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sophical Society, New Series) Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. Deshpande, Madhav M. 1975. Critical Studies in Indian Grammarians I: The theory of homogeneity [Sa ya]. Ann Arbor: Center for South and varn Southeast Asian Studies, The Univ. of Michigan. Thieme, Paul. 1985. The First Verse of the Tris ap 1.1 AV, P 1.6) and the Beginnings t yam (AV, S

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics of Sanskrit Linguistics. Journal of the American Oriental Society 105.559565. Varma, Siddheshwar. 1929. The Phonetic Observations of Indian Grammarians. London, 1929. (Indian Reprint Edition, Delhi. 1961.)

Madhav M. Deshpande, Ann Arbor (USA)

20. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition


1. Introduction 2. Buddhist Abhidharma and Sarva stiva da 3. Meditative experience as a source of relevant data 4. Perceptive knowledge and language hari on language and thought 5. Bhartr 6. Din na ga on perception and language hari 7. Other reactions on Bhartr ra d 8. M ana Mis sa ma m : Kuma rila and Man a 9. Nya t a and Gan ges ya: Jayanta Bhat 10. Analysis of knowledge derived from words or cognition based on language 11. Further research 12. Bibliography

1.

Introduction

According to a statement in the Upanis ads the one who knows the bliss of Brahman, from which words and mind revert without having reached it, does not fear anything (yato va co nivartante apra pya manasa saha a o vidva brahman nandam n na bibheti kutas cana Taittir ad 2.9). Like several ya Upanis other texts and passages in Vedic literature this statement shows that an intimate relation was accepted between language (words) and thought (mind). What is remarkable, however, is that it is here at the same time recognized that there is something beyond both language and thought, and even that it is possible to know this something the bliss of Brahman. The philosophical problems involved in this statement play a role in the linguistic and philosophical literature of the Sanskrit tradition throughout its long history. There are numerous problematic aspects to the relation between thought and language, for instance: How is language (spoken or written) perceived and understood? How is a message or idea encoded in language? What truth-claims can be upheld for knowl` -vis knowledge edge based on language (vis-a

based on, say, perception; cf. Matilal & Chakrabarti 1994)? What is the relation between language and the process of thinking in general, or of logical thought in particular (cf. Staal 1960 [1988: 5979])? A basic issue relevant to all these questions is: are thought, thinking, understanding always connected with language not just at the level of discursive thinking which seems clearly language-related, but also at the level of vaguer thoughts and ideas; or are there cognitive episodes which are entirely free from language? It is this basic issue which was of crucial importance in philosophical and linguistic discussions in the Sanskrit tradition. It is on this basic issue, already evoked by the cited Upanis adic statement, that the present article will focus. At the background of the problems of the relation between language and thought there is a larger problematic set of notions, namely language, thought and reality. Problems concerning language and thought and their relation are always inextricably bound up with ontological questions (what is real?), apart from linguistic and epistemological ones. Thus, in the statement cited above, it is presupposed that the bliss of Brahman is a reality even a knowable reality, and even a reality basic to the entire universe according to Brahminical belief although it cannot be grasped in language or thinking.

2.

Buddhist Abhidharma and Sarva stiva da: Language and thought, and the basic constituents of the universe

Some of the earliest traceable attempts at a systematic (rather than poetic or intuitive) treatment of the problem of language and thought are found in Buddhist Abhidharma-

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147 were dravyasat substantially existent. All other things (persons, chariots, huts, etc.), whatever their tenacity in daily discourse, are composite objects which are only prajn aptisat nominally or conceptually existing, and they persist on account of language (Williams 1980; Bronkhorst 1996).

texts, which start to be composed in ca. the 2nd century BCE, some two centuries after the death of Gautama, the Buddha (cf. Frauwallner 1995). The Abhidharma-texts started as lists of basic doctrinal elements (dharmas) in the Buddhas teaching, plus their explanations. Now, already at an early stage the followers of the Buddha, the fully awakened one, considered him to be all-knowing: cf. the Sutta Nipa ta, v. 1133: they call him Buddha, the Enlightened, [] with total vision, knowing the world to its ends (transl. Saddhatissa 1994: 131; on the passage cf. Vetter 1990). Hence, it is not strange that the basic elements in his teaching came to be looked upon as the basic elements of reality as well (cf. further Bronkhorst 1985). A sincere concern with the ontological question what is real? seems to have been common to Buddhist and Jaina thinkers, as well as to emerging Brahminical philosophies such as Sa khya and m es Vais ika (Frauwallner 1995: 146). The Abhidharma-authors answered this question with the above mentioned lists of basic elements. These included physical elements such as earth, water, fire and air, as well as mental elements such as faith, suffering, etc. Important discussions on the elements or dharmas we find in the Sarva stiva da school of Buddhism, the school according to which these dharmas exist in the past, present and future. In addition to the physical and mental elements, it was at an early stage felt necessary to accept a category of elements which are neither physical nor mental. This category of cittaviprayuktas, as they are called, contained elements such as birth, life, old age, and death; but sometimes we find here also elements with a bearing on language as an instrument of communication: na maka ya set of names, padaka ya set of phrases and vyan janaka ya set of syllables. According to some, among them Vasubandhu, author of a-Bha the important work Abhidharma-Kos s ya (4th or 5th century CE), these elements na maka ya etc. are merely configurations of speech or sound, and cannot be accepted in the list of basic elements in the universe. Counter-arguments to the view held by Vasubandhu and a defense of the inclusion of the signifying units among the basic elements were offered by Sam ghabhadra, a contemporary of Vasubandhu (Cox 1995: 160169). Whether or not these few problematic ones were accepted, the basic elements or dharmas were considered to be the only things that

3.

