %ain bouts o! statebuilding long preceded the ascent o! the country-s %ost !orce!ul leader, +ahathir +oha%ad( /ee Huan :ew played his hand well, but he was also dealt so%e "ery good cards, in the !or% o! strong elite support !or a %ore authoritarian and statist dispensation a!ter race riots roc2ed the island in 1@A;( n su%, inco%petent leadership %ight always %a2e state-building i%possible& but history is too littered with e'a%ples o! highly co%petent and co%%itted leaders !ailing to achie"e their ob1ecti"es to belie"e that charis%a and chut.pah are all it ta2es( 0evel o! 1evelopment( ! the di"ergence in state capacity between +alaysia, Singapore, and their neighbors cannot be attributed to the 4uality o! national leadership, or to antecedent institutions, %ight the e'planation lie in these countries- greater le"el o! econo%ic de"elop%entF ,o be sure, +alaysia and Singapore are the richest countries in Southeast Asia, sa"e Brunei, which gi"es the% an edge in collecting inco%e and corporate ta'es( But endogeneity co%plicates this argu%ent, since high public sa"ings represent a co%%on cause as well as a potential e!!ect o! econo%ic growth(6E Another di!!iculty with this e'planation is that it rests on what Cuiller%o O-Donnell calls a co%parison o! national %eans) rather than a -cross-center- strategy o! co%parison()6B n other words, all o! the countries being analy.ed here contain signi!icant urban concentrations o! wealth that could potentially be ta'ed by state authorities( ,he !act that Philippine and ndonesian peasants are poorer than +alaysian peasants has little or no in!luence on the stri2ing "ariation in these countries- !iscal power, since +alaysian peasants are not the indi"iduals paying the bul2 o! inco%e ta'es( n !act, i! any country in Southeast Asia was too i%po"erished to sustain any
6E 6B

Hriec2haus 3883( O-Donnell 1@E6: 3?-3A(

3; increase in do%estic ta'ation during the period under analysis, it was ndonesia in the wa2e o! Su2arno-s !all !ro% power in 1@AA( :et Suharto-s >ew Order regi%e see%s to ha"e dra%atically stepped up do%estic collection o! re"enues in these %ost unpro%ising circu%stances6@ 5 suggesting that any other country under consideration here possessed su!!icient national wealth, i! not the institutional capacity or political will, to ha"e done li2ewise( 2xternal &hreat( As discuss at length in the ne't chapter, it would not be theoretically surprising i! +alaysia and Singapore de"eloped increased !iscal power in response to e'ternal threat rather than do%estic con!lict( ,his e'planation see%s highly plausible in post-1@A? Singapore, suggesting that the city-state-s re%ar2able state capacity since gaining independence is causally o"erdeter%ined( 7owe"er, e'ternal threat cannot e'plain why colonial authorities in Singapore were so success!ul at collecting inco%e ta'es and i%ple%enting !orced sa"ings sche%es <to which corporate elites were re4uired to contribute= as early as the late 1@;8s and early 1@?8s, %ore than a decade be!ore Singapore was !orced to !ace an uncertain geopolitical en"iron%ent on its own( State-building in Singapore in the pre-1@A? era was dri"en by internal, not e'ternal con!lict(;8 ,he historical e'periences o! +alaysia and South Iietna% call the necessity o! e'ternal threat into 4uestion e"en !urther( Saigon ob"iously !aced !ar %ore se"ere e'ternal con!lict than any other case under consideration here, yet the state was 4uite slow to respond in !iscal ter%s(;1 And the absence o! any signi!icant e'ternal threat to +alaysia throughout its post-independence history suggests that state-building can ta2e place in a setting o! geopolitical cal%, so long as internal con!lict presses societal elites to pay a higher price !or their co%%on protection(;3 2xternal 3evenues( ! e'ternal threat is considered the ulti%ate instigator o! increased ta' e!!ort, bounti!ul sources o! !oreign e'change are e'pected to be the ulti%ate suppressor o! do%estic e'traction( Con"ersely, states lac2ing access to !oreign aid and co%%odity re"enues are widely e'pected to collect ta'es with considerable "igor( n this respect, it is proble%atic !or
6@ ;8

S%ith 3883& Harl 1@@E( ,o put it another way, internal con!lict in Singapore in the 1@;8s ga"e the city-state the ad%inistrati"e capacity to cope with e'ternal threat a!ter 1@A?( ,his "iew is consistent with argu%ents by Centeno <3883= and Hohli <1@@@= that e'ternal threats only induce state-building when signi!icant institutional capacity is already in place( ;1 Dacy 1@BA( ;3 +alaysia did !ace %ilitary attac2 !ro% ndonesia during the 4on!rontasi o! 1@A6-A?, but the operation was inept, and +alaysia retained the !ull support o! the diplo%atic co%%unity throughout the crisis( +ore i%portantly !ro% an e"identiary perspecti"e, the biggest bursts in +alaysian state-building too2 place during the %id-to-late 1@;8s and the late 1@A8s: periods o! intense do%estic stri!e, but geopolitical tran4uility( ,han2s to *a%ie Da"idson !or challenging %e on this point(

3? the argu%ent presented here that Singapore built its power!ul state under conditions o! resource scarcity and !ew opportunities to garner e'ternal rents( Once again, Singapore-s post-1@A? e'perience is o"erdeter%ined( :et the !iscal history o! post-colonial Southeast Asia suggests that highly contentious class politics can e"en lead states with access to a%ple e'ternal re"enues to step up direct ta'ation( ,his is not what e'pected to !ind when began this study, howe"er( Ci"en the pronounced e%phasis on e'ternal re"enues in the rentier state) literature, assu%ed such re"enues would act as a %a1or suppressor "ariable, reducing the i%pact o! contentious class politics on ta' collections( 9ith the potential, partial e'ception o! ndonesia a!ter its oil boo%, howe"er, did not !ind e"idence !or any noticeable suppression e!!ect( Co%%odity-rich +alaysia is the best e'a%ple( 0"en during the Horean 9ar co%%odity boo% o! the early 1@?8s, British +alaya-s direct ta' collections s2yroc2eted(;6 ndonesia-s burst o! increased ta'ation between 1@AA and the oil boo% o! the %id-1@E8s is si%ilarly noteworthy, gi"en ndonesia-s access to considerable !oreign aid during this period( Although %any obser"ers thin2 ta' institutions !altered in ndonesia a!ter the %id-1@E8s due to a rentier state) logic, others consider the country the clearest e'ception to the rentier rule in this regard( Proble%atic data %a2e it di!!icult to resol"e this contro"ersy de!initi"ely( But e"en i! ta' institutions did e'perience a drop in e'tracti"e per!or%ance !ro% the %id-1@E8s on, suggest that had as %uch i! not %ore to do with the declining se"erity o! do%estic threats !ro% below 5 and a subse4uently shrin2ing authoritarian coalition 5 than the oil boo% itsel!( 0"en in the Philippines, ta'ation increased noticeably, i! te%porarily, in the wa2e o! Derdinand +arcos- declaration o! %artial law a%id an upswing in le!tist %obili.ation( ,his spi2e in the Philippine state-s !iscal power surprisingly occurred in an era when e'ternal re"enues were especially abundant, gi"en the co%bined e!!ect o! a %assi"e ti%ber boo% and ballooning A%erican pay%ents !or the lease o! %ilitary bases( n su%, the in!luence o! e'ternal re"enues on direct ta'ation does not appear signi!icant enough to warrant its inclusion as either an independent or suppressor "ariable in this dissertation-s causal !ra%ewor2( (ritish )olonialism( Dinally, is it possible that +alaysia and Singapore de"eloped greater !iscal power than their neighbors because they were coloni.ed by Britain, while their neighbors were notF ,his argu%ent is i%%ediately called into 4uestion, i! not seriously i%pugned, by the

