You are on page 1of 16

The paper presented at the 2nd International Conference

‘HIERARCHY AND POWER IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION’


St. Petersburg 7 July 2002

Leonid GRININ

General context of the social evolution at the


early state formation

The general evolutionary and historical backgrounds of politogen-


esis and formation of state are connected with а whole set of
changes in economy and society noted by many various researchers
(Ambrosino 1995; Adams 1966; Bondarenko & Korotayev 2000; Bondar-
enko & Sledzevski 2000; Carneiro 1970; 1978; 2000; 2002; Chase-
Dunn & Hall 1997; Claessen 2000; 2002; Claessen & Scalnik 1978;
1981; Claessen & Oosten 1996; Cohen 1978a; 1978b; Cohen & Service
1978; Daniel 1968; Earle 1997; 2001; Feinman & Marcus 1998; Frazer
1980; Fried 1967; 1978; Grinin∗ 1997, 1999; 2000a, 2000b, 2000c;
2001, 2002a; 2002b; Haas 1995; 2001; Johnson & Earle 2000; Kradin &
Lynsha 1995; Kradin et all 2000; Kubbel` 1988; Sahlins 1960; 1972;
Service 1975; Spenser 2000; Vasiliev 1980; Wittfogel 1957 etc.). Along
with that, the multifactoral nature of politogenesis is stressed, often enough.
However, the monolinear view of the problem of the origin of state still
dominates (Kradin 1995:7), and, in fact, most researchers, manifestly or
discretely, show inclination towards monolinear models (Service 1978;
Haas 1995). So case material from history or ethnography can be found
to support or refute an these positions and other as well (Cohen 1978a:
8; 1978b).
Among the researchers who deal with the problems of polito-
genesis the actually predominant tendency is to narrow the analysis to
its ‘pure’ line. However, it is necessary to consider the genesis of early
state in the general context of socioevolutionary processes coeval with
it. It seems impossible to say that such an approach was always ignored
(Claessen & Scalnik 1978; Claessen 2000). However, notwithstanding
substantial achievements in the analysis of the general cultural context of


The ideas of this report are presented in detail in my work consisting of separate pub-
lishings (Grinin 2001; 2002a; 2000b).
state formation processes, this problem still appears to be far from its real
solution.
One of the reasons is the fact that the process of politogenesis
becomes а central issue not only because of the formulation of the prob-
lem itself – which is quite justifiable – but also because it seems to be-
come actually central among other evolution processes coeval with it.
The latter circumstance is far from always being fair since political as-
pects of society complication not infrequently proved to be of secondary
importance (although later they could became of primary importance).
Often enough politogenesis is illegitimately reduced to а more
narrow process – that is, the formation of state. I name this approach as
statocentrism (Grinin 2001; Bondarenko, Grinin, Korotayev 2002).
However, many historical and ethnographical examples of polities are
known which morphologically and otherwise differ significantly from
early state but are quite comparable with it in the range of their func-
tions and/or level of their structural complexity (Bondaren-
ko & Korotayev 2000; Grinin 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002a; Kradin
& Lynsha 1995; Kradin et all 2000). It is also noted that differences
between complex chiefdoms and rudimentary early states are insignific-
ant (Kochacova 1999). Therefore, from the point of view of develop-
ment stages, such chiefdoms and other polities can be regarded as equal
to state, and they can legitimately be named as early state analogues
(Grinin 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2000с; Bondarenko, Grinin, Korotayev
2002). In certain conditions, the early state analogues could transform
into state proper.
Therefore, for the solution of early state genesis problems I con-
sider it very important to make а much stronger distinction, both in the-
ory and terminology, between: а) politogenesis not only as an earlier but
also as а wider phenomenon, and b) state formation process proper as а
more specific and а later process that can be termed as statogenesis
(Grinin 2002a; Bondarenko, Grinin, Korotayev 2002). In the Western,
at least in the one that uses the English language, anthropological sci-
ence the terminological situation resembles а mirror reflection. The no-
tion of politogenesis does not exist there, and political anthropologists
consider the term ‘state formation process’ to be sufficient. We suggest
to use the term ‘politogenesis’ in order to denote the formation of any
types of complex political organization (Grinin 2002a; Bondarenko,
Grinin, Korotayev 2002).