Meditative experience as a source of relevant data

The sources of relevant data accepted in discussions concerning language and thought include, as may be expected in traditions centered around sacred texts, authoritative statements from these texts and from their sacred authors and propounders. Together with this, simple introspection and logical reasoning play roles which may vary in relative importance with different schools of thought. In addition, there is a source which usually plays no role in modern or classical Western traditions of linguistics and philosophy of language: the meditative experiences of ascetics, monks, holy persons etc. Early comprehensive and well-argued discussions on this source of relevant data are again found with the Buddhists. Accounts of the Buddhas meditative experiences are important in the earliest layers of the Pali-canon (Vetter 1988). Usually, four stages are distinguished in the meditation (dhya na) of the Buddha. What interests us here most is that, according to a description by Vetter (1988: XXVIf.),
already at the second stage of dhya na, contemplation and reflection one could also say every form of discursive reasoning have disappeared; one is in a state of inner calm and oneness of heart.

While analysis of factors leading from states with thought (savica ra) to states without (avica ra) was of the highest relevance to practitioners trying to follow the Buddhas path, Buddhist thinkers also plunged into the numerous theoretical problems posed by the acceptance of these states. Thus, quite divergent theories were advanced to explain how thought arises again after the subject has been in a state without thought for some time. According to some, the new thought arises on account of the impressions of the last thought immediately preceding the state without thought; according to others it arises on account of corporeal factors; and according to still others thought is in fact not completely extinguished if someone is in a so-

148 called state without thought (Cox 1995: 119; cf. also Schmithausen 1987). Although these discussions do not focus on language, their relevance for, and inextricable connection with, the problem of the relation between language and thought is obvious. It is interesting to note that in some further reflections on his 1988 description of Buddhist meditation, Vetter (1991: 184f.) observed that, in order to account for the element of awareness (Bewutheit) which remains, one should allow for an implicit linguistic vision (Anschauung) even in the higher meditative states even though the early sources do not mention anything of the sort and emphasize only the absence of discursive thought. In the Brahminical Yoga and meditation tradition influenced by and intimately linked to the Buddhist tradition a distinction is maintained between a state with discursive thought (savitarka) and a state without discursive thought (nirvitarka), and also between a state with musing (savica ra) and a state without musing (nirvica ra). The difference between discursive thought and musing is that the former has gross objects and the latter more subtle ones (Yoga-Su tra 1.4244 and Bha ya on these). s The theoretical framework of Brahminical Yoga as we find it in Patan jalis Yoga-Su tra and especially in the so-called Vya ya sa-Bha s (4th century CE?) which comments on it, may be regarded as a form of Sa khya m which differs slightly from the classical doctrines of the Sa khya-Ka m rika (ca. 400 CE?). Sa khya is one of the six Brahminical m philosophical systems which are orthodox in the sense that they accept, at least nominally, the authority of the Veda. In its classical formulation, Sa khya m maintains a sharp distinction between (a) Purus a, soul or self, which is pure consciousness; and (b) a universal material matrix called Prakr ti. In the European tradition dualism stands for a philosophical position according to which all objects accessible to sense-perception, including the body, belong to the sphere of matter; and all thinking, feeling, and so on belong to the sphere of the spirit. Also Sa khya is dualistic, but it acm cepted quite a different dividing line between spirit and matter. Matter according to Sa m khya comprises not just the objects perceptible to the senses but also much of what a European (Cartesian) dualist would consider part of the thinking self or ghost in the ma-

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics

chine: the mental organ, the citta of Yoga, which corresponds to the buddhi intellect, aham ka ra ego-awareness, and manas mind of classical Sa khya. In other words, m with Descartes cogito ergo sum I think, therefore I am we would still be in the sphere of materiality from a Sa khya point m of view. The aim of Sa khya as well as of m Yoga is to isolate Purus a or the soul from the entire sphere of matter, including the mental organ (or intellect, ego-awareness and mind). One may wonder what remains for the soul if we subtract the intellect, ego-awareness and mind. From the ancient Sa khya and Yoga m treatises it can be inferred that the soul, if it has realized its distinction from matter and the mental organ, remains a silent witness to all material processes, including processes of thinking. In accordance with this, we may interpret Purus a as pure consciousness (without thought), as is sometimes done. But it is clear that we enter here a problem area which is not confined to Sa khya, nor even to the m Sanskrit tradition. We may well follow the advice of Wittgenstein and remain silent about this alleged consciousness beyond thinking. But the challenge to make language express or at least approach the inexpressible appears to be irresistible, in the Sanskrit tradition as much as in the Western tradition (cf. Katz 1978; Forman 1990). In any case, both thought and speech will belong to the realm of matter according to Sa khya and Yoga. Within matter, these two m are fundamentally distinct, but nevertheless commonly confused. Thus, Yoga-Su tra 3.17 speaks of the super-imposition of word, abda-artha-prathing-meant and cognition: s tyaya , which the na m itaretara-adhya sah Yoga-practitioner may overcome on his way to the isolation of pure consciousness from materiality.

4.

Perceptive knowledge and language

Apart from the somewhat extreme and theoretically highly problematic situation of a meditative state without thought, there is something else that is of considerable importance in South Asian philosophy and directly relevant to the problem of the relation between language and thought: the situation of pure perception (pratyaks a). All philosophical systems accept pratyaks a perception as a source of reliable knowledge; they only differ in their definition and in their ac-

20. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition

149

ceptance of additional sources of reliable knowledge, such as inference and verbal testimony. Some thinkers have put forward arguments according to which perception includes both the process and the knowledge originating from it; although other thinkers did not agree and insisted on a sharp distinction between the process and the result, the two problem areas of perception and of knowledge and thought remained inseparably intertwined throughout the history of South Asian philosophical discussion. And in the usual Sanskrit philosophical terminology, the term for perception, pratyaks a, includes the result of the process of perception, namely the perceptual cognition or knowledge (though the latter is properly called pramiti ). To illustrate the issue we may start with the uncomplicated definition of perception as it is found in an early, largely lost Sa khya m text, the S t itantra (early centuries CE): as perception is the functioning of the faculty rotra ttih of hearing, etc. (s pratyaks ah ). divr The Sa khya-thinker Vindhyava m sin (early 5th century), however, found it necessary, no doubt under the influence of intense philosophical discussions of his age, to explicitly exclude the thinking process, and to modify the definition to: perception is the conceptualization-free functioning of the faculty of rotra hearing, etc. (s ttir avikalpika divr pratyaks ah ) (cf. Frauwallner 1958). The philosophers of the Nya ya-system defended a different definition, formulated as follows in the Nya ya-Su tra (early centuries CE?; cf. Potter 1977: 221):
Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, which cannot be designated, which does not go astray, and which is determinate (indriya otpannam nikars rtha-sam yam avyabhica jn a nam avyapades ri vyavasa ya tmakam am, Nya pratyaks ya-Su tra 1.1.4).