Stubbs 1@@E(

3A negati"e e'a%ple o! the other !or%er British colony in Southeast Asia: Bur%a( >or can British colonial legacies e'plain the spi2es in direct ta' collections witnessed during ti%es o! intensi!ying internal con!lict in ndonesia, the Philippines, and South Iietna%( +ore i%portantly, a 4uic2 glance outside the Southeast Asian conte't suggests that British colonial legacies are by no %eans associated with state strength in other areas o! the de"eloping world( Although a large cross-sectional analysis would be necessary to assess this issue de!initi"ely, the dread!ul per!or%ance o! states in countries ranging !ro% Pa2istan and Bangladesh to >igeria and Sierra /eone does not pro"ide %uch con!idence that the British 0%pire had a +idas touch where state-building was concerned( ndeed, Bur%a-s bro2en-bac2ed state);; appears %ore si%ilar to central authorities in %ost !or%er British colonies than the highly capable state apparatuses in +alaysia and Singapore( Colonial legacies thus appear in no way to predestine any particular pattern o! post-colonial state power(;? A %ore nuanced argu%ent %ight hold that +alaysia and Singapore bene!ited !ro% the duration o! colonialis% rather than (ritish colonialis%( And indeed, these were the only two colonies under analysis here to gain independence through a %anaged, gradual transition rather than through anti-colonial war or an i%%ediate post-war hando"er o! so"ereignty(;A would not suggest that this !actor is irrele"ant( :et it raises the 4uestion hy the British %anaged the transition so care!ully, and %ade e!!orts to install state capacity in ways 4uite unli2e other cases o! %anaged transition, such as all o! British A!rica( On this point, would sub%it that Britain-s distincti"e i%perial approach to +alaysia and Singapore was not idiosyncratic, but rather was deeply in!luenced by precisely the independent "ariable speci!ied here: highly intense urban class con!lict with e'plosi"e co%%unal i%plications(;E American 'ntervention( #(S( inter"ention ob"iously had a pro!ound e!!ect on Southeast Asia throughout the Cold 9ar period, with the Iietna% 9ar ser"ing as only the %ost dra%atic and de"astating e'a%ple( +ight it there!ore be the case that A%erican inter"ention shaped statebuilding outco%es %ore pro!oundly than "ariation in the type and ti%ing o! contentious politicsF
;; ;?

H( *ac2son 1@B?: 38( ,he one possible e'ception to this rule is long-ter% *apanese occupation, which Hohli <1@@@= associates with highly capable central states in Horea and ,aiwan( ;A 9hile the Philippines- gaining o! independence a!ter 9orld 9ar was al%ost i%%ediate, there, too, the departing colonial power %anaged the transition o"er a %atter o! decades( ,han2s to Paul 7utchcro!t !or drawing this parallel( ;E ntense class con!lict was e'tre%ely rare during A!rica-s decoloni.ation process <than2s to >icholas Ian de 9alle !or directing %e to this point=& perhaps this has in!luenced state-building in the region as pro!oundly as the %ore co%%only recogni.ed absence o! cross-border con!lict(

3E ,o assess the "alidity o! this alternati"e hypothesis, it is !irst necessary to speci!y in which direction A%erican inter"ention is presu%ed to ha"e had its causal e!!ect( ,here see% to be two basic possibilities( On the one hand, #(S( aid and assistance %ight ha"e i%pro"ed Southeast Asian states- ad%inistrati"e capacity to go"ern their populations and, %ore speci!ically, to collect direct ta'es in a%ounts( 9e %ight call this the enhance%ent hypothesis() On the other hand, A%erican assistance %ight ha"e da%pened Southeast Asian states- need to collect re"enue internally by pro"iding the% with a reliable alternati"e re"enue strea%( 9e %ight call this the suppression hypothesis() At !irst blush, the historical record pro"ides !ar %ore support !or the suppression hypothesis( ,he three states where the #nited States pro"ided the %ost signi!icant econo%ic and %ilitary assistance 5 the Philippines, South Iietna%, and ,hailand 5 all wound up as cases o! relati"e !iscal incapacity( By contrast, #(S( inter"ention in +alaysia and Singapore was close to non-e'istent during the Cold 9ar, and these are Southeast Asia-s two %ost i%pressi"e ta' states( Ci"en this broad correlation between A%erican inter"ention and state wea2ness at ta' collection, the enhance%ent hypothesis recei"es little initial e%pirical support( But what about the suppression hypothesisF ,here are se"eral reasons why belie"e the suppression hypothesis !ails to outper!or% %y own hypothesis centering on contentious politics( Dirst, the case o! Bur%a clearly de!ies the general correlati"e pattern 5 A%erican assistance was nil, and state !iscal capacity re%ained %oribund( A second, bigger wea2ness o! the suppression hypothesis is that it !ails to e'plain why American inter"ention see%s to ha"e debilitated states in the Philippines, South Iietna%, and ,hailand, while (ritish inter"ention e"idently !orti!ied the state in +alaysia and Singapore( ,his suggests that it is not si%ply the presence or absence o! !oreign inter"ention, but the character o! !oreign in"ol"e%ent, that see%s to help shape state-building outco%es( +y argu%ent is not there!ore that !oreign inter"ention was irrele"ant( $ather, it is that the character o! !oreign inter"ention itsel! was pro!oundly shaped by the types o! contentious politics that 9estern powers con!ronted on the ground in Southeast Asia( 9here contentious politics was widely percei"ed as ende%ic and un%anageable under e'isting political arrange%ents, !oreign inter"ention broadly ai%ed to strengthen central states, e"en at the e'pense o! power!ul societal elites( 9here contentious politics was %ore generally percei"ed as episodic and %anageable,