2
The general evolution context of post-primitive stage is connec-
ted with powerful changes caused by the transition from foraging to
food production. Population growth, increase in the quantity of welfare
and more complicated distribution of it, as well as other processes, lead
to а situation when previous ways of the formation of societies, of rela-
tions inside of them and between them could no longer solve all the
emerging problems. For this reason, the already more complex sociums
faced а principally similar evolution problem: to find new ways of
structuring and unification of societies and establishing intersociety
relations. The vast diversity of specific socio-political forms yielded, in
а sense, different answers to this evolution problem. It should also be
taken into consideration that these processes were very syncretic and
they easily transformed into each other: social into professional and vice
versa; sacral into political and vice versa (Wason and Baldia 1995: 142),
ethnical into political and vice versa (Kubbel` 1988; Cabezas 2000);
political and social into proprietary and vice versa (see Sahlins 1972:
140). In this aspect, politogenesis can also be regarded only as one of
the ways – for а long time not the most important from the point of view
of evolution at that – of solving the mentioned evolution problem, along
with other processes (such as ethnogenesis, emergence of inequality,
other socio-cultural changes) (Grinin 2001).
Although now many deny the necessity to single out stages in
this or that process (Shanks and Tilley 1987; see criticism of this by
Wason 1995:19), I am inclined to agree with Robert Carneiro in that op-
posing the process and the stages is false dichotomy (Carneiro 2000). In
the general evolution aspect the following stages can be singled out in
politogenesis: 1. Prestate. 2. Early state. 3. State, i. e. the stage of
already formed state.
But, in contradistinction to the concepts by Service (Service
1975), Fried (Fried 1967) and some other researchers that are also based
evolution phases of development, I most specifically point out that:
when societies reach the mentioned stages they may possess quite differ-
ent political and social forms. There is no, and cannot be, any unifica-
tion and singular linearity. The aims of such division into periods are:
а) to reveal similarities in complexity, development level and functions
of outwardly dissimilar societies, and b) to emphasize the multilinearity
of evolution, at the same time not forgetting that among evolution lines
the main (or general) one can be singled out which is the formation of

3
state (the latter has been reflected in the names of stages pertaining to
state).
Although in every type of society different domains developed
unevenly, I am still inclined to suppose that in most cases politogenesis
started as а side process and followed as an addition to strengthening
high birth, status, sacrality and, in part, other processes. Even in the so-
cieties of early state stage it frequently occupied still а subordinate posi-
tion. And only in the next, the state stage, politogenesis, now basically
in the form of statogenesis, may be regarded as an evolutionally leading
process.
That is why, speaking in very general terms, both the appear-
ance of social inequality and invention of primary mechanism to secure
it were the most universal evolutionary result of the development of the
prestate phase of politogenesis (Grinin 2002a). However, this inequality
is not antagonistic yet. As to political aspects, their essential develop-
ment is far from being characteristic of all societies. Nevertheless, in
many cases the power is concentrated with the minority, and so its de-
tachment from the basic population starts. But, as а rule, its detachment
is very incomplete, the power still being poorly differentiated and re-
maining rather conciliatory than compelling. So in the second, the early
state stage the most universal task for sociums still was to make main-
tenance of inequality steady enough and easily reproducible (Grinin,
2002a). The political subsystem of the society is actively forming, too,
and detachment of power from the population is on the whole increas-
ing.
Although the second stage is called ‘the early state stage’, the
emergence of early state analogues was not at all an exception (see
Doornbos 1994; Schaedel 1995, on the proportion of ‘norm’ during the
formation of state and non-state forms). On the contrary, it was the
formation of early state that for а long period remained а rarer phe-
nomenon in politogenesis. So, over а long period of time, the complicat-
ing of social structure, the exploitation of neighbourhood and wars, the
development of commerce, property inequality and private ownership,
amplifying of the part of religious cults and corporations and other
could be enough alternative of properly administrative and political de-
cisions of above-mentioned evolution problem. And in these terms, the
early State is only one of the forms of new organization of the soci-
ety and intersociety relations. Evolution advantages of the early State
over its analogs cold be ulterior during very long time (Grinin 2001).