5.

Bhartr hari on language and thought

Thus, in numerous philosophical schools (not only Buddhist, but also Jaina and Brahminical), problems concerning language and thought posed themselves, but the first extensive treatise in which language and its relation with thought is not a side issue but a major one, can be found not earlier than in the Va kyapad ya, the mature and comprehensive work on semantics, linguistics, and philosophy of language, of the Brahminical grammarian-philosopher Bhartr hari (5th century CE). Bhartr haris work can be seen as a systematic investigation of the presuppositions and basic notions and categories of the grammar composed by Pa ini (ca. 4th century BCE) n and amended and annotated by later grammarians, notably Patan jali (ca. 2nd century BCE). In his investigation, Bhartr hari takes a grammatical category, for instance time, gender, number etc., and confronts it with the diverging conceptions of time etc. in the major philosophical schools with which he haris attitude to the variwas familiar. Bhartr ous views is generally non-committal: we find him often engaged in demonstrations of the inian notions, categories compatibility of Pa n and presuppositions with those of quite diverging philosophical schools and systems. At the same time, we do see arise certain own philosophical positions, or at least preferences, from Bhartr haris careful discussions of the views of different schools. One of the preferences concerns the very intimate relation between language and thought and between language and knowledge:
There is no cognition in the world that does not follow language. All knowledge appears as if permeated by words. If understanding would give up its eternal character of language, the light [of consciousness] would no longer shine. For it is that [language-character of understanding] which produces comprehension. That [language-character of understanding] functions as the external and internal awareness of living beings. The consciousness in all forms of existence does not go beyond the dimension of that [language-character of under-standing]. abda (na so sti pratyayo loke yah te s nugama d r abdena bha anuviddham iva jn a sarvam s nam sate a vat va gru pata ced utkramed avabodhasya s s ah eta sa in na praka praka s s hi pratyavamars

Apart from perception, the Nya ya-system accepts inference (anuma na), verbal testimoabda), and comparison (upama ny (s na) as sources of reliable knowledge. As far as the perceptive knowledge of perception is concerned, it is the requirement that it cannot ya) which has be designated (avyapades given rise to elaborate discussions by Nya yathinkers, and to polemics with thinkers of other schools on the possibility or otherwise of a cognitive episode based on perception and entirely free from language (cf. Matilal 1986: 309354).

150
ca vartate sais a a a sa sam jn sam rin m bahir antas tanma u caitanyam sarvaja tra m avyatikra ntam tis Va kyapad ya, ed. Rau, ka 1.131, 132, 134).

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics

According to both his later followers and his hari would defend here what critics, Bhartr Matilal (1990: 133ff.) has called the strong version of Bhartr haris thesis:
B1: All cognitive episodes are equivalent to verbal thoughts.

If other passages in the Va kyapad ya are takhari seems en into account, however, Bhartr to be willing to defend only a weaker version:
B2: Most cognitive episodes are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.

Bhartr hari, as a sort of early common-language philosopher, emphasizes the intimate link between language and thought in normal circumstances (cf. the verse quoted above: There is no cognition in the world []). But he also leaves open without committing himself the possibility of pure cognitions, perhaps with reference to nonworldly, uncommon circumstances such as the above-mentioned meditative experiences (Va kyapad ya 3.3.5657; Houben 1995a: 277282). On the other hand, Bhartr hari leaves little room for a pure perception free from language: in some profound way, perception is unavoidably shaped by language:
The difference between s ad ja [comparable to the musical note do] and the other [musical notes] is perceived [only] if it is explained by words; so all divisions of objects are based on the dimensions of words. It is observed in the case of a torch-wheel etc. [ref. to the fiery circle which one perceives if a torch is turned around very fast], that the form of an object [here: a wheel] is perceived on account of words, even though the [external] basis [of the perception, viz. the turning torch] is entirely different. abda abde(s ad ja [read thus instead of s dibhedah -] s na vya khya to ru pyate yatah abdama rita tasma sarva s u nis d arthavidha h h tres h rutyupa raya atyantam atatha bhu te nimitte s s t yate la dr s a tacakra dau vastva ka raniru pan Va kyapad ya, ed. Rau, 1.123, 142).

theoretical problem with far-reaching philosophical and linguistic consequences: should one see words as primary, and sentences and their meanings as based on a combination of words; or are the sentences primary, and are words and their meanings abstracted from the sentence? What is important here is that it becomes clear in Bhartr haris elaborate discussion of the problem (Houben 1995b) that the acceptance of the sentence as the primary unit from which words and word-meanings are analyzed, leads to a view in which the importance of external reality (especially the discrete objects corresponding to isolated words) is very much restricted. The realities corresponding to words are rather externalized word-meanings, abstracted from the sentence-meaning which is not anything external but has the character of a cognition:
From the (sentence) meaning which is a cognition, the external meaning, whether or not (in fact) existing, is externalized and analyzed. As for the analysis, it is defined as an analysis of capacities. (sam sann asan va pratyaya rtha d ba hyo rthah vibhajyate aktyapoddha tya vibha ba an ah hy kr gas tu s ralaks Va kyapad ya 2.445).

6.