3B !oreign inter"ention did not in"ol"e sustained e!!orts to increase state e'traction, and thus wound up e'hibiting %ore o! a suppression e!!ect than an enhance%ent e!!ect( Critically, this pattern holds !or both A%erican and British inter"ention( ,o see how, we %ust go beyond the analysis o! no%inal "ariation across cases <i(e( +alaysia as a strong ta' state and the Philippines as a wea2 ta' state=, and conduct longitudinal analysis o! ordinal "ariation within the cases in 4uestion( Dor instance, A%erican inter"ention did help enhance the central Philippine state-s in!rastructural power in general and ta' capacity in particular when the rural 7u2 rebellion was at its .enith in the early 1@?8s& but these li%ited e!!orts dropped o!! altogether once the rebellion was %ore !ir%ly in control( On the opposite side o! the coin, British co%%it%ent to building state capacity in +alaysia actually ebbed and !lowed as the ad%inistrati"e challenges o! the le!tist threat wa'ed and waned( n su%, the logic o! !oreign inter"ention closely rese%bled that o! ho%egrown e!!orts at building state capacity( Only where contentious class politics a!!licted urban areas and e'acerbated co%%unal tensions did state elites en1oy lasting success at generating both internal cohesion and widespread elite ac4uiescence in their state-building e!!orts( Authoritarian #urabilit! ,he causal i%pact o! un%anageable class con!lict on !iscal power thus stands up relati"ely well in the !ace o! a wide array o! ri"al e'planations in the theoretical literature( Con!lict counts, e"en i! it is not necessarily all that counts( ,his leads us to the second %a1or causal argu%ent presented here: na%ely, that "ariation in contentious politics and subse4uent protection pacts best e'plains "ariation in authoritarian durability in Southeast Asia( 7ow does this !are as an e'planation in co%parison to the %ost pre"alent hypotheses in the de%ocrati.ation literatureF 2conomic 1evelopment( ,he correlation between de"elop%ent and de%ocracy is perhaps the %ost pored-o"er correlation in political science(;B :et it helps us little in e'plaining why so%e Southeast Asian countries ha"e de%ocrati.ed while others ha"e not( As discussed in the pre"ious section, +alaysia and Singapore ha"e the region-s two richest econo%ies, but they also ha"e two o! its e'ceedingly durable authoritarian regi%es( ,o understand why authoritarianis%

/ipset <1@?@= is the original state%ent on the socioecono%ic prere4uisites) !or de%ocracy( ,he %ain current debate centers on whether de"elop%ent enhances prospects !or de%ocracy e'ogenously) <"i.(, countries can de%ocrati.e at any le"el o! national inco%e, but rich de%ocracies ne"er brea2 down=, or endogenously) <"i.(, de"elop%ent itsel! %a2es de%ocratic transition %ore li2ely=( On e'ogenous de%ocrati.ation, see Pr.ewors2i and /i%ongi <1@@E=& on endogenous de%ocrati.ation, see Boi' and Sto2es <3886= and Boi' <3886=(

3@ has collapsed in relati"ely low-inco%e ndonesia and the Philippines but not in relati"ely highinco%e +alaysia and Singapore, we clearly %ust loo2 to other potential causal "ariables( 2conomic )risis( ,he !lip side o! the argu%ent that econo%ic success in authoritarian regi%es leads to de%ocrati.ation is that se"ere econo%ic crises can ha"e a si%ilar, albeit %ore sudden e!!ect( Singapore-s dual i%%unity to both econo%ic downturns and political unrest pro"ides e%pirical support !or this hypothesis, as does the !act that both ndonesia and the Philippines saw authoritarian rule collapse a%id horrible econo%ic ti%es( :et ,hailand-s de%ocratic transitions in 1@E6 and 1@@3 did not occur against the bac2drop o! econo%ic troubles,;@ and authoritarian regi%es in Bur%a and +alaysia sur"i"ed the i%pact o! se"ere econo%ic crashes in 1@BB and 1@@B, respecti"ely( +y argu%ent here is not that econo%ic crisis does not %atter: $ather, argue that protection pacts can help sustain authoritarian rule during hard ti%es, when non-de%ocratic regi%es- capacity to pro"ide econo%ic growth co%es into serious 4uestion( 9hene"er pro"ision !ails, protection beco%es essential( Durther%ore, since the robustness o! protection pacts helps e'plain state !iscal power, it also helps e'plain why so%e countries are %ore i%%une to se"ere !iscal crises 5 or %ore nationally resilient when they occur 5 than others( +ost notably, +alaysia-s authoritarian regi%e en1oyed access to copious state sa"ings, accu%ulated o"er decades, when the !inancial crisis o! 1@@E-1@@B roc2ed Asian %ar2ets( ,he regi%e-s capacity to a"oid the !ate o! ndonesia-s Suharto regi%e ne't door was thus inti%ately connected to "ariation in the capacity o! the two countriesstate institutions( 1ominant 3eligion( 9hich religion is considered broadly inco%patible with de%ocratic "alues shi!ts on a regular basis( Dirst it was Catholicis%, then Con!ucianis%, now sla%( ,o wea2en any argu%ent that religion is doing the theoretical wor2, rather than protection pacts, the e'a%ple o! ndonesia as the world-s largest +usli% country and one o! the world-s newest de%ocracies is a power!ul one( /oo2ing at "ariation within a single case, the !act that prode%ocracy acti"ists in +alaysia during the regi%e crisis o! 1@@B were o"erwhel%ingly +usli% lends !urther credence to the argu%ent that religion alone cannot e'plain the "ariation in 4uestion( Ad%ittedly, Con!ucianis% and de%ocracy do not %i' anywhere in Southeast Asia& but the e'a%ples o! sturdy de%ocracy in *apan, Horea, and ,aiwan, as well as the "igor o! recent


7aggard and Hau!%an <1@@?= indeed classi!y ,hailand as a non-crisis) case o! transition to de%ocracy(