4
The differences between societies of early state stage (both
early states proper and their analogues) and societies of prestate stage
can be formulated as follows:
1. Changes in production base, increase in territory and popula-
tion growth.
2. Increase in the complexity of society and the number of its
structural complexity levels.
3. Essential changes in traditions and institutions related to the
regulation of socio-political life.
4. Division of society into two or more strata differing from
each other in rights and duties. Growing degree of material independ-
ence of the highest stratum from the lowest one.
5. Emergence of an ideology that acquits and legitimizes socio-
political changes in the society.
All these differences are obvious enough, while those in par 1, 2
and even 4 can also be expressed in figures.
Same features serve to distinguish the early state from pre-state
forms – but only as of the polities of а higher politogenesis stage from
the formations of а lower stage. The above-mentioned features do not
belong exclusively to the early state since other analogous forms of the
early state also possess them.
That is why, contrary to what one may often read in some re-
searchers’ papers, neither the degree of complexity, nor the territory size
and population density, nor the division into two or more strata
(Claessen & Scalnik 1978; Claessen 2002), nor the performance of ob-
ligationd demanded from the population (Claessen & Scalnik 1978;
Claessen 2002), nor the presence of towns (Adams 1966; see criticism
of this: Servise 1975; Claessen 1978), nor the spatial integration of set-
tlements (Lozny 1995: 90), nor the presence of ceremonial centres
which were all dense aggregations of buildings (see criticism of this:
Schaedel 1995: 51), nor the so-called secondary features of а primary
state formation process (Lozny 1995: 90) will not serve as an exclusive
feature of а state distinguishing it from pre-state formations. They are
encountered in many, or at least in some of the analogues of early states.
At the same time, however, some of these features may not be observed
in some or other early states.
The more so, such features do not allow to distinguish an early
state from its analogues. Many researchers implicitly believe that there
is only а single criterion (which actually is regarded as а single feature

5
by some of them or as а system of interconnected features by others),
but it is the only one by which an early state is distinguished from all
other forms of polities once and for all. However, there are at least three
such criteria distinguishing an early state from: а) pre-state forms; b)
early state analogues and c) already formed states. Applying only one
single criterion to all cases is practically impossible and unproductive.
Therefore, to solve the problem of disclosing the specifics of the early
state all the same, it should be divided into the following stages:
– First, to show the differences between the societies of the
early state stage from those of the pre-state stage. This has been done
above.
– Next, to look for the differences between an early state and its
analogues belonging to the same stage.
– Still next, to point out both similarity and dissimilarity
between an early state and already formed state. At this point one can
observe the emerging, still vague features of an early state become more
pronounced in а mature state, and, on the contrary, the transitional and
residual moments disappear.
When looking for dissimilarities between early states and their ana-
logues, one should take into consideration the fact. That, since both be-
long to the same development stage, the differences between them are
not as strong as between the societies of pre-state and early state stages;
they are not so evident, noticeable only in retrospect. This calls for
more delicate approaches and means, as well as more detailed ana-
lysis. To distinguish an early state from its analogues, I have elaborated
four features (Grinin 2002b) described as follows:
1. Special attributes of supreme power.
2. New principles of labour division in society administration.
3. Ability to break off from traditions and substitute traditions with
political will.
4. Redistribution of powers.
These features are abstract enough, and within their framework
some or other more specific trends prevailed in each of the polities. For
example, it should be understood that no early state could break away
from many of the traditions, not to mention all of them, immediately. In
each case it was most important to break away from one or another.
The singled out features make it possible to concentrate in them –
that is, to include as constituents – many of the moments pointed out by
various researchers as distinguishing features of the early state. This