Din na ga on perception and language

So far we have selected passages in which hari presupposes or explicitly speaks Bhartr of rather simple cognitions, in which a simple object expressible by a simple word is reflected. The situation becomes considerably more complex if we take into account that both verbal communication and private thinking proceed in sentences and phrases rather than in isolated words. This confronts us with a

It can be said that Bhartr hari catalyzed a linguistic turn as well as powerful counter-currents in Indian philosophy. Apart from the later grammarians who developed their own philosophical school in more definite and pohari, the lemically defended terms than Bhartr Buddhist schools show clear traces of his profound influence. One of the few thinkers hari in his preference for who followed Bhartr the sentence as the primary unit of language is the Buddhist philosopher Din na ga (Hattori 1979; Hayes 1988: 215f.). While Din na ga also accepted an intimate relation between language and thought, and between language and the perception of reality, he continued to defend contra Bhartr hari earlier Buddhist ideas on a moment of pure perceptive cognition before any linguistic influence has crept in. Din na ga considers perception to be free from conceptual construction (kalpana ), which means that the thing perceived is not associated with a name, universal, etc. (Prama a-Samucn caya, ka rika 3; Hattori 1968: 25). In his elaboration of this idea, however, Din na ga is

20. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition

151 Unlike both inference and its special form, language, perception has direct access to the only things which can be considered real, namely the momentary particulars (svalaks an a proper characteristic) which are not yet subjected to conceptualization (kalpana ). From this angle it is quite clear how important it was to Din na ga to define perception as something separate from anything linguistic.

hari in that this concepagain close to Bhartr tual construction is intertwined with language. Largely in acordance with the grammarians, Din na ga distinguishes five categories of conceptual construction, and in each case the object perceived receives a corresponding designation or word category: if the object is associated with a name it receives a proper name as designation (e. g. John); if with a universal it receives a common noun (e. g. cow); if with a quality it receives a designation such as white; if with an action it receives a designation such as to cook or a cook; if, finally, it is conceptualized as associated with a substance it receives a designation such as staff-bearer (a person bearing a staff) or horned, horn-bearer (Hattori 1968: 8385). For Din na ga, direct perception is a very important source of reliable knowledge (prama a), as he accepts only one other n source, namely inference (anuma na). Lanabda), acceptguage or verbal testimony (s ed in Nya ya and other systems as a separate source of knowledge, is according to him nothing but a special form of inference though indeed a very important one, to which he devotes a separate chapter in his Prama asamuccaya. In this chapter, Din na n ga develops his famous theory of anya poha exclusion of the other (or shorter: apoha exclusion). Antecedents of Apoha can be found in earlier Buddhist works (Hattori 1977), as well as in theories referred to (and not rejected) by Bhartr hari (e. g. Va kyapad ya 3.1.100103). But Din na ga, and later on Dharmak na rti, Din gas successor and cofounder of the Buddhist logical-epistemological school, elaborated it in a unique way. According to the Apoha-theory, a word such as cow does not lead to the cognition of an objectively given universal cowness, but merely to the cognition not-not-cow (cf. Hattori 1968: 12). Language is here just like inference, which likewise can only give access to the cognition of a universal or class (sa ma nyalaks an a), which is not objectively given but a result of mental exclusion (apoha). On the basis of the perception of smoke on a hill, for instance, one may infer that there is fire, but we do not have a specific cognition of a particular fire. The object to be inferred is not earth, water, etc., which are known to possess no smoke: it is not anything that is not fire, or not-not-fire.

7.

Other reactions on Bhartr hari: aivism mir S M sa ma m , Nya ya, Kas

While Bhartr haris ideas on the primacy of the sentence and on the pervading influence of language on thought were critically but positively received by the Buddhist Din na ga, they were strongly criticized by thinkers of other Brahminical systems such as M sa ma m and Nya ya (on which we will focus below; es other interesting systems such as Vais ika, Veda nta and Jaina [ Art. 18] will be largely neglected in order to keep the account surveyable). As far as the intimate relation between language and thought is concerned, however, the period of rejection is in both systems followed by a period in which one haris position. comes much closer to Bhartr Below we will return to these two systems. aimir S A similar pattern we see in Kas vism: Bhartr hari was initially strongly criticized by Soma nanda (9th/10th century), but later on, with Utpaladeva and especially Abhinavagupta (10th and 11th century) the religious-philosophical environment of Kas aivism gave an important place to mir S Bhartr haris ideas. In the work of Utpaladeva one can observe a glaring reversal of Soma hari, who, nandas attitude towards Bhartr from being a punctiliously criticized and even derided opponent, becomes one of the major inspirers (Torella 1994: xxiii). The above-mentioned thesis of Bhartr hari was defended and elaborated in its strong version (B1): All cognitive episodes are permeated by language. Even the most abstract cognitive episodes which are far removed from normal linguistic expressions and discursive thinking, are considered to be mirians disof a linguistic nature. The Kas tinguished four levels of speech, three of which are already mentioned in Bhartr haris Va tti (ka kyapad ya and the Vr rika 1.159): these are (1) Vaikhar , the Elaborate Speech, which is the speech we perceive with our ears;

152 (2) Madhyama , the Intermediate, which is seyant quential, mental speech; and (3) Pas , the Seeing one, which is inner, sequenceless speech. The fourth level added by the Kas mirians is Para Va c, the Highest Speech, yant which is beyond the most subtle Pas . It is not different from ultimate reality, which iva. The linguistic in this system is called S character even of this ultimate reality or Para Va c is emphasized, otherwise it would not have a conscious nature. However, unlike the language of the grosser levels, viz. Madhyama and Vaikhar , language at the subtle level of Para Va c is non-conventional and free from conceptualizations (cf. Padoux 1990: 176177). Commenting on a verse of s varapratyahis predecessor Utpaladeva (I bhijn 1.5.14), the Kas mirian Abhinavagupta a (ca. 1000 CE) quotes Va kyapad ya 1.131132 (see above) to illustrate the linguistic character of awareness, which he presents as a caanam pacity of Para ca para Va c (vimars va kaktimayam). s In his commentary on Bharatas Na tyaa s stra, Abhinavagupta quotes the same verse 1.131 to support his claim that even bodily gestures are pervaded by language: Indeed, even bodily motions (ka t a yaces ) are pervaded by subtle motions which are mental and linguistic (ma su ma va nas bhih ks bhih cik bhis ces t a ), in accordance with the principle bhih There is no cognition (Abhinavagupta, cited by Abhyankar & Limaye in their edition of the Va kyapad ya, 1965: 209.)