68 pro-de%ocratic %o"e%ents in 7ong Hong, suggest that Con!ucianis% and de%ocracy can indeed go hand in hand( (ritish )olonialism( +yron 9einer-s !a%ous attribution o! post-colonial de%ocracy to Britain-s ostensibly liberal heritage !ares e"en worse than econo%ic de"elop%ent as an e'planation !or regi%e outco%es in Southeast Asia(?8 ,he three durable authoritarian regi%es under consideration here 5 +alaysia, Singapore, and Bur%a 5 were all once British colonies( ,he cases o! de%ocratic transition 5 ndonesia, the Philippines, and ,hailand 5 were all not( /egacies o! British rule thus !ail to pro"ide a con"incing e'planation !or authoritarian durability as well as !iscal power( Antecedent 'nstitutions( 0"en i! British colonialis% did not plant the seeds !or post-colonial de%ocracy, %ight other prewar institutions ha"e done soF ,he %ost plausible such clai% would be that the Philippines- de%ocratic procli"ities ha"e prewar rather than postwar origins, as A%erican colonialists introduced elections 4uite early in the twentieth century( :et the only other Southeast Asian country to ha"e e'perienced recurrent prewar elections was Bur%a, suggesting that such se%i-de%ocratic colonial institutions are by no %eans su!!icient to e'plain post-colonial de%ocrati.ation( And since newly de%ocratic ndonesia has no such colonial electoral legacy, prewar electoral institutions do not see% to be a necessary condition !or authoritarian brea2down either(?1 0abor+3epressive 0andlords( Classic studies o! de%ocrati.ation in 0urope and /atin A%erica broadly concur on which social !orce has historically posed the %ost stubborn social obstacle to popular so"ereignty: large landlords who depend on cheap or bonded rural labor(?3 :et none o! Southeast Asia-s %ost i%pressi"e cases o! authoritarian durability <Bur%a, +alaysia, and Singapore= ha"e highly concentrated landholding patterns& and the region-s ulti%ate e'a%ple o! a hacienda-style rural political econo%y, the Philippines, has spent !ewer years under authoritarian rule than any other Southeast Asian country( 3ural 'ncorporation( +ight other aspects o! rural politics ha"e shaped Southeast Asian regi%es, i! not labor-repressi"e landlordsF n a !ascinating new contribution, Da"id 9aldner

9einer <1@BE=( $eusche%eyer, Stephens, and Stephens <1@@3= attribute this correlation to Britain-s relati"ely tepid support !or labor-repressi"e landed elites, in co%parison to other colonial powers( ?1 ,hailand held only one election be!ore 9orld 9ar , with e'tre%ely li%ited su!!rage and %iniscule turnout( t thus does not appear to lend %uch support to the i%portance o! antecedent electoralis%( ?3 See, especially, +oore <1@AA= and $eusche%eyer, Stephens, and Stephens <1@@3=( n his superb sur"ey o! the Barrington +oore research tradition,) +ahoney <3881= shows that this hypothesis has withstood the test o! ti%e and co%parati"e analysis better than any other in +oore-s classic wor2(

61 argues that regi%e durability 5 both authoritarian and de%ocratic 5 rests upon the e!!ecti"e incorporation o! rural %iddle classes into the ruling coalition( ,his can ta2e a "ariety o! !or%s& but the 2ey consideration is whether the state %anages to deli"er side-pay%ents to supporters in the countryside, hence buying their long-ter% political loyalty( 9aldner-s thesis !its Southeast Asian e"idence relati"ely well( Authoritarian regi%es in +alaysia and ndonesia clearly channeled %ore state spending into rural areas than their counterparts in ,hailand and the Philippines, and they ha"e indeed pro"en %ore durable( :et this capacity to co-opt the countryside with generous policies rested upon strong state and party institutions, which are precisely the central !ocus here(?6 Durther%ore, while rural incorporation %ight help e'plain a regi%e-s long-ter% structural stability, it tells us little about the causal %echanis%s through which such regi%es actually brea2 down 5 as 9aldner hi%sel! ac2nowledges( Since authoritarianis% in Southeast Asia has uni"ersally been !elled by %ass urban %obili.ation rather than any steep decline in rural support, we see% to gain greater analytic purchase on de%ocrati.ation in the region by studying coalitional politics in cities than in the countryside( Authoritarian 'nstitutions( ,he %ost con"incing alternati"e line o! argu%ent holds that %ilitary regi%es are %ore "ulnerable to de%ocratic transition than single-party regi%es(?; ,his hypothesis !ares 4uite well in the Southeast Asian conte't, where all three cases o! de%ocratic transition occurred in %ilitary-bac2ed regi%es: ndonesia, the Philippines, and ,hailand( +eanwhile, party-bac2ed regi%es in +alaysia and Singapore <as well as /aos and Iietna%= %aintain their stranglehold on political hege%ony( 7ow can an analysis o! contentious politics and protection pacts i%pro"e our understanding o! these outco%es, gi"en the e'tre%ely i%pressi"e correlation between speci!ic authoritarian institutions and regi%e outco%esF +y response is two!old( Dirst, the case o! a highly durable %ilitary regi%e in Bur%a suggests the need to loo2 beyond institutions alone, to deter%ine how %ilitary regi%es can o"erco%e !rictions between pro!essional and political soldiers( Si%ilarly, the highly i%pressi"e durability o! ndonesia-s %ilitary-do%inant regi%e, which sur"i"ed until 1@@B, pro"ides !urther e"idence that parties are not the only institutions that can hold an authoritarian coalition together o"er a long period o! ti%e( ,o the contrary, will argue, 4uite counter-intuiti"ely, that Suharto

Dor an e'cellent analysis o! the i%portance o! state and party institutions in helping to deli"er the !ruits o! de"elop%ent to the rural sector 5 with +alaysia and ,hailand as the pri%ary cases 5 see Huhonta <3886=( ?; Ceddes 1@@@, Slater 3886(

63 %ight ha"e done his regi%e %ore har% than good by constructing a ruling party, because his regi%e lac2ed the necessary social and coalitional !oundations to order power) o"er ti%e( On the whole, %y e'planation is 4uite consistent with the general clai% that single-party regi%es syste%atically outlast both %ilitary and personali.ed regi%es( :et by o!!ering an e'planation !or why these %ilitary regi%es e'perienced the 2ind o! durability that is %ore co%%only associated with single-party regi%es, hope to show that authoritarian sur"i"al is not only about institutions per se, but coalitions and legacies o! contentious politics as well( +ore i%portantly, i! a% correct that new authoritarian regi%es are syste%atically %ore li2ely to construct robust parties i! they rise to power in the !ace o! %a1or threats !ro% below, this will help us understand where single-party regi%es co%e !ro% in the !irst place( Perhaps ,hailand and the Philippines re%ained %ilitary regi%es, ne"er elaborating party institutions to enhance social control, precisely because these regi%es needed no such institutions to bridle un%anageable contentious class politics( And with no threat !ro% below to te%per elite !actionalis%, constructing parties would ha"e been %ore li2ely to e'acerbate these regi%escoalitional wea2nesses than sol"e the%( By the sa%e to2en, it see%s reasonable to suggest that +alaysia and Singapore-s ruling parties ca%e to de"elop their e'tensi"e organi.ational tentacles precisely to pre"ent a recurrence o! the se"ere social and political instability o! the 1@;8s, 1@?8s, and 1@A8s( Ci"en societal elites- shared concerns with renewed %ass "iolence in those settings, they %ade easy pic2ings !or authoritarian rulers trying to co-opt all potential elite ri"als into national party apparatuses(