6
concerns, for example, the differentiation and specialization of the
power and ability to delegate it (Claessen 1978: 576; Wright 1977;
Spenser 2000), the division of the society into the governing and gov-
erned strata, the emergence of the apparatus and repressive bodies (this
feature is especially frequently mentioned in Godiner 1991: 68), – all
these are included into the feature ‘the new principles of labour division
in society administration’. Or let us take Weber’s idea of state monopoly
for employment of coercion. This attribute is not infrequently regarded
as а feature of state. It is an organic component of the feature the ability
to break off from traditions.
However, it should be pointed out that although each of these fea-
tures must, to this or that extent, be present in each early state, none sep-
arate of them is exclusively characteristic of the state only. They may
also be found in some (or even many) analogues. But each feature un-
failingly demonstrates distinctions between the early state and certain
analogues in which it is missing. Thus, the features of an early state
that make it different from analogues should be regarded as а sys-
tem since no analogues exist that could exhibit all the features listed
in the required volume and completeness. Which shows that ‘we must
not think in terms of ‘pure’ types. The state is distinct even though it
holds many features in common with chiefdoms’ (Wason 1995: 23).
Now we shall elaborate on the features that we have singled out and
mark several lines within each of them.
1. Special attributes of supreme power
– Sufficient strength of the supreme power is what distinguishes
early states from those analogues in which it is quite weak or missing, as
well as from those where the primary task of the supreme power is to
preserve unity and consensus – of the types such as the Iroquois
(Vorobyov 2000), or Mesoamerican confederations (Beliaev 2000) or
more complex societies, for instance, Gaulish chiefdoms and towns (see
Le Roux 2000: 123–127). The indications of Reality and strength of the
supreme power are: sufficiently systematic character of its activities – at
least in certain important directions – and possibility to make any sub-
stantial changes in the controlled territories and to expand its authority.
– It is very important to point out the sufficient completeness of
functions of the supreme power (on functions see Service 1975: XIII;
Claessen 1978: 576). This is what distinguishes early states from their
analogues where the domestic rule is weak (since based traditions) while

7
the foreign-policy function is quite well developed – like in nomadic
empires (Kradin 1992, 1996, 2001).
– The ability to resist disintegration processes and tendencies (Co-
hen 1981).
2. New principles of labour division in society administration
– Divisibility of power and ability to delegate it. Indivisible power is
such power that cannot be temporarily transferred, delegated, distributed
and divided between several people without the risk of losing it partially
or completely. That is what it used to be in the pre-state and the majority
of the complex societies (Wright 1977; Spenser 2000). It is worth men-
tioning that indivisibility of power also means indivisibility of respons-
ibility of the ruler for of failures and disasters of all sorts. Accordingly,
divisibility of power does not mean its complete or partial loss but а
possibility to endow somebody with а measured portion of power pre-
serving the possibility to take it back or redistribute.
Turning to the early state, one may already talk about а considerable
degree of power divisibility. In pre-state and non-state societies, using а
sociological term, the rule of the Zero sum is in force meaning that if
somebody’s amount of power has increased, somebody else’s amount of
power has decreased (Smelser 1994: 545). As the apparatus develops,
the centre may delegate power to somebody, and the amount of its
power does not decrease because of this delegation (at least, it should
not). But since every functionary also has the power, as whole the
amount of power increases which fact definitely increases the oppor-
tunities of an early state in comparison with its analogues. In this way
power differentiation and specialization as well as division of adminis-
trative labour become possible which opens great possibilities for а soci-
ety to develop politically.
– In an early state, execution of supreme power functions becomes
detached from the supreme power itself (as the bearer of these func-
tions). Sometimes the delegation of tasks is mentioned (Claessen 1978:
576), but it is а somewhat narrower notion, it can be fond in analogues
as well. Now the functions of supreme power begin to be executed by
functionaries, deputies, specialists, etc.
– Peculiarities of apparatus formation. Greater social mobility of
the persons who execute state functions is characteristic of the state as
compared to many of its analogues. It is important to take into account