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics

8.

M sa ma m : Kuma rila (7th century) ra (8th century) and Man d ana Mis

abda). As we have seen, this was timony (s not acknowledged as a separate source of knowledge by Buddhists such as Din na ga, who considered it a special form of inference. For M sa ma m , however, it is a separate source, and it is indispensable for knowing dharma an untranslatable term, which in Brahminical works often amounts to the entirety of religious and moral duties, and in M sa ma m especially to the entirety of ritual duties. This dharma or duty is to be understood from the Vedic texts. While verbal testimony is the indispensable source of knowledge on dharma, other sources of knowledge have their validity in their own sphere. Thus, perception is authoritative with regard to objects observable by the senses. Kuma rila distinguishes here between a first stage, which he calls a locana (mere) perceiving (a term also important in es Vais ika and Nya ya), and a stage at which the object is not just perceived but also qualified through a universal, attribute, or action etc. In the first stage, the object is perceived in its entirety, in both its particular and general aspect, but the cognition is free from conceptualizations (nirvikalpaka), similar to lokava that of a child or mute person (S rttika, Pratyaks asu tra 112120). Unlike the Buddhists, Kuma rila includes the second stage in which the object is both perceived and conceptualized in his notion of perception. But mirians, and in unlike Bhartr hari and the Kas accordance with the Buddhists, he strongly denies the linguistic character of the first, pure perception, which arises directly from the object:
The cognition which arises with regard to the objects does not have a linguistic form []. Just as colour, [taste,] and so on, are separately cognized according to their own nature, even before [their expression in] language, like that their association with a name (sam itvam) is only something that jn follows abda (na s a buddhir arthes u ja bhedaru pen yate [] abda yatha pra ru pa dayo bhinna h k s t sva tmanaiva tu gamyante tadvad evaitat sam itvam jn kevalam param lokava S asu rttika, Pratyaks tra 172ab, 175).

The system of M sa ma m is rooted in the ancient ritualistic exegesis of Vedic texts. M sa ma m offers rules of interpretation so that clear prescriptions can be derived from the early Vedic texts which leave so many details on the ritual practice implicit, apparently because these were considered well-known to the intended public. Although there were earlier contributions to turn the collection of hermeneutical principles of the old M ma m sa into a full-fledged philosophical system, Kuma rilas work is, after the extensive commentary of the less philosophically inclined abara, the earliest comprehensive attempt to S do so which is still accessible. As a hermeneutical-philosophical system, M sa ma m is mostly interested in one specific source of reliable knowledge, viz. verbal tes-

ra The M d ana Mis sa ma m philosopher Man considered himself a follower of Kuma rila. Nevertheless, he disagreed with him on several important points; moreover, Man d anas philosophical deliberations were not confined to the field of M sa ma m but included that of grammar and Veda nta. An important prob-

20. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition

153 ened person (cf. Thrasher 1993: 98; Biardeau 1969: 91102). ras direct and inWhatever Man d ana Mis direct importance for South Asian philosophy, his role in M sa ma m remained limited. The two main schools of M sa ma m till the present are the schools of Kuma t a rila Bhat and of his earlier contemporary Prabha kara (scholars and followers of the latter have nowadays become very rare). In Veda nta, ra was overshadowed and suMan d ana Mis an perseded by S kara and his mode of Advaita, which did not recognize the linguistic nature of Brahman (on other doctrinal distinctions: Vetter 1969, Einleitung).

lem area which touches the heart of both M sa ma m and grammar is the perception of a special object, namely language. Bhartr hari had presented and elaborated a theory according to which phonemes give first rise to the grasping of a unitary linguistic unit, which in turn is associated with a meaning. The term which came to be invariably associated with the notion of this unitary linguistic hari used also other unit (though Bhartr terms) was sphot a. Now, Kuma rila had criticized the notion of sphot a in strong terms (although it is fair to say that he silently also accepts much of Bhartr haris theory, Ghler ra, however, de1995: 145). Man d ana Mis fended this notion in a special treatise, the Sphot asiddhi Establishment of Sphot a. In this work he quotes profusely from both the hari. work of Kuma rila and that of Bhartr Here, it becomes clear that Man d ana accepts, like Bhartr hari, not only a mental state in which the sphot a or unitary linguistic sign is clearly and distinctly apprehended, but also a preliminary stage at which the linguistic unit is still vague and undefinable (anupa khyeya, cf. Thrasher 1993: 16). This stage of vague perception reminds us of the first perception of Kuma locana ). However, this rila (a first perception was a nirvikalpa or conceptualization-free cognition for Kuma rila. d How did Man ana think about this? Unfortunately, Man d ana did not write a special treatise on this interesting topic. Allan Thrasher (1993) searched for indications in other works, and found that for Man d ana probably even the nirvikalpa cognition is, in some sense, verbal (though distinct words are here utterly absent). In support he cites for instance from a treatise of Man d anas called Brahma-Siddhi Establishment of Brahman:
Even the movement towards, for instance, their mothers breast, disregarding other things, that babies show could not be if they did not determine it as this; unless it has been determined whether something is a post or a man there is no activity based on [its being] one or the other. Now, there is no determination without the coloration of words. Therefore even they [children], possessing the influences of words from previous births, have knowledge that is determined by being coloured by the form of speech (Brahma-Siddhi, 18.1317; transl. Thrasher 1993: 88).

9.