66 Part! Strength 7ow does this e'planation !or ruling party strength in authoritarian settings 5 as 1ust elaborated 5 co%pare with e'isting argu%ents in the theoretical literatureF #n!ortunately, we 2now %uch less about party !or%ation than state !or%ation& and while theorists ha"e long recogni.ed the role o! ruling parties in sustaining authoritarian rule, scholars are only beginning to thin2 rigorously about why so %any authoritarian regi%es !ail to de"elop robust ruling parties at all( ndeed, the two %ain e'planations !or party strength in post-colonial settings apply to de%ocratic as well as authoritarian conte'ts 5 suggesting the potential need !or %ore o! how authoritarian party !or%ation %ight syste%atically di!!er !ro% such dyna%ics in de%ocratic settings( 3evolutionary #truggle( >o scholar has thought %ore deeply about the role o! political parties in ordering ,hird 9orld politics than Sa%uel 7untington& and no scholar has pro"ided a %ore concise hypothesis !or why such parties "ary so greatly in their robustness( Put si%ply, the harder a party is !orced to struggle to sei.e power, the stronger the party will be a!ter doing so( One party syste%s which e%erge out o! re"olutions,) 7untington concludes, are %ore stable than those produced by nationalist %o"e%ents, and those produced by prolonged nationalist %o"e%ents are %ore stable than those produced by %o"e%ents whose struggle was brie! and easy()?? China-s Co%%unist Party and ndia-s Congress Party ser"e as consu%%ate e'a%ples on opposite sides o! the regi%e-type di"ide( ,his hypothesis wor2s rather well in apprehending %ost o! Southeast Asia-s cases o! wea2 ruling parties, but less well in e'plaining its stronger ones( ,hailand, the Philippines, and South Iietna% all e'hibited wea2 ruling parties during bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, and none o! these countries were led by anti-colonial elites, let alone re"olutionary elites, during this era( But neither did +alaysia and Singapore ha"e re"olutionary or e"en !iercely anti-colonial !igures !ronting their "anguard parties during the decoloni.ation process, when +alaysia-s #+>O and Singapore-s PAP arose and beca%e institutionali.ed( $ather, the strongest anti-British "oices in +alaysia and Singapore beca%e tarred by association with co%%unist insurgents, and were crushed be!ore independence was secured( Ci"en their borderline nationalist credentials, #+>O and the PAP gained and retained broad support, argue, pri%arily by de!ending ethnic interests rather than national interests 5 ethnic +alay interests in #+>O-s case, and ethnic Chinese interests in the case o! the PAP(

7untington 1@AB: ;3?(

6; ,hese co%%unal interests were not %erely challenged at the elite le"el, but threatened by disturbing patterns o! %ass %obili.ation by ethnic others( By contrast, nationalist parties leading i%%easurably %ore contentious anti-colonial struggles in Bur%a and ndonesia !ailed to institutionali.e the%sel"es su!!iciently to sur"i"e into those countries- bureaucratic-authoritarian periods( 9e %ust there!ore loo2 beyond re"olutionary nationalis% !or sources o! post-colonial ruling party strength in Southeast Asia( 2lectoral 3ules( Party strength is o!ten directly related to the o!!icial rules go"erning electoral co%petition( 0"en though electoral authoritarian) regi%es such as +alaysia and Singapore !all short o! the procedural %ini%u% de!inition o! de%ocracies, they do hold periodic elections that broadly accord to codi!ied, o!!icial guidelines( Can speci!ic institutional arrange%ents e'plain why these countries ha"e consolidated such stronger ruling parties than other countries in the region during their periods o! open-ended authoritarian ruleF Once again, +alaysia de!ies theoretical e'pectations %ost pro!oundly( 0lectoral rules there ha"e always been !ar %ore candidate-centered than party-centered: "oters choose indi"idual candidates rather than party labels, and candidates ser"e bounded geographic constituencies rather than being chosen !ro% a ran2ing on a national party list( ,hese are the sa%e basic rules that go"erned elections in ,hailand and the Philippines during the eras in 4uestion, when parties had precious little independent political i%portance, and electoral politics re"ol"ed around local bosses and their personal !ie!do%s( ,hat Singapore a"oided such a !ate despite candidatecentered electoral rules %ay si%ply be due to its purely urban geography 5 wiping out parochial !ie!do%s was there!ore easier to acco%plish( But the success o! the parties in +alaysia-s ruling coalition in establishing e!!ecti"e hierarchical control o"er their %e%bers, gi"en electoral rules !a"oring stronger direct ties !ro% parlia%entarians to "oters than to party leaders, is a serious theoretical pu..le( 5rganized 5pposition( n a "aluable update and re!ine%ent o! 7untington-s hypothesis that the se"erity o! struggle shapes party strength, Ben1a%in S%ith argues that new authoritarian regi%es will not construct power!ul ruling parties unless they con!ront highly organi.ed opposition %o"e%ents(?A ,he har%onies o! this argu%ent with %y own regarding the i%pact o! contentious class politics on party !or%ation should be sel!-e"ident( S%ith and agree that party?A

B( S%ith 3886, 3883( 7e adds that this e!!ect is strengthened whene"er new regi%es lac2 access to !le'ible !inances) such as aid and oil re"enues( ,his %ight help e'plain Singapore-s power!ul ruling party& but +alaysia and ndonesia each en1oyed relati"ely easy access to e'ternal re"enues during their pea2 periods o! party-building, by %ost %easures(

6? building is a ris2y and costly political e'ercise, in which new leaders %ust allow elite !igures outside their own inner circle to assu%e positions o! political authority( :et when opposition !orces are already well organi.ed, a new regi%e %ight be !orced to out-organi.e its opponents to consolidate political control( #nli2e S%ith, howe"er, draw a sharp analytic contrast between %ass opposition and elite opposition( 9hereas S%ith argues that the presence o! either a %ass-based or an elite-based opposition group is li2ely to press authoritarian leaders to construct a broad and e!!ecti"e ruling party, sub%it that only %ass opposition should ha"e this e!!ect( 9hen elite opposition to a new regi%e is strong, argue that the social and coalitional !oundations !or a strong ruling party are lac2ing( ,o build a ruling party under such conditions is to !oster elite collecti"e action in a conte't where elite support cannot be assured 5 in other words, to play with !ire( By contrast, when %ass opposition to a new regi%e is strong, elites will be %ore supporti"e o! the destruction o! de%ocratic institutions, and thus %ore li2ely to ser"e as reliable coalition partners( ,his plays out in our slightly di!!erent readings o! the ndonesian and Philippine cases( Dor S%ith, Suharto-s ndonesia e'hibited strong opposition and a strong ruling party, whereas +arcos- Philippines displayed a wea2 opposition and hence a wea2 ruling party( So long as opposition !orces are coded as strong or wea2 along a single di%ension, S%ith-s classi!ications %a2e sense( :et when one distinguishes between %ass and elite opposition, would sub%it that +arcos actually !aced %ore intense elite opposition than Suharto, while Suharto !aced %ore intense %ass opposition than +arcos( t was not %erely the o"erall wea2ness o! political opposition that led +arcos to eschew a %a1or party-building e!!ort, as S%ith argues, but the relati"e strength o! elite opposition( ,he "irtues o! distinguishing between %ass and elite opposition beco%e e"ident when considering the contrasting party outco%es in ndonesia and +alaysia( 0lite opposition to the i%position o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in ndonesia %ight ha"e been wea2er than in the Philippines, but it was %uch stronger than in +alaysia( ,here was thus too %uch residue o! elite opposition in ndonesia !or Suharto to pri"ilege new party institutions o"er old %ilitary institutions, which initially pro"ided a %ore reliable basis !or political support( +alaysian leaders built a %uch stronger coalition o! ruling parties because ende%ic !ears o! %ass co%%unal "iolence had uni!ied elite groups behind a strategy o! curtailing de%ocratic co%petition( Only when we draw a clear distinction between %ass and elite opposition can we see why ndonesia is