8
the degree of easiness with which people not belonging to certain elite
circles (kin, clan, etc.) are admitted to the apparatus (and the army).
– New type of professional administrators. Wittfogel used to say
that the state is administration by professionals (Wittfogel 1957).
However ‘а professional’ has quite а broad meaning. Many of the ana-
logues were also ruled by professionals. Mostly they were professionals
by inheritance. That is what the chieftains of various ranks were in
chiefdoms. As to the state, there were enough professionals by inherit-
ance, but professional functionaries (their classification see in Claessen
1978: 576) started to play а more and more significant part. Their rights
for а position differed, but among all of them we would specifically
single out the nominees – those who are appointed or hired to take cer-
tain positions or posts and are fully dependent from the ruler and the
power (e. g. see material on the role of royal servants in administration
in the Old Kingdom, Ancient Egypt) (Janssen 1978: 223). The advent of
functionaries intensified labour division in the sphere of administration.
(On dissimilarities in administration between chiefdom and state see
Diamond 1999: 274).
3. Ability to break off from traditions and substitute its with
political will
Administration of power according to tradition does not require а
special apparatus. But the deeper is the break off from tradition, the
stronger is the need for it. Therefore, paraphrasing the well-known
definition by Lenin, it can be said that the state starts there and then,
where and when traditional methods of administration stop working.
Since the number of traditions is great, they could change in as many
directions as well. But in each early state traditions change only at cer-
tain moments determined by historical and geographical circumstances.
Some of the important trends of such changes can be singled out:
а) Changes in the structure of the state and in the order of power
transfer; introduction or abolition of positions and bodies; b) changes in
the status, rights and obligations of persons, groups and total population
(e. g. see Tokarev, Kobishahchanov 1978: 257); c) changes in the ritual,
norms and customs; d) changes in the territory organization (see
Korotayev 2000: 245–246; Bondarenko 1995: 183–189) and spatial in-
tegration of settlements (Lozny 1995: 90); e) improvement of the mater-
ial independence of the government from the population. As а rule,
forced expropriation from the population has а larger scale in the early

9
states than in their analogues. However, the incomes of an early state are
not always connected with taxes levied upon its subjects or forced la-
bour (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 236).
4. Redistribution of powers (I have devised this concept (Grinin
2000a, 2002b) on the analogy with redistribution of goods). To control а
political situation, traditions are not always а sufficient means when
political situation exchanges especially. That is why the kind of fluctu-
ations и dislocations of the power happens from time to time in the
analogues (from the centre to the periphery and vice versa, from the
population to the elite and vice versa, from ones groups to others and
vice versa, from the aristocracy to the chieftain and vice versa etc). In
the early state this phenomena starts to transform into redistribution of
powers, that is, redistribution of powers and rights to take (execute) de-
cisions from the population, settlements, provinces and territories by the
centre (as а withdrawal of powers and rights from ones and transfer of
them to others).
Redistribution of powers means а more or less permanent two-
way traffic between the centre and the periphery, to and from, of
power functions, directives, actions and manpower and material re-
sources involved in it. This movement is aimed at maintenance of cer-
tain order, balance of interests in the society and solution of the prob-
lems that it faces, but by all means under the aegis of and control from
the supreme power. Conventionally speaking, it’s a re-orientation of the
streams of power functions and actions towards the centre where con-
siderable portion of the power is withheld (Cf.e.g. the statuses of metro-
politan and provincial nobility in the Old Kingdom, Ancient Egypt –
Perepyolkin 2001:191-192). As a result, the early state starts to
change relationships from within much faster than the analogues.
The above said does not exclude hesitations and temporary weakening
of the centre, disorder in the power redistribution system. Ultimately the
powers are redistributed in its favor.
But as the redistribution of welfare does not yet follow a permanent,
systematic and strictly controlled order, – the properties that taxes begin
to acquire, – the redistribution of powers similarly does not mean that
power circulates freely so that a power will would not face any obstacles
in bringing it to those to whom it is turned and controlling its imple-
mentation. Redistribution of powers is a state of transition from concili-
atory power to coercive. The political order has not been established yet,