Nya t a ya: Jayanta Bhat a (9th century) and Gan ges (14th century)

This would fit in with other statements of Man d ana according to which Brahman is abda language ( linguistic in nature?), s and seems to be the object of a non-dual nirvikalpa verbal knowledge of an enlight-

That cognition would not be possible without language was entirely unacceptable to the Nya t a. For him ya-philosopher Jayanta Bhat there is no basis for the distinction into three levels of speech (Nya jar ya-Man , ed. Varadacharya 1983: 183184): The so-called Intermediate speech is not a kind of speech at all, but it is a cognition in which both the expressed and the expressor (or signified and signifier) figure (nais a va prabhedah , bud cah dhir va va ca-ullikhant cyam cakam ); and the so-called Seeing one is but another name for yant the construction-free cognition (pas ti tu nirvikalpakamater na kalpitam). In ma ntaram fact, there is only one speech which is well known, viz. the Elaborate one (ekaiva vaikhar va g va g iti prasiddha hi ). Commenting on the Nya ya-definition of pratyaks a perception (Nya ya-Su tra 1.1.4, see above), Jayanta comes to speak of the ya purpose of the expression avyapades which cannot be designated. Jayanta discusses various possible reasons why this expression is used in the definition. The older Nya ya-philosophers (especially Va ya tsya yana in his commentary on the Nya ya was intended to Su tra) held that avyapades exclude from perception all cognitions connected with language, so as to make it distinct from verbal testimony, a separate source of reliable knowledge. But with this interpretation too much is excluded from perception for Jayanta, who accepts, much like Kuma rila whom he occasionally quotes, that there is an initial stage without conceptualizations, and a second stage in which these

154 are present and also expressible in words. However, when the perceived object is associated with the appropriate word, no new knowledge is added. This view, then, that a perceptual cognition would originate from both sources, sense perception and language, ya (tasma is excluded by avyapades t ubhayaja-jn a padam iti, na-vyavaccheda rtham evedam Nya jar ya-Man , ed. Varadacharya 1970: 221). The rejected view that a perceptual cognition is (partly) indebted to verbal testimony or language is illustrated with the by now hari: There is no well-known verse of Bhartr cognition in the world [] (see above). Jayanta suggests that this view of Bhartr hari would imply that there were no such thing as perception or a perceptual cognition at all, hence there would have been no point in formulating its definition (Nya jar ya-Man , I, 290). Radical innovations in the Nya ya-view on perception were introduced in the so-called Navya-Nya ya or New-Nya ya, which has important starting points in the work of Udayana (ca. 11th century), but which finds its first comprehensive classical expression in the a (late 13th or early 14th cenwork of Gan ges tury, Potter & Bhattacharya 1993: 85). a agrees with Jayanta that percepGan ges tion is of two kinds, one free from conceptualizations (nirvikalpaka) and the other accompanied by these (savikalpaka) (Tattvacinta mani 857ff.). In the section devoted to the nirvikalpaka-kind, he stages a discussion with someone who doubts that there can be any awareness if conceptualizations are entirely absent: After all, we cannot prove this conceptualization-free awareness (and conscious perception) by perception, since perception is what the dispute is about; and we cannot prove it by our speaking about perception because that necessarily has to take place on the basis of conceptualizations. a In the discussion which follows, Gan ges revived some of the old arguments of Bharhari according to whom each cognitive epitr sode is inter-shot irresistibly with concept or abda-bha word or what he called s vana (Mata and other ilal 1986: 342). Whether Gan ges Navya-Nya ya thinkers are here indeed more or less directly influenced by Bhartr hari as Matilal suggests, or whether their new position arose out of centuries of opposition to Buddhists like Din na ga and Dharmak rti, it is difficult to say. As we have seen, in Din na ga and Dharmak rtis system the assumption that there is a pure perception and perceptual

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics

awareness entirely free from conceptualization played a fundamental role; but when Navya-Nya ya-thinkers question the feasibility of this, they have to distance themselves also from some aspects of the old Nya ya view on conception-free awareness. A third alternative would be that their new position was a matter of maturity of insight regarding the importance of language and conceptual construction even for perceptual knowledge. In a deany case, in the final view as Gan ges fends it, language has encroached considerably on the domain which Jayanta and earlier Nya ya-thinkers had reserved for conceptualization-free perceptual awareness. It is argued that if we are clearly aware of something, we are aware of it as something, and this presupposes a prior awareness of this qualifying something, the distinguishing es attribute (vis an a). A clear perception of a familiar object like a cow is therefore not entirely free from conceptualization. However, with regard to the awareness of cowness as one of the preconditions for the perception of a cow, we may assume a conceptualization-free perception. It is to be noted that the Nya ya-thinkers are realists in the sense that they hold (unlike idealists like certain Buddhists and Veda ntists) that universals, among others, are given independently from our a admits that even in the mind. Now Gan ges perception of the universal cowness memory-traces may play a role. Hence, the discussion focusses on the first perception of a cow in this life (pra am gaur iti pratyaks thamikam jn a nam). Even here, perception is accompanied by conceptualization, but with regard to the cowness-part of this perception-as-cognitive-episode, there is absence of conceptuale ization (gaur iti savikalpakam api, gotva s m nirvikalpakam, Tattvacinta mani, 857ff.). In the words of Matilal (1986: 348):
a here obviously implies The argument of Gan ges that we do not need to postulate a non-constructive, conception-free, perceptual awareness always occurring at the beginning of a constructive, conception-loaded perception. This goes against the general assumption of these philosophers that a sensory awareness in unstructured form must precede all structured, conception-loaded percepas point, if I understand it correctly, tions. Gan ges is that there is no logical necessity here. Only in some cases, (as in those already described) does such a preconceptual, unstructured perception become logically and causally necessary to precede judgmental perception.

a and other Navya-Nya With this, Gan ges yaphilosophers have come quite close to the

20. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition

155 dition which are novel in their treatment of themes playing an important role in the Western tradition as well. It also may have become clear that the philosophical statements made by, for instance, the Sanskrit grammarians or the Nya ya-thinkers were not intended to apply exclusively to, say, these Sanskrit grammarians or Nya ya-thinkers, or to no-one but the South Asians, or to only Brahmins. The statements concern universals of the human condition: the perception of objects through our senses, communication through speech, the having of clear or vague cognitions, and so on. Hence, they have a claim to universal validity, even if this is usually not made explicit. It invites a comparison and confrontation with statements made in other traditions which likewise have an implicit or explicit claim to universal validity. However, as far as the Sanskrit tradition with its extensive philosophical material is concerned, there is still no solid philological basis for such a comparison. In spite of all that has been accomplished so far, much basic work (in editing, translating, historical location etc.) remains to be done to make important Sanskrit authors such as those mentioned in this article in a satisfactory way accessible to scholars and students (let alone to a larger audience).

haris thesis (B2 weaker version of Bhartr above), the only one which Bhartr hari himself was ready to fully defend even though his later followers preferred to take him as a propounder of the stronger version.