6A %ore o! an inter%ediate than a purely strong) case, and e'plain the wide range o! "ariation in party politics !ro% the Philippines to +alaysia( 1ecisive Factional %ictory( n another %a1or recent contribution to our understanding o! party origins, *ason Brownlee has argued that strong parties arise !ro% the decisi"e "ictory o! one elite !action o"er all others during the initial !or%ation o! an authoritarian regi%e(?E 0gypt and +alaysia are his positi"e cases( By contrast, where authoritarian onset witnesses the co%pro%ise and incorporation o! co%peting elite !actions 5 as in ran and the Philippines 5 parties will be less cohesi"e and %ore prone to splits o"er ti%e( Brownlee-s argu%ent echoes %y own e%phasis on the obstacles that !actionalis% presents to party strength, as well as the i%portance o! party origins in in!luencing subse4uent institutional robustness( try to %o"e beyond the elite le"el, howe"er, by speci!ying the broader social conditions 5 speci!ically, challenging and threatening !or%s o! %ass %obili.ation 5 that %ight lead elites to o"erco%e !actional !rictions in the !irst place( Durther%ore, would sub%it that success!ul party-building in cases such as +alaysia e'e%pli!ies not so %uch the decisi"e "ictory o! %ono-!actionalis% o"er %ulti-!actionalis%, as Brownlee portrays it( $ather, we see the decisi"e de!eat o! !actionalism rit large, as the broad interests o! the party-as-institution co%e to supersede the narrower interests o! particular !actions( Dactionalis% is not transcended because particular party-builders are notably sel!less or "isionary, but because ende%ic pressures !ro% below present power!ul incenti"es to set aside parochial !actional interests in !a"or o! broader class interests(?B Elite ollecti1e Action 0'isting theory thus does not see% to pro"ide %ore con"incing e'planations !or "ariation in party, state, and regi%e institutions in Southeast Asia than %y own argu%ent contentious politics( But what about alternati"e hypotheses !or elite collecti"e action, which depict as the social !oundation o! all three o! these distinct political institutionsF As noted in the opening o! this chapter, there are three broad perspecti"es on how elite collecti"e action can be generated 5 but all three !ace li%itations in e'plaining coalitional di"ergence in Southeast Asia( 2xternal &hreat( ha"e already shown in %y discussion o! state-building that e'ternal threats and international wars ha"e had li%ited e!!ect on Southeast Asia-s political institutions(
?E ?B

Brownlee 388?( Dor a parallel argu%ent in /atin A%erica, especially Chile, see Drieden <1@@1=(

6E #nli2e 0urope and /atin A%erica, but 4uite si%ilar to sub-Saharan A!rica, Southeast Asia was characteri.ed by international consensus on borders and boundaries during 2ey processes o! state !or%ation(?@ ,he region-s e'perience thus does not show that international wars do not !oster elite collecti"e action in any general sense& it only shows that e'ternal con!lict cannot e'plain the dra%atic "ariation in elite collecti"e action within Southeast Asia itsel!( As will argue in greater detail in the ne't chapter, see contentious politics as %ore o! a !unctional e/uivalent !or e'ternal threat than a ri"al hypothesis( 9ar has indeed helped %a2e the state in %any conte'ts, precisely by !ostering elite collecti"e action a%ong state o!!icials, and by pressuring societal elites to collecti"ely co%ply with state de%ands( 9hat Southeast Asia shows is that contentious politics can trigger a si%ilar political process, but only when it ta2es certain !or%s( n su%, argue that either e'ternal threat or internal con!lict is a necessary condition !or elite collecti"e action, and hence !or i%pressi"e state capacity, party cohesion, and authoritarian durability as well( Nationalist #entiment( One o! the causal %echanis%s through which e'ternal threat is presu%ed to !oster elite collecti"e action is "ia the strengthening o! nationalis%( 0'ternal con!licts are clearly %ore liable than internal con!licts to !oster nationalist attach%ents& hence, %ost theorists o! war and the nation-state ha"e concluded that while e'ternal wars bring national elites together, internal con!licts tear a country-s elites apart( +y argu%ent that purely do%estic !or%s o! contentious politics can !oster elite collecti"e action thus stands as a direct challenge to this broad consensus( 9idespread s2epticis% that internal stri!e can pa"e the way !or greater elite collecti"e action arises !or a si%ple reason: +ost internal con!licts are elite con!licts( t is rare that %ass %obili.ation can be generated without so%e sort o! elite sponsorship( Contentious %ass politics thus typically ser"es as notice that elites are not getting along, and are using %ass allies to ta2e their battles to the streets(A8 :et this is not uni"ersally the case( As Southeast Asia-s e'perience shows, %ass politics can also e%erge when elite control is disrupted by %a1or political e"ents( Speci!ically, *apan-s rout o! 9estern colonial powers during its in"asion o! Southeast Asia crushed the region-s colonial states, upsetting e'isting arrange%ents o! social control( 9hile *apan ruled the region with incredible brutality, occupation !orces were hardly obsessed with ad%inistrati"e e!!iciency(
?@ A8

7erbst 3888( See 9aldner <1@@@= !or an especially strong state%ent o! this perspecti"e(