10
so it requires heavy efforts from the government to retain the redistrib-
uted power.

REFERENCES
Adams, R.
1966. The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia and Pre-
historic Mexico. – Chicago: Aldine.
Ambrosino, J. N.
1995. Inter-societal contact and the rise of the state: a brief note work
in progress. In Kradin & Lynsha: 54-59.
Beliaev, D. D.
2000. ‘Joint Government’ in Mesoamerican History. In Bondarenko
and Sledzevski 2000: 13–14.
Bondarenko D. M., Grinin L. E., Korotayev A. V.
2002. Alternative Pathways of Social Evolution. Social Evolution &
History 1: 54-79.
Bondarenko, D. M. (Бондаренко, Д. М.)
1995. Бенин накануне первых контактов с европейцами. Человек.
Общество. Власть. М: Институт Африки РАН.
Bondarenko, D. M. & Korotayev, A. V. (eds.).
2000. Civilizational Models of Politogenesis. Moscow: IAf RAN.
Bondarenko, D. M. & Sledzevski, I. V. (eds)
2000. Hierarchy and Power in the History of Civilizations. Moscow:
IAf RAN.
Cabezas, J. M.
2000. Ethnogenesis and Politogenesis: Social Identify, Frontier and
Ethnogenesis as an Ongoing Dinamic. In Bondarenko & Sledzevski
2000: P. 29.
Carneiro, R.
1970. A Theory of the Origin of the State. Science 169: 733-738.
1978. Political Expansion as an Expression of the Principle of Com-
petitive Exclusion. In Cohen & Service 1978: 205-223.
2000. Process VS. Stages: A False Dichotomy in Tracing the Rise of
the State. In Kradin et all. 2000: 52-58.
2002. Was the Chiefdom a Congelation of Ideas? Social Evolution &
History 1: 80-100.

11
Chase-Dunn, C. & Hall, T. D.
1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press,
Claessen, H. J.M.
1978. The Early State: A Structural Approach. In Claessen & Scalnik
1978: 533-596.
2000. Problems, Paradoxes, and Prospects of Evolutionism. In Kradin
et all. 2000: 1-11.
2002. Was the State Inevitable? Social Evolution & History 1: 101-
117.
Claessen, H. J. M. & Scalnik, P. (eds.)
1978. The Early State. The Hague: Mouton.
Claessen, H. J. M. & Scalnik, P. (eds.)
1981. The Study of the State. The Hague: Mouton.
Claessen, H. J. M. & Oosten, J. G. (eds.)
1996. Ideology and the Formation of Early States. Leiden: Brill.
Cohen, R.
1978a. Introduction. In Cohen & Service 1978: 1-20.
1978b. State Origins: A Reappraisal. In Claessen & Scalnik 1978: 31-
75.
1981. Evolution, fission and early state. In Claessen & Scalnik 1981:
96-112.
Cohen, R. & Service, E. R. (eds.)
1978. Origins of the state. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Hu-
man Issues.
Crumley, C. L.
2001. Communication, Holism, and the Evolution of Sociopolitical
Complexity. In Haas 2001: 19-33.
Daniel, G.
1968. The First Civilizations. London: L.C. Card
Diamond, J.
1999. Guns, Germs, and Steel. The Fates of Human Societies. New
York, London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Doornbos, M.
1994. Early State formation and the present; reflection on identity and
power. In Bakel, M. van, Hagesteijn R., Velde, P. van de (eds.)