10. Analysis of knowledge derived from words or cognition based on language


With the extension of the domain of structured, conception-loaded awareness, also the interest in the analysis of this awareness increased. This analysis took place through language, the unavoidable correlate of clear conceptions (and perhaps also of vague conceptions). In particular, methods were developed to analyse the cognition which arises from linguistic input in the form of, usually, a sentences. This cognition is termed s bdabodha understanding from language or words. On this subject we see new controversies arise, in which Nya ya-thinkers contend with M sa ma m -thinkers and grammarians (the 17th century knows some major discussants). In these controversies, the Pa in nian system of grammatical analysis is in broad outlines accepted by all. They also adopt much of the new Nya ya-terminology. All thinkers agree that the structure of the a s bda-bodha or cognition based on language is of the qualifier-qualificand type, but they disagree on what is the qualifier and what the qualificand. The grammarians of this period hold the sentence and sentence meaning (va kya-sphot a and va kya-artha) to be indivisible wholes, but they accept division on a secondary plane, for the sake of analysis. Here, the verb is the qualificand, to be qualified by all the other words of the sentence. The M ma m sa -thinkers, occupied with the ritual and prescriptive part of the ancient Vedic texts, take a special interest in a special kind of sentence, viz. the injunction. For them, the qualificand is not the verb as a whole, but the verbal suffix. For Nya ya-thinkers, finally, the word in the nominative is generally speaking the main meaning-bearing element understood from a sentence, and all other words are its qualifiers (cf. Jha 1986; Matilal 1988).

12. Bibliography
12.1. Primary sources
Advaita Veda nta. Ed. by Allen Wright Thrasher, The Advaita Veda nta of Brahma-siddhi. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993. hari, Va Bhartr kyapad ya. Ed. by K. V. Abhyan r hari. kar & V. P. Limaye, Va kyapad ya of S Bhartr ( University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 2.) Poona: Univ. of Poona, 1965. Ed. by Wilhelm haris Va Rau, Bhartr kyapad ya: Die Mu la-ka rika s nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pa da-index versehen. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1977. a, Tattvacinta Gan i. Ed. by Ramanuja Ta ges man opa tacharya, Tattvacinta ges mani of Gan dhya ya, a of Rucidattamis ra, and Nya ikha with Praka s ya-s a of Ra s man i on Praka n a s makr dhvarin. I. Pratyaks akhan d a. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1973. Jayantabhat jar t a, Nya yaman . Ed. by K. S. Varadacharya, Nya jar t a, with yaman of Jayantabhat Tippan Nya yasaurabha by the editor. 2 vols. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1970, 1983. lokava Kuma rttika. Ed. by Ganga Sagar Rai, rila, S lokava r S t a.. With com rttika of S Kuma rila Bhat

11. Further research


This article has hopefully given an inkling of the complexity and profundity of centuries of philosophical discussions in the Sanskrit tra-

156
r mentary Nya yaratna kara of S Pa rthasa rathi Mis ra. Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1993. ra, Brahmasiddhi. Ed. by Kuppud Man ana Mis ca swami Sastri, Brahmasiddhi by A d anamis rya Man an ra. With commentary by S i. Madras: Gov khapa n ernment of Madras, 1937. Transl. by Tilmann Vetras Brahmasiddhi: Brahmaka ter, Man d anamis d ah | n bersetzung, Einleitung und Anmerkungen. ( Sitzungsberichte der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 262: 2.) Wien: Bhlau, 1965. Sutta Nipa ta. Transl. by H. Saddhatissa, The Sutta Nipata. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994. (1st ed., 1985.) s varapratyabhijn Utpaladeva, I a ka rika . Ed. and s varapratyabhijn transl. by Raffaele Torella, The I a tti. Critical ka rika of Utpaladeva with the authors Vr edition and annotated translation. Roma: Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1994.

V. The Establishment of Sanskrit Linguistics his sixtieth birthday ed. by L. S. Kawamura & K. Scott, 4758. Emeryville, Cal.: Dharma. . 1979. Apoha and Pratibha . Sanskrit and Indian Studies ed. by M. Nagatomi, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson & E. Dimock, 6173. Dordrecht: Reidel. Hayes, Richard P. 1988. Digna ga on the Interpretation of Signs. ( Studies of Classical India, 9.) Dordrecht: Kluwer. Houben, Jan E. M. 1995a. The Sam bandha-samuda (chapter on relation) and Bhartr des haris Philosophy of Language. Groningen: Forsten. . 1995b. Bhartr haris Perspectivism. 2. Bhartr hari on the Primary Unit of Language. History and Rationality: The Skvde Papers in the Historiography of Linguistics ed. by Klaus D. Dutz & Kjell ke Forsgren, 2962. Mnster: Nodus. A a Jha, V. N. 1986. The Structure of a s bdabodha. Studies in Language, Logic and Epistemology, 70 76. Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan. Katz, Steven T., ed. 1978. Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. ( Studies in Philosophy and Religion, 5.) London: Sheldon Press. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. a . 1988. S bdabodha and the Problem of Knowledge-representation in Sanskrit. Journal of Indian Philosophy 16.107122. . 1990. The Word and the World: Indias contribution to the study of language. Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press. & A. Chakrabarti, eds. 1994. Knowing from Words: Western and Indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony. Dordrecht: Kluwer. . 1990. Va Padoux, Andre c: The concept of the word in selected Hindu Tantras. Transl. by Jacques Gontier. New York: State Univ. of New York Press. ePotter, Karl H. 1977. The Tradition of Nya ya-Vais a. ( Encyclopedia of Indian s ika up to Gan ges Philosophies, 2.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. & Sibajiban Bhattacharya, eds. 1993. Indian es Philosophical Analysis: Nya ika from Gan ya-Vais iroman a to Raghuna ges i. ( Encyclopedia of tha S Indian Philosophies, 6.) Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. layavijn Schmithausen, Lambert. 1987. A a na: On the origin and the early development of a concept of Yoga ca ra philosophy. Vols. I, II. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Staal, Frits. 1960. Correlations between Language and Logic in Indian Thought. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 23.109122. (Repr., in Staal 1988.) . 1988. Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics. Chicago & London: Univ. of Chicago Press. Vetter, Tilmann. 1988. The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism. Leiden: Brill.