6B Durther%ore, displaced colonial powers poured aid and %ateriel to anti-*apanese rebel groups throughout the occupation 5 creating the %onster o! %ass politics that they had 2ept %ostly under loc2 and 2ey during the prewar period( 9hen *apanese rule suddenly collapsed in August 1@;?, returning colonialists were !orced to con!ront entirely new patterns o! %ass %obili.ation that they could not co%pletely control( :et these %ass %o"e%ents that arose during the *apanese occupation "aried in critical ways( So%e had the capacity to penetrate the urban sphere, while others were relegated to the countryside( So%e had re"olutionary intent, while others were %ore re!or%ist, and thus easier to %anage( Dinally, so%e o! these %ass %o"e%ents e'acerbated ethnic and religious tensions in the process o! new %ass organi.ations, while others only presented a threat in class, not co%%unal ter%s( 0lite collecti"e action was strongest in response where contentious politics had an urban i%pact, e'pressed re"olutionary ideology, and worsened inter-co%%unal tensions( ,his has surprising and highly counter-intuiti"e i%plications !or the relationship between nationalis% and the state( n countries where prewar nation-building had been %ost e!!ecti"e, such as ,hailand and the Philippines, le!tist unrest posed little i! any threat to o"erturn the political order in ter%s o! ethnicity and religion( 0lites thus re%ained highly !actionali.ed, and saw little i%perati"e to act collecti"ely, despite their shared sense o! nationalis%( #tates remained ea- here nations ere relatively strong( Only where prewar nation-building had !ailed to create any strong sense o! national identity, as in +alaysia and Singapore, did co%%unist insurgents literally put the !ear o! Cod into state and societal elites( Paying higher ta'es to a central authority that could 4uell such !orces was a s%all price to pay indeed( Strong states and i%pressi"e le"els o! elite collecti"e action thus e%erged out o! wea2 nations 5 precisely the opposite o! recei"ed wisdo%( 2conomic (ene!its( n his classic treatise, +ancur Olson suggested that selecti"e bene!its) were essential !or inducing collecti"e action( #nless %e%bership <or co%pliance= con!ers pri"ileges that are denied non-%e%bers, why 1oin <or co%ply=F ,his would suggest that +alaysian and Singaporean elites ha"e consistently pro"en %ore willing than ,hai or Philippine elites to cooperate with each other, and to co%ply with state co%%ands, because such cooperation and collecti"e co%pliance ha"e been %ore a%ply rewarded( n short, has ordering power) in Southeast Asia depended on e!!ecti"e state provision rather than e!!ecti"e state protectionF

6@ One %a1or concern ha"e with this argu%ent is that it is too pro'i%ate to the institutional outco%es o! interest to be substanti"ely enlightening( t is certainly true that regi%es are %ore unstable, ceteris paribus, when they !ail to pro"ide patronage to elite coalition partners( But why do so%e regi%es !ail to %obili.e the re"enue necessary to 2eep patronage !lowing, or !ail to organi.e supporters into institutions that %a2e the deli"ery o! patronage %ore predictable and syste%aticF Ade4uately answering such 4uestions re4uires attention to long-ter% processes o! state-building and party consolidation, not 1ust short-ter% patterns o! econo%ic crisis, elite de!ection, and regi%e brea2down( n other words, we %ust consider how political leaders succeed or !ail at ordering power) in the !irst place( And on this point, would argue that patronage is a relati"ely ine!!ecti"e tool with which to cra!t a reliable elite coalition( As argue at %ore length in the ne't chapter, patronage has two %ain drawbac2s "is-P-"is protection: <1= it is di"isible, inso!ar as gi"ing contracts and concessions to one !igure or !action %eans denying it to others& and <3= it has relati"ely little e!!ect on urban %iddle classes, whose cooperation is "ital !or regi%e stability, yet who are e'tre%ely di!!icult to target with selecti"e bene!its() $egi%es that rest entirely on patronage thus tend to su!!er chronic opposition at the geographic heart o! their rule, especially !ro% econo%ic elites and %iddle classes le!t out o! the patronage networ2( Such patronage-dependent regi%es also tend to ha"e wea2er political parties, because the costs o! buying such a broad base o! support with patronage alone are prohibiti"e( ,hailand and the Philippines pro"ide e'cellent e'a%ples, as we will see in later chapters( And i! econo%ic elites only as2 what their go"ern%ent can do !or the%, and not what they can do !or their go"ern%ent, state authorities will not be able to raise su!!icient re"enue to 2eep such a ra"enous business class satis!ied o"er ti%e( n short, new authoritarian regi%es will only build strong state and party institutions in the !irst place i! their legiti%acy rests %ore on protection than pro"ision( 7owe"er, it is precisely these institutions that 2eep the pipelines o! patronage !lowing s%oothly o"er ti%e, pro"iding the ruling regi%e with the re%unerati"e power) that helps it sur"i"e( ,o su%%ari.e this discussion o! ri"al e'planations: Post-colonial states can gain the capacity to i%pose direct ta'es on elites, e"en when colonial legacies are un!a"orable, leaders lac2 charis%a, e'ternal threats are %ild, e'ternal re"enues are abundant, and econo%ic de"elop%ent is li%ited( Authoritarian regimes can e'hibit i%pressi"e durability, e"en when they undergo signi!icant econo%ic de"elop%ent, con!ront se"ere econo%ic crises, ha"e a non-+usli%

;8 %a1ority population, lac2 a labor-repressi"e landlord class, depend on %ilitary rather than party institutions, and e'hibit a British colonial heritage( ,hose regi%es can build highly e!!ecti"e and cohesi"e ruling parties, e"en when they did not !ace a protracted and contentious process o! decoloni.ation, and electoral rules !acilitate personali.ed, parochial politic2ing rather than party discipline( n broader ter%s, political leaders can generate i%pressi"e elite collective action in the absence o! e'ternal security threats, copious patronage !unds, and reser"oirs o! nationalist senti%ent( $ather, argue that the elite collecti"e action that is essential !or state capacity, party strength, and authoritarian durability can best be accounted !or by the robustness o! protection pacts, which are the%sel"es a !unction o! historical legacies o! contentious politics( III. The #issertation )rom =ere ,he !ollowing chapters see2 to establish the "alidity o! these argu%ents in se"en Southeast Asian countries( :et due to space and ti%e constraints, do not pay all se"en country-cases e4ual attention( nstead, sort these se"en countries into three sets, based on their o"erall signi!icance !or the dissertation-s theoretical !ra%ewor2( ,he two pri%ary cases) are +alaysia and the Philippines, the co%parison o! which constitutes the lion-s share o! the e%pirical chapters 5 three chapters apiece( ,he re%aining !i"e cases are di"ided into three congruent cases) <Singapore, South Iietna%, and ,hailand=, which largely duplicate the theoretical contributions o! the +alaysian or Philippine cases, and two inter%ediate cases) <Bur%a and ndonesia=, which present %ore %i'ed institutional pro!iles than the pri%ary and congruent cases( Be!ore switching gears to these e%pirical chapters, Chapter 3 concludes Part by situating %y argu%ents in rele"ant theoretical literatures on contentious politics, state-building, and authoritarian durability( t thereby ai%s to sharpen three separate theoretical hoo2s) o! this pro1ect( Dirst, show how %y argu%ent on contentious politics and !iscal power %ight shi!t e'isting scholarly consensus on international war!are being the right 2ind o! con!lict) !or building states( Second, %a2e the case that political scientists %ight bene!it !ro% renewing their apparently lapsed interest in political de"elop%ent, and !ro% treating state, party, and regi%e institutions as %ultiple re!lections o! a single pheno%enon 5 elite collecti"e action( Dinally, argue that the literature on social !orces in de%ocratic transitions has gi"en too %uch e%phasis to the role o! labor unions in o"erthrowing authoritarian rule, and to the i%portance o! econo%ic grie"ances in inspiring de%ocratic protest( 9e %ight better understand recent regi%e transitions

