Social Sciences and the Military

An interdisciplinary overview

Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

Cass military studies

Social Sciences and the Military

Social Sciences and the Military presents a clear view of interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approaches to military and conflict-resolution studies from an international perspective, offering a thorough analysis of new thinking and movements within the social sciences when studying the military. Since the end of the Cold War, military operations other than war – crisisresponse operations, the fight against terrorism and hi-tech warfare – have posed a new set of human and social challenges for the militaries of all countries, problems of an intensity never before seen in peacetime. Sociology, social psychology, anthropology and the science of conflict are grappling with these issues, common to all armed forces, with a new fervour. Social Sciences and the Military offers an up-to-date view on the state-of-the-art of this theme, defining the new study trends in the field. Containing essays by some of the most highly regarded scholars on the subject, including David Segal, John Allen Williams, Donna Winslow, Vladimir Rukavishnikov, Slavek Magala and Joseph Soeters, this book is essential reading for all students of civil–military relations, conflict resolution and military studies in general. Giuseppe Caforio is President of the Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution Research Committee of the International Sociological Association. He is a founding member of ERGOMAS as well as being a member of several other institutes of research. He holds degrees in Strategic Sciences, Law, Political Science and Communication. His recent publications include: The Sociology of the Military (1998), The Flexible Officer (2001), the Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (2003) and (together with G. Kuemmel) the Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September 11th (2005).

Cass military studies

Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome Trust in the gods, but verify Rose Mary Sheldon Clausewitz and African War Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia Isabelle Duyvesteyn Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954–60 Defending the northern tier Michael Cohen The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale Edward George Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651 ‘The Genius of this Age’ Stanley Carpenter Israel’s Reprisal Policy, 1953–1956 The dynamics of military retaliation Ze’ev Drory Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War Enver Redzic Leaders in War West Point remembers the 1991 Gulf War Edited by Frederick Kagan and Christian Kubik Khedive Ismail’s Army John Dunn

Yugoslav Military Industry 1918–1991 Amadeo Watkins Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914–1918 The list regiment John Williams Rostóv in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920 The key to victory Brian Murphy The Tet Effect, Intelligence and the Public Perception of War Jake Blood The US Military Profession into the 21st Century War, peace and politics Edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. Civil–Military Relations in Europe Learning from crisis and institutional change Edited by Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jürgen Kuhlmann Strategic Culture and Ways of War Lawrence Sondhaus Military Unionism in the Post Cold War Era A future reality? Edited by Richard Bartle and Lindy Heinecken Warriors and Politicians U.S. civil–military relations under stress Charles A. Stevenson Military Honour and the Conduct of War From Ancient Greece to Iraq Paul Robinson Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy India, Iraq and Israel Timothy D. Hoyt Managing Defence in a Democracy Edited by Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville

Gender and the Military Women in the armed forces of Western democracies Helena Carreiras Social Sciences and the Military An interdisciplinary overview Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

Social Sciences and the Military
An interdisciplinary overview

Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJI Digital. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN10: 0-415-37646-7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96677-5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-37646-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-96677-8 (ebk) . or other means. Abingdon. Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic. mechanical. now known or hereafter invented. without permission in writing from the publishers.First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square. Giuseppe Caforio. NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group. Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave. or in any information storage or retrieval system. including photocopying and recording. New York. Padstow. the contributors. their contributions Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd. Boldon. Milton Park. an informa business © 2007 Selection and editorial matter.

social sciences and strategic thinking VLADIMIR RUKAVISHNIKOV 21 23 2 Current developments and trends in social research on the military DAVID R. SEGAL 46 3 Military organization and culture from three perspectives: the case of army DONNA WINSLOW 67 4 Political science perspectives on the military and civil–military relations JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS 89 5 Social history and the armed forces: military education and social change SLAWOMIR MAGALA 105 .Contents List of illustrations List of contributors Introduction: the interdisciplinary and cross-national character of social studies on the military – the need for such an approach GIUSEPPE CAFORIO ix xi 1 PART I General issues 1 Challenges of the twenty-first century.

MOOTW. CRO. and the military WILFRIED VON BREDOW 161 163 9 How the military can profit from management and organization science ERIK DE WAARD AND JOSEPH SOETERS 181 10 The military in post-communist societies in transition MARIAN ZULEAN 197 11 Trends and evolution in the military profession GIUSEPPE CAFORIO 217 12 Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective MARINA NUCIARI 238 13 Between legitimacy and efficiency: a comparative view on democratic accountability of defence activities in democracies HANS BORN AND INGRID BEUTLER 261 Index 287 . terrorism.viii Contents 123 6 From a psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach and beyond in military research: current status and trends JACQUES MYLLE 7 The study of workgroups in the military: an organisational aesthetics perspective ENRICO MARIA PIRAS 144 PART II New issues and emerging trends 8 Conceptual insecurity: new wars.

3 11.4 13.2 6.4 9. UAI and MAS dimensions Characteristics of political systems and oversight bodies in selected states General powers of parliament Budgetary powers of parliament Powers concerning peace support operations Parliamentary powers to influence government’s procurement decisions 69 73 76 80 184 187 242 258 267 270 273 274 277 .1 11.3 13.3 3.2 11.1 6.1 13.2 3.1 6.1 12.1 3.3 11.1 9.1 12.5 Characteristics of the three perspectives on organizations Integration perspective Differentiation perspective Fragmentation perspective Three approaches to flexibility Definitions of modularity Index of women’s military integration in NATO (IWMI) Position of NATO countries according to PDI.2 12.3 UN Peacekeeping operations timeline TG023’s Command Team Effectiveness Model Difference in heartbeat pattern under imbalanced versus balanced conditions Logo of the International Military Testing Association Terrorism as threat perception and mission assigned Opinions in favour of conscription Trend of reasons for choosing a career as an officer Main qualities of the “good officer” Perceived social image of the military profession Index of women’s military integration in NATO countries Cultural map of 81 societies Support for gender equality in nine cultural zones 5 128 130 138 227 227 228 229 231 241 249 251 Tables 3.Illustrations Figures I.4 11.2 12.2 13.2 13.5 12.

10 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies .8 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: country ranking 13.9 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in different democratic systems 13.7 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: category ranking 13.6 Parliamentary powers to influence government’s defence policy decisions 13.x Illustrations 278 280 281 282 283 13.

.A. a Law degree. The Double Democratic Deficit (2004). She is currently consultant at the Office of the Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace. teaches international relations at the Institute for Political Science at Philipps University Marburg (Germany).Contributors Hans Born is Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). His most recent publication is Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (2003). Among his main research interests are Germany’s foreign and security policy. Ingrid Beutler. Who is Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Agency Accountability (2005). as well as being a member of several other research institutes. His latest publication is Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. BA. civil–military relations and the future of the military profession. His projects focus on: democracy and the use of force. He is president of the Research Committee 01 “Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution” of the I. He is also an outside consultant of the governmental Italian Centre of Strategic and Military Studies.S. Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practices for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (2005). human rights of armed forces personnel. the development and the demise of the East–West conflict. Giuseppe Caforio is a retired general in the Italian Army. PhD. civil–military relations. His recent publications include the Handbook on “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector”. jointly published in 30 languages by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and DCAF in 2003. LLM. Wiesbaden (VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften. LLB. accountability of the security sector. and Civil–Military Relations in Europe (2006). Wilfried von Bredow. He has a Strategic Sciences degree. and a Masters degree in Communication Science. is an international lawyer and former research assistant at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). vice-president of the Italian Inter-university Centre of Historical and Military Studies. 2006). founding member of the ERGOMAS.. a Political Science degree.

Vladimir Rukavishnikov has been Professor in the Department of Global Politics and International Relations of the State University – Higher School of Economics in Moscow since the autumn of 2003. University of Torino and a founding member of the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). gender studies. military sociology and cross-cultural research. He started his career as an Armoured Reconnaissance officer. Course in Strategic Sciences. His areas of research include micro-practices of organising and control. She is Professor of Military Sociology. considered from an organisational aesthetics perspective. University of Torino. He is also involved in several forums of applied military psychology. Formerly he was affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. Appointed Chief Officers’ Selection. His research focuses on democratisa- . He is on the editorial board of Qualitative Sociology Review. Marina Nuciari has been Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Economics. His current interests include the studies of post-communist transformations. She is a member of the International Sociological Association. since 1992. 2005). paradigmatic gambles in social science and management of knowledge and tradition. In 1991 he was called to the Royal Military Academy as Head of the Psychology Department. since 1993. His most recent publication is Cross-Cultural Competence (Routledge. he earned a PhD in Psychology with a thesis on The Structure of Post-traumatic Stress Reactions After a Man-Made Disaster. and member of RUCOLA (Research Unit on Cognition. Enrico Maria Piras is a doctoral candidate in “Information Systems and Organisation” at the University of Trento.xii Contributors Slawomir Magala Professor of Cross-Cultural Management at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. “Machiavelli and von Clausewitz for Managers”. His main field of research is in modelling factors that contribute to the optimisation of a soldier’s behaviour in peace-support operations. His research networks include: Standing Conference on Organizational Symbolism and Standing Conference on Management and Organization Inquiry. 1 – Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. Currently he is working on research on the relation between organisational learning and norm production in the Italian Armed Forces. since 1986. he graduated as a psychologist. Jacques Mylle graduated from the Royal Military Academy. Organisational Learning and Aesthetics). She is a member of the Associazione Italiana di Sociologia (AIS) and the author of many volumes and articles in the fields of general sociology. Italy. Head of the Department of Organizational and Personnel Sciences. and of its Research Committee n. He teaches “Global Networks of States and Markets”. Master in Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences. He is Editorin-chief of Journal of Organizational Change Management and Journal of Cross Cultural Competence and Management. She was Chairperson of ERGOMAS 1992–6 and has been a member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

Processes. Cold Peace (Moscow.S.J. David R. papers and books in Russian and other languages. Bryant) and co-edited and contributed to The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (with Charles Moskos and David R. analyses the public perception of the USSR/Russia in the USA and Europe from the early 1930s until the present day. Chicago. and Public Policy. and Professor of Sociology. He subsequently studied business administration at Radboud University. Nijmegen. and on civil–military relations and foreign and security policies. Segal). entitled Cold War. essays. the most recent one on civil wars and terrorism (Routledge. War. Dr Williams chairs the Academic Advisory Committee of the National Strategy Forum in Chicago.Contributors xiii tion. and Politics (with Sam C. and Social Conflict of the American Sociological Association. E. he is also affiliated with Tilburg University and TIAS Business School as a Professor of Organisational sociology. at the University of Maryland. His works were published in more than 12 different countries. She is . the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society. He co-authored U. He became a platoon commander in the Air Mobile Brigade. (Erik) de Waard graduated from the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in 1994. as well as evaluation of policy programmes in developing countries. and the District of Columbia Sociological Society. where he teaches organisational strategy and design. He has written over 200 scholarly articles. His research interests focus on international military cooperation. and fulfilled a number of operational executive functions in the world of business. Sarkesian and Fred B. He is a former president of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association. the use of organisation studies in operational military situations. Government and Politics. and a former chair of the Section on Peace. public opinion and value changes in Russia. and is Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He has published over 150 articles and chapters in books (in seven languages) and he has (co-)edited and authored ten books in Dutch and English. Professor Doctor Donna Winslow is an award-winning anthropologist. 2005). His latest monograph (in Russian). He is currently preparing his doctoral thesis on modular design in the armed forces. He retired as a Captain in the US Naval Reserve with 30 years of commissioned service. Since 2001 he has worked as an assistant professor at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. Segal is Director of the Center for Research on Military Organisation. John Allen (“Jay”) Williams is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University. Joseph Soeters is a Professor of Management and Organisation Studies at the Netherlands Defense Academy. 2005). National Security: Policymakers.

PhD in Sociology. the former Yugoslavia. She currently holds the Chair of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam and teaches at Royal Netherlands Military Academy in Breda. 2005). In the following years she conducted several other researches among Canadian Forces deployed to Afghanistan. CT: JAI Press. All these studies have been published. he taught Policy Analysis. the Golan Heights and on European Defence. Security and Society at the University of Ottawa. Kummel (eds) (Greenwich. in Military Missions and their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th. She began developing the field of military anthropology from 1995 to 1997 as a technical advisor to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. His latest publications are: “Civil–military cultural gap in Romania”. He is a member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS). G. As an academic. holds a Masters degree in International Affairs/International Security. RC01 of International Sociological Association and ERGOMAS. International Security and Civil–Military Relations. . Marian Zulean. Caforio and G.xiv Contributors the former coordinator of the Programme for Research on Peace. Currently he is an adviser with the National Security Department at the Office of the Romanian President and Associate Professor at the University of Bucharest.

while other disciplines – history. an approach. psychology. scholarly need has probably always existed in this direction but. cross-national studies of the military Modern social-scientific study of the military is usually traced back to the work of Samuel Stouffer’s team in the United States in 1942–5. Today. As is widely known. the results of which were published following the Second World War (Stouffer. as the cooperation and interaction of various scientific disciplines – instead of growing and expanding to extend the array of disciplines involved. In the subsequent development of studies and researches on the military. diversification and importance of the military function imperiously calls us back to interdisciplinary. political science. statisticians and others. aimed at overcoming national boundaries. I introduce this dimension. etc. this need finds currency and instruments when problems of a practical. much more than in the past.Introduction The interdisciplinary and cross-national character of social studies on the military – the need for such an approach Giuseppe Caforio Premise The need for interdisciplinary. The more properly sociological studies. cross-national studies of the military. although often carried out by scholars from neighbouring disciplines. that is. concrete nature become urgent.2 have continued in accordance with a line of investigation of their own. this interdisciplinarity – understood. anthropologists. that was certainly interdisciplinary and perhaps (but I leave this assessment to historians of the social sciences) also transdisciplinary1 ante litteram. as already occurred for our subject of study at the time of The American Soldier. has been lost. because both the problems and the dimensions of deployment of national armed forces now amply exceed the confines of individual countries and can no longer be studied and solved in a narrow national perspective. without much interaction between them. – have taken other roads. as often occurs for the social sciences.3 law. this was a study conducted jointly by a team of sociologists. as I shall describe more fully below. a need for the cooperation of several disciplines in the study of the military? A theoretical. such as political scientists. the increased complexity. But why does one feel today. psychologists.4 A more specific analysis of the conditions in which the military operates . 1949).

with all its inadequacy. as the following example. but for now it is sufficient to point out that the parallel and often contemporaneous existence of new and old forms of warfare. What a representative cross section of these soldiers has to say about its childhood experiences is therefore of interest going well beyond concerns about adjustment in the Army. demonstrates. might predispose people to confront new situations effectively or ineffectively. drawn from the old research. It is for this reason that sociologists should integrate their efforts with social and organizational psychologists. as one example among several. The body of data now to be reviewed is. many new terms have appeared in the literature to indicate this change. .5 If the scholar. (Soeters. “revolution in military affairs”. the increased conflict following the end of the bloc politics. 2003). the researcher. like “fourth-generation warfare”. scholars in public administration and even anthropologists . 1960) of many missions. I am not the first to express this need. Dealing with pre-army experiences in childhood. pose the military and its leaders (at all levels) a new set of problems with respect to the recent past. 2000: 136) Moreover. . almost unique. The American Soldiers were representative of every aspect of American life . . Let me cite here. . (Stouffer. interdisciplinary approach. according to various psychiatric theories. must provide elements of knowledge and interpretation of the phenomena that can invest the military today. Samuel Stouffer writes: Psychiatry has been so predominantly clinical that very little statistical evidence exists as to the presence or absence in a cross section of American people of experiences which. the machinery now exists to assemble even better inventories in the future for representative cross sections of the entire American public. Through modern methods of sampling and of question design. This new development may bring back the old idea of one holistic social science. it no longer seems possible (or sufficient) for this to occur in a satisfactory way with a monodisciplinary approach. As recently summarised by Harry Bondy (Bondy. because there are too many factors of various origins that impact and determine these phenomena. of course. The American Soldier. and the growing constabulary aspect (see Janowitz. and “postglobalism”.2 Giuseppe Caforio today is given later in this chapter. so that “military culture can only be understood and shaped by an inter-disciplinary approach that addresses individual and group behaviour”. single disciplines can also gain advantage from a broader. political scientists. 1949: 130) . what Joseph Soeters recently wrote: Problem based research – and this is what decision-makers ask for – does not account for disciplinary boundaries. “postmodernism”.

problem or phenomenon is studied with the contribution of various disciplines that cooperate to achieve a common result of greater knowledge.e. it seems especially important to fix the confines between the two and explain the choice made here for the former. It means that different social scientists belonging to different disciplines work together for a single specific project. seems to require first passing through a phase of interdisciplinarity. anywhere in the world. as the author goes on to say. This is a condition that has occurred rarely. it appears far from having remedied the consequences of the extreme specialisation mentioned above. differentiation and fragmentation. “multidisciplinarity” (or “pluridisciplinarity”) and “transdisciplinarity” have often been used either as synonyms or at least with little semantic precision.7 I accept here the definition of interdisciplinarity as a process in which a certain aspect. for our sector. such as those offered as examples by theoreticians of this concept. Following. in this case. We instead have transdisciplinarity when the boundaries between the various disciplines have been exceeded from the start and the approach to the phenomenon to be studied is effected within a stable system that is already multidisciplinary in itself and aimed at joint problem-solving.Introduction Terminological clarifications 3 It seems advisable to precede further development of this topic with some terminological stipulations. often specific and limited. of each socialscientific discipline”. in reality. since scientific disagreement seems to have occurred particularly between the two concepts of “interdisciplinarity” and “transdisciplinarity”. perhaps partially only once. Each discipline retains its independence and its boundaries. to be achieved. with shared methodologies. in social research applied to the military9 and to our knowledge does not now appear to be present. therefore.10 a simultaneous tendency towards interdisciplinary integration is in progress. in any case. i. historically. It is not out of place to recall here that the term “transdisciplinarity” in particular gave rise to a real school of thought whose roots go back to a conference held in France in 1970. 2000) describes as “the growing specialisation. the term “multidisciplinarity” represented only a specification of interdisciplinarity.8 that unites scholars of different disciplines and keeps them in a single place of study and research (today also virtual) to define. This also because. internal disintegration. The choice of the term “interdisciplinarity” to define the type of approach that seems necessary in studying the military today derives from my personal conviction that the transdisciplinary approach is more proper when an organisation exists.6 And. what I feel is a prevalent current of thought on this point. as the terms “interdisciplinarity”. unitary way. the current general condition of the various social sciences is what Piotr Sztompka (Sztompka. And even if. and that. Indeed. 2003). plan and study a research subject. in a joint. And since the approach of the behavioural sciences to study of the . to signify that the initial interaction between two disciplines was becoming interaction between several disciplines (Sztompka.

has also been preferred to other current terms. non facit saltus. to cite the most common. pacified world for its development where it can expand and conquer markets.1). like nature. rightly or wrongly. because science. empirical science. in fact. The other term that characterises the title and the subject of this chapter. and on the other proposes to identify. This has produced an initial and extraordinary growth of constabulary operations (see Figure I. This approach should create the basic knowledge necessary for transdisciplinary studies and empirical researches. 2004) of national borders and specificities than a comparison of situations and problems. Free trade. and to “transnational”. necessary objective like that of interdisciplinary study of the military and its actions and interactions. whose equilibrium was nevertheless a strong guarantee of the preservation of some sort of status quo. the champions of statism. but far from being generalised and complete. which seems more appropriate for a transcending (in progress partially and locally.12 they have been called “new wars” (see Mary Kaldor. the very force that enabled the West to win the confrontation with the opposing bloc. ethnic conflicts. “cross-national”. the disintegration of states and the birth of new state entities often in conflict with each other – phenomena all strongly at odds with the free-trade and globalisation needs of the victors in that war. and later also of conventional but asymmetric warfare11 against states that. such as “international” and “transnational”. The general framework of change The end of the Cold War and the resulting disappearance of the two opposing blocs of states. see Deaglio. we cannot suddenly go from the current prevailing mono-disciplinarity in studying the military to trans-disciplinarity. 1999). appeared to prevent the conditions necessary for the ongoing globalisation. the purpose of this project is to create the conditions that drive scholars to reach an interdisciplinary mindset. particularly from a practical point of view. Therefore. through the knowledge of what the contribution of different disciplines could be in studying the subject. it seems pragmatic to shoot for a first possible and. without neglecting national peculiarities. acknowledges on the one hand a growing parallelism of problems and situations in the different countries (at least those at a comparable stage of development). . through comparative surveys. have spoken of a clash of civilisations (Huntington. as will be shown later. Cross-national is meant here as defining an approach which. lines of development and possible common solutions. which seems better suited for identifying the external relations between countries than comparing their internal situations. 1993). while others. needs a peaceful. to go on step-by-step and. to define the salient aspect of the geopolitical framework.4 Giuseppe Caforio military is certainly no exception to this general framework. We have. For lack of a better term. opened a Pandora’s box from which have progressively and tumultuously emerged religious wars. It has been preferred both to the term “international”.

as well as mercenaries and private military companies. They include: para-military groups organised around a charismatic leader. in a later publication (Kaldor. warlords who control particular areas. 2001). As Kaldor further writes (2001): “The strategy is to gain political power through sowing fear and hatred.” The essence of the resulting war operations could also be described as organised crime (illegal or private violence) or as massive violations of human rights (violence against civilians). The form of warfare that is waged by these networks is what I call “new war”.13 by a diligent effort to exploit the media. characterises the new wars as follows: A typical new phenomenon is armed networks of non-state and state actors.1 UN Peacekeeping operations timeline (Source: data from un.org/Depts/dpko/ timeline).14 by consciously and determinedly ignoring any ethical standard. Kaldor herself. These new forms of warfare appear to be characterised by a prevalently political and ideological (often religious) nature. Further. units of regular forces or other security services. to create a climate of terror.Introduction 100 90 80 70 Percentage 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1948 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 5 1986–9 1990s 2000s Figure I. fanatic volunteers like the Mujahadeen. the financing of this type of war generates a particular type of economy. terrorist cells. to eliminate moderate voices and to defeat tolerance. thus described by Kaldor (2001): . organised criminal groups.

It is this need for rational solutions or. because. through support from sympathetic states and through remittances from members of the networks. as José R. All this in an international scenario that. having broad international legitimation. Rationality in the conduct of war. Serano (2000) observes.16 I have lingered over this new type of warfare precisely because it is new. . they have to seek alternative. writes. 2003). And it is the complex nature of these problems that motivates (it is the thesis of this chapter) the recourse to an interdisciplinary and cross-national research. They raise money through loot and plunder. they may behave ‘irrationally’ in order to undermine it” (Barylski. if possible by the UN (re-emergence of the concept of just war). operations of a constabulary nature have already brought substantial differences in the exercise of command for officers at the various levels. since: 1 The decision-making process is decisively shifted towards lower levels of the hierarchy. But what interests us most here is seeing the consequences of this different international conflict scenario and understanding what changes it brings for the exercise of the military function. now appears to be called into question by this type of war. a phenomenon that is still current and extensive. As I have had to occasion to write. rather.15 This is what happens in the practice of terrorism. through “taxing” humanitarian assistance. exploitative forms of financing. and why the need typical of the time of The American Soldier to provide sound answers to new. through illegal trading in drugs. real problems for those operating in the military is renewed today. illegal immigrants. cigarettes and alcohol.6 Giuseppe Caforio Because these networks flourish in states where systems of taxation have collapsed and where little new wealth is being created. and which is not only quantitative. cut off trade and create a climate of insecurity that prohibits investment. for example. that gives rise to the push for scientific research in the social field. where the very definition of the concept is rather controversial among scholars. as Barylski. but I hasten to point out that it does not replace either traditional warfare. as well as (a matter of no small importance) the assigning of means to conduct it. avoiding “collateral damage”. and where the wars destroy physical infrastructure. for example (Caforio. and indeed rendered more complex by new technologies (technical warfare).17 It is merely a new form of conflict that joins the previous ones and helps to make contemporary warfare increasingly complex and composite. whose strong growth I have already shown. namely. a heritage of Western thought at least since the writings of Clausewitz. or constabulary operations. sets three new limits on all military intervention by the developed countries. if possible – as further proof of legitimacy. “When your enemies realize that your rational strategy has them cornered. and being carried out by international coalitions – broad. for elements of knowledge for identifying such solutions. 2001).

The officer has to deal with different rules of engagement from operation to operation. . religions. Due to the oft-cited “CNN effect”. the commander at each level finds himself having to compete with the media in ensuring news is quickly transmitted to his own military leadership. almost a disappearance. 6 A radical asymmetry between the sides in the value attached to human life. 7 The blurring of the boundary between combat forces and civilian populations. Relational problems can also arise in regard to local populations of different cultures. 9 The taking and unscrupulous use of hostages. 12 The presence in conventional operations of many aspects typical of constabulary operations (such as multinational contingents. 8 The civilian populations of countries that supply units or support the war effort become targets of terrorist attacks.18 3 The absence of a Clausewitzian rationality in the adversary’s behaviour. Even commanders at lower levels often take on a political role. Flanking constabulary operations with operations of conventional but asymmetric warfare and new wars has brought another range of new conditions. 10 The spectre of imprisonment no longer guaranteed by international laws of war. 11 A steady trickle of human losses.Introduction 2 7 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Even small units find themselves interacting with units of other nations that are often characterised by quite different professional ethical codes and value systems. with personal and family problems for all personnel. with heavy effects on unit morale.19 4 The difficulty of clearly identifying adversaries and predicting their moves. whose way of thinking and operating can be quite different from that of the military units. relational problems with local populations) which make the necessary models of conduct more complex. political role of commanders. An unusually high frequency of deployments in missions has become commonplace. etc. with possible elements of uncertainty or contradiction. the line of national command overlaps the international one (or ones). Not infrequently. It is often necessary to cooperate with non-governmental organisations. 2 The prospect of war without end against an enemy whose objectives are unclear.20 5 The necessity of operating in a generalised situation of guerrilla warfare. such as (without pretending to be exhaustive): 1 A muting. of the difference between war and peace situations. rules he or she must know how to interpret in the concrete case and make lower ranks understand and apply. CNN effect.

strategic and international studies institutes (sometimes connected. and particularly officers. others separate). to no longer rely on one specific competence only. and also leads to concrete requests on their part. to indicate only the most important. the threats relate to the essential aspects of the person (life. as countless studies have shown (so numerous that I would be hard put to select citations). Problem-based research is what the military needs.8 Giuseppe Caforio All of this occurs in a framework in which the stress factors characteristic of war as such are nevertheless all still present.21 for example. they can be summed up as a condition where nearly all of the individual’s needs are compressed and deprived of gratification. They are easily recognisable by the fact that. In addition. and the individual ego is assailed by anxiety. The list of these disciplines reveals a strongly felt need for interdisciplinarity in education as well: they ask to be better trained in foreign languages. fear. Interdisciplinarity and the study of armed forces The state of affairs As mentioned in the first section of this introduction. international politics. seven out of ten officers declared that they encountered shortcomings in their basic preparation during their constabulary deployment and indicated a series of topics and disciplines that they hoped would be focused on and/or studied more in that preparation. communication science. In a recent cross-national study coordinated by me. especially officers. individualism is often stifled. study . but be able to cope with seemingly contradicting demands. we have to consider that in approaching problems that occur in everyday military practice. prediction and the resulting planning of the military. various disciplines deal with the social study of the military. history. military personnel. as De Waard and Soeters note in Chapter 9. among others. sociology. However. intercultural management. 1949). It is common for armies to have study centres on military and social psychology (often specialised in psychometrics and aptitude selection).e. they correspond to government study centres or. international law. uncertainty and a sense of impotence (see. As described in the prevailing literature. boundaries between academic disciplines are highly artificial and clearly unproductive. i. meaning those disciplines to which those in authority normally turn to gain elements for insight. and in following such an approach interdisciplinarity will be inevitable. pain. only some of them have an operational dimension. radical value conflicts are created (contrast between moral codes and combat codes). in the developed countries. physical integrity). first and foremost for greater and different preparation of military personnel. The heavily changed scenario in which the armed forces of the developed countries find themselves operating is clearly perceived by those who work within them. if private. Stouffer. ones that are nevertheless used by government agencies dedicated to the armed forces. need to acquire an ambidexterity. and the study of religions.

the InterUniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS). despite conducting studies on the military and despite being at times (see The American Soldier) called to contribute to government-commissioned studies on the subject. which every year holds interesting and well-attended study conferences on issues of interest to it. but so far their collaboration has not managed to extend beyond periodic exchanges of good wishes and invitations to the other’s initiatives. and at times leadership studies centres. there is an association of political scientists who devote themselves to the study of the military in the International Political Science Association (IPSA). organised according to a new dimension (not a single discipline but the social sciences in general). Thus. which promotes several international conferences and a broad biennial conference. like cultural anthropology. in the framework of the International Sociological Association (ISA). it is extremely rare for centres devoted to other studies to set up joint researches.Introduction 9 centres devoted to the sociology of the military. which. looking at the general landscape of the social studies. literature. the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). political economy. a group of disciplines exist that have greater public recognition than others. A third worldwide association on this theme. but they have no point of contact. to list only a few. This is a trend that must also be rationally applied to the study of the military. this book is aimed at giving the reader a first worldwide view of . generally do not have their own centres for study and research on the military and are not even included. free from governmental constraints and public regulations. therefore.22 as well as a large association of European scholars of military sociology. broader involvement (not only national studies but. the International Military Testing Association (IMTA). ethical philosophy. we see that interdisciplinary and cross-national approaches are becoming the rule and the “new deal” for social research today. with a nearly identical name. as far as possible. it is not difficult to imagine what the situation is between the different study centres within the individual countries. nor mutual knowledge. in multivalent study centres. also in view of the fact that. even though its membership is not limited to sociologists. crossnational ones). and they are still quite far from promoting joint research initiatives. Recognition of this situation has led to my project for attempting to overcome it. and with an approach directed more at the future than the past (more study of the lines of trends and development than analyses of past situations). Other disciplines. conflict resolution science (or the neighbouring polemology and the like) and organisation science. As regards the study of the military. unites all scholars of the sociology of the military at the world level and. there is a research committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. But even staying within the first group. no longer has a relationship with the IPSA. institutes for the study of military history. there is a European centre for psychological studies (psychometrics and aptitude selection) on the military. To give examples from my own experience. normally. On a larger scale.23 And if this occurs for international non-governmental associations.

It opens with a chapter by Vladimir Rukavishnikov that expands. forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policy around the world. An exposition of global strategic thinking. offers a broad historical picture of social and behavioural science research on the military from Herbert Spencer up to our times. Segal and the political scientist John Allen Williams that follow. specifies and deepens the picture of the current international situation that I have already briefly sketched in the preceding section. the status of studies on the military in each one. Here strategic thinking and the social sciences find a reason for synergetic collaboration aimed at creating a general security architecture for today’s globalised world. a choice that is far from exhaustive and only provides a sampling. This verification is limited only to a few disciplines.10 Giuseppe Caforio the new aspects. One of the interesting aspects of this chapter is that. Rukavishnikov’s chapter delineates the political fundamentals and then goes on to identify the challenges of the twenty-first century as drivers for strategic thinking. and prospective of the tendencies and lines of development of the selected disciplines. and that he defines as follows: “The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 totally transformed the strategic landscape. This part is both descriptive of the various approaches as they are today. tendencies and contributions of the human sciences (all human sciences) in studying the military universe. devoted to the general framework of change. Rukavishnikov points to globalisation and the new technologies applied to the military. challenges that appear largely linked to social change. although it offers a worldwide vision. In addition to geopolitical changes. chosen in relation to their significance for the study of the military. Purposes and content of the book The first part of the book attempts – to my knowledge for the first time in the history of our field of study – to give an account of the approaches of different disciplines to the study of a complex organism and phenomenon like the military. it is written by a Russian scholar and therefore from a vantage point that differs from the pre-eminent (American) literature on the topic. Segal. through the contributions of specialists in the individual disciplines. with the consequent revolution of military affairs. The book’s perspective is therefore that of verifying. The reader will thus find interesting elements for comparison and contrast with the rather America-centric chapters by the sociologist David R. with his chapter on “Current developments and trends in social research on the military”. . in order to create a common platform of knowledge for scholars and organisations interested in an interdisciplinary approach to the subject.” But there is more than one reason for this transformation.

In the course of this analysis. as well as changes in the modern world system and in the nature of warfare. But they have also been gaining in social importance: Segal points out. This leads to an analysis that starts out from a macro level – that of the organisation as a whole – and arrives at the micro level of the single individual. each one provides focused information and different levels of insight that. the differentiated approach refers to analysis of the subgroups and to informal cultures. of which single individuals are often bearers. over time. who prefers to document it through a concrete subject of investigation: the largest (and most studied) armed force.” He also points out that the approach of the social sciences24 to the military in America has been interdisciplinary from the start. can bring us closer to a full comprehension of the investigated subject. Starting from different observation points. integrated. The anthropological point of view is presented in the chapter by Donna Winslow. is therefore carried out by analysing the literature on army culture according to three perspectives – integration. and in impact both within the disciplines and more broadly in society. especially by the dominant American sociology of the military. the army. the army. in part the applied orientation of military behavioral science that emerged in the twentieth century. and the fragmented one refers to the contradictions and ambiguities internal to the organisation’s culture. to a . due both to the emergence of problems common to numerous countries – from the shift away from conscription to the changed spectrum of missions entrusted to the military – and to the sharing among several countries of the responsibility of guaranteeing international security. differentiation. The social sciences in the study of the military today.Introduction He starts stating that: 11 Current concerns in social and behavioral science research on the military reflect in part the philosophical foundations of the social sciences. a significant difference of coherence is pointed out between the three levels: from a general coherence at the macro level. in fact. that military studies since the end of the Cold War “have grown significantly in substance. The chapter then offers a broad overview of the themes dealt with. The theme of the changed military function in the post-Cold War and the resulting challenges that this change poses to the social sciences in studying the military is particularly present in Segal’s contribution. fragmentation – where the integrated approach refers to the themes and the fundamental structures of the organisation and its formal values. says Segal. The chapter emphasises the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach since no subject can be examined thoroughly from a single point of view. and in part recent developments in social science conceptualization and methodology. Winslow’s investigation into her chosen concrete subject. also appear to be characterised by an extensive internationalisation of the field. in size.

adopts an America-centric perspective. as already mentioned.” Notwithstanding this. which takes in all three of the perspectives. So if one can say that Segal’s chapter lays special emphasis on the internationalisation of military studies. But this incoherence is not negative. Winslow. This partitioning connects her chapter with that of Enrico Maria Piras (Chapter 7). Indeed. that of Winslow undoubtedly places it on interdisciplinarity. finally. however. says Winslow. declaring: “Although the center of gravity in military sociology may well be shifting toward Europe. in an organisational aesthetic perspective. “the fragmentation perspective will be the most useful concerning the complexity of the future”. scholars of the military who identify themselves as political scientists are primarily from the United States. too. Winslow feels that the winning approach is the multidimensional one. to an incoherence at the fragmented level. and basic assumptions. precisely in an interdisciplinary perspective. the theme of artefacts as a characterising cultural element is fully developed. Slavomir Magala takes a historian’s view of a theme typical of political . political scientists are largely concerned about the relationships of individuals and groups with formal governmental institutions”. which is the sizeable presence of military professionals among scholars of military studies: the figure of the soldier–scholar already identified by Morris Janowitz (1960) is increasingly present in bibliographies on this theme.12 Giuseppe Caforio coherence internal to single groups in the differentiated approach. Interdisciplinarity does not mean loss of identity of the competing individual disciplines. noting that “while sociologists look at relationships between and among groups in society. says Williams. too. espoused values. He. places the accent on the necessity of making these studies more interdisciplinary. Finally. have a purely political science perspective. the confines between sociological studies of the military and those conducted from a political science perspective are rather fuzzy and therefore the author is careful to define what studies. a sophisticated understanding of the military is more important than ever before”. distinguishes three levels of culture: artefacts. In defining the military culture. “political science is the core of interdisciplinary studies of the military”. the contribution that political science can make to the study of the military is central because. because “as militaries assume more domestic security functions traditionally associated with police forces. Williams also emphasises a phenomenon that not only regards political science but the other disciplinary approaches to the military as well. He. in his view. Her reference to the future regards the use of the military in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). says Williams. where. but it seems to me that it can be extended to deployment in asymmetric warfare operations. drawing on Schein (1996). His overview appears aimed at highlighting the importance of the political science perspective in studies of the military. On the advisability of having different vantage points. John Allen Williams presents an overview of the contribution of political science to military studies.

Magala asserts the importance of correct historical reconstruction in preventing imperialistic tendencies. this pertained precisely to the USSR. since “the human being is a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity and.Introduction 13 science: power. historically. so that it inculcates a democratic mentality in them that will produce an internal control of the armed forces. with a chapter whose purpose is not “to write an encyclopaedia of military psychology but to demonstrate through a selection of topics which issues were addressed in the past. the problem is a grave one for today’s Russia. free of the hidden injuries of an authoritarian state which uses militarization as a chief instrument of domestic and foreign policy. a civilian and military education of this type “is a threat to European integration. Added to them for the study of the military is “the dramatic change of the operational context”. which takes on the importance of a fifth milestone in such studies. the fundamental question that poses itself is: can military education and education about the military promote sustainable loyalty to alert and knowledgeable citizenry? According to the author. And since the primary factor of democracy is education. Having staked out the role of history in the education both of citizens in general and of military cadres in particular. the discovery of the unconscious. and contemporary Russia does not appear to have sufficiently come to terms with or disavowed it. he writes. For these reasons. through a historical excursus that covers the whole period of the Cold War and with a parallel USSR–US comparison. It is therefore necessary to place special attention on the professional training of military officers. Describing first of all how the power of the nation-state survived regional aggregations and alliances. global stability and gradual reconstruction of a community of democratic civil societies. the history of Russia needs to be rewritten: this. of both military personnel and civilians. how to facilitate Russian reconciliation with their own past on terms other than those dictated by the power elite commanding absolute power in the authoritarian state.” The contribution of psychology and the behavioural sciences is offered by Jacques Mylle. and the integrative view of the human being as a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity. Magala points out that. particularly the power of the military–industrial complex. an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to explain as much as possible of the observed variation in behaviour”. namely the experimental approach in studying the mind. In analysing imperialism. the interactionist view. hence. . in both of these big countries.” Mylle first lays out a synthesis of the history of psychology in general and identifies four milestones that particularly interest military psychology.” Indeed. the military is attributed powers that escape all democratic control. “is the main problem of the European Union as far as Russia (the state and civil society) and Russian armed forces are concerned. he then asserts that. And it is precisely from the integrative view of the person of the soldier that the need for the contribution of diverse disciplines to the study of the military arises. and how they are dealt with nowadays in a military context.

irrespective of nationality. organisation. This necessity derives not only from the already mentioned integrative view of the soldier’s person. I wanted to give. In a second case study it is a single artefact that takes in an aesthetic category of beauty and a charge of feelings perceived by the members of a group and by them only: an element therefore of cohesion and identification of the group itself. that is used to show the negative impact that the use of artefacts to perform an unrealistic drill for the benefit of a general visiting the unit has on the morale and self-esteem of the members of a third group examined. The investigation of organisational artefacts allows Piras to discover and describe situations and states of mind of individuals and groups that are hard to analyse through the usual processes of rational. this type of investigation brings him to materialise the particular sense of family belonging of special units. such as education. some individual emerging themes which certainly regard the new security landscape but do not pretend to exhaust the subject: evolution of the military profession. multicultural and multiservice. a sense of belonging identified as pathos. problems of democratic control over the armed forces emerging from an increased presence of the military in public life. The concrete exemplification that Piras presents to us in this chapter thus offers an interesting new way of looking at group processes in the military. but also from a new de facto situation where military operations are prevalently multinational. pointing out how all these fields show the necessity of not staying within the narrow framework of the discipline but of realising an approach that is as interdisciplinary as possible. application to the military of management theory. as state of mind. To do this Piras makes use of concrete case studies on some workgroups in the Italian military forces using in particular the organisational artefacts as windows to look inside the workgroups. training. where possible in an interdisciplinary fashion. and utilises aesthetics as science of sensory knowledge as an alternative to the processes of rational knowledge. Cartesian knowledge. women soldiers. mission rehearsal. operations. In the first of the three cases examined. And it is again the category of beauty. some concrete examples of an approach to individual case studies that is no longer solely monodisciplinary. displayed by an Italian paratrooper contingent. through the contributions of other colleagues. and the current and new . even partially unconscious.14 Giuseppe Caforio Mylle then moves to a review of the researches and initiatives of the behavioural sciences in the study of the military in various fields of application. operations support and clinic. treating. this time contrasted with the grotesque. the ongoing transition in the East European countries. This second part is intended to give greater concreteness to the book. In Part II. This is a very interesting approach precisely because it realises one of those different – and totally different – vantage points needed for better knowledge of the subject of study called for in the fundamental essay by Donna Winslow. Enrico Maria Piras’ chapter is centred on recouping sensoriality over pure rationality.

for the first time. or by military operations becoming prevalently multinational. . which. often make recourse to a broad exemplification of concrete cases. probably the most significant ones today and for the medium-term future. The basic assumptions of this volume – the profound change of the military function. whether due to the multinational nature of missions (Mylle). whether determined by geopolitical factors and globalisation (Rukavishnikov). even if certainly not the only ones. in both parts of the book. all that remains is to point out that the need for an interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary approach to an ever-more-complex subject of study. often superseded by the reality of the single contributions. can affect the organisation (Winslow). My hope is that the combination of the two parts of the book can provide both the basic stimulation for an interdisciplinary approach to study of the military and a concrete demonstration of its feasibility. Here the problem arises on how the culture external to the military. Caforio). or to the commonality of problems in the different countries (Rukavishnikov. just as the military is a commonly felt one – even with differing and competing motivations – by the scholars from various disciplines present in this book: the superiority of an examination of the subject of investigation from different vantage points advocated by Donna Winslow finds full confirmation and acceptance here by all the contributors. Piras. Finally. or perhaps also by the historical inversion of the influence of the military organisation on civilian ones (De Waard and Soeters). Mylle. regarding as it does the sphere of a special sociology. transnational homogenisation of the various parts of the military (Piras). Emphasis is also placed by all on the profound change that the military function has undergone at the turn of the millennium (the transformation of war cited by von Bredow). And to conclude So. It is an intention. or to the growing transversal. an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the military.Introduction 15 forms of struggle constitute a set of topics and issues of great currency and importance. Nuciari. However. but then applying it to the concrete reality of the subjects of greatest topicality. multicultural and multiservice (Mylle). a sociology applied to a concrete subject of social investigation. Caforio. Rukavishnikov. the need for an interdisciplinary. many of the contributors to this volume (Born. Segal. Zulean) emphasise the need for crossnational research. The link between the two parts is therefore represented by the intention of taking. cross-national approach to its study – thus appear to be amply analysed and demonstrated in the various chapters. to finish up this introduction. such as national culture. so that it appears difficult at times to distinguish where a theory is being presented and where an application of it is being made. I consider this concreteness a positive feature of this work.

on peut espérer voir succéder une étape supérieure. whether or not they were on any else’s agenda before. and. p. The point is that when they come to a head.16 Giuseppe Caforio which. . 6 The workshop “L’interdisciplinarité – Problèmes d’enseignement et de recherche dans les universités”. offer a first sampling of this new and necessary dimension of military studies. 144). Marilyn Strathern expresses this same concept when she writes: Bluntly put. one must gather what tools there are to hand to deal with them. mais situerait ces liaisons à l’intérieur d’un système total sans frontières stables entre les disciplines” (Proceedings. . à l’étape des relations interdisciplinaires. especially when couched in terms of public concern. 7 See. Indeed. dealing with the job of the Research Branch. Notes 1 For definitions of “interdisciplinarity” and of “transdisciplinarity”. Julie Thompson Klein gives the following definitions of three of the four terms examined here: . see the following section. Julie Thompson Klein (1996) and Joseph Kockelmans (1979). one way in which the social sciences “advance” is in response to current issues. further: “New types of professional will have to be trained to perform these roles which blend civilian and military functions.or inter-disciplinary nature of the expertise they seem to summon. . qui serait ‘transdisciplinaire’. might be helpful in policy formation. the other part of the International Political Science Association. that is. when they seem imperative to study. wish to venture into multidisciplinary research on single concrete aspects and themes of our subject of study. (2002) Samuel Stouffer. On that occasion. qui ne se contenterait pas d’atteindre des interactions ou réciprocités entre recherches spécialisées. In his contribution. in his introduction.” It is interesting to point out here that. taking up the challenge. without much communication between them. As a result. perhaps for the first time. In particular. (Stouffer. this volume aims to offer itself as a model for those who. . . held in Nice (France) from 7 to 12 September 1970 (Proceedings published by OECD in 1972). as follows: “Enfin. 3 As proof it is significant that there are two distinct international associations of scholars of the military. military science. for example. such situations are often identifiable by the multi. and Western ethical tradition to develop and evaluate the performance of our civilian and military leaders as they intervene in ethno-national conflicts”. Piaget gives the first known definition of transdisciplinarity. cooperation of the ethical disciplines together with the more traditional politico-military ones is invoked. Helga Nowotny (2004). in relation to the preparation of politico-military elites: “We need criteria that bring together elements from political science. Basarab Nicolescu (1999). wrote: Its purpose was to provide the Army Command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which. These are moments which present themselves as requiring attention. for example. 4 In a general sense. 2 Such as Samuel Huntington. Jean Piaget was the thinker who first coined the word “transdisciplinarity”. . along with other facts and inferences. precisely in the difference of the various methodological approaches. 1949: 5) 5 The same concept is expressed by Barylski (2003). one within the framework of the International Sociological Association.

see Chapter 8. data. where a bridge from the fifteenth century or so can still bear the name of “Ponte Nuovo” (“New Bridge”). hot wars between states scrambling to safeguard their vital interests. (1996) Oren Lieberman writes that “Interdisciplinarity means bridging between humanities (alpha-sciences). Economic and ethnic rivalries. often brought into close contact by globalisation. the Tofflers insist that we need to rethink how we make war and how we make peace. See The American Soldier. Histoire). that can cause asymmetric conflicts.) (1949). spawned by very different civilisations and often indifferent to the principles of rationality that characterise our world. Julie Thompson Klein et al. Writing that. The DACH project is an international cooperative effort across Germany. the Institut Universitaire Kurt Bosch. when military confrontation between countries belonging to different stages occurs. On the use of media by terrorists. Multidisciplinarity – the juxtaposition of disciplines in an additive rather than integrative and interactive fashion. Austria and Switzerland. heightened the threat of small. Which reminds me of what one sees in some old Italian towns. and the Santa Fe Institute. the Center for Theoretical Study in Prague. Defila and Di Giulio. chemical and biological weaponry. . technological). CIES (Centre Interfacultaire d’Etudes Systémiques). religious fanaticism. . in a new discourse.. 1993). (2001) reports that transdisciplinary interests are addressed by such diverse groups as CIRLA (Center for Interdisciplinary Research in the Liberal Arts). According to Alvin and Heidi Toffler (Toffler and Toffler. or epistemology of multiple disciplines around a particular question. natural sciences (beta-sciences). industrial. they write that The coexistence of three fundamentally different types of civilizations . problem. Anthropologie. sont des fabricants de représentation du terrorisme” (p. 1994). producing an encyclopedic alignment of multiple perspectives. it is the coexistence in the world of countries in three different stages of civilisation (agrarian. we are witnessing intra-disciplinary disintegration accompanied by inter-disciplinary integration” (Sztompka. theme. CETSAH (Centre d’Etudes Transdisciplinaires – Sociologie. 2000. see the deep analysis by J. genetically engineered “superplagues”. In addition. we can cite the US Transdisciplinary Tobacco Use Research Centers and the DACH project. . in conclusion: “Thus. Transdisciplinarity – a higher stage of interaction that entails an overarching framework that organizes knowledge in a new way and. not less. the authors point to the increasing threats of nuclear terrorism. while today Western ideology finds itself up against much more primitive belief systems. . and various allied causes are likely to produce more. methods.L. both tending to a rationality of their own and offspring in any case of the same civilisation. and the arts” (Lieberman. of course. 45). from preconditions to criteria of evaluation (Dahinden et al. Marret (2003). 2000). cooperation of multiple sectors of society and stakeholders in addressing complex problems. social sciences (gamma-sciences). The difference is that the clash then was between two ideologies that we might call “evolved”. 2001). Also the confrontation of blocs of states typical of the Cold War had an ideological character. political demagoguery. or idea. where he states: “Le médias occidentaux . and other horrors of technologically aided warfare. the erosion of nation-states’ sovereignty. For a broader insight of this new face of war. Against this background. The project surveyed researchers on a broad range of questions about transdisciplinary research. As to the new face of war.Introduction 17 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Interdisciplinarity – a label for a variety of interactions that aim to integrate concepts. Samuel Stouffer (ed. In addition. They describe what they see as “a true revolution in military thinking” taking place in response to today’s changing economic and technological imperatives. armed conflicts in the coming years. .

18

Giuseppe Caforio

15 A significant example is offered by Barylski himself where he writes, referring to the war in Kosovo: Most of our military planning and investment went into the modernization of more conventional warfare. Hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of fighting power was mobilized against Milosevich’s small, lightly armed units who moved from town to town and terrorized the Kosovar Albanians. Military and paramilitary units equipped with Kalashnikovs, Lugars, knives, and clubs implemented horrific ethnic cleansing while NATO generals enthralled their publics with images of the new high-tech warfare. After several weeks of this new warfare and billions of dollars of material costs, it became clear that Milosevich’s despicable gangs had been able to drive some 800,000 into exile in a matter of weeks. (Barylski, 2003, 6) 16 I can quote here two official definitions. The first is from the US Mitchell Commission (2001) and states: “Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population.” The second comes from the European Commission and defines terrorism as an “Offense intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country.” 17 In the 1990s, indeed, constabulary operations often took on a tougher aspect, that is, compulsion with military force, where agreements did not appear possible or were not respected, so that traditional peacekeeping was flanked by what is called “muscular peacekeeping” or “second-generation peacekeeping”. 18 In the case, for example, of the fight against Islamic fundamentalism (“war on terror”, as American President George W. Bush has called it), reasonable demands on the part of the fundamentalists have not emerged, beyond the broad one of smashing Western imperialism. 19 Lee Harris writes in this regard in Policy Review: Behind this shared assumption stands the figure of Clausewitz and his famous definition of war as politics carried out by other means. The whole point of war, on this reading, is to get other people to do what we want them to do: It is an effort to make others adopt our policies and/or to further our interests. Clausewitzian war, in short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring about a new state of affairs through the artful combination of violence and the promise to cease violence if certain political objectives are met. (Harris, 2002) 20 Such as to lead some authors to claim the need for interpretation through the use of complexity theory (Gore, 1996; Thomas, 2003). 21 See Caforio, The Flexible Officer, 2001. The study was conducted on a sample of 371 officers from nine different countries, all with prior experience of participation in MOOTW. The concept of flexibility is also amply employed by De Waard and Soeters in Chapter 9. 22 As well as other international occasions of this type, such as the International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, which celebrated its fortieth anniversary in Oslo (Norway), May 2004. 23 It may be interesting to note that several scholars devoted to the study of the military are members of more than one of the mentioned international associations, so that there is some overlap among them. 24 He examines, in particular, the developments of sociological thought, social psychology and political science on the theme.

Introduction

19

Bibliography
Barylski, V. Robert, “Learning from the Chechen and Kosovo Wars – Standards for Ethnonational Conflicts”, paper presented at the IUS Biennial Conference, Chicago, 2003. Bondy, Harry, “Toward a Postmodern Transformation of Military Culture”, paper presented at the 2003 International Biennial Conference of the IUS, Chicago. Caforio, Giuseppe, The Flexible Officer: Professional Education and Military Operations Other Than War – a Crossnational Analysis, Gaeta, Artistic and Publishing Company, 2001. Calhoun, C., “Introduction to Roundtable on Rethinking International Studies in a Global Context”, Items & Issues (U.S. Social Science Research Council), 2002, 3: 1–4. Dahinden, U., Bonfadelli, Heinz and Leonarz, Martina, “Biotechnology: Dimensions of Public Concern in Europe.” In: Scholz, R.W., Häberli, Rudolf, Bill, Alain and Welti, Myrta (eds) Proceedings of the International Transdisciplinarity 2000 Conference: Transdisciplinarity – Joint Problem Solving Among Science, Technology and Society. Workbook II: Contributions to the Mutual Learning Sessions, Zurich, Haffmans, 2000, pp. 47–51. Deaglio, Mario, Postglobal, Bari, Laterza, 2004. Defila, R. and Di Giulio, A., “Inter- and Transdisciplinary Processes – Experience and Lessons Learnt.” In: Kaufmann-Hayoz, R. and Gutscher, H. (Hrsg.), Changing Things – Moving People, Strategies for Promoting Sustainable Development at the Local Level, Themenheft Schwerpunktprogramm Umwelt. Birkhäuser, Basel, Boston, Berlin, 2001, pp. 337–56. Gore, John, Chaos, Complexity and the Military, Washington, National War College, National Defense University, 1996. Habib, H.B., Towards a Paradigmatic Approach to Interdisciplinarity in the Behavioral and Medical Sciences, University of Karlstad, Karlstad, 1990. Harris, Lee, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology”, Policy Review, 114, 2002. Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), Summer 1993, 22–49. Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait, New York, Free Press, 1960. Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Kaldor, Mary, “Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control”, paper presented at the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium, 6–8 December, 2001. Klein, J. Thompson, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1990. Klein, J. Thompson, Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities, and Interdisciplinarities, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1996. Klein, J. Thompson, Grossenbacher Mansuy, W., Häberli, R., Bill, A., Scholz, R. and Welti, M. (eds), Transdisciplinarity: Joint Problem Solving among Science, Technology, and Society, Basel, Birkhäuser, 2001. Kockelmans, Joseph, Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979. Lambert, R. “Blurring the Disciplinary Boundaries”, Divided Knowledge: Across Disciplines, Across Cultures, Newbury Park, CA, Sage, 1991, pp. 171–94. Lieberman, Oren, Interdisciplinarity to Transdisciplinarity: Rethinking the Boundary in Architectural Learning, paper presented at the University of Strathclyde, 1 September, 1994.

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Marret, Jean Luc, Terrorisme: les strategies de communication, Paris, C2SD, 2003. Mittelstraß, Jürgen, “Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science”, Innovative Structures in Basic Research (Ringberg-Symposium 4–7 October 2000), Max-PlanckGesellschaft, Munich, 2002, pp. 43–54. Nicolescu, Basarab, O manifesto de transdisciplinaridade, São Paulo, Triom, 1999. Nowotny, Helga, The Potential of Transdisciplinarity, Interdisciplines, 2004. Online, available at: www.interdisciplines.org/interdisplinarity/papers/5. Royaumont Project, Transdisciplinarity: Stimulating Synergies, Integrating Knowledge, 1998, Paris, UNESCO. Schein, Edgar H. “Three Cultures of Management: the Key to Organizational Learning”, Sloan Management Review, 40–51. Serano, José Romero, “Ideas estrategicas para el pròximo milenio.” In: Pere Vilanova and Rafael Martinez (eds) Seguridad y defensa en el siglo XXI, 2000, 11–18. Soeters, Joseph, “Military Sociology in the Netherlands.” In: Kuemmel, G. and Puefert, A. (eds) Military Sociology: the Richness of a Discipline, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000. Somerville, M. and Rapport, D. (eds) Transdisciplinarity: Recreating Integrated Knowledge, Oxford, UK, EOLSS, 2000. Stouffer, Andrew Samuel (ed.), Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949. The first two volumes, under the better-known title of The American Soldier, were published in 1947. Strathern, Dame Marilyn, “In Crisis Mode: a Comment on Interculturality.” In: Barry, A. and Slater, D. (eds) Economy & Society, spec. issue, “The Technological Economy”, 2002, 31: 250–67. Strathern, Dame Marilyn, “Robust Knowledge and Fragile Futures.” In: Ong, Aihwa and Collier, Stephen (eds) Oikos and Anthropos: Rationality, Technology, Infrastructure, Oxford/New York, Blackwell, 2005. Sztompka, Piotr, “Cultural Trauma: the Other Face of Social Change”, European Journal of Social Theory, 2000, 3, 449–66. Sztompka, Piotr, “Toward a Transdisciplinary Social Science.” In: Kosinski, L.A. and Pawlik, K. (eds) Social Science at the Crossroads: Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Science and Social Policy in the 21st Century, ISSC, Paris, 2003. Thomas, Leonard, “Complexity, Non Linear Thinking and Intelligence Analysis”, paper presented at the 2003 International Biennial Conference of the IUS, Chicago. Toffler, Alvin and Toffler, Heidi, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1993. Ziman, J. “Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity in Research.” In: Cunningham, R. (ed.) Interdisciplinarity and the Organization of Knowledge in Europe, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999, pp. 71–82.

Part I

General issues

1

Challenges of the twenty-first century, social sciences and strategic thinking
Vladimir Rukavishnikov

Introduction
The end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policy around the world. Today the world is located at a transitional stage, from the East–West confrontation that formed the model of international relations in the twentieth century to a new pattern of international relationships, creating a huge opportunity for constructive cooperation and the settlement of conflicts by political means, dialogue and compromise. Although there are certain grounds to name this period as Cold Peace, all of us know that the world order of the twenty-first century belongs to those who build it. Now it is time to think on how to build it – a future of greater peace, security, prosperity and freedom – and to predict the possible problems. There had been a sharp growth in the number of internal crises, civil wars and violent ethnic conflicts around the globe during the years after the end of Cold war.1 This means the entire world has unfortunately not rid itself of military dangers. One may also add that less predictable regional armed conflicts had displaced the previously overarching but predictable global one. The geography of armed conflict in the last decade of the past century had changed as well. Europe, which during the years of Cold War did not have a single armed conflict, had quite a few. It leads social scientists and the military analysts to new debates on war and peace issues both in a “Clausewitzian” and non-Clausewitzian way of thinking, while at the same time trying to look to the future, to understand the new world order.2 The politicians and the military leaders, in their turn, focused on the implications of the rapid geopolitical change and economic globalization accompanied by the scientific–technological revolution on the security sector, on the debates about new missions of the armed forces and their organizational structure, maintenance and training.3 Armed forces have to adjust not only to a new strategic environment of international relations but also to a rapidly changing society. Almost everywhere the process of defining a new foreign policy, security and military strategy is unfolding. The objective is to provide guidelines on how the armed forces could be used in support of national security and defense policy in a new security environment.

” otherwise simply as “NATO enlargement. and the burden of history. and about the role of the military as a national and/or international instrument in safeguarding the nation and shaping the new global order. the indirect influence of social sciences on contemporary military thinking may be found in the official strategic documents. an ever-greater role is being played by economic. Indeed. The process of globalization forces the nation-states to adhere to a cooperative international system with all sorts of mechanisms for non-violent conflict regulations where armed forces are mainly viewed as an instrument of collective security. political. or the disruption of trade agreements and environmental disasters – can pose real threats to both national and global security. the Russians favored describing the process as “NATO expansion. But. ecological and information factors. the breakdown of law and order in faraway regions. That is why in the first section of this chapter we present a brief review of main global challenges together with a general discussion of the impact of science on security thinking. Theoretical debates in the social sciences are almost always perceived by the military analysts as “rather abstract” and “nonpragmatic” ones. current military might and economic capacities.” Terms “expansion” and “enlargement” are virtually identical terms in English but not in the Russian language. and the repulsion and cessation of aggression against the nation and its allies. where they have different meanings: “expansion” has a distinctly aggressive connotation. Vital interests include the securing of the integrity and inviolability of a country’s territory.4 and social science helps to discover most important drivers in time. and on the way people think. which – . Interests are the main driving force of politics. That is why. As the global economy is becoming increasingly interdependent. of course. quite recently regarding NATO’s intention to accept new members. Indeed. but over and over again such a discussion serves as an impulse for the broader public discourse on policy. The way of examination of newly emerged challenges is equally important. the conclusions and recommendations of civilian experts are often articulated in a “too scientific” way. not only historical experience equips minds for making military–strategic calculations. They are national interests. Challenges of the twenty-first century may be considered as drivers for strategic thinking.24 Vladimir Rukavishnikov Several fundamentals determine policy of the state in both long-term and short-term perspectives in each country. scientific and technological. We have to point out the complicated relationship between the social science and re-making of strategy. including the way the military staff thinks. values. This past leaves its mark on the development of society. While the military power still retains significance in relations among states. in a most obvious way. Each nation steps into the future carrying the heritage of its own past. the old threats and new challenges taken together tie the security and well-being of people in any country to events beyond their borders more than ever before. present-day internal and external threats. goals. For instance.” while the Americans and the Europeans tended to refer to the process as “joining NATO. today incidents formerly considered peripheral to national security – the spread of ethnic and religious conflict.