12
1994. Pivot Politics: Changing cultural identities in early state form-
ation processes (pp. 281-295). Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Earle, T. K.
1997. How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehis-
tory. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press,
2001. Institutionalization of Chifdoms. Why Landscapes Are Built. In
Haas 2001: 105-124.
Frazer, G. G. (Фрезер, Дж. Дж.)
1980. Золотая ветвь: исследование магии и религии. Пер. с англ.
М.: Политиздат.
Feinman, G. M. & Marcus, J. (eds.)
1998. Archaic States. Santa Fe – New Mexico: School of American
Research Press.
Fried M. H.
1967. The Evolution of Political Society. An Essay in Political Anthro-
pology. New York: Random House.
1978. The State, the Chicken, and the Egg; or What Came First? In
Cohen & Service 1978: 35-48.
Godiner E. S. (Годинер, Э.С.)
1991. Политическая антропология о происхождении государства. В:
Этнологическая наука за рубежом: проблемы, поиски, решения (С.
51-78). М.: Наука.
Grinin. L. E.
1997. Formatsii i tsivilizatsii. Gl. 4. Sotsial’no-politicheskie, et-
nicheskie i dukhovnye aspekty sotsiologii istorii [Formations and Civil-
izations. Ch. 4. Socio-Political, Ethnic, and Spiritual Aspects of the So-
ciology of History]. Filosofija i obshchestvo 5: 5–64.
1999. Соотношение развития государства и производительных сил (в
рамках всемирно-исторического процесса). Вест. Моск. ун-та. Сер.
12. Политические науки. 1: 17-27.
2000а. Proizvoditel’nye sily i istoricheskij protsess [Productive
Forces and Historical Process]. Мoskva: Teis.
2000b. Политогенез: генеральная и боковые линии (доклад на
Международной конференции «Иерархия и власть в истории
цивилизаций», Москва, 15-18 июня 2000). Волгоград: Учитель.
2000c. Politogenesis: General and Lateral Branches. In Bondarenko &
Sledzevski 2000: P. 51.

13
2001. Genesis gosudarstva kak sostavnaja chast’ protsessa perehoda ot
pervobytnosti k tsivilizatsii (obshchij kontekst sotsial’noj evoljutsii pri
obrazovanii rannego gosudarstva) [State Formation as a Component of
the Civilization Formation Process (General Socioevolutionary Context
of the Early State Formation)]. Part 1. Filosofija i obshchestvo 4: 5–60.
2002a. Genesis gosudarstva kak sostavnaja chast’ protsessa perehoda
ot pervobytnosti k tsivilizatsii (obshchij kontekst sotsial’noj evoljutsii
pri obrazovanii rannego gosudarstva. [State Formation as a Component
of the Civilization Formation Process (General Socioevolutionary Con-
text of the Early State Formation)]. Part 2. Filosofija i obshchestvo 2:
5-74.
2002b. Genesis gosudarstva kak sostavnaja chast’ protsessa perehoda
ot pervobytnosti k tsivilizatsii (obshchij kontekst sotsial’noj evoljutsii
pri obrazovanii rannego gosudarstva) [State Formation as a Component
of the Civilization Formation Process (General Socioevolutionary Con-
text of the Early State Formation)]. Part 3. Filosofija i obshchestvo 3
(in print).
Haas, J.
1995. The Roads to statehood. In Kradin & Lynsha: 16-18.
Haas, J. (ed.)
2001. From Leaders to Rulers. New York etc : Kluwer Academic/
Plenum Publishers.
Janssen, Jac. J.
1978. The Early State in Ancient Egypt. In Claessen & Scalnik 1978:
213-234.
Johnson, A. W. & Earle T. K.
2000. The Evolution of Human Societies: from foraging group to
agrarian state. Second Ed.– Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
Kochacova N. B. (Кочакова, Н. Б.)
1999. Ранее государство и Африка (аналитический обзор
публикаций Международного исследовательского проекта «Раннее
государство»). М.: Институт Африки РАН.
Kradin, N. N. (Крадин, Н. Н.)
1992. Кочевые общества. Владивосток: Дальнаука.
1995. From unilinear view to the state origin to the multilinear. In
Kradin & Lynsha: 7-15.
1996. Империя Хунну. Владивосток: Дальнаука.