;1 by paying closer attention to co%%unal elites, and the e%otional appeals they use to %obili.e !ollowers against authoritarian incu%bents( Part e'a%ines the historical e"olution o! wea2 states, wea2 parties, and brittle authoritarian regi%es through the e%pirical lens o! the Philippines( Chapter 6 traces the postwar wea2ness o! the Philippine state to the %anageable character o! contentious politics between 1@;?-1@??, rather than the prewar A%erican colonial legacies that ha"e captured %ost scholarsattention( Chapter ; e'plores the upswing in urban unrest that preceded Derdinand +arcosi%position o! open-ended authoritarian rule in 1@E3, and argues that +arcos- apparent co%plicity in %uch o! the "iolence pre"ented hi% !ro% le"eraging the instability into broad elite support( Chapter ? shows that +arcos !aced considerable elite opposition !ro% the onset o! %artial law, denying hi% the necessary coalitional !oundations upon which to build stronger state and party institutions to buttress his dictatorship( 9ith only tepid and unorgani.ed support !ro% his !ellow elites, +arcos pro"ed unable either to 4uell cross-class de%ocratic %obili.ation, or to %aintain the cohesion o! his regi%e-s coerci"e apparatus during the political crisis o! 1@BA( Part shi!ts attention to +alaysia: a case o! ordered power) that stands in star2 contrast to the disordered power) witnessed in the Philippines( Chapter A shows that contentious class politics !ro% 1@;?-1@?E was considerably %ore urban in i%pact, re"olutionary in intent, and co%%unalist in e!!ect than conte%poraneous patterns o! contention in the Philippines( ,his ga"e British and +alayan elites a power!ul incenti"e to o"erco%e !actional di"isions and wor2 collecti"ely toward the establish%ent o! %uch stronger state and party institutions( Class and co%%unal tensions re%ained e'plosi"e throughout the era o! parlia%entary de%ocracy in the 1@A8s, cul%inating in the Huala /u%pur riots o! +ay 1@A@( Chapter E e'a%ines the close coupling o! electoral co%petition and ethnic con!lict between 1@?E-1@A@, which con"inced %ost +alaysian elites that a %ore authoritarian syste% was necessary to %aintain social and political order( Besides !ostering such anti-de%ocratic attitudes, un%anageable urban unrest be!ore the onset o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule in 1@A@ ga"e the political leadership considerable le"erage to build stronger state and party institutions in the early 1@E8s( Chapter B shows how these institutions ha"e consistently e'tracted econo%ic resources and organi.ed political support !or the ruling regi%e, pro"iding it with a preponderance o! power that helped it snu!! out de%ocratic %obili.ation with ease in 1@@B-1@@@(

;3 Part I concludes the dissertation with an assess%ent o! %y argu%ent-s broader applications and i%plications( Chapter @ pro"ides a cursory o"er"iew o! the political pathways tra"eled by this dissertation-s three congruent cases) <Singapore, South Iietna%, and ,hailand= and two inter%ediate cases) <Bur%a and ndonesia=( n brie!, Singapore roughly appro'i%ates +alaysia-s pattern o! intense class con!lict with urban i%pact and co%%unal i%plications be!ore the onset o! bureaucratic-authoritarian rule( As in +alaysia, robust state and party institutions and durable authoritarian rule ha"e been the result( South Iietna% rese%bles the Philippine pattern o! wea2 coalitions and wea2 political institutions arising !ro% the rural, non-co%%unal types o! con!lict that pre"ailed be!ore de%ocratic institutions were put on ice( ,he third and !inal congruent case, ,hailand, e'hibits si%ilar institutional wea2nesses to those o! the Philippines and South Iietna%, which attribute to the %uted nature o! class and co%%unal con!lict in ,hailand throughout the 1@;8s and 1@?8s( ,his le!t ,hai %ilitary regi%es with wea2 social !oundations upon which to underta2e signi!icant state or party !or%ation, %a2ing the% highly "ulnerable to urban anti-regi%e %obili.ation and authoritarian collapse in 1@E6 and 1@@3( Besides these three congruent cases, Chapter @ also endea"ors to trace the causal dyna%ics operating in the inter%ediate cases o! Bur%a and ndonesia( 0"idence !ro% Bur%a suggests that regional rebellions tend to build narrow elite coalitions and %ilitari.ed states( Subse4uent %ilitary cohesion can sustain authoritarian rule in the absence o! the sort o! robust state and party institutions that consolidated non-de%ocratic politics in +alaysia and Singapore( ndonesia-s era o! %ilitary rule was inaugurated with wider elite support than Bur%a-s, because the regional rebellions o! the late 1@?8s had been !ollowed by the co%%unist upsurge o! the early-%id 1@A8s, which brought a wide array o! state o!!icials, %iddle classes, and religious elites under the u%brella o! a %ilitary-do%inated protection pact( Party and state institutions were both signi!icantly strengthened( :et the protection pact that sustained these institutions was wea2ened o"er ti%e by the !ading shadow o! a le!tist insurgency that had been utterly destroyed when bureaucratic-authoritarian rule was born( +any o! the elite groups that initially supported Suharto-s >ew Order) in the %id-late 1@A8s thus ca%e to oppose it by the %id-late 1@@8s, bringing the regi%e crashing down a%id %assi"e urban protests in 1@@B( Chapter 18 concludes the dissertation by considering the study-s i%plications !or %a2ing public authority both e!!ecti"e and accountable 5 in other words, !or resol"ing +adison-s classic dile%%a( Although the cases considered here broadly suggest that state-building and

;6 de%ocrati.ation are di!!icult goals to reconcile, particular bits o! e"idence !ro% speci!ic Southeast Asian cases pro"ide %ore grounds !or opti%is%( Speci!ically, show that relati"ely co%petiti"e national elections ha"e at ti%es spurred state-building e!!orts in ndonesia, +alaysia, and the Philippines( ,hese causal dyna%ics were triggered when go"ern%ents percei"ed that the sta2es in such elections were especially high, in large %easure because radical %ass %obili.ation pro"ided the% with an urgent need !or a strong electoral %andate( 9hile not unco"ering any correlation between state-building and de%ocracy per se, these e'a%ples re"eal potential causal %echanis%s through which robust political co%petition %ight !oster state e!!ecti"eness in the post-colonial world(

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;E 9ur!el, Da"id( 1@@@( Con"ergence and Di"ergence A%idst De%ocrati.ation and 0cono%ic Crisis: ,hailand and the Philippines Co%pared() $hilippine $olitical #cience 7ournal 38:;6, pp( 1-;;(