The Military Doctrine presents a system of strategic views. taking into account the available resources. and the USA and its NATO allies. The doctrine explores the military–strategic environment. both immediate and longer-term ones. on the other side. the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept. society and state against external and internal threats of any nature. The enemies were to be the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. The task for analysts is to dispel the real security threats. The rearrangement of the hierarchy of threats that occurred after the Cold War and the terrorist attack that occurred in the USA on September 11. and international treaties signed by the name of the given state. generally recognized principles and norms of international law. one always recalls the invention of nuclear weapons that forced the revision of military strategy in the second half of the twentieth century. build-up and development of the Armed Forces in the interest of national security and promotion of peace and stability in the region and the world as a whole.6 Due to a lack of room in this chapter. have been reflected in a revision of earlier approved strategic documents. principles and approaches to ensure national security in military–political and military terms. This document defines the security objectives and reviews the risk factors that currently threaten the security of the given country. During the years after the creation of nuclear weapons. and conforming to the level of guarantees which provide the global and regional security system. The legal basis of these documents consists of the Constitution of the state and other legislative acts that regulate the activity of certain bodies of state power in foreign and security policy. Global challenges and the impact of science on security thinking When speaking about the impact of science and technology on the military thinking. The public perception of threats has changed as well.5 The National Security Concept represents formally adopted general political goals on protecting the citizens. on one side. and to recommend possible paths and methods for countering them. and defines defense policy priorities and directions of employment. Three kinds of documents are most important in this regard: the National Security Concept. 2001. challenges and goals to be achieved. the USA and the Russian Federation exert a significant influence on the formation of the world order of the twenty-first century.7 Being permanent members of the UN Security Council. and this fact was registered by opinion polls. we’ll take a brief look on general changes in concepts and doctrines. there was a consensus that the big war of the future would most probably be a worldwide nuclear war. The projected World War III . possessing a substantial potential and resources in all spheres of the activity and maintaining intensive relations with the leading states of the world.Challenges of the twenty-first century 25 no matter how they would be named – needed to declare clearly the list of threats. The Foreign Policy Concept is a system of views on the content and main areas in the foreign-policy activities of the given state. focusing mainly on American and Russian grand strategies.

but all of humanity would be annihilated. and the weapons of mass destruction are still around in very large numbers. commonly held in Russia) to the use of one or a few devices by a socalled “rogue nation” or subnational terrorist groups against the United States or one of its allies (a popular version in the West). Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons – by slowing the spread of nuclear capabilities among states. thanks to the efforts of many states. peace enforcement. . The conclusion was a result of scientific researches.” which some time ago was popular both in the USA and the Soviet Union. each side considers victory to be its ultimate goal. the nature of the nuclear threat has fundamentally changed. it is the total defeat of the enemy’s armed force as the main objective of destruction. As a consequence of this sad truth.8 At the end of the 1960s. the threat of nuclear weapon use lost its former value in the theory and practice of containment of communism. There would be no victor in such a clash. and. it was based on the conviction that the first sudden massive nuclear strike could not be successfully implemented without the act of retaliation. above all Russia and the United States. but the number of state-members of the “nuclear club” is growing despite the efforts of the international community to stop the process of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Strategists both in the USA and the USSR agreed that the basic form of combat actions in this war would be the nuclear strikes by ICBM and heavy bombers and the counter-actions of the anti-air and anti-missile defense forces in deflecting these strikes. which was the core of US foreign policy. then. although the possibility of a protracted war was not excluded. The world has undoubtedly gained from the diminishing of a scale of this deadly threat. Second. According to the classical theory of war. Older people may remember in this regard a theory of “massive nuclear retaliation.26 Vladimir Rukavishnikov considered as the decisive clash between “the world of communism” and “the world of capitalism. first of all. Strategic offensive operations in ground theaters of military actions were planned as the way to exploit the nuclear strikes of strategic forces.10 Nonetheless until recently the military considered the nuclear deterrent as the ultimate mean of defense. over the last decade. it is the undermining of the enemy’s economic power. nuclear weapons lost much of their relevance for international security. when Soviets and Americans had actually reached nuclear parity. The war was expected to be short. the two sides began to lose their illusions concerning the possible outcome of the global nuclear war. and US security and military doctrines since 1948.9 With the end of the nuclear stand-off between the Soviet Union and the United States. The immediate threat of global nuclear war has significantly declined. Third. Could the victor achieve all above-mentioned goals in the nuclear war? The answer was negative. it is the replacement of the unfriendly government which started the war (plus the destruction of the enemy’s political system as the ideologically motivated goal).11 On the other hand. and now it varies from the large-scale attack against Russia by its possible enemies (the central point of view on this issue. But what does “a military victory” mean in the classic sense? First.

even though the cost of the modern high-tech weaponry tends to be very high. but . defense expenditures of the main powers fell significantly. Worldwide terrorist incidents revive fears of 9/11 and ignite talk about the global terrorist network of Islamic extremists. and international prestige – all of which contribute to national strategy.16 The dynamics of defense spending is the indicator of dominant strategic viewpoints. It is the foundation of economic and military strength. After the end of the Cold War. to counter terrorism. and if so. we have to say that science and technology.Challenges of the twenty-first century 27 assuring that nuclear devices do not get into the hands of terrorist groups. which ultimately resulted in the appearance of new. What is more or less clear from the Russian experience is that. This theme has occupied the headlines and front pages of newspapers and magazines since the September 11 terrorist attack in the US. one may conclude that present-day thinking about global security has narrowed down to little more than five-to-seven international issues. and those that cannot afford to renovate their armaments. the government must coordinate justice and home affairs to good effect. unquestionably.12 Scientific and technological expertise is essential to any country’s security. those that benefit from its advantages. and protecting existing stockpiles – has thus become as high a priority for leading nuclear powers as deterring major nuclear attacks. The first issue is international terrorism. Indeed. are drivers for change in the military–strategic thinking. not for local low-intensity conflicts or fighting against terrorists.14 Today.13 The revolution in military affairs and the onset of information warfare and operations is silent. Does the new rise of defense spending mean that inherited geopolitical ideas still influence the thinking of military strategists and politicians? Is it possible for an interstate war to break out somewhere. are currently on production lines. highly effective means of conducting war that have a great influence on tactics and strategy of combat operations. intelligence capabilities. as the Russian officials name it) can be included in this news group as well. the tendency is the opposite – defense spending is increasing essentially not only in the USA but also in the EU. The point to be stressed here is the dynamics of global defense spending. China. It has always led to the competition between projectile and amour designers. The military always attempt to exploit advanced technology. the great uncertainty created by the growth of total world military expenditure is the challenge humanity is facing today to its long-term security. The state must react. maybe in a circumlocutory form. and the history of nuclear weapons may serve as the best proof of it. to its very survival. between whom and by whom is it to be undertaken? On these questions the policy analysts should be ready to present an answer. Turning back to the starting point. Looking through the press reports and mainstream publications in the domain of international studies.15 What is important in this regard is that new types of weaponry for interstate wars. India and the like. Russia. The age-old “projectile vs amour” problem continues to live. but it creates a truly strategic gap between the countries. The endless war in Chechnya (or the counter-terrorist operation.

Democracy is on its way over the planet. The last. it is becoming clear a few suggestions for radical resolution of the protracted conflict are not enough. together with Europe and the USA. a concentration of such people in certain areas creates social tension which.28 Vladimir Rukavishnikov avoid over-reacting. although no one can say that there is a one-way. The rise of drugs flowing over the Afghan–Tajikistan border has emerged after the fall of the Taliban regime. The third issue is US-lead military interventions and their consequences. Although today’s Russia is trying. the latest cases to mention are Kosovo (1999). The clear understanding of the roots of terrorism in each case is also important. jeopardizes inner stability. up to now. The fourth point is a long-drawn-out problem of proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. The fifth issue is an increased traffic of narcotics from Asia (basically Afghanistan and South-East Asia). nor the US-led coalition peacekeeping forces are effectively controlling the situation in Afghan provinces. The sixth issue is the illegal immigration and the illegal traffic of people to the EU and the Russian Federation. to break that deadlock. The second issue is the non-stop conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians that has been running since the late 1940s. point to mention is political turnouts that change the local and international political landscapes. causeand-effect relationship between ongoing democratization and stability and peace on the global level. It is an indicator that neither the new central government. Immigrants are often recruited by terrorist cells. but not least. we have to notice that. or unidirectional. Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003). and/or that there are no facts to support a reverse tendency. in its turn. the “leaks” of information about the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran fire the constant public interest in this theme. What is quite clear is that the “export of democracy” on American bayonets is becoming a factor jeopardizing regional stability.17 There are no concrete benefits that justify the costs and risks of US “global leadership” (a euphemism for “world policeman”). including greater reliance on the UN and regional security organizations. The media emphasize the necessity of international cooperation in the joint struggle against this real global threat. Misunderstanding between the USA and the Russian Federation concerning the essence of the Iranian atomic energy program may be noted in this regard. This enduring issue has many dimensions. because the discrepancy concerning the definition of terrorism still exists. While Americans insist that we are entering a new epoch of war and the twentyfirst century will be the American century. which increase the profits of international organized crime despite all the efforts of the international community and police to fight it. Europeans argue America’s “global war on terrorism” neglects lessons from the past. . the UN has never agreed on what is terrorism. as the post-Saddam Iraq shows. This issue is a heritage of the Cold-War past that overshadows the observed future. sporadic acts of violence in that area leave the world in despair. but there are several alternatives to American global leadership. etc.

In short. Kofi Annan. We also understand that lasting peace requires a broader vision or the so-called idea of comprehensive security which includes the people-centered concept of human security. environmental problems.18 For instance. Specifically. as determinants of potential internal and regional conflicts. and the security and military doctrines focused only on immediate threats are myopic. Human security is complementary to state security. the population of the largest part of the world that served as the locus for most twentieth-century history will shrink dramatically in relative terms. on regional. Global warming is a security problem that is still underestimated. the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization. today we know that global security means far more than the absence of global conflict. Thus demographic factors will serve as catalysts and shapers of political instability and conflicts inside and among nations. by 2050 it will be near to 7–8 percent. namely in their human dignity and their worth as a human being. which may rise from these pressures in the foreseeable future. in 1950. This shift will demand an appropriate reaction.Challenges of the twenty-first century 29 Important as these issues are. together with a blind hatred towards the USA and other richer nations. at the beginning of the twenty-first century this share is about 10–13 percent. “We know that we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of injustice. human security has to address the enormous amounts of national . the longer-term global problems have not gone away. who has to be protected in all aspects of their life. Rising sea levels. The above-mentioned issues form an inadequate basis for long-term policy. military and political – and for each great nation’s weight within the international community. national and international levels. ethnic frictions and nationalism are acting in developing countries. But there is a fear we’re facing the problem that could actually be dangerous for present-day great nations. says. Global demographic trends should be mentioned ahead of other new challenges. It has also meant new tasks for the military around the world. It is still a question on whether the international community as a whole is ready to attack the underlying causes of insecurity. but the security of the individual citizen. The rise of inequality in levels of social and economic development between nations is another global security challenge. government corruption.” Huge income inequality and poverty. famine and disease will all contribute to making conflicts more likely. or even more traditional-like wars between states. To resume. It’s always hard to know where the fire hazard could be. Europe and Russia comprised 22 percent of the global population.20 Environmental degradation is partly responsible for mass deaths.19 The mentioned demographic change raises a question concerning far-reaching consequences for the key elements of national power – economic. They may be terrorist in style. The entire world will soon be older and far less Caucasian and Christian than today. Global ecologic trends are also hard to ignore. The concept of comprehensive security encompasses not only the safeguarding of integrity of the sovereign territorial state by arms.

the attitude of the ruling elite to security serves as an orientation for national security and military doctrines. state and international systems. To protect. in close cooperation with civilian authorities. in the national security concepts and military doctrines of the bulk of small nations. intelligence activity and the foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union totally transformed the strategic landscape.30 Vladimir Rukavishnikov wealth and human resources derived into armaments and armed forces. The very emergence of this broad definition is an illustration of ties between modern social science and modern strategic thinking. The new state of affairs called for new responses. and the threat of global nuclear war. as defined by the government in charge. the following basic strategic aims may be found: • • • • To defend the country against an armed attack from abroad. The bipolar global division. We have acknowledged that. To prevent the emergence or re-emergence of armed conflicts in a nearby country or the region. social conflict and environmental hazards. today. the persistent ideological struggle.21 It became clear by the end of the twentieth century that the issues the national security doctrines were dealing with were not of the type that they should be addressing. inadequate shelter. etc. Therefore let us take a closer look on how the new vision of security has been reflected in the re-making of concepts and doctrines of small and great countries. The post-Cold War question that even the Pentagon strategists had great difficulty answering was. This list is a mix of tasks derived from both traditional and modern attitudes to security. disease. integrity of the state and stability of the region. forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policies around the world. The strategists in small countries have to make choices based on priorities that are viewed through the prism of national interests and simultaneously . which had a strong geopolitical impact on military–strategic thinking during the second half of the previous century. crime. society. while countries failed to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger. Changes in strategic concepts and doctrines Security is about war and peace. in each country. unemployment. the pillars of what we now understand as (global) human security and traditional national security are interrelated. We should also admit that. must be operationalized through the set of political and military–strategic aims that should be pursued both nationally and internationally. “Ready for what?” At the present time. had gone. interests of individual. the territory and people of the country against non-military security threats. thirst. The strategic tasks. To prevent the spreading of external conflicts to the national territory and/or subdue conflicts in neighboring countries (in the framework of international peace operations including peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

the real reason for keeping 1.25 According to the Clinton strategy. Strategy of National Security for the 21st Century adopted by the Clinton administration. and it becomes incoherent and indefensible. to a certain extent at least.S. Since work on the strategic documents is still in progress. the expressed positions are to be understood primarily as tentative ones. in our view. US strategy and of US defense budgets that took place from the early 1990s. Adaptability. Yet the Pentagon leaders were not aware of this.23 Less attention has been given to a comparison of security and military policies of former adversaries in the post-Cold war epoch. the tragic events of September 11. they reflect a current state of military thinking in the small-nation group.24 The Hart–Redman Commission had revised the U. the policy is held hostage to other concerns. prepared by the Bush administration. Generally speaking. Other considerations must. be secondary. civilian and military cooperation are considered to be the central prerequisites for the governments of small countries to act freely with regard to choosing means and methods in situations of crisis and armed conflict. was published in 2002. perhaps. the Hart–Redman Commission energetically argued for a new strategy for the twenty-first century with a focus on terrorism as a main treat. 2001 became an additional argument that backed the recommendation of the Commission for modernizing the entire national security policy. Retrospectively. The Hart–Redman Commission had refused that basic principle. the USA should have the level of military personnel and money needed to fight two major regional conflicts – MRCs. It had issued warnings of possible large-scale terrorist attacks. During the 1990s. Later. in “Pentagonese language” (a journalist’s joke) – nearly simultaneously and win.5 million American men and women in uniform was to guard against a reconstitution of the global threat from Moscow. America’s military establishment was not constructed to take on and deal with specific threats. In June 1998. Meanwhile grand strategies of these two international actors remain the main factors in determining the world order of the twenty-first century. nobody doubted that America possessed an overwhelming conventional military superiority that would not be undone for a decade or longer “if Russia continued to chase its own tail” (as some Western authors of the time said). and. and now it is often named as the Bush . Russia’s passive reaction in the case of NATO action against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Russian debacle in Chechnya in 1996 proved that the Russian (non-nuclear) threat had grown consistently weaker and less focused abroad with every passing day. when the military leaders and policy-makers lose sight of this governing principle. By the end of the twentieth century. the US Congress formed the National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart–Redman Commission). at most.Challenges of the twenty-first century 31 keep in mind the limitations on a country’s resources. However. The National Security Strategy of the United States.22 Social scientists and military analysts published a great deal about Soviet and American military strategy and perceptions – and misperceptions – of one another. the reports and hearings of the Hart–Redman Commission should be considered as an important part of internal debates about the nature of future wars.

It was considered as being especially timely as the Americans viewed the challenges of the post-9/11 world.27 Perhaps the administration remembered that the very idea of “preventive war” was condemned by the Nuremberg tribunal as the cover for aggression. Since the end of the Cold War. The price of American hegemony in the world can no longer be described as burdensome due to its special role and special obligations. DC: Office of the President. and. grand strategy and the restructuring of today’s unipolar world. and therefore preferred to use another term. and its adherents insist on the difference between a “pre-emptive” action and a “preventative” war. Historically. The key word for the document was “pre-emption.S.32 Vladimir Rukavishnikov doctrine (National Security Strategy of the United States. It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for countries that challenge Washington’s standards of . even preventive. At the extreme. as was achieved by the USSR in the recent past. and meting out justice. The document focused on terrorist nets and rogue states trying to get weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the most important threats to US national security. facilitated if possible by coalitions of the willing – but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community. They call for American unilateral and preemptive.26 The definition of US national security was widened to include homeland security. “America enjoys a global military dominance that combines the transoceanic reach of the Pax Britannica with the military power of Imperial Rome at the height of its powers.” It is easy to find in this comparison an allusion to the lamentable end of the past great empires. John Ikenberry characterized the Bush strategy in the following words: In the shadows of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. The Bush doctrine proclaims that in the future the USA will not allow the creation of military parity with America by any state. These threats motivated a proposed shift from a policy of non-proliferation of WMD toward a policy of counter-proliferation. Georgetown University Professor G.” The Bush doctrine stated that the USA will use force against the newly emerging threat before it was completely formed. Really. The Bush administration argued for more restricted use but has adopted an activist posture since September 11 (Brown. the major attention in state politics is allocated to the military aspects of national security and relations with nations that may pose external threats. the US defense budget is greater than that of the world’s next ten military powers added together. determining threats. use of force. to name a few visible steps on a practical level. sweeping new ideas are circulating about U. Washington. The Clinton administration broadened the grounds for military action but remained cautious in practice. a revision of curriculum in military academies and the reforming of the system of security and intelligence agencies. these notions form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards. September 2002). using force. as some people say. policy-makers and theorists have debated when and how the United States should use armed force. 2003). etc.

for one. Bush presided over the redesign of US strategy. are overdue. Preparing for the war against the Iraq president Saddam Hussein. Now they aren’t. For the Americans. It was true for the Cold War period when the European allies were frightened of the Soviet Union. chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery28). George W. however. the Bush doctrine was a fundamental twist compared with the previous strategy of democrats. It is a vision made necessary – at least in the eyes of its advocates – by the new and apocalyptic character of contemporary terrorist threats and by America’s unprecedented global dominance. “Some midcourse corrections. The alternative is real partnership relations for the USA with the other major actors of global politics. the burning European ambition for independent foreign and defense policy. “Rogue states” hostile to US interests. This means there are clouds on the horizon. These radical strategic ideas and impulses could transform today’s world order in a way that the end of the Cold War. Lewis Gaddis. and here we want to attract attention to the change of attitude toward allies and partners noticed by Gaddis. his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world.Challenges of the twenty-first century 33 internal and external behavior. prominent threats include: • • • International terrorism. did not. Some suggest that China as the potential superpower of the twenty-first century could be a third. but rather war alone or war with allies. 2002) While. and so require no additional commentary. says Professor of History at Yale John. Russia. Professor Gaddis’ words on restoring security and promoting democracy around the world speak for themselves. . perhaps.” was also against that war. As a matter of fact. (Ikenberry. And. 2005). Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy” (Gaddis. he adds. such a “grand anti-US hegemony cocktail” could pose a serious geostrategic threat to American interest in the future. the USA partner in “the global war on terror. slightly underestimated in the strategic equation of the Bush administration: Russia with its nostalgia for a former superpower status. over the next four. Germany and France voiced protest against the “pre-emptive” war against Iraq without UN sanctions. strangely enough. Proliferation of WMD (threats by potential adversaries and terrorists to acquire or use nuclear. It was true for the 1990s when Europeans were scared of occurrences in the Balkans. for another. There was a presumption that the US world leadership would be indefinitely sustained because of the automatic followership of traditional American allies in Europe. even if the imagined coalition would be a fragile one. In combination with one another and with Islamic fundamentalism and the widely spread anti-American mood in the Muslim world feeding terrorist nets. during his first four years. the US president was no longer choosing between war and no war.

• The Bush administration. In this regard the post-Cold War American perception of threats and national goals differs from what we have found in the Russian strategic documents. At that time.).34 • • Vladimir Rukavishnikov Threats to democracy elsewhere. including the former Soviet Union successor states. The armed forces and the government have adopted a viewpoint that magnifies both the internal and external threats to Russia that they perceive. who. being Prime Minister. President Yeltsin resigned and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin. The Russian national interests. were poorly and vaguely articulated. religious or tribal groups that produce forced mass migration. national. the illegal drug trade. In this respect Russia’s affairs are currently far from dazzling. and clashes between ethnic. like its predecessor. And we have found that it is ultimately impossible to explain Russia’s grand strategy without looking at the domestic roots of foreign conduct.). the revised editions of the National Security Concept of Russia. Regional instability and humanitarian problems: local internal political conflicts that undermine friendly governments. threaten innocent lives and undermine internal stability and international order. and the capacity of its leadership for achieving recognition of its domestic policy in the outside world. the Clinton administration. attempts by regional powers hostile to US interests to gain hegemony in their regions (through aggression or intimidation. subversion and lawlessness. sees only external threats for America. etc. and they regard those threats as growing in number and saliency.29 The years 1999–2000 marked a watershed in Russian security thinking analogous to that which occurred in the USA. The NATO operation against Yugoslavia during the days of the Kosovo crisis triggered the growth of anxiety concerning the potential external enemies among both the Russian military and the public at large. international crime and illegal immigration. Threats to US prosperity and economic growth that can come from a variety of sources (global environmental degradation. During that time. The shift in the military perception of risks that the nation ought to be guarded from by the armed forces is associated with the second Russian president coming into power. and was elected in his own right in March 2000. and the military policy during the first years of post-communist development of this country under President Boris Yeltsin (1992–9).30 the Military Doctrine31 and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation32 were revealed. etc. Although quite . on the state of its internal affairs. had launched the second Chechen war in August 1999. security and foreign policy goals. Reluctantly. The Russians thought the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east of Europe in opposition to Russia’s objections finalized the detriment of Russian military security. there is no definition of internal threats in the strategic documents issued by these two presidents at least. the post-communist Russian leadership agrees with the old wisdom that the nation’s international standing depends to a tremendous extent on economics as well as on military might.

September 11 emotionally shocked Russia to much the same degree as it did other nations. albeit the Russian position on this issue has been formulated over two years before the September 11. Later. has become a key feature of President Putin’s policy since coming to office. President Putin came out in favor of Russia joining the international counterterrorism coalition led by the United States after 9/11. Russia’s key threat is internal. In the Russian strategic documents.33 However. Moscow also emphasized the alleged links between Osama bin Laden’s “Al Qaeda” and Chechen rebels. who was re-elected in 2004.” in reality the goals and national interests of post-Soviet Russia have no global character. Safeguarding the integrity of the territory and strengthening the statehood of the Russian Federation are top priorities for President Putin when compared with any domestic and foreign-policy objectives. The struggle against the internal terrorist threat. Perceived foreign threats also include military build-up changing the balance near the borders of Russia and its allies. the immediate consequence of the recent revolt in Chechnya that challenged the country’s territorial integrity in the 1990s. as in the “good old times.36 Terror is not a new phenomenon.W. Bush. which was the principal justification for armed intervention in Chechnya in 1999. is actually considered as unacceptable for Russia (yet it has not been openly named an external threat to Russia’s security) – and this is why Russia always says the role of the UN must be strengthened. Putin. Russia’s president . national security and foreign policy concepts. and with today’s instability in Northern Caucasus. but for the first time in the world history “international terrorism is a strategic threat. and the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty announced by G. analyzing the Russian military doctrine. There are no external enemies to Russia today – President Vladimir Putin always says – and his position is echoed in the official strategic documents. which challenges both global and domestic security.37 It looks like the current US attitude toward bin Laden’s Al-Queda network. with the US dominance. 2001 event. anti-Russian policies of certain neighboring governments. which is linked to a large extent to Chechen terrorist activity. the principal positions exposed in 1999–2000 have not been radically changed despite the turn in foreign affairs toward closer cooperation with the West made by the Putin administration after 9/11.” as has been stated in the European Security Strategy.Challenges of the twenty-first century 35 recently all these documents have been reworked and adjusted again to a new security environment due to the beginning of the second presidential term of Mr. international terrorism is also considered as the newly emerged threat.35 But there is a significant difference: despite the very fact that global ambitions are declared in the RF foreign policy concept.34 The documented threat assessments are clearly the culmination to date of a long-standing process by which the Russian military and government have forsaken the optimistic Westernizing postures and visions of the initial post-Soviet years and returned in many respects to assessments and demands for specific policies that evoke the Soviet mentality and period. one may easily come to the conclusion that the present-day unipolar world order. It is associated with terrorism.

Concerning the problem of non-proliferation of WMD. but not at the expense of national pride and sovereignty. US dominance is a factor jeopardizing world stability. The official positions of Russia and the USA on this topic match to a high degree. the United Nations can be developed to work more effectively. with its neighbors and all world powers to cope with challenges of the twenty-first century. For the Americans. they consider a united Europe and Russia as two of the most important actors that can and must talk across the Atlantic as equals about how to make the world a more peaceful place. if not strategic alliances. not in his actions. That warning showed that the Bush principle of pre-emption had being admired and exploited in Putin’s rhetoric – but. and. All in all. we again face a resemblance of views on this strategic risk. but it was not an event akin to the collapse of the Soviet Union. it influenced the shift in the US–Russia and NATO–Russia relationships. threats to US security will worsen and the window of opportunities will narrow. The Bush administration is disappointed with the UN and convinced that. the Russian national security policy is not exclusively focused on risks of international terrorism and WMD. The reader may ask whether the similarity of viewpoints on two main strategic risks have formed a sufficient base for US–Russia partnership to provide genuine security for the entire world in a dynamic international context of the twenty-first century or not. . this allows us to speak about certain signs of similarity of attitude toward the terrorist threat between the Americans and the Russians. In short. One nation. The official strategic documents of the United States and the Russian Federation admit that both nations need to secure the cooperation of a number of groups. For the Russians. Of course.36 Vladimir Rukavishnikov warned that his country might use pre-emptive strikes if the neighboring states provide a shelter for Chechen terrorists. Once that happens. To resume. first of all. Russia and other major international actors the debates about the new strategy began long before the 9/11 tragedy. with American perspectives on international security. even one as powerful as the USA. it will become less able to secure the basic objectives outlined above. If the United States chooses not to lead in the post-Cold War world. or disagreements concerning the American deployment of national missile defense (NMD) systems and NATO enlargement to the Russian borders. Russia’s strategic worldview is fundamentally at odds with the American one. The fundamental national interest of the Russian Federation is to preserve and develop good relations. There is a common understanding that new challenges can only be tackled at the global level. nations and international organizations to protect themselves from traditional and newly emerged threats.38 These are just parts. of a broader context. The terrorist events of 9/11 altered many things. happily. the United States must remain engaged in exporting democracy and exerting leadership abroad in order to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and advance US interests. cannot keep the lid on this boiling pot of global problems. although key parts. perhaps. without active US leadership and engagement abroad. in the USA. But there are essential differences in long-term strategies.

armed secessionism. Conclusion Important characteristics of the military–strategic environment at the end of the twentieth century included: the increasing number of states possessing. This connection is not always discernible. and the unfolding process of economic and cultural globalization. What are the alternatives? One is associated with the concept of human security. The number and diversity of nations. The very appearance of the concept of human security is a manifestation of the influence of . i. The last leads to global insecurity and vice versa. on the other. and information warfare. A deep connection exists between national. not much new thinking has penetrated the facilities of nuclear theology of old in the light of what is new.Challenges of the twenty-first century 37 Certainly. policies of genocide toward ethnic minorities and religious entities. This way of thinking brings the attention of the international community to the architecture of security. settlement of territorial and border disputes by means of military hostilities. But military strategies have not changed so greatly. the focus of attention was only on state security – concerns arising from outside threats. The perception of certain nations as foes. ignoring the opinion of the international community. rather than threats to nations. and increases the probability of large-scale financial and economic crises that may pose a threat to regional and global stability. or developing. Some of these features were drawn from the reality of present-day Europe. regional and global security. each of which under “favorable circumstances” could evolve into an open. where there are areas with active or “frozen” conflicts. organizations and other actors vying for influence on international relations continues to grow. the expansion of human contacts. the distrust and misinterpretations of the policy of “others” based on prejudices rooted in the past. Yet the old strategic views are still largely in force. are still influential forces. Social studies highlight two conflicting developments in the present-day epoch of globalization that any national security strategy must manage: increasing economic integration combined with the growth of nationalism (not excluding its most ugly disruptive ethnic form in certain cases) and new global challenges. In the twenty-first century. globalization gives rise to new dangers. integrity of states. the beginning of the present century brought remarkable changes in national politics of former rivals. Asia and Africa. which emphasizes that it is more important to address threats to individuals. nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. During the twentieth century. on one hand.e. the international environment is more complex and integrated than at any other time in history. and to the understanding of deficiencies of the global system which actually allows the use of force. and for preservation of borders. but its influence on national long-term policy is indisputable. Along with additional possibilities for socio-economic progress. large-scale fire and a threat to peace for the entire world. especially for economically weak states. international terrorism. with which we operate.

On the one hand. the second group was preoccupied with unresolved regional problems and local conflicts. etc.39 In this respect it is certainly possible to put forward many questions. and the government needs to provide the strategic context for it in its official documents. we want to emphasize the point that the media. stability and peace – we come to new missions for the armed forces. ought to be debating military ends and means. including the policy expert community as its part.40 An enlargement of international military cooperation eventually questions national sovereignty. The society needs to have that discussion.38 Vladimir Rukavishnikov modern social sciences on strategic thinking. As a result of an increased emphasis on various forms of international cooperation. This is an argument in favor of the dialogue between social scientists. military capacity and economic standing of the given country in the world. to overcome the myopic vision of national security and to understand a range of challenges of the twenty-first century. reacting on ecological changes and demographic pressures. . The last decade was characterized by a growing similarity of the threat perception around the world. On the other. including military education. While the first group considered the risk of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction as the main rising threats. The shift to democracy in Russia and other former socialist states coincided with profound changes in the world order and the entire European security architecture. This creates difficulties of its own.” but also very relevant on a “practical” level. although the difference between the great nations and the smaller ones existed. These questions are not only “philosophical. perceived threats. the scientific community. What the military leaders of the USA and other like-minded strategists need is to get rid of old phobias. policy-makers and the military in dealing with the security challenges. Adjusting to both international and domestic changes means a reconstruction of military establishment. As we seek to meet the challenges outlined above – combating international terrorism. compel governments to reduce military personnel. Few people actually realize how deeply the military is involved in security thinking and foreign policy developments. trans-border organized crime. political and social changes. are colossal drivers for military–strategic thinking. doctrines and cultural ethos which was inherited from the past. national goals. states are demanding greater flexibility from their armed forces. if young people are not up to the demands made on those heading the military. Putting these questions first. boosting governmental support for science and improving education. etc. as the military in Europe have to react in a measured way to social change. Generally speaking. we also have a problem. maintaining democracy. the military cannot be so alien from the society they are defending that no one wants to join them. Otherwise the general public understands less and less about the military and the objectives of contemporary state policy. illegal migration. to end conscription and to create a combatready professional army. along with geopolitical changes. The internal socio-political and economic transformations pull ex-socialist European countries out from one alliance and push them into another. Strategy depends upon a vision of the geopolitical situation.

As such. with calculations of necessary means and “rational” limitations. such as demography. in which about six million person were killed and 300 million more became refugees. The exotic view on this issue can be seen in Hoffmann (2002). democratic values and other relevant constraints should be combined in the “age of terror” with a discussion in the public arena about alternatives to war. 4 The term “a driver” is used to mark an underlying force that is variable and can lead to an unavoidable change over the next ten-to-fifteen years. especially the leading international actors. the demographic driver is often transformed into the impact of dramatic changes in populations or large-scale immigration on the given economy and society. we cannot discuss what scientific concepts better serve to explain the new global order. For example.41 Contributions from academics and security experts elaborate on both the conceptual underpinnings and the practical realities and – crucially – the military reforms needed to achieve security for a state. The findings of these discussions were then assembled in patterns that constitute potential scenarios for the future. Rosenau (1990). for a lack of space in this chapter. For the Western views. six were connected to drugdealing. The new world order means the end of the ideological cleavage between the ex-socialist and capitalist bloc countries. in fact. Freedman and Freedman (1996). the scenariobuilding exercise is a bottom-up process. but – we have to repeat – alas. Alas. form the foundation of the scenario-building exercise. Social sciences identified the global challenges as security problems long before politicians and military analysts started a dispute about how to deal with them. but. . Precisely because the future is neither decipherable nor determined. military analysts and social scientists face a similar mission: to identify threats. trends and global challenges. being preoccupied with the evaluations of immediate threats. natural resources. From 40 confrontations that took place in the world on December of 2000. particularly the interaction of drivers. The debates concerning grand strategies. During the course of discussion. from 1990 to 2000. Roberts (1995). security strategies and military strategies in new circumstances occurred in both the NATO countries and Russia and other ex-socialist states. as well as the future of the national armed forces. or the environment. Driver categories are necessarily broad. we cannot predict the exact future. Since the Cold War formally ended. Hippler (1994). the focus on drivers narrows. 3 Gyarmati and Winkler (2002). see: Mearsheimer (1990). the debate about the future of international politics started. Notes 1 In the last decade. Discussions on drivers. The discussion of how to balance security and civil liberties without violating constitutional principles and international law. around the world there were almost 120 armed conflicts.Challenges of the twenty-first century 39 A set of new global security challenges demands somber and responsible responses from all states. 15 had religious causes. eight were on an ethnic grounds. 2 The East–West global confrontation was more than just a traditional clash of national interests between the rival states. We can analyze the present. it was ideologically motivated. five from ideological disagreements and two because of territorial claims. but nobody knows what kind of international system is coming to survive. the politicians and the military heads actually ignore their appeals. Scientists around the world call for an urgent and determined integrated approach for coping with new challenges.

in the USA there is a perceptive distinction between the national security doctrine or grand strategy with an emphasis on principal and long-term defense and foreign policy goals (geopolitical aims). smart bombs and rockets of the air force and anti-air defense. or diminishing them to the rational level of risk.iimes.htm). and so on. 1997). not to fight it. 13 I am actually speaking about various classes of weapons systems designed for the possible wars of the twenty-first century: nuclear weapons of a new generation. the military analysts considered many “theories”: massive retaliation. At least 20 or more states have chemical weapons. political. and the military strategy with its concrete tasks. Wolftal (2005). Deutch (2005). Carter (2004). first of all. cultural – in aspiring toward a principal political aim. 11 In a world community totaling nearly 195 state-members of the UNO. 9 In our view. 7 The concept of grand strategy had emerged from the work of military analyst Basil H. 73–5 and the information on the Russian website www. 2000. In Russia such a distinction between three levels of strategy traditionally is not so evident. economic. (2000). 2003). Liddell Hart. its roots may be found in the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz.” exaggerating its virtues. see the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. see Haglung (1999) and Freedman (2004). damage limitation in nuclear exchanges. or controlling escalation in more limited scenarios. These observations underscored that peace and war are equally significant in achieving security for a state. seven have declared their possession of nuclear weapons in the past century. Lavoy et al. The grand strategy involves the country’s ability to mobilize all its resources – military. on Israeli nuclear forces. 10 For the post-Cold War re-examination of nuclear issues. that began with the application of “Star Wars” technology to the tactical battlefield first demonstrated in “Desert Storm” and then in wars in Kosovo and Iraq in a limited way. published in 1967. studying how they arrange resources for certain tasks means understanding the essence of US grand strategy (see Hahn. 14 The Clinton administration in the mid-1990s faithfully followed in the footsteps of its . (2004). even if undeclared (see Horton. and the national security doctrine approved by the president. in our view. including mini-nukes and bunker-nukes. 6 The collection of popular opinions in various European countries was reviewed in Vlachova (2003). pp. The process. oriented to the elimination of threats to the very existence of the state or stability of society. Levi and O’Hanlon (2005). 8 In the Cold War past. Hart’s views on strategy centered the attention of analysis on nonmilitary dimensions of strategy such as economic–industrial mobilization. see Shtaudenmayer (1982). For debates on nuclear terror. Potter et al. Although the US officials who make security strategy documents rarely use that term. the essence of post-Soviet Russia’s grand strategy may be drawn. is unfolding. US policymakers have understood that the ultimate purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter global war. the security strategy at large. 12 Schneider (1999). from the annual presidential messages to the Federal Assembly. The number of states in each category threatens to grow as expertise and technical capability grow with each passing year. But when the military doctrine is considered. North Korea and Israel are also believed to possess such weapons. since the time of the Soviet inclusion in the nuclear race. See Rethinaraj (2002). diplomacy and domestic political culture. the Russian military analysts often underline its “comprehensive and normative character. the navy’s cruise missiles and anti-tank guided missile systems. ten or more possess biological weapons. strategic missiles. limits and means of obtaining precisely formulated aims (Art.40 Vladimir Rukavishnikov 5 Generally speaking. electronic warfare. and only one of them – South Africa – has cancelled its nuclear arms program. In fact. and a dozen or more have operational ballistic missiles. As for the late Cold War period.ru/rus/stat/ 2004/29-01-04. see Graham (2004). September/October 2002.

see State and Human Security in the “Age of Terrorism” (2004). are difficult to classify as antiterrorist weapons. According to the recent SIPRI report. The analysis of key strategic documents of that time and evaluation of numerous other sources clear shows now. had asked Congress for $242. The EU and Russia ratified the treaty. there was no agreement concerning the effects of global warming and measures to reduce them – take the Kyoto Treaty as an example. For reasons of space. Russia planned to spend only about 93 milliard rubles on defense. Intriligator and Jacobsen (1988). through political decisions at the highest levels. but the USA refused to join them. in 1999. though even this did not lead in any fundamental ways to the abandonment of earlier plans in the USA. that is twice more than in 1999 if one takes into account the inflation rate. The anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons that are developing in the USA. with an expected climax in the mid-2020s that is not far from the present day. The quick rise of defense spending in the EU countries and Russia may be identified as the consequence of the NATO action against the former Yugoslavia (the war for Kosovo in 1999). with the advent of the Gorbachev era in the USSR. Only in the mid-1980s. Population growth and global poverty pressures will generate more emigration from poorer to richer areas and deplete resources further. which is widely recognized as key in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of so-called “failed states” and states emerging from violent internal or inter-state conflict. We have to notice that despite the common understanding of the validity of the problem. that is close to the peak of the Cold War period. that the armed forces of both sides were organized and constantly trained in exercises to carry out the option of an offensive war. the role played by the military and public attitudes have been analyzed from the European perspective in Hassner (2002). in spring 1996. See Bryden and Hanggi (2004). President George Bush senior. the US Secretary of Defense. the global war against terror is by its very nature a war with no simple conclusion (Rukavishnikov. b). inter ana. See also Utgoff (2002).8 billion). an aging and declining population – especially among native Russian males – might impact on military capacities that its potential foes may seek to exploit. which are capable of piercing the American antimissile shield. William J. the total of global defense expenditures in 2004 is over US$ one trillion.Challenges of the twenty-first century 41 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 predecessor. Although the events of 9/11 exposed a new and dangerous form of terrorism. the level achieved in 1960. we do not tackle the issue of security-sector reform in small nations. For Russia with its basically conscription army. It is likely that in the fiscal year of 2005 the US defense budget will double that of the mid1990s.5 million people on active duty.6 billion in spending authority for fiscal year 1997. Almost all population growth will occur in developing nations. was greater emphasis given to defensive tasks. The European Union and the Russian Federation are entering an unprecedented crisis of aging. We have to say that US military spending and staffing at that time exceeded that of Russia and the major powers of Western Europe combined. in 2005 it spent 549 milliard rubles in current prices (or about US$18. While. Russia’s military spending of that time was less than one-tenth of the US defense spending. . together with the new Russian warheads. Jacobsen (1990). For books see. 2002a. According to demographic projections. 2001 events. the pace has accelerated after the September 11. The American post-11 September strategy. For materials of the UN-organized discussion on this issue. some strategists say. in fixing the need of American manpower at about 1. The cited weapons are the products of the Reagan strategic initiative (or the “Star war” program) announced in the early 1980s. Russia is expected to further contract in the next five decades to somewhere near 118–120 million people. Perry. For instance. and defense spending in the range of about $250 billion a year.

It’s a case of logic overriding common sense. Cox (2002). space-based sensors and other information technology to enable the US army to extent its conventional superiority indefinitely. etc. which was published in December 1997. asks the parliament to increase defense expenses. One may find a discussion of the Clinton strategy in Ripley and Lindsey (1997). using the word “pre-emption” to justify what turned out to be a “preventive” war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Gaddis. Cronin (2002). 29 Clearly these are largely political concerns about possible threats that would reduce and even potentially marginalize Russia’s role in European and even Eurasian security processes. which was a starting point of a series of analogous exercises interpreted by some American military observers as openly anti-Western. 34 Contrary to Yeltsin’s politics. Talbott and Chanda (2002). military threats against Russia or its vital strategic interests. Putin intensifies military reforming and. 31 The Russian Federation Military Doctrine was approved by the presidential decree of 21 April 2000. at some future point. in addition to the traditional internal and external threats. The last are not. international law and practice had long allowed such actions to forestall clear and immediately present dangers. the feeling of distrust to the Russians and the . known as Zapad (West)-99. which recognizes the importance of and interplay between political. In our view. producing new military triumphs like the 1991 Desert Storm operation with almost no US casualties and vast destruction to the other side. 35 In addition. for the most part. 2005). “Prevention” meant starting a war against a state that might. 33 There is nothing new in Putin’s statements. clearly stated that no foreign country posed a threat to Russia’s security. see Both and Dunne (2002). 25 After the Cold War ended. 30 The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation was approved by the National Security Council on 5 October 1999. 26 There was a variety of views about the immediate impact of that event on US policy and international relations. the Bush administration conflated these terms. evoking the Vietnam-era talk of destroying a village in order to save it. “Pre-emption” meant taking military action against a state that was about to launch an attack. economic. Ifantis (2002). demographic and environmental security risks. communications. 27 American critics of the concept of pre-emption.” Admirers of the Bush strategy pointed out on the following distinction between pre-emption and prevention. The large-scale external threats to Russia are basically hypothetical in nature. Russia’s grand strategy is really committed to a broader (comprehensive) approach to security. which was felt to no longer correspond to the changing realities of the contemporary international system. Due to diversification of the content of security. in 1999 the Russian armed forces conducted the biggest exercise of their post-1991 history. This foreign policy concept replaces the previous one published in 1993. informational. As this estimate showed.42 Vladimir Rukavishnikov 24 There were suggestions of massive spending on battlefield computers. used for the justification of the intervention in Iraq.” “envelope-bombs” with biological components. pose such risks. Mazzari (2000). In mounting its post-September 11 offensive. each fiscal year. because the previous (Yeltsin’s) national security doctrine. a large list of risks in various fields is presented as well. US grand strategy changed in only minor ways. The idea had strong backers among the military. 28 Including non-traditional forms such as so-called “dirty bomb. social. They can and must be neutralized by political means with reliance on the state’s military might. intelligence and early-warning systems. 32 President Putin approved the new foreign policy concept on 28 June 2000. and first and foremost on combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and general-purpose forces with precisely functioning command and control. put their concern in plain words: “The whole idea that we should have a war now so we don’t have to fight one later has always struck a lot of people as really bad.

the military experts can debate over the best way to carry out this mission. Anyone trying to understand the interplay between the US military and US foreign policy must pay attention for a defense demagogy during the presidential election campaigns. In adopting the heightened sense of threats. (2003) A Grand Strategy for America. and their real security concerns are with Chechen terrorists. Concentration of diplomatic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. but these issues have no bearing on the political decision to intervene. or more accurately. there is no need to overemphasize anti-Western sentiments among the Russians who worry more about domestic problems than external enemies. In our view. the role of social scientists in implanting of the democratic civilian control over the national security and military policy has become indispensable. (eds) (2002) The Great Terror and Global Order. . the president has the last word. Bryden. Of course. wars and conflicts that are not being prevented. K. and Dunne. Brown. R. T. After the US’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. For instance. . The US government (long before the tragic events of September 11) had become increasingly dependent on its military leaders and heads of the security and intelligence agencies to formulate and implement its security and foreign policy. economic. While Africa and Latin America traditionally occupied an essential part of the text of the US foreign policy documents. the candidate may well have been guided as much by the interests of the military–industrial complex urging higher defense spending as by a greater role for the Pentagon in the framing of national policy at large. making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad. (eds) (2004) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security .” Elsewhere. where the reader may discover that the US has its (distinctly articulated) national interests and aims in almost all parts of the world. drug traffic and illegal immigration from neighboring countries. Both. The military of each country has its own culture and traditions when dealing with the future problems and present local and global tasks. the concept argued that a “successful foreign policy . S. and Hanggi. must be based on maintaining a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives. either.” The Russian leadership has the perception of an “Islamic extremist terrorist’s International” threatening the southern regions of the former Soviet Union and the stability of the Russian Federation as well. Washington. A. financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia’s national interests. military. and the diplomats can determine how best to restore order and stability afterward. DC: Brookings Institution Press.J. References Art. Here I am speaking of wars that were not prevented. in the case of peacekeeping operations. In this regard. only a few sentences were devoted to the Russian activity on these continents in the RF foreign policy concept issued in 2000. Perhaps the most significant feature of that concept was the emphasis it placed on Russia’s foreign policy capabilities. Basingstoke: Palgrave.Challenges of the twenty-first century 43 36 37 38 39 40 41 suspicions toward Russia’s foreign and security policy had not disappeared in America. H. the Russian authorities decided that Russia’s strategic arsenal should be renovated despite the signing of the US–Russia treaty on the limitation of the strategic arsenals of both sides in 2002. It noted “the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. (2003) The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century.

and Lindsey.J. (eds) (1988) East–West Conflict: Elite Perceptions and Political Options. 2. Deutch. Ferguson. Gyarmati. (2004) Deterrence. (2005) The Future of Arms Control. J.” Foreign Affairs. (2005) “A Nuclear Posture for Today. 91–106. Gaddis. Hassner. July/August. (eds) (2000) Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear.44 Vladimir Rukavishnikov Sector. Disarmament. D. Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Boulder: Pluto Press. (2002) “Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism. J. pp. September/October. J. Levi. Summer. DC: Brookings Institution Press. 185–214. January/February. 35. and Biological Weapons. and Winkler. 1. Munster: Lit Vertag.” Foreign Affairs. Boulder and London: Westview Press. H. 5–56. 101–15. September/ October. L. Hahn. Technology. Hoffmann. (2000) “US Foreign Policy Decision-Making During the Clinton Administration. 44.S. 4. and International Security. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). G. M. Horton. 15. New York: Crown Publishers Inc. (1994) Pax Americana? Hegemony or Decline? London. January/ February. No. Michael E.” Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. 7.M. Intriligator. Research of the Program in Arms Control. I. M. (2004) “How to Counter WMD. January/February. Mearsheimer. Cox. October–December. Queen’s University (a special issuer of Queen’s Quarterly). Washington.” International Affairs. Th. Graham. and American World Dominance in the 21st Century. (2002) The United States: the Empire of Force or the Force of Empire? Chaillot Papers. A. James J. J.L. G. Michael A. March–May. The European Union Institute for Security Studies. Sagan.” Survival.G..E. (2000) Out of South Africa: Pretoria’s Nuclear Weapons Experience. Ontario: Center for International Studies. Lavoy. 2.B. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Freedman. and Jacobsen.B. pp. April. August. J. R. and Freedman. (2002) “ Understanding International Politics after the 11 September Terrorist Attacks: a Note on the New Security Paradigm. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (2004) “The Four . (ed. Leonard S. Cronin. Potter.) (1999) Pondering NATO’s Nuclear Options: Gambits for a PostWestphalian World. DC: Brassey’s Inc. pp. New York: Macmillan. William C. (1990) “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. 54. Peter. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 261–76.G.” Foreign Affairs. Chemical. September. Freedman.L.” Foreign Affairs.” The International Spectator. Jacobsen. Ifantis. S. A. Cambridge: Polity Press. M. C.” In: Ripley. (2002) “Clash of Globalizations. (2002) “America’s Imperial Ambition. 78. and O’Hanlon. USA. ACDIS Occasional Paper.K. Charles. Carter.” International Security.” Foreign Affairs. (eds) U.D. 104–15. and Spector. (2004) “How to Stop Nuclear Terror. M. Paris. (1996) The Future of War: Power. A. (2002) “American Power Before and After 11 September: Dizzy with Success. (ed. Mazzari. (1997) “Grand Strategy. P. Haglung. Hippler. K.) (1990) Strategic Power: USA/USSR. (2005) “Grand Strategy in the Second Term. Kingston. R. Washington. 119–39.-A. Ikenberry. Scott D. and Wirtz. D. Summer.H.” Foreign Affairs. (eds) (2002) Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States. P.

4.” Military Review. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (1999) Future War and Counterproliferation: U. English.” Foreign Affairs. V. London: Praeger.) (2003) The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe.B. Summer.’” Central European Political Science Review. Belgrade. Rosenau. State and Human Security in the “Age of Terrorism”: the Role of Security Sector Reform (2002) Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva. January/February. (ed. Fall.” Survival.N. with summary in Serbian). V. Wolftal. Geneva. Barry R. Switzerland. J. Summer. (2002) “Proliferation.M. Gopi (2002) “Threats and Perceptions of Nuclear War in South Asia. Rethinaraj.” Swords and Ploughshares. S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats. Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Vlachova. N. Oxford: Perseus.S. 22–4.” Foreign Affairs. (2002a) “The Russian Perception of the American ‘War on Terror. May/June. V. (2005) “The Next Nuclear Wave. J. R. Schneider. Missile Defence and American Ambitions. Rukavishnikov.” International Problems. London: the MIT Press. (eds) (1997) U. and the Center of Civil–Military Relations (CCMR). Marie (ed. 9. 92–139 (in English). B. Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). (eds) (2002) The Age of Terror and the World After 11 September. Rukavishnikov. (1982) “Strategic Concepts of 1980s.S. Roberts. 1. Belgrade: The Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). 2. and Lindsey. Shtaudenmayer. . Ripley.Challenges of the twenty-first century 45 Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritized Response. MA. Cambridge. Westpoint. 3. 44. (2002b) “The Russians and the American ‘War on Terror’: Lessons Learned During the First Year After September 11. 85–102. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity. W. (Belgrade.) (1995) Order and Disorder after the Cold War. Jon B. 16. and Chanda. 3. Talbott. Utgoff. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

acknowledged the role of the military as the agent of the state for the legitimate monopolization of organized violence. More frequently. Herbert Spencer (1908). For example. Karl Marx and his followers saw military forces as necessary for the imperialism that capitalist industrial societies would have to pursue as they exhausted domestic raw materials and markets. the military plays a major integrative role in society. such as Switzerland and Israel. Segal Current concerns in social and behavioral science research on the military reflect in part the philosophical foundations of the social sciences. they were strongly influenced by the ideological and humanistic concerns of the day. By contrast. and neo-Marxist scholars point to the role of the military in international capitalist expansion. the institutional presence of the military was acknowledged. familial and educational institutions. where the military frequently plays a less central role. were given little attention.2 Current developments and trends in social research on the military1 David R. in part the applied orientation of military behavioral science that emerged in the twentieth century. the military has repeatedly played a significant role in modernization. an early social Darwinist. In developing nations. Max Weber (1968). Spencer’s expectations have not been realized in the modern world. in his economic history. as well as changes in the modern world system and in the nature of warfare. it is likely to affect the lives of a large proportion of the population through its impact on economic. political. However. In many nations. economists and political scientists. Military organization. and in part recent developments in social science conceptualization and methodology. the military provided the organizational context within which theorists who were concerned with grand narratives addressed general substantive concerns. As the social sciences evolved from social philosophy to independent academic and scientific disciplines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even in modern nations. saw social organization evolving from primitive military forms to advanced industrial societies. although there is little consensus on the reasons for this among sociologists. Emil Durkheim (1951) viewed participation in the military as one of the social conditions affecting the rate of suicide. and drew heavily on the Prussian Army as the prototype in developing his general model of bureaucratic organization. Most major industrial societies are also military powers. In the early twenty-first century. and war as a social process. one cannot read a newspaper in any major city in the world .

and sought to make contributions through the development of aptitude testing for the military (Yerkes. focused on individual abilities and behavior. Political scientists. Psychologists. journalistic representations of contemporary military affairs include references to the work of social scientists who study the military. Thus. a meliorist orientation to social problems within the discipline and war-weariness after World War I. Many of the early contributions were by psychologists and political scientists. like most important social issues. particularly during World War I. Because the problems studied. little attention was paid to the military as a social institution. 1921). Of his catalogue of publications in the field. mobilized large numbers of economists. in Charles Merriam’s project on the causes of war. an occupation or a profession. Virtually all contemporary selection and classification tests. reflected. to a greater extent than other nations involved in the war. relative to other social science disciplines. for their part. were not contained within the boundaries of a single discipline. conducted at the University of Chicago with support from the Social Science Research Council. and understanding of effectiveness (Munson. including those used by industry and by higher education. Military testing did not advance much between the two World Wars. psychologists. are descendants of the original tests developed for the US Army. However. He attributed the slow growth of the field largely to ideological liberalism. and there has been significant technology transfer to the civilian realm. particularly in the areas of psychometrics and training. and this ultimately produced an interdisciplinary orientation in social science analysis of the military that has continued. This project ultimately led to Quincy Wright’s (1942) seminal study of war. Military forces have been drawing on the contributions of psychologists. but was reinvigorated in 1939 with the establishment of the Army Personnel Research Office. an organization. for example. World War II The World War II period was a turning point for both the social scientific study of the military and for social science generally. 1921). since then. The United States. Early twentieth century Although the center of gravity of military social science for most of the twentieth century was the United States. and increasingly.Social research on the military 47 without being struck by the impact of the military. these researchers established a pattern of interdisciplinary . only about 5 percent were published before 1942. Boene’s (2000) analysis of the growth of military sociology in the United States reflects its slow start. sought to understand war as part of the process of international relations. political scientists and sociologists in a variety of research and analysis roles in support of the war effort. This was not to say that war and the military were disregarded by social science generally. the field of military social science was initially dominated by Americans.

including the two-volume American Soldier studies authored by Samuel A. covered a range of topics including cohesion. in 1946 the major sociological journal of the day. it emerged primarily as an applied field – one oriented toward organizational and small group processes.” Reuben Hill (1949) conducted a landmark study of the stress that military service imposes on families: a topic that has come dramatically to the fore in the twenty-first century. George C. for example. and because of the nature and size of the mobilization. This disciplinary perspective has become increasingly important within the Department of Defense in the decades since World War II.g. published a special issue on “Human Behavior in Military Society. it focused primarily on the enlisted ranks rather than the officer corps. data analysis and experimental design changed the face of quantitative sociology and social psychology. rather than toward national or transnational concerns. Williams.48 David R. social psychology. morale. Smith. b). In 1959. came from the reporting of the results of experiments and surveys conducted by the Information and Education Division of the War Department. The major substantive sociological knowledge base of the field in the World War II period. as well as major conceptual and methodological advances in the discipline of sociology. b. human engineering. Because the army was the largest service. As a policy science. including. it was largely concerned with army policies regarding soldiers and small units. 1984. As a . The four volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Ginzberg et al. Lumsdaine. published a retrospective review of the impact of this work (Clausen. And because the research was aimed explicitly at helping to manage the army and the war. The methodological contributions of this team to survey research. 1959). Indeed. World War II also saw the War Department drawing on the knowledge of manpower economists to help to manage the personnel assets of the nation in support of the war (e. Psychology in the army expanded beyond selection and classification testing into training research. primary groups. leadership. military social science emerged primarily (but not exclusively) as the study of ground combat forces. communication and persuasion. rather than national policies regarding the army. Indeed.. and physiological psychology and after the war came to dominate military social science. that helped establish the research agenda of sociology and social psychology for years to come. 35 years after the publication of The American Soldier. race relations (the army was still racially segregated). and Tamotsu Shibutani’s (1978) study of demoralization in a company of Japanese-American soldiers. 1984. the major journal in sociological social psychology. Homans’ (1946) observations of social relations on a small warship that ultimately contributed to his formulation of exchange theory. Many of the social scientists who were mobilized in non-research roles in World War II recorded their experiences and observations in the social science literature. Segal collaboration. 1984a. Stouffer and his sociological and psychological colleagues (1949a. 1984). the psychologists who worked for all of the American services formed the Military Testing Association. American Journal of Sociology. Social Psychology Quarterly.

as well as demoralizing American prisoners of war through “brainwashing. In general. in part as a consequence of the army’s research on leadership and cohesion in World War II and Korea. The Cold War After the war. most social scientists who had participated in the war effort returned to their colleges and universities. and the Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University studied race relations in the newly racially integrated US Army (Bogart. Roger Little (1969) conducted research reaffirming the importance of interpersonal processes for motivation and support in combat. Both the army and the air force became principal sponsors of extramural research on small group processes. 1969). despite a minor increase during the Korean War. in a few cases. Although publications reflecting World War II experiences continued to appear. but these efforts have had continuing impact on the field. During the Korean War. would not be permitted under current US federal regulations regarding research on human subjects. such as POW interrogation. based on the interrogation of German prisoners of war. site visits. where the US Army Personnel Research Office ultimately evolved into the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in the last years of military conscription. and also influenced by the apparent success of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in using principles of group dynamics in support of troop indoctrination and the building of military morale (Lifton. Some of the methods used in intelligence gathering. Psychology dominated military social science during most of the Cold War period. civil–military relations. reflected the permeability of the boundary between social science and military intelligence. the American military continued to use survey research as a personnel management tool after World War II. or. These large-scale studies of the effects of bombing civilian targets. Perhaps the major examples of this permeability were the Strategic Bombing Surveys conducted in Germany and Japan at the end of the war. even as that agenda has been broadened by changes in military organization. interrogations and interviews. turned their research efforts to other social institutions and processes.Social research on the military 49 result of these studies. the nature of military conflict. such as the work of Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (1948) on the social dynamics of German army units. overseen by an interdisciplinary board that included psychologist Rensis Likert and economist John Kenneth Galbraith. the topics that were studied during World War II have retained central positions in the current research agenda of military social science. involved hundreds of military and civilian analysts. the focus on group processes that had started in World War II continued. much as it had continued to use selection and classification tests after World War I. and with few exceptions. The major disciplinary exception was psychology. Other World War II research. and other global trends. there was little new research in other disciplines. 1963).” . based on analyses of documents. their more applied pursuits.

and began to bring military sociologists from a number of nations (including the Soviet Union) together every four years at the World Congresses of Sociology. Huntington (1957). a political scientist at Harvard University. While much of the . 1964).g. One of the dimensions of this concern was the role of the military in the development process (e. but still maintains the atmosphere of an invisible college rather than a professional association. it was not until the 1960s that sociology and political science focused on the military as a viable academic field. and shifted the focus of the field from the conscripts and enlisted personnel who held center stage in the World War II research to the officer corps and the nature of the military profession. 2003). the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society (RC 01) of the International Sociological Association was formed. the state and society added civil–military relations to the sociological agenda. Also reflecting the increasing globalization of social science analysis of the military. initially at the University of Michigan. The Military Sociology Department of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was established in 1967 (Obraztsov. This research committee has evolved into the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution. One reflection of the tendency toward symmetry of the Cold War was the emergence of military sociology in the Soviet Union. The professionalism theme came to dominate the research agenda of the field. and Morris Janowitz (1960). there were occasional attempts by scholars to describe the structural relationships between military forces and their host societies in the modern world. At the turn of the decade. Another reflection of the internationalization of the field was its incorporation of social scientists who were concerned with development processes in former colonized territories. Lasswell’s (1941) developmental model of “the garrison state” were among the most important of these. However. published books on the nature of the military profession and its relationship to the state (in Huntington’s case) and to society (in Janowitz’s case). C. and then at the University of Chicago. Samuel P. with the incorporation of members from many nations. The 1960s saw the growth of an organizational infrastructure in military social science with the establishment of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society (IUS). scholars concerned with military sociology in Europe have formed the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). a small group of American scholars from several universities who met periodically to discuss their research. A parallel Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society was formed within the International Political Science Association in 1981. Wright Mills’ (1956) The Power Elite and Harold D. At the international level. in the late twentieth century. More recently. The IUS has grown to an international and interdisciplinary group of more than 600 scholars that meets every two years. a sociologist at the University of Michigan. Segal In the mid-twentieth century. and political scientists and sociologists in a number of nations began to address the issues raised by Huntington and Janowitz in their own nations. the Military Testing Association became the International Military Testing Association. This concern with the relationships among the military.50 David R. Janowitz.

1976). The Vietnam War Just as World War II had been an inflection point for military social science. However. Curry. which spread through the Western world. as the nation discussed whether labor market dynamics could be substituted for conscription as a means of raising America’s Cold War military (e. but to depend on selective conscription of the large baby-boom generation to man the force.g. sought to .Social research on the military 51 concern in this area focused on authoritarian military rule. a special interest among American scholars early in the second half of the twentieth century was the ongoing war of national liberation in French Indo-China. The social unrest in America during the 1960s. The issue of military conscription was widely debated in the early 1970s. 1967). 1989: 34–8). on ending conscription and manning America’s military force with volunteers. Friedman. and among military sociologists. 2004). and the eventual implications of that war for American military organization and military manpower policy. Added to these were drug use (e. which placed the burden of waging the war disproportionately on the shoulders of the poor. we had ended conscription and demobilized in interwar periods.g. elected not to use the military’s reserve components to mobilize for the Vietnam War. Helmer. the US Department of Defense announced the end of peacetime conscription for the first time since World War II. This would not be the first all-volunteer military force that America had. through American history. Given the bipolar tensions between East and West at the end of World War II. The debate on conscription brought labor economics into a central position in the social scientific analysis of the military. and starting in 1973. for the first time in American military history. Scott.g. rather than the exception. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.g. Savage and Gabriel. 1973). In January 1973. and race relations (e. A more long-term consequence was a concern with the re-entry of war veterans into society. Moskos. Before the Vietnam War was over. 1985). Voluntarism had been the rule. debates had begun in America. inequities and failures of the system of military conscription then in place (e. so too was the Vietnam War.g. the subsequent Americanization of the Vietnam War. Research by sociologists and political scientists on the internal dynamics of the armed forces during Vietnam focused largely on themes that had characterized military social science during World War II and the Korean War: group dynamics of leadership and cohesion (e. Earlier in US history. and with the way the nation treats its military veterans (e. and conscription had never been a popular alternative. it would be the first time America maintained a large standing force on a voluntary basis. and the advent of military aviation and nuclear technology that deprived nations of the luxuries of time and distance from the battlefield when war broke out. was largely directed at the inequities of this conscription process. we had never demobilized after World War II. 1974) and the shortcomings. and the 1972 defense appropriation provided funds for the establishment of an all-volunteer military force (Segal.g.

military social science grew in terms of both in-house research and extramural funded research. During the Vietnam War and the post-Vietnam years. Bowman et al. The USA’s national leadership decided that it had also been an error not to mobilize the reserve components for the Vietnam War. they at times had sociological. all became part of the subject matter of military social science. The manifestations of these trends in the military. . economic. The armed forces had been racially integrated during the Korean War. which was published by the IUS. anthropological and historical components. both in universities and in the research and development industry. led to the establishment of two specialized journals. Second. and Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Women were entering the American labor force in increasing numbers. While the behavioral science programs of the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center. while there had been prior volunteer military forces in the United States. and steps were taken to reconfigure the force so that we would not go to war again without the reserves. and drew on the expertise of a number of disciplines. were unwilling to publish articles on war and the military. social and behavioral science research in support of organizational effectiveness to make this experiment a success. and this was reflected in the young people coming into the military. they had always been demobilized inter-war cadre forces. 1986). 1983) were dominated by psychology. there was increasing recognition that social trends in America were having an impact on the military. The failure to use these citizen-soldiers disrupted an historical linkage between the American military and the American people. Third. perhaps because of the ideological opposition to the Vietnam War that existed within social science disciplines.g. the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. and the military had to confront the issue of gender integration. Armed Forces & Society. The nation had never attempted to maintain a large standing force on a volunteer basis. the substantive focus of the field was broadened. The decision to end conscription in 1973 had a number of major impacts on military social science. First. but both America and her armed forces had been punctuated by racial tensions during the Vietnam War and postwar periods.52 David R. Drug use had increased greatly in the American youth population. Both are interdisciplinary and international. Indeed. The services showed a new willingness to draw on. A large volunteer force was a challenging social experiment. and support. the growth and broadening of the field led to significant increases in research and writing at a time that the major social science journals. the American military recognized that. the post-Vietnam War volunteer military has undergone a major interdisciplinary evaluation by social scientists at least once a decade (e. and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Zeidner and Drucker. This. Thus. which were common to the Western industrial nations to varying degrees. The appropriate role of the reserves in the total force has emerged as an important concern in military policy and military social science. Segal maintain a standing Cold War force on a voluntary basis. coupled with increasing fragmentation and specialization of publication outlets in social science.

1988). military social science began to reconceptualize the nature of military service and its relationship to society. had implications for understanding both the individual soldier and military organization (Segal. Taylor et al. one derivative of the hypothesized convergence between military service and civilian occupations was the potential for military unionization. which was referred to as the Institutional and Occupational models (I/O). Many of the dimensions of change that had been specified in Moskos’ American-based formulation. 1999).. 2000). honor and country. and this became an active area of research in the 1970s. and to explore the isomorphism between military service and other forms of employment (Biderman. military service was being transformed from a values-based vocation to an economically based job. In particular. In Germany. 2000). and came to dominate the research agenda of the field as increasing numbers of nations abandoned conscription in favor of volunteer forces (Haltiner. 1988. Closer to the specifics of Moskos’ model. and that therefore recruitment appeals would shift from character qualities such as duty.Social research on the military 53 and are now in their fourth decade of publication. 1977). and only recently has it been acknowledged that even in the . came to dominate the agenda of international military social science in the last quarter of the twentieth century. even as the applicability of the model has been debated (Caforio. a group that recognizes and indeed celebrates the contributions of non-psychologists to the field. France saw the evolution of the Centre of Social Sciences Study of Defence (Martin. due. particularly by political scientists and labor economists (e.g. the study of the military by social scientists became increasingly internationalized. to the large percentage of Israeli professors who are reserve military officers. This change was assumed by the military recruiting structure. Fifth.. Fourth. the Lenin Political–Military Academy began training military sociologists. Moskos’ formulation. turned the focus of military social science from the officer corps toward enlisted personnel once again. For example. and into the twenty-first century. the formulation suggested that the basis of legitimacy of the military institution was shifting from normative values of service to the dynamics of the market economy. a series of research efforts led to the establishment of the German Armed Forces Institute of Social Research – SOWI (Klein. large numbers of university-based scholars as well as military-based scientists have contributed to the knowledge base (Ben-Ari et al. as well as derivatives of the formulation. One facet of this reconceptualization was to question the uniqueness of the military institution as the state’s agent for the legitimate management of violence. Social Science Research on the military expanded markedly in Israel. and perhaps most importantly. where perhaps uniquely in the Western world. For example. 1986). 2003). They have been joined more recently by Military Psychology. which already existed in some European nations. it would be suggested. Sorensen. in the Soviet Union. 1967). Scholars in other nations went on to apply Moskos’ models to their nations (Moskos and Wood. 2000). Moskos (1977) suggested that with the replacement of conscription by a volunteer force recruited by labor market dynamics. to compensation. published by the Society for Military Psychology.

1995. Perhaps most dramatically. 2004) than in their military roles or in an external occupational community. patriotic values have been as important. and that their reference groups would be people who shared their occupations outside the military rather than other soldiers in different occupations. such as Japan (Kurashina. and military personnel in the late twentieth century defined their appropriate duties in terms of specific military occupations (Segal. 1994. 1990). . and has attempted to accommodate them in recognition of the effect they have on commitment. However. 1976). military personnel were more likely to root their identities in their familial roles (Woodruff. retention and performance (Bourg and Segal. in the recruiting process than economic considerations (Woodruff et al. Moskos... In fact. Moskos’ formulation also posited a change in the nature of the relationship between the military and the families of its personnel. 1995). 2000). major changes have taken place in the numbers and roles of women in military service both in the United States and in other nations (Segal. while the major powers largely avoided involvement in United Nations peace operations during the Cold War. These new forms of participation became part of the subject matter of military social science. by newly democratized Central and Eastern European nations. 2003) and Germany (Klein and Kummel. and by nations of the developing world. 2003). 1993). and emergent concerns with sexual-orientation integration (Scott and Stanley. Indeed. 2003). 1986). or more important. Dandeker. 1999). This dimension is just one reflection of increasing concerns with diversity. has faced demands from those families (Stanley et al. from a posture of inclusion to one of exclusion. the United States did get involved on a continuing basis in peace operations conducted under other auspices (Segal and Segal. Research has shown that the former expectation is correct. while full equality has not been achieved. and indeed. 2003). Moskos’ formulation posited that the missions of the occupational model would focus less on the waging of conventional interstate wars. 1996. including continuing concerns with racial and ethnic equality (Moskos and Butler. 2006). Moskos’ formulation suggested that women would increasingly be integrated into the military on an equal basis. 2003) or religious affiliations (Trainor. Siefert.54 David R. Segal absence of appeals to character in recruiting advertising. in terms of general reference groups. Battistelli.g. and increasingly on the constabulary or peacekeeping types of operations that Janowitz had hypothesized to be the focus of military professionals in the post-World War II world (e. Emerging norms of burden-sharing in pursuit of international security elicited increasing participation in peace operations by nations whose military participation after World War II had been constitutionally constrained. The formulation also assumed that military personnel would become less committed to the general military role of soldier and more to their specific occupational specialty. the modern military is an increasingly married force which competes for commitment with the families of its personnel (Segal.

These processes took place overseas as well (Hamilton et al. employs roughly 700. supporting the assertion by most host communities that military bases were an economic asset. However. and civilian communities that hosted those bases experienced the same kinds of economic challenges that are confronted when industrial plants close. 2000). Thus. a strategy being used in the corporate world to deal with economic downturns..000 military positions were scheduled to be transferred to civilian employment in 2004–5. some military bases grew as a result of realignment of functions. such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. the relationship between military bases and their host civilian communities became a focus of sociological. economic and political research. and the size of military forces was reduced significantly (Segal and Babin.. While forces were being downsized. was higher in communities with a major military presence (Booth et al. military downsizing produced problems both for victims and for survivors of the process (Wong and McNally. with more civilianization conversions in 2006 and beyond. We learned that communities that have a major military presence have less racial segregation in housing. and in deploying for old missions more frequently. in terms of higher unemployment. began to change markedly in the 1980s.000 civilians. the number of contingency operations expanded markedly. and the relationship between armed forces and society. When the Cold War ended in Europe.. Downsizing. 2003). making up about 20 percent of the DoD workforce. 1994). 2000). As forces were downsized. and their growth had positive effects on the economies of surrounding communities (e. military budgets in many nations were diminished. One way of accomplishing an increasing number of operations was to have those jobs most clearly requiring military competence and military status performed by military personnel. At the same time. but taking other jobs that had previously been performed by military personnel and having them done by civilian employees of the services. However.g. 2000). a larger number of military bases were closed. and the survivors of downsizing – both individuals and military units – found that they were asked to do more work with fewer available resources. both in terms of taking on new missions (e. Hicks and Raney. Rather than having government employees perform tasks that had .g. Another adjustment involved adopting yet another corporate strategy: outsourcing. we also learned that gender discrimination in employment. and as was the case in the corporate world. 2001).Social research on the military 55 The current state of knowledge The nature of military organization. for example. Segal et al. The US Department of Defense (DoD). An additional 20. Some of the changes that have been observed reflect the military increasingly adopting management strategies from civilian corporate enterprise. military missions were redefined from the waging of large-scale wars to contingency operations. and less racial inequality in employment than other communities. was adopted by the military. lower wages and lower returns to human capital for women. Both processes have potential implications for morale and for retention (Reed and Segal. 1999).

the military services increased the degree to which they contracted out support. programs were put in place to improve the deployability of the National Guard. At the maximum strength of Operation Desert Storm. and were not deployed. being co-located with military personnel in a combat zone are in the very early stages of exploration (e. military police and other support units. However. more than 73. the period starting with the end of the Cold War in Europe represents a unique phase in this relationship. America’s invasion of Iraq in 2002. the active and reserve components have been conceptualized as a “total force. Three National Guard combat brigades that were intended to bring active duty combat divisions to full strength were activated but not judged combat ready.000 Army Reserve and National Guard personnel were in the combat theater. In the wake of the Gulf War. For the National Guard. In the mid-1990s. Social science research on the privatization of military functions is currently ongoing in a number of countries (Jager and Kummel. the total force was called upon. accounting for about one-quarter of all army personnel there.” the image of the reserves has been that of a force in reserve. which serves as an agent of state government unless federalized. almost as much of the US Army’s combat force was in the National Guard as in the active army. the state missions were regarded as paramount. Segal previously been done by military personnel. core functions. forthcoming). Civilian contractors have been used to support military operations since before the Civil War. With the downsizing of the active force. When the United States went to war on the Arabian Peninsula in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. the reserves had not been mobilized by the United States in the Vietnam War. medical. The evaluation of this experiment was conducted by a team of psychologists. However. The use of civilian contractors to support the US military is not a new process.g.56 David R. to be used only in the case of an emergency. who are not subject to military discipline and are not combatants under the terms of the laws of war. and in some cases. and despite the fact that. changed the role of the reserves . The implications of having large numbers of civilian contractor personnel. for six-month deployments. generally in relatively small numbers. during which civilian contractors are being used to offset a downsizing of the active military force when the number of missions and frequency of deployments is increasing. however. One strategy to deal with increased numbers of missions and deployments with a reduced active military force that was not drawn from the civilian corporate world was a change in the use of reserve forces. Other nations had previously used reserve personnel as peacekeepers. sociologists and economists (Phelps and Farr. The success of that experiment led to expanded use of the reserves for contingency operations. As noted above. by the end of the 1980s. in the post-Vietnam years. the reserve units that were deployed were largely transportation. Kelty. the US Army experimented for the first time with overseas deployment of reserve component personnel for contingency operations. initially serving as the majority of the American contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. 2005). 1996).

called up in larger numbers than at any time since World War II (between 40 and 50 percent of the personnel in Iraq in 2005 have been from the reserve components). the less universal conscripted service is. discussions in the United States about whether the Global War on Terrorism can be sustained without a return to conscription. the more inequitable it is likely to be. questions that had been raised during the days of conscription by Janowitz and Huntington about relations between the military. Despite increasing international disfavor with military conscription and feelings that. the era of more highly educated. technically competent and career-oriented volunteer forces has raised questions of whether enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers. the state and society. 1998. and where early Cold War conceptualizations of the profession were limited to the active duty officer corps. 2003). and in both Western and Eastern Europe about the future of conscription (Malesic. This change is not restricted to the United States. both active and reserve. the theoretical perspectives brought to bear on them reflect changes in the social science disciplines. The nature of the military profession likewise remains an active research area. should be included in the profession. does not require homogeneity. And it has required that the research agenda of military social science. 2002). Bartone. Both in Europe (Caforio. While many of the topics of military social science remain unchanged. This has had implications not only for the reserve component personnel. be expanded to include the reserves as well. but has been observed in other nations as well. and for longer periods of time – sometimes a year or more. based on contributions to common goals. 2002) and in the United States (Snider and Watkins. 2002). 2003) have kept this a focus of current research. 1998. based on charisma-like qualities (Bass. which had focused on the active force. but also for their families and their civilian employers. The study of leadership has largely been the province of social psychologists. 2002). Many of the topics of current research extend long-term research traditions. focusing in part on the fact that the social cohesion based on homogeneity that was identified in World War II research as being important for the military has been used repeatedly as an argument against diversity in military forces without being shown to have a positive impact on performance (Segal and Kestnbaum. The processes of group dynamics that became focal points of research have continued to be active areas. whether the specialization of armed forces requires that we regard each branch as an autonomous profession. and the ways in which changes in the military profession reflect broader changes in the sociology of professions (Abbott.Social research on the military 57 from participants in contingency operations to participants in continuous operations. the major studies have been executed by interdisciplinary research teams. who to some extent have abandoned contingency and transactional approaches in favor of transformational models of leadership. The research that has been done on the military profession reflects another interesting characteristic of contemporary military social science. while task cohesion. and reflected in the early years of the volunteer . Thus in the 1990s. Major changes have taken place in the conceptualization of cohesion in military units.

1997) and military organization (e. The second was that increased attention has been paid to the intersections of race. 2005). became more active in the study of the military (e. where the I/O model had focused on more micro-organizational dimensions such as recruitment appeals and role commitment. This research topic achieved sufficient visibility in the late twentieth century. Feaver and Kohn. and that a truly postmodern military would be no military at all (Booth et al. while Western industrial nations vary in their degree of modernity. 2001). that like the topics of organizational change and military professionalism in the 1960s and 1970s. 2001). Research showed that the American military does have a distinct culture. and increasingly appeared in analyses of soldiers (e.58 David R. Moskos.g. 2000). 2000). Indeed. Segal force in attitude research by Bachman et al. anthropology.. but that it is consistent with the culture of the broader society that it defends. Others referred to more strategic and macro-organizational dimensions. Moskos’ formulation has been particularly influential. there is no truly postmodern military. Another focus of late-twentieth-century sociology was postmodern theory. and the language of postmodernism. Frese and Harrell. which is the social science most closely associated with the study of culture. he postulated a shift from modern to postmodern military organization along a number of empirical dimensions. rather than focusing on disadvantaged statuses one at a time (Booth and Segal. The first is that other nations began to pay greater attention to gender integration in their armed forces (e. and questions were raised about whether the culture of the military was divergent from the culture of its host society (e. a major critique of the postmodern military formulation pointed out that the template used to study it was rooted in positivistic science. class and gender. as would any profession studied. in some ways the center of gravity of military social science has shifted from North America to Europe. One of the dimensions of Moskos’ postmodern model was the sexualorientation integration of the military. and like other recent projects. Like his earlier conceptualization of the transition from an institutional to an occupational model. Like the I/O model. Important examples. (1977). which postmodernism would reject. which reflect an important . 1996). such as gender roles and the relationship between the family and the military.g.g. Two other trends in social science research on diversity in the military are notable. 2003).. Indeed. This latter project was executed by an interdisciplinary research team. some of which mirrored the components of his earlier formulation. such as changes in major mission and force structure. In addition. and to which a considerable amount of social science literature has been devoted.g. were recast in terms of the trend toward culture studies in the social sciences. Battistelli. Dandeker and Segal. a process that has taken place in most European nations.g. The major finding has been that. the research has been conducted by an interdisciplinary team. it has become a focus of European military social science in the twenty-first century. which was adopted from the humanities by the social sciences. although the research agenda is largely isomorphic with developments in the USA. the postmodern model has been applied in a range of national settings (Moskos et al. but which had very little impact in the twentieth century.

psychologists. which reduced the relevance of large conventional military . World War II was seen on the home front through the eyes of war correspondents whose copy passed through the hands of military censors before it appeared in the next day’s newspapers. men who served in World War II or the Korean War benefited from their service relative to their peers who did not serve. The changes that have taken place in the missions of the twenty-first century. The nature of the missions on which these soldiers are deployed has also expanded the scope of military social science. minority women benefited more than white women (Segal. to widespread use of the Internet (Ender and Segal. and raise issues of information security to new levels. In the main. and in newsreels the following week. with film on the evening news.g. and that among women veterans. to the differences associated with unconventional war.Social research on the military 59 emerging historical perspective in military sociology as well as the concept of intersectionality. that this benefit did not extend into the Vietnam War and current volunteer force periods. These technologies alter the relationships within military families when soldiers are deployed. it suggested that in the United States.. The Vietnam War sensitized military forces. 1998). 2005) by sociologists. the media. Rohall et al. are Moore’s (1996. and Operation Iraqi Freedom has been covered in part by reporters from the print and broadcast media embedded in military units and using modern communications media to file their stories in real time.g. Another contemporary perspective that has been applied to traditional problems in military sociology is that of the life course. While much research was done in the last quarter of the twentieth century on the post-service status of veterans compared to their peers who did not serve. 2003) studies of African-American and Japanese-American women who served in the US military in World War II. At the level of the individual soldier. More recently. and the technological and political context within which those changes have taken place. The field as it grew during World War II focused on conventional military forces. These changes have altered the relationships between the military. by historians and even by criminologists to clarify the dynamics by which military service. and military social science. communications technologies for contact with families back home have progressed from mail. through telephones and faxes. the life course perspective has been used cross-nationally (e. have broadened the scope of military social science. that minority men benefited more than white men. it was primarily done from a status attainment or bridging environment perspective. the state and society. Changes in communication technology have altered the relationship between armies deployed at war and the society they defend. and particularly service in wartime and in combat. The Gulf War was covered in part by CNN reporters in Baghdad reporting on the arrival of American bombs and rockets. and facing similarly organized adversaries. affects the post-service life trajectories of veterans (e. allied with similarly organized forces. Headlines from the Vietnam War appeared on television the same day. 2005). 1996). Sampson and Laub. and between deployed soldiers and their families back home.

2003). At the same time. Interest in the applied aspects of the field has grown in many nations – most dramatically in the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. nations with more pacific security policies. It is increasingly common to find social scientists quoted in news stories about armed forces and military operations in both print and broadcast media. There has been a moderate growth of academic interest in military social science. becoming more martial in their orientations (Segal and Kurashina. The late twentieth century saw major nations like the United States moving into the arena of peace operations. 1997. which had been limited by their post-World War II constitutions with regard to their military forces and to out-of-area military operations.60 David R. Vlachova. Callaghan and Kernic. Major powers became increasingly involved in peace operations. became increasingly concerned with non-state actors such as insurgencies and terrorism. Central and Eastern European nations. 2003. Thus. Segal formations. Zulean. 2003. becoming less martial and more constabulary in their orientations. peacekeeping norms changed. They had largely been excluded by Cold War peacekeeping doctrines that emphasized impartiality. and developing nations also became more involved in multinational peace operations in response to the new burden-sharing norms. the Netherlands.g. rather than conventional military operations. and addressing issues of gender integration and military families (Bebler. minimum use of force and host-nation consent. were encouraged under new international norms of burden-sharing to become involved in multi-national peace operations. . in the last half century. which were largely overlooked during the twentieth century. in turn. All of these changes have been incorporated into the field of military social science. modernizing and professionalizing their forces. 1999. Sarvas. And there has been increased social science attention paid to air and naval forces. 2007). such as Japan and Germany. other industrial nations that previously had been more isolationist. 2002). since the major nations were likely to be interested parties in any area of the world in which conflict occurred. with the Cold War over in Europe. and emphasized the political dimensions of warfare. although the Gulf War closed the twentieth century with a conventional war. in size. adopting democratic models of civilian control of the military. accompanied by a growing concern with the national and transnational implications and consequences of the nature of the military institution and its relationship to the state and to citizenship (e. as they have dealt with issues of potentially ending military conscription. While military studies are still a small subfield of the social science disciplines. peacekeeping had largely become the domain of “middle powers. during the second half of the twentieth century. with a slowly growing number of colleges and universities offering courses in the field. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Kestnbaum. with more deviations occurring from impartiality. they have grown significantly in substance. the Nordic nations and smaller nations such as Fiji. and particularly since the end of the Cold War in Europe.” such as Canada. and in impact both within the disciplines and more broadly in society. but also challenging the primacy of the middle powers in the peacekeeping arena. And the operations.

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Alexander Gerschenkron The popular grasp of “culture” is similar to the concept of “opposition” – a concept from semiotics – which suggests that we know something by knowing what it is not. The Differentiated approach gives us insight into the sub-groups and informal culture(s) within the organization and. The macro. This opposition does not. (1991). Martin and Meyerson (1988) and Frost et al. I reach for my culture. The Integration perspective to organizational culture can be likened to a performance of the national anthem – everyone sings together the same words and the same tune in harmony with each other. The Differentiation perspective is like a symphony – everyone playing different pieces of the music . We have an intuitive understanding of what it is and what it is not. yet when faced with the challenge of determining and measuring culture exactly. After much consideration I have adopted a pluralistic approach since it provides a varied assortment of lenses for viewing army culture. finally. but we do not have scientific accuracy or measurement.” Thus we have an idea of what up and hot are. major themes. we have an intuitive grasp of what is and what is not music. Let us take the metaphor of music for a moment. Differentiation and Fragmentation. Integrated approach leads us to the large brushstrokes. It implies an act of performance in the way that culture implies social interaction. Inspired by the work of Martin (1992). These levels of analysis flow from macro to micro: that is from the Integrated to Fragmented perspective. I will analyze the literature on army culture according to three perspectives: Integration. however.3 Military organization and culture from three perspectives The case of army Donna Winslow Introduction When I hear the word gun. the Fragmented approach shows us how individuals grasp different and sometimes contradictory and ambiguous fragments of the organizational culture. Technically music is a collection of acoustic vibrations but that is not what we think of when we think of “music. For example. hot is not cold and up is not down. This is similar to the way we often conceive of culture.” Just as in culture. we end up with a plurality of definitions and methods. inform us on the temperature of “hot” nor the exact height of “up. structures and formal values of the organization.

” This economy of explanation requires a respect for the three levels of analysis with only a few examples to illustrate them due to limitations of space. Studies were classified as “Differentiated” if they looked at specific groups or subcultures within the organization. studies were classified as “Integrationist” if they assumed or supported the idea of broad coherent patterns across the organization and/or placed an emphasis on a stable set of ideas.68 Donna Winslow which comprise a totality. Each of them alone does not comprise all of music. By examining all three forms of music. tempos. Method The complexity of the field of organizational culture exerted certain demands upon my methodological approach and gave rise to an “economy of explanation. After briefly outlining my methodology in the next section. it is the group and not the entire organization that has consistency. values and norms characterizing the organization as a whole. and tells us something about music (notes. by multiplying the levels of analysis. Consensus exists within the boundaries of subcultures which might find themselves in opposition to each other or to the organization. The reader will see in this chapter that army culture contains elements congruent with all three perspectives. It is thus irregular and can never be repeated over and over in the same way as a symphony or national anthem can. Briefly. we can more fully interpret army culture. Each of these forms of performance is music. we have a larger grasp of what music is and can be. conflict and ambiguity in the organization. The reader will see that the majority of work on army culture falls into this category. see how studies of the army can be viewed according to these perspectives and how they can inform us about the nature of army culture. I will examine three perspectives (Integration. The meta-theoretical model is outlined in Table 3. In a Fragmented approach. In particular we will see how culture research can explore the interplay between homogeneity. The Fragmentation perspective can be considered like jazz improvization. etc). Differentiation and Fragmentation) used in studying organizational behavior. yet it is the least used in studies of military culture. Differentiation studies defines culture in terms that are similar to the Integration approach – culture is shared. however they all tell us something about some aspect of music. In a similar way I am proposing to examine organizational culture and in particular army culture using three analytical approaches. However. By combining the perspectives. culture is a loosely structured and incompletely shared system that .1. however what emerges is unpredictable and is created in the moment by the social interaction of the musicians in the performance. The Fragmented perspective perhaps most adequately explains the chaos of war. The individual musicians master their instrument and have basic shared understandings of the principles of music. keys.

As a dependent variable. 1992: 13. As an independent variable. organization as machine or “little society” Channel it outside subcultures Subgroups as islands Culture as web. or the conditions under which the group and its culture develop. family life and comfortable living conditions). the first approach is functionalist while the latter is symbolic (and. we can observe two major approaches to the subject: the views that organizations have culture vs.” theoreticians attempt to understand the culture of a whole group. we might add – cognitive). Integration perspective Within the Integration perspective. technology.1 Characteristics of the three perspectives on organizations Features Perspective Integration Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors Organization-wide consensus Consistency Differentiation Sub-cultural consensus Inconsistency Fragmentation 69 Multiplicity of views (no consensus) Complexity (not clearly consistent or inconsistent) Focus on it Exclude it Culture as glue.Military organization and culture Table 3. researchers examine how culture external to the organization (such as national culture) can affect the organization. Hofstede found four cultural1 dimensions that expressed national differences: power distance (perceived and accepted social inequality and the relation to authority). Examples of this in military sociological research are Soeters (1997) and Soeters and Recht (1998). individualism (importance attached to leisure time. According to Jordan (1995). researchers examine how the organizational culture can be shaped by particular practices such as leadership. Organizations have culture In the approach “organizations have culture. 1991) approach to studying differences between different national labor forces. etc. Soeters uses Hofstede’s (1980. 1992: 152). events and the organization’s contextual features (Martin. emerges dynamically as cultural members experience each other. of clarity in a sea organization as jungle of ambiguity Source: Martin. . tasks. In his 1997 study. the functions that culture performs in maintaining the group. Culture is just one variable among several others such as structure. organizations are culture.

2000: xviii). Organizations are seen as expressive forms and manifestations of human consciousness.3 The major goals of this approach are to determine how to mold and shape internal culture in particular ways and how to change culture according to the needs of management. Their study does not appear to be based upon any observation of how things are actually done. It is often reduced to values and norms. values. The CSIS study draws upon the work of James Burk (1999) who also defines military culture in terms of essential elements. it is something an organization is. they only study the extent to which members say they support traditional military values and how members feel about the organization. 1999: 14). cohesion and esprit de corps.g. norms. have created shared individual expectations among members. beliefs and symbols – discipline. Burk’s work centers on elements of formal military culture and particularly how war-fighting determines central values. 1997) and. and. professional ethos. ceremony and etiquette. such as the CSIS one. . 1996. Organizations are culture In the “organizations are cultures” approach culture is not something an organization has.4 In Integration studies. construct social realities and negotiate meaning for their lives” (Jermier. Culture can also be mapped or measured on a scale of values. It is a form of glue that holds people together (Snider. This approach is ideational or symbolic.g. Authors working in Schein’s (1990) tradition distinguish between three levels of culture: . Widen. An example of this is the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on American military culture in the twenty-first century (2000). studies in this tradition define military culture as the deep structure rooted in the prevailing assumptions. customs and traditions that collectively. . the health of the organization is measured by the extent to which these elements are shared by members of the organization.70 Donna Winslow masculinity (importance attached to income growth and the possibilities of promotion). and identify the patterns of subjective meaning embodied in the content and context of cultural practice. strong or weak cultures2 or efficient and inefficient cultures. over time. Culture thus becomes a root concept for understanding human ideas and behaviors expressed in the organization. “An organization may be viewed as a specific cultural setting in which human actors . 1991: 230–1). Schein is often used in describing military culture (e. and that their definition of culture is “how things are done in a military organization” (CSIS.5 Researchers seek to identify and document the various symbolic forms through which the culture of an organization expresses itself. Arnold. Although the authors clearly say they are studying culture. Culture is thus perceived as an attribute of the organization which can be manipulated. as a result. uncertainty avoidance (level of anxiety when confronted with unknown situations). Soeters applied these dimensions to military academies and found that the cultural profiles of military cadets in 13 countries differed with one another according to nationality. e.

Insecurities about service legitimacy and relevancy. the core concept of combat defines all assumptions – “We must fight and win the nation’s wars. “senior officers convey a more dutiful ‘can do’ attitude with respect to civilian directives. etc. pictures. and how they affect strategy. Terms of self measurement (the US Army measures its health in terms of its people). the basic distinction is between the combat arms and all the others who are in a support role to the combat arms). Degree and extent of intra-service (or branch) distinctions (in the US Army. the army needs to be internally focused. That is. According to Builder (1989: 33). berets (these artifacts also mark different army sub cultures such as Regiments. as the nation’s obedient and loyal servant and the .” To enhance war-fighting competence. codes of service. As a result. Another spin on this is that a good combat leader can do anything.6 Another assumption described by Scroggs is “Muddy Boots can do it all” which means that army personnel do not need special training for peacekeeping operations if their combat skills are up to speed. to a greater degree than the other services. plaques. the army looks inward to address and resolve the challenges of maintaining or improving its professional war-fighting competence. Basic underlying assumptions – these are the ultimate source of values and actions. The “Muddy Boots can do it all” attitude is similar to the “can-do attitude” which also stems from combat realities. Builder examines the specific service cultures of the US military according to five aspects: 1 2 3 4 Altars of worship (the US Army believes in utter devotion to the country through service).Military organization and culture 1 71 2 3 Artifacts – such as uniforms. Carl Builder’s Masks of War (1989) is also in this tradition of research. unit patches. Let’s examine just a few basic underlying assumptions of the US Army as described by Scroggs (1996). 5 Builder then goes on to describe how these underlying assumptions translate into specific service identities and behavior. According to Scroggs. They are not written down but permeate conceptual modes. monuments. etc. congressmen. Artifacts also include flags. ceremonies. the US Army sees itself first and foremost. even if these actions are antithetical to the Army’s national interests” (McCormick. sees itself as the nation’s loyal servant. such as talk to media. etc. Preoccupation with toys versus the arts (the US Army is more focused on the basic skills of soldiering). McCormick tells us that the US Army. Espoused values – these defined sets of values appear in military doctrine and statements about ethos. These espoused values underpin the formal structure of the organization and the importance of the chain of command. oath of enlistment. 1998: 59). analysis and military planning.

There are also informal ceremonies among peers. 1999b) shows how soldiers are proving their readiness to participate in the group regardless of the personal cost. The wholesale use of such language. military funerals. Symbolic studies also look at rites and rituals which are seen as crucial links between ideologies that provide the framework for collective life and the associated forms of individual experience. Elkin did a very interesting study of soldier’s language in the 1940s. such as saluting. taboo in much of civilian life. For example.8 Hockey found the same significance over 40 years later. reinforces and symbolizes the status of masculine soldier. Symbolic studies often entail the study of language as an expression of culture. In this way the army is able to divest itself of political responsibility in spite of the political nature of the tasks it is asked to perform.) are organized and used. and thus they become a binding in-group force” (Elkin 1946: 415). It carries patterns of meaning which do much to evoke and define the realities of organizational life. something an organization is) portray organizational culture as being shared by members. images. Another form of “organizations are culture” studies focuses on the symbolic aspects of the army. either in terms of shared values and attitudes or overlapping interpretative frameworks. Some of the best examples of this work are to be found among Israeli anthropologists studying the IDF (Israeli Defense Force). Army rituals range from the small routines. thus gaining peer group acceptance. The attributes of manhood in this situation are physical condition. It describes what is often easily observable – . metaphors. and is a topic central to the analysis of organizational symbolism. professionalism.72 Donna Winslow neutral instrument of state policy.2.” Summary Both these views (culture as something an organization has vs. etc. to the complex ceremonies of change of command. etc. In particular she looks at army service in the IDF as a rite of initiation into becoming a full male member of Israeli society. self-control.9 As Morgan et al. The Integration perspective gives the reader insight into the broad organizational patterns and structures. Using a social constructionist framework. In a similar vein. Ben-Ari (1998) looks at the ways in which military meanings (publicly shared symbols. He looked at the use of acronyms and even obscenities to show how these expressions “give the soldier a unique universe of discourse which help distinguish him. This promotes the idea of organization-wide consensus and consistency as summarized in Table 3. He tells us that swearing is a generalized practice for non-officers. my own work on Airborne rites of initiation (Winslow. (1983: 11) have remarked: “The use of language is rich in symbolic significance.7 he explains how soldiers and officers in field units make sense of soldiering and commanding. Sion’s (1997) work focuses on the symbolic processes that young men serving in the Israeli infantry undergo. aggressiveness and heterosexuality.

Infantry. Organizations are studied in terms of different subcultures which develop due to common experiences. Airborne. Leaders play an important role in preserving culture. Similar to Integration studies. although there is difference between groups. some theorists10 began to criticize the idea of organization-wide consensus and consistency. environment. gender.” Members learn it through socialization and participation in organizational rites and ceremonies. rites and ceremonies. there is – or at least there should be – consistency between the various components of the organization and a general widespread agreement and understanding of the organization’s culture (which often means ethos or core values). gender. Unlike Integration research. In its symbolic studies.. The subcultures co-exist in harmony. formal behavior. Differentiation studies define the boundary of a culture at the group level of analysis (Martin. officers. authors believe in a lack of consistency and a lack of consensus among organization members.g. In terms of army culture. we find studies of different functional categories. it tries to uncover underlying assumptions or cultural codes which guide formal behavior. diversity and variation in groups in terms of their interests. ethnicity. Differentiation perspective In the 1990s. All of these articles and books share the view that army culture constitutes a whole. and they are analyzed in terms of ethnicity. etc. however. . NCOs. From an Integration perspective. objectives and action. Artillery and so on.2 Integration perspective Features Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors Integration perspective 73 Organization-wide consensus Consistency Exclude it Culture as glue. In the Differentiation approach. They question the degree of homogeneity in organizations and place emphasis on difference. Army culture is seen as a “thing” that sets the army apart. makes it unique. conflict or sometimes in indifference to each other.Military organization and culture Table 3. etc. and of race. molding it and transmitting it. The Integration perspective represents the bulk of writing on army culture – by military personnel particularly reflect this monolithic view of culture. Rangers. professional background and functional position in the organization. 1992: 96). Differentiation research defines culture as that which is shared among members of the group. Within each subculture there is consensus. e. interaction patterns. organization as machine or “little society” that is. creating it. dress codes. of command positions such as privates. This approach is very similar to the Integration perspective in that the group is like a little society and members of the group share a common culture. which should be shared by all members – if the organization is “healthy” or “strong.

For example. i.e. personalities and motivations of the NCOs who make up Special Forces teams. In Canada. Hockey shows how cohesion. Davis and Thomas indicate that women in the combat arms have found themselves in an environment that does not foster an atmosphere of acceptance. as a result of social and political trends in the wider society (e. leadership styles. 1992: 12). regiments have at times formed subcultures with their own loyalties which can be at odds with loyalty to the Canadian Forces. at times.” On the other hand. Different social mechanisms ensure this through training.11 One of the most interesting studies of enlisted culture is Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture (1986) in which John Hockey used participant observation field methods to study infantry privates in the British Army. Mershon and Schlossman.g. In Canada. Ambiguity exists. as an example of an international collection on the subject). There have also been many studies of diversity in the armed forces (see Soeters and van der Meulen. Even though loyalty is perceived as a positive state in the military. 1999. In the end. Simons shows that the ability of the men to work together as a cohesive team is dependent for the most part on their ability to bond. The Differentiation perspective can also unveil the workings of power in organizations. These studies do not engage the reader in a discussion of army culture in general. be divisive for the army. What is clearly an effective and necessary attitude for the battlefield can then become an exaggerated force that undermines good order and discipline. but they do describe the difficulties army culture has had in adapting to change imposed from without. The world that women enter is a world that defines and reinforces gender roles in a way that is in conflict with the role of a woman in the combat arms. Ambiguity is channeled so that it does not intrude on the clarity which exists within these sub cultural boundaries” (Martin. In contrast. The Differentiation perspective can also demonstrate just how important informal culture can be and the positive (and negative) impacts it can have on an organization. there is nowhere for them to go because they cannot achieve either of these conflicting roles (Davis and Thomas.74 Donna Winslow “Consensus occurs only within the boundaries of subcultures. teamwork and conformity with organizational demands also influ- . women understand that they will have to become “one of the guys” if they are going to succeed. acknowledge conflicts of interest between groups. my own work (Winslow. 1998: 13). The motivations and behaviors of each woman are interpreted in a way that leaves no room for women to be there because they “want to do the job. but in the interface between subcultures. These include everything from issues of homosexuality to gender. the article shows that highly intense unit cohesion can. shared experience and of course the personalities of individuals who are able to cooperate with each other. there have been studies of the experience of women in the army. 1998). Anna Simons’ (1997) book is a narrative description of team life. and attend to differences of opinion. 1999a) on regimental subculture demonstrates how unit cohesion can be a double-edged sword. from race to ethnicity.

the narrower the differences between military and non-military establishments (Janowitz. For example. However what is most significant is the change that takes place once the privates find themselves in an operational environment in Northern Ireland. pointing out that to argue that the military is either an institution or an occupation “is to do an injustice to reality. aggressiveness and decisiveness associated with stealing are also characteristics of a “good soldier. From the moment a recruit enters basic training.” “Skiving” is part of an overall strategy by privates of “looking out for Number One. however.” Thus the Institutional/Occupational model began with an Integration perspective. This model is based upon the work of Morris Janowitz (1970.” A private’s survival strategy implies using every opportunity to make life easier. In short. “Skiving” (or not doing one’s job) would put the privates at physical risk. these activities are often unofficially approved of by officers since the initiative. and it simultaneously displays organizational . As in Hockey’s British study. created new patterns of combat and therefore modified organizational behavior in the military. the more complex the technology of warfare.” The non-lifers expressed explicit antimilitary norms.” The Institutional/Occupational distinction has become one of the most widely referred to models in military sociology. “looking out for Number One” means being the best soldier you can be in order to survive. This seems to be reflected in what Moskos calls the segmented or plural military. resourcefulness. added a Differentiation perspective. therefore it was abandoned as a practice. The plural military is both convergent and divergent with civilian society. and theft from the organization was not considered a crime but as exacting one’s due. In the field “looking out for Number One” and “doing the job” finally converged. This study highlights how an informal value (such as “looking out for Number One”) can be dysfunctional in garrison. Building upon the work of Janowitz. yet essential to good soldiering in the field. It gives the reader a unique look at garrison life in the 1980s where there was a clear distinction among non-commissioned members who were there for a short time and those who were “lifers. As Bryant (1974: 251) has observed. Charles Moskos (1973: 266) made reference to a “continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures.Military organization and culture 75 ences patterns of resistance. Both elements have been and always will be present in the military system” (Moskos. stealing within the primary group was not tolerated but outside of the barrack group it was an accepted mode of behavior. 1977). This model assumes a monolithic military on a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures. Faced with intense danger. Moskos. 1988: 57). there is a pattern known as “skiving” which seems to contradict the official ethos of “doing the job. Ingraham’s (1984) The Boys in the Barracks is a similar type of study of the garrison life and habits of American soldiers below the rank of sergeant. It is interesting to note that Sion and Ben-Ari found the same phenomenon in the IDF. Changing technology. 1970: 143). he/she begins to learn the “unofficial” ways of coping with army life. according to Janowitz.

however. Differentiation studies observe formal patterns and behavior in groups. “the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces” (Moskos.76 Donna Winslow trends that are civilianized and traditional. Moskos adds. instead. Summary A Differentiation perspective can give the reader insight into the informal groupings and power relations in an organization. According to Frost et al. broken into constituent parts that. In addition. uncertainties and contradictions that do not fit the pattern. unclear and dissonant cultural manifestations.” He argues that the plural model does not foresee a “homogeneous military” lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles.’s (1991: 8) description of the Fragmentation approach. as well as the underlying assumptions that guide behavior in groups. within the different subgroups there is a shared culture – enclaves or “islands” of consensus. more often than not. “Consensus and dissensus co-exist in a constantly fluctuating pattern influenced by Table 3. Ambiguity is the essence of organizational culture (Martin. Thus subcultures appear in the organization according to institutional or occupational orientation. an organization is seen as divided. For example. From a Differentiation perspective. This theme has been picked up in many studies. From a Differentiation perspective. that the segmented military “will not be an alloy of opposing trends. informal leadership may play as important a role as formal leadership in setting standards and upholding the “unwritten rules” which guide members’ actions as much (if not more) than the formal ones.3 Differentiation perspective Features Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors Differentiation perspective Sub-cultural consensus Inconsistency Channel it outside subcultures Subgroups as islands of clarity in a sea of ambiguity . thereby excluding paradoxes. Differentiation studies describe the organizational conditions that allow for the emergence of subcultures. Similar to the Integration perspective. but a compartmentalization of these trends. 1973: 275). McCormick (1998) refers to it as “corporate” vs. 1992: 130). However. Fragmentation research argues that organizations have inconsistent. Fragmentation perspective The Fragmentation perspective grew out of a dissatisfaction with research focused on finding consistent cultural patterns (whether they be organization wide or just within subcultures). the “muddy boots” army. are in conflict with each other – an orchestra where each musical section is doing its own thing.

Their involvement. so interpretations will differ – even of the same phenomenon. 1988: 117). This is similar to a postmodern approach where authors acknowledge the existence of alternative realities to be uncovered. It is important to remember that it is not an absence of culture in an organization that creates ambiguity. In postmodernism. and they look at just how differently people in the same organization understand and experience organizational reality. There are many voices and many meanings whose understandings overlap. Martin has written extensively on the Fragmentation perspective and gives us the following definition of culture from this point of view: As individuals come into contact with organizations. The patterns or configurations of these interpretations. events and the organization’s features (a shared frame of reference or shared recognition of relevant issues (see Feldman.” This view. pay systems. attention. its informal codes of behavior. Subcultures are therefore fleeting. and so on. tasks. depending on which issues are activated at a given moment (Martin. ambiguity and change may appear in any number of places and vary with issues that the organization faces” (Ginger. and the ways they are enacted. These elements are some of the manifestations of organizational culture. 1992: 153). and is. individuals etc. experiences. 1988: 727). their perceptions. they come into contact with dress norms. and cognitive overload. interpreted in a myriad of ways. constitute culture. Thus individuals share some viewpoints. sporadically and loosely connected by their changing positions on a variety of issues.Military organization and culture 77 changes. for example in events. disagree about some and are ignorant or indifferent to others (Martin and Meyerson. enhance and silence one another. the Fragmentation approach points out that there is not one authoritative voice of interpretation for the researcher. it is the presence of a fragmented one which is loosely structured and incompletely shared. an organization is a web12 of individuals. “The assumption is that a multiplicity of views exists. Thus in addition to consistency there is also inconsistency and dissonance. jargon and jokes only understood by insiders. factions. memories. the organization’s formal rules. which sees culture as dynamic and multivocal. their subcultural identities and their individual selfdefinitions fluctuate. hierarchical system of stable relationships and universal symbols. When cultural members interpret the meanings of these manifestations. 1983: 139). rituals. collide. stories people tell about what goes on. The activity of culture is “plural and beyond the control of any individual” (Clifford. issue-specific coalitions that may or may not have a similar configuration in the future. salience. (Martin. 1992: 3) . In addition. beliefs. represents a radical departure from those views that depict culture as a mechanistic. and values will vary. Any cultural manifestation can be. and procedures. The organization’s culture emerges dynamically as cultural members experience each other. Groups coalesce around specific issues and are context dependent. 1991: 154)). culture is an open-ended creative dialogue of subcultures. In the Fragmentation perspective.

is an intricate. Ben-Ari (1998) tells us of the existence of two kinds of professionalism within the IDF. fragmentation of authority. Sabrosky et al. 1982: 149) Certainly. Speaking of institutional and occupational forces. (Sabrosky et al. For example. Beaumont (1994: 89) cites Rommel’s account of battle as a junior officer who frequently found himself in situations where confusion reigned. or the right people (because of mismanagement or oversight) may be overlooked or sent elsewhere. (1982) have described the US military as “organized anarchy. multi-component processes.. although some recent Institutional/Occupational research hints at it. “their relationship is one of dialectical tension: the full expression or incarnation of one logic is necessarily frustrated by the inescapable presence of the other” (Boene. (Sabrosky et al. And war. In his race against France in 1940. Similarly. the wrong people may try to solve a problem because of their prowess at bureaucratic gamesmanship.78 Donna Winslow This perspective is the least used in approaches to the army. turbulent. 1982: 142) They ironically note that this may not be such a bad thing: The existence of bureaucratic inertia. beyond effective monitoring and reasonable approximate depiction or prediction. One is combat and operationally oriented.. while the other is administrative and technical. units acting out of phase. For example. Some authors suggest that varying perspectives can be held by the same persons in different circumstances. like chaos. as does his dictum that war is the “province of chance. like chaos. information still becomes lost in the system. or both. inadequate maps. things had not changed much. he notes that. But as a commanding general. . “rational” manner. and the inability of the military bureaucracy to execute rapidly some radical (or reactionary) executive proposal could have some inadvertent utility.” Although government appointees and military officers in charge do what they can to see that decisions are made in a structured.” Similarly. and relative lack of efficiency may be a collective blessing in disguise in certain circumstances. Elected and appointed officials are not always paragons of intelligence and wisdom. delays. directed to the wrong people. communications failures. Rommel met with constant confusion. during a crisis. exceeds the capacity of a single individual to understand it sufficiently to exercise effective control – regardless of the resources at his or her disposal Von Clausewitz’s fog of war suggests the same. 1990: 25). the Fragmentation perspective seems to describe the chaotic nature of ground warfare. Other military research has hinted that confusion and paradox are the rule rather than the exception. The French military sociologist Bernard Boene makes the same argument. War.

boundaries will become unclear. Cyprus and the Sinai) or in the more unstable ones (e. 1994. 1996) offers some concepts that could be used to explain patterns. 2000. From a Fragmentation perspective. inappropriate equipment and meddling politicians. Somalia and Afghanistan). 1997). fragmentary information. “I had no idea where the main body of the division was. Will the army be called upon to build democracy in far-away lands in addition to defending it? Factors that contribute to confusion include: a lack of strategic direction. Summary From a Fragmentation perspective. 1973: 5). obstacles. Winslow and Everts. imprecise wording of orders. Moore. As Clifford Geertz put it. David (1997). 2000). 1976. I can imagine that this fragmentary nature of the battlefield applies in Iraq. changes in mission and changing rules of engagement. organizational culture is characterized by ambiguity and loosely shared understandings that hold the members together in a loose web of relationships. constraints. Winslow. media intensity. one is reminded of the analogy of the Lorenz effect where the flapping of a butterfly’s wings can create conditions for an unstable weather system on another continent. multiple players.” Rommel’s descriptions of grappling with complexity and disorder conformed in spirit to Eisenhower’s admission that he had made several major decisions without basis in certainty when doing things that were so risky “as to be almost crazy” (cited in Beaumont. I take culture to be those webs” (Geertz. Dixon (1976) and Watson (1997) also note that not only is battlefield chaotic. leaders can be unpredictable and illogical as well as incompetent. political and cultural diversity. 1994. challenges. David.g. man “is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. Even though much of the focus of books on military incompetence is on individual incompetence (e. peace missions reflect ambiguities. the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of modern-day armies and .g. A tactical decision can now have unpredictable political repercussions and a relatively small field event can turn into a political crisis. But perhaps the Fragmentation perspective will be most useful concerning the complexities of the future. In peace operations where an apparently minor action can lead to unpredictable effects. Dixon (1976) and Watson (1997) give us tales of misinformation. lack of (or limited) rule of law. poor logistics. inevitably the fragmentary character of the battlefield and military organization for battle is described. Members of the organization do not interpret or share organizational structures and symbols in the same way. This is all the more true given the media intensity and public scrutiny of military operations. limited intelligence. It can be a useful analytical tool to deal with the confusion and ambiguity associated with peace operations.g. In the future. Dixon. 1994: 89).Military organization and culture 79 wild confusion and at one point confessed. Chaos theory (see Beaumont. as missions become more complex and military roles polyvalent. expanded scope. Whether as part of stable operations (e. risks and frustrations that differ – at least qualitatively – from those experienced in conventional operations (see Pinch. inadequate reconnaissance.

various factions. 1983: 139). . and no widely accepted procedure for implementing it (Druckman et al. If there is interim conflict or ambiguity concerning the change.. Leaders can set the boundaries of the dialogue. Integration approach to culture change Certainly there is no universal formula for producing effective change. Problems will disappear once most organizational members understand and are “on board. that is. Culture change – three perspectives In this section. Because the organization is seen as homogeneous and culture as being shared by all the members. From the top to the bottom. Leadership seems to be decentered. organization as jungle the tasks they are asked to perform create a lack of clarity and confusion. individuals.4 Fragmentation perspective Features Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors Fragmentation perspective Multiplicity of views (no consensus) Complexity (not clearly consistent or inconsistent) Focus on it Culture as web. normally stable and consensual. 1985: 476). Organizations are assumed to be integrated wholes.” it is “beyond the control of any individual” (Clifford. 1997: 7). In fact. Culture is an open-ended creative dialogue of subcultures. Because the activity of culture is “plural. we will see what adopting one of the three perspectives means when trying to introduce change within an organization. Culture change will be instituted to establish.” The Integration literature on change can be divided into two approaches – case studies of change and advice to executives (Ouchi and Wilkins. the change will occur until the entire glass of water is the same color. however. they can assume that it will occur more or less systematically throughout the organization. This is a very instrumental view – that culture or parts of it might be managed. ambiguity and fluidity are the characteristics of modern organizational culture. Once the mechanisms and policies are in place. it does not play the determining role in the culture of the organization as it does in the Integration perspective. any attempt to create a cohesive culture is doomed to fail since diversity. they cannot determine the outcome. etc. it is because of faulty implementation or it is a temporary state of affairs.80 Donna Winslow Table 3. maintain or return to a stable state. little societies. However. change can be introduced like dropping ink into a glass of water. if one takes an Integration view of culture. In the same way the leaders at the top of an organization can set the tone and implement a change process. then one holds certain assumptions about what culture is and what actions need to be taken in order to induce culture change.

function. 1992: 29). diversity. In the Integration approach. etc. the appraisal and rewarding of behavior consistent with the desired culture. repetitive socializing and training of employees in the key cultural values. According to the Differentiation perspective. it would be encapsulated in the words “top-down” and “planned. Leaders communicate what is going to happen and they maintain control over how it will happen. Different subcultures set up social boundaries compared to other groups with which they may be in conflict or in accommodation. Druckman et al. and the design of an organizational structure that reinforces the key cultural values among all organization members. This approach assumes that change is a linear process and that the changed vision or new end state is fixed and can be collectively shared. Leaders choose the basic change and/or are responsible for implementing it. change can result from a struggle among groups. that they impact the armed forces.” Again Schein’s work is often cited by military writers. the use of symbols to reinforce cultural attributes. (1997: 90) mention the following mechanisms for changing/ forming/maintaining a culture: a unique and clearly articulated ideology. In the end. 1985: 48).” Differentiation approach to culture change The Differentiation perspective assumes that organizational subcultures exist and are related to specific variables such as department. They engineer the change. Leaders can create strong cultures by shaping norms. manageable concepts (values. and that they can be managed.) and mechanisms (levers) for changing them are identified. norms. They pull the levers. inculcating values and generating emotions (see Peters and Waterman. When this form of cultural engineering is proposed.Military organization and culture 81 controlled and intentionally changed (Alvesson and Berg. the role of management in an Integration approach is clear. ethnicity. 1982). 1996: 370). rather than issues to be explored or possible catalysts for change. race. For example. with varying degrees of power . Groups are embedded in different contexts or patterns of interaction which lead to collective understandings that differ by group (Van Maanen and Barley. difference and dissent are treated as problems to be ironed out. The organization is seen as some sort of mechanistic system in which management identifies some destination (vision or end state) and then drives the organization in the right direction while watching at checkpoints along the way (DiBella. According to Schein (1990: 2) “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture. gender. profession.” Dunivin (1997) also maintains that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a paradigm shift of US military culture. etc. In pulling these levers. For example Widen (1997: 20) affirms that “The strategic leader should recognize that military cultures exist. religion. work groups. instilling beliefs. culture is just another lever that management can pull in order to institute change or improve performance in the organization. If we were to summarize the integration approach to military culture change. the recruitment of like-minded employees.

1992: 10). most Differentiation studies offer a “snapshot” of a particular subculture at a single point in time.82 Donna Winslow to impose and resist change (Martin. for a discussion of this). In his work on the British Army. negotiations and bargains. the expectations and dictates embodied in the official manuals. There are inherent contradictions in the idea that the same kinds of values and behaviors exist and therefore the same kind of controls can be imposed upon diverse groups in an organization. can be contrasted with. then we would have to use the word “negotiated. and men and men. is deviant to. In short. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 92. Some studies draw attention to the ways internal loose coupling can dampen the flow of information in an organization. therefore analysis seldom offers clear and comforting prescriptions for action concerning culture change. officers and men. Things do . are very much a negotiated order” (Hockey. thus those who support a new culture can rise to positions of power within the organization. tangled interactions giving rise to unintended results. Ambiguity is the operating principle. The presence of multiple cultures in an organization means that strategies for planned change may have to consider simultaneous.” Fragmentation approach to culture change The Fragmentation perspective assumes that organizational culture is already fluctuating and unstable. They react. The organization itself then needs to be looked at as a series of accommodations. 183) state that organizational cultures are so heterogeneous that it is impossible to introduce planned change. not something that is an intermittent state in an otherwise stable environment. 1998. However. According to Bolman and Deal (1997: 23): Taking action in an organization is like shooting a wobbly cue ball into a large and complex array of self-directed billiard balls. if you push on one side you have no idea what will come out the other. So many balls bounce off one another in so many directions that it is hard to know how things will look when everything settles down. The Differentiation approach is critical of culture change imposed from the top. The presence of subcultures in an organization can affect change due to their contradictory interpretations of a change (see Hauser. resist and reinterpret these changes. multiple and interdependent changes within and between culturally heterogeneous groups. 1986: 141). If we were to summarize the Differentiation approach to culture change in an organization. They rarely discuss change. Employees do not act as passive recipients of cultural change. Different groups will try to place their representatives in strategic positions and one way to control change is to control the promotion process. The idea is that formal organizations may be the stage for complicated. “This has enabled me to show how relationships between NCOs and men. Hockey shows how the behavior of privates departs from.

In this way. beliefs. “Factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be considerably less important. Therefore Fragmentation studies of change offer few guidelines for those who would normatively control the change process (see Martin and Frost. not important at all. decisions and structural issues. since whatever they do will be interpreted and reinterpreted in unexpected and unintended ways. he observes that it is very difficult. negotiation and bargaining. If change is attempted. however. 1996: 285. The organization continually “learns how to learn” by maintaining processes that critically examine key assumptions. organizational members are not seen as passive recipients of culture change. Change. There are. even though they cannot control the outcome (Bryman. I believe that all three perspectives must be taken into consideration so that a wide range of strategies can be developed. 287). culture is not only seen as a thing to be changed but as a dynamic system. 1991: 5).Military organization and culture 83 change. Since those holding power will have more influence. In order to even attempt change. a new state of affairs is created through accommodation. It cannot be planned. but according to their own logic. Leaders’ messages can frame organizational responses. if not impossible. If we were to summarize the Fragmentation approach to culture change in an organization. then we would have to use the word “emergence” which implies that change will emerge from the dialogue that occurs between organizational members. one of the implications of the Fragmentation perspective for leaders is that their strategies for change are problematized. or even inversely important in another study” (Rosen. Summary In Rosen’s study of military innovations. Their roles are less central and less effective than that portrayed in the Integration perspective. it is difficult to predict what the result will be. . they are imaginative consumers of leaders’ visions. leaders may not be able to send clear signals at all. some of their meanings will prevail over others. Similar to the Differentiation perspective. It represents an inter-subjective world where the meanings of any organizational change are likely to be temporary and partial. Leaders can therefore set the parameters of the dialogue. Change will be something that is continually being negotiated. tasks. It also allows organizational members and leaders to question their basic assumptions. In this way. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 168) describe the need for dialogue. since their influence depends on others’ interpretations and the effect of these interpretations on behavior. not according to anyone’s plans. a few indications of how to approach change using a Fragmented approach. then. In fact. to know what causes change. with varying degrees of success (see Fineman. 1994: 81). becomes a form of organizational learning. To be aware of culture in terms of the three perspectives increases the likelihood of success. As Bryman (1996: 286) points out. 1996: 609).

Thus the shift in missions will impact on army culture. Why does using all three perspectives make sense? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that army culture reflects the chaos of warfare.) in a fragmentary. I do not think that this core will not change in the near future – even if armies are primarily involved in operations other than war. suppression of individuality. since the chaos of peace operations is qualitively different from the chaos of war. Thus the cross-pull between order and chaos becomes a principle of army culture and becomes visible in many forms (highly ritualized promotion ceremonies and drunken initiations and hazings. but not destroy its core dialectic. peace operation environments are very chaotic. espoused values. or as essential and abstract? Do we think of culture as homogeneous or as heterogeneous? My answer is that it depends on the perspective that you adopt. Since I believe that the core dialectic of army culture is the structuring of chaos. . My underlying assumption was that the strength of the approach has been this multidimensionality. Throughout this chapter. However.84 Donna Winslow Conclusions I began this discussion by saying that our understanding of culture was intuitive. fixation on details. This produces a structured set of patterning (hierarchy. This creates the dynamic and contradictory impulses characteristic of a rational organization that demands that soldiers be warriors who can kill and be killed in a very irrational environment. Like canoeists trained on a lake to shoot rapids. In an army organization. which creates a dynamic tension between ordering and chaotic forces. etc. Decisions and actions thus become a mix of deliberate thought and reflex mixed with a certain form of creativity and instinct. strong currents and undercurrents co-exist. then the structuring of that chaos is also bound to change. Do we regard it as an objective “fact” located “out there” in the external world. they quickly abandon the rhythm and sense of order and concentrate mainly on staying upright. rigorous physical training. that using all three perspectives enhanced understanding of army culture. Accepting the assumption that combat lies at the heart of army culture as its raison d’être. creating linear orderliness and formalistic hierarchical authority. or as a subjective “essence” which is constructed via a “network of meaning”? Do we think of culture as real and concrete. we can observe the integrative processes that are set in motion to control the essentially chaotic task of waging war. As soldiers can attest to. In my view the dialectic between order and chaos constitutes the real heart of army culture. etc.13 when they enter the raging stream of water and the rapidly changing currents. rationality of tactics and the raw emotions of battle skill training. I have been pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of all three perspectives and giving a few examples of how they have been used in the study of army culture.). Yet at the same time the use of the idea of the art (which is a creative and intuitive process) of war. fluctuating and fluid environment that characterizes (the fog of) war. the gut feelings of leadership are necessary. between integrative and disintegrative forces.

the sergeant’s relentless demand for cleanliness) and anxiety (e. Ceremonies are the rituals of collective action that mark certain events or passages to new rank or status within the life of the military unit. see Alvesson (1996) and Martin (1992). for example. In sociological terms. this means vertical or secondary group integration. 11 Similarly. Peters and Waterman (1982) or Denison (1996). who measure organizational culture’s internal consistency and impact on members.g. because of societal mechanisms. about death and violence). Etiquette is the normative prescriptions that guide or control interpersonal behavior. loosely coupled. 10 For example.Military organization and culture 85 Notes 1 According to Hofstede. In sociological terms this means horizontal or primary group integration. 2 See. According to Sabrosky et al. social constructs are internalized in collective and shared mental symbolic universes. military structure is also more like a web or network than a pyramidal bureaucracy of reporting relationships. Kotter and Heskett (1992) and Deal and Kennedy (1983). masculinity and freedom from social restraint characteristic of the exclusively male military world of that time. instruction and drills. they cultivate a form of speech full of grammatical errors. 7 According to Berger and Luckmann (1967). 8 Elkin (1946: 419) also noted how soldiers’ language expresses virility. 12 This image depicts culture as a web of diverse. Other forms of verbal behavior have also been studied. 13 Metaphor taken from Beaumont (1994: 124). (1982). 4 Burk (1999: 447) defines discipline as the behavior of military personnel in conformity with previously prescribed rules. Complementing the “muscular bonding” that is going on through joint physical exercise. Social constructivism thus looks at the processes of symbolic interaction and meaningmaking engaged in by organizational members. Whatever their background.g. beliefs and ideologies that may have little to do with the formal military system. Cohesion refers to the emotional bond of shared identity and camaraderie among soldiers within their local unity. code of conduct and social worth of the officer corps. Georgia. Ethos refers to the normative understandings that define the corporate identity. . and the attention of those in command was concentrated on the development of increasingly sophisticated military skills. 3 See for example. especially between those of different rank or status. He maintains the professionalization of the officer corps resulted in the army becoming more self-centered. who examine the organization’s ability to fulfill goals and innovate. Esprit de corps is the commitment and pride soldiers take in their military establishment and its effectiveness. and sprinkled with expletives in order to seem not too well educated or distant from their men. and volatile networks of symbols and relationships. Ladkani (1993) did an ethnographic study of marching or running cadences during infantry training in Fort Benning. the cadence allows for expression of collective experience (e. command. culture is a collective “programming of the mind” which distinguishes members of one national culture from another. 9 Other work on army language includes Irwin’s (1993) observations of the language habits of Canadian NCOs. Watson (1997: 173) describes how sub or peer groups can generate their own values. 5 In a summary of symbolic approaches to culture. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 131) have classified ten out of 12 perspectives as what would be considered integrative. 6 This is very similar to Finer’s (1976) analysis as to why the British Army does not concern itself with politics.

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is also military sociology. Categorizations are always arguable. David Segal holds appointments in both sociology and government at his university. but rather suggestive of the importance of the political science perspective in such studies. It does not pretend to be comprehensive. together with other institutions. the author included. lies closer to political science and government. Indeed. They will also play an important role. As militaries assume more domestic security functions traditionally associated with police forces. Given the profound implications of these developments for civil–military relations and military professionalism. such as Charles C.2 Readers from other disciplines may find some portions of this perspective to be useful in their own work. sociology.4 Political science perspectives on the military and civil–military relations John Allen Williams Introduction Militaries have traditionally been at the center of a State’s national security policy. two of whose work is highlighted below. and military analyses can hardly avoid dealing with some matters of traditional concern to political scientists. pathbreaking work is being done by European political scientists.1 This chapter presents an overview of the contribution of the discipline of political science and of some prominent political scientists to studies of the military and civil–military relations. In fact. scholars of the military who identify themselves as political scientists are primarily from the United States. Giuseppe Caforio’s call for studies of the military to be both cross-national and interdisciplinary is timely. Moskos and David R. Although the center of gravity in military sociology may well be shifting toward Europe. some of the work of renowned military sociologists. . but in any event will have a better idea of the contributions of this approach and its practitioners. Nevertheless. Similarly. in responding to new threats to national security highlighted by terrorist attacks around the world. a sophisticated understanding of the military is more important than ever before. Segal. The political science approach Political science shares many characteristics with other social sciences. much of the work performed by political scientists. especially that branch nearest to it.

These range from nominal level measurement statements to statistical analyses ranging from simple cross tabulations to multiple regressions and formal modeling. Some political science studies rely heavily on “scientific” techniques. force structure. Primary among these is a focus on governmental institutions. This sometimes detracts from the readability of political science literature and its accessibility to those not schooled in the mysteries of the discipline. Accession. etc. especially those less interested in the development of theory or who do not have a strong background in mathematics. how. Therefore. political scientists are largely concerned about the relationships of individuals and groups with formal governmental institutions. tend to look for patterned generalizations of cause and effect. they are interested in patterns rather than idiosyncrasies. but political science writings often reflect a combination of characteristics. “Who gets what.90 John Allen Williams There is no single characteristic that identifies a particular work as one of political science. Political scientists are concerned with power and formal authority. of course. national security strategy and the achievement of state goals. issues of military professionalism and civil–military relations are relevant insofar as they affect military effectiveness or the evolution of the force over time. In the minds of some observers. Many political scientists can best be categorized as students of conflict. The control of the state over the military as an institution is not transitory. the sole client of the military is the state.” This focus. but comprehensive. These security specialists are interested in the military primarily insofar as it relates to force employment. in the words of Harold Lasswell (1936). these techniques sometimes obscure more than they illuminate. “political scientists. or allocating costs and benefits. For political scientists. More so than in the humanistic disciplines. promotion. they are likely to produce nomothetic as opposed to ideographic studies – that is. coercion. While sociologists look at relationships between and among groups in society. As Feaver pointed out (1999: 212). The control of the state over the military and the context in which military members practice their profession is not only economic. there is a preference for generalizations and theory building. Not every political science study will evidence all of these characteristics. training. considerations of the state and its impact on the military are often in the foreground of any discussions of civil–military relations. They want to know. As Giuseppe Caforio notes elsewhere in this volume. sometimes causes political scientists to miss important social interactions not related to power. . an important characteristic of a relationship is power and its effect on the distribution of costs and benefits in society. when. missions. while often useful. Most frustrating to some is the use of quantitative methods of varying degrees of sophistication. and no other client is permitted. as opposed to historians. are all determined directly or indirectly by conditions set by the state.” With many exceptions. but continuous. In such studies. but they do illustrate some general tendencies.

The clearest exposition of his thesis is found in his early article. as well. Lasswell and Samuel P. where “all organized activities are directed by the . 1941. as Japanese troops were on the march in China (Lasswell. Huntington.4 He expanded his ideas in 1941 in a more widely quoted article in the American Journal of Sociology and updated them in 1962 in the light of subsequent events (Lasswell. Huntington No review of political science contributions to the study of the military and civil–military relations would be complete without emphasizing the important contributions of two early pioneers. Harold D. For example. 1937. with other aspects of society “systematically subordinated to the fighting forces. Lasswell’s career is interesting from an interdisciplinary perspective. The former is best known in this area for his warnings about the growth of what he termed a “garrison state. Harold D.” and the latter for his writings on military professionalism and the requisites for effective civilian control. 1962: 77–116). Lasswell first aired his concerns about the garrison state in 1937. Works such as Psychopathology and Politics (1930) established him as one of the founders of the field of political psychology. In addition. All but the late Harold Lasswell and Morris Janowitz continue to be active scholars.” where the state “has been associated with the institutions of representative and responsible government.” Different types of states value different skills. The trailblazers: Harold D. the predominant form in the West. The writings of the authors discussed below all have continuing relevance for military studies in the new century. the distinctive skill is “bargaining in the competitive market. Lasswell and Samuel P. in which he expressed his fear that civilian institutions may not be equal to the strain imposed on them by an expansion of the emergency then unfolding: “The upshot may be the rise of the garrison state to replace the civilian state” (1937: 43). and the free forum.” Other types of state have been seen historically.3 Categorization is complicated by the fact that these very prolific writers often cross the boundaries of the typology. they account for all the cases under discussion and divide the examples by criteria that clearly differentiate them.Military and civil–military relations 91 Examples from political science We turn now from general considerations to the work of some prominent political scientists in order to assess the contribution of the discipline to studies of the military and of civil–military relations. The following categorization falls short of these criteria. but it does attempt to highlight important authors whose writings display common characteristics. such as the official bureaucratic state. in Huntington. in the business state. 1997). in Stanley. Lasswell noted in the same article that specialists in violence would run a garrison state. The typology presented below of some notable political scientists who have done or are doing work on the military and civil–military relations is offered in the awareness that the most useful typologies are those that are both exclusive and exhaustive – that is. the criteria should be theoretically based.

Huntington was critical of Lasswell’s partial solution to the garrison state of minimizing the distinction between political and military functions. responsibility (for the security of the state) and corporateness (self-aware professional identity) (1957: 11–18).5 By 1941 he refined his argument to suggest that the specialists in violence who are the core of a garrison state will include expertise in areas heretofore regarded as civilian. and. there are several areas of inquiry that would help preserve as many civilian values as possible.92 John Allen Williams government.” Even if the garrison state were to come to pass. in his view. personnel management and public relations (1941: 59). It further believes “that war is the inspiration of politics.” Examples include China prior to 1911 and.” (1941: 69). The American liberal tradition has not been hospitable to the military. Huntington first made the case that the military is a profession. Lasswell closed with the optimistic thought that the garrison state is not inevitable. such as administrative organization. best described as conservative realism. . This is “objective” civilian control. such as seen in the Soviet Union. He suggested the importance of “the absorption of the military by the multivalued orientation of a society” (Huntington 1962: 107). This Huntington called “fusionism. A variant of this pattern is the party bureaucratic states. The complexity of the inter- . civilian control is guaranteed. the rulers will rely on war scares to keep the population compliant. some “bloodletting” to help preserve the “virtues of sturdy acquiescence in the regime. Huntington calls this a policy of extirpation. it has tried to reduce the size of the military to the point that it could not pose a threat to civilian authority. to some extent. the large states prior to 1914. Samuel P. which believes that the nature of the individual and the realities of international relations require that states maintain strong military forces to defend themselves. but protracted crises increase the danger. Lasswell believed that there are implications for scientists who are “friends of democracy” and who wish “to defend the dignity of human personality. reinforcing these tenets of military professionalism rather then trying to civilianize the military best ensures civilian control. It is.” This policy of “subjective” military control he called transmutation (1957: 155). the defining characteristics of which are expertise (in the management of violence). when these have lost their effectiveness. and hence the duly constituted officials. No value relativist. and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism” (1957: 79) For this reason. In 1962. including civilianizing the ruling elite (1941: 71–2). a position that would put him at odds with Huntington.6 Chillingly. that the military are the servants of the statesman. On the one hand. . Another policy is to sacrifice military characteristics by “the refashioning of the military institution along liberal lines.” in which the military would include non-military factors in their thinking and take on non-military responsibilities (1957: 349–51). If the military is professional. Lasswell returned to the notion of maintaining civilian values in a world where conflict made military values important. There is a distinctive military mind. a serious mistake to involve the military in politics or to try to civilianize the military.

now retired from active service. Some of Sarkesian’s work was done in collaboration with scholars from his own and from other disciplines. all with close connections to US military and civilian leaders. even when their opinions may differ from those of their civilian masters. civil–military relations and civilian control of the military. at the US Military Academy. This section includes two such soldier–scholars. 112).. military officers have the responsibility to speak out in their area of expertise. In his writings. 1986) to military effectiveness (with Williams. These include political scientists. 1995). and the important role of special forces in the US military. Don M. and as an infantry officer in Vietnam. The militaries of the world have provided numerous examples of this kind of individual throughout history. .. Snider and Eliot A. In his view. Sarkesian highlights the importance of military professionalism to combat effectiveness. Normative theorists: Sam C. He notes that “the military profession itself must be philosophically broadened and encouraged to involve itself judiciously in the policy arena. This work ranged from sophisticated analyses of revolutionary guerilla warfare and terrorism (Sarkesian. The Soldier and the State remains one of two standard reference points for discussions of military professionalism. 1960 and 1971). .Military and civil–military relations 93 national strategic landscape and the multitude on non-military factors that affect US military success pose a problem for military leaders whose preference is to focus primarily on military factors. 1995. 1975b. an historian and a psychologist (Sarkesian et al. He remains concerned that the military must at the same time preserve “the culture and virtues suited to its unique mission” and be aware of the limits of such “constructive political engagement as defined by the military professional ethos and the American democratic system” (1998: 107. and professional military education (with Williams and Bryant. 99). as a Special Forces officer in Korea. 2002). 1984. 1999). as an airborne officer.7 Janowitz was a strong believer in subjective civilian control of the military. military professionalism (1975a). This cannot be done by adhering to a notion of the military profession as a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm” (1998: 97. Sarkesian’s contributions to the profession and to the field of military studies include assuming the presidency of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed . military sociology (1980). Sarkesian turned his attention to scholarly issues concerning the military and civil–military relations. Cohen One of the important constructs of Morris Janowitz was his notion of the soldier–scholar. Sam C. 1990). Sarkesian and Connor. so these two classic books continue to frame the discussion very well. and a distinguished nonmilitary scholar. The other is the late sociologist Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (Janowitz. Sarkesian. Following a military career that included enlisted service in the occupation of Germany. He emphasizes the central role of the president and the national security establishment in making effective military policy (Sarkesian et al. .

Don M. Eliot A. and Leadership in Wartime (2002) is a magisterial account of the relations between military leaders and civil authority in a democracy. suggesting that a new norm of jointness. They had studied military matters closely. he returned to the US Military Academy at West Point. 1999. indeed a new military profession. He did much to institutionalize the organization and put it on a solid footing for the post-Janowitz era. His examples were Abraham Lincoln. naive amateurs or armchair generals. DC. Winston Churchill and David Ben Gurion – all of whom had strong opinions about the manner in which their respective wars should be fought. Georges Clemenceau. but a political scientist whose vision and organizational skills were crucial to the advancement of the field. civilian control and most effective ways in which to apply military force. was emerging (1996. His book. Many of his writings have been concerned with issues of military professionalism in general and army professionalism and army officership in particular (Snider et al. 2000). even on military subjects. after retiring and directing political–military research for five years in an influential thinktank in Washington. He is also a prominent scholar and commentator on issues of professional military education (Snider et al. Supreme Command: Soldiers. Cohen chose four historical examples that support his view that civilian leaders must frequently insist on prevailing against military leaders. serving in his last tours of duty in the White House on the National Security Council Staff and then in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. His latest work brings together several interdisciplinary strands of research on army service as a professional calling.. In this case.. Snider completed his military career at the highest levels of civil–military relationships in the United States. Cohen is among the most prominent US scholars writing about military command. Statesmen. 2001). 2003). it was not only political science as a discipline that advanced the interdisciplinary study of the military. Snider and Watkins. While much of Snider’s work has a decidedly policy focus. He was among the first to trace the effects of new legislation increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2005). and were more qualified than many of their generals to make strategic decisions. as their military opponents sometimes supposed. They were not. Snider publishes in military publications as well as prestigious academic venues. 1995). Military academy cadets became congressional interns.94 John Allen Williams Forces and Society (IUS) from Morris Janowitz. Cohen suggested that the American military became politicized during the Cold War. rather than simply as participation in a large bureaucracy (Snider and Matthews. and has added much toward our understanding of civil–military relations and how these relate to the effectiveness of the military profession. he is also a prominent commentator on the areas of the expert knowledge of military professions and how that knowledge is best practiced by military professionals in the American civil–military context (Snider and Carlton-Carew. Then. strategy was taught in the war colleges and civilians were discouraged from developing their .

The military version of this is what Feaver calls the “civil–military . Cohen writes. He said of successful civilian wartime leaders. and self-sacrifice and a civilian world that seems increasingly egalitarian (at least in work habits). indeed. Feaver has augmented his academic career with high-level service on the staff of the US National Security Council and as an officer in the Naval Reserve. even more in their ability to retreat from their own poor decisions or simply to change their minds” (2002: 173). individualistic. it is up to the civilians to assert themselves. President Lyndon B. rather then substitute their own civilian “military” judgment. As these words are written. each of the four leaders chosen valued candid advice from their militaries. In such a situation. had a coherent strategy for prosecuting the war. which combines academic rigor and real-world experience. Johnson did not interfere much in the details of the Vietnam War. This is reflected in his academic work.Military and civil–military relations 95 expertise in military affairs (2002: 204). New institutionalists/formal theorists: Peter D. it comes from the increasingly close connection between force in politics. The greater problem was that no one in authority. misunderstand the nature of strategic challenges. Avant Peter D. Contrary to the conventional wisdom.” not for blind civilian domination of the process. “reinforced by the increasing gap between traditional military values of hierarchy. there are problems with the pacification and reconstruction of Iraq. and have difficulty in determining acceptable risk. however. loyalty. “Much of their genius lay in their ability to tolerate disagreement. and it appears that civilian leaders in the USA should have paid closer attention to military warnings – especially about the number of troops that would be required to win the peace after a successful initial battle. Cohen believes that civilian leaders must become involved in the details of military matters so that they can dominate such discussions with the military. yet also obliged to control itself. Civilians should not simply issue orders. For Feaver. civilian or military. fluid. Feaver and Deborah D. order. It is hard to disagree in principle with the notion that civilian leaders should exercise close control over the military. The issue is the degree to which these leaders should defer to military judgments in areas of particular military expertise. but should intensively push their leaders and probe for their best advice. This is no guarantee of success. apart from some rules of engagement and target selection. and acquisitive” (2002: 205). the problem of how to control the military is similar to the problem addressed by James Madison in Federalist 51: how to frame a government strong enough to govern. This does not mean that civilian leaders should dictate to the military. He argues for an “unequal dialogue. A complication is that the line between “civilian” and “military” strategic expertise is not so sharp. civilian and military strategists alike differ with one another. He did not suggest a sinister motive for this development. Even in those cases he often accepted the views of his military advisors.

carried out in 2004. 2004). Normatively. such as Feaver’s timely work with Christopher Gelpi on civilian and military attitudes toward the use of force and their willingness to incur casualties in the process (Feaver and Gelpi. he says. in that both civilian and military actors in advanced democracies anticipate the actions of the other in an ongoing strategic interaction. however. it should be their call.” (Feaver. the civilian view trumps it. There is also an international dimension to the civilian–military culture gap work spearheaded in the US by Feaver and Kohn. Avant views the relationship between civilians and military as one of principal and agent. 1996)? Like most students of civil–military relations in the United States. 1998). He sees agency theory as an alternative to the dominant theory of Samuel P. Perhaps the most important contribution of this project was a set of survey data that is the most complete and current on US civilian and military attitudes. the style of the president and the personalities in the military hierarchy. Illustrating the crossover between sociology and political science. 2003: 6). He was co-principal investigator with historian Richard D. The project also spawned scholarly collaborations of significant scholarly and practical importance. Feaver has also done important interdisciplinary work. Feaver is of the view that even if civilians are wrong. As he says.96 John Allen Williams problematique”: how do you have a military that is strong enough to be effective that does not also pose a threat to democratic political institutions (Feaver. Feaver is not concerned about anything as dramatic as a military coup. Kohn on a project examining the “culture gap” between the civilians and military. including the issue. is more likely when “civilians will detect and punish military misbehavior . 2003: 14. . “Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be. 2001). He is concerned. Huntington. He uses agency theory to predict when the military will work (follow the directions of their civilian masters) or shirk (not follow the directions of their civilian masters). will be published in 2006. [C]ivilians have the right to be wrong” (Feaver. the use of force. about the degree to which military leaders follow the directions of their civilian masters. and resulted in an edited book that marks the state of research on civil–military relations in the United States (Feaver and Kohn.8 Like Feaver. . and has used this perspective to examine civilian control as it applies to both military effectiveness and the accountability . . Military obedience. . Feaver’s theory is more dynamic than Huntington’s. The issue has been addressed more recently by scholars associated with RC01: Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association and the European Research Group on the Military and Society (ERGOMAS). Deborah D. while agreeing with Huntington that there is a distinction between civilians and the military. This research. they use the sociological method of survey data to shed light on a traditional political science issue. The degree to which civilian control is effective will depend on a number of factors. This was a major collaborative effort with scholars from many disciplines. .

Military and civil–military relations 97 of military policy in a democracy.9 Structuralists/IR theorists: John J. 1988) which suggested that Liddell Hart’s theories were neither as influential nor as original as he claimed. including advanced training that directly impacts combat on the battlefield. Liddell Hart (Mearsheimer. Michael C. This type of institutional system maximizes the integration of doctrine with grand strategy. the unified civilian leadership will more effectively exercise control over the military than a leadership that is divided. It was followed by a critical analysis of the work of B. This changed principal–agent relationship has gained mounting importance. She looked at the ability of the British Army to adapt in the Boer War and in Malaya. Cimbala John J. Avant (1994: 138) understands the importance of historical context in understanding civil–military relations. 2000). there was one contractor for every ten soldiers (2004: 153). and much of his work bears directly or indirectly on civil military relations. The implications of the changed political control in the US include a reduced role for congress. in the recent war in Iraq. This privatization of security has implications not only for the conduct of war but for civil–military relations.H. reduced transparency and greater opportunities for adventurous military policy (2005). This significant volume had a profound effect on military thinking and ultimately on the US military. Desch and Stephen J. and compares this with the difficulties of the American Army in adapting in Vietnam. their use always changes the political control of force. Mearsheimer is perhaps the most influential grand theorist of conflict of his generation. as more and more of what used to be performed by soldiers is done by civilian contractors. and thereby ensure that military leaders who wish to be promoted will remain in harmony with them (1994: 47). In her view. or who guards the guardians. Mearsheimer. In general. forthcoming). Though under different circumstances they may provide more or less effectiveness and greater or lesser integration with societal values. . there was one contractor for every 50 soldiers. in the US particularly. Her latest project concerns the growing degree to which ostensibly military functions are performed by civilians (2004). Avant’s later work looks at various indicators of the degree of crisis in American civil–military relations (1998) and the attitudes of the military toward new missions (Avant and Lebovic. They now provide other services. In the first Gulf War. Mearsheimer’s first book was a contribution to the discussion then raging about the role of conventional as opposed to nuclear forces in the defense of Western Europe (1985). one of the most effective mechanisms of civilian control is the military personnel system. Civilian contractors are different kinds of agents than military organizations. It permits civilian leaders to select for advancement those military leaders most in sympathy with civilian perspectives. contractors were mainly useful for maintaining complex weapons systems. but sometimes at the cost of the skill and resources devoted to military preparedness (Avant. In the past.

Sarkesian et al. demonstrates the applicability of realist theory to international relations in general. Cimbala is an extraordinarily perceptive and prolific political scientist whose works range from history (1997) to strategic studies (Cimbala. for example. and international conflict in particular. (2003: 3–5) Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” predicts. b). . Desch. and commands a wide readership of specialists and non-specialists alike.” (1998a. Desch is firmly of the belief that it is best for civilian preferences to prevail over those of the military. is more directly concerned with issues of civilian control of the military.98 John Allen Williams Mearsheimer’s book. This is a different conclusion from that of Harold Lasswell. . Mearsheimer’s views on the primacy of land power and the relative ineffectiveness of strategic bombing and naval blockades (except in concert with strong land forces) have important implications for the structure of military forces and the way military leaders are trained.. Like Cohen. Desch is not concerned that there may be a military coup. 2000b) and the difficulties of maintaining deterrence in the face of nuclear proliferation (2002a). Michael C. such as during the Cold War (1998b: 591–2). 1984. The best environment for civilian control is when external threats are high and internal threats are low. a student of Mearsheimer’s. The hope that a stronger China will not try to become a regional hegemon in Asia is wishful thinking. that the United States and China will engage in an intense rivalry not unlike the superpower competition in the Cold War if China’s power continues to increase. but one would be hard pressed to think of an area of military studies that has not been illuminated by Cimbala’s work. 2002) to nuclear warfare (1998. [S]tates recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals. The “tragedy” is that: Great powers that have no reason to fight each other – that are merely concerned with their own survival – nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. His work reflects a solid understanding of history and is accessible to a non-specialized audience. who feared that a long period of international crisis would cause the emergence of a garrison state. It is difficult to convey the breadth of Cimbala’s scholarly activities in a brief summary. Stephen J. . the worst environment is when external threats are low and internal threats are high” (1999: 14). the better their chances of survival. it is precisely that challenging environment that increases civilian control. Cimbala has a particular gift of clear exposition of complicated subjects. For Desch. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2003). but suggests that the main issue for civilian control is this (1999): “can civilian leaders reliably get the military to obey when civilian and military preferences diverge?” Desch set forth a structural theory that “expects civilian control of the military to be strongest in the face of a challenging international threat environment and weakest when that threat environment is comprised largely of domestic threats. . 2000a.

He takes issue with Eliot Cohen’s view (Cohen. it is apparent to Forster that there are many similarities in European civil–military relations.” The former resulted in “an empowered military with smarter and more motivated people” (2005: 30).. A recent article by Cimbala on military transformation in the influential professional military journal. shows a combination of strategic and tactical insights and an awareness of the implications of transformation for civil military relations (2005: 28–33). Building on the work of military sociologists. arguing that the army “belongs not to the Congress or the President but to the American populace” (Cimbala. Cimbala applies Clausewitz’s insights on friction to situations confronted by militaries today.Military and civil–military relations 99 Cimbala’s work on military persuasion (2002b) brings together concepts from military history. Edmunds and Cottey (including some 30 international collaborators) use the methodology of political science to study civil–military relations in European postcommunist societies. including that of the author of this chapter (Moskos et al. 2002: 187) that this was an inappropriate limitation on choice for civilian officials.. 2005: 32–3). 2003). A student of Clausewitz.. Their work introduces new conceptual frameworks through which to understand civil–military issues and highlights such issues as military reform. politics and psychology in order to study issues from Clausewitz to cyber-war. In particular.. political objectives must be coordinated with military operations and not considered separately. His discussion references previous scholarship. As the Cold War recedes. Joint Forces Quarterly (2005). . b. military professionalism. New European theorists: Anthony Forster and Hans Born Some of the most pathbreaking work in applying political science perspectives to problems of civil–military relations is being done by British scholar Anthony Forster. Cimbala is also an influential scholar on the issue of conflict termination (2001). and is relevant to contemporary issues of the military and society. 2005). Forster et al. The latter bound the nation’s military to pursue only those wars that had public support sufficient to permit the reserve force mobilization necessary to pursue a war of any significant scope or duration (2005: 30–2). whose advice is frequently sought by government and the media. 2000). 2002a. He has also written in opposition to excessive US unilateralism and the importance of the US standing together with Canada and the European democracies (Forster et al. both alone and with frequent co-authors Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey. Forster’s own work includes an important interdisciplinary monograph on armed forces and society in Europe (2005) and is an extension of his earlier collaborative work. including peace operations and other small wars (2000a). and issues of the military and society (Cottey et al. Forster. Perhaps the most important “transformations” of the US military have involved the end of conscription and the integration of the active and reserve components of the military into the “total force. 2002. Their comparative analyses dealt with democratic civilian control.

There he coordinates two DCAF working groups of great relevance to civil–military relations: Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector and Legal Aspects of Security Sector Governance.” Born’s scholarly work also focuses on democratic accountability. Lasswell and Huntington. Collaboration is especially common with sociologists. “Civil–Military Relations in Europe” (with the European Research Group on Military and Society) and “Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practices for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. Born emphasizes the importance of comparative studies of civil–military relations. They can read and understand studies ranging from the purely historical to efforts by psychologists or sociologists to find patterned regularities in behavior using advanced statistical techniques. But in addition to its contribution as a discipline. 2004). Most political scientists are trained social scientists who understand the language and mores of normal science. intelligence accountability (Born et al.10 Political science as the core of interdisciplinary studies of the military This discussion has focused on the unique contribution of some important political scientists to the study of the military and civil–military relations. political science is uniquely well positioned to integrate studies of other disciplines. and requires all conditions to be fulfilled to be effective.”11 Political scientists who do not themselves do quantitative studies are often familiar enough with the strengths and limitations of such studies to comprehend their degree of importance and to collaborate with others more familiar with that mode of analysis.” “Democratic Accountability of the Security Sector in Member States” (for the Council of Europe). operating in a strategic concept that affects the kind of military a society will have. have had a long-lasting impact. and subsequently his students. 2005) and the use of force (Born and Hänggi. as suggested by their titles: “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. whose discipline is closest to political science (Moskos et al. Many of the products of these working groups are designed to be relevant to decision-makers. Like Forster. 2006).. 2000). “most military sociologists today do not recognize the impact that Lasswell’s thinking had on Morris Janowitz.100 John Allen Williams Militaries are considered to be political actors. rather than “insular case studies. Political scientists have also influenced the thinking of scholars from other disciplines. . As David Segal pointed out. and their students .. ability (expertise and resources) and attitude (critical attitude).” Parliamentary control of the military is based on authority (legal powers).. many political scientists do work that is indistinguishable from that done by sociolo- . Indeed. . Hans Born is a Dutch scholar working in Switzerland as a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). such as the effect of crises and institutional change (Born et al. in particular.

I appreciate the help of all of these scholars in developing my thinking on these matters. where such discussions continue to this day. June 20. Charles C. for that matter. 24 (3): 375–87. Moskos. of course. I am particularly indebted to James Burk and Michael P. August 29. (2004) “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force. 5: 153–7. Page references are from this book. 2005. Deborah D.” Armed Forces and Society. Turkey. Noonan for their suggestions for the overall conceptualization of these issues. are not non-disciplinary studies. NY. Michel Martin. and more broadly for his scholarship and his leadership of the Research Committee.Military and civil–military relations 101 gists. I have received valuable advice from most of the authors referred to in this chapter. 4 Stanley’s introduction provides an exceptionally perceptive overview of Lasswell’s garrison state construct. Deborah D.” International Studies Perspectives. Avant. 6 This is a close paraphrase of Lasswell’s words. Such studies are best pursued by scholars with a strong foundation in their own discipline. 10 Personal communication. from which this chapter is drawn. Given Feaver’s germinal contributions to civil–military relations theory and his insightful observations. cross-national. and David R. Not all worthwhile studies will be interdisciplinary. 8 Giuseppe Caforio took a leading role in this research. But if the subfield is to achieve its full potential – both in intellectual development and in its contribution to public policy – scholars will need to look beyond their own disciplines and beyond the borders of their own countries. Notes 1 I thank Giuseppe Caforio for the invitation to participate in the 2004 Interim Conference of the RC01: Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association in Ankara. Interdisciplinary studies. Segal. Feaver (1999) for an earlier and more exhaustive treatment of this subject. his article is a particularly valuable resource. as well as from Aaron Belkin. Noonan for the organization of this section. References Avant. He should not be held accountable for my version of his ideas. (1994) Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars. as well as an appreciation for the contributions of other disciplines and an understanding of how research is conducted in those disciplines. Lasswell’s caution seems especially important. 11 Personal communication. 2 See Peter D. Cornell University Press. 2004. 7 Morris Janowitz was Founding Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS). 5 In view of current security threats and their likely long duration. Avant. 9 I thank Deborah Avant for clarifying my wording in this section. or. (1998) “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil–Military Relations. The work of most of the political scientists discussed above regularly crossed disciplinary borders. 3 I am indebted to Michael P. The IUS has remained faithful to Janowitz’s vision and encourages rigorous social science research with an interdisciplinary and international focus. Deborah D. Ithaca. .

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Don M. A Need for Renewal and Redefinition. (1986) The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts. in Crisis or Transition. CO. Sarkesian. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Westport. Lynne Rienner. Civil–Military Relations.” Orbis. Jr. Priest and Felisa Lewis (2001) “The Civilian–Military Gap and Professional Military Education at the Precommissioning Level. Westport. Snider. Sarkesian. December. Stanley. NJ. Lasswell.104 John Allen Williams Sarkesian. Boulder. Don M.S.. Military Must Find Its Voice. Connor. Transaction Publishers. Don M. John A. Robert F. Snider. Snider. editor (2005) The Future of the Army Profession. Washington. Boston. John Allen Williams and Fred B. and Politics. Sam C. project director. Bryant (1995) Soldiers. Don M. Carlisle Barracks. XXX (3): 5–20. Watkins (2000) “The Future of Army Professionalism. London. Boulder.S. and Robert E. CO. 27 (2): 249–72. Carlton-Carew (eds) (1995) U. Matthews. Jay (ed. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. CT.) (1997) “Harold D... Snider. (1998) “The U.S.S. Lynne Rienner. Sarkesian. . (1999) The U. Cimbala (2002) U. Sam C. McGraw Hill.” Essays on the Garrison State. Sarkesian. Society and National Security. Policymakers. Sam C. Lynne Rienner.. (1996) “The US Military in Transition to Jointness Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice Rivalry. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century.” Parameters.. Boulder. 12 (3): 423–37. National Security.” Parameters. and Gayle L. Sam C. Sam C. John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Nagl and Tony Pfaff (1999) Army Professionalism: The Military Ethic and Officership in the 21st Century. Greenwood Press. PA.S. Snider. Army in a New Security Era. Sarkesian. Sam C. and Miranda A. Frank Cass. Sarkesian. DC.” Armed Forces & Society. CO.” Airpower Journal. 2nd Edn. and Lloyd J. Defense Transformation and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession. Fall: 16–27. Don M. Don M. Don M. Sam C. XXXIII (3): 17–30. Snider. CT. and John Allen Williams (eds) (1990) The U. New Brunswick. Greenwood Press. (1984) America’s Forgotten Wars: the Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future. (2003) “Jointness. Processes. Snider.

His warning against the military–industrial establishment evoked a vision of hidden networks and cunning passages filled by bureaucrats. had sounded the above-mentioned warning in 1961. Secrets. researchers. (Dwight Eisenhower. whether sought or unsought. McGeorge Bundy – and thus to the president – in early 1961. whose military career as a commander-in-chief of allied forces in Europe after the Normandy invasion preceded his political career. Kennedy secretly continued the authorization. January 17. when Soviet military planners were about to launch the . at least. We should take nothing for granted. suggest they are up to some mysterious activities). by the military–industrial complex. entrepreneurs and managers networking under the cloak of secrecy. we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence. as did President Johnson. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. very influential as lobbyists yet barely seen in the media (if media decided to trace them or. President Eisenhower had delegated to major theater commanders the authority to initiate nuclear attacks under certain circumstances. after nearly a month in office. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. so that security and liberty may prosper together. officers. let alone analyzed in serious political debate of concerned citizens. Farewell Address Speech. Eisenhower’s warning came at the time of aggressive Soviet policy of communist expansion. 2002)1 Introduction President Dwight Eisenhower. when I briefed him on the issue. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals. This delegation was unknown to President Kennedy’s assistant for national security. (Daniel Ellsberg. 1961) Contrary to all public declarations. They were supposedly secretive and uncontrolled. such as outage of communications with Washington – an almost daily occurrence in those days – or presidential incapacitation (twice suffered by President Eisenhower).5 Social history and the armed forces Military education and social change Sl awomir Magala In the councils of government. which resulted in winning elections for the presidency of the United States.

In the case of the Soviets. wealth. which had to be enslaved and exploited so that “benevolent” dictatorship could implement its plans. His warning was sounded in the period when the USA’s industrial domination of the “free world” assured an increasingly affluent lifestyle for the growing middle class. proclaimed that the state’s target was a classless society. The Americans insisted on preserving inequalities (of talent. the military had to work through networking and persuasion. for which the existing one should fight like an army.106 Slawomir Magala attempt to station nuclear weapons in Cuba. and for the time being. but still enjoying the relatively quiet intermezzo between the war in Korea (1950–3) and the outbreak of protests against the involvement in Vietnam (1966–8). Kennedy’s call to young Americans to join the Peace Corps and help the rest of the world reach the USA living standards. . power). the military had priority in designing and managing social processes. Russians went on constructing a militarized state. unable to “destalinize” the system in spite of lip service being paid to millions of its victims in Kruschtschev’s famous speech at the twentieth party congress. and their right to do so was systematically questioned. Americans preached a class society based on capitalist markets subjected to a benign control by parliamentary democracy. Corporate managers did not shy away from proclaiming that “what is good for General Motors is good for the United States. just about to begin bowling alone. especially its ideological climate. The rise of the suburban middle class was expected to defuse class struggle. diverting all resources toward military planning and imposing radical totalitarian inequality on Russian society (and societies they had occupied after World War II). In the case of the USA. albeit sometimes belatedly. The Soviet political elite. The Cold War tends to be underestimated and partly forgotten. They hoped to expand their middle class so as to include all those who wanted to “take chances” in pursuit of liberty. It did – at the time. While Soviet upward social mobility met sharp limits separating the political power elite from the rest of society (including most of the professional bureaucracies initially serving as channels of upward social mobility for peasants and industrial workers).” and an affluent society of conspicuous consumption turned other-directed organization men with their household-dedicated women into a lonely crowd of a huge middle class. reflected in the enthusiastic response to John F. and their right to do so had never been questioned. had also prompted a large-scale “war on poverty” (and Johnson’s successful improvement of urban housing and education for the poorest). This optimism. but demonstrated the “stretching” capacities of a flexible and accommodating middle class as an achievable and desirable target for upward social mobility (and emphasized the attractiveness of the United States as the world’s number one destination for immigrants). and when serious strategic think tanks pondered the question of “mutually assured destruction” and the ability to survive the first nuclear attack – and to retaliate. property and happiness (and thus appeared to pose no limits to the upward social mobility of immigrant masses). eliminate industrial strikes and end racial discrimination in the southern states of the USA.

shaping citizens’ attention span (and shortening it to the zapping distance from the next “cut” of images and soundbites).2 Some of them manage to break free of military or commercial control (as did the Internet and the World Wide Web). some disappear forever from the public eye and will – eventually. to use Gavril Kharitonovitch Popov’s words. All these were thought to strengthen the resistance to communist infiltration and subversion and were based on an idea that: . or. many developments in the contemporary military–industrial establishment remain unknown. military intelligence data or diaries of CIA executives. The West Side story. The more clearly we also see. advanced research in corporate labs and top universities. or the double-edged sword of civil defense World politics in the twenty-first century will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the twentieth century – that is. how Stalin managed to privatize the Russian war effort and to turn the end of World War II into an expansion of his version of militarized and totalitarian state socialist society. had no qualms about disavowing any direct knowledge of the “Militant Liberty” program. (Chalmers Johnson. Lucky incidents. articulated in a classified National Security Council directive in 1958 and recommending troop education (following brainwashing of the US prisoners of war captured by the Chinese and Northern Koreans. serious. 2000: 229) The very same President Eisenhower who warned against the military–industrial establishment when leaving office in January 1961. shaping the agenda for public discussions and competing for a scarce resource in networked societies: the undivided. reflexive attention of individual citizens. from the unintended consequences of the Cold War. Eisenhower’s ideal of an alert and knowledgeable citizenry is also continually undermined by the multi-mediated communications. some day.Social history and the armed forces 107 Eisenhower’s warning remains important. The longer the distance separating us from the Cold War. rather. from the archives of the National Security Administration. Cloaked in the secrecy imposed on intelligence communities. uncontrolled and understudied. and generational clusters – allow us to see but a fleeting glimpse of the entire constellation of Silicon Valleys on the make. as well as public education and information programs. its emergence out of the secretive labyrinths of venture capital. hopefully – be reconstructed. the more we learn about the all-pervasive influence of the military and their think tanks upon the very civil society and its democratic political agenda they were supposed to protect and respect as their superior in a political and moral sense. or inaccessible because of the arcane peer control of high-tech elite research teams. as – for instance – the making of the Internet. the US Army worried about increasing the resistance to such techniques among soldiers). high-tech military industries.

the international espionage and sabotage conducted by the agents of Comintern and Soviet policy conducted under the ideological banners of communism facilitated the exclusion of the communist option from a legitimate range of choices in democratic societies. (Yarmolinsky. which sponsored his research – “every nook and cranny of our national life almost without our knowing it. is where we see most clearly the hidden injuries of the Cold War. even on a morally right side of it. This would have been impossible if communism remained one of the many political options in a democratic society. or make official expressions that are inconsistent with the foreign policy of this country.J. which had been the opposite of the “evil empire. His exchange with Rear Admiral D. Rossant. His findings are interesting. Adam Yarmolinsky. Director of The Twentieth-Century Fund. for instance. therefore. are in agreement that all military people should not make official expressions or participate in partisan politics. he was very much concerned that the military–industrial (one is almost tempted to say military–industrial–academic–political) establishment pervaded – in the words of M. within the democratic state.F. Smith Jr. However. the military establishment’s accomplishments.” Wars.108 Slawomir Magala Discussion of Communism and relations with the Soviet Union was not “political” or at least did not constitute an involvement in political activities in the sense of partisan politics. former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (a lawyer. some of which (for instance the “Gladio” project and P2 massonic lodge network in Italy) are still partly shrouded in secrecy. Soviet colonial policies in post-Yalta central and eastern Europe provided a justification for ideological exclusion of communism from the US political agenda. France and Italy – resulted in different policies. certainly you and I. is an illustration: Senator Thurmond: I think most people. because he has been working with the political controllers of the military.” Here. and he was not hostile to the latter – appreciating. Different European trajectories of countries with a strong Communist Party participating in legal elections – for example. which were supposed to control the military and quoted crucial fragment of the Senate investigative committee hearings. editor and educator) had investigated this complacent attitude of civilian institutions. at the time Chief of Information for the Navy. cold or hot. because it shows how political controls can be avoided by the military and their political neutrality violated – without a major public debate about the role of the armed forces in shaping civil society’s political agenda. 1971: 228) This is an important point. Nevertheless.. rarely leave combatants untainted: Putting the study of Communism into a “nonpolitical” category – as a “given” – was a particular concern of Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate investigating committee. . especially as far as education of individuals drawn from lower classes or the diminishing of racial inequalities in society at large went.

1971: 228–9) The above exchange between a senator. Admiral. subversion and contributes to the increased alertness of citizens. including the distinction between partisan politics and limits of the involvement of the military in the latter. sir. statements on communism. sir. (Yarmolinsky. and I never give a speech but what I throw a few nasty cracks about Communism. is a different situation.Social history and the armed forces Admiral Smith: Yes. sir. sir. whose role consisted of checking compatibility of military initiatives in a broader society with democratic institutions and public control of rules and agendas. sir. the insidious nature of it. would you? Admiral Smith: No. sir. provided it is linked to the threat of communist infiltration. Senator Thurmond: Is that not right? Admiral Smith: Yes. their aims and designs. sir. the enemy. Senator Thurmond: Communism is the common enemy of the United States and the free world. Senator Thurmond: Are you in accord with that? Admiral Smith: I am completely in accord with it. and a representative of the army bureaucracy (on top of that – of one of the most secret arms of the armed forces) lets us see that the “controlling” arm of a democratically elected parliament is “weak” and “permissive. and every true patriot would be against communism? Admiral Smith: Yes. 109 Senator Thurmond: Or the national policy of this country. is it not? Admiral Smith: I agree that it is. Admiral Smith: Yes. you would not consider speaking against communism as involving foreign policy. the techniques of subversion and so forth.” giving the military a free hand in disseminating political propaganda. The social and political functions of the “war on communism” or “war on terrorism” are ideological (nobody accepts Communist Parties . Senator Thurmond: So that there should be no objection to military personnel making expressions or making speeches on the subject of Communism. Senator Thurmond: In other words.

trained to defend themselves against nuclear attack. training and preparations. Civil defense would teach Americans what they needed to know about nuclear weapons. institutional scale. commissioned by Truman and undertaken by Associated Universities. MIT. it would elaborate the techniques that Americans could use to control their emotions regarding nuclear war. Harvard. almost without saying. Here. while at the same time involving all citizens in “do-it-yourself” selfdefense initiatives: Emotion managers would control nuclear terror by promoting civil defense to American people. allowing for a much broader influence of military planners on civil society. they could face a potential nuclear war and maximize their chances of survival by undertaking rational actions – taking steps to implement lessons learned during the civil defense exercises designed and disseminated by the military and their faithful think tanks. A new general screenplay (a doomsday scenario) for the mass of the US citizens has been “written” and rehearsed. the influence of the Cold War upon our present predicament and political marketing is quite clear: the invention of the civil defense projects served a very useful purpose of preventing the outbreak of panic. The University of Pennsylvania. again. National Security Resources Board and the Department of Defense. Ideological alertness in the face of an external threat has been complemented by the internal. less “visible” platform had already been created. Yale) or other top research universities (Johns Hopkins. Columbia. ten years earlier. a think tank. under the general label of “civil defense. the role of champions of preventive psychological warfare. the very year that Eisenhower left office. However. the University of Rochester). The aim of the study was to convince US citizens that. Citizens. which included top US universities. either Ivy League (Cornell. It would also spell out norms specifying appropriate responses to a nuclear attack. while the military assume.” The introduction of the concept and the construction of infrastructure for “civil defense” meant that the influence of the army spilled over into the area of psychological manipulation of the mass of citizens. Finally. The above senate hearings took place in 1961. are supposed to be “on the front line” of the Cold War. 1994: 46) The East River Project was a study of Cold War systems of emotion management. which is waged in order to render US citizens less vulnerable to the communist propaganda and more “sympathetic” to the Western values of political democracy and market economy. citizens were supposed to manage their emotions and to overcome their fear of nuclear destruction. another. domestic intervention on an organized. (Oakes. given relevant and accurate information. By exercising their roles in a future . The commissioning agencies included the Federal Civil Defense Administration.110 Slawomir Magala as legitimate participants in a political arena) and social (disciplined citizens take over duties that otherwise would have to be performed by the military and by the government).

of course.Social history and the armed forces 111 possible nuclear war. or how the other side of the Elbe was ruled The secrecy. US civilians were rehearsing their obedience to the military planners. in their own interest. which are meant to deconstruct the Cold War policies in the Western world. The propaganda instrumentarium used against the Communists would be retooled as emotion management techniques for psychologically manipulating the American people. but. 2003). would provide an ideal ground for conspiracy. 1968: 174) Contemporary studies. As contemporary researchers phrased it: Project East River undertook to domesticate the psychological warfare tactics that were employed against America’s enemies abroad. (Andreski. planned genocide). are slowly but surely reaching the level of academic recognition and spilling over to the public domain. like the general secretary of the Russian Communist Party who became a marshal. 2003). The rationale for the use of psychological warfare techniques abroad and the justification for their incorporation into domestic civil defense were the same: national security. Amadae. in particular. The recent celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the capitulation of Nazi . 2001. or studies of the political background of methodological and sociological choices made by managers of scientific communities in the Cold War period (see Fuller. Let us notice that all this happened without any major modification of the laws nor of the legal regulation of the functioning of the democratic institutions. This conscious attempt to prevent further analysis of historical documents is based on an assumption that any reconstruction of the conduct of state organs in post-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union is bound to result in a general re-evaluation of the status of the Soviet Union as a state (and to reveal many more crimes against humanity leading to the acquisition of status of a perpetrator of systematic.4 While there are numerous studies of the Western side of the “iron curtain. these studies tend to be one-sided. Vladimir Putin.” studies of processes that went on east of Elbe are much less frequent and are based on very few documentary sources – mainly due to the conscious prevention of research and discouraging of investigations on the part of the contemporary Russian government in general. 1994: 51)3 The East Side story. which would have to envelope the army. However. and of a former KGB operative. The country would be at the mercy of the generals unless (which would lead to much the same results) its civilian rulers militarized themselves. Suffice it to mention the study of a cultural struggle for cultural supremacy in the world media between the communist and Western cultural managers and their political sponsors (see Caute. (Oakes. The weapons devised to protect the United States from its enemies would now be turned against its own citizens.

for instance. or Peter Wyden’s Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. including the officers and soldiers of the army. had been quietly disarmed and loaded to trains. 1991: 1122). A realistic presentation of the victory parade would have to include its lesserknown episodes and stages. Had they been published. for searching through the archives.112 Slawomir Magala Germany has been viewed as an occasion not to reflect on the past. of getting rid of the curse of a “homo sovieticus. The reason they had been sentenced to this Gulag archipelago was that they had moved through Poland. Awareness of the crimes committed by uniformed officials of the Soviet state. World public opinion – including in Russian itself – might decide that crimes the Soviet Russians perpetrated in a systematic way belong to the crimes of genocide and have thus to be responded to in a way in which Nazi genocide was dealt with. Who has been guilty of genocide? As Norman Mailer says in the closing words of his novel about the CIA: “I would ask: Whom? In the immortal words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. ‘Whom? Whom does this all benefit?’ ”(Mailer. The presence of some Western politicians in Moscow in May 2005 is a shameful episode of the European Union and a step back from a resolute support for the Ukrainian independence from Russian colonial rule in December 2004. edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf in 1978. nor Stalin’s crimes against citizens of all nations. Dirty Work: the CIA in Western Europe. and of the very enslaved and oppressed Russian masses. Front soldiers. Russian citizens would have been given a chance to reflect on the power of their militarized and autocratic state. which took them to the camps of the Gulag. It would also call for more openness of state-controlled documents. They would be able to decide what to do with their own past and with the collective burden of generations of enslaved citizens of the Soviet Union – they would stand a chance of de-sovietizing. Czechoslovakia and Germany and thus might have noticed that the paradise of the working class had less to offer in terms of material standards of life then these “bourgeois” states – not exactly the party line in the heavily censored media. This would involve a huge program of rethinking Russian history and re-evaluating all Soviet institutions. whose emergence had been . and in spite of secrecy. so are the non-fictitious publications (Mailer lists more than three pages of them in the preface to Harlot’s Ghost. including. but as an opportunity to continue pretending that the past never happened. could trigger a change of mind and heart of the world at large. have ever been mentioned. counter-espionage. secret archives and hidden documents in order to establish the responsibility of war criminals – state functionaries of the Soviet Union. Novels on the CIA are quite numerous in the USA. military units of the Ministry of the Interior). including the Russian one. They are not in Russia. Hungary. who had been allowed to march through the Red Square in 1945. Citizens and media audiences have been offered a victory parade – but neither the role of Stalin’s Russia in provoking the outbreak of World War II.” This part of the post-Cold War political agenda of world’s democracies and of the agenda of the Russian civil society. published in 1979). police and special forces (secret police.

between the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact. the better for the further development of the European Union. Moreover. and the Fulton speech. but empire is historically more resilient. which tailors its legitimizing ideology pragmatically and even cynically to the demands of political exigency. some international tribunal could be summoned in order to perform an act of judgment analogous to the judgment meted out in the Nuremberg trials. where their chances for economic success would be bleaker.D. aged 14. When working on an EU-sponsored change project in the Ministry of Economics. thus finally putting an end to illusions cherished by F. 2002: 199) My interest in a possibility of overcoming this resistance of a neopaternalist autocratic ruler in contemporary Russian society has been triggered by a conversation held in the early years of the twenty-first century in Tallin. but the Soviet Empire may still turn out to be the latest rather than the last manifestation of imperialism. Let us look at its feasibility from the point of a relatively minor problem – that of rewriting of Russian history books. I had once shared a morning bus from a hotel outside the city to the city center with a young schoolboy. Estonia. in which Churchill used the expression “iron curtain” for the first time. where his parents. He lived in a former Red Army base housing block. but the sooner we face the problem of what to do with Russia so that it allows its citizens to mature in moral and civil terms. To attempt to maintain even a socialist-justified but over-extended and late Soviet Empire in an era of imperial decolonization may indeed have proved anachronistic.e. especially of those books in which they interpret Soviet state policies in the years 1939–47. a power system. who turned out to be a Russian citizen of Estonia. formerly civilian specialists servicing the army. still remains to be written. One might imagine the start of a UNO-sponsored and managed program of helping to re-socialize the Russian citizens subjected to de-socializing influences for so many generations and allowing them to come to terms with the legacy of genocide. i. They resented the loss of privileges they enjoyed at the expense of the majority of . (Pearson.Social history and the armed forces 113 delayed for too long for Europe’s good.”5 Learning from history: a militarized empire can only be right Ideologies may come and go. decided to stay rather than return to Russia. colonial oppression and aggression against all neighboring nations. who returned from Yalta to the US Congress with the message that the Americans “will get along with the Russians just fine. Such a program of moral rehabilitation would have required many activities. procedures and close collaboration with democratic movements in Russia. with which Stalin and Hitler started World War II as aggressive dictators dividing Europe in Communist–Nazi complicity. Roosevelt.

His concept of history was forged by bowdlerized descriptions of the great military leaders. All victims were handcuffed and shot in the back of the head from close distance. but an attempt to conduct an investigation establishing the complicity of Soviet state functionaries has been sabotaged by the Russian Federation’s Military Prosecutor’s Office . No mention had been made of rationally planned acts of genocide. authorized by Stalin and by the government of Soviet Union. delegated to the footnotes and explained away from the point of the state’s raison d’etre. Zhukov – and dreaming of the time he might possibly return to Estonia crushing the local population and restoring Russian domination. That these commanders and soldiers were fighting to enslave other nations and maintain an empire he took for granted. Suvorov. nor was he aware of the fact that forced settlement of Russians in Estonia was part and parcel of Russification and Sovietization campaigns. The boy would have none of this. which meant a joint invasion and partition of the Republic of Poland (which Molotov called “the bastard of Versailles”). The boy knew nothing about Soviet aggression in 1940. we shall quote only two cases: the explanation of the background of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact and its secret clause. but somehow marginalized. For the sake of brevity. I had started consulting Russian history textbooks and decided to focus only on the most sophisticated of them (it soon became clear that the popular mass of history textbooks from which children are taught in grammar and high schools prepares them only to be obedient servants of a strong. but they were attracted by the country’s new economic opportunities. autocratic state. The results of this check were interesting – they pointed out some awareness of the problem. He was reading about great military leaders of the past – Kutuzov. never questioning the right of this state to make sovereign decisions at the expense of all other nations and never raising the question of huge moral. restoring colonial domination maintained by supreme military power). police and secret police. which came to be known as the “Katyn ´ forest massacre” (although it was conducted at a number of locations) was reluctantly admitted by the Soviet government at the end of the 1980s. which he clearly was looking forward to. which bravely embraced any other nation which happened to be within the reach of her armed forces.114 Slawomir Magala Estonian population under the Soviet rule and the necessity to learn Estonian in order to become eligible for full citizenship.e. and the case of a brutal murder of around 20. which had also included mass executions and deportations of Estonian citizens by members of Soviet army.000 Polish officers – prisoners of war – ordered by Stalin and executed by the military units of the Soviet Ministry of Interior. brave foot soldiers and holy motherland. legal and material responsibility of Russians vis-à-vis their neighboring nations). which were meant to benefit the Soviet state’s power elite in expanding its sphere of influence. or reinforcing total control of the entire population. then buried in mass graves near Smolensk. Intrigued by his blind belief that Soviet soldiers have the right to return to all the countries they had once conquered and excited by his total refusal to acknowledge Estonians’ right to anything else than patient waiting for Russians to return and claim what belongs to them (i. The massacre.

without. it is simply the presence of the Red Army which somehow changes the laws and makes communist forces win. Germany acknowledged Soviet interests in the Baltic countries (Latvia. Here is a sample of the background explanations of the origins of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact. Latvia and Lithuania and obtained them. A secret protocol had been added with a demarcation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. 2005: 388) Let us note that Poland is mentioned only at the beginning in the context of an imminent German invasion. who explicitly refused to acknowledge the Katyn ´ massacre as an act of genocide. Once the pact has been signed. a German–Soviet agreement on “friendship and frontiers” had been signed reinforcing the bond of these territories with the rest of the Soviet Union. 2005: 388) Apart from historical mistakes – the Polish army was not defeated on September 17. legislative organs were established. Latvia and Lithuania became republics of Soviet Union. On August 23 1939. and communist forces won.Social history and the armed forces 115 under Putin. Aware of the inevitability of war and of the fact they the Soviets were ill prepared for it. being in any way responsible for. which triggered the outbreak of World War II: The Soviet government knew that German army was poised to attack Poland. Poland disappears (if she did not. (Orlov et al. Estonia and Finland) and in Besarabia. so that the occupied nations become part of the Soviet empire.. however. on the territories of Estonia. The description gets better: Under new international circumstances. a German–Soviet pact of non-aggression has been signed with immediate implementation and for ten years (the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact). (Orlov et al. The authors acknowledge thus on the next page: . after the Polish army had been defeated and the Polish government fell. On September 17. The Red Army does not enter Poland. On September 28.” Nor does it occupy the Baltics. they made a sharp turn in inner politics and decided to forge closer ties with Germany. the Soviet government started implementing German–Soviet agreements of August 1939. but “Western Ukraine” and “Western Byelorussia. nor did the Polish government “fall” on that day – the above fragment reads like propaganda from 1939.. After the entry of Soviet troops elections had been held in these republics. the Red Army entered Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. or contributing to. the outbreak of World War II. At the same time Soviet Union pressed for signing agreements on stationing Soviet troops. In 1940 Estonia. one would have to ask why a peaceful neighbor was considered a legitimate spoil) and the Soviet government is presented as merely securing the Russian share in German conquests.

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Slawomir Magala As a result, Soviet union incorporated large territories with a population of 14 million. State border moved westwards from 300 to 600 km. Political agreements of 1939 delayed Nazi attack against Soviet Union for two years. (Orlov et al., 2005: 389)

A Russian child gets the impression that Russians were facing mortal threat in 1939, but luckily managed to avoid it by agreeing to attack Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and provide the Nazis with strategic raw materials (Lutwaffe planes bombing London were flying on Soviet oil generously provided by Stalin). But they also understand that something should be said about the Soviet government’s conduct – ruthless predatory aggression against neighboring nations and close collaboration with an equally criminal regime. They demonstrate quite surprising restraint, and manage to produce the following alibi: If the non-aggression pact, signed in August 1939, was a step to a certain extent imposed on Soviet Union, the secret protocol, and agreement on friendship and frontiers, and other inner political acts [my emphasis] of Stalin’s government, which happened during the war, were a breach of sovereignty of some nations of Eastern Europe. (Orlov et al., 2005: 389) In other words, general policy was legitimate, but some unfortunate acts went too far and thus might infringe on sovereignty of some (few) Eastern European nations. The above fragments clearly demonstrate the gap between our – European – knowledge of World War II and what is being offered as a teaching aid to the Russians students in Putin’s Russia. Bridging this gap is a challenge, which calls for a joint international effort. It is a political, moral and historical scandal that genocide is presented to Russian children as unfortunate “inner political acts.” The fact that hundreds of thousands of Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian citizens were executed, jailed, starved in concentration camps, stripped of all their possessions and transported to Siberia or Kazakhstan in the same sort of trains Jews were transported to concentration camps by the Soviets’ Nazi friends should not and cannot be presented to children of perpetrators of those crimes as “inner political acts.” If they continue to be presented in this way, young generations of Russians will be deprived of a chance to grow up morally, to mature as responsible members of civil society, and will continue to be the cannon fodder of absolutist regimes, which uses all state institutions, including the army, as the personal property of the power-holders. While Orlov et al. do not dare to mention Katyn ´ and Soviet genocide, a few historians do, but then they clearly indicate that the timing of an international discussion about the Soviet state’s crimes against humanity basically provides an alibi, and explains why this problem was not and should not ever be raised by international bodies. In a chapter on Soviet–Polish relations in the years 1941–4, Balashov and Rudakov state firmly that:

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Final breakdown of Soviet–Polish relations took place in the fall of 1943 in connection with the so-called Katyn ´ affair. On March 13, 1943, Berlin announced that mass graves of the Polish officers had been discovered in the forest of Katyn ´ near Smolen ´ sk. They had been murdered by the organs of NKVD in spring of 1940. On March 20, 1943, the Polish émigré government turned, as did the German one, to the International Red Cross asking them to investigate the matter. Soviet government retaliated accusing “London Poles” of collaboration with Nazi Germany. On April 25, 1943, Stalin’s government broke diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile. (Balashov and Rudakov, 2005: 272) This is the text a student of Soviet history reads: only those who stray to the footnote on page 272 can read a trace, a residue, a small remnant of a feeling of guilt, which must have been felt by those authors: The participation of Soviet special services in executing Polish officers, prisoners of war of 1939 near Katyn ´ had been acknowledged by the Soviet government as late as the end of 1980s and accordingly, the Russian government apologized to the Polish one. Nevertheless, when evaluating the position of Soviet Union with respect to this problem in spring of 1943, one should take into consideration that acknowledging their guilt, the Soviet government would weaken the anti-fascist coalition and the resistance in Eastern Europe. It was under the influence of such considerations that the Soviet Union categorically denied executing Polish officers and blamed the executions on German state organs. A special commission formed after the liberation of Smolen ´sk, led by the member of Academy of Sciences of Soviet Union, V.P. Potemkin, confirmed official statements about executions claiming they happened under German occupation. (Balashov and Rudakov, 2005: 272) This is the tip of the iceberg. What is being offered as a textbook of history turns out to be lightly disguised political propaganda of a militarized Stalinist state. No historians, political scientists, sociologists or social psychologists are invited to investigate the case or, for that matter, numerous other cases, in which the role of the Soviet state and of the Russian armed forces might be judged, evaluated and brought to international justice. The role of the Red Army in perpetrating crimes of genocide, the role which can lead to an international investigation of criminal acts committed by members of this army against all European nations, including their own, thus remains safely undiscussed, unmentioned and unproblematic.

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If the United States is to avoid becoming a militarized society, the public and its civilian representatives must retain the ultimate right of decision on such central political issues as counter-revolution and insurgency, war and peace. (Yarmolinsky, 1971: 420) The worldwide experience of countries dependent on the export of oil and minerals suggests a powerful debilitating long-term effect of resource dependency upon both growth rates in the economy and the integrity of national political, legal and administrative institutions. The temptations of “rent seeking” – to exploit privileged institutional access to “extractive” export revenue – gravely weaken incentives to build rule-governed institutional regimes. This is above all true in those countries, such as post-Soviet Russia and postcolonial Nigeria, that inherited already devastated institutional landscapes upon the end of the previous regime, that is, communist and colonial, respectively. (Lynch, 2005: 243)6 When comparing the social history of contemporary United States and Russia (something that has not been done in Europe ever since Marquis de Custine went to describe the Russian empire, trying to provide a counterpart to Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”), one is often reminded of the notorious phrase used by the late US president, Ronald Reagan, who called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” When we accept this description, then we have no qualms about seeing the US military as a benevolent donor of the Internet,7 while the Russian military remains a weapon of authoritarian, at times totalitarian state, responsible to no one, but to the political authorities of Russia, which, in turn, act opportunistically, with no concern for international law or human rights, and with no procedure to conduct open public debates, assign responsibility for acts of criminal violence and campaigns of genocide, and to come to terms with the past record of crimes and misdemeanors both inside the Soviet Union and behind its borders. Russian war crimes have not been a topic of international debate due to many circumstances, of which the influence of the communist-inspired agents d’influence (“useful idiots,” as Sartre and public intellectuals similar to him had been described by the Komintern specialists) or outright spies (as Kim Philby and his Cambridge team, who fulfilled Stalin’s orders and planted a bomb in an airplane that carried the Polish general Sikorski from Gibraltar to London) were key factors. Putin’s moral and political kitsch – or the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the capitulation of the Third Reich – must be seen for what it was: a desperate attempt to ward off the specter of the past genocide, the ghost of responsibility, and to postpone the ultimate liberation of Russians from the yoke of their state-controlled social development. It is also an alternative to an honest discussion of the place of the armed

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forces in a civil society and of their role in safeguarding this civil society’s democratic institutions. The Spanish or Portuguese military had managed to survive dictatorship and to support democratic transformations. However, the legacy of genocide prevents the Russian military, who carry the burden of crimes against humanity on their backs, from doing the same – they are, to put it bluntly, “blackmailed” by former KGB agents and their present masters. If they manage to face their responsibilities and heritage, they stand a chance of ending this blackmail. Can they manage, if they are watched over by increasingly specialized “special forces,” which are paid to commit those crimes on a daily basis trying to keep Chechnya within the power sphere of Moscow’s current rulers? Let us hope they can. There must be an alternative to the vicious circle of violence, authoritarianism, autocracy and disenfranchising of the majority of citizens. However, the moral outrage at a lack of accountability for criminal activities of Soviet troops in the course of World War II (looting, rape, random killings) and for the criminal misbehavior of Soviet authorities, which did not hesitate to execute their own troops if the latter failed to attack or dared to fall back (NKVD troops were stationed behind Soviet front lines with orders to shoot their own soldiers, if those wanted to retreat), is difficult to translate into an international institutional form. Responsibility for Soviet genocide rests with the Russian Federation as the direct descendant of the Soviet Union. An inability to prosecute members of their own Russian armed forces or of special services must be seen as a refusal to meet international obligations and to investigate crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, which do not have a judicial deadline and never “expire.” This, then, is the main problem of the European Union as far as Russia (the state and civil society) and Russian armed forces are concerned: how to facilitate Russian’s reconciliation with its own past on terms other than those dictated by the power elite commanding absolute power in the authoritarian state. Russians tanks do not threaten Madrid anymore (though Russian jets infringe on Latvian air space and the Russian military maintain – among others – the mafia republic in Moldova, increasingly obsolete and corrupt anti-European military base in Kalinigrad and a neocolonial wasteland of terror in Chechnya). But Russians’ ignorance about their own history and about their personal responsibility, about the Russian military’s unpaid moral and material debt for playing the role of accomplice, both in triggering the outbreak of World War II and in attempting to enslave nations (including most of central Europe) is a threat to European integration, global stability and the gradual reconstruction of a community of democratic civil societies, free of the hidden injuries of an authoritarian state that uses militarization as a chief instrument of domestic and foreign policy. There are, fortunately enough, voices in contemporary Russia that do point in this direction. Gavril Popov, the first democratically elected mayor of Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union, refers directly to the veterans of World War II and declares that the Russian government does not have the right to celebrate the anniversary of the end of World War II, since this end in fact meant a lease of

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life for the neo-Stalinist system of genocide (as practiced in Chechnya, as of the present writing); and a serious celebration of this anniversary would have to include a major enquiry into the responsibility for crimes against Russians, against citizens of former Soviet republics, and against the nations of Eastern Europe – all of whom became victims of the Stalinist terms on which World War II has been concluded. Popov writes: Our government should tell our veterans: yes, you had defeated fascism. Praised be your victory. But you hadn’t enough intellect nor courage to strive for a reform of Stalinist socialism. You are personally responsible for the road which Stalin forced our country and the whole world to take. Nobody among you equals Dekabrists, who drew conclusions after the great motherland war of 1812 and stood up against repulsive social system of Russia. This is why democratic forces in Russia in the years 1989–1991 had to do what could have been done better if you had chosen to act – after all, you had weapons in your hands. [. . .] As it is, those European leaders who refused to show up for victory celebrations are right, and not those who agree to play their role in celebrating the anniversary of Stalinist aggression. (Popov, 2005: 6) Let us hope that some day these words will be printed in history textbooks for both school children and cadets in military academies in Russia. The Russian military, definitely one of the most corrupt and isolated professional groups in the history of human societies, deserve a helping hand from democratic societies. They are already receiving some assistance. The lives of the crew members of the “Kursk” submarine could have been saved were it not for the lack of action of the Russian military. Somebody among Russian admirals – trained by their Soviet masters – must have given the order to weld the safety locks, rendering them useless in times of emergency. We can only speculate that this was done because the secrecy around a new type of torpedo was considered more important than the lives of the entire crew. On the other hand, lives of the small submarine crew members have been saved due to modern communication technology. When the wife of one of the threatened crew members talked on a cellular phone and understood the danger, the news was out and it became more difficult for the Russian admirals to pretend they were able to act themselves. Still, in spite of clear evidence to the contrary, they issued curious official statements in which they claimed that they would have been able to do it on their own – and much better at that. Luckily, the unfortunate crew members did not have to experience the practical application of those curiosities on themselves and lived to tell the tale. Can we hope that these Russian sailors will exercise pressure on their Sovietized superiors to change and to make the Russian Army less of a threat to Russians and to the rest of humanity? Can we help them, by starting a discussion about a moral blackmail of the powerholders who – like Putin – refuse to come to terms with the criminal past of the Soviet Union and its Red Army and hold their past cowardice (which Popov was writing about)

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against them? Locks on Soviet nuclear weapons would be much safer if they were in the hands of democratic leaders of a responsible mass of knowledgeable citizens. By trying to bring the day of honest discussion about Soviet genocide closer, we are helping Russians to establish a civil society, dispelling the specter of Cold War and helping ourselves in defusing the danger of a militarized, aggressive state which continues the history of “evil empire” and still teaches its population a docile, bowdlerized, propagandized version of their collective past.

Notes
1 Cf. after Johnson (2004: 97). 2 The debate over network protocols illustrates how standards can be politics by other means. Whereas other government interventions into business and technology (such a safety regulations and antitrust actions) are readily seen as having political and social significance, technical standards are generally assumed to be socially neutral [. . .] But technical decisions can have far-reaching economic and social consequences, altering the balance of power between competing businesses or nations and constraining the freedom of users. Efforts to create formal standards can bring system builders’ private technical decisions into the public realm; in this way, standards battles can bring to light unspoken assumptions and conflicts of interest. (Abbate, 1999: 179)

3 Oakes calls this influence of the military planners upon civilian life in the USA under the constraints of the Cold War a militarization by non-military means: Civil defense militarizes life by non-military means, using techniques of emotion management in order to train Americans to manage themselves. As a result, they will solve the problem of nuclear terror and thereby fulfill the moral requirements of American national security policy. (Oakes, 1994: 77) 4 This judgment has to be qualified, to a certain extent, by evoking many local studies in regional languages. For instance, there is a lively literature, partly triggered by the new access to the postcommunist archives, in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (see, ´ for instance, Staniszkis, 2003; Dudek, 2004; Spiewak, 2005). 5 “We are going to get along with the Russians just fine” (New York Times, March 1, 1945, p. 1) – see Lynch, 2005: 239. 6 Lynch does not harbor many illusions and looks for analogies of the Russian predicament in Romania and Serbia: “A neopatrimonial state within the framework of façade democracy is being consolidated, as in Romania and Serbia under Ion Iliescu and Slobodan Milosevic, respectively” (Lynch, 2005: 251). 7 Historians of the Internet do stress the fortunate dissolving of military authority: In the 1990s, the Internet proved adaptable enough to make the transition to private commercial operation and to survive the resulting fragmentation of authority. The Internet’s decentralized architecture made it possible to divide operational control among a number of competing providers, while its open and informal structures for technical management were able (at least in the near terms) to survive new commercial and political pressures. (Abbate, 1999: 219–20)

A. Oxford University Press. S. Palgrave. 1999. Istoria Rossii: Uchebnik (The History of Russia: a Textbook). Olimp Agency. Moscow. Arkana. A. Lomonosov. Andreski. The Dancer Defects: the Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War. Norman. Janet. Steve. Reglamentowana rewolucja: Rozklad dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–1990 (Controlled Revolution: Decline of Communist Dictatorship in Poland 1988–1990).S.A. Basingstoke & New York. N. Routledge & Kegan Paul. How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development. 2000. Gavril. 2003. Popov. 2005. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire. Military Organization and Society. New York. Moscow. New York and Oxford. London. MA. 2005. Georgev. Gdan ´sk. Oxford. Oxford University Press. G. Istorija Velikoj Otchestvennej Voyny 1941–1945 (The History of the Great Motherland War 1941–1945). Harper & Row. 2002. Brown and Company.I. Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire. and Sivohina.122 Slawomir Magala References Abbate. ´ piewak. Antoni.W.A. Harlot’s Ghost. Johnson. 2004. Lynch. Staniszkis. Chicago. Postkomunizm: Próba opisu (Postcommunism: Tentative Description). London. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. Slowo/obraz terytoria. The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism. T. 2003. Yarmolinsky. and the End of the Republic.. Balashov. 2005. Inventing the Internet. Thomas Kuhn: a Philosophical History for Our Times. Jadwiga. Dudek. Pearson. Piter. 1968 (first published 1954). Michael Joseph. Mailer. 2005. 2nd edn. 1991. Amadae. Georgeva. Guy. 1994. Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: the Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism. Gdan ´sk..M. David. Caute. and Rudakov. Moscow State University of M. . New York..G. MIT Press.P. Little. A. Orlov. Secrecy. University of Chicago Press.. Holt. Cambridge. Historical Faculty. Oakes.. Moscow... Chalmers. Cambridge. St. Fuller. 2003. 1971. W. 2004. London. Pawel. Kraków. The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. 2005.. Cambridge University Press. The Military Establishment: its Impacts on American Society. 2001. 1941–1945: Zamyetki o woynie (1941–1945: Notes on the War). Pamie S ¸c ´ o komunizmie (Remembering Communism). Johnson. Raymond. Allen C. Slowo/obraz terytoria. Chalmers.

. . . somewhere in Iraq. Is it science fiction or (nearby) reality? For sure. . a number of questions can only be solved adequately in an interdisciplinary way.e. moreover. Asking for fire support to be able to penetrate into the town will certainly provoke a slaughter. neuro-physiological. (Baard. Continuing to progress under enemy fire is excluded. . the lieutenant and his men will be confronted with the consequences of the platoon commander’s decision: an apocalyptic scene of corpses ripped apart. i. resuming the progress. . science and literature. The spearhead section reports to the platoon commander that these houses are not only occupied by enemy troops whose fire prevents them from entering the village but that they also use local civilians – elderly men. progressing towards the outer house blocks of a village that has to be taken. In this chapter we will focus on the scientific development. but suppose all platoon members have taken a pill which will “protect” them from remembering these traumatogenic events and hence from long-life feelings of guilt . 2003) The above example shows clearly a multi-faceted problem: an interaction between biological. screaming survivors . psychological and ethical aspects of the human being. and hence feelings of guilt. women and children – as a living shield. heavily mutilated bodies. those tablets are not available yet in the units but research labs are thoroughly studying and experimenting with substances aiming at suppressing fear. Even if progress is made each day within each scientific discipline. a dampened formation of remembrances and their accompanying emotions. . But the framework within which this thinking takes place has evolved throughout history. two cultures have existed and still exist side-by-side. Introduction Thinking about human behaviour is probably as old as humanity itself.6 From a psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach and beyond in military research Current status and trends Jacques Mylle Imagine an infantry platoon. His norms and values will probably prohibit him from asking for fire support .

a psychiatric nurse. A team involved in the treatment of a patient in a mental health clinic. but has been described in epic stories. finally we focus on how a number of military scientific forums have evolved too. “psychology” – literally translated as the “study of the soul” – was part of philosophy.) in his book on the second Punic War (218–201 BC) when describing the behaviour of Hannibal’s soldiers: “They did not even have the courage anymore to bear their own bodies. laboratories and research agencies both on the national and international level – for example. It must be stressed that. We start with an overview of some milestones in the history of psychology. which is composed of. He considers four fields of application: school. next we address a number of interdisciplinary subjects. also form an interdisciplinary team where human sciences and applied sciences are intertwined. We will structure the chapter in a double way: first in a time perspective. All co-workers are specialised in human sciences sensu latu. the main aim of these institutions is not to develop new methods but. with respect to human sciences. 1958). n. psychological testing implies the use of psychometrics and hence of mathematics. An expert in ballistics and a psychologist. among others.2 Military behaviour was not studied per se..124 Jacques Mylle It is not our aim to write an encyclopaedia of military psychology. studying together the suppression effect of non-lethal weapons. and second according to a number of “fields of application” (Duyker et al. Furthermore. “clinic” deals with all mental health issues. Searching through literature databases shows that interdisciplinarity is understood in different ways. depending on the setting people are working in. Some of them were dragging their . Overview From ancient times until 1879. no more hope to sustain. the third section deals with an enlargement to the behavioural sciences. and how they are dealt with nowadays in a military context. by Livy (Titus Livius. An example of what in the twentieth century became “combat stress reactions” was already addressed. in a second section we highlight some “pure” psychological phenomena. for example. NATO Research and Technology Organisation1 – and in each of the Services and at joint level as well. a clinical psychologist and a social worker. but also all operations-related and operations-support issues. as stated in the title. organisation/enterprise. rather. Each of those fields of application can have a military character: “school” covers education. training and mission rehearsal. say a psychiatrist. clinic and research methodology. but to demonstrate through a selection of topics which issues were addressed in the past. and “research” is done in military academies. “organisation” encompasses all human resources aspects. to apply them to issues belonging to one of the former fields.d. it is clear that psychology uses a number of support or aid disciplines without therefore qualifying the problem at hand as an interdisciplinary problem. will be called an interdisciplinary team.

2004. collapsed . for example. A fourth milestone has to do with the integration of the mind–body relationship.e. in black despair. The military relevance of these processes is quite straightforward.e. because the focus was put on the “experimental method” in studying the “mind”. and thus was the precursor of cognitive psychology which expanded enormously after the Second World War. others. who stated that behaviour (B) is a function of both a person’s characteristics (P) and situational influences (S). we believe that human behaviour is determined in a multiple . selecting response and engaging the target will make the difference between “hit” and “be hit”. “soldiers’ heart” (Myers. 1919)! A third milestone causing a dramatic shift in psychological research paradigms has been set by Kurt Lewin (1935).4 This means that different persons act differently in a given situation. . which ammunition do I have to choose to destroy it? The chances are high that the reaction time of detecting.d. a clinical perspective – and introduced the notion of the “unconscious”. psychiatrists did not know how to deal with this phenomenon as described. Furthermore. is condemned to fail. Even during the First World War. as a tank commander: is the acquired target – say a tank – friend or foe? If the latter applies. for example Theucydides (n. S). . This means that searching for the “one-size-fits-all person” such as the ideal leader. McAndrews (Debacker. in short B ϭ (P. 1916.) about the Sicily campaign of the Greek (AD 413). by the well-known Canadian psychiatrist. 1996). Explanations such as “home sickness”. Unlike authors who contend that psychological phenomena are only epiphenomena of neurobiological structures and processes (e. for example. a lot of these unfortunate soldiers were sentenced to death. Combat stress reactions were considered to be signs of cowardice. for example. as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders Edition III 3 in 1980 have been documented by Freud (1896. The foundations of what became Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 1871) have been put forward. A first milestone in the development of psychology as a science was around 1860. For example. i. it suffices to think.g.” [our translation]. and that a given person acts differently in different situations. and selection of an appropriate response. as proven again by Stogdill (1974) in a meta-study. and that there exists an interaction between both P and S. Lamme. 2005). using his well-known reaction time subtraction method (1865). Wolters.A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 125 legs. press a certain button). 1870) or “irritable heart” (Da Costa. discriminating. a lack of psychological knowledge has often led to misinterpretation of soldiers’ behaviour in war. Donders (1868) was already interested in decision-making processes (implying discrimination between simple stimuli such as green and red light. so. his conceptions have been heavily influenced by his experiences as a medical doctor in the First World War. as a consequence. A second milestone was set by Freud in Paris in 1885 when he learned to look from a totally different perspective at mental disorders – i. Other authors have written analogue stories about other wars. Until the nineteenth century.

For example. in a number of cases. specialists in (neuro)imaging. Without expert testimonies from a psychologist. organisation and ways of intervening. Therefore we will not dwell on it. taskforces became more and more multinational and multicultural. These changes can be developed along two lines. hence. and even multi-service. Moreover. among others. second. philosophers and jurists have to cooperate. peace support operations became prevalent over classic warfare and. (psycho)pharmacologists and psychologists have to work together while. Military psychology In fact. an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to explain as much as possible of the observed variation in behaviour.126 Jacques Mylle and heterogeneous way. Doctrines have been established6 and manuals written. Depending on the subject matter. clinical. but it has no insight in the relationship between cause(s) and effect.5 These changes have been discussed at great length but have meanwhile become “common business”. who contend in their introduction to the Handbook of Military Psychology (1991) that military psychological topics constitute an intersection of the above- . First. But how to explain then that misbehaviour in operations seems to be ubiquitous. There is no doubt that the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in social behaviour. the court will not be able to take possible extenuating circumstances into account. psychological. It goes without saying that both changes have had an enormous impact on military education. psychologists and experts from natural/applied sciences have to be coworkers on equal terms. and have internalised the core values of a democratic society. Facets of P that have to be considered are four-fold: biological. sociologists. To date. all soldiers are trained to be good (global) citizens too. and in respecting. psychologists. developmental. in other cases. neurologists. especially in the beginning. in being conscious of. A lack of meaningfulness of the assigned tasks in peace support operations (PSO) leads to demotivation and to lower performance. Do the “fields” within psychology – like social. These interactions show clearly that the human being is a bio-psycho-sociospiritual entity and. the wellknown transgressions by American solders in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. even in situations where the rules are clear? Let us take a recent example. if not to avoidance behaviour. norms and societal values. social and spiritual. experimental – not suffice? Unlike Reuven and Mangelsdorff. one can wonder whether there is a need for a sub-discipline like military psychology. As a consequence. or to burn out. these four facets of the person interact and can be in turn cause and effect. training. A fifth milestone – not at the level of theoretical development but at the contextual level – is the dramatic change in operational settings in the 1990s since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. for example. psychosomatic complaints – such as stomach ulcers – are the somatic “expression” of a lack of control over workload. the court-marshal has a basis to sue the trespasser.

father or mother at a distance. we consider under this header all human resources activities from advertising and recruitment. the union of it.g. image building. Education. such as stress and stress management.A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 127 mentioned fields (1991: xxv). TG023 on Team Effectiveness. a problem of optimal allocation arises too. publicity. but evaluating the effect over time of psychosocial support (e. and the number of crisis response operations under the auspices of the United Nations. selection tools. we believe that military psychology covers. over selection. has grown tremendously. Given that the ratio of qualified people selected to the number of vacancies is often lower than one. Organisation As stated in the introduction. In humanitarian operations.. clinical and social psychology. For example. It is thus not surprising that human resources decision-makers invest a lot in applied psychological research subjects such as market analysis. soldiers had to learn to behave as social workers. 2005). usable in educational (e. the confrontation with life-threatening danger and the misery of the local population has put new topics at the forefront. especially in attracting and keeping a sufficient number of valuable collaborators. non-existing in the Cold War era. Long-term deployments and reallife operations were at the basis of psychological problems. the number of conflict areas in Europe and abroad. Measuring vigilance under conditions of sleep deprivation is typically done by means of an experiment. studying group cohesion falls under group dynamics as a part of social psychology. Nearly all Western countries are facing staffing problems. but studying the effect of particular substances to counter the fatigue is at the intersection of psychophysiology and experimental psychology. instead. or the impact of cultural differences on interpersonal relationships. at the family level. and the partner at home had to learn to assume a number of roles and activities assumed otherwise by the deployed partner. in the first place. deployed soldiers had to learn to be a partner. function allocation and promotion to exit from the armed forces.g. .1) and an instrument to assess the current status of variables put forward in the model and their impact on team effectiveness (Essens et al. Treatment of post-traumatic stress victims using a particular form therapy is a “pure” clinical topic. training and mission rehearsal Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. worked on military command teams (as opposed to executive teams) and has created a model (Figure 6. The HFM task group. to give commanders a tool for autoevaluation and improvement of the team’s functioning. For example. given by a patient’s most significant others) on post-traumatic stress reactions implies (at least) three sub-disciplines: developmental. staff college). training and even operational settings. The aim is.

and hence lose their incentive value. use of daycare centres.). etc. in Monterey (1999) and Brussels (2004) (in parallel with IMTA’s annual conferences). and to bind personnel to the employer.1 TG023’s Command Team Effectiveness Model. Often a number of these benefits are taken for granted or considered self-evident by the soldier. cultural activities. 138). reduced costs for a variety of services (public transport. function allocation tools. etc. career incentives.7 More and more private and public organisations offer employee benefits on top of the wage. Operations and operations support Modern operations become more and more a problem of information management. but a number of NATO workshops have been organised too. holiday travels. especially at command level: network-centric warfare is the new leading theme. especially focusing on officers. among others. sports accommodation). hoping by doing so to be competitive and attractive in the labour market. Defence organisations are not an exception to this rule.128 Jacques Mylle CONDITIONS PROCESSES OUTCOMES Mission framework Task Task-focused behaviours Team-focused behaviours Task outcomes Team outcomes A A R Organisation Leader Team member Process adjustment loop Team Conditions adjustment loop Organisational learning loop Figure 6.g. These issues are not only recurrent themes at the annual conference of the International Military Testing Association (see below. p. housing. . use of military facilities for private activities (e. Just to name a few benefits applicable in the Belgian Armed Forces (but surely also in a number of other countries): medical care free of charge.

9 The goal of this programme is to substantively enhance the information-management capacity of a human–computer entity. group cohesion and. The TADMUS programme (Cannon-Bowers and Salas. This challenge has been taken up by the Human Systems Integration Division of the US Naval Warfare Center among others. especially in stressful conditions such as operations. The system relies on models postulated by naturalistic decision-making theory. 2000) aims to apply recent developments in decision theory and in human–system interaction technology to design a decision support system that will enhance decision-making under these highly complex conditions. The main objective is to significantly improve performance by developing a closed-loop computational system in which the computer adapts to the state of the soldier. this programme will empower the soldier’s ability to successfully accomplish the functions currently carried out by at least three individuals. Specifically. Therefore. Experiences with long-term deployments of Belgian Army units in the Balkans in the 1990s have led to the introduction of a uniformed field psychologist in the staff of each brigade. An important question is how to support and improve decision-making. Therefore. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States (DARPA) is running a programme aiming at improving warfighter information intake under stress. the home front and the remaining units of the garrison. The primary goal is to present relevant information in a format that minimises mismatches between the cognitive characteristics of the human decision-maker and the response characteristics of the decision-support system that parallels the cognitive strategies humans already employ.8 Information becomes more and more critical in modern battle space. last but not least. operational environments. at heart. more detailed information can easily be found on the Internet. a second psychologist was added to each brigade garrison to take care of the rear detachment. Their primary role is thus to be a force multiplier and not to be a problem solver. TADMUS (Tactical decision-making under stress). even at the bottom level of the hierarchy. The core business of these military psychologists can be summarised as “mental readiness” and encompasses four assigned task domains: job satisfaction. Moreover. is how to improve performance in information management? A question also referred to as “augmented cognition”. the need for psychosocial support of the most significant others of the soldier on deployment became quickly clear.10 . while the first psychologist is on deployment with the taskforce. We will not elaborate on this decision-making system here. psychosocial support of the soldier. The question. and thus to reduce the number of decision-making errors. good leadership.A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 129 There is no doubt that one of the core tasks of leaders at all levels of the hierarchy is to make decisions. and by doing so. in support units of the same size and on the division level. these psychologists are called “counsellor in mental readiness”. stressful. to increase human performance in diverse. in the context of tactical antiaircraft combat in coastal environments and is well-known under its acronym.

“Tablets” is the solution preferred by biological-oriented psychiatrists. even in non-clinical settings. (partial) post-traumatic stress disorder or depression. a new approach emerged: “No Tablets NO talks”. team building exercises). the whole problem can be summarised as an equilibrium between the (neo)cortex – knowledge – and the limbic system – emotions – which is “visible” in a coherent heartbeat pattern. chronic fatigue syndrome. But recently. . they just have proved to work. physical training and nutrition supplements11 (especially the fat acid Omega-3). EMDR. Servan-Schreiber recommends a treatment that consists of (a combination of) seven methods: affective communication (to reach a secure attachment with most significant others). Clinic In this section we will put the emphasis on military mental health issues and. anxiety disorders. on topics that are on the cutting edge of care development. intervention (using the mentioned techniques) and follow up of effect measures (it is good to be open to alternative solutions. A classic matter of debate with regard to treatment of these syndromes/disorders can be synthesised as “Tablets OR talks”. meditation. as demonstrated during the last European Conference of Traumatic Stress (Stockholm.fr). Those who adhere to a more moderate position will opt for a combination and thus for “Tablets AND talks”. more specifically. Some of these soldiers will suffer from stress-related syndromes (e. things were clear. These ideas certainly are relevant for the military at the level of prevention (e.g. on the other hand.guérir.2 Difference in heartbeat pattern under imbalanced versus balanced conditions (source: www.2). food quality. soldiers deployed in military operations – especially in high intensity conflicts – may be subject to intense stressors. Balkan syndrome. David Servan-Schreiber (2003). fibromyalgia). (more or less) to the same vision. According to the French psychiatrist. “pure” clinical psychologists are advocates of “talks”. in his book From Freud to Omega-3 (2005). (acute) stress disorders. Needless to say. acupuncture. an imbalance leading to a chaotic pattern (Figure 6. Chaos Coherence Figure 6. Gulf War syndrome. but in practice – especially on deployment – some problems arose due to the dual role of the psychologist: he or she is at the same time an advisor to the commander and a counsellor of the individual soldier. light therapy. The Belgian psychiatrist Michael Maes adheres. We will not comment here on the validity proof of the methods.130 Jacques Mylle On paper. June 2005). but one should remain critical too).g.

Areas of interest include selection. research task groups. workshops and lecture series. aiming at a target with a rifle. p. The issues at heart here are twofold: 1) how to optimise the teaching and learning processes. which is often the case with interdisciplinary study objects. for example. performance enhancement and aiding. many executive jobs rely on eye–hand coordination. and 2) how to optimise the learning environment at a reasonable cost/benefit rate. The conclusion of research on this particular topic is also: I-do-what-I-see. fatigue management. human error. psychiatrist and educator who had a profound impact in several disciplines. cognitive engineering. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has proved that the human brain possesses particular neuronal structures13 and pathways between the perceptual cortex and the motor cortex that facilitate this way of learning (Bekkering.g. 135). design of information displays and controls. If the subject matter does not fit into one of the particular panels. Typical activities with respect to a particular subject matter are exploratory teams. human science research studies fall typically under the Human Factors and Medicine Panel (HFM).A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 131 Military behavioural sciences The term “behavioural sciences” was coined by James Grier Miller (1916–2002) to describe an integrative multidisciplinary approach to the development of a broad theoretical framework for the biological and social sciences. Learning from an example demonstrating the behaviour to be learned – also called social learning – is an intuitively often used method. Soldiers need to have some characteristics that civilians do not need (as much) and have to work in environments which pose alternative. 2003). training and mission rehearsal It is stating the obvious that most of the typical (individual) military behaviours have to be learned in training. anthropometry. and function allocation including in automated systems. 2005). often more-demanding challenges than civilian workplaces. process and make effective decisions using task-critical information. The first question is addressed by cognitive psychology. which has six “technical panels”. Education. This was. In the same vein. communications and teamwork. Just as in military psychology. the case with the long-term strategic study on Human Behaviour Representation (LTSS-51) (described below. which studies (among others) the relationship between perception and motor behaviour. gender and minority issues.12 The Human Factors part covers topics that affect military personnel’s ability to acquire. it will be put under the “umbrella” of the Studies. Within NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation (RTO). e. Analysis and Simulation panel (SAS). the military behavioural sciences have their raison d’être too. for the same reasons. He was a psychologist. including involvement with the clinical psychology section of the Veterans Administration (Pickren. training. In other .

So it is not surprising that there exist (defence) research agencies specialised in this area. building a correct mental scheme is essential for a good execution. The proceedings of both have been published in book form. of training and of simulation (hardware and software). defence services rely more and more on simulation for training purposes. the Dutch TNO works on several programmes related to the Human-in-Command. with the intention of raising awareness of the uniquely human aspects of military command. especially on solutions for problems in the area of digitisation of command. It provides the reader with insight into current issues such as leadership. In simulation. and empirical findings from experimental studies in the field. Material. mission . This holds particularly for the training of commanders and their staffs. modern simulation tools allow the representation of different aspects of the human being. Military and civilian specialists in the field of command and control. new concepts and treatises on command theory. Given the cost of military personnel and material. doctrine. mission rehearsal allows for evaluating the impact of particular decisions.14 Organisation Military leadership is beyond doubt one of the most important concerns. meet annually in the United States at the Computer Generated Forces Conference. The book brings together experienced military leaders and researchers in the human sciences to offer current operational experience and scientific thought on the issue of military command.15 Two Human-in-Command Conferences have been held under auspices of Defence researchers in Kingston (1998) and Breda (2000) respectively. (McCann and Pigeau. Moreover. The purpose of the first one is: to explore and understand the implications of this human intervention and the ways that science can make it more effective.132 Jacques Mylle words. 2000) The second one focuses on the particular context of Peace Support Operations: These operations require qualities of commanders and their teams that are in addition to the qualities that are normally needed to conduct successful combat operations. empirical data on peace support issues. It includes chapters on the personal experiences of senior commanders. and training must be tailored to fulfil their functions. and theoretical models. For example. What are these qualities and what are the ingredients for effective operations? The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations combines personal experiences of commanders. but it is the quality of the human in command that leads to successful missions in ambiguous situations. and “anchoring” these schemes requires (frequent) rehearsal. The second question has a lot to do with simulation.

A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 133 characteristics. mission preparation and training. Ron Levant. the soldiers and their most significant others. The programme leader’s efforts are to build a strong partnership of health. the “padre” or the moral counsellor and the members of the Psychology Department of the Royal Military Academy. This particular difference has been at the basis of some frictions among countries. to some extent. social workers. nurses. and effectiveness of individual commanders. in a relationship of mutual trust and confidence in the commanders. in a multidisciplinary team.. German officers expect “blind obedience”.. Turkey (and Germany) power distance is proven to be high. (Essens et al. whereas Dutch and Danish superiors rely much more on communication with. paediatricians. Clinic An integrated approach to the human being – be it specifically with respect to healthcare – is also endorsed by the American Psychological Association (APA). consumer and public health groups to endorse a vision of healthcare that integrates mental and behavioural health services. Eight committees. A (yet exploratory) international behavioural sciences16 field study in Afghanistan has shown different conceptions of the leadership function. as opposed to the Netherlands and Denmark where it is known to be low. family physicians. HCWP is about mending the mind–body gap and it aims at improving the quality of healthcare nationwide. Turkish and. For example. 2001) Operation and operations support The mission statement (Verbanck. crisis management. that is growing at a high pace. e. units. and finally with the colleagues of the curative sector. operational conditions and processes. emergency medicine . and consultation of their subordinates. including psychologists. 2002) of the Belgian counsellors in mental readiness reads: Through a preventive approach. we want to guarantee the mental readiness within the Armed Forces. the power distance (Hofstede. 1991) between superiors and subordinates. This “team approach” is already emphasised in education during the leadership seminars at the Staff College for officers of various levels of command. 2005). It states explicitly that they do not work on their own but in strong collaboration with other colleagues such as the social worker. These differences are clearly culturally determined. “Health Care for the Whole Person” (HCWP) is an initiative of the APA’s president. and missions. British. and impacts strongly on command and control because of a different “working style” (Manigart et al.g. multinational cooperation. In the United Kingdom. economists. and within it by the Society for Military Psychology.

groups and crowds .134 Jacques Mylle physicians.. and public health experts. psychologists and social workers have to be sensitive to signs that might be indicative of not wellmanaged traumatogenic events. PsychInfo. A total of 20 per cent of the publications stem from the last five years. Psychologists remain mostly at the descriptive level and. training and mission rehearsal The long-term strategic study on human behaviour representation (LTSS-51). and hence some 10 per cent stem from before 1950. social and occupational functioning. the individual. Education. internists. including that of individual combatants and non-combatants. An interdisciplinary approach in military context The relevance of an interdisciplinary approach in military-related issues has. examples are thinking automated opposing forces (training and exercise). superiors. and to improve operations in the new environment. to be derived from content-based evidence and scientific hypotheses. the workgroup was composed of participants stemming from ten different NATO countries and with various backgrounds such as com- . closed simulation systems (defence planning).18 posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR) and particularly post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)19 have been extensively studied by different kinds of researchers. teams. their explanations are mainly hermeneutic. Growing interest is also shown in the number of publications in a given time frame. military and non-military organisations. 2001) To reach the set goals. stated: Human Behaviour Representation (HBR) can be used as a tool to support the development and operational use of new concepts and systems for the future. Hence. if they go into causal relationships. resulted in 207 hits. work together to assemble the evidence and rationale for integrated care. HBR also helps to better train and use existing forces and equipment. Emerging technologies will have a great impact on the implementation and on the military use of such HBR in the future. A search through the most extensive psychological literature database.17 Since their introduction in the nosography of mental disorders. namely. . platforms. in the first place. . and virtual environments (acquisition). as opposed to more than 70 per cent in the former 55 years. The most important argument for a more integrative behavioural science approach is implied by the definition criterion F. It is concluded that HBR is a critical element for many military simulations. peers. (Anon. It offers support in different application areas. Decision Support Tools (support to operations). Committees span science to practice and to policy.

In each defence organisation. People who cope successfully appear to share some personality traits. causing suboptimal solutions to the problem. Information and Communication Technology (ICT). believing that someone else is responsible for a particular issue). due to “biased” actions. specialists in simulation and psychologists from different orientations (organisational. hence. 1987). The natural question that arises is how to improve selection and classification for stressful occupations. all cadets have been equipped with a laptop computer. It is not surprising that this has been long acknowledged by large organisations such as the Unites States Armed Forces. 1969).A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 135 puter scientists. different people with different professional competencies are involved in different aspects of the well-being of the soldier and of his/her most significant others. It has also been shown that. To make the electronic learning platform into an effective learning instrument requires a close interaction between teachers.20 The Belgian Military Academy intends to follow this procedure. Moreover. the better the results are. The Belgian Defence Staff has felt the need to bring together the experiences . which can be connected to the wireless network of the Academy. psychometric). Occupations have to be analysed in terms of stress dimensions to provide a rationale for the identification of valid predictors and criteria of successful performance in stressful jobs. educational researchers and ICT specialists because there is much more at stake than replacing books with computers.. social. One of the most recent implementations is found at the United States Military Academy. everything else kept constant. The main problem is that each of them is looking at the “reality” from his or her own perspective. more particularly Computer Based Training (CBT). overlaps and omissions (for example. Developing a potent learning environment. West Point (USMA): since 2004. research in education – more specifically Aptitude–Treatment–Interaction (ATI) research – has shown for a long time that it is important for effective learning to take individual differences into account (Cronbach and Snow. the more actively the student is involved in his or her learning process. starting in September 2005. meets these requirements (Adams et al. attention has to be paid to interactive instructional methods. that is accessible anytime and anywhere. Their expertise is seldom brought together. has become a crucial factor for military instruction and education. Heslegrave and Colvin (1998) concluded that: 1 2 3 A number of psycho-physiological measures have predictive validity. Long-term quartering out of the country and deployments all over the world call for distance learning and training. course designers. Organisation Many military occupations are stressful by their very nature.

This platform is composed of. 2003). which can adversely impact on the functioning of the organisation.g. the Defence Social Service. this study is at the crossroads of psychology. In operational and overseas environments. neurophysiology and ergonomics. among others. A particular facet that has to be taken into account when having female co-workers is pregnancy. ergonomic and neuro-physiological data. education and training is needed both for soldiers and their relatives. thus ensuring readiness and mission accomplishment (Hughes and Staren. aircrews in long-haul carriers. the consequences are even amplified. active-duty women can encroach upon mission accomplishment. psychometrics. Psychosocial support in crisis response operations and in humanitarian operations is not only a matter for military personnel. Everything else kept constant. In summary. Women in uniform in the armed services have become common. or sailors in the machine room of a ship. representatives of the Centre for Mental Health of the Central Military Hospital. Unintended pregnancies negatively impact on families. e. unwanted pregnancies of unmarried. Operation and operation support Particular kinds of soldiers have to work (and to live) in a very small space.136 Jacques Mylle from the field and the scientific expertise in behavioural sciences by creating the “Psychosocial Platform” at the level of the Deputy Chief of Staff Well Being. This multidisciplinary approach shows promise in reducing unplanned pregnancies. but also impacts on the most significant others. the Human Resources Directorate General. A multidisciplinary effort. it is important to investigate what the effects are of confinement and isolation on performance. communities and society as a whole but in the military. molecular biology. The doctoral dissertation of Nathalie Pattyn22 aims at: 1 2 Developing new methods for measuring human cognitive performance by integrating psychological. was set up to reduce unplanned pregnancies. the Counsellors for Mental Readiness. and the Behavioural Sciences Department21 of the Belgian Royal Military Academy. Trying to isolate molecular substances with a signal function for mood changes and perception of interpersonal relationship by studying in particular the vomeronasal organ. but the implementation is far from trivial: which needs have to be covered? What competencies must be available in what kind of agencies or parts of the military organisation? How should the military cooperate with representatives of other countries and cultures or even deliver support to units of other countries? . and the relationship with coworkers in the same environment. Alongside the effect of all other stressors. It is trivial to say that appropriate information. active-duty women (younger than 27 years old) who did not attend “Choices” were three-times more likely to have an unplanned pregnancy. Results showed that unmarried. the ergonomic aspects of the working space may be crucial for success in operations. called “Choices”.

A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 137 The HFM Task Group 020 on Stress and Psychological Support in Modern Military Operations (SPSiMMO) deals with these issues. in his doctoral dissertation. Clinic In actual research on PTSD. This team composed of professionals (social work. law enforcement. The aim of the study is to determine what the links are between psychological. Moreover. (2004) evaluated the effects of the Unified Psychogeriatric Biopsychosocial Evaluation and Treatment (UPBEAT) programme. the programme had no or very limited added value to the classic care approach. Just to name one recent collaborative research project between the Central Military Hospital of the Dutch Armed Forces and the University of Utrecht concerning the Glucocorticoid Receptor Functioning in Deployment Related PTSD (de Kloet et al. Although the task group. 2004). The treatment outcomes were generally good but. the study had a longitudinal design. psychiatry and medicine are also represented. other disciplines such as sociology. we observe a shift to molecular biology and neurophysiology to determine the correlates of PTSR/PTSD. It is needless to stress the importance of these research lines for psychopharmacology as a treatment form. aside from a contribution of applied sciences in developing tools or techniques for detection and identification of human beings or objects. more than 60 years old). i. . the SAS 049 specialist team on Counter Terrorism started its activities in April 2002 and delivered a report in 2003. threat assessment or preparing for the consequences of a (large-scale) terrorist attack. endocrinological. The title shows clearly the interdisciplinary approach to the problem studied. and immunological alterations. which is an interdisciplinary mental health care management program. human sciences have a role to play. in profiling (potential) terrorists. Oslin et al. For example. and notwithstanding a theoretical and practically sound intervention. family specialists and military command representatives) was entitled the Family Maltreatment Case Management Team (FMCMT). on the behavioural health symptoms of hospitalised elderly veterans (i. the status of participants was assessed every six months over two years. Combating terrorism is probably one of the “hottest issues” in NATO’s R&D bodies24 and countries. The scope is on prevention as well as on intervention. Prompted by the September 11 2001 events. clergy. It is not difficult to imagine that. contrary to expectations.e.. educational. healthcare. which counts civilian and military professionals as members from 18 different NATO and PfP23 countries. legal.e. for example. organisational and treatment issues. is composed mainly of psychologists belonging to different sub-disciplines. instruction and training. Slack (2004) investigated the factors influencing interdisciplinary team-member agreement with social worker assessments of domestic violence incidents in the United States Air Force. It is not only the soldiers themselves in operations that deserve the attention of defence agencies but also their relatives in routine situations.

October 2005). The International Applied Military Psychology Symposium. At the beginning. papers are increasingly addressing other behavioural sciences issues. teaching.138 Jacques Mylle Evolution of military psychological forums To start with. presentations deal with all five of the fields of application27 which is more or less transparent through the leading themes: Competencies for Crisis Response Operations (2003). A number of these forums have been mentioned in the introduction of this book. focused only on testing issues. Members are military psychologists who serve diverse functions in settings including research activities. The later internationalisation is reflected in the small “i” that was subsequently added to MTA.26 For example. and therefore new forums have been set up. Over the years since their creation. The origin and link with psychometric applications are clearly reflected in its logo (Figure 6. but we also feel the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach. In the last five years. some others seem worth mentioning here. intended to be a forum to address all psychological and related subject matters. Obviously this list is far from complete. has been. By-laws have been changed accordingly but the name has been kept.3). it is worth mentioning that there exists a permanent professional forum for military psychologists – the Society for Military Psychology – and that it has been represented as an occupational group in the largest and most powerful association in the world. team effectiveness issues constituted a new particular subject. Below. . as its name indicates. especially in the realm of operations other than war or the impact of multicultural multinational military settings. consulting. as Division 19 of the American Psychological Association (APA)25 since 1945.3 Logo of the International Military Testing Association. providing mental health services. So. The Society for Military Psychology encourages research and the application of psychological research to military problems. work with Congressional committees and advising senior military commands. Leadership in Calm and Chaos (in the Network Centric Warfare Era) (2004). which started in the early 1960s. and still is. at the fortyeighth annual meeting (Singapore. The shift from a purely psychological approach over a behavioural approach to interdisciplinary cooperation is also visible in most of the military scientific forums. management. the International Military Testing Association (IMTA) was a pure American affair and. we do not only observe a general tendency of broadening the scope of conference cycles and symposia. Ensuring Psycho- Figure 6.

fulfil a particular need. psychiatrists. interdisciplinary character is explicitly stated in its by-laws:29 Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary working groups constitute the core of ERGOMAS. Its purposes shall be pursued by the activity of Working Groups and the Biennial Conferences of ERGOMAS. Since 2000.A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 139 logical Readiness and Resilience for Deployed Forces (2005). moreover. psychologists. The actual multinational. non-profit. For example. welcomes especially “field experts” such as commanders who have had to deal with or feel concerned by the announced theme. there is a whole range of different types of documentation about military behavioural sciences applications that both researchers and practitioners can rely on. etc. psycho-neuro-physiological issues have also been brought to bear. ERGOMAS promotes empirically and theoretically oriented European research cooperation and international scientific communication. is open to everyone who is involved in the bio-psycho-socialspiritual well-being of the soldier (e.). should have its centre of gravity in military–societal questions studied by European sociologists and political scientists but. as its name suggests. The European Research Group on the Military and Society (ERGOMAS). Psychosocial Dimensions of Veterans Care (2003). . medical doctors. social workers. too. field manuals and web pages – both on the national and international level – there exists also international scientific journals such as Military Psychology or the Journal of Political and Military Sociology. ERGOMAS is a public. technical reports. the Lytaev and Popovitch paper (2003).g. it is no longer limited to European participants since it has US members too. Besides books. The International Military Mental Health Conferences (IMMH). Its objectives are realised mainly through a varied series of presentations and multinational interdisciplinary workshops. as can be derived from its mission statement:28 [IMMH] is an interdisciplinary forum where practitioners meet with researchers. created in 1998. and aims at establishing guidelines for cooperation and best practice in a multinational multicultural operational environment. unlike its name. meanwhile. Unwanted Behaviours in Military Operations (2004). Finally. for example. Major Disasters in Military Settings: Challenges for Co-operation (2002). the themes from past conferences were: Multiple Facets of Trauma and Care (2001). politically and ideologically independent professional organization of scientists. psychologists and even psychiatrists have become involved.

mostly under the auspices of the UN or NATO. 7 Hence. 3 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders. 4 See Lewin (1935). have their raison d’être on the basis of. forced to life-long learning to remain efficacious.navy. The fifth milestone. 6 See.internationalmta. As all sciences. Chapter 3. for example.asp. for precise contents. 8 See. www.nato.sdsu. and finally clinic – the need for the military behavioural scientist to follow the pace of development in the field of different human sciences (and not only in their own discipline) in order to be able to better understand the complexity of human behaviour and the relative contribution of their own discipline.htm.spawar. www. We have highlighted a number of forums that contribute to the updating of his/her competencies and a number of particular sources as well.uk/jdcc/pso. Moreover. “Environmental forces in child behavior and development”. multicultural and multiservice. S). Therefore. whether scientific or artistic. 3rd edn (1980).html. is the dramatic change of the operational context. We have illustrated stepwise. more than ever before. We identified four milestones which are highly relevant to military psychology: the experimental approach in studying the mind.mil or www. see the proceedings of IMTA 1999 and 2004 on www. education. 5 See. an interdisciplinary team approach is required because operations are multinational. that are quite different from the civilian work environment. as can be derived from literature. for instance.org. the date that is commonly accepted as the birthday of psychology as an “independent” discipline.gc. organisation.dfait-maeci.sci. www. but some findings have changed scientific thinking within psychology remarkably. the kind and variation of missions. first. the discovery of the unconscious.int. by extension military behavioural sciences.140 Jacques Mylle Conclusion People have always shown an interest in human behaviour in general and in military behaviour in particular. psychology – as an independent science – has evolved most of the time step-by-step. The military behavioural scientist is.rta. Notes 1 See www. the peculiarities of the soldier that distinguish him or her from the civilian. the interactionist vision B ϭ f(P. the integrative vision on the human being as a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity. we believe that military psychology and. through a few examples from different fields – namely.mod. which is rather typical for the military. known as crisis response operations.edu/cerf/content/ tadmus.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en. the specific situations that soldiers have to work in. operations and operations support. and second. training and mission rehearsal. .tadmus. just as any high-skilled co-worker. 2 1879 is the year of the opening of Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig. for example.

int/. 2003). The symptoms shown have a significant adverse impact on social and professional functioning or other domains considered important to the subject. 21 The Behavioural Sciences Department encompasses four “Chairs”.passagen. American Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edn).iamps.nato. 13 The Broca area. Psychology. available at: www. 22–8 January.edu/ietd/wireless.darpa. at the individual. T.A psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach 141 9 See www. 17 Email.. and deals both with psychological and sociological aspects. Neuilly-surSeine: RTA. 22 Nathalie Pattyn is a medical doctor and lecturer at the Air Force Department of the Royal Military Academy of Belgium. Her research project is granted by the Belgian Defence (Human Factors and Military Operations – project HF-10) and by the European Space Agency. 27 An overview of the aims of IAMPS can be found in the proceedings of the 39th IAMPS (Brussels. suffer from unvoluntary intrusive recollections (criterion B). and McCroskey.int/Pubs.. Washington. C. neuro-vegetative hyper-arousal (criterion D).org. 28 As presented at the 7IMMH conference in Brussels.nato.e. 23 Partnership for Peace. (2003) The Guilt-Free Soldier. to be precise.tno. Baard. (2001) Human Behaviour Representation Study. 29 See hem. Final Report. The Village Voice.nl/defensie_en_veiligheid/subthemas/commandovoering_en_operat/human_ in_command/. J. 24 See www.mil/ipto/programs/augcog. Anon. 1990).org/divisions/div19. 21–3. Canada and the Netherlands. (1987) Aptitude-treatment interaction in computer-assisted instruction. there is no IMMH website. Online.e.ch/materiel.apa. 12 www.maad. www. 27.cfm. Ethics and Social Sciences. 25 For detailed information. group.checkpoint-online.se/itl/bylaws. which regroups former Eastern European states not yet members of NATO. Brad Johnson to the members. 11 In a strict sense. 14 See. i. Latest editions are respectively DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association.rta. 16 This research project involves (for the time being) partners from Belgium.usma. but the author means classic medication prescribed by a medical doctor. E. community and national culture level.dean. 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organisation. 2004. 19 PTSD is defined as: having experienced a sudden life-threatening event (criterion A). see www. 26 By-laws and proceedings of former conferences are available on www. 18 PTSD is described both in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) and in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). 20 www. 10 Taskforces were at that moment battalion-size units composed of several units of the brigade plus some external reinforcements.rto.com/index.org. To date.internationalmta. Justen III. numbing and avoidance behaviour (criterion C). 2005 from Division 19 president. Educational Technology.pl/computer_generated_forces. Proceedings (since 2000) are published on www. during more than one month (criterion E). References Adams II. 12. 4 May. Waldrop. . P. i. Paris. 15 www. Law. DC: author.html. for example. the phrase “no tablets” seems not to hold.

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In the last two decades social sciences seem to have rediscovered aesthetics as an epistemology. the preferred objects of interest of many scholars fascinated by aesthetics. 2000. White. ugly. . grotesque. it has made use of the aesthetic categories (such as beauty. especially after the Second World War as a reaction to what Pierre Guillet de Montoux has named the ‘aesthetic totalization’ performed by Fascism and Nazism (2004). 1990a) and has used art as a metaphor for organisation and leadership (Guillet de Montoux. just to put forth a non-exclusive list of topics. 2002). Strati. The aesthetic dimension of everyday life has been neglected in contemporary social research. 1987. 2004). It has stressed the relevance of materiality in shaping organisational activity (Gagliardi. and still are.7 The study of workgroups in the military An organisational aesthetics perspective Enrico Maria Piras Introduction Aesthetics. 1996). 1992) useful to describe and analyse any possible organisation or aspect of organisational life. 1999). 1991. or in the instruments of art critique to analyse social processes (Degot. A discussion of the debate is clearly not an aim of this contribution. or the relevance of the tacit dimension of knowledge (Strati. a branch of philosophy founded in the eighteenth century. a dimension of society or as a method. Taylor. Pelzer. tragic. 2002). many researches and reflections propose a different way to conceptualise organisational aesthetics as a ‘holistic approach’ (Strati. has from its establishment challenged the primacy acknowledged to rational thinking by proposing a different epistemology. This approach has addressed topics such as the use of five senses in gathering data and understanding organisational life. Given the commonsense equation aesthetic ϭ beauty ϭ art the art worlds and related organisations have been. 1996. However. It has accorded relevance to the knowledge capabilities of human senses and empathy and only later it has focused its attention to a specific object coming to be identified as the ‘philosophy of art’. but it is enough to say that organisational aesthetics has emerged as a new approach in the field of organisational studies (Strati and Guillet de Montoux. disgust. Sociology has rediscovered art as a form of knowledge and there is growing interest in the use of art-based (Finley and Knowles. 1995) and art-like methods (Barry. to name just a few) as analytic and descriptive tools (Ramírez. sublime. 2000).

1990. participatory design and organisational aesthetics (Strati. Rosen et al. as well as logos and ethos (Gagliardi. To do so. In recent years there has been a strong critique of the idea that artefacts are merely tools to be considered in their instrumentality (Latour and Woolgar. 1996. claiming the objects are the ‘missing masses’ of social theory (Latour. Hatch. in particular. All these perspectives share a constructionist approach to social theory and are aware of the relevance of micro-level social action.. 1987). are perceived and judged by senses and have pathos. 1990b). I will then present the theoretical framework underlying this approach and conclude with some remarks on methods. workplace studies. science and technology studies (STS). where artefacts play a role in continuously reproducing the social world by mediating meanings and activities. 1999) to offices (Davis. Many organisational artefacts have been explored in literature in the last two decades. the so-called ‘non-human actors’. 1984. as this looks a promising field for stimulating reflective thought on this analytical framework. 2002). Cairns.1 In the following pages I will present and discuss some field notes from my ethnographical research on some workgroups in the Italian military forces. the intentions being not to give an exhaustive account of their culture and behaviour but only to show some possible applications of organisational aesthetics to the study of the military. In this work I will restrain my reflections to the study of workgroups. . The pathos of organisational artefacts In this section I will briefly analyse the role of artefacts in the organising processes of some military workgroups I observed. 2005). as this is the empirical setting I made my research on. 1979). This critical position is shared by scholars from various fields. even if I believe some consideration might apply to the study of other aspects and dimensions of the military. and that their use requires a practical knowledge. cooperative learning. 2004) I will focus on some dimensions of military life arguing these can be analysed differently (I do not dare to say better) when considered from an aesthetic perspective. stresses that artefacts are symbols of organisational life (Berg. I shall try to reflect on organisational artefacts as windows to look inside the workgroups. from chairs (Strati. The aesthetics approach. Artefacts are ‘primary cultural phenomena’ (Gagliardi. 1996: 568) that limit and structure the sensory experience of the members and are pathways of action in organisational life (Gagliardi. from architecture (Berg. The overall idea behind this work is that understanding military institutions can benefit from an aesthetic approach as much as this theoretical perspective can profit from studying them. 1995). the same agency traditionally attributed only to humans. 1992) and acknowledging them. Strati. 1987. ranging from cognitive science (Hutchins. Drawing from an empirical research (Gherardi et al.. 1999). 1990. a research area still not explored by this approach. given the limited space.The study of workgroups in the military 145 This work aims at reflecting on the contribution that organisational aesthetics can offer to the empirical study of the military.

‘the physical vestiges of a corporate culture’ (1987: 25). 2003) to images (Schneider and Powley.146 Enrico Maria Piras Kersten and Gilardi. They are symbols of organisational life. In two distinct photographs were depicted the two last presidents of the Italian Republic visiting the troops.e. The entrance of the barracks As I first stepped into the barracks of a special corps of the Italian Army.) centimetres long. They suggest that part of their selfrepresentation is to be found in the typical professional activities rather than in the belonging to the Italian Army. On my left I could observe some A4 white pages where records of the best performances in some training activities. in English and not in Italian. These artefacts are. I also argue that even a superficial analysis of them can be of great help in indicating to researchers how to fine-tune the next steps in the research process. In front of me was the motto. I noticed a wide array of different artefacts hanging from the walls. the typical black and white Palestinian scarf. new pictures of a new president’s visit could have easily altered that space. Pictures and plates were alternated with no particular order but still not in a messy way. Here I want to draw the reader’s attention to some military artefacts to show the fruitfulness of following this line of research in bringing forth new understanding of the culture of different workgroups. in the picture the President was also smiling. One of them was signed and there was a handwritten dedication by the President himself. From the open door of one of the officer’s office I could see a keffiah. The overall feeling they inspired in me was a sense of provisional though studied aesthetics. hanging from a metal bookcase behind the desk and a rainbow peace flag by its side. Everything in that space suggested the idea of possible modifications. imbued with meanings clearly understandable to their members that call for an interpretation by the researcher. as short distance run or bar tractions. depicting some members of the unit in relaxed poses and smiling faces. At the same time. breaking a record or substituting the Palestinian scarf with other objects. 1986) and the list could easily go on. waiting for my contact to arrive. On my right there were photographs of the division in various missions abroad.2 . as confirmed by one of my informants who later admitted to feel more ‘a special force member’ than a component of the specific corps he served. that space suggested the possibility for the individual to modify it. 40 (approx. Newer records in training activities. accompanied with the plates of foreign (special) units and the pictures of the missions abroad suggests the unit members feel themselves to be part both of the Italian Army and the international community of special units. gothic characters on the white wall. new missions abroad and new collaborations. were printed with the names of the record holders by the side. The choice to have an English motto. mostly not Italian ones. Nearby there were some plates with the logos of other units. in Per Olof Berg’s terms. written in black ink. i.

to use the words of one soldier of the workgroup. an artefact not . Afghanistan and Kosovo are not just geographical expressions but relevant time spans in this particular organisational life. They are positioned in an office. The dedication and the smiling face of the president on the photograph suggest friendliness and the respect the head of the state grants to the unit. They are also physical signs left to posterity. In this sense. They are time markers (Berg. The officer explained to me that the keffiah had no political meaning but it was just a present received during a mission by a foreign soldier. The strict execution of the prescribed procedure would require the maintainers to spend a lot of time moving from the engine to the rack. According to the rules. or not overtly displayed in a communal space. The solution to the problem was found in building a trousse (“box”. even if not considered as such by those who generally made use of that symbol. which is not a common space. as their acceptance lies in a shared understanding of their meanings. Unlike the plates and the pictures of the unit. They are physical signs that recall that Bosnia. both militaries and the two presidents. people who would have found it strange. In this sense these artefacts constitute a boundary for the group. and would cause even more problems when the engine to be inspected had to be left far away from the tool rack. The trousse The same line of reasoning could be followed to understand the relevance of another artefact observed in a group of maintainers in the Italian Air Force whose task is to take care of the airplane engines. The poses of people depicted are relaxed. pick another one. At the time of my research. to remind them of the history of the unit. to those enrolling now and tomorrow.3 These artefacts do not belong specifically to the context of analysis and at least one of them could easily look out of place (the flag). back and forth. Nevertheless they come to be legitimate organisational artefacts by virtue of being inaccessible to sight. 1987) and evoke the missions of the last few years. giving a sign of warmth to the hall. and so forth. use it on the engine. a maintainer should pick one tool at a time from the rack. some other artefacts described above could easily be found in totally different contests. This procedure is aimed at avoiding losing tools and leaving them in the airplane engine. the keffiah and the peace flag were quite commonly worn and displayed by pacifists. and by being re-symbolised in a process that attributes new meaning to them. put it back on the rack. in 2003.The study of workgroups in the military 147 All the pictures depict smiling and relaxed people. to see them in the office of a young officer training to fight in the Iraq war. there to tell newcomers ‘where other colleagues have arrived’. Pictures and plates tell a story to those who have the necessary information to decode it. the peace flag was displayed there as a way to reaffirm his conviction that military missions he took part in are to be considered peacekeeping missions. Iraq. suggesting the pictures have been taken during work activities but not in highly formalised moments like parades. in French). they work just like the A4 paper sheets with the best performances written in. if not insulting. which may provoke fatal incidents.

there is a trousse for every two maintainers. Nevertheless. a linguistic one: they refer to the trousse and to other new artefacts they’ve created as ‘optimisations’. the construction of a new artefact not described anywhere in the strict procedures of their work activities. At the base of each drawer they glued a sheet of bright yellow paper. to alter their work practices. Each of the four drawers of the trousse contains a given type of tool and their disposition is the same in every trousse. 1987) and separates two eras: before the trousse and after it. It also stands as a symbol of the bravery of the members of the unit for using a non-legal artefact. allowing time to be saved. they are not interchangeable. The trousse. They have built more than one of these mobile units. The moving capabilities granted by the wheels makes it a far more versatile artefact than the rack fixed to the wall. something rationally designed to save time. all identical. it is not perceived as a blasphemous act to modify ‘the bible’. The trousse is also. meaning it ‘comprises its unwritten principles. and brings to the fore the contribution that aesthetics makes to the understanding of this workgroup. However. This artefact allows them to carry all of their tools with them all the time and to keep them under control: they just need to look inside the drawers of their trousse at the end of their work and see if there is a yellow empty space. an aesthetics approach can help us to see the too-often neglected dimension of the pathos of the artefact. Bravery here is merged with pride. It is a work device. With this brilliant move the members of the group of maintainers reconfirm at once the overall validity of the manual they are supposed to follow strictly and their modifications to it. The trousse may be used as an example to explain what is meant by the logos. The trousse is a time marker (Berg. affirming they know ‘how the work has to be done’ better than those who have written the job guide. ontology. The artefact also has an ethos. 2005: 25). In addition to this. ethos and pathos of artefacts. They stressed the fact that no other unit had thought of building something similar. its deontologies. It is a mobile drawers unit on four wheels. The divide between before and after is marked by an act of creation. though. The trousse has logos. The members make use of another artefact. in the sense that they feel authorised.148 Enrico Maria Piras present in the job guide of the group. In the specific case we have the violation of a rule (use of the rack) and the constitution of a new set of rules to regulate the use of the trousse: it ‘belongs’ to two people. they work in pairs and are responsible for it and the tools it contains. There was always a proud tone when the workers told me the story of the trousse. With a simple glimpse they can tell if there is anything missing and understand by its empty shape which it is. characterised by different work practices. they are responsible for it. presented as something that makes perfect what was already very good. its moral codes. then they placed a piece of black foam rubber on it and cut it so as to allow each single tool to fit into the holes created. they never change their trousse with teammates or people not belonging to the group. embodies the pride of creativity. and most of all. or ‘the bible’ as they call it. in a way. and the constant regulation of its legitimacy’ (Strati. a material artefact that is appreciated aes- . even though they are identical.

Every single step of their activity is regulated by a job guide and its rules are sacred. The trousse is the way in which the workgroup shows its ability in innovating and defining new procedures. Moreover. or the review made by Strati. It may look like this artefact is a poor one. Understatement. not deserving of too much attention. And it is with the senses that the members of the workgroup judge it a beautiful object. appreciated for the pleasantness to the eye and for its sharp style. grotesque. has to be the rule. having a tradition dating back from the first Western philosopher to the present day with a continuous shift of meaning (Bodei. In this century. and by virtue of sight they can tell if every tool is in its place. they can see little marks that distinguish one trousse from another. If an airplane falls or has a minor incident. Beauty (and other aesthetic categories) in the military Aesthetic philosophers have deeply reflected on aesthetic categories. The organisational scholar is not required to become a philosopher or to study all the detailed . This knowledge has a tacit dimension. the gain of time granted by it allows the member of the unit to depict themselves as people who deeply love their work: at risk of personal consequences they introduce an artefact only to do their job faster and better. not expressible through words (Polanyi. More extensively. see Milani. they are able to understand by the creaks it produces if it is overloaded or if the tools inside are placed incorrectly. tragic. following Gianni Vattimo (1977). The beauty of the artefact lies both in the physical aspect and in the emotion it arouses in the members of the workgroup. In this setting what might be overlooked as a minor change assumes the connotation of a risky personal initiative. instead. has to be found in the particular work setting it has been created. it is a knowledge gained with practice and it rests not in the rational faculties but in the sensorial realm. Beauty certainly occupies a special position among aesthetic categories. sublime. But I shall come to discuss the role of the beauty in more extensive terms in the next section. possessed by those who belong to the unit and have access to this artefact. though. they smell the grease and the oil that has touched the tools during the repairs. 1966). The creation of a new artefact is a rule-breaking activity. the idea that art and real life are distinct has been radically challenged. comic. mostly as a way to discuss art. we can argue that paying attention to the beauty can be transferred from art works to social practices. sacred and so on (for an extensive discussion of aesthetic categories in philosophy. Its relevance. we can argue that this can apply not just to beauty but to every aesthetic category such as ugly. Beauty and functionality merge in the artefact.The study of workgroups in the military 149 thetically. Use the trousse requires knowledge. 1991. the trousse is not legitimate and its use may cause problems. 2002). no matter how much it alters the prescribed procedures. Those who use it can tell by pushing it if it needs maintenance. the maintainers who worked on it are suddenly investigated. 1962. 2000). In this sense. 1995). art has escaped museums to find its place in society. From the ready-made by Marcel Duchamps to the so-called relational aesthetics (Bourriaud. still.

They were not asked. restricting my discussion to beauty and grotesque. but some others categories have also become common tools in organisational analyses. like the kitsch (Kostera. the use of leaves and branches to disguise themselves. 1987a. 1996). The concept of beauty. particularly annoyed with this activity. but to use them in order to analyse. The path-breaking research by Rafael Ramírez on the beauty of the social organisation (Ramírez. They even had a special jargon word to describe this manuallike drill. The concept of beauty has come to be widely used since then (Ramírez. strictly followed during action. In other words. In this section I will try to show how useful some aesthetic categories have proven to be in understanding some workgroup processes. of knee caps and elbow caps. 2004). 2002) or the sublime (Guillet de Montoux. while another rule allowed only shooting twice at the target. 1962) of beauty as ‘pattern that connects’. they considered the whole thing not as a real drill but a big fake. Some autonomy is granted in the unit in the choice of a favourite weapon. they explained to me. The members of the group considered the drill quite easy and even boring. He explained to me that he felt ridiculous. and hardly tall enough to enrol in the corps. They showed no concern for making any mistakes. 2000. the wide philosophical literature on every aesthetic category can be a useful repertoire of insights and can stimulate reflections to the organisational scholar. They were mostly about security measures prescribed by manuals but never. in this respect a mistake such as a wrong attribution to an author would make no real difference as far as the concept proves useful to organisational analysis or description (White. 1997. 1991) drew on the idea of Susanne Langer (1942. These rules regarded the thickness (and the heaviness) of the bullet-proof jacket. to show that the perception people had of the three organisations under analysis originated from the strong link felt between the organisation and the surrounding social environment of which it was a part. White suggests that organisational scholar’s aim is not to develop the debate around those concepts. One of the members of the unit. He felt less . but only to strictly follow every rule. Other rules prescribed the weapons to be used for that particular action. 1996. or almost never. he had always felt a better proportion between his limbs and a little pistol rather than his arms and the large rifle. since he was the shortest of the unit. 2002). Strati. 1996. 1996). Linstead.150 Enrico Maria Piras history of each and every aesthetic category s/he utilises before using one. The philosopher David A. is by far the most used. White. My informant was particularly irritated by having to use the rifle instead of the pistol. to perform as if a situation like that could really happen for real. the use of protective glasses. the disgust (Pelzer. in the various ways it has been given. 1999. the greasy mimetic camouflage. a completely unrealistic action to be performed just to impress the audience. The existence of such a word clearly meant that drills like the one I could observe were not an unusual event in the life of the workgroup. and he developed an ability to use pistols rather than rifles. but they were unhappy with the job they had been given. b. explained to me all the differences between the ‘real action’ and the fake drill. The group I was observing was setting up a drill to be performed for a visiting general.

and he has to be focally aware of . The disturbance can be explained in terms of subsidiary awareness turned to focal awareness. established by sensorial judgement. i. But the rules of today’s drill are making him feel his body and the other artefacts. He added that day he felt even less confident: the thicker and heaviest bullet-proof jacket they were forced to use reduced his agility and he was not able to place the rifle correctly between the arm and the chest because of the thickness of the jacket. weapons and bullet-proof jacket. it derives from the diverse arrangement of the body. The drill This is not true. Beauty here is symmetry. we miss the nail and hit the wall. as Bodei remind us (1995). The relevance of the proportion derives from a self-observation in relation to the others. and its parts. proportion among parts of the body and the artefacts used to complete it and to create. Pythagorean. the soldier body plus all the artefacts carried. the beauty in this case also relates to the ‘good feelings’ the person feels when he uses the pistol instead of the rifle. It is the unusual and not pleasing feeling that something is out of place or out of scale. he explained. disturbing elements. we are feeling both the hammer in our palm and the nail on the wall: when we strike the nail we perceive the head of the hammer has struck the nail.e. but do not feel the handle of the hammer striking the palm of our hands. explains Polanyi. then. at least in real action situations. are not present to the soldier’s awareness as they are merged with his body. This idea of beauty. The hammer becomes.e. too long and too heavy. He also added that he would not use all the protections required for the drill in a real action. When we use a hammer to drive a nail. We are aware both of the hammer and of the nail. This is what I meant above when I argued that the military body. but would wear a light bullet-proof jacket in order to feel free to move and be quicker. Clumsiness is a relative sensorial feeling. and the organisational artefacts. i.The study of workgroups in the military 151 confident with rifles. but we have a distinct kind of awareness of the two: a focal awareness on the nail and a subsidiary awareness on the palm of our hand. A consideration can be made about the workgroup: it is a work environment that allows and encourages people to feel at ease with their bodies and let them evaluate for themselves what equipment to use. the military body that I shall consider an artefact in itself. when the unit happens to perform drills in front of generals. In a normal situation all the artefacts. In this case the beauty of the free-moving body is opposed to the ridiculousness of the clumsy overloaded soldier. is a concept that connects the individual to its artefact and to his teammates. Moreover. though. The usual tactile feelings are swept away by new. The fitness of a certain artefact for a certain body depends on some aesthetic evaluation of ‘good proportion’ seen in the unit. a part of the body we’re not aware of until something unexpected happens. has to be considered a single organisational artefact. together with it. and the soldier is only conscious of them in a subsidiary way. using the distinction drawn by Polanyi (1962).

152 Enrico Maria Piras them. The ridiculousness of the situation is the fragmentation of the artefact ‘body-of-the-warrior’ into smaller parts: rifle. it is heard in their heavy breaths. By the use of ‘grotesque’ to describe the situation. In this case it also comes to be defined by the belief that they hold a secret: they. though. The grotesque. though. complimented the unit after it. know what is really going on. and the general. The grotesqueness of the situation depicted by my informant rested on the different ways the workgroup and the visiting general perceived the drill. Grotesque is a form of ugliness. knee cap. as other categories like the ironic. the kitsch and the like. something quite easy to spot in the presentation generally required in every work space (Tyler and Taylor. While. my informant was feeling with all his body the fake nature of it. In this perspective. It is not relevant to discuss here if the general had really perceived the drill as being realistic. of course. the members of the group take a little revenge on the general. He is aware of all the (unusual) components of his equipment as they impose themselves on his attention by disturbing him. the humoristic. eye protection. for them the drill can even be beautiful. The attention paid to sensorial perceptions and aesthetic judgements opens new possible ways to interpret power relations as impositions of one’s aesthetic to someone else. and only them. another aesthetic category. 1998). the drill has to be performed according to the rules and the aesthetic taste of the general. disrupts the usual flow of action. The whole drill is imbued with power relationships. a transformation of the ugly into something comic. The distinctive feature of grotesque is that it has some caricature aspects not recognised as such. he supposed. beauty is opposed to grotesque. . in discussing the role of physical artefacts. What matters is to notice that the members of the group believed so and used a linguistic artefact to communicate (‘grotesque’) and reaffirm this belief. it is seen in the clumsy moves of the team mates. As seen above. is perceived only by the members of the unit. it is felt with the heaviness of the equipment. it is smelled in the greasy cream they cover their faces with in order to disguise themselves and in the odour of their sweating bodies. power is something inscribed in the bodies of those who experience it. eliciting laughter rather than disgust. not by the spectators. the general was convinced he was observing a representation of a combat-like activity. The different aesthetic categories used by the members of the unit and the general indicate a ‘conflict of different aesthetics’ among the members of the same organisation. This. we can see how a linguistic artefact can be used as a tool to continuously rebuild the boundary of the workgroup. In this case I indicate with the word ‘aesthetics’ the presentation of the bodies. the caricature. camouflage and so on. Power is recalled by the focal awareness it is necessary to have on the artefacts. The comic categories are what familiarise us to ugliness. in fact. Beauty and grotesque In this representation. implicitly described as a person not able to tell a real action from a fake drill.

is not something that requires clocks to be understood. 1750–8). The beauty and rhythm of the action are what guide the training and the rehearsal of the drill. the knowledge-gathering faculties of the five senses. is more than a mere adjective to be used to describe an action. considered the rational and the poetic as two irreducible forms of knowledge. art and empathy as a form of understanding date back to the beginning of Western philosophy. The uncertainty rests on the unforeseeable enemy reaction. the clockwork mechanics of the whole unit moving together. Organisational aesthetics: an outline Organisational aesthetics has an intrinsic multidisciplinary nature. as something that paves the way to logical understanding. another aesthetic category. Beauty. it is something that structures the actions itself. Organisational scholars who make use of this approach have conceptualised it in different ways. The members of the workgroup know. implicitly or overtly. The ‘light’ bullet-proof jacket. In the next couple of centuries. not to a physical artefact.The study of workgroups in the military 153 I shall go back to the beauty for a final remark. The grotesque is such because it spoils the beauty of the freedom felt by soldiers when they are able to decide for themselves what equipment to use. They feel the flow of their bodies on the terrain. The group has to train in order to perform some attack schemes in an uncertain context. It emerges as a counterposition to the grotesque fake drill and it refers to the ‘real’ situation. in describing the principles of his ‘scienza nuova’ (new science). according his favours to the latter (Vico. the ‘choreographies’ created to attack the enemy. I have shown the Pythagorean conception of beauty when the soldier explained to me his preference for pistols. the absence of pauses in the action. for instance. but only aesthetic. They are not natural but learned. what the action should be and how it feels to do it unconstrained. creating a new word. to a different . He considered it a form of knowing distinct from the predominant Cartesian rationality. Its judgement rests on the sensorial feelings of the member of the unit. somehow referring. the Neapolitan philosopher Gianbattista Vico. 1725). 1989). and defining it ‘the science of sensory knowledge’ (Baumgarten. becomes light and comfortable after months and months of heavy training. The sense of beauty is related here to the sense of rhythm perceived through the senses when they perform the same actions with no limitations. The sense of rhythm. though this learning cannot be rational. Some decades earlier. aesthetics has been considered mainly as a ‘philosophy of art’ and only in the last few decades has there been a renewed interest to rediscover the roots of the discipline and the epistemic counterposition stated at its origins (Barilli. Reflection on topics as the concepts of beauty. then. ‘aesthetics’. namely the aesthetic. These feeling are what Gagliardi (1990b) has termed as ‘sensory maps’. Only in the eighteenth century did Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten reunify the field. Here we have the concept of beauty referred to the action. given the common ground it shares with philosophy. with their body.

This produces an over-rationalised depiction of both organisations and researchers: if an organisation is deprived of its physicality. 2000). The sensory or aesthetic experience is an ineffable and elusive one. 1999). Patricia Yancey Martin. In this work I have considered aesthetics as a form of knowledge based on the sensorial faculties of human beings who have five sense plus one. contrasting those organisational theories that usually depict organisations as populated by bodiless minds (Strati. Imagination is the way to explore and ‘live’ organisational life. though. by the organisational actors. My understanding of the uneasiness felt by the soldiers obliged to wear greasy camouflage on their face on a hot and sunny May morning cannot be fully explained in rational terms. for instance. Rational/logic thinking aims at ‘purifying’ understanding and theorising from the qualitative datum of sensorial experience. I could feel the same temperature of the sun. It escapes rational definition and can only be understood by means of empathy.154 Enrico Maria Piras philosophical background (for an overview see. according to the predominant positivistic paradigm of that time that required the researcher not to put anything ‘personal’ in the research. In the introduction she explains she had taken notes about her feelings while conducting a research in a residential organisation for the elderly. or the capacity to judge through the senses (Strati. as the saying goes. 1999). rather than just studying it while remaining detached from it. These elements are central in organisational aesthetics as they become what is to be observed and the lenses for observation. ‘standing in someone else’s shoes’. had to be left aside while writing the research report. the same must happen to the researcher too.4 As sensorial faculties of both researchers and organisational members come into play in a research project. Those bits of notes. Beauty or ugliness are agreed. but only imagining myself with that thick cream of my face I could understand their discomfort. were what allowed her to relive in the imagination her experience and write about it more than 20 years later. These bits. Aesthetic categories are verbal and written artefacts that allow the sharing and discussion of aesthetic experiences but they are not ‘natural’ or individual products. or contested. The emphasis on the sensorial faculties and judgement underpins the relevance given to the practical knowledge of organisational members and its role in continuously reconstructing the organising processes through their interactions. The idea of . has produced a journal article some 20 years after collecting her field notes (Martin. 1992). Stephen Linstead and Heather Höpfl. Aesthetic research rests on the gathering faculties of the researcher’s senses and his/her willingness to activate them in the context of analysis (Strati. The evocation allows the investigation of an organisation even after a long period of time. for example. it is relevant to explore these crucial elements in the processes of sense-making. 2002). This perspective stresses the materiality of organising. however. The reflection on how they are socially constructed and whose aesthetic prevails leads a researcher to investigate power relations and the processes of modification of such structuring elements of organisational culture. where the sixth sense is the aesthetic judgement.

To elicit the tacit dimension of knowledge. 1996. the style of writing becomes an essential part of the theory proposed (Van Maanen. 2004. When carrying out aesthetic research ‘participant observation’ reminds us of the effort the researchers have to put in. Others suggest the text should be ‘open’ to interpretation. The relevance accorded to empathy and to the ineffability of the knowledge gathered by means of an aesthetic approach requires the researcher to solve the difficult problem of how this understanding can or should be proposed to the academic community. it is an indicator of the relevance of the problems emerging when trying to dig under the surface of rationalist explanations of organisational behaviour. among them it is impossible to quote those who choose to communicate with performances. in fact. here. 1996). Hancock. Taylor. in order to ‘put themselves in the other’s shoes’. the author describes what s/he has seen and leaves it for the reader to interpret it (Strati. It is not just a linguistic game to underline that.The study of workgroups in the military 155 what is beautiful. ephemeral by definition. Some suggest translating in rational terms whatever has been discovered by empathic understanding (Gagliardi. The data presented here as field notes have been collected in an ethnographic study conducted mainly with participant observation and some interviews. Participation means empathically living the situation explored. In general we use this expression to highlight that the researcher’s presence ‘in the field’ is perceived by the others and so s/he becomes an actor (Bruni. David Barry suggests asking the interviewee to draw a picture of him/herself in the work setting and then describe and analyse it together with the interviewer (Barry. . 1995). 2003). 2002). On aesthetic research: some remarks on method While controversies arise and grow among the scholars who use organisational aesthetics. some prefer to use art-related methods. In recent years there has been a growing number of conferences accepting or even encouraging submission of performances instead of papers. 1999). Participant observation and in-depth interviews are the most common ways to conduct an aesthetic research. These and other forms of inquiry rest on the belief that artistic forms of expression can help to surface buried meanings and feelings that can then be grasped analytically or empathically. reproduced and negotiated by actors in their everyday activities. then. Steve Taylor has written a drama based on a personal organisational experience and then has analysed it together with his research team (Taylor. Some scholars reject the formalised ways of presenting a work and write instead evocative texts. This raises the question of how this experience can become part of a community that still communicates through journals and books. These categories. Still. as John Van Maanen points out. there is one firm point about the methods needed: they have to be qualitative. participant observation gains a more profound meaning. tragic and so on is produced. are both a tool for description and an object or study of the aesthetic researcher. This is one of the most debated points. such as plays or dramas (Steyaert and Hjorth. 2005). ugly. 2004).

an artefact itself. Here I have tried to present how some workgroups in the armed forces looked like if seen ‘under the lens of aesthetics’. The artefacts have been considered as objectsin-use. I proposed a way to analyse some military phenomena using some aesthetic categories. I stress here the relevance of the study of the body and the artefacts of military institutions because I believe they have a special relevance in this setting.156 Enrico Maria Piras The choice of method depends on the particular way the researcher interprets the aesthetic approach. I also proposed to observe power as something continuously ‘felt’ by the body and not just inscribed in the body (Foucault. places where . I have tried to see workgroup cohesion as resting on the shared pathos felt by members for some organisational object. various shooting ranges outside the military camp. where differences rest not in the mere possession of the artefact. Conclusions The aim of this contribution was to present a new way to look at the processes of the workgroup in the military. In the military settings I explored. Adopting a micro-level perspective. Enrolling involves moving far away from home towns. In the first section I have tried to show the relevance of artefacts in the creation of boundaries between different workgroups. on the contrary. the choice of a method is also a matter of opportunity. I believe it would have been strange to propose that people did drawings while they were sat in the mud. the temporary and often self-constructed structures built during missions abroad. I have tried to show they also possess pathos. being transferred when promoted. for example. As Fabrizio Battistelli (1990) has brilliantly demonstrated. the role played by physical perceptions and aesthetic judgement. While some studies insist on the prosthetic function of military artefacts (Bishop and Phillips. military studies can benefit from an approach of looking at military institutions as organisations. They become constitutive parts of the military body. But. and are judged through the senses. but in the shared meanings it is given. Those who. the open text or the performance provides a good way to share his/her knowledge. having a dispersed work setting. as every researcher knows. becoming a part of what Knorr Cetina has defined as a ‘postsocial society’ (1997). 2002. 1991). For those who believe in the impossibility of transforming the empathic understanding into logical reasoning. are imbued with meanings and emotions. These elements are useful tools in the attempt to look for new perspectives on some traditional sociological concepts like control. The workplace is constituted by barracks. the contrasting aesthetics sheltered within the same organisation by different groups. are convinced there is a way to formalise and define the aesthetics of the organisation will probably be keener on art-related methods. emphasising the social relations they become part of. 2004). and discussing some artefacts. 2005) which have a notorious relevance in military studies. Restricting the discussion to beauty and the grotesque. to use Strati’s powerful metaphor (1996). This process of analysis brings to the fore pleasure or displeasure in performing certain tasks. power and cohesion (Piras and Fraccaroli.

in Italy. Hopefully. F. and so forth. The same week they exercised crossing a river in a non-restricted area and planned to spend a week simulating an intrusion behind enemy lines in the surrounding forests. the rainbow-coloured flags with the word PEACE written in the middle were commonly displayed in windows. one because there was the carcass of a helicopter to exercise with and the other because it was near a lake where they had their swim training. Scos NoteWork. and J. this approach may say something interesting to those concerned with military studies. Bishop. (1750–8) Aesthetica I–II. Frankfurt am Oder. (1996) ‘Artful inquiry: a symbolic constructivist approach to social science research’. (1987) ‘Some notes on corporate artifacts’. was named by the prestigious journal. P. and many other parts of Europe. Notes 1 I would like to thank CeMiSS (Centro Militare Studi Strategici – Military Centre for Strategic Studies) that sponsored the research project I draw my data from. Franco Fraccaroli and Michela Giampietro. R. they are given names and arouse feelings of pride. R. References Barilli. Qualitative Inquiry. and that it may rapidly change its meaning.The study of workgroups in the military 157 international drills are carried out. recalls the unit history and traditions. The relevance of corporeality. (1989) Corso di estetica. Parachutes. I believe the sense of belonging in such a disseminated work setting rests also on the cohesive symbolic force of the artefacts. They mean more than just what they are designed for. In particular. Kleyb. the flag came to be seen as a symbol used mainly by the leftist parties and the Catholics. Battistelli. or the small histories of their members. and the overload of symbols make the military a very interesting workspace to be explored by aesthetics. and all the other researchers: Silvia Gherardi (coordinator). The article would have probably not been published even in a minor journal some years before. 2 Whenever referring to my field notes I will use the masculine form: all the groups I happened to observe were entirely composed of males. Angeli. weapons. Milano. shelter. force. Boundary 2. This is probably a good example of how what is regarded ‘scientific’ is historical. 3 In those days in Italy. Barry. 6(1): 24–8. visors. Il Mulino. by no means less important. Bologna. Sociologia dell’organizzazione militare. protective items are all accurately maintained. A special forces’ group I could observe used two different shooting ranges in one week.O. (1990) Marte e Mercurio. 4 The article. Human Relations as the best article published that year in the journal. They are required to move to other regions to perform international drills or to train with heavy weapons only allowed in a special training camp. Phillips (2002) ‘Sighted weapons and modernist opacity: aesthetics. some artefacts are vital to survive. A. Berg. Some other artefact. For those involved in warfare. poetics. D.G. the tacit nature of many skills. prosthetics’. after a double-blind review process. 2(4): 411–38. . Baumgarten. Adalgisa Battistelli. 29(2): 157–79.

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Part II New issues and emerging trends .

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local wars always have a global dimension. This did not and does not impede the use of organised violence in different forms. . and with a special dynamism after the end of that bipolar international system. by different actors (many non-state actors among them). lost its legitimacy. They are formed. Local conflicts and wars are developing a considerable spillover effect into the zones of peaceful everyday-life elsewhere. During the years of the East–West conflict. to go to war. In some areas of the world. MOOTW. Failing states are becoming a security problem not only for their inhabitants. governments are proving themselves less and less capable of running their states. by and by. Throughout the twentieth century. paid for and utilised in the name of the state’s security. the offensive function has. the transformation of the international system also causes a “transformation of war” (van Creveld. In short. strategic doctrines and tactics. CRO. and the military Wilfried von Bredow Introduction In the modern international system. The process of globalisation decreased the role of the state. their structure. the armed forces usually function as an instrument of the territorial state. This defensive role is complemented by an offensive role: armed forces have been used in order to expand the political and economic weight of a state and to gain or exercise regional hegemony. security means primarily sufficient military strength in order to deter any possible aggressor from penetrating the state’s territory or to defend the territory. They strive for victory in the name and interest of the state (nation-state or multinational state) to which they have pledged their allegiance.8 Conceptual insecurity New wars. We can call these two main functions of the armed forces “traditional functions”. The notion of sovereignty is losing some of its former relevance. One cornerstone of the perception of the military and the military self-perception has remained unchanged: armed forces are created and sustained in order to fight. their armament and equipment have changed considerably over time. According to some observers. 1991). terrorism. These functions converge in the capacity of waging war. other forms of organised violence occurred. The organisation of the armed forces. In this context. and with different political (or other) motives and goals. in case of an attack from the outside.

it is necessary to think about the structural changes in the sphere of politics. but also those of smaller states that are trying to re-define their place in the international order in an affirmative and constructive way. In this chapter. military technology. but they are. this is probably the only stable continuity we can build upon. changed themselves. the organised use of force fulfils political goals. Military technology has rapidly advanced over the past few decades. or at least recently reemphasised. we shall look more closely at the ongoing political and academic debates about the changing nature of war and the consequences of this development for the armed forces. The nature of politics has certainly not changed. The various aspects of change in the national and international politicomilitary balances are difficult to identify and to disentangle. However. With regard to the long history of warfare and military actions. The end of the East–West conflict is more than just the end of one specific conflict between great powers and their respective alliances. the roles of the military in such missions are not completely new. the international community has developed some concepts of humanitarian intervention. They are challenged by the necessity to take over new and non-traditional functions and missions. with the addition of other means”. mainly in the Western world. This is especially so for the North Atlantic theatre of the East–West conflict after 1945. changes in military affairs. The range of missions for the armed forces are determined by the political system of a state. peace-making and peacekeeping missions. different from the military roles we usually think of when dealing with modern armed forces. as all three of the principal factors of change in the military have. These goals differ according to the historic. of course. In most cases. This is the main reason for a certain conceptual insecurity as opposed to a comprehensive theory of the new forms of violent conflicts and the role of the armed forces in their containment. These missions usually comprise civil and military elements. and the international system are two principal sources of change in the military – the third one being. Even in conflicts where paramilitary and private actors prevail. or by the political head of a non-state actor. The current international system is different from the bipolar system we . the classic observation by von Clausewitz (1989: 605) “that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse. indeed. This concerns not only the armed forces of the great and middle powers. geographic and cultural context. Societies. or goals that can be easily translated into political goals. organised as states. in many respects. Political framework Before looking deeper into the consequences of the new.1 has not become obsolete. The armed forces of the states in this area (some of them number among the leading actors in the international system) are thus dismissing part of their traditional functions and missions.164 Wilfried von Bredow In order to prevent these negative effects and to contain local violence. It is the beginning of a postmodern interlude in world politics.

where violence remains a most important ingredient of power (Kaplan. to remain the central institution of their citizens’ loyalty. either in a diplomatic or. The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded in the centuries following the peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648. 2000). if regarded as effective and comparatively cheap. 1993). among other things. In order to have a name for these dramatic changes. it makes sense to analyse the expansion of this system from Europe all over the globe with the help of this model. defined by territory. At its core is the sovereign state. The actors’ attempts to mutually balance their power. Conflicts between states are settled by power. political and military alliances to provide for collective defence. The main reason for this development is the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organise their societies. the structures and principles of the globalising Westphalian system changed deeply.Conceptual insecurity 165 lived in during the second half of the twentieth century. During the twentieth century. A bleak outlook into the future stresses the anarchical and disorderly features of the current international system. States seem to be losing a certain part of their structural strength in politics. borders. population and internal order. and a minimalist set of binding rules for the behaviour of states. in a military way. has grown considerably. the key pillars of the Westphalian system seemed to be cracking. it is hardly contestable that inside some . The state has the monopoly on legal physical violence and is. and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond their borders. It is anarchical in so far as there are no political authorities above the state. They claim that democratic societies would have serious problems mobilising their citizens for the purpose of waging war if the military enemy were also a democratic society. National economies are becoming more and more interdependent. optimists among political science experts point to the wave of democratisation after the end of the East–West conflict. On the other hand. as well as the number of categories of actors in the international system. however. Ecological problems can only be dealt with on a macro-regional or global scale: states as single actors are mostly incapable of ecological problem-solving. This development comprises optimistic and pessimistic aspects. The number of actors. Even if it is still too early for the assumption of a universally valid “law” of democratic peace (Russett. Still. some scholars of international relations use the term “end of the Westphalian system”. This system developed in Europe in the seventeenth century. The national interests of states dominate international politics and the methods of best realising these interests. States can rely on their power and on their leaders’ ability to make rational use of it. the settlement of disputes and law enforcement. Towards its end. responsible for law-making. The international system is mainly an inter-state system. which diminishes the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement a national economic policy. They conclude that the risk of war among authentic democracies is close to zero. characterise the Westphalian system.

that it was not only the decolonisation era that saw many wars of the third kind. organised violence and war will accompany humankind into the next millennium. but on a restricted level. proxy war. only part of the overall assessment of future violence. Institutionalised war occurred in the eighteenth century between the states of the expanding European international system and was a rather domesticated. In some regions. albeit with a quite different meaning. Kalevi Holsti (1996) distinguishes three kinds of war. Africa and Asia displayed similar features (and similar cruelties). Then. Civilians not only become major targets of operations. These wars are also total wars in a certain sense. limited war. On some continents. The indigenous people fought the liberation wars of the decolonisation era in order to create a political community against the colonial power. In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this “third kind”. We ought not to forget. as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships. with the French Revolution. and cities. for example. however. inter-state war is no longer a meaningful political option for policymakers. internal wars have become quite “normal”. Roger Beaumont (1995) lists among others: dirty war. which represent the terrible climax of this development. One of the consequences of this development was the formation of mass armed forces. This is. to turn them into good revolutionaries and/or nationalists. the flush of victory of nationalism as the most forceful mobilising ideology for modernising societies began. guerrilla war. The purpose of such wars is often to politicise the masses. called “people’s war” or “wars of a third kind”. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed two world wars. the colonial wars of the European powers in the Americas. towns. not so much because it offers clear distinctions. (Holsti. highly professional form of war. but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major purpose of war. to . Some centuries before. The second half of this century was characterised by the rise of yet another form of war.166 Wilfried von Bredow macro-regions of the planet (like North America since the nineteenth century or Western Europe since the end of the Second World War). as described by Holsti. it is not surprising that the brunt of casualties are suffered by the inhabitants of villages. These wars are. but because it makes us aware of the hidden continuities between these forms of war. insurgency/counterinsurgency. Since the distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred or indistinct. New wars In his historic overview on the development of war in modern times. 1996: 39) This typology is certainly helpful. a term already used by Clausewitz. Even in Europe. Wars between mass armed forces developed the tendency to become total wars. surrogate war and low-intensity operations. border conflicts and inter-ethnic wars continue to occur.

A different political framework is of salient importance for the shaping of the “new wars”. They combine primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and hyper-modern propaganda. Mary Kaldor (2000) insists on the category of “new wars” because wars like those in former Yugoslavia or in many parts of Africa are distinctively different from “old wars” with regard to their goals. HerbergRothe. The fighting itself can be transferred into other regions. Holsti (1996: 40) argues that they will continue into the future because. Münkler. when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and to sustain law and order. mass violation. easily escalate into major threats for third parties. However. many similarities between guerrilla and counterguerilla warfare in the decolonisation era of the twentieth century and today’s “new wars”. in many parts of the world. into the urbanised parts of the world. like fighting insurgents (“stability operations”). indeed. This is important to note in order to remain sensitive to the impact of political factors on the outbreak. predominantly small wars. Financial resources for the participants of such wars come from . The conflicts in question do not become militarised because of the strength of a state. Small wars are usually local wars. the consequence may well be the outbreak of internal clashes and civil wars. 2000. The literature on guerrilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to study their tactics and strategy. religious or otherwise defined group. but because of its instability and weakness. but mainly on the level of official war aims and the motivation to fight. have a tradition of their own. states are not strong enough to successfully monopolise the means of organised physical violence. Ideological and geopolitical confrontations are less important than the clash of collective identities. They originate in zones with weak or failing states. indeed. but always present part of conventional modern warfare.2 They formed a less visible. Territorial control plays an important role in these wars. intrastate conflicts between comparatively weak governments and comparatively strong opponents. the waging and. Forced migration. They may. etc.g. the de-escalation of those violent conflicts that fall into the category of “new wars”. Their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide. e. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different groups. however. 2002: 16). 2003).Conceptual insecurity 167 a large degree. such as the struggle between radical Kurds and Turks in Germany and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s. the different political framework and the so-called “revolution in military affairs”3 are demanding “fundamentally new military doctrines and organizations” (Sloan. This implies a fight against every single member of the other ethnic. Some features of the new military missions. ethnic cleansing and genocide belong to the methods of violence in such new wars. There are enough examples to illustrate this horizontal escalation. 2002. There are. and they are. eventually. The current discussion about war in the post-East–West conflict era is structured around the notion of “new wars” (Kaldor. in either the neighbourhood or elsewhere. the usage of violence and their financing.

2003: 15) A second salient feature of new wars is their partial privatisation. its weaknesses” (Pfanner. a logical consequence. when they are. anti-personnel mines and machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. Striking against non-military targets often causes spectacular damage. In recent wars in Africa and on other continents.168 Wilfried von Bredow different sources – a considerable part through a symbiosis of the war fighting groups with organised crimes (drug-trafficking. 2005: 151). (Münkler. kidnapping. Asymmetric warfare is not a completely new phenomenon: “In a sense. 2003: 17). The “new wars” at the fringes of the Western world are comparatively cheap for those who wage them: Most of these wars are not fought by well-equipped armies but by the hastily recruited militias of tribal chiefs or heads of clans. the weapons used in the new wars are cheap – small arms. Herfried Münkler (2002. plus the armed followers of warlords and the like. smuggling. prostitution). The emergence of warlords and their privately recruited militaries (often including child soldiers) in zones with failing or failed states is no surprise but. greater material resources and a more advanced technological development will not automatically tip the scale between victory and defeat. gold and diamonds. all warfare is asymmetrical as there are never identical belligerents” (Pfanner. instead. As Münkler (2003: 9) states. The war economies in these zones are able to tap into the flows of capital and goods in the world market: “Apart from oil and strategic raw materials such as ores and minerals. In today’s world. Heavy weapons are only rarely used and. but second-hand small arms. consist mostly of remnants from the stockpiles of the Cold War. The fundamental aim of asymmetric warfare “is to find a way round the adversary’s military strength by discovering and exploiting. Acts of terrorism have become an integral part of asymmetric warfare. the warlords use above all illegal or fraudulently certified goods to finance their wars and frequently to accumulate enormous fortunes” (Münkler. the differences between belligerents are more dramatic than ever before. That wars of this type can be fought – and even fought successfully – is mainly due to the fact that they are not decided on the battlefield between two armies but drag on interminably in violence directed against the civilian population. The militaries of the rich Western countries may be the winner in an open battle (like the USA winning the Gulf War in 2003 without much resistance from the Iraqi troops). in the extreme. . 2003) regards asymmetry as one of the salient features of the new wars. automatic rifles. Above all. The USA have a high-tech military at their disposal which can be rapidly deployed all over the planet. 2005: 151). the decisive factor was not high-tech weapons. The main weakness of complex societies is their infrastructure.

like in “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). In this period. NATO troops in Western Europe had the mission to defend the territory against the aggressor. the armed forces of many Western countries (although not all of them – the German Bundeswehr being the most prominent exception) were engaged in wars. they also refer to strategic. the military profession as a whole has become similar to large bureaucratic. the armed forces needed warriors more urgently than managers. Before the East–West conflict was about to enter its last phase. In the case of the deterrence failing. as well as by the intricate nuclear strategic “balance of terror”. the nuclear “superpowers”. However. operational and tactic innovations in two quite different political frameworks: first. for it guided the adversaries towards a kind of antagonistic cooperation – as expressed in a whole range of arms-control agreements from the 1960s to 1990. non-military institutions. Generally. The rapid development of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with a global reach brought about a kind of strategic stalemate. Until 1990. For these wars. was necessary in order to make deterrence more credible.Conceptual insecurity 169 Revolutions in security affairs It is quite normal today to use the terms “revolution” and “revolutionary” with regard to current changes in warfare. The capacity to do so. the USA and the Soviet Union4 built their defence against each other on the concept of “mutually assured destruction”. 1972) and second in the turbulent postEast–West conflict era. the anti-colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century within the East–West conflict (see. Within this political framework. This trend was sustained by technological change. Even the decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia were always connected with the main threat of Soviet. however. the international community5 started to regard the containment of violence in local or regional conflicts as a high-priority goal – not in all .” In the same year. in effect. We should be aware that these terms have two different (although not mutually exclusive) meanings. and military leadership implied more managerial skills than in the past. Beaufre. Most of these wars were a mixture of guerrilla war and conventional war. a first revolution in security affairs occurred. The main task of the protagonists of the East–West conflict’s armed forces was to demonstrate a credible deterrence. the armed forces of the Western countries became more of a bureaucratised organisation. At the same time. become civilianised. It has. Underneath the nuclear level. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos (1981: 11) stated bluntly: “In short. they characterise the enormous technological developments in military technology.or communist-inspired aggression. but it seems to have worked. Nuclear peace was an uneasy phenomenon. among others. The virtualisation of war in Europe and between the “superpowers” was a first and rather dramatic revolution in security matters. Michel Martin described the development of the French military establishment since 1945 as a passage from “warriors to managers” (1981). the threat perceptions of Western countries had been dominated for more than four decades by the anticipation of a nuclear and/or a non-nuclear (conventional) aggression from the Soviet Union and its allies.

A famous saying. the nuclear balance of terror ceased to be a point of reference for the maintenance of armed forces.170 Wilfried von Bredow cases. stated that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers. truce commissions. from Rwanda to Chechnya. Moskos Jr. neutral and non-aligned countries or countries (like Canada. After the end of the East–West conflict. The enormous pace of the military technological development in some countries. the United States. Jr. small wars with different degrees of asymmetry and of different intensity. therefore. In addition. 1976: 10). and the like. Under the auspices of the East–West conflict. In the 1950s.. the United Nations developed the instrument of international peacekeeping: [A peacekeeping force consists of] military components from various nations. This role implied a neutral and status quo-oriented stand by the military: “The interposition of UN forces came only after the belligerents had separated of their own accord” (Hillen. Instead. 1976: 4) These are definitions of the traditional kind of peacekeeping. The increasing demand for military intervention in nasty fringe wars (from Somalia to Bosnia. The peace soldier is. peacekeeping was mainly a business for smaller and middle powers. from East Timor to Haiti) . operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimum use of force. generated a revolution in military affairs. who had looked more closely into UNFICYP6 peacekeeping operations. mainly of course. but in those where violence appeared to be especially dangerous for the neighbouring countries or especially evil. The more generic term peacekeeping operations includes not only peacekeeping military forces but also such diverse and usually smaller peacekeeping enterprises as observer groups. The peacekeeping role combined the traditional image of the soldier as warrior with the non-traditional image of the soldier as a constable. peacekeeping and a whole range of military missions other than war fighting seemed to occupy the imagination of the military planners. but only soldiers can do it. attributed to Dag Hammerskjöld and to Charles Moskos.. (Moskos. investigatory missions. the Security Council of the United Nations initiated a whole range of what we now call traditional peacekeeping operations. which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities. During the East–West conflict. grand-scale conventional warfare between big powers or alliances became quite an unlikely scenario. contended the necessity of special training for peacekeeping soldiers: “Contemporary standards of military professionalism must undergo fundamental redefinition to meet the requirements of the peacekeeping role” (Moskos Jr.. one who serves in a military capacity under a command authorized by an internationally accepted mandate and who adheres to impartiality while subscribing to the strictest standards of absolute minimal force functionally related to self-defense. for instance) that developed a generally acclaimed political preference for mediation and brokerage in international politics. 2000: 86).

new patterns. Intervene in regional conflicts in order to help restore and build peace. and continue to have. A common European security policy has not yet been created. The European strategic objectives are. the Near East and the Mediterranean area. The European Security Strategy defines the following global challenges and key threats to Europe. the Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). competition for natural resources. . To develop more coherent policies for crises and post-crisis situations. state failure and organised crime. The policy implications for Europe are: • • • To become more active in pursuing these strategic objectives. the considerable dependence on an interconnected global infrastructure. in fact. notably the USA. and energy dependence. The list of key threats comprises terrorism. Both processes had. notably the Balkans. An impressive reflection of this most recent revolution in security affairs can be found in the official security strategies of the United States and the European Union. according to ESS. It is therefore easier for the EU than for many states (including the individual EU member states) to focus its security strategy on current and anticipated threats. Global challenges are the indissoluble linkage of internal and external aspects of security. Build security in Europe’s neighbourhood. European threat perception On 12 December 2003. Strengthen the international control of WMD non-proliferation. to: • • • • • Fight terrorism both on the civil and on the military level in cooperation with other countries. poverty and disease in developing countries. regional conflicts and their impacts on European interests. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Develop an international order based on effective multilateralism with stronger international organisations and regimes. To become more capable in terms of military forces without duplications. operational and even tactical thinking in the military.Conceptual insecurity 171 and the unprecedented growth of international terrorism generated a revolution in the perception of security. The slowly emergent patterns of this policy are. a remarkable impact on strategic.

economic. They . A well-functioning democracy is hardly thinkable without successful democratic control of the armed forces and other security agencies. The latter definition comprises armed organisations like the regular armed forces. which undergo a transition process and want to democratise. In the future. the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 2003 Gulf War against the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein are painful examples for the problems the stronger military party will meet without a well-adapted security sector. and even the judiciary in the security sector (see Edmunds. Even with long-range precision weapons. Experts in security-sector reform use it either in a broader or in a more limited sense. 2003: 117) These are also telling examples for the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach to the political. Aidid beat the Army in Mogadishu and Al Qaeda beat the Navy in Yemen because. international terrorism.172 Wilfried von Bredow The security sector and military transformation This document reflects clearly the structural change in the international system. they had better information about us than we had about them – exactly the same situation that existed on September 11. religious and security aspects of the country where the intervention takes place in the name of democratisation and disarmament. The necessity of a comprehensive approach does not only stem from political factors. This necessity is. you still need a network that gets you inside your opponent’s decision cycle. but also in the well-established Western democratic societies. The broader definition widens the scope and integrates private security firms. in both cases. It’s the total package – the total information picture that is important. 2003: 15). In the information Age. (Berkowitz. demand a thorough security-sector reform not only in new democracies. The impact of economic and cultural globalisation. also present in the often-quoted September 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA. with a different emphasis. 2001. One of its implications is the necessity to redefine the functions and structure of the security sector and especially the armed forces. The complex transition process should be based on a comprehensive security approach. They will have to create peace between civil war parties. paramilitary forces. police forces and the intelligence agencies. it’s not just smart weapons that win wars. the armed forces of the Western countries will often be engaged in new missions. Security-sector reform refers mostly to post-communist countries and those of the former Third World. other non-governmental actors with certain interests in security matters. social. in short the very nature of the new threats and risks. For the Americans. the Somali intervention in the early 1990s. The term “security sector” is comparatively new in the security discourse. the re-emergence of ethnic and religious militancy. It is based on a more comprehensive approach to security and security policy.

conflict prevention. 2003: 26) A 1999 definition in the British Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 is a little broader: PSO was a term first used by the military to cover peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations.Conceptual insecurity 173 will control truces in traditional peacekeeping missions. (Schmidseder. The catchword for this process in Western armed forces is transformation. but is now used more widely to embrace not only PK and PE but also those other peace related operations. mental and physical condition. There are many slightly different definitions of PSO in related literature. peace making. “peace support operations” (PSO). but they will also have to protect the population against attacks by insurgents in robust or strategic peacekeeping7 missions. In order to prevent and contain the horizontal escalation of conflicts and crises. The response to these new threats and risks is partly a military one.8 Transformation of the security sector is complex and far from approaching its end. A representative example is the 1997 definition by the Swedish armed forces: PSO is the military term used to cover both peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations. NATO now uses the term “crisis response operations” instead of the older term. but not only. part of a wider strategy in support of political goals. They will have to fight the troops of ruthless warlords in the name of the international community. partly a civil one. a cautious redefinition of the functions. we shall zoom in on the character of the new missions and on the military profile of soldiers performing them. These new missions in violent conflicts and new wars demand. the international community introduced crisis response operations (CRO). which are principally the preserve of civilian agencies. peace building. and humanitarian operations. This kind of military human intervention has had many different names in the past decade. range of capacities and. It is part of an international crisis management. . which is mainly. organised in the framework of the United Nations. for example. last but not least. In the two remaining sections of this chapter. without exception. New missions The changes in the ways to wage war and the enlargement of the concept of security have led to new security strategies with a new canon of security threats and risks. of the professional self-perception of the soldiers serving in the armed forces. Military activities in PSO will be. PSO differ from war in that they are complex operations that do not have a designated enemy but are designed as part of a composite approach involving diplomatic and generally humanitarian agencies to achieve a long-term peace settlement. with special pressure.

However. Humanitarian operations (HUMOPS): humanitarian aid. establishing and protecting safe areas or exclusion zones. disaster relief. non-combatant evacuation operations. protection of human rights. which was generally conducted in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict or war. Peacekeeping (PK): observation. arms control. establishment and enforcing of no-fly-zones. and combat versus support roles. protection of humanitarian operations. The forth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. mediation. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres. interposition force. New military Around the turn of the century. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service. (Schmidseder. they are categorically different from traditional war-fighting operations. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. This is the reason why these new missions demand a new profile and a renewed professional self-understanding of the soldier. (Moskos et al. conciliation. both structurally and culturally. sanctions and embargoes. A final change is the internationalization of military forces themselves.. but mostly “operations other than war”. even when they include fighting. the United States used in their manuals and directives the term “military operations other than war” (MOOTW). Peace-making (PM): mainly diplomatic activities like good offices. diplomatic pressures. 2003: 27) Instead of PSO. early warning. Peace-building (PB): military aid to civil authorities. surveillance. assistance to refugees or displaced persons. military sociologists debated what some of them called (to the chagrin of some of their colleagues) the “postmodern military”. rank.174 Wilfried von Bredow PSO are increasingly in response to complex intra-state conflicts involving widespread human rights violations as opposed to more traditional PK. Peace enforcement (PE): enforcing sanctions and embargoes. NATO differentiates between six kinds of PSO or CRO: • • • • Conflict prevention (CP): preventive deployment. • • These operations are not always. The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. transition assistance. 2000: 2) .

France. • • • • • • • . At least among the officer corps. The motivation. become of secondary importance. 2003). but a kind of cosmopolitan perception of the necessity to defend human rights. Israel. In spite of this. Italy. Instead. Today. Military intervention by third parties in a local conflict is the first step towards a reconciliation process. The “enemy” is not to be defeated and destroyed. the diagnoses of the authors Moskos. the United States. but this made his essay provocative in the most positive sense of the word. was one of the first to paint the outline of the new soldier of the twenty-first century. which integrate former enemies. of course. The political environment of the armed forces generated new challenges for them. prevent genocide and other atrocities. and to keep or enforce peace. The Swiss military writer and former general. this quasi-ironic perspective on the time we live in has somehow lost much of its aggressive freshness. however. Flexibility and multi-functionality are becoming as important on the battlefield as fire and mobility. Switzerland. The military will no longer seek military victory. Canada. As crisis response operations (CRO) are in nearly all cases a reaction of the international community. converged. and the moral and political basis of the soldier’s professionalism is no longer or not solely his or her allegiance to the nation-state. • The armed forces will have to fulfil mainly functions of prevention. the soldiers will have to create and protect suitable conditions for comprehensive and stable peace settlements. but his/her actions have to be stopped in order to prepare him/her for a kind of re-education. War criminals will have to be caught by the armed forces which will act as a police force. a genuine ability to think in political and diplomatic terms will become part of their education and training. These individuals will be brought before an international criminal court and will be held personally responsible for their violations of the law. They will. military units will have to get used to serving in multinational frameworks (Kretchik. intervention and restoration of order. South Africa. The soldiers are not allowed to think and behave according to purely military norms and rules. the United Kingdom and. Williams and Segal which were collected in order to depict the changes in the organisation of the armed forces in such different countries as Australia. Deterrence and traditional combat will not disappear. and they had to respond by adapting their structures and skills to meet the new requirements. Gustav Däniker (1992). Denmark. Germany. He did not shy away from occasional idealism. To balance a strong military patriotism and a more cosmopolitan perspective is not always easy. Here are (with some alterations and additions) some of his propositions for the future (or futuristic?) soldier in Western armed forces.Conceptual insecurity 175 Postmodernity and/or postmodern features of current history were widely discussed in the 1990s.

warriors. 1989) tends to be underestimated in the military establishment. Military activities within CRO often overlap with paramilitary police activities. . indeed. Franke. Soldiers in these kinds of forces are. Will the armed forces of the future become a small. there is no consensus about the weight of the different elements in the future role of the soldier. 1997). and more positive attitudes towards crisis response operations among the military establishment on the other (for the USA. see: Rinaldo. A certain constabularisation of the military is probable. a certain gap may develop between a spirit of strong commitment to the warrior aspects of the soldier’s role among the rank and file and younger officers on the one side. Conclusion New wars.176 • Wilfried von Bredow The armed forces will have to build up special forces against especially dangerous threats like terrorism by extremist groups and their backers. highly professionalised fringe group. In most Western societies. It is important to keep in mind that these elements of the armed forces’ functions do not replace their traditional missions (deterrence and defence) but complement them. • • • Do these elements form a coherent picture of the new military? Probably not. Two strands of research seem to be especially necessary. 1996. new militaries – there are many valuable arguments that create a case for a deep structural change in the profession of arms. the guardians of a society that does not really care for them? This is not a probable scenario. 2003: 113). the relatively unproblematic balance of civil–military relations and the different ways of securing democratic control of the armed forces are perhaps endangered by a growing gap between civil society and the military. The role of the classic “mud soldier” (Wilson. but also not an unthinkable one. we shall have to investigate the consequences of the strange process of asymmetrisation of war and organised violence. the changing role of the state and the emergence of sub-state violence markets on the concept of security. new missions. There is also the need for a third cluster of research. In some militaries. The same is certainly true for the “new missions” debate and the “new” or “postmodern military” debate. the more we develop a slight scepticism. we need some more and conclusive information on the impact of globalisation. They will have to fight both on the level of sheer physical violence with “primitive” weapons and on the level of a highly advanced network-centric warfare model (Berkowitz. On the other hand. the closer we look into the empirical evidence presented by the various authors. First. In military circles. Edward Newman (2004) contended that the “new wars” debate needs a historical perspective. Second.

5 The term “international community” is a euphemism. 7 A quite convincing plea for strategic peacekeeping is published by Dandeker and Gow (1997). never capable of matching the pace of the USA in the field of military technological innovation. 541: 20–35. the crux with simple names for complex processes so that they tend to lose their meaning. This is certainly correct. . we should emphasise the possibilities of early warning.”) to those that highlight its defining characteristics (an RMA “involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations . and the other nuclear powers on the other hand. writes Stephen J. Sloan (2002: 3) provides a useful survey on the many competing and mutually complementary definitions of this complex notion: Definitions of a revolution in military affairs are wide and varied and perhaps as numerous as its analysts. André (1972) La guerre révolutionnaire. fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations”).) (1999) Digital War: The 21st Century Battlefield.”) to those that enunciate its specific elements (an RMA is “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies which. (1995) “Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions”. and Greek Cypriots in the south. (ed. 6 The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was formed in 1964. 2 Roger Beaumont (1995: 23) notes that concern about what he prefers to call “small wars” has increased since the end of the East–West conflict.L. The Soviet Union was only in this respect a “superpower”. Bibliography Bateman III. . ibooks. Basically. Beaumont. combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts. 4 The term “superpower” is somewhat misleading. Their valuable arguments enlighten the discussion on the relationship between the political and military spheres. the USSR was. With very few exceptions. Librairie Arthème Fayard. 3 Elinor C. prevention and early containment of violence. . “the occurrence of many such conflicts as a kind of background static in international affairs is not a recent novelty”. 8 “The subject of military transformation has expanded to the point that it transcends focused discussion”. These kinds of war have come to the foreground. It is still operating on the demarcation line between the two communities of Turkish Cypriots in the north. indeed. New York. R. Notes 1 This observation has recently been severely questioned by authors like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. Cimbala (2005: 28). Beaufre. It was used in order to emphasise the considerable gap in nuclear armament between the USA and the Soviet Union on the one hand. but by no means have they diminished the insights of this enigmatic Prussian political philosopher. it means the majority of governments in the United Nations plus a growing number of non-governmental organisations. This is now a global task. however. .Conceptual insecurity 177 As the threats and risks of our security will continue to infringe on our everyday life. It is. The Annals. . They range from those that capture with sweeping simplicity the essential nature of RMA (an RMA “is simply a revolutionary change in how wars are fought and won . Paris. R.

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Much later. In general. The first concept to mention in this connection is flexibility. military practice has dominated thinking about organizing and organizations. imperial China and the Ottoman Sultanate demonstrated the use of organizational principles long before Max Weber published the foundations of modern organization theory. (Isenberg. 1999). but still more than a century ago. German thinkers like Carl von Clausewitz and the already mentioned Max Weber deeply influenced managerial theories on strategy and structure. We will illustrate this using some basic concepts applied in current management and organization theory.500 years ago. Using the concept in a military . the diffusion of management knowledge goes the other way around nowadays. little military knowledge and theorizing finds its way to civilian firms and institutions. Armed forces in the Roman Empire. both in peace and war. whereas he deems the use of violence as the last resort and least preferred strategic maneuver. In the twenty-first century. On the contrary.9 How the military can profit from management and organization science Erik de Waard and Joseph Soeters I hope this process of applying knowledge from business settings will help future Army leaders at different levels to be as effective as possible. This concept has become important in attempts to understand and influence organizations’ responsiveness to changing business conditions. some management theorists have become inspired by the way the military (like the USA Marine Corps) is firing up and energizing their workforce (Katzenbach and Santamaria. This little book has nowadays become a best-selling management book. the Chinese general Sun-Zsu (2004) authored a small book on the way wars could be won using proper strategies and tactics. More than 2. in this chapter we aim to show that civilian management and organization science is helpful in improving today’s military performance. Very recently. though. a sort of “bible” of strategic management. One of the reasons for this current popularity is Sun-Zsu’s emphasis on the intelligent deployment of resources and the importance of outsmarting one’s competitors. basing their ideas on well-established military practices. 1985) Introduction In the history of mankind.

Networking foremost emphasizes the organizations’ need for cooperation with others. branches and countries creates an enormous military capacity on the basis of which specific configurations of resources can be composed. we will deal with the concept of ambidexterity. Flexibility can be achieved because the units can be recombined in different ways. but at the same time they need to be good at peacekeeping which is most of all communicating and talking to people. The first of those two concepts is networking. Finally. de Waard and J. risks. individual organization may be. inter-organizational collaboration – is the inevitable answer to this development. that can react flexibly to changes in the environment. areas of operation. efficiency and effectiveness of largescale international military deployments. This mixing and matching of product components or organizational modules has the potential to create tailor-made systems. and exploration of future opportunities on the other. Networking – i. the search for flexibility can lead to different strategic managerial concepts. as they need to be specialized in applying violence and in peace-enforcing.e. . 2004). To put it differently. We hope this chapter will constitute a clear example of the way the armed forces can profit from interdisciplinary approaches to military studies. technologies and societal impact are becoming too vast to be comprehended and dealt with by one single organization. modularity. this concept makes us aware of the fact that current organizations can no longer rely on only one specific competence (Birkenshaw and Gibson. The sum of different units from the various services. leading to a system that is capable of transforming itself into different taskforces in order to perform a wide variety of tasks. The military is facing similar contradicting demands. 2001). as operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show every day. Today’s business organizations must be equally skilful in coping with seemingly contradictory demands like exploitation and execution of activities on the one hand.182 E. Yet. The same applies to the military: even the US armed forces are incapable of executing large-scale missions on their own. We will relate two of those concepts to modern military operations and discuss them in depth. Operations. networking influences organizational design. for firms as much as for the military. Soeters setting may help to improve the speed. How can those seemingly contrasting demands be balanced and united in one and the same organization? We will close this chapter with conclusions and avenues for future research. No longer can organizations rely on their own specific competencies only. However. This is where the other concept. Systems are said to have a high degree of modularity when their components can be disaggregated and recombined into new configurations – possibly with new components – with little loss of functionality (Schilling and Steensma. Current military deployment is also based on the general principles of modularity. no matter how large a single. indicating even more theories and practices from management and organization science that can be fruitfully implemented in the military. business firms nowadays need to focus simultaneously on being both innovative and cost efficient. becomes relevant.

territorial disputes. In this respect terrorism. In business research. In order to cope with all these changes and challenges. Finally. The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) tries to achieve this by exploiting the opportunities offered by the information era. flexible production lines and flexible information systems. are taking place at the same time. Based on an extensive literature survey. In addition. the general approach considers flexibility as a necessary quality that organizations need to possess in order to adjust to a changing environment or stimulate innovative processes. The functional approach focuses on specific aspects of the organization. high-tech weapon and information systems get a more prominent role in modern military operations. Western armed forces are nowadays exposed to all kinds of different threats. resulting in roughly three flexibility approaches. First of all. Most European countries have gone through major downsizing operations. countries have to be capable of executing different operations simultaneously. Third. states that personal traits of stakeholders in the organization are predominant in the ambition to achieve flexibility. most individual countries do not have sufficient military means to support their vast individual security ambitions. Departing from a relative stable security environment during the Cold War. traditional war-fighting capabilities were not sufficient to cope with the current security risks. armed forces need to adjust and become more flexible. nation-building and humanitarian relief. First of all. The military product portfolio had to be expanded with new ways of operating. values and norms than the ones used for traditional war fighting. ethnic and religious rivalry. finally. and a humanitarian operation to support refugees in a flooded area. International cooperation is seen as the best way to safeguard common Western security ambitions despite these reductions. like implementing flexible labor contracts. In theory it is possible that a peace support operation to solve a territorial dispute or to stop ethnic rivalry between population groups. the abuse of human rights. A soldier is no longer only a warrior. Fourth. the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery. the dissolution of states and other risks of a wider nature are mentioned in NATO’s Strategic Concept. Volberda (1998) concluded that flexibility is determined by the interaction between management’s adaptive capabilities and the organization’s responsiveness. the concept of flexibility has been around for more than 25 years. The quantitative loss of troops and resources must be counterbalanced by the advanced performance of modern technologies. On the one hand. he or she also has to be some sort of a diplomat who is capable of winning the hearts and minds of local people in a crisis area.Management and organization science 183 Flexibility Over the past two decades the international security environment has changed considerably. such as peacekeeping. Table 9.1 provides some examples of these three approaches. managers must . these new operations are based on different competencies. The actor approach.1 A great deal of agility is needed to successfully counter all these different threats. causing a significant loss of each country’s military capacity.

such as the . computer games. and still is now. television. allow firms to design and commercialize new generations and variants of products faster than ever before (Lei. Microsoft itself did not have sufficient organizational capabilities to support this strategy. de Waard and J.184 E. • The values of the elite inner circle are more important than those of the executive director or of the entire staff in predicting innovation (Hage and Dewar. A network evolved with participants all contributing something specific to the development of the X-Box.5 million game consoles per year. radio. 2000: 5).. Its weakest dimension determines the system’s overall flexibility. Functional approach • The flexibility and speed offered by advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT). Success will be determined by the leadership’s competence in making a particular set of choices within the sense-and-respond model’s framework (Haeckel. movie channels and. cultural and technological characteristics may fail if its managers lack the vision and power to make the organization respond to changes in the market and organizational environment. Neither management’s control capacity nor the controllability of the organization may dominate. In 2001 Microsoft decided to enter the market for game consoles. but developing computer games is a completely different story. such as the Internet. have the dynamic capabilities to respond at the right time in the right way to changes. the organization must possess structural. • The use of externalized workers adds flexibility to work arrangements and complements the stability provided by the internalized workforce (Davis-Blake and Uzzi. Moreover. opportunities or threats in the environment. A good business case to mention in this respect is Microsoft’s development of the X-Box. In other words. et al. the firm does not even have sufficient operational facilities of its own to live up to the ambition of producing 1. 1993: 218). According to Volberda (1998: 97). there should be a balance in this interaction. The introduction of the X-Box was the first step toward an integrated system that links all kinds of entertainment and information sources. 1973: 287). Soeters Table 9. to obtain the missing capacities and competencies.. to create a digital entertainment revolution. when properly implemented. However. The firm is pretty good at developing software. 1995: 8). An organization with sufficiently adaptive structural.1 Three approaches to flexibility General approach • Flexibility means an ability to adapt aspects of the organization rapidly in the face of new opportunities or threats in the environment (Birkinshaw and Hagström. of course. Microsoft decided to start collaborating with other companies. • Organizations that move quickly are flexible (Ashkenas et al. 1996: 515). Actor approach • The only kind of strategy that makes sense in the face of unpredictable change is to become adaptive. On the other hand. cultural and technical characteristics that support this need for speed and adaptation. Therefore. the organization’s management with high adaptive capabilities can never make up for an organization architecture that is too rigid. Microsoft’s managerial intention was then. 1999: xvii).

” To cope with these problems. memory chips. speaking their own language and using their own equipment and procedures. keyboards and controllers. Networks are groups of autonomous organizations that are directly or indirectly related through strategic alliances. and. graphics. vary a lot. The operations in Afghanistan are different from the ones in Iraq or Bosnia. . However. networks have become more and more popular in the world of business (De Man. This strategy shows a lot of similarities with the quasi-integration networks from the business sector. expanding the market as well as the delivery of a product or service. The set-up of every deployment is different. Microsoft was capable of successfully entering a new market within a very short time frame. The combined units of several countries ensure an extended military potential to draw from. Dussauge and Garrette (1999) describe quasi-integration networks as networks that try to achieve the same advantages as traditional mergers or acquisitions. They can be directed at a large number of different objectives: research and development. 2004). Military taskforces are no fixed formations. Under the influence of several factors. The most important reason for this is the fact that (inter)national collaboration offers the best possibilities to realize the present political security ambitions in spite of the aforementioned reductions in size and the increased task variation. Sometimes even during the mission. that they are from different nationalities and cultures. Even the production and assembly needed to be organized as a joint effort of various participants. the microprocessor. but even in Afghanistan the operations. Institutions such as NATO. building-up critical mass. by bringing the organizational capabilities in line with its ambitious strategy. rapid technological developments. one can imagine that it is difficult to be on the same “wavelength. and hence the organizational set-ups of the troops. Networking Let us now translate these flexibility insights to the current military context. cost reduction. This trend also occurs in the defense sector. drastic changes in the composition of the forces take place. military taskforces rely heavily on standardization processes. those units are selected specifically for the purpose. This example shows that. higher demands from customers and internationalization. the setting of a standard. dependent on the task. Inter-firm cooperation focuses on long-lasting. networking has become a predominant strategy. Given the fact that the participating units do not have the time to train together. despite its unfamiliarity with the field and the fierce competition it faced. only an adequate level of mutual adjustment between the participating organizations can guarantee the effectiveness of such mixed taskforces.Management and organization science 185 DVD drive. The X-Box case underlines the fact that. EU and the UN have increasingly begun to organize their deployments around multinational (combined) and multiservice (joint) ad hoc coalitions in order to meet the security risks. such as an increasing competition. at the managerial level. horizontal integration of specific activities to reap economies of scale and scope and realize cost savings.

(1999) describe NCW as follows: NCW focuses on reaping the potential benefits of linking together – or networking – battlespace entities. 1999). NCW is also acquiring a more prominent place in European thinking about security and military deployment. both as inputs to decisions and in the form of decisions themselves. it is also very risky for organizations to develop a standard on their own. but certainly also the new way of warfare has stressed the need to standardize. 2004). weapons and weapon systems and. multi-role fighters. decide. Networking enables this. to another. It is not surprising that certain countries prefer to follow the leading technology of the United States. Nodes to things (sense. both systems failed to dominate the market and the R&D costs were never recovered. de Waard and J. With the establishment of the concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF). Soeters Yet. is passed over links from one battlespace entity. satellites and reconnaissance and communication assets are resources that Europe is still rather short of. is too fragmented. a lack of compatibility. This view is in accordance with the standardization battles that are fought in the high-tech business sector. The dominant position Microsoft has obtained since the introduction of its Windows operating system shows that setting a standard can offer huge profits for a single organization. must be deployable at very short notice in crisis-response operations. A network consists of nodes (entities) and links among them. tanker planes. act) and information. The NRF. Philips invested heavily in its V2000 VCR system. cruise missiles. The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the military response to the opportunities and threats coming along with the new information technologies. These standardiza- . not only the increased importance of international cooperation. In the most extreme case this force must be able to wage a campaign independently in a hostile arena for at least a month. Strategic bombers. because this stimulates a positive feedback movement. Linking battlespace entities together will greatly increase productivity by allowing us to get more use of our battlespace entities. the USA creates as it were the standard for modern military deployment (De Waard and De Man. as the pioneer of expeditionary deployment and NCW. For Europe this implies a drastic improvement of its military technological possibilities. However. Organizations have learned from the past and nowadays they team up in their search for standards. It offers firms more advantages to be linked to a larger network than a smaller one. In the early 1980s. precision ammunition. after all. consequently. but these assets are essential for modern operations exploiting the information advantage. The European defense industry. Nevertheless. NCW is built around the concept of sharing information and assets. military transport planes. however. Alberts et al. that is. a combined international force of about 20.186 E. Sony did the same with its minidisk technology. allowing them to work in concert to achieve synergistic effects.000 soldiers. resulting in a great diversity of technologies. Ten years later. reinforcing the stronger and weakening the weaker (Shapiro and Varian. or node.

The high-tech. a Dutch Labor Party MP and a member of the defense work group of the European Convention (Van Velzen and Stekete. Doz and Hamel (1998) speak of building up a sufficient degree of critical mass. the establishment of alliances to provide enough counterbalance against new powerful competitors and to secure one’s autonomy and business opportunities. • Modularity is a special form of design that intentionally creates a high degree of independence or “loose coupling” between component designs by standardizing component interface specifications (Sanchez and Mahoney. First of all.2 Definitions of modularity • Modularity is a general systems concept: it is a continuum describing the degree to which a system’s components can be separated and recombined. Bringing the cooperation to a higher level will not only narrow the technological gap with the USA. 2003). after setting a standard. In today’s world. It involves breaking up the system into discrete chunks that communicate with each other through standardized interfaces or rules and specifications. and to modernize Western armed forces. Moreover. 2004).2).Management and organization science 187 tion networks have two aims. organizations can obtain revenues from complementary products based on that standard (De Man. tailor-made formations that are formed by blending together modules from different arms. With Volberda’s flexibility model in mind. one could say that these strategic networking decisions have had major consequences for the organization of military forces. but will also make Europe less dependent on the USA in determining its own security policy. or in other words. Modularity So networking has become essential to counter current threats and risks. all this networking has dramatically changed the competitive environment. This trend is also known in the business world. • Modularity is a general set of design principles for managing the complexity of largescale interdependent systems. . Increasingly more European countries call for strengthening the European defense industry.” according to Frans Timmermans. and it refers both to the tightness of coupling between components and the degree to which the “rules” of the system architecture enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of components (Schilling. companies can make money. by licensing the technology that has been developed. we will incur an enormous technological backlog and cease to play any significant role in the world. Yet. entire networks have started rivaling each other instead. This trend of networks competing with one another shows many similarities with the rivalry between the USA and Europe concerning security issues. 1996). “If Europe does not begin to cooperate much more intensively within the coming ten to fifteen years. services and countries are based on the general principles of modularity (see Table 9. 2000). there is no longer a competition going on between single organizations. Table 9.

engineers. Soeters All these definitions stress the fact that modularity is about independent or autonomous subsystems functioning together. survivability and force protection. none of the sub-units could independently execute its task. The main element of this company-size unit consisted of three infantry platoons. This – very . the Dutch armed forces deployed their third rotation of troops in Afghanistan. light infantry. such as strategic lift. On the contrary. A subsystem can be seen as a black box with one common restriction. as the following example demonstrates. This formation was tailored for the mission and so the units came from different parts of the parent organization. This process is based on – as Baldwin and Clark (1997) prefer to call it – visible design rules and hidden design parameters. the units depended heavily on one another for their security and logistical support. air reconnaissance. The focus on these essential operational capabilities leads to multinational military formations that are functionally grouped. and what will be the number of participating modules? The second question particularly gets a lot of attention in military policies. each multinational crisis response unit is built on the following essential operational capabilities: timely force availability. As mentioned above. The hidden design parameters refer to the autonomy of a subsystem. air-to-air refueling. Furthermore. The situation was made even more complex by the fact that the Dutch unit was fitted into a German battle group. effective intelligence. In order to successfully execute a variety of tasks. military taskforces are built along national or functional lines. According to Kramer (2004). de Waard and J. visible design rules can be divided into three categories: architecture. they were therefore not used to working together. Architecture deals with questions like: what modules will be part of the system? What will their functions look like. According to Baldwin and Clark (1997: 86). and effective engagement. the subsystem is entirely free in its internal design as long as its output complies with the general rules or specifications of the overall system. this way of assembling may create problems if operational units are structurally dependent on other units. effective command control and communications. Imperfect or incomplete modularization will only show at the end of the process after the components have been connected. Each participating country offers one or more specific functional contributions. this is exactly what happens in everyday practice. Namely. interfaces and standards. In June 2002. However. etc. It is interesting to take a closer look at the modular characteristics of military forces and see how the three visible design rules work out in military practice. Complementing each other’s specific resources and competencies is the underlying principle of this functional grouping. deployability and mobility.188 E. logistics sustainability. The visible design rules deal with the process of integrating the autonomous units to a system that functions as a whole. The process of mixing and matching military units into a working system relies heavily on interfaces. It is best to determine the visible design rules at an early stage. an engineers unit and a medical group. because they form the backbone of the system’s overall performance. a logistical support platoon.

such as using the same caliber ammunitions. most of the time. this need has grown exponentially during the last decade when operations became more modular and multinational. procedural. doctrines. the participating members were still relatively autonomous. To counterbalance this lack of autonomy. creating autonomous organizational modules is. They are part of a larger military force and depend heavily on external command. 1967). such as a military taskforce. . procedures or equipment are used. two well-trained and experienced US Airforce F-15 fighter pilots shot down two US Army Black Hawk helicopters. interchangeability and commonality in the field of operational. After all. process or service to be used instead of another in order to meet the same need(s). However. procedures and designs in order to achieve and retain the desired levels of compatibility. technical and administrative capacities in the context of the pursuit of interoperability. Compatibility is defined as the usefulness of products. The third visible design rule mentioned by Baldwin and Clarke (1997) is standardization. So.Management and organization science 189 common – example shows that crisis response units generally do not comply with the principle of modularization. NATO defines standardization as: The development and introduction of concepts. processes or services for common use in specific circumstances in order to meet relevant needs without causing any unacceptable interactions. for example.2 During NATO’s early years. The use of liaison devices must help in accomplishing these connections. but failing integration can also cost lives. The continuation of a mission meant. The incident could even take place under the watchful eye of an AWACS aircraft controlling the airspace. the exception instead of common practice. killing all 26 people on board. Interchangeability is defined as the capability of a product. special attention needs to be paid to the collaboration of units. In the military. The accident makes painfully clear that lacking integration of resources and procedures can have dramatic consequences in a complex organization. This is not a new insight for Western armed forces. NATO has put a great deal of effort in to standardization processes. a detailed flight plan and up-to-date radio systems. the overall effectiveness of a military taskforce depends on the effective linkage of all the different contributions. Despite the use of prescribed rules. not only efficiency and effectiveness are at stake (Lawrence and Lorsch. Gradually cooperation increased and so did the need to standardize. types of fuel and operational procedures. control and support for the execution of their tasks. material. Snook (2000) emphasizes that this integration process is not as easy as it seems. Using standards helps loosely coupled modules to achieve synthesis when working together. Commonality is defined as the situation that has been achieved when the same doctrine. This all happened during Operation Provide Comfort in 1994 over Northern Iraq. Since its inception. and standardization was mainly focused on basic levels of compatibility. However. It became clear that being compatible alone was not enough.

technologies are becoming more complex. Organizations may be successful in mass production and sales. an example of which is the Swedish low-cost fashion retailer. 2001). Yet.190 E. The softer aspects of the organization also have to be taken into account. costly and risky. de Waard and J. organizations need to be equally skillful in seemingly contradictory abilities. becoming flexible through networking and a modular organizational design is not sufficient. Organizations can no longer afford to develop long-term strategies because today’s profitable insights will be tomorrow’s obsolete losses. But to be more competitive they will try to come up with niche-specialty branding. O’Reilly and Tushman.g. organizations were used to operating in one single – national. More specifically. Therefore. But times are changing. Some of these have already been mentioned in the previous section in relation to the motives for networking. Organizations need to move quickly to new opportunities (adapting). whereas an equally important capacity is alignment. institutional. However. 2004. while at the same time they feel urged to recruit new employees who will provide them with new knowledge and ideas. Those companies who are most successful in combining and balancing both competencies are most likely to survive the hyper-competition that is evolving in the global economy (He and Wong. But this is not the only set of contrasting demands organizations are facing today. weapon and information systems or staff elements had to be replaced by assets from another country without the loss of functionality. all kinds of political processes complicate this development enormously. but simultaneously they need to compete with the same organizations. organizations need to resize and reshape continuously (Knoke. products. albeit in different areas. 2004). Hennes and Moritz. to cope with these permanently changing conditions. The fact that modern military operations ask for servicemen and women with a flexible mindset will be discussed in more detail in the next section. belonging to one particular type of organizational configuration (Mintzberg. Soeters that certain units. Ambidexterity Until recently. technological – context in one particular way. technologies or elements in the value chain. mass vs batch production or production vs sales – like a football player who has a good right foot or a good left foot. Organizations nowadays may be forced to downsize their operational workforce. Organizations cannot evade collaboration with other organizations (as we saw before). the need for interchangeability and commonality as far-reaching forms of standardization is gaining ground rapidly in modern military operations. and high demands on the organization are following each other at an increasingly faster pace. 1979). a clear sense of creating and delivering value in the short term. asking top designers like Karl . Organizations used to be good at one particular process – e. while simultaneously developing tomorrow’s strategy and innovations (exploration). They need to execute today’s operations and practices (exploitation). As a consequence. Markets are expanding rapidly.

Since the use of violence is an everdecreasing part of the military’s job. which implies that their roles and tasks are relatively flexible. and they especially need to build linkages to the local people in the area of operation and to other actors operating in the area. However. is how they can (learn to) do that. two types of ambidexterity are distinguished: structural and contextual. The question. Contextual ambidexterity.Management and organization science 191 Lagerfeld and Stella McCartney to craft a collection for their retail stores. and they themselves need to have a relatively generalist attitude. roles and tasks are well-defined and the coordination of the organization’s activities takes place at the strategic apex. . These employees see their activities coordinated by people on the front line. specialization is enhanced. As a consequence. on the contrary. humanitarian relief) challenge the military in more ways than one: no longer can commanders pay exclusive attention to the cohesion in their own unit. 2004). 2000). military from other nations). organizations nowadays need to be ambidextrous: good at dealing with seemingly contradictory demands at the same time. But how does all this relate to the military? The military also faces seemingly contradictory demands. the military also need to obtain combinative capabilities in order to become ambidextrous. and football players who try to develop their “weak” foot. In the management and organization literature (Birkinshaw and Gibson.g. however. They need to be ready for action. They need to be equally skillful in contradictory demands. Nowadays. however. In today’s operations. violent action if need be. the military also need to bridge to other people outside the unit but inside the mission (e. implies that individual employees divide their time between alignment-focused and adaptability-focused activities. they should be prepared to shift from talking to shooting in a matter of seconds. A Dutch unit experienced this very clearly in Iraq in August 2004. such as NGOs. which they have to cope with simultaneously. Traditionally. Organizations relying on structural ambidexterity tend to separate units or teams for either alignment (exploitation) or adaptation (exploration). This clearly has always been a form of ambidexterity. These new tasks (civil– military cooperation. Like piano players and percussionists who need to be equally skillful with their right and left hand. In fact. In this way. which traditionally was their main concern. like today’s business firms. At the same time they are requested to hold their fire when they operate in peacekeeping missions in which talking to the people is more important than shooting at them. the military should be prepared for all sorts of other tasks that society has put on their shoulders. These two “solutions” may be helpful guidelines for the military to solve the problems coming along with the contradictory demands made upon them. the military have to cope with many more contrasting demands in the fields of operations. when they were ambushed by 50 to 100 warriors and were forced to immediately change their usual friendly attitude into real fighting and firing. the military – like other uniformed organizations – was used to balance the cold side of their organization during peace conditions and the hot side of their organization during action (Soeters. this internal concern remains important.

violence is not in the air at all. They should do so in their training programs as well as in their decision-making processes concerning who will be promoted to the higher ranks. other actors. This assumption will be violated over and over again. And. They need to have a broad view of their work. these strategies are in an early stage of their development. terrorist hunting and other activities that imply the use of violence and b) units that concentrate on peacekeeping. this option has some serious limitations. nation-building and humanitarian relief. one would have Special Forces on the one hand and peacekeeping forces on the other. The very essence of the military’s job is their competence in the control and the use of force. As is also shown in the previous sections. Hence. Soeters Structural ambidexterity would imply specialization between a) units that focus on war fighting. they have to be comfortable wearing more than one hat. if needed. and embedding them firmly in the military organization still . if needed. Conclusions and avenues for future research Although choosing the path of flexibility is inevitable.192 E. flexibility is the keyword in improving today’s ambidextrous. whereas the British troops would focus on special operations. Although this type of (international) specialization will undoubtedly occur to some degree in the near future. being alert to opportunities and challenges beyond the confines of their own jobs. Every unit would be dedicated to specific tasks and all units would be separated from each other. However. the military should explicitly start paying attention to these features. as experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate every day. Besides. the military in particular. Specialization decreases the flexibility of the operational resources. Cimic (civil–military cooperation) activities. To make sure that commanders at all levels obtain such a broad view of their work. military performance. the concepts that have been discussed show that this choice has major organizational consequences. Another option in this line of thinking is international specialization. which – as we saw before – is an important feature in today’s organizations. de Waard and J. they need to act like brokers. Contextual ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gibson. In this way. Networking and adding new ways of operating to the traditional military portfolio seem quite understandable. need to be generalists. If. like NGOs or local authorities. always looking to build internal and external linkages and. can do a much better job. structural ambidexterity seems to be less applicable than contextual ambidexterity in today’s military. especially commanders at all levels. 2004) emphasizes that military personnel. Only the “ambiapt” commanders should arrive at the organization’s top. in a certain situation. allowing for instance the Dutch to concentrate their resources on logistics and Cimic. perhaps most of all. because they are the ones who can shift and display the mental flexibility that is needed so much in today’s military. they need to be able to immediately switch from communicating and negotiating to the actual use of violence. this option assumes that operational conditions are either suited for Special Forces or for peace soldiers. both in training and operations.

1989. technical failures. Normal accident theory (Perrow. Weick and Roberts. successful integration determines to a large extent the operational flexibility of a taskforce in the field. 2000). such as the Challenger disaster (Vaughan. innovative and compatible. the tension between assembly flexibility and operational flexibility requires further attention. 1993. 1993). Sagan. 1989. and a lot of countries do not have the financial means for this. However. Yet. Furthermore. Despite these considerations. 1993. But this national thinking is probably counterproductive. working in projects and teams. because experiences from the business sector have demonstrated that it is possible for companies to be independent and . can help to explain the reasons for bad integration. neglected safety procedures. The units deployed to crisis areas resemble project organizations. With the introduction of NCW. Critical accidents. international institutions and local politicians. To support this process. In a military context we also see a growing need for cooperating with a variety of external partners. such as armed forces from partnering countries. 1987. 1991. 1990.. Roberts. However. In this respect collaborating with external partners. just like in the business world. By analyzing these accidents and understanding why mistakes such as failed joint cooperation. LaPorte et al. The armed forces can learn from these business experiences. the new ways of organizing have to cascade down to the units operating in the actual area of operations. developing common. the integration of these different functional and national contributions into a system that works as a whole is not so self-evident. group failures and human error happen. 1993) and theory on highreliability organizations are useful starting points in this respect (Weick. non-governmental organizations.Management and organization science 193 leaves room for improvement. we can learn to improve the process of interrelating organizational elements. technology will play an increasingly important role in modern military deployment. 1984. 1996) and cases of friendly fire (Snook. industrial collaboration may be deemed the best way to keep military technology affordable. because the forces deployed are frequently of battalion or smaller size. The assembly process of military taskforces is based on differentiation along functional and national lines. Many multinationals in the business sector have struggled to change from vertically oriented bureaucracies to more horizontally oriented organizations. LaPorte and Consolini. Let us start with the organizational structure of the armed forces in general. Business cases can help military organizations in adjusting to these changing circumstances by overcoming their traditional design based on far-reaching functional concentration and hierarchical control. Every single mission is conceived as a project and specific assessments are made with respect to the number of troops and the functions needed. innovative technologies and equipment is expensive. many countries do not want to give up on their national autonomy and they only want to cooperate with others if this is clearly in their own interest. Second. Adjusting the focus and structure of the parent organization can have a positive influence on the deployment of troops. existing business research offers a lot of leads. Therefore. and delegating authorities to frontline managers are examples of successful strategies.

In contrast to the business sector. However. Here the hurdles to outsource core functions such as R&D. Do we need heavy armored tanks and artillery pieces given our expeditionary strategy? Why do we concentrate on all tasks in the military spectrum and not only on the ones we are really good at. Slowly the armed forces are being stripped down entirely and even the core organizational elements are not spared. Contracting out mess facilities. organizations are changing the way they think about their organizations. they realize that these developments do have implications for their own organizations. Furthermore. armed forces have a tendency to cling to their past and keep tight control over all their assets. It is no longer useful for a company to own all its strategic sources. such as logistics and engineering. However. 2000). such as peacekeeping and humanitarian aid? Is it wise to cover the entire military value chain nationally or is it better to specialize in one or two aspects. another way to keep modern high-tech armed forces flexible and affordable is through well-considered outsourcing strategies. outsourcing so far has not been used very often as a strategic tool. top officials in defense departments and Headquarters often lack the power. The motto seems to be: concentrate on your core capabilities and leave the rest to specialized companies. most of the time. de Waard and J. 2005). As this “knowledge-doing-gap” has also been observed in the business world. this is another example of where the military could profit from insights that have been developed in civilian organization studies (Pfeffer and Sutton. it has fulfilled its objectives. it has been used more frequently as an instrument to counter financial cutbacks and reductions. .194 E. If this chapter has contributed in demonstrating the relevance of management and organization science for improving today’s military performance. avoided. fundamental questions need to be answered. The problem. To turn the tide. the threat of further budget cuts renders this strategy very dangerous. So it would be wise to look deeper into this evidence from the business sector and see what these experiences can contribute to the development of the global defense industry and the organizational set-up of military deployments.. and leave the rest to other countries? Only after such questions have been answered properly can well-considered investment and divestment decisions be made. more fundamental choices are. endurance and wisdom to turn knowledge into action. When it comes to these fundamental choices. manufacturing and marketing have already been taken. Soeters at the same time be more innovative and profitable as a consequence of collaborating with others. However. their value chains and their competitive positions. the business world is again way ahead of the military community. Yet. in fact. In their search for flexibility. however. security services and ICT services is quite safe because they do not touch the core of the military organizations. is not that military decision-makers and commanders are unaware of these developments in the business sector. Business experiences with strategic outsourcing can help the armed forces in this process (Gottfredson et al.

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what would be the role of the military in the post-Cold-War era. For their part.” The main goal of the conference was to offer an informed answer to the stringent policy questions on “who should guard the guards” of the former communist countries. a “ground-breaking” conference on “Civil–Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy. civilians must respect the military’s special role in society. and what patterns of civil–military relations should be implemented. He presented a rather optimistic view on the chances of success for building healthy democratic civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. In his concluding remarks. in March 1995. The main factors. was invited as a keynote speaker to the conference. Marshall Center for European Security Studies co-sponsored. the interest of both military and civilians for such control. jointly with the National Endowment for Democracy. Joseph Nye. (Nye. and must educate themselves so they can interact positively with the military. 1995: 14) . The military must recognize that it is accountable to the rule of law. one of the “founding fathers” of civil–military relations theory. it must remain nonpartisan and respect civilian authority. the George C. identified by Huntington. must provide adequate funding for appropriate military roles and missions. considering the lessons learned from “the third wave” of democratization in Latin America and South Europe (Huntington. as guarantors of a successful transition were related to the growing acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civilian control. 1995: 17). tried to answer the questions and elaborated some policy recommendations.10 The military in post-communist societies in transition Marian Zulean Introduction Ten years ago. Samuel P. then the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security. basically drawn from the Huntington’s theoretical model of “objective civilian control”: The proper response is the liberal “bargain” which defines specific rights and responsibilities for both the military and civilian leadership. and the low political and social cost comparative with high benefits for society. Huntington.

had an interdisciplinary approach. However. there is a double knowledge gap: at the academic level. 2005). as the “East European bloc” is very rich. Bush. except for some “taking stock” papers and the results of some interdisciplinary research on civil–military relations. tailored to the needs of any region around the globe.” Although extensive. both national policy-makers and international institutions that offered assistance for democratization. such as military sociology. Some of the research projects. there is no universal knowledge on democratic state-building and the role of the military in that process. the engagement of the West to promote democracy at the global level. there is a need for a tailored model of civil–military relations. That raises the question of any lesson learned from the success stories of East European transitions to democracy and building democratic civil–military relations.1 In fact. geopolitics. the Partnership for Peace (PfP). at the policy level. under the title “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” (Ghebali. international relations or “transitology. The PfP Framework Document already required that partners should establish democratic control of their armed forces. the issue of democratic control of armed forces in Europe came as a pressing issue on the agenda of policymakers immediately after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. at most. Military and societies in transition were at the center of research in many academic disciplines. then. particularly the US policy. Soon after (September 1995). the problem of the militaries in relations with parent societies in transition to democracy became an important issue on the agenda of stakeholders. there are quite a few evaluations or synthesis of knowledge acquired from the study of the military in East European transition. in a special document for the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later OSCE). In conclusion. Therefore. political science. George W. multi-disciplinary approach. to be in charge of defense-related cooperation between NATO and partner countries. As the US President. That was codified. declared “graduates” and become NATO members. while. After 15 . while some others are in the waiting room. What is the universal knowledge concerning civil– military relations drawn from East European experience? What is the contribution of the major social science disciplines or interdisciplinary studies in explaining the process? These are the main questions this study would like to answer. recently put it at the swearing-in ceremony for his second term of office: “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” but “America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling” (White House.198 Marian Zulean Those conclusions were important for the policy-makers who had created some months earlier an institution. By now. became more evident. The social science literature that focused on transition of what was seen. 2003). NATO’s Study on NATO Enlargement established more detailed conditions on civil–military relations for the countries willing to join NATO. ten former communist countries have been evaluated with regard to their implementation of the Western pattern of civil–military relations. in 1994. carried out in the late 1990s. the literature has rather a mono-disciplinary or. Today.

what kind of fresh knowledge could this chapter bring? On the other hand. However. Schiff and Forester). political geography. the “post-communism” concept was studied by “transitology. Starting from the needs presented above. If “the military” is the main subject in military sociology. from a legalistic or a traditional institutionalist view.” Each term of the proposition is a basic subject of a specific discipline. the ontological subject of the study is “the military in post-communist societies in transition. Even though the implementation of the liberal pattern in Eastern Europe was evaluated as being successful. political science. so as to clarify what the knowledge gap is and how the research goals will be met. However.” a branch of political science. An additional criticism is related to the misunderstanding of the policy transfer. Thus. While the concept of “society” is the main subject of sociology. produced by many disciplines. Burk. will explain the complex phenomenon. transitology. international relations or Sovietology. Sovietology. However it is necessary to present the logic of research and methodology in detail. and there are a lot of studies that describe civil–military relations. Nelson. dismiss the conspiracy theories and escape from the ethnocentric views. none of them succeeded in making a fundamental criticism as in proposing a revolutionary paradigm change. a complex synthesis of the acquired knowledge is not only possible. and all hybrid or interdisciplinary studies on . the work of Feaver. Some people consider that the implementation of Huntington’s liberal model has been a success in the majority of East European countries. The following part of the study will review and analyze the knowledge produced by military sociology. this study intends to analyze both theoretical and empirical studies related to the military in the post-communist countries in transition. taking the form of a new theory. all these concepts were parts of a broader “civil–military relations” paradigm. So. The “imperial” thinking on transferring a Western pattern of civil–military relations without a cultural and social understanding of the recipient country is often criticized. The interpretation of the literature will deepen the understanding of the knowledge produced by disciplines on the military in post-communist transitions. the question of how institutions work in practice in Eastern Europe or the possibility of successfully transferring a similar pattern to new circumstances still needs to be questioned. in particular. but also necessary.The military in societies in transition 199 years of studying the civil–military relations in transition societies. there is a growing dissatisfaction among academics related to the application of Huntington–Janowitz’s basic works in contemporary practice (see. geopolitics. The method employed for argumentation is the critical review and interpretation of written literature. “East Europe” could be considered a common concept for geopolitics. The logic of the research The first part of this chapter presented the basic rationale of the research and the grand tour questions.

political control. its conclusions are valid as a starting point for any research of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. professionalization. Among the disciplines. restructuring and downsizing military organizations. Bengt Abrahamson.2 Although Huntington’s study was written in 1957. so that his book is considered as a basic tool by both military sociologists and political scientists. institutionalism. Huntington in 1957. William Odom or Dale Herspring. military sociology. Eric Nordlinger. have studied the Soviet pattern. The official framework in political science for the study of civil–military relations was the Research Committee 24 under the International Political Science Association aegis. a systematic theory of the relations between military and society began to emerge only after World War II. Alfred Stepan or Constantine Danopoulos. new missions and military culture (Caforio. written by Samuel P. power. but on their basic concepts and methods employed or that could be employed in a more complex research: civil–military relations. globalization or path-dependency. the main topics being related to social change. such as Roman Kolkowitz. the most important topic that became heavily debated and researched in both political science and military sociology is the broader relation between the armed forces and the state or the parent society – “civil–military relations. space. 2003). Timothy Colton. Political scientists. institution vs occupation The military was an important subject of study for the core social sciences. However. . military organization.” The term “civil–military relations” became popular through the seminal work The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations. Military sociology. particularly American military sociology. The interaction of these forces represents the nub of the problems of civil–military relations. such as Amos Perlmutter. political science and interdisciplinary studies: civil–military relations. However. within the Cold War context. A recently published Handbook of the Sociology of the Military presents a rather comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach of the studies about the military. Although Professor Huntington was mostly connected with the political science departments of Harvard University. One of the main theses of Huntington’s work is the identification of two forces that shape military institutions in every society: “a functional imperative which depends on the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative coming from dominant social forces. ideologies and institutions in society” (Huntington. especially in Latin America or Southern Europe while others. continued the study of civil–military relations. some of his concepts were borrowed from and related to sociology. particularly as it was presented as an ideal-type model for the transition of the former communist countries. professionalization. produced the most complex knowledge to help to understand the role of the military in a democratic society. 1957: 2). The focus would be not on disciplines themselves.200 Marian Zulean civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. such as political science or sociology.

Concerning the issue of civil–military relations. status. Morris Janowitz is considered as the “founding father” of military sociology (Burk. either under the aegis of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) “Armed Forces and Society” or the Research Committee 01 on “Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution” of the International Sociological Association. James Burk’s is the most complex and complete (Burk. Eastern Europe became a “laboratory” of quasi-experiments. and the theory of their concordance (Schiff. society and army missions led to an increasingly politicized role for professional soldiers. In Europe the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) was set up. 2003: 24–6). Burk also gives a brief presentation of the main efforts of political scientists to revolutionize the Huntington–Janowitz paradigm. part of the wider social science framework that focused on the armed forces or the military (Callaghan and Kernic. as Callaghan and Kernic put it. particularly the civic virtue of citizen– soldier. In this respect. in a crisis. Therefore. military sociology is the main scientific endeavor. or the competition for resources and influence. The demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the bipolar world found the branches of both political science and military sociology. In this respect. Still. The fact that the military must sustain and protect democratic values are important flaws in the effort to promote the civil–military paradigm elsewhere (Burk. motivations. The two viewpoints left behind a two-headed legacy within the paradigm of civil–military relations. The Janowitz book. the supremacy of civilians could be achieved through “inter-arms” competition. they were rather “tribes” pursuing research within their own paradigms. he developed a partially opposite perspective to that of Huntington’s.The military in societies in transition 201 On the other hand. 1993). there was a push from inside the mainstream of the CMR paradigm to criticize the liberal pattern as a model applicable elsewhere. 2002: 14–15). lifestyles. 2003: 14). with the military profession following the social and political changes of society as a whole. The Professional Soldier (1960). Thus he notes that the changes occurring at the level of technology. offering opportunities for further research. a group pursued more cross-national and interdisciplinary research (Caforio. 1995). pointing . prestige and other characteristics. Sociological studies dealing with civil–military relations continued to develop after the 1960s. Some of their members shared common interests and published in the journals Armed Forces and Society or Journal of Political and Military Sociology but it can be assessed that there were not many interactions between the academic fields. Janowitz considers that military institutions are convergent with civil society. 2002: 12). He considers that the liberal theory underwriting Huntington’s work is primarily concerned with protecting democratic values against external threats while the civic republican theory underwriting Janowitz’s work is primarily concerned with sustaining democratic values. Among the criticisms. First of all. interested in armed forces and societies. the theory of divergence of the civilian and military spheres. taking into account data on soldiers’ social origins. offers a detailed empirical study of the American professional soldier during the twentieth century.

The first endeavor worth mentioning is a collection of case studies. edited by Anton Bebler (Bebler. 1997). what is important is the conclusion that even though Huntington’s model set up similar hopes. there was another push offered by the opportunity to test theories and bring fresh knowledge from the experience of East European transitions to the general theory. democratization and professionalization). 1996. James Gow and Anton Bebler. generalizations or theories to understand the relations of the military with its East European parent society. departyization. initiated by political scientists. after the majority of the East European countries had joined the Partnership for Peace and the OSCE had launched its “Code of Conduct” (1994). departyization is closely related with de-communization (getting rid of the Communist Party chain of control within the army) and discouraging the armed forces to serve the interests of a particular party. Approaching the year 2000 and beyond. Peter Feaver (principal–agent model) and Deborah Avant (private military). In a later paper. Danopoulos and Zirker explain the diverging outcomes through a powerful variable: variance of religion (Danopoulos and Zirker. They found four complementary processes of transition: depoliticization. The first part of the book provides a backdrop for analyzing Eastern European countries. Some important interdisciplinary studies appeared in the late 1990s. The explanation seems rather reductionist. However it is a hypothesis that should be tested further. while the second part presents the case studies. However. they were mentioned to underline that a flawed theoretical model which worked for a mature democratic state was imposed on the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. Democratization of civil–military relations and professionalization are processes closely related with the implementation of Huntington’s liberal model in Eastern Europe. democratization and professionalization. Ronald Linden.202 Marian Zulean out the contributions of Michael Desch (structural–cultural model). the outcomes were rather divergent and they begin to explain the phenomenon. There were some early studies. one may find an increasing number of research projects and individual studies of civil–military relations in Eastern . Although the books provide rather descriptive presentations of a country’s transitions. Both volumes describe the common features of postcommunist regimes across the Eurasian area. Second. While depoliticization means keeping the militaries out of politics. The second useful citation is a set of two books. 2002). based on the late Huntington paradigm of the clash of civilizations. either on one particular issue of civil–military relations or as a case study. Constantine Danopoulos. But here is not the place to develop them. edited by Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (Danopoulos and Zirker. 1999). A review of the main empirical studies might offer better inductive knowledge. written in the 1990s by Daniel Nelson. departyization. but they had a narrow focus. either initiated by military sociologists or political scientists. following the four processes identified by Danopoulos and Zirker (depoliticization. the issue of civil–military relations ranked high on the agenda of both policymakers and academics.

The second is a book. Czech Republic. On the policy level. the authors analyze some specific aspects of civil–military transitions. The main findings are related to the emergence of common features and some differences in transition. Hungary. then the special adviser of NATO’s Secretary General. Among the common features shared by all the countries are: a massive decline of funding and recruitment. comprising more complex interdisciplinary research based on a common analytical framework.The military in societies in transition 203 Europe. Czech Republic. The basic differences are related to the exercise of civilian authority within the government structures and the progress made toward a democratic civil–military pattern. The first is a collection of case studies. published by the journal Armed Forces and Society (Jones and Mychajlyszyn. Poland. Alternative terms. Ukraine. Although the study failed to focus broadly on the larger context of transition. another collection of empirical studies. it is an important starting point for a comparative survey of civil–military relations in the post-communist world. Slovakia. One of the reasons for the troubles with CMR is due to an underestimation of the complexity of the issue. lack of civilians expertise in defense and the lack of important involvement of military officers in politics. written by political scientists or practitioners on Russia. set the goals for the research (the need for a fresh analysis. an introductory chapter. 2002: 383) that describes the evolution of civil–military relations in eight post-communist states (Russia. Hungary. In it. in-depth evaluation of CMR and offering an impetus for educating people on CMR). Some recommendations were important outputs of the research. Another recommendation is that the civilian leadership should decide what kind of army they want. Another reason is the misunderstanding on the existence of a unique model of CMR in the West. The conclusions of the study explain the main causes of common issues in the post-communist states. written by Chris Donnelly. 2001). moreover. many Western countries face difficult issues of military reform (Betz and Lowenhardt. Ukraine. two of them purely empirical studies and. another two. offer recommendations to get the CMR right in practice and for a research agenda. such as “civil control” or “political control. when they tried to re-define the CMR paradigm. As a result. but none was satisfactory. This time. Donnelly concludes that there is not a single Central and East European country with a satisfactory CMR.” “civilian management” came up. Bulgaria and a regional SEE study (Betz and Lowenhardt. the practice of CMR became more shallow than substantive. the CMR has not been understood properly by scholars and policy-makers from both Eastern and Western Europe (the main issue of CMR is that armed forces must be effective and effectively managed). There are four studies worth mentioning. the establishment of a correct legal basis for democratic control is considered important. or the basic structure for the armed forces. Romania and Bulgaria). The confusion had existed from the very beginning. 2001: 9). it was demonstrated that the old CMR theory was misleading and the new research should no longer focus on civilian control but on proper civilian . On the research agenda. but much more important is the system to be enacted. Moreover.

with the results published later by Jurgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan. Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. Thus a complex set of factors that could explain the CMR transition in the specific countries. it appears that a common-risk society is indeed emerging in Europe. Each volume combines complex analytical frameworks and descriptive case-study chapters. in-depth explanation and prediction. However. economic and social) and weight of history. Another finding of the research is that. from the Atlantic to Vladivostok. as well as exploring the idea of a “common-risk society.204 Marian Zulean management of the army. were grouped as such: international context. The first important interdisciplinary project was carried out in 1998. and the Russian Federation). Although the findings are not definitive..” The study is important. Although these two studies brought together researchers and practitioners from other disciplines to discuss and carry out research. the phenomena of moving from the hard to soft security concerns. with many similarities in building new missions for armed forces. by the year 2000. This comparative study brought together both Western and Eastern European analysts and investigated whether a common security landscape (in Karl Deutsch’s terms) is developing in Europe. they were rather multidisciplinary approaches. while the conclusions summarize the findings. both for theory and for the practice of CMR. three social scientists from different disciplines came together with the research coordinators and set up a complex theoretical framework that helped not only the description of case studies but also to set up the indicators for crossnational comparisons. the second deals with the professionalization of armed forces while the third one has a broader approach on the relations between the military and their post-communist societies. The main findings are rich. cultural. Central and Southeast Europe. so the research should focus on a better-defined cluster of states.. democratically elected government. and set up a common analytical framework. It explores emerging patterns of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe and implications for a more general understanding of the changing nature of civil–military relations in the contemporary world (Cottey et al. 2002a. b). and was coordinated by Andrew Cottey. 2002a). along with findings on lessons learned and general trends. Among the similarities. each focused on an important aspect of civil–military relations. the authors . two more complex interdisciplinary studies are worth mentioning because they put together concepts and methodology. Thus. In the first volume (Cottey et al. national domestic context (political. but with different layers (Western. The latest and more complex interdisciplinary research project focused on the transformation of civil–military relations in a comparative context. decline of mass armies and importance of flexible forces are the most important.3 Among the products of the project are three books. the term “post-communist states” is outdated. not only for the findings but also for methodology. The first book focused on the issue of democratic control of the military. by defining democratic control as political control by a legitimate.

external influence. In transition from the regime defense and decline of national security role. (Forester.. Among the factors that explain the variation are: legitimacy and progress to democratization. revealed. efforts to integrate with the West and structural factors (traditions and state capacity). missions (territorial defense. 2002b) explain the process of building professional armed forces by changing the roles. the dominance of analytical realism is being challenged by the new developments in our knowledge. Anthony Forester. there is a shift away from conscription and the role of the military as nation-builder. the ghettoisation of CMR is under serious challenge from outside the traditional field of “old” CMR as scholars anchored in different fields of inquiry have engaged in analysis of many issues ..The military in societies in transition 205 succeeded in identifying a variation in the extent of democratic control across the post-communist world: a successful group of countries. nation-builder. the authors successfully summarize the main findings of such a complex project (Cottey et al. 2003) define armed forces–society relations in terms of importance and legitimacy of five possible roles: territorial defense. 2002: 7) . 2005: 12–15). The last volume (Cottey et al. it may be assessed that we experience a global democratic revolution and a trend away from praetorianism. 2005). In a very recent issue of the European Security journal. Forester claims that: This epistemological challenge to the field of “old” civil–military relations can be summarized by three propositions: first the atheoretical approach of “old” civil–military relations is now seriously being questioned by the greater theoretical rigour in the Social Sciences.]. Second. with a Westernized and consolidated pattern of the countries admitted or candidates to NATO membership. .. neutral or combination) and system of education. there is a need for further study on political economy’s influence on CMR and the impact of economics on security policy (Cottey et al. one of the authors. in a separate paper. Thus. There are also interesting lessons learned from the East European transition for the study of civil–military relations in general. social changes and changes in military technology and strategy. regime defense. The second volume (Cottey et al. and Russia. Ukraine and former Soviet states as a semi-authoritarian pattern. They claim that the relative homogeneity of communist CMR has been replaced by a significant diversity across the region. Third. second. third.. domestic assistance and military diplomacy. . the countries differ but mostly overlap the clusters found in the democratic-control-issue book. . especially from post-positivist theoretical approaches and the normative turn in International Relations rooted in constructivism [. power projection. and another two clusters (one cluster containing Russia and Ukraine with the former Yugoslav states in the other). the main epistemological shortcomings of CMR theory. Also as an outcome of the same research project. basically the admitted and candidate countries to NATO membership. . The main drivers of change were the collapse of communism.

The complex interdisciplinary research of Cottey et al. transitology and democratic consolidation: pathdependency Huntington’s theory of civil–military relations was based on the assumption that the social imperatives were constant (particularly in US history) and only the external threats alone could explain the evolution of civil–military relations. Moreover. would evaluate their importance and would recommend their incorporation in a more complex interdisciplinary or transdiciplinary approach. it can be assessed that military sociology and political science were the main disciplines that tried to explain the evolution of civil–military relations in post-communist Europe.206 Marian Zulean From the papers. democratization and professionalization. setting up the legislative and constitutional basis as a first step in making the military more accountable is important. This was not a powerful argument to explain the complex transition in Eastern Europe. departyization. Equally important are observed the differences and epistemological shortcomings that help us to better understand the transition. based on Huntington–Janowitz paradigms. 2002: 383). went beyond the common description of transitions and tried to clarify are the main factors that explain the success or failure of transition. Moreover. the need for more theoretical rigor. What is the general knowledge from the transition of East European civil–military relations? There were not only similar goals or similar ideal–types set up. were useful for both understanding the process. a recent . Thus. a lack of civilian expertise in defense and the lack of important involvement of military officers in politics are similar experiences in Eastern Europe (Jones and Mychajlyszyn. designing institutions and evaluating the progresses. The study would further explore the knowledge produced by other disciplines that were marginalized. the need for post-positivist approaches and need for interdisciplinarity. Also. importance of flexible forces and an emerging common security landscape. Similar common processes were brought up by the interdisciplinary study coordinated by Callaghan and Kuhlmann: moving from the hard to soft security concerns. as Danopoulos and Zirker demonstrated. decline of mass armies. conscription and changing the role of the military as nation-builder. Thus the main epistemological shortcomings are related to the misunderstanding of the complexity of the CMR issue. where social imperatives (ideologies and institutions). all the countries experienced the processes of depoliticization. but also some similar processes. with serious influences upon the configurations specific to civil–military relations. but more important is how to enact the system. as Chris Donnelly put it. The interdisciplinary studies of civil–military relations. are characterized by a dynamic change. Sovietology. but in different degrees. the importance of the “weight of history” variable. a principal observation for the successful transition was a shift away from praetorianism. books and research project presented above. Thus. a massive decline in funding and recruitment. as defined by Huntington.

dismissed Colton and Odom’s approaches for the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. Even before 1990. Therefore it is necessary to explain the origin of the variance among the East European transitions. three authors are relevant for this study.4 In Kolkowitz’s opinion (1967). which was largely used by the subfield of political science. The path-dependency theory could also explain the diversification of patterns within what was considered a relatively unitary “Eastern bloc. accepting the idea of some occasional conflicts between the army and the political leadership. Colton (1990: 3–44) has a different vision. Colton and William Odom. One can see that there was no consensus among the Sovietologists on assessing the communist CMR (there was not such a unique CMR model). In his view. Roman Kolkowitz. the pattern of civil–military relations in the communist countries was a conflictual one. because the Communist Party’s policy was consistent with the interests and to the advantage of the officers. Timothy J. not static like Huntington’s. by the former school of “Sovietology” that can be exploited to explain the role of legacy (what Callaghan and Kuhlmann called the “weight of history”).The military in societies in transition 207 study pointed out the role of the “weight of history” variable in explaining the dynamic process of building a democratic CMR (Callaghan and Kuhlmann. There is a plentiful literature. The single party tries to counterbalance this intention through the establishment of some mechanisms of control and indoctrination of the military.” Scholars of pathdependency focus on the legacy of prior regimes as a constraining factor in explaining the transition process. an additional explanatory model.” But the CMR studies after 1990 did not consider it explicitly. William Odom (1978) conceives a consensual pattern of civil–military relations in communist countries. 2000). for example. that describes the communist pattern(s) of civil–military relations during the Cold War. which has many similarities with the Western one. the army was an administrative arm of the Communist Party.” but rejects Kolkowitz’s idea that the party would need to control the military. That legacy could have created difficulties and challenges to democratic consolidation. Among the studies. Thus. Thus. the soldiers being constantly tempted to intervene in politics. there being rather more union than division between the two. produced prior to 1990. discovering a so-called participative pattern. he maintains the “(Communist) Party versus military dichotomy. He correctly predicted that “If Soviet leaders were to reduce their commitment to maintaining . explain the influence of prior heritage on the tracks of transitions and expand the focus of description and explanation to states and regions. but a dynamic one could bring an additional understanding of transition. That method is provided by the path-dependency theory. despite the fact that there is a large amount of knowledge. Mark Kramer. some Sovietologists considered that Huntington’s model does not apply to communist states. as Odom considers. called “transitology/consolidology. The military’s inclination toward conservatism makes the army a natural ally of the single party.

For example. British. variations of transitions among what was seen as a unitary bloc – Eastern Europe. So the knowledge produced by “democratic consolidation” theory on East European cases can enrich and help to re-interpret the previous transitions in South Europe and Latin America. if one agrees with the demonstration. is irrelevant in explaining the CMR in former Soviet or communist East European countries. civil–military relations might change dramatically” (Kramer. French and German experiences. Even though Herspring’s demonstration needs more evidence and arguments. a search for the word “military” using the EBSCO database (accessed in June 2005) in one of the main journals for transition studies. 1994. 1995). 1992) and the dismissal of Sovietologists for the sin of not predicting the fall of communism. it can be concluded that Huntington’s model “presented” to the Marshall Center conference in 1995 was based on a flawed assumption. that “civilian control” of the military should be the focus of reform. He bases his demonstration on some empirical data from the USSR and East Germany. there was a theoretical vacuum when it came to explaining transitions and. the political commissar was transformed into a political officer.208 Marian Zulean political and military hegemony in Eastern Europe. only one of them referring to “civil–military relations. particularly. After the triumph of “the end of history” paradigm (Fukuyama. authors such as Valerie Bunce and Phillipe Schmitter debated the relevance of literature produced by studying South European experiences within the sub-fields of “transitology and consolidology” to explain the transitions in Eastern Europe (Schmitter and Lynn. when the military enjoyed considerable autonomy. into an objective one (Herspring.” This offers an argument for the necessity of borrowing concepts. Thus. 1985: 45–66). demonstrates that Huntington’s paradigm. The vacuum was immediately filled by the sub-fields of “transitology/consolidology” or by democratic consolidation theory. it is important that it proved the irrelevance of Huntington’s model for Eastern Europe as a whole and the fact that East Europe was not a unitary “bloc. offered only six hits. in the 1980s. particularly his dichotomization of civil and military spheres. 1999: 573). In a recent paper. methods or knowledge by the researchers of other disciplines. Bunce.5 Thus Herspring considers that Huntington’s model was drawn from US. Thus. . and that Soviet experience proved how a subjective control model can be transformed. but it is also flawed and outdated to comprehend even Southern Europe transitions themselves. The consensus of area experts is not only that the transitology/consolidology model produced by South European and Latin American experience of limited use to comprehend East European transitions. As far as the importance of knowledge produced by transitology/consolidology as branches of political science. but not later. there were longer debates and tensions within the political science discipline. an exponent of the former Soviet studies. East European Politics and Society.” Another shortcoming of CMR theory was related to its narrow approach and its dismissal of the broader theories of democratization. CMR studies and “transitology” ignored each other. over time. Dale Herspring. It was perhaps applicable in the early years of USSR.

the path-dependency methodology is a very useful tool that could be integrated by the scholars that study civil–military relations. due first to the power of some scholars in geopolitics to influence political decisions. power and geography. the contribution from this area in describing or explaining the civil–military relations in Eastern Europe was rather marginal. is shadowed by the absence of testable hypotheses and operationalizing variables. but directly influenced political decisions. In her conclusions she recommends regional and cross-regional studies in order to bring additional further arguments for understanding democratization as a global process (Bunce. Even Valerie Bunce. are basic conditions to evaluate consolidated democracies and essential components of a democratic system. Concepts such as “containment. there is a broader knowledge produced by the democratic consolidation theory or by the “transitologists/consolidologists. agreed that the interacting arenas. corroborated with the popularity of . promoted by George Kennan. in a very recent paper. 2003: 192). international relations: space. there was a consensus that a democratic consolidation paradigm develops (Linz and Stepan. such as international relations or political science. political geography.7 The question remains: how did the knowledge produced by geopolitics influence specific issues. 2003). by striking a balance between structural explanation and the transitions approach.” “realpolitik” or “linchpin states” became notorious during the Cold War in the academic realm.The military in societies in transition 209 In spite of all the tensions. corroborated with the ignorance of mainstream social sciences (sociology. a very critical political scientist. or to bring evidence for theories. state bureaucracy. Zbigniew Brzezinski or Henry Kissinger. 1996). rule of law. and its application as an ideology to influence political decisions (see the influence of Mahan on Theodore Roosevelt or Houshofer’s influence on Rudolf Hess). Mackinder or Houshofer not only influenced other social sciences. established by Linz and Stepan. geopolitics could be considered an important scholarly analysis during the twentieth century. Geopolitics. namely civil society. The main critique for geopolitics is that it lacks evidence in building theories and explanations. political society.6 However. power and globalization While the role of geographical studies is increasing today. economic society and stateness.” “domino theory. despite recent efforts to replace the “orthodox” geopolitics with critical geopolitics. The usefulness of applying Linz and Stepan’s theoretical framework for explaining the variation of transition. used the post-communist studies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to rethink the understanding of the democratization process (Bunce. such as civil–military relations in Eastern Europe? The influence was rather indirect. Valerie Bunce. Ratzel. The main reasons are: the failure of classical geopolitics to explain complex phenomena. boosted by globalization.” Moreover. Some of the concepts produced by Kjellen. Despite the disputes and tensions. economics and political science) to consider space.

. the New Europe and the New World Order. 1999). Moreover. in the 1990s. Thus. but Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a region where the effects are likely to remain pivotal” (Whitehead. delivered in Warsaw. group and territorial identity.” (White House. His study is another argument in favor of the interdisciplinary approach. the main reason for that was the globalization phenomenon that blurred the territorial boundaries. Brzezinski. that stated that: “All Europe’s new democracies. who reviewed the geographical research in the 1990s. not only an important ontological subject of study but also an important academic “area study” for political science and international affairs. Professor Whitehead considers that “Geography may not entirely dictate any nation’s democratic destiny. trying to answer the question of whether Europe is a continent or a culture (Dingsdale. second. As one of the political scientists that emphasize the importance of geopolitics in understanding the democratization process in Eastern Europe. but one of .9 or it has been split among many clusters. the speech of President Bush. 1919: 265–78) was a powerful axiom among the Great Powers regarding Eastern Europe. should have the chance for security and freedom . from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between. on the policy level. There are later studies in political science or economics that provided additional evidence for Whitehead’s conclusions which will be presented below. It is important to explain how “Eastern Europe. has identified four paradigms that underpin geographical studies: redefining personal. I would argue that the popularity among the militaries and policy-makers of the classical Mackinder’s dictum: “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the world” (Mackinder. The geopolitical vision promoted by people such as Dr.210 Marian Zulean geopolitics among the East European academics and policy-makers8 and. different geopolitical settings generating different opportunities or constraints for democratization. 2001) was understood in Eastern Europe as a symbolic message that the USA is interested in promoting its policies in the “Heartland” space. transition and transformation. 1997). who advised a special US strategy for Eurasia and NATO enlargement was based on Mackinder’s dictum and it became very popular among the decision-makers who promoted a Western pattern of civil–military relations (Brzezinski. such as political science or sociology. through the export of its concepts to other social sciences. the geopolitical concept of “Eastern Europe” became. societal and cultural theories of space to construct new geographies of Eastern Europe after socialism. . re-oriented the state-centric analysis and opened the disciplines toward the notions of space and geography.” previously seen as a unitary region. Alan Dingsdale. 1999). Then he criticizes them and calls for a closer association of locational. evolved over the past 15 years in such a way that it disappeared. As for the export of geographical or geopolitical concepts and their incorporation in the rhetoric and methodology of core social sciences. Whitehead’s arguments start from the assumption that each potential democracy in CEE is fixed in a territorial matrix that exposes it to powerful crosscurrents.

Security studies could close the theory–practice gap on the military and society if it used the constructivist paradigm in explaining the new role of the military. . The final conclusion of the Kopstein and Reilly study is that the integration of spatial and temporal factors is essential to a deeper understanding of the post-communist world. The end of the Cold War brought an implosion of the Westphalian system. Although the policy requirements created a relatively unique model of civil–military relations. with their thesis of the social construction of reality (borrowed from sociology). geopolitics and political science’s methodology was published after ten years of transition in the journal World Politics (Kopstein and Reilly. Conclusions The fall of communism was a shock. the main conclusion for our study of the military in East European societies is the necessity of integrating temporal arguments (path dependency theory) with geography for the analysis of political and social change. produced by the major social sciences studies. and recommend a more complex research. postmodernists. The dominant paradigm of IR during the Cold War was Realism. These conclusions present the universal knowledge concerning the civil–military relations. the outcomes of transition are very diverse. borrowed many concepts from his native Germany. One of its modern founding fathers. a decrease of the importance of realism’s basic concepts of national interests and sovereignty. Hans Morgenthau. the monopoly of violence that might have been important for Huntington in 1957. Thus. globalists or critical theorists show a richness of the IR discipline. critical and opposed to realism or neo-realism. while isolation hindered that transformation (they did so through a complex statistical test of “neighbor effects”). Thus the focus on power and military force. evaluate the contribution of each discipline and of interdisciplinary studies. where geopolitics was an important “science” in the first half of the twentieth century. would soon be considered in civil–military relations theory (Lepgold and Nincic. and the emergence of new paradigms. 2000: 1–37). The concepts of space and power were imported earlier by another sub-field of social science: international relations (IR). based on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches. Kopstein and Reilly tried to answer the question: “how did the countries that began the post-communist journey from similar starting points end up so far from each other”? They demonstrated statistically the plausibility of the thesis that geographical proximity to the West exercised a positive influence on the transformation of communist states. 2001).The military in societies in transition 211 the more powerful empirical and interdisciplinary explanation using economics. Constructivist approaches. threats perception and drafting the new national security strategies. both to the study and understanding of democratization process and to the practice of designing a desirable pattern of civil–military relations for East European countries. feminists. The main gap that recent critics of IR theories became aware of between the theory and practice. but they were only marginally involved in explaining civil–military relations in East European transitions. lost its meaning.

A recent epistemological push to overcome those shortcomings. A critical review of the literature highlighted the necessity of interdisciplinary studies to better explain the more complex phenomena through overcoming the shortcomings of fragmented knowledge. the focus of reform on “civilian control” was important as a “Damocles sword” for not letting the military intervene in the democratization process. Also.. setting up the legislative framework as a first step in implementing a democratic CMR. in the majority of communist countries it was not the military but the intelligence or security forces (or paramilitary) that were the main supporters of dictatorial regimes. Among the similarities were: depoliticization. influence. 2000. brought about by positivism and postmodernism. space. professionalization and democratization. including in the Middle East. but many similarities. would bring a “reservoir” of useful knowledge to the understanding of the role of historical legacy (“weight of history”). Instead. brought by geopolitics or IR theory. the capacity to enact the legislative framework and the main factors that explain the success or failure to implement such a democratic civil–military pattern. 2002a. such as Sovietology. but the Western models evolved themselves during the last 15 years. and therefore the necessity to expand the interdisciplinarity and bring fresh knowledge and methods from disciplines that were marginal in explaining CMR. since not only was there no such unique Western model. as observed by military sociologists and political scientists. they noticed their own narrow focus. and their concepts of power.212 Marian Zulean The main conclusion is that there is no unique model of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. In addition. proposes not only interdisciplinary but also a transdisciplinary approach to explain complex phenomena. There were many differences among the post-communist transitions. the “international context” set of variables. a massive decline in funding and personnel. or the emergence of a common security landscape and a shift away from praetorianism and conscription. by both Western and Eastern European policy-makers. 2003) were more complex and brought a better understanding of CMR transition. b. de-partyzation. Cottey et al. The main differences are related to the misunderstanding of the complexity of the CMR issue. as conceived by both cited interdisciplinary studies. a focus on a broader security sector would have been better because. Moreover. a lack of civilian expertise. would deepen the understanding of the process. Disciplines. but was misleading since the military were already under some sort of civilian control. a revolution in military affairs and new . Building a “Western type” model of civil–military relations was like hitting the ground running. Pathdependency theory and methodology would better explain the broader process of democratization and the variation of the outcomes. by the former communist regime. geography and globalization. the democratization in the Arab world. a lack of involvement of militaries in politics. Although the interdisciplinary studies (Callaghan and Kuhlmann.10 The complexity of civil–military relations in a postmodern world. cultural studies and anthropology could help to bring understanding and aid the design of a feasible model of civil–military relations that could be adopted elsewhere.

Moreover.J. instead. This type of control can be witnessed in developing countries. there is an opportunity for the promotion of democracy at the global level. (eds) Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems. He/she was. as we noted in this chapter.11 Thus. In Huntington’s view. and to make policy recommendations for the global push of democratization. 2 The simplest way of reducing the military’s power within the state is through the maximization of the power of a certain civil group. Princeton University Press: Princeton. three edited books and many research papers. I. a staff officer. experts in geopolitics. 10–11 January. “transitologists. political scientists. The Soldier and the State. Westview Press: Boulder. a clear separation of responsibilities between the military and civilians is necessary. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space.” anthopologists and policy scientists. To achieve perfect objective civilian control. Notes 1 See Partnership for Peace: Framework Document. to the disadvantage of others (subjective civilian control). IR academics. Kolkowitz. Brussels. while the political officer never assumed the role of changing value systems or controlling officers. D. 3 The research project “The transformation of civil–military relations in comparative context” with UK funding and leadership lasted for about five years. as an outcome. Odom. controlling the behavior of officers and motivating troops for combat. T. this study tried to prepare the ground and propose a transdisciplinary approach for the study of civil–military relations in the Western world. Latin America. (1978) “The party–military connection: a critique. and Gustafson. 6 For the explanation of the failure of mainstream social sciences to consider space and . the military becoming a professional body dealing with the management of force within the state. R. Therefore a new agenda of research should investigate. there is an additional methodological push for multiple argumentation and interdisciplinarity in the policy-analysis field. the notion of objective civilian control is opposed to subjective civilian control and represents the maximization of military professionalism. in an interdisciplinary fashion. and Volgyes. engaged about 50 researchers and practitioners from the area and has. Ministerial Communiqué (1994) North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO Headquarters. Princeton University Press: Princeton. with a new one: The Soldier and the Globe. Finally. 5 In Herspring’s view. T. (1967) The Soviet Military and the Communist Party. It is beyond the powers and intellectual capacity of an individual researcher as he/she would require the postmodern spirit of Leonardo da Vinci to pursue such an endeavor. The investigation should start with criticism of the Huntington–Janowitz paradigm and the study of experiences from the recent wave of democratization in Eastern Europe.The military in societies in transition 213 global missions for the military require both a cross-national and a transdisciplinary approach. That kind of transdisciplinary research could be realized by a team of military sociologists.” in Herspring. the new role of armed forces in a global society. W. 4 See Colton. It is time to replace Huntington’s book. a political commissar is an officer appointed by the Communist Party whose tasks include missions such as changing the soldiers’ value systems. (eds) (1990) Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil–Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. rendering the army neutral in the political realm.

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Sticking to the best-known and most meaningful. we cannot fail to take account of the fact that it manages a complex of collective resources of such a magnitude and for such vital purposes for the community that its study takes on a fundamental importance for the comprehension of society itself.2 deferring until later an examination of how valid this limitation can still be considered today. and then investigating whether this categorisation has a historical variance or if it can be considered.11 Trends and evolution in the military profession Giuseppe Caforio The military professional If Whitehead (1961) was right that ancient society was a coordination of trades whereas modern society is a coordination of professions. so for the moment we shall restrict our analysis to the literature regarding this figure. By coordinating and interacting with other professionals. 1957). starting naturally from its origin.1 it is immediately apparent that analysing and defining their professional aspects and monitoring their development and trends are central to study of the military. after having formed and moulded its inner soul. as a sufficiently constant designation. Study of the occupation of officer requires ascertaining first of all whether we can speak of the military officer as a professional in a strict sense. a first model defines a profession by the existence of a certain set of attributes (Greenwood. The set of attributes varies according to the theoretical constructs of the different . the professional species to which they should be assigned. But who is the military professional? It must be said at the outset that the literature on the subject has long debated whether one can speak of a profession in the proper sense for military personnel and. They will be the ones to provide the external representation of the military. if so. military professionals will make their contribution – whether positive or negative – to shaping the broader society. If we consider the military profession in the general context of the other professions. leaving aside that of the NCO. Various approaches have tried to define the content of the officer’s occupation by applying a series of theoretical models created to define a profession in a strict sense. This debate has focused chiefly on the professional figure of the officer.

monopoly. through the creation of a “pluralist” model (also called a “segmented” or “fusionist” model) in which the profession is distinguished in segments or fractions. His conclusion is that the profession of officer today has all three attributes of a profession. Applying this model to the officer’s occupation leads one to define it as an atypical profession. 1973). A further attempt at conceptualisation has been made by Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1977). 1965). since its genesis has followed a process that is somehow the reverse of the other professions: first commission.3 . He wrote: “A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics” (1957). in the officer’s occupation one of these attributes – autonomy – is clearly absent. Within the military some of these segments display specifically military professional characteristics. etc. responsibility (towards the society at large) and corporateness (as self-awareness of the professional group). which therefore deserve to be outlined here. in contrast to ancient times. high social status and a code of ethics. in which the officer’s occupation has been examined in terms of the professionalisation process and historical acquisition of social legitimation (Van Doorn. and only at the end the creation of professional associations (Van Doorn. Downes’ thesis is that applying an attribution approach reveals only partial and limited convergence between the concrete content of the officer’s profession and its ideal-type. this occupation can be considered a profession. due to the fullness of the content of the other attributes. 1973. However. so that one cannot speak of a unitary military profession (Deagle. others characteristics similar to neighbouring civilian professions (engineers. as defined according to a set of attributes in the literature. The officer’s occupation would thus seem to be a profession in decline. socially important skills. as “Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warrior of previous ages”. authors like Cathy Downes (1985) have wondered whether the officer’s occupation was losing its professional characteristics with the changing situations and content. For Huntington there are three attributes that define a profession in the strict sense: expertise (acquired through prolonged education and experience). 1965). autonomy or self-rule. thereby avoiding the static nature of the attribution-based model. a code of ethics and a system of compulsion. A second model used in the literature has been the process model. Moskos. According to Janowitz.218 Giuseppe Caforio authors. 1973. For Janowitz there are five attributes that define the professional ideal-type. It emphasises the process rather than the product. The ones that have most influenced subsequent thought on the military professional are those of Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960). physicists. and places the emphasis on the historical variance of the concept of profession.). then the establishment of training schools. an own organisation. The debate has developed over time and in the course of the rapid changes that the professional content of the officer’s occupation was undergoing in the last part of the twentieth century. Jordan and Taylor. even if not completely. depending more on function/specialisation than on rank or category. namely a core of hard-to-master. In this framework.

a new profession (Prandstraller. determined by the . appears to be accepted in the prevailing literature today. but such a discussion would take us too far in time and space from the purposes of this work. with an individual. where an occupation. The military profession is thus included among those closely incorporated in an organisation and strongly dependent on it: for soldiering.4 but membership in it is no longer considered to be limited to the category of officers. 1997). the country and the period of reference. Today’s NCOs go through a training process that in many countries leads to a university degree (or diploma) and acquire specialisations that enable them to master a sector of activity that. where the officer’s occupation is clearly ranked among the latter. Indeed. at least as we mean them today and how we have sketched them in the foregoing pages. Essential in this regard is the distinction between independent and dependent professions (Prandstraller. in light of the above. the organisation is the state and the state is the military’s sole client. The officer’s occupation thus moves along a continuum that ranges from organisation to profession (in a strict sense). It is widely recognised in the historical research that. Non-commissioned officers. 1975). at least in all the developed countries. at least up to the mideighteenth century. The choice of officers was almost always adscriptive. up to the current ideal-type. now seem. One can debate and make distinctions as to where and when it was a role. to have completed the historical process that has led them to be considered a profession – according to some. It is sufficient here to give an account of how historical social research has reconstructed the birth of the military profession in modern and contemporary times.Trends and evolution in the military profession 219 Subsequently improvement in the characterisation and classification of the category of the professions in general has helped to better define the profession characteristics of the officer. 1969). where it had adscriptive characteristics of choice. The occupation of officer is therefore defined as a unique example of fusion between profession and organisation where strictly professional aspects and bureaucratic aspects are present simultaneously. the eighteenth-century serra gente whose main task was keeping squads of soldiers united and in close ranks in combat. case-by-case placement that is a function of time and space (Harries-Jenkins. The definition of the military profession as a bureaucratic one. officer education had few or no professional characteristics. where it displayed genuine professional connotations. The role of the officer has of course always existed in armies the world over and in every era. focusing. see Etzioni. NCOs no longer fit the mould of the sergeant. Having briefly defined the military profession we can now turn to its historical development. considered for some time to be a semiprofession (for semi-professions. dependent on an organisation. with the former prevailing over the latter to varying degrees depending on the service. almost exclusively on the figure of the officer. 1997). in complexity and importance. can be considered the equivalent of what is normally entrusted to a junior officer.

with some temporal differentiation according to the various currents of historical thought. says Gooch. then. see Teitler. for example. Traces remain of their origins and of the process of change in the social make-up of the different services and specialities: the officers in technical weaponry. All this changed between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries. just as the necessity of commanding. who trace this process to the social change in officer recruitment that results from the technological and social transformations mentioned above. consequent on or co-agent with the Industrial Revolution. artillery and the corps of engineers are now mostly . and those. 1977). when it presented itself. 1988). military units were often purchased by those who wished to command them. And on this point there is a first disagreement among the historians: there are those who trace the officer’s professionalisation process back to the spread of these schools. new social and technical conditions required a standardisation of problems and solutions in the field that was much less felt previously. that the development of artillery obliged the officer to acquire technical knowledge that could not have been part and parcel of his family education. There are essentially two: technological evolution. When the selection of officers is no longer by birth but by merit. the noble by birth were considered to have – by nature and by primary education – the qualities and knowledge to command. The field of battle. however.7 so the state turns to the sons of a middle class that is then on the rise and that sees an appointment as an officer as a further instrument for rapid social promotion.5 while the possibility of access to military academies for the sons of the bourgeoisie becomes generalised in Europe around a hundred years later (Gooch. Access and attendance at these schools. moving and supporting logistically great masses of men required knowledge and experience that could not be improvised. 1988).6 leading to the creation of the military schools. for all. John Gooch. The result is the first schools for officers. both in terms of selection and experience. the first military “universities”. On the factors of change. created in response to a need for standardised military training (for all. one can speak of the birth of the military profession. there is sufficient agreement among historians (see. like the already cited John Gooch. and therefore it became necessary to prepare officers in somewhat uniform fashion. stemming from the French Revolution. and the creation of mass armies. to draw a parallel with the professions already recognised at the time. did the rest. requires more ability and resolve than the offspring of the nobility are able to provide. Over that time span.220 Giuseppe Caforio social class into which one was born. with their own university-level training institutes. The officers of the second half of the nineteenth century thus appear to be professionals already. It is quite clear. however. their own codes of ethics – by now quite homogeneous among the different armies – and strong esprit de corps. About a century passes between the two events: the first military schools start springing up in the mid-eighteenth century.

but at the same time brought about an internal change in the content of this professionalism. right when. William Napier. as well as of the fact that leadership can also. the force of things leads to new interrogatives. be taught and learned. depending on the post covered. Technological evolution continues in the ensuing decades and its increasing impact on military operations brings a specific characteristic to the military profession not shared. The End of the Cold War (upper case is mandatory) brings the armed forces to the fore. the debate on the military profession seemed to die out in consolidated agreement as to its nature and the internal contradictions due to the “forced peace” of deterrence. Today this debate appears to be superseded by recognition that. the cavalry remains more the prerogative of the nobly born. more specialised preparation was needed. in different measure in the various countries but with great prominence in Italy. This appears to be a first affirmation of the principle of continuous.8 By accentuating the characteristics that had led to the development of a military profession in the proper sense (deployment of large masses of soldiers and technological evolution of weaponry).9 from a leader offering chiefly command skills to an executive excelling especially in organisational skills. This is a dichotomy that seems to reproduce in a modern key the old contrast between the “natural” qualities of the nobly born and those “acquired” by the new professional. But then. the wars of the twentieth century inevitably increased the need for professionalism of officers. motivated as is always the case by another “great” change. one that would cause sociological analysis to hypothesise a transition from the figure of the heroic leader to that of the manager. to a certain degree. Authors like Carl von Clausewitz. the contradiction between an instrument – the military – created for war and the persistent absence of warfighting in the four decades of the East–West standoff was a constant point of discussion regarding tendencies to consider the military professional’s activity as nothing more than a “job like any other” in a big government bureaucracy.Trends and evolution in the military profession 221 sons of the bourgeoisie. Parallel to this professional development is a strong growth in military culture and thinking. by other professions: the creation of a separate elite of military professionals. both capacities must be present in the officer. This is a condition that will persist in Europe until it gradually fades away in the first half of the twentieth century. Antonio Jomini. at the end of the 1980s. career-long training that will later be extended to other professions. as the armed forces had now become in most of the developed countries. the general staff corps. as Marina Nuciari (2006) shrewdly observes: With a certain irony of history. with tasks that are no longer reducible to one pole or the other of the professional .10 As everyone knows. at least at the time of their birth. Not coincidentally. the second half of the twentieth century is characterised almost entirely by the period and theme of the Cold War. Here the training provided by the military academies was no longer sufficient for access: further. Denis Hart Mahon and Nicola Marselli are some of the protagonists of this cultural trend in the various countries.

new knowledge is required of field commanders. . whether the approach be that of sociology. according to the old prediction of a segmented profession (see above.222 Giuseppe Caforio scheme but appear so “other” as to generate a new set of names in an attempt to adequately label a phenomenon that even after fifteen years many still define as “new”: the new missions. practical function of fighting.11 officer training courses tend to increase in depth and duration. or missions other than war. 218)? At this point we can pose the question of the uniqueness and specificity of the military profession. This is especially so because one cannot say that a specific new function has been assigned to the armies. Patrick Mileham (2003) for instance describes the complexity of these changes: Armies. with the start of the new millennium. political science or legal doctrine. controlling international arms-trafficking. universal. The professional content of the officer’s occupation is clearly thrown into confusion by this: consolidated experiences are (temporarily?) marginalised. carried out by numerous inherent and out-sourced resources. they are engaged more and more in peace support operations. I think. those of NCOs become of university level. in Europe. Boene’s study is an expression of a discussion on the nature and specificity of the military profession due to the new question raised by the long period of deterrence – is the military occupation like another? – but it goes beyond the historical contingency out of which it arose and provides. p. and so forth. Navies and Air Forces are organisations whose purpose has long since shifted from the relatively straight-forward. The new military professional is at a crossroads: should officers be “jacks of all trades” or should they be sliced and diced among different specialisations. they continue to be an element of dissuasion. the abandonment of conscription and the transition to an all-volunteer force. armed forces have gone back to making war. to an enormously complex institutional matrix of processes and procedures. the function of armed forces appears to be undergoing a series of such profound changes that it is still difficult to diagnose their range. or a previous one abandoned: concretely. providing relief in the event of natural disasters. permanent elements for understanding this profession. Indeed. but they retain the task of defending the national territory and are increasingly called on to contribute in various tasks like fighting terrorism. such as. to achieve certain ends. human and material. is the question of how unique the military really is – and ought to be”. All this in the presence of far-reaching social and structural changes. The obligatory reference here is to a well-known study by Bernard Boene (1990) that retains its relevancy and starts out as follows: “Central to the study of ‘armed forces and society’.

Trends and evolution in the military profession 223 In every context. the “manager of organised violence”. (1990: 58) They are those characteristics that a French general referred to in the 1970s13 in pointing out that an officer is no ordinary public servant: he or she must answer a calling. without upsetting organised society. as the military professional has also been called. unlimited liability for service. a code of ethics that guarantees society (and him or herself) that the wholly atypical functions entrusted to him or her will be exercised properly. once it has embarked on such a course – obedience. dedication to the common good. as Boene calls them. In order to be able to exercise this violence. and so forth. these powers.14 and a chapter in this book is devoted . This is what is called political control over the armed forces. The military professional has as client the state. related to the sacred character of war for any society. loyalty. has precise control over his or her professional activity. without overwhelming it. universal traits. The client. a stronger degree of coercive institutional authority – as well as to its violent nature. remote control affair: the handful of men and/or women in hardened command posts would still experience and.12 cannot be subject only to external checks (so-called political control over the armed forces). would still need a degree of divergence from civilian ways. that is. a number of “civilian taboos”. a reverse monopolist (since no other client is permitted but the state). (1990: 58) And they are aspects that would remain unchanged even if war were to evolve into a fully robotised. life-and-death decisions regarding him or herself and other human beings. as described by Boene: permanent. Various theorisations exist on the modalities of this control. the military professional displays two peculiar characteristics. as well as dedicated study centres and research institutes. and another of his or her peculiarities is that this client. push-button. whether old or new. to operate effectively. does not limit itself to asking the military professional for the service it needs at that moment. acceptance of risk to life and limb and of the peculiar obligations of the profession of arms. This is why traits not generally necessary for other professions are required here. and the power to violate. such as the prohibitions against killing human beings or taking them captive. but needs a self-limitation of his or her own. which would be normal – both over the provision of the service and the professional’s entire way of being and of organising him or herself. destroying goods or taking them for one’s own use. we have said. but exercises complete control – and not only economic. made up of keen interest in things military. They are. legitimately. taboos essential for human coexistence. ones not shared with other professional categories: the power/duty to take binding.

fundamental values of national society. both by backing the capitalist elite and by taking its place when it showed itself incapable. According to those considered the fathers of contemporary thinking on the military. which found themselves in the phase of construction or expansion of capitalism. the solutions given by the two authors to the problem of internal control are quite different. For Janowitz (1960). a blend of the two). their failure to accept democratic principles and the subordination of the armed forces to the popular will continued from the initial stages of decolonisation into the following century and up to our own times. As is known. so here we shall give only a brief description to indicate its impact on the content of the military profession. the existence of an internal political control is part of the content of military professionalisation. both in Asia and Africa. the armed forces continued to support the pre-existing social order. where the armed forces have taken on particular political and social roles. According to Huntington (1957).224 Giuseppe Caforio to it. But there are other parts of the world where this development has taken on particular aspects and characteristics that deserve to be mentioned briefly. practical influence in linking the new armed forces. internal control is achieved mainly through interiorisation by the individual military professional of the dominant. These are the lines of historical development that the military profession has followed in Europe and North America. This phenomenon has characterised the countries of Latin America especially. to a dominant capitalist class that asked them first and foremost to maintain a social order dominated by market relations. The military professional’s attitude towards politics is therefore part of the code of ethics and conduct of the profession itself and takes concrete form in reality mainly in an internal control. political control over military power is primarily exercised through the professionalisation of the officer corps. When a process of politico-social democratisation was later grafted on to the initial freemarket philosophy. in the subsequent literature as well. and therefore through participation in the country’s political life. probably. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. this is the context I shall be referring to in these notes. what we are interested in pointing out here is that. Fernando . Whichever of the two solutions one wishes to consider more appropriate (or. since it first manifested itself in the Latin American countries. instead. a kind of neutralisation of the profession with respect to the political power: the officer does not get involved in politics. inept or corrupt (situations quite frequent in the examined context). not to say opposing. however. In the absence of other military traditions on which the armies of these countries might draw. this control is ensured by rigid separation of the military professional from politics. but in more recent periods it has manifested itself in nearly all countries that have emerged from a process of decolonisation. where the decolonisation process mainly occurred in the nineteenth century. The creation of independent national armies in these countries took place in a situation of interdependence with Western European nations. I refer here to the “Third World” countries. still lacking traditions of their own. This relationship appears to have had concrete. However.

markedly traditionalist ideological stance. The process of change in the military profession The first to emphasise a process of change under way in the military profession and to clearly delineate its future developments was Morris Janowitz (1960). explains the propensity of the militaries of the Latin American countries to intervene in the political sphere in this way: The military “pressure” on the political sphere appears to be the fruit of the militaries’ need to resolve the failures and dysfunctions resulting from an asynchronous development between “modernisation” and the rationalinstrumental logic prevalent in the barracks (“islands of modernity”). But as we have had occasion to study these changes almost step-by-step through a series of field surveys conducted in their most significant period. and the questions to which we refer were posed in a similar but not identical way in some questionnaires. we feel that comparison is possible and correct: those who wish to go deeper into this aspect can consult the literature cited in the note to get a clearer idea. must be defined as rigidly institutional. rather than through the vast and varied literature on the topic. one that. . Countless studies have followed.Trends and evolution in the military profession 225 Bustamante (1991). 1977 and 1986). for example. my translation from the Spanish) This has produced a type of military professional with peculiar characteristics with respect to the Euro-Atlantic model that was nevertheless its source of inspiration. The officer produced by this context poses him or herself as a staunch defender of the traditional values of society. namely as a clear-cut separation of the profession from politics. The projection of his or her professional interest is much more towards the “internal enemy” than towards any external threats to the country state. which he or she watches over and with which he or she actively interacts in order to prevent deviations from these values. Political control internal to the military in the sense described by Samuel Huntington (1957). is that. when applying Charles Moskos’ well-known institution/occupation model (Moskos. (1991: 39. a strong anti-progressive. and the inability of civil political society to provide the armed forces with a compatible and congruent environment.15 we shall look at the changes in the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps of a good sample of advanced democracies through empirical research data. also by force of arms. as a response (in the political science and sociology literature. replaced by an autonomous ideological control that is often linked to a minority sector of national society. appears to be non-existent here. mainly) to the obvious changes of the international context and of the military function. above all. overall. Although the comparison is general because the participating countries were not always the same in the various surveys (even if there is a nucleus of countries that always participated16).

the threat perceived by military professionals appears to have changed: migratory flows and the possibility of involvement in outside-area wars rank significantly lower among their concerns. a period that extends from 1991 to 2004 and is dense with profound changes on the international scene. The plotted data clearly show that. especially in Europe. defence of the national soil and the provision of disaster relief to civilian populations. particularly the growth of organised crime. The change in the perception of the threat. in curbing clandestine immigration and inroads made towards resolving conflict in the Balkans thus seem to have had some weight in altering the assessment of national security threats. albeit more cautious. of course. as well as helping police forces combat organised crime. and the different emphasis placed on the tasks of the armed forces as a result. participation in PSOs. Although a strong shift towards abandoning conscription in favour of volunteer armed forces (where this had not already be done. decline of support for antiterrorism missions. a conflict between Third World countries involving one’s own country. just as the materialisation and expansion of the terrorist menace have certainly had an effect in an opposing direction. This datum on the trend of the perceived threat is helpful for seeing how the attitudes of military professionals react to the missions assigned to their armed forces: for verifying.226 Giuseppe Caforio The first interesting datum to evaluate is how the military professional’s perception of the national security threat changes in the period in question. there was a sizeable decline in the perception of the terrorist threat among military professionals. At the end of the period. and the possibility of nuclear blackmail. Greater coordination. rank higher. seem to have contributed powerfully to changing the opinions of military professionals regarding recruitment of the national armed forces. abroad. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and internal security.1). The situation changes radically after the cited event. remain high on the list throughout the period and across the various cited surveys. A graph enables us to compare the trends during this period of the perception of the terrorist threat and of the importance of the mission to deal with this threat (the most topical) (Figure 11. and a corresponding. Increasing importance is shown for the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. that is. The increased concerns for the internal security of the examined countries can in part be read as a result of the increased threat of terrorism. the parallelism that exists between the two elements. Among the priority tasks that the interviewees assign to their armed forces. both by Third World countries (read the so-called “rogue states” in American political discourse) and by non-state terrorist organisations. The most felt threats at the start of the period appear to be mass immigration from Third World countries. while fears relating to the threat of terrorism. in the run-up to 11 September 2001. as in the USA) was already being manifested in the 1980s in public opinion in the . and.

Also significant is the percentage drop that 80 70 60 Percentage 50 40 30 20 10 0 1991 1995 2004 Democracy = conscription Less costly Figure 11.19 both the percentage of those who feel there is a natural link between democracy and conscription and those who feel conscription is less costly than an all-volunteer force20 fall considerably during the period. especially.2 Opinions in favour of conscription. Although the percentage of those who feel that the draft ensures a steady exchange of values. The change in these data over the period in question is graphed as well.18 that convince military professionals that conscripted armed forces are no longer suitable. advanced democracies.1 Terrorism as threat perception and mission assigned. either for taking on this type of mission or for the emerging fight against terrorism.2.17 But it is these new events and. it had met with considerable opposition among military professionals due to a number of – all things considered – valid reasons.Trends and evolution in the military profession 69 68 67 66 Percentage 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 1991 2000 Threat Mission 2004 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 227 Figure 11. the strong and growing participation in PSOs. This change of attitude on the part of the military professional is clearly echoed in the research data. opinions and perceptions between society and the armed forces remains high from 1991 to 2004. in Figure 11. .

3. and career choices linked to the education opportunities offered by the military and to an interest of a technological nature in the instrumentation and equipment used in the military decline just as noticeably. Substantially. Here the available research data allow us to examine changes in career choice reasons. . Having outlined the main factors of change that act on the military profession. 60 50 40 Percentage Adventuring Serving Military interest Education Technology 30 20 10 0 1991 1995 2000 Figure 11. let us now take a look at the change of attitudes and values that effectively materialises in the military professional in the period. with good possibilities of professional training. at least for some of its aspects. in 2000 it gives more room to adventure. With regard to the first question. access to advanced technologies and job security. the desire for adventure and the desire to serve one’s country both rise steadily. what seems to change in the examined period is the profession’s appeal. as shown by the available data.228 Giuseppe Caforio occurred between 1991 and 199521 for those who feel the draft distributes the national defence burden more fairly: from 72 per cent to 44 per cent. but at a less-significant level. professional choice due to a specific interest in military matters and to a desire to command remain high in the period. in the military ideal-type that the interviewees have in mind. If being an officer still came across as a somewhat bureaucratised job in 1991. The trends during the period of the most interesting reasons for choice are shown in Figure 11. as well as to ethical and patriotic motivations. and in their estimation of the profession’s social prestige. Choices related to the profession’s ethical values and those motivated by job security remain constant.3 Trend of reasons for choosing a career as an officer.

a core of essential qualities for the profession that includes. initiative and physical appearance. Of these.22 The ideal-type of the officer was determined by selecting the human and professional qualities that the respondents felt should characterise the military professional. Among the qualities in the second group. professional expertise. The other characteristics are more or less stationary. Ranked at a slightly lower level.4 Main qualities of the “good officer”. there is an increased appreciation for mental openness and an ability to take initiative. is a second group of traits such as mental openness. while a sense of responsibility or determination fall somewhat. depicted graphically in Figure 11. with a constant pre-eminence of leadership. the modern officer of the surveyed countries thus seems to rely more on his or her own sense of responsibility and the spirit of discipline – understood. in all the surveys examined here. the ability to lead. obedience does not number among the most prized qualities. . Note “Expertise” was not included in the list of qualities in the 2004 survey. As already stated. ranking outside the top ten in all four surveys. in the top spots. confirms the core essential qualities as determined above. For the difficult choices. the spirit of discipline rises appreciably. as mental discipline – than on passive obedience to superiors’ orders. a sense of responsibility. 12 10 Percentage 8 6 4 2 0 1991 1995 2000 2004 Leadership Responsibility Expertise Discipline Determination Patriotism Figure 11. the trend over the period. probably. the spirit of sacrifice. not included in the graph. but still confirmed over time. discipline. the interviewees confirm. Asked to choose from a set of 18 different qualities.Trends and evolution in the military profession 229 Although there is a rather immediate and evident reason for the upswing in the desire for adventure – namely the exponential growth of PSOs. determination and patriotism. where constant comparison with contingents from other countries seems – also on the basis of other indicators – to have increased the nationalistic spirit already proper to military professionals. It appears to be related to the multinational nature of the PSOs carried out in the 1990s. often with deployments out-of-area and overseas – the increase of the reason of serving one’s country appears to be more mediated. Unlike what one might have expected.4.

are reflected in the ideal-type of the officer cultivated by the military professional. 1995–2004. unlike what happened with the reasons for professional choice. he observed. 1976). it does not appear that the changes that occurred in the period. even in the presence of the changes mentioned earlier. and then. The interviewees’ perceived image of the profession does not display sizeable variations in the period 1991–5. But what the research data point up especially is that a hypothesis of proletarianisation does not constitute a mere statistical curiosity: both the career choices and the cultural model of the officer (as seen above) – in addition. This datum is probably in need of further confirmation because polls conducted on public opinion in general in the countries concerned show an opposing trend for this perception. this item declines during in the period from 11 per cent to 5. This implies that the professional identity perceived by the interviewees remains the same as ever. The interviewed officers in this last year seem to have a social image of their profession that is less positive overall than in the preceding period. as shown in the graph in Figure 11. to the reasons for professional choice – show that they are influenced by the individual’s social origin. every possible correlation is excluded by a comparison between the two variables. Future trends A good starting point for identifying some possible trends of the military profession is to listen to the opinions expressed in this regard by the officers inter- . looking for comparison at the data on dissatisfaction. At bottom. This would seem to confirm various judgements asserting that the fundamental ethical and educational core of the military must remain the same. As for the social origins of the members of the military profession. Another interesting internal aspect of the profession that seems to be influenced by the ongoing process of change is the sociocultural extraction of officers. though significant. “It is not a job for soldiers. even in the different contexts and with partially changed functions and tasks.230 Giuseppe Caforio In short. but only soldiers can do it” (Moskos. it is what UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was already saying (in the 1950s) when. here identified through the father’s occupation. referring to peacekeeping.5. while it varies considerably in the subsequent one. The data on the paternal occupation of officers and their trend in the period seem to confirm this tendency.23 The interviewees’ satisfaction with the professional activity carried out appears to remain quite high (averaging over 70 per cent). we find a tendency to endo-recruitment (sons of officers and NCOs especially: percentages ranging from 12 per cent to 30 per cent depending on the country) that is always appreciable but shows a slight downward trend over the examined period. In the first place. Harries-Jenkins (1990: 119) points out in this regard that it is possible that the military profession is subject to a process of proletarianisation. naturally. and the decline in perceived social prestige does not seem in any way correlated to reasons of professional dissatisfaction.2 per cent.

e. as well as members of NGOs). which was specifically aimed at probing the views on professional preparation of officers who had participated in missions that came under the heading “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW). Knowing the moods of one’s soldiers. i. the WEU. religions. What is more. i.Trends and evolution in the military profession 35 30 Percentage 25 20 15 10 5 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 1995 2004 1991 231 (v er y 1 Figure 11. To fulfil this requirement.. etc. is that the preparation given to them by their training institutes is no longer adequate for the array of missions that the officer is called upon to carry out today. 2001)..e. They are manifested particularly in: 1 Understanding people. international relations. NATO. The shortcomings in professional preparation are prevalently perceived to be in the sector of the behavioural sciences. the percentage of those dissatisfied with this basic preparation increases in parallel with the number of months that the officer spent on MOOTW: it is not. it applies to educational processes that have changed over time. to cope with the problems and psychological stresses that deployment in. factions in conflict).e. to interact effectively with the local actors present on the territory (the civilian population. local political and religious authorities. but also with the international actors in the field (officials representing the UN. a reaction to a first impact with missions of this kind but a datum that consolidates with experience.5 Perceived social image of the military profession. sociology and cultural anthropology. with particular reference to the 2001 survey (Caforio. i. that is. regarding over 70 per cent of the interviewees. One interesting aspect of this datum is that it cuts across all the ranks involved in the research (from lieutenant to colonel). languages. social communication techniques. these kinds of 2 8 (v er y ne ga tiv e) po si tiv e) . and carrying out. history. including foreign languages.24 A common datum. viewed in the researches. a basic education is needed that provides better grounding in intercultural management techniques.

Indeed. nearly everywhere. and only for a few roles).25 by a kind of self-sufficiency. together with that of preparing the military professional for combat command in any event. but also of NATO procedures. The widespread dissatisfaction with the basic preparation shown by the officers interviewed in 2001. The isolation was formal (separate regulations).26 appears to be headed in two directions: the first tends to bring the military professional’s education process progressively closer to the national education system: comparability of programmes.29 demonstrates that updating the basic preparation is struggling to keep pace with the needs of the military profession in practice.27 and this is achieved both through a longer duration of the basic programme (which tends to increase from four years to five) and through the implementation of life-long learning at various career levels. greater knowledge of international law and politics is requested most. which began in the 1990s and is still ongoing. which are largely new (at least for their extension). at least in the medium term. equivalency of diplomas. uniformity of regulations and sharing of teachers are the most common elements. This once again poses the question. already put forward in the literature. The change. especially of officers. institutional (little cooperation between military academies and civilian universities) and educational (little permeability between the two sets of institutions: only occasionally were cadets able to study in civilian universities and civilian students at military academies. the military professional’s basic training appeared to be characterised. as well as in the organisation and duration of the courses.232 Giuseppe Caforio operations often generates in soldiers: the greater knowledge deemed necessary here is mostly in the area of sociology and psychology. according to the old prediction of a segmented profession. we see that. military regulations and administrative rules. and isolation with respect to the national education system. This is a general datum that emerges from analysis of the training procedures of all the democratic countries that were the focus of our researches. leading also to the new problem of preparation that is differentiated. This is a situation that is likely to continue. has led to a series of far-reaching and significant changes in the programmes of the training institutes. when these changes were already largely in progress. prior to the 1990s. which are often new and in any case quite differentiated. which makes it possible to postpone some military studies28 that have had to be eliminated from the basic education to make room for new university subjects. At present it seems that the prevalent choice in the most advanced armies is a . Knowing the rules that relate to the whole network of official and unofficial relations that a unit commander has to manage in relation to the other social actors present locally: here. at least in part. The second direction of change is aimed at expanding the general preparation. of whether the future military professional should become a “jack of all trades” or if the officer corps should be fragmented and divided among different specialisations. 3 The necessity of coping with these needs. within the same armed force according to officer seniority.

in response to increased perceptions of a national security threat. even if the numbers are somewhat different: 48. 1989) and a peace dividend (Tonelson. a parallel survey conducted on the future civilian elites of the same countries – represented by a broad sample of university students – leads to similar results. officers and NCOs – oriented towards expanding the professional training. have always been considered unpopular. 1939: 457). war included.7 per cent who think they will stay the same. Finally. against 27. towards partial segmentation into sectors of specialisation. the 2004 survey enables us to report some recent opinion data on future officers. the armed forces. is of a development of the military profession – inclusive of the two categories. Interestingly. even more acute. at least in the medium term. for what interests us here. with 50 per cent expecting the growth to be considerable. with a majority of 86. both national and supranational. Notes 1 Thereby harking back to Talcott Parsons’ thesis that the professions have become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies (Parsons. and. the great majority of whom feel their country’s military commitment is likely to increase in the medium term. the future officers feel. both basic and subsequent.Trends and evolution in the military profession 233 compromise between the two: the preparation of the officer with command functions is broadened and deepened – also during his career – flanking him with professionals (often but not always military) specialised in particular sectors. regarding predictions on the future developments of the profession. in themselves. new interest for study. From the indicators cited here – and also from others – it appears that the importance and the role of the military profession is destined to expand. clearly attested to by the generalised expectation of a necessary increase in military expenditures.4 per cent. The spectre of war – or at least of a diffuse international conflict situation – has thus pushed to the fore in the new millennium. with a consequent substantial increase in the financial resources devoted to the sector: 84 per cent of the sample holds this view. In such a situation. making hopes of an end of history (Fukuyama. The picture that emerges. that the military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions. therefore. expenditures that. The military profession appears to be moving towards more and more interaction with the various sectors of organised society. probably. . the literature on the figure of the non-commissioned officer is nearly non-existent.5 per cent of these students feel that military budgets are destined to rise. at the time to which we refer here. taking on increased importance in the configuration and development of society itself. 1989) disappear. at least in the medium term. 2 Also because. a profession defined as “management of organised violence” cannot but find new importance and significance and. This makes the issue of political control over the instrument managed by these professionals. Although giving adequate importance to PSOs.

for example. Greece. 15 The cross-national surveys referred to go from 1991 to 2004. 2. almost all the remaining countries – namely Belgium. 3–4 June 1971.959 cases. 1998). without pretending to be exhaustive. published in Caforio. 2000/1 (nine participating countries. followed by the Royal Military College Sandhurst. The disappearance of the duty of every male citizen to devote part of his life to military service is not only a technical–organisational passage. at least in some of its components (Haltiner. . 4. 14 Such as. Turkey. 1. The surveys were carried out in the years: 1991/2 (eight participating countries. thus making it possible to test the changes over time. the Prussian War Academy (1756) and the Ecole Militaire de Paris on the heels of the French defeat at Rossbach. Romania. the reader is referred to a study of mine from the same period (Caforio. the implicit message being that the Army was a serious and responsible institution and that the term embraced all its members. UK and USA – have participated in at least two of the five surveys carried out. Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic. Germany. personal participants in the military. 1995/6 (ten participating countries.327 cases. another when this function is delegated to a restricted group of professionals. the French Military School of Saint-Cyr. in Great Britain the Camberley Staff College (1858). the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Geneva. 2001). “Officier pour quel office?”. Netherlands. who states: “I may affirm that the professional approach to problems is wholly dependent on the possibility of being able to tackle these problems on a standard basis – to recognise and to assess them – and to apply cut and dried standard solutions” (Teitler. not just commissioned officers”. to cite only the most important. Bulgaria. 231) on the educational shortcomings bemoaned by officers deployed in new missions. the creation of the Russian Academy of St Petersburg (1723).659 cases. As Patrick Mileham. the related data have all been published. 17 It is one thing when citizens are direct. in Italy the Scuola Superiore di Guerra in Turin (1867). 7 Also powerfully at work here is the social prejudice that says soldiering is ingrained in the nobleman from birth and therefore he does not need to “go to school” to learn it. 873 cases. according to Teitler. but the phrase was taken up by many others after him. 416 cases. 11 See below (p. Spain. for instance. published in Manigart and Jelusic. but a significant political and social one whose consequences on the relations between civil society and armed forces can be summed up in the statement that it leads to a demilitarisation of society and to a remilitarisation of the military. 4 Prandstraller (1997). the Regia Accademia di Artiglieria e Genio in Turin (1726). 1991). In some of them (such as Canada) there are actual military schools specialised in the sector. Poland. Portugal. Caforio. 5 We can recall here. and the United States Military Academy at West Point (all between 1799 and 1802). 13 General André Beaufre. 10 Currently leadership courses are included in the training process for army officers in all the developed countries. published in Caforio. Le Figaro. We have also to cite that the term “professionals” was and is used to indicate soldiers members of an all-volunteer force too. 1994). Sweden and Switzerland. South Africa. 16 France. 1999/2000 (six participating countries.234 Giuseppe Caforio 3 For a more detailed account of the debate on the military profession in those years. Badaracco (2002) and Keegan (1989). Russia. Slovenia. 8 The creation of the war schools in Europe dates from those years: in France the Ecole d’Application d’Etat-Major (1819). 1977: 12). However. in press. 6 A precondition for the birth of a profession. 1998). 2007). Italy. published in Caforio. 9 See. writes (2003): “for several years the British Army was promoted as ‘The Professionals’. 2001). 2004 (13 participating countries. 12 See Samuel Huntington (1957).

Bibliography Badaracco. 1994). of NCO schools that lead to a first-level university degree. Slovenia and Switzerland in the lead and Bulgaria and Poland bringing up the rear (the situation in 2000).Trends and evolution in the military profession 235 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The decline of conscription significantly reduces the sectors of society involved in defence: at the level of public opinion. missions that have become an important (at times preponderant) part of the commitment of national armed forces. The ethical reference of the officers of the European countries examined remains fully national and the strategic thinking appears to be more oriented towards national interests than European ones (see Caforio. for example. since everywhere the primary purpose of armed forces remains the preparation and conduct of war. With the partial exception of Germany. and as confirmed by the most recent international events: The professional military culture still exists in its “conventional” features. the process begins and unfolds at different times in each one. the number of citizens who have had personal experience of the military becomes less and less. Which for several countries is explained by the greater visibility that PSOs have given to the military. Bustamante. It was formulated as follows: “Looking at the whole national economy. at the most. (Nuciari. government leaders. London. But also the preparation of NCOs receives much more attention today: see the setting up. Joseph (2002) Beyond Heroic Moral Leadership: Conversations on Leadership. It may be interesting to note in this regard that the data from European research (1991/2. Center for Public Leadership. does conscription cause more costs than AVF. Fernando (1991) “Consideraciones sobre algunos factores relevantes en la . Although common to all of the examined countries. just the PSOs under UN auspices rose from 16 at the start of the 1980s to 90 in 2000. opinion leaders and opinion makers with direct experience of military life nearly disappear. so that the movement that brings the military academies closer to the civilian universities creates a procession of countries with. European Journal of Sociology. because of the waste of human resources?” The item was not reproposed in the later surveys. Boene. Germany. see note 15) show that a common defence identity is struggling to emerge among European officers. One must bear in mind here the exponential growth of the number of peacekeeping missions from the 1980s to 2000 and beyond. Which include primarily PSOs and then a series of other missions such as providing disaster relief. albeit partial. 2000–2001. Bernard (1990) “How ‘unique’ should the military be? A review of representative literature and outline of a synthetic formulation”. Here the motivations mentioned in Note 17 are at work. as Marina Nuciari wrote in 2001. Considering that. To report one datum. members of parliament. and the idea of a warless society seems to be pertinent more to the “heaven of ideas” than to political reality. The question posed took into account the global cost of conscription. 31: 3–59. in not only monetary terms. but also among the national elites. 2001: 61–2) 29 Bearing in mind that only the officers with the rank of lieutenant or. both political and non-political. captain could have been trained according to the new orientations. controlling mass immigration and combating drug trafficking. in several countries now.

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defined by .12 Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective Marina Nuciari Introduction This chapter deals with the vexed question of female integration into military forces. factors and concepts from all the abovementioned disciplines are inevitably recalled. in fact. Theories of societal change: economic. organisational science and political science are involved to a minor or major extent. It is evident. a Durkheimian view will be followed in this chapter. On the contrary. and this is evident when analysing some major contribution to the topic. The model. several disciplines’ outcomes are employed by many scholars dealing with the issue of women and the military. since the topic itself calls for more than a single-discipline approach. in its first version. To explain the trend leading to the entry of female personnel within armed forces. we can use Mady Segal’s (1995) model of female–military relationships as a departure point. on the other side. history. political economy. either for the specific topic of women’s position in the military or for the general societal change process. on the one side. To a certain extent. an interdisciplinary viewpoint is unavoidable. cultural anthropology. that when trying to say something more than a mere description of the phenomenon and its various trends. many human sciences can apply to the topic of female participation in military affairs. This position will be clarified using some theoretical models created and proposed by different scholars. Among the disciplines actually having something to say about our topic. considering that. an overall sociological outlook can give the necessary unifying vision to it. and that. gender studies. these models will be progressively interconnected in order to reach a general theoretical explanation of the variety and diversity characterising the process of women and armed forces relationships. political and cultural development and their application to women’s integration in the armed forces As an introduction to the main steps followed in this chapter. psychology. was formed by many different variables. sociology. and it would be nonsense to give here a review of existing contributions in each discipline to the study of our topic. juridical science.

psychological. all fields where human action manifests itself. the object is the access of women in a social subsystem. The model has recently been redefined and enlarged in order to better include other countries’ experiences (Iskra et al. etc. is the fact that it shows the inevitable interaction among many different levels and sectors of human reality where phenomena must be observed in order to understand a specific object: in this case. juridical. historical. a sociostructural dimension and a cultural dimension (Segal. the structure of the family (average age of marriage and maternity. and this variance is considered under an historical point-ofview as well as with a socio-economic change approach. sexuality. characteristics of the labour force (women’s participation in the labour force and occupational gender segregation). the kind and level of military technology. gender. which refer to and use economic. a strict link. public discourse about gender and gender equality. an interdisciplinary viewpoint is unavoidable. cannot be approached or understood without paying attention to. role responsibilities sharing). technological. the main factors affecting the changing role of women in the armed forces can be grouped into three sets of variables. each of them defining a specific dimension: a military dimension. social values underlining the above definitions.. the military. A modified and enlarged version of the model has been presented recently. ethnicity. the state of the civilian economy (expansion or depression). where gender-role distinction receives its absolute expression. public policy regarding race. even a sort of identification. military and cultural variables. A first general model of the women–military relationship According to Segal.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 239 Segal as structural. What is valuable in this model. values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity. the combat-to-support-function ratio. and this is correct because it touches a perpetual topic of the human condition. anthropological as well as organisational elements. Social structure variables include a country’s demographic pattern. and include the national security situation.. 2002). are added. Military variables are considered in a wide sense. political ideology. Armed forces have been traditionally defined as all-male societies. Cultural variables such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family. This is why I believe above that to explain the trend leading to the entry of female personnel into armed forces. the structure of forces and the policies driving accession to the military. adding some political variables referring to a political-science approach. in principle at least. considered in its current configuration. We could say that the phenomenon of women in the military. current leadership policies. aggressiveness expressed in humanity’s inclination to combat has long been associated as a typical masculine personality trait. Each set of variables provides positive and/or negative effects on women’s entry into the armed forces. already in its early presentation and even more in this last version. 1995). where political variables such as national security situation. has always been recognised between masculinity and the practice of war. . civil–military relations.

even though some similarities result from proximity. mutual adaptation across time. thus this last set of cultural variables seems to have a major causation capacity. The change in cultural values about women’s social roles is linked also to changes in the definition of family roles. and the growing supportive policies outside the family. and a large part of our discussion will be based on the observation of NATO countries. and especially to economic and social develop- . where a diachronic dimension is given when considering each case in its historical and social change dimension. as well as belonging to the same geographic area. The social construction of gender. direct support to combat and true combat roles included). I have already had the opportunity to raise this question before. the model can be applied to different countries. so that the move away from traditional conceptions of family and family duties. especially when societies under comparison are rather similar in a wide variety of traits. where many specific bulks of knowledge must be considered in the analysis of a single social phenomenon. at first. and proactive actions bound to adopt. A good example of cross-cultural comparison between many countries where the position of women in the military has been analysed is the group of countries belonging to NATO. but also according to different cultures. since it appears always at the background and beside every change in the other three dimensions (Nuciari.240 Marina Nuciari The latest version of Segal’s model provides a first attempt to reconcile different levels of analysis. observing that at an attentive analysis of Segal’s discussion. and it changes within the same culture across time. Thus. then a question arises about what makes the same set of variables play together in so many various ways. is culturally determined. the main cause is linked to social change. the progressive accessibility for women to every military role. since the possible variety of empirical results can arise from the ‘simple diversity’ of each empirical case. to be slight rather universal. permit a greater participation of women in military activities. and social change as a general process has to be considered. 2002). it is my opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between: 1 2 the opening to women of military roles per se. stepby-step. A different point of view arises when a cross-cultural approach is needed: if the women–military relationship is considered from a comparative perspective. Its applicability seems. both feminine and masculine. For the mere entry of female personnel in the military. and the widening of gender integration in the armed forces (that is. Even demographic restrictions can be influenced by changes in the conception of gender and a consequential opening of labour markets to women. the cultural dimension appears to be crucial. similar policies. general social and political processes. For a synchronic point of view. A cultural approach is then needed.1 Here differences are currently great. Then the answer to the question could be found in trying to assess if some of the four types of variables in the model could have a different weight or function in the determination of situations and progressive changes.

by putting together a similar but not identical number of variables. as demonstrated in her essay cited above. provides a better explanation to the second phenomenon. economic and technological change have specific impact over military organisations. a distinction has to be made.1. thus giving rise to a cross-cultural image of the level of integration of women in each country is military. as Figure 12. on the other side. 2002. she argues that servicewomen integration is not a unilinear process at all. for each one of them the integration index has been calculated. between those factors that concern women’s ‘simple presence’ in the system and those referring to women’s ‘qualified’ presence. Value change. Social policies to improve female participation and career advancement in the armed forces can help. in Western societies and in many non-Western countries. (0 ϭ lower integration. Figure 7). over the last century. In her research. on the contrary. From an analysis of this. The strength of this effort is really in its capacity to provide not only a measure for integration. Carreiras’ index can also be used to sustain the cultural hypotheses mentioned above. shows. but also the possibility of comparing different situations. l Po y la G n er d m an G y re ec Tu e r H ke C ze un y ga ch ry R Lu ep u xe b m lic bo u Fr rg an Po ce rtu ga Sp l U ni Be ain te d lgiu K m N ingd et he om rla nd s N U o ni te rwa d y St at D en es m a C rk an ad a Ita . in the sense that it does not seem to be linked to time or to the increasing number of women in the ranks. and of family roles as well. 20 ϭ higher integration) (source: Carreiras.2 Since the change in social values means a change in a crucial part of the general culture. Helena Carreiras (2002) proposed an integration index of women in the military. differences are 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Score Figure 12.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 241 ment. By making use of this possibility.1 Index of women’s military integration in NATO countries (2000 data). but they cannot stand alone if the general culture of a society does not change in order to support a different definition of male and female social roles. this is the sense I give to the statement according to which culture matters – including for women in the military. Carreiras has plotted together data from 18 NATO countries.3 An index of female soldiers’ integration From a different perspective.

and call for some explanatory reasons. In Carreiras’ words: Structural variables refer to the overall representation of women in active duty forces (1). 3 ϭ none 0 ϭ 90–100%. 1 ϭ partial. These indicators are usually considered of major importance to determine the extent of women’s roles in the military. 2 ϭ 50–66%.1 shows how the index has been formed. 3 ϭ yes 8 Harassment and gender 0 ϭ no. 1 ϭ ϩ1–5%. This is why. 2 ϭ ϩ5–10%. 2 ϭ none 7 Family programmes 0 ϭ no. Finally. Hence. together. Since it has been recognised that these factors have a strong impact over integration processes.242 Marina Nuciari relevant. occupational sex segregation (3) and rank distribution (5). including organisational structure and organisational policy indicators. since we deal here with countries belonging to an institutional alliance such as NATO! Different indicators have been chosen to build the index.4 Table 12. 1 ϭ many.1 Index of women’s military integration in NATO (IWMI) (2000) Variable (weight) 1 Global representation (3) Indicator 1 Percentage of women in total active force Measurement 0 ϭ 0–2%. attention given by policymakers to ‘quality-of-life’ areas should be taken as important elements for the qualification of women’s presence in the military. other dimensions of the integration process are included that concern respectively the structure of opportunities and power distribution. 1 ϭ 66–89%. 3 ϭ ϩ10% 0 ϭ total. the index includes two additional indicators relative to existing programs or policies aimed at confronting erosion factors. such as those derived from the difficult conciliation between family and a military occupation (6) or sexual harassment and gender equity monitoring (7). beyond the question of relative numbers. 3 ϭ less than 50% 2 Occupational integration (6) 2 Formal functional restrictions 3 Percentage in traditional functions 3 Hierarchical integration (6) 4 Formal rank restrictions 0 ϭ total. and presence or absence of formal limitations in occupational (2) and hierarchical terms (4). ranks 2 ϭ ϩ5–10%. these indicators contribute with more than 70% to the indexes’ overall weight. The impact of related policies is also captured through the inclusion of indicators pertaining to the existence of segregation practices (6). 3 ϭ yes equity monitoring . 2 ϭ few. 3 ϭ ϩ10% 4 Training segregation (2) 5 Social policies (6) 6 Segregation in basic training 0 ϭ total. 1 ϭ ϩ2–5%. 2 ϭ none 5 Percentage in officers 0 ϭ 0–1%.5 Table 12. 1 ϭ partial.

the personnel accession policies are the most frequently addressed. some of them also sustained by theoretical assumptions. Netherlands. Socio-cultural aspects. Even though some relative positions could be affected by recent changes in restriction and numerical presence (Carreiras’ data. such as values and gender-related issues. . are at stake. France. Belgium). on the other hand. Spain.1. these variables are strongly affected by socio-economic change. Denmark. Countries belonging to each portion can be considered to be part of the same cluster. Norway. a general assessment of female integration within the military is given in Figure 12. 1995). Similarity and diversity within countries: explanations from social change and development theories The above observations can be summarised in the two following propositions: • The entry of women in the military is driven mainly by structural and military variables (as defined by Mady Segal. but nevertheless. ‘but does not seem to have the same influence on overall integration’. the higherintegration portion is formed by the North-Europe cluster and English-speaking countries cluster (Belgium. from 9 to 14 points (medium integration) and from 15 to 20 (high integration). the second half of the South-Europe cluster (Spain.6 Personnel accession policies. with Turkey and half of the South-Europe cluster (Italy and Greece). UK. Poland). refer to the 2002 situation). UK and Canada). a Central–South Europe cluster (Germany. the relative positions of the 18 countries presents a high variety. USA. while the organisational format (conscription or AVF) has an effect over female presence. Portugal and Italy). The East-Europe cluster. then. belong to the lower integration portion. which can be named as follows: an English-speaking or Anglo-Saxon countries cluster (USA. and encourage the following question: is there any common factor explaining this high variety? Among the possible explanations. Portugal). and an East-Europe cluster of countries (Czech Republic. where legal rules and opportunities applied to every citizen in the labour market are signals of the overall integration of women in a given society. Hungary. Norway. could be considered as a mirror of the socio-political and economic situation of a country. Greece.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 243 By applying the index to the situation of the various NATO countries where data were available. a North-Europe cluster of countries (Netherlands. nevertheless results are rather sharp. Luxembourg. the curve can be split into three portions: from 0 to 8 points (rather low integration). Denmark and Canada). Looking at the graph. the organisational format of the military. time. at best. Carreiras’ efforts do not sustain the explicative capacity of time (integration does not seem to increase with time). along with part of the North-Central Europe cluster (France and Luxembourg) occupy the central (mid-integration) position.

mainly peripheral to the military core roles. The second point stresses the role of culture: since women usually enter the military in a segregated way or with relevant limitations. and it makes possible the opening of professional roles to women in the armed forces even in the absence of national emergencies or demographic shortages. social values underlining gender and family definitions. in various forms. As far as the first proposition is concerned. Women’s Corps in the UK. and the professional practice. and by cultural change in particular: when career opportunities are at stake. are already accepted in parallel roles within civilian society. The process of civilianisation goes along with female emancipation and progressive integration in every occupation and profession within Western societies. in fact. The simple presence of women in the armed forces in the various countries can be found historically. progressively reduces impermeability of military roles with respect to women: women. when selective criteria for advancement become more subjective. and without any intention towards gender integration. such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family. public discourse about gender and gender equality. there is an increase of highly bureaucratic roles and of scientific–technological and managerial content roles as well. removes the perception of activities in the military as intrinsically combat related. then discrimination and segregation can remain untouched if social values (that is. values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity. as in many other Western and non-Western countries.244 • Marina Nuciari Women soldiers’ integration is driven by cultural variables. Such a process. it is no longer possible to keep the armed forces as a world apart. and became a common prominent trait in every contemporary Western (and some non-Western) armed forces. the level and scope of these limitations are strongly affected by culture. To a certain extent. the progressive accessibility for women to every military role. Canada or USA. socio-economic change has had a strong impact on military organisations. 2002). With civilianisation. direct support to combat and true combat roles included). The organisational structure becomes similar to that of a civilian administration. than to the opening to women of military roles per se. culture) about gender remain more or less untouched as well. are examples of a certain recognition of women’s capacity to serve in case of emer- . As I have stated above and elsewhere (Nuciari. values change – including the prevailing of value orientations based on universalistic principles combined with the so-called principle of achievement (as opposed to the traditional ascription principle) as well as of equity-based reasoning as far as citizenship rights and duties entitlement based on gender are concerned – which provides a better explanation of growing gender integration in the armed forces (that is. and it was the cause of the well-known process of ‘civilianisation’. In the first half of twentieth century. in my opinion. expected to remain essentially peaceful. defined and described by Janowitz in the early 1960s. many technical roles are aligned with roles in big civilian corporations.

differences in development level as well as in institutional assessment are considered under a comparative viewpoint and explained by means of cultural differences. According to Inglehart’s results. social and political change. economic determinism is present in virtually all modernisation theories. Stiglitz. the modernisation process seems to be conditioned by cultural legacies and by religious traditions in a way that gives rise to many different paths to social change. in the sense that a certain type of social assessment must contain a given variety of elements. and that this discontinuity is the mark of the modern society in a general and all-embracing sense. political and cultural institutions are pushed to change and to adjust one another in given geometries. driven by the diffusion of the industrial system of production.. and even globalisation theorists from positive as well as negative sides (Omahe. along which transitional situations are the rule. Convergence theorists in the economic field (Kerr et al. have stated that the rise of industrial society has meant a break with past ‘traditional’ societies. From simple presence to full integration. . This is a very recent occurrence. 1976) and many others. and rather rare in its accomplishment. 1993. in this chapter the position of female soldiers in the various countries is analysed as part of the general process of socio-cultural change. in fact. such as nurses. a path recalling a somewhat traditional vision of social and economic change (Rostow. from classic evolutionism and Marxist tradition to contemporary scholars such as Daniel Bell (1973. Bearing in mind the distinction between ‘simple presence’ and ‘integration’. But it is an entirely different phenomenon when female soldiers are considered to be members of an organisation where roles and tasks are assigned without distinction in terms of gender. but it can be considered as the final point of a sort of developmental process where the starting point is the possibility given to women to serve in the military organisation in some peripheral – but necessary – roles. Modernisation theorists. or even drivers or administrative personnel. a long road has to be run. but where segregation was the rule. following the traditional–modern–postmodern trend proposed by Inglehart’s works (1997 and 2004). and this outlook can also be a great help in the study of the women–military relationship. where every change is inevitably driven by social forces so that any society will follow a similar path.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 245 gency (war mobilisation). or recall occasions and situations where women’s contribution was worthy of recognition. In this respect. and this is obtained by a sort of social necessity by means of which economic. 1960). and variety a persistent trait. all historical accounts about women and the armed forces begin with statements such as ‘women have always participated in military forces’. social. however. But this position can have different meanings according to different cultures. 1961). Considering women’s integration in the military as a developmental process could mean imagining a linear change going through steps. 2002) do reflect this conviction about a general trend to a shared model of society. On the other side. With major or minor emphasis. even when the level of economic development is similar amongst nations. Emphasis on culture is now predominant in many analyses of economic.

and two research-based types of cultural mapping will be here recalled. value change and political democracy has been supposed or taken for granted by many scholars for decades. 1998: 35). 2003). on the contrary. but the path towards integration is culturally dependent. national cultures are subjected to changes. and to Weber’s explanation of capitalistic industrialisation on the other. their integration gives rise to complex societies where . and these differences are not unlimited. 2003). we could rely on Dahl’s conclusion when saying that ‘the exact nature of the relationship among socio-economic modernization. These three components are socio-economic development. Recently a tentative attempt to demonstrate the existence of a complex syndrome named Human Development (HD) using empirical and wide-range data has been made by Ronald Inglehart and others (Welzel et al. and GES can be considered in the light of the above mentioned cultural maps (Inglehart and Norris. democratization and the creation of a democratic culture is almost as puzzling today as it was a quarter-century ago’ (Dahl. measuring the level of gender gap in a great number of societies. cultural diversity can be compared according to the five cultural dimensions model proposed by Geert Hofstede in 1980. • • • Modernisation and human development: the role of culture A certain link between socioeconomic development. Countries can be ranged in a Gender Equality Scale (GES). however. to test the hypothesis according to which the simple presence of women can be a consequence of socio-economic development. In a changing and dynamic situation. In a transcultural perspective.246 Marina Nuciari Moreover. but. In the following paragraphs we shall try to explain the above assumptions according to the following steps: • National cultures can be grouped in various clusters according to some general dimensions. even though links have been questioned as far as causal variables are concerned: the main question. that gender is a social definition and that gender relations are culturally defined.. from Inglehart’s and Hofstede’s works respectively. A century later. Clusters according to gender gap can be compared with clusters according to military integration. however. Countries can also be grouped in clusters according to their similarities in the process of female entry and integration in the respective military forces. HD as a theoretical construct is proposed as an integrating framework formed by the three main factors usually used when arguing about societal change and development. is a classical question making reference to Marx’s theory of socio-economic change on the one side. some rather obvious observations have to be pointed out: that cultures differ from one another. and in a globalised condition these changes can help to reduce cultural differences. they can be measured according to a definite and limited number of indices. however. value change and democracy.

its motives-component. which is drawn from the recently published volume. cultural change and democratisation respectively. cultural change indicates ‘the growing emphasis on self-expression’ as ‘the central motivating factor leading people to demand broader choice. and it is indicated as its rules-component. By means of Inglehart’s cultural maps. and it indicates that the role of cultural zones is complementary to the playing factors of Human Development. political culture and political institutions’. since it helps to consider at an operative level economic data and theories. which Inglehart indicates as the means-component of human choice.. 2000). shared values on a second and political institutions on a third side work together to realise what can be considered to be ‘the core principle of modernization’. so that a certain .’ In the author’s words (Welzel et al. that is. Socio-economic development provides individual resources. This concept is taken as central in Inglehart et al. political democracy provides effective rights so that human choice could be exerted. and give to different processes a theoretical ground for interpretation. This concept goes a step further than the modernisation theory proposed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) (where the impact of cultural zones was shown on self-expression values beyond the effects of economic development). 2003: 7): Individual resources.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 247 economic factors. 1955: 9–19). These components become increasingly widespread through the process of socio-economic development. self-expression and effective rights are the three components of Human Development.’s tentative attempt to integrate ‘major changes in socio-economic structure. that is. and represent its means-motives-rules components. 14). and political structures and processes. and by means of an integrated interdisciplinary approach. Yet. in the final round of their World Values Surveys will be used here. in that it does not imply that the three processes go upwards together in a linear direction. the capability of human beings to choose the lives they want must also be considered (Sen. on the one side. we can compare national situations by considering wider cultural zones. This theory of social change provides us with a general framework where the analysis of female entry and integration in the military can be done using a cross-cultural viewpoint. that is ‘the broadening of human choice’ (Lewis. Human Beliefs and Values (2004: 12. social values (cultural) changes. In this map (as in the previous ones) a rather stable (even though on the move) set of reciprocal positions are occupied by the 81 countries surveyed. Human Development is not a teleological concept. with Amartya Sen’s approach on human capability. The cultural map and the cultural clusters of countries The last version of the cultural map presented by Ronald Inglehart et al.

South Asian. an English Speaking group. We have. 1996) and very similar to those already presented in previous rounds of the World Values Survey (1997. based on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. and adherence to family and communal obligations.. Each cluster has distinctive characters and positions on the two cultural dimensions shown in the map: For example. a secular worldview in which authority is legitimated by rational–legal norms. all of the former communist societies rank relatively . the historically Protestant societies tend to rank higher on the Survival/Self-Expression dimension than the historically Roman Catholic societies. a Catholic Europe. these cultural. it would not be feasible to compare the values of each public on each topic separately. rather homogeneous zones are named according to some broad dimensions such as language or geographical position. taken by Inglehart as the true dominant factor able to discriminate between similarities and diversities. This dimension is based on a large number of items that reflect emphasis on obedience to traditional authority (usually religious authority). and norms of sharing. Clusters of countries in the cultural map are defined by Inglehart by means of some cultural traditions. African and Latin American countries. Excommunist countries. These two dimensions tap: 1 Traditional authority vs Secular–Rational authority. These two dimensions. or. 2004: 11) 2 A look at the map shows the presence of clusters of countries highly consistent with the groups of countries where analysis on female-soldier integration has been possible using data from Helena Carreiras. Survival values vs Self-Expression values. reflect most of the key values examined in the Values Surveys. 2000). Confucian countries. (Inglehart et al. Orthodox countries. emphasizing hard work and self-denial.248 Marina Nuciari number of cultural clusters can be distinguished. This reflects the fact that in post-industrial society. thus functioning as a latent assimilatory factor. but mainly according to religious traditions. Since hundreds of questions were asked in these surveys. in fact. as well as groups for Protestant Europe. [Here] the orientations of these publics [are compared] on two important dimensions that sum up the cross-national variation on scores of narrower values. They also permit further distinctions to be described later in the chapter. drawn from Huntington’s cultural zones (1994. Conversely. quoting from Inglehart. historically unprecedented levels of wealth and the emergence of the welfare states have given rise to a shift from scarcity norms. emancipation of women and sexual minorities and related Postmaterialist priorities such as emphasis on self-expression. on the other hand. to postmodern values emphasizing the quality of life. linked with an emphasis on economic accumulation and individual achievement.

from materialism to postmaterialism in Western societies.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective Secular–rational values 2. an Orthodox society that did not experience communist rule.5 2 Figure 12. Pakistan. Thematising the transition as a change from prevailing Survival values and Traditional Authority to prevailing SelfExpression values and Legal–Rational authority.0 Ϫ1.0 0.5 Ϫ1 Ϫ0. (Ibid. Algeria. this theory has tried to .5 0 0. Jordan and Egypt) constitutes a relatively compact group in the Southwest quadrant of the map. Bangladesh. low on the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. The Islamic societies fall into two clusters: a larger group containing the mainline Islamic societies (Indonesia.0 249 1. while the Islamic societies that experienced communist rule (Azerbaijan and Albania) are much more secular than the rest of the Islamic societies.5 1 1.5 0 Ϫ0.: 15) Cultural traditions are then considered to be affecting the trend described in Inglehart’s first work.5 1. Iran.5 Traditional values Ϫ1. and subsequent works that demonstrate the existence of a path from Traditional. 2004).0 Ϫ2 Ϫ1. Morocco. and ranks substantially higher on Self-Expression values than the other communist societies. The historically Orthodox societies form a coherent cluster within the broader ex-communist zone – except for Greece. through Modern to Postmodern society.5 Ϫ2.2 Cultural map of 81 societies (source: Inglehart and Welzel. Turkey.

a Gender Equality Scale is built up. may encounter fewer barriers than those challenging conventional sexual stereotypes in military. social and cultural change. and they maintain similarities within them and differences across them over time. as we are going to consider later in this chapter. but culture is even more important in affecting career and true integration by means of effective policies. reflecting traditional sex roles of women as caregivers. 2003: 32). 2003). and religious institutions. The evidence seems to be that the process is not simply nonlinear. by means of several indicators. The scale is intended to measure the attitudes towards gender equality in a given population. or positive discrimination for women. by means of the same data set. the cultural definition of gender is part of the topic. by nation. by per capita GDP and by other variables such as age cohort and societal modernisation indicators (Inglehart and Norris. the right-upper side where Self-Expression values and Legal–Rational authority . and voluntary organizations. a specific assessment of the gender relationships in the various countries under survey is available where. it looks evident that countries ranking as most egalitarian belong to the most affluent quadrant of the cultural map (mean score on the 100-point scale is 80 per cent). A formal specification of this last proposition could be the following main hypothesis: socio-economic development is important in determining the entry of women into the military. a question arises as to whether a typology as such make sense as far as female soldiers are concerned. (Inglehart and Norris. The gender equality scale From the same research programmes. Ranking on a 100-point scale the nations surveyed in 1995–2001. health. As far as our topic on female integration in the military is related to economic. taking into consideration the fact that women’s emancipation is a multidimensional phenomenon where inconsistencies are possible in different social sectors: Women working in sectors such as education.250 Marina Nuciari demonstrate the causative capacity of economic development in pushing societies upwards from tradition to postmodernity. Different societies surveyed as different countries do cluster together in groups forming traditional cultural zones. but is also not culture-free. 2003: 30–1) The scale is formed by five items taken from the four rounds of the World Values Surveys.7 and the ranking of nations in the Gender Equality Scale ‘provides preliminary support for the proposition that attitudes toward traditional or egalitarian roles for women and men vary systematically according to levels of economic development’ (Inglehart and Norris. political. gender parity. To this respect. Equal opportunities policies reflecting common classical liberal beliefs may prove more popular than strategies designed to achieve affirmative action.

looking at the cultural map. Canada. Finland. Jordan. In Inglehart and Norris’ words: Percentage disagree: men have U S/ more right to a job C an ad a/ Au s/ N W Z es tE ur op La e tin Am er ic a Ea st Su Eu bro Sa pe ha ra n Af ric a So ut h As ia O th er Is la m ic Ea st As Ar ia ab co un tri es 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 . Income and wealth are not considered as the only variables responsible for different levels of gender-equality recognition since. Georgia. Notes Regional groupings Arab countries: Algeria. Egypt. Western Europe: Austria. Poland. Azerbaijan. Eastern Europe: Armenia. Egypt. Spain. and many countries score much less. Germany. 2004). Slovakia. Macedonia. United Kingdom. and are followed by a large number of industrial societies (such as Latin American countries and postcommunist countries) where gender equality is lower. Pakistan. Russia. New Zealand. with a certain tendency towards Postmodernity. Uganda. East Asia: China. Armenia. Sweden. Morocco. Lithuania. Philippines. Belarus. English-speaking: Australia. East Germany. a last group is formed by agrarian societies (Georgia. Norway. Latin America: Argentina. West Germany. Brazil. Iran. a condition that Inglehart has called as a process of erosion of institutional authority and the rise of citizen participation in politics and in the society at large. Bangladesh. Uruguay. Hungary. Slovenia. South Asia: India. Moldova. Czech Republic. Taiwan. Saudi Arabia. Dominican Republic. Croatia. Kyrgyzstan. Iran. Vietnam. Ireland. South Africa. Bulgaria. Yugoslavia. Canada. the position of countries can differ in the socio-cultural dimension even when it could be similar as far as GDP is concerned. United States. Republic of Korea. Bosnia. Bangladesh and Jordan) where the mean score on the Gender Equality Scale is around 60 per cent. Morocco. Other Islamic: Albania. Norway. Switzerland. Turkey. Columbia. principal are absolutely dominant. These countries (Finland. Sweden. Indonesia. Venezuela. Azerbaijan. El Salvador. Chile. Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective Support gender equality 251 Figure 12. Australia) are in their large majority postindustrial societies also in terms of GDP. Mexico.3 Support for gender equality in nine cultural zones (source: Inglehart and Welzel. Peru. USA. New Zealand. Estonia. Ukraine. Spain. Zimbabwe. Romania. Latvia. Belgium. Luxembourg. Philippines. Tanzania. Nigeria. Greece. Iceland. Italy. Singapore. Japan. Netherlands. Denmark. with a mean score of 68.

according to which servicewomen are accepted until a given percentage over total force. child rearing and sexual behavior. . proving similar to some of the Islamic North African and Middle Eastern nations (e. functions and specialties are concerned. so that it has been possible to cluster the various countries about which coherent and rather systematic data are available according to seven factors. restrictions as far as roles. A tentative typology of women–armed forces and culture linkages After some 50 years. Attitudes toward gender equality are central to this much broader and more diffuse process of cultural change. format of the armed forces. presence and type of social policies. . . women in the armed forces have not yet reached a unique status in every military institution. Nigeria. based on draft system or AVF.g. . but within this group there are distinctions between the Protestant countries of northern Europe and the historically Roman Catholic nations of Western Europe. These factors are the following: time (year of the legal/formal acceptance of female personnel in military ranks). Their status levels are greatly varied so that it is difficult to trace a uniform picture. the experience of Communist rule. And the ex-Communist states form another cluster. What we can do is to take some situation as being pivotal to a specific type. ceiling. .252 Marina Nuciari Religious traditions seem to have an enduring impact on contemporary value systems. Zimbabwe and Uganda). Data from CWINF permit the comparison of 18 out of the now 25 countries belonging to NATO. The most traditional and materialistic publics live in the Sub-Saharan African countries (Tanzania. including religious traditions. (2003: 156) This last statement has central relevance for our issue on women’s participation in military organisations. and datasets about cultural zones and gender equality (based on subjective statements of surveyed publics) are both useful to better explain differences among countries where female soldiers are a complex and many-sided reality. as well as similar attitudes toward gender roles. The publics in Latin American countries also share relatively similar values. and to describe then a tentative typology of servicewomen and society relationships. religious and economic questions. reflecting the fact that their publics have relatively similar values on political. colonial ties.] A society’s culture reflects its entire historical heritage. . . Postindustrial societies prove to be the most secular and postmaterialist. family policies and proactive attitudes in order to facilitate . which can then give an idea of the position and integration of servicewomen in the military organisation. . Egypt and Jordan) [. their status being continuously affected by different paces of change in the various national countries. and its contemporary level of economic development.

In this subgroup. the Central-European cluster and South-European cluster belong together to the Roman Catholic area. this cluster could be divided into two sub-clusters according to the dominant traditional culture. In the definition given by Vicki Nielsen. namely a North-Central-European cluster (split into two sub-clusters. and the Eastern-Europe cluster is part of the zone named by Inglehart as post-communist countries. Strictly speaking. five) clusters. this is totally integrated. as we can see further on. characterised partly by a traditionally Protestant culture and partly by a traditionally Catholic culture. Belgium. representation of women in these countries remains rather low relative to some other NATO countries. a common trait is the early appearance of a general trend towards integration (when compared with other NATO countries). it seems possible to rename some of the groups following Inglehart’s definitions: the North-European cluster can be renamed as the Protestant countries cluster. a South-European cluster. the existence or not of restrictions in recruitment and career advancement. The North-Central European cluster is formed by North-European countries and. an English-speaking cluster. deployments in operative theatres. in the first subgroup we can find ‘the most progressive countries where female soldiers are concerned’. leaving aside the ‘time’ factor. and Central and mainly Catholic countries on the other side (Belgium. Denmark. whose resemblance with those shown in Inglehart’s map are actually very relevant: these similarities permit us to speak of four (but to a certain extent. Germany and France). the English-speaking cluster is coincident with Inglehart’s English-speaking zone. at least on a formal basis. Countries included here are Norway. countries can be grouped in clusters according to relative similarities. and an Eastern-Europe cluster. France could also fit better here than within the South-European cluster.9 being countries where female soldiers have been allowed to serve in almost all posts since the mid-1980s. and a strong bulk of social and family policies have been adopted to sustain not merely recruitment but also female personnel’s careers and retention. Denmark and the Netherlands). Germany. Luxembourg. the quality and quantity of social policies and proactive orientations towards integration. Actually. The main differences among the clusters. North and Central European). this distinction between two religious traditions is of some help in grouping Northern and Protestant countries on the one side (Norway. Restrictions in role assignment are very low or non-existent. Actually. and the ways through which training and deployment are addressed. recruitment and training modalities (integrated or not). according to Inglehart. Confronting these clusters with those presented in Figure 12. Luxembourg. As far as training is concerned.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 253 recruitment and retention of female personnel. Netherlands. no ceiling was imposed on recruitment from the beginning. and deployments in . even though it is not possible here to go too far with these distinctions. are given by the relative percentages of servicewomen both globally and in the various hierarchical ranks.8 By considering the differences in the modalities presented by each factor.2 (considering the obvious absence of a large number of nations included in Inglehart’s map that do not belong to NATO).

where in 1989 a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decided that ‘all restrictions barring women from employment in the Canadian Forces be removed. Here we find the cases of the most recent opening up of services to women (Greece and Italy). are not only possible but practically sustained (this is especially the case in Norway and Denmark).13 US servicewomen has been deployed all over the world in combat as well as noncombat specialties. and the presence of ceilings and exclusions from various roles or posts (Greece in particular. or a certain attention being paid to reduce possible obstacles to female adaptation to military life. and only in Greece are women banned by law from combat tasks. A similar situation is found for Canada. later than in the previous group and in some cases with many restrictions.12 All three countries legally accepted women in the forces very early in the last century (in some cases. more similar to the one in the Northern subgroup. Spain and Portugal. gave them some posts in the 1970s and almost all posts around the end of the 1980s. the four Southern European countries that started opening up entry to their armed forces to women in the 1980s and 1990s. quotas for female enlistment were abandoned in 1998. Belgian women soldiers enjoy a better integration. such as the presence of strong proactive orientations towards family policies (Luxembourg. Germany). in fact. In some other respects. while some restrictions (for combat roles. gradually but only very recently reduced or abandoned: in France. 11. all posts are open in principle). the sole exception being service in submarines’. but this last restriction was abolished in 2001. just a few years after the end of the Second World War). from line officers’ roles in the army. full integration is declared in legal terms. and by persisting restrictions in role assignments.4 per cent and 8.1 per cent respectively). Here similarities can be seen in a later arrival of women in the services. proactive integration policies are pursued. with the only exclusion being direct ground combat positions since 1993. usually in Crises Response Operations. Portugal and Spain. Germany and France.254 Marina Nuciari operative theatres.11 The English-speaking cluster represents the peak in terms of servicewomen presence: United States. Luxembourg. Canada and United Kingdom. in Germany a ruling from the European High Court of Justice was needed in January 2000 to prompt the government to change legislation so that women could enter into the Bundeswehr without restrictions. and Italy to a certain extent for quotas). record the highest presence of women soldiers when compared with all the other NATO countries (14 per cent. such as Belgium. The relative exclusion of female personnel from some specialties and from combat positions is not legal in every instance (in Italy. According to information given by the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces in 2001. this subgroup has many indicator modalities in common with the Northern subgroup. Italy.14 . and from the majority of roles in the navy and the air force. while differences in some training standards are maintained (as in the cases of Germany and France).10 The second subgroup is formed by mainly Catholic countries. The South-European cluster comprises Greece. for example) are maintained on the other. In general it seems that a double-sided orientation is present: on the one side. around the 1970s and after. in fact.

that is for Hungary. In a somewhat isolated position. but recruitment was then stopped. integration programmes and policies strongly devoted to continuous improvement reflect an advanced situation with respect to female integration. the early date of entry. and the early removal of almost all restrictions in comparison with all the other NATO countries. recruitment.6 per cent in 2001).15 and now they are integrated into the three services with the only exceptions of Royal Marine Commandos. A general overview shows a situation where women soldiers remain somewhat in the minority in the services (with the exception of Hungary. In Inglehart’s map. What makes this cluster homogeneous is the early arrival of women on the scene. including combatants. that is in those units where primary duty is direct combat. most importantly. and they serve . so that it is difficult to ascertain something common in even these three countries. seem to be the main goals now motivating the armed forces’ courses of action. belonging to different traditions and cultural frameworks. This double-sided trend has various and different effects on size. and policies on female soldiers are simply a part of this. the early abandonment of ceilings and role restrictions. This prolonged experience gave rise to a certain pivotal role for the Anglo-Saxon militaries as examples of female integration and advancement. social and family policies are changing as well. Justifications