14
2001. Кочевники в мировом историческом процессе. Философия и
общество 2: 108-137.
Kradin, N. N., Korotayev, A. V., Bondarenko, D. M., de Munck, V., and
Wason, P. K. (eds.)
2000. Alternatives of Social Evolution. Vladivostok: FEB RAS.
Kradin, N. N. & Lynsha, V. A. (eds.)
1995. Alternative Pathways to Early State. Vladivostok: Dal'nauka.
Korotayev, A. V. (Коротаев, А. В.)
2000. От государства к вождеству? От вождества к племени?
(некоторые общие тенденции эволюции южноаравийских
социально-политических систем за последние три тысячи лет). В:
Попов, В. А. (сост. и отв. ред.).
2000. Ранние формы социальной организации. Генезис,
функционирование, историческая динамика (С. 224-302). СПб.: МАЭ
РАН.
Kubbel`, L. E. (Куббель, Л. Е.)
1988. Очерки потестарно-политической этнографии. М.: Наука.
Le Roux F. (Леру, Ф.)
2000. Друиды. Пер. с фр. С.- Петербург: Евразия.
Lozny, L.
1995. The Transition to statehood in Central Europe. In Kradin & Lyn-
sha: 84-92.
Perepelkin, Yu. Ya. (Перепелкин, Ю. Я.)
2001. История Древнего Египта. С.-Петербург: Журнал «Нева»,
Летний сад.
Sahlins, M. D.
1960. Political Power and the Economy in Primitive Society. In Dole,
G. E. & Carneiro, R. L. (eds.). Essays in the Science of Culture (pp.
390-415). New York: Tomas Y. Crowell Company.
1972. Stone Age Economics. – Chicago: Aldine.
Schaedel, R.
1995. The temporal variants of proto-state societies. In Kradin & Lyn-
sha: 47-53.
Service, E. R.
1975. Origins of the State and Civilization. The Process of Cultural
Evolution. New York: Norton.

15
1978. Classical and Modern Theories of the Origins of Government.
In Cohen & Service 1978: 21-34.
Shanks, M. and Tilley, C.
1987. Social Theory and Archaeology. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Smelser N. (Смелзер, Н.)
1994. Социология. Пер. с англ. М.:Феникс.
Spenser, C. S.
2000. The Political Economy of Pristine State Formation. In Kradin et
all. 2000: 154-165.
Tokarev S. A., Kobishahchanov, Yu. M. (eds.) (Токарев, С. А.,
Кобищанов, Ю. М. (ред.))
1978. Община в Африке: проблемы типологии. М.: Наука.
Vasiliev, L. S. (Васильев, Л. С.)
1980. Становление политической администрации (от локальной
группы охотников-собирателей к протогосударству-чифдом). Народы
Азии и Африки 1: 177-186.
Vorobyov, D. V.
2000. The Iroquis (15th–18th centuries AD). In Bondaren-
ko & Korotayev 2000: 157-174.
Wason, P. K.
1995. Social Types and the Limits of Typological Thinking in Social
Archaeology. In Kradin & Lynsha: 19-27.
Wason, P. K. and Baldia, M. O.
2000. Religion, Communication, and Genesis of Social Complexity in
European Neolithic. In Kradin et all. 2000:138-149.
Wittfogel, K. A.
1957. Oriental Despotism. New Haven; Yale university Press.
Wright, H. T.
1977. Recent Research on the Origin of the State. Annual Review of
Anthropology 6: 379-397.

16

Related Interests