11.2. Secondary sources


Biardeau, Madeleine. 1969. La Philosophie de Man ra vue a ` partir de la Brahmasiddhi. Paris: d ana Mis cole Franc ` me-Orient. E aise dExtre Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1985. Dharma and Abhidharma. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48: 2.305320. . 1996. Sanskrit and Reality: The Buddhist contribution. Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the history of the Sanskrit language ed. by Jan E. M. Houben, 109135. Leiden: Brill. Cox, Collett. 1995. Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist theories on existence. An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from San ghabhadras Nya ya nusa ra. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Forman, Robert K. C. 1990. The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and philosophy. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Frauwallner, Erich. 1958. Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sa khya-Systems. Wiener Zeitschrift m fr die Kunde Sd-Asiens 2.84139. [ Kleine Schriften 223278.] . 1995. Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems. Transl. from the German by Sophie Francis Kidd under supervision of Ernst Steinkellner. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Ghler, Lars. 1995. Wort und Text bei Kuma rila Bhat t a: Studie zur mittelalterlichen indischen Sprachphilosophie und Hermeneutik. ( Europische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XX. Philosophie, 468). Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Hattori, Masaaki. 1968. Din na ga on Perception. Cambridge, Mass. . 1977. The Sautra ntika Background of the Apoha Theory. Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilisation: Essays in honor of Herbert V. Guenther on

21. The organization of grammar in Sanskrit linguistics . 1990. Some Remarks on Older Parts of the Suttanipa ta. Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka ed. by D. Seyfort Ruegg & Lambert Schmithausen, 3656. Leiden: Brill. . 1991. Zur religisen Hermeneutik buddhistischer Texte. Beitrge zur Hermeneutik indischer und abendlndischer Religionstraditionen ed. by

157
Gerhard Oberhammer, 179192. Wien: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Williams, Paul M. 1980. Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka. Journal of Indian Philosophy 8.145.

Jan Houben, Leiden (The Netherlands)

21. The organization of grammar in Sanskrit linguistics


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Introduction Kinds of rules Organization of the As t a dhya y Relations among rules and operations Pa inis commentators n Bibliography

1.

Introduction

1.1. In India a grammar is conceived of as a a set of rules (s an a) that stra, su tra, yoga, laks serves to explain (anva khya na explanation) through derivation a system of language usage. The objects to be described correct abda) of usage are considspeech forms (s ered a target (laks ya), and the rules that apply to derive these objects are considered means to explain (laks an a) the speech forms. Starting with the earliest complete grammar inis As of Sanskrit known to us, Pa t a dhya y , n such grammars are composed from a speakers point of view, so that meaning serves from the very outset to condition the use of bases (prakr ti ) and affixes (pratyaya; J Art. 17, section 3.1.A). The following is based on inis work. Pa n 1.2. The As t a dhya y represents a synthetic system: starting with bases, affixes are introduced under stated conditions to form utterances. In deriving utterances, underlying strings are posited from which actually used utterances are derived. For example, (a) in each of the following pairs is a Sanskrit utterance derived from the corresponding posited string (b) (J Art. 17, section 3.1.A(3ab) (4ab)).
(1a) devadattah kat an karoti Devadatta is making a mat -tip) [I kr -lat (1b) (devadatta-s1) (kat a-am2) (kr ] (2a) devadattena kat kriyate A mat is being ah made by Devadatta (2b) (devadatta-a -ta) [I kr -lat a-s1) (kr ] 3) (kat

Pa ini does not have to define what particun lar stretch of constituents makes up an utterance (va kya). On the other hand, there is an interpretation system, represented by major schools of ritual exegesis (m sa ma m ). One of the tasks this system assigns itself is to determine what particular stretch of Vedic material constitutes a yajus (a ritual formula) to accompany a ritual act. To this end, a definition is given of an utterance (va kya): A particular stretch constitutes a va kya if it has one purpose (arthaikatva t) and constituents would remain in semantic expectancy (sa ka am sya ks n t) of others if one split up the unit (ced vibha inis derivational sys ge). Pa n tem, representing the speakers viewpoint, also does not concern itself with the semantic and syntactic interpretation of utterances. The ritual exegetical system of interpretation, on the other hand, also sets forth principles for determining the relation that is to be accepted between an enjoined ritual act and something that contributes to this act in some manner. Six means of knowing such reruti ), lations are given: direct statement (s conventional capacity of reference (lin ga), occurring in a single utterance (va kya), contextual mutual expectancy (prakaran a), textual or ritual position (stha na), and the use of a term in its etymological meaning (sama khya ) instead of its conventional meaning. These means take priority in descending order, so that direct statement takes precedence over the next five and so on. 1.3. In Pa inis derivational system, there is n no strict demarcation between syntax and morphology as envisioned by western linguists. Inflectional endings of forms like kat am (I kat a-am), kat ah ( kat a-s), karoti (I kr -u-ti I kr -ti I kr -l ) are introduced under meaning conditions: affix A follows base B when meaning M is to be signified. For ex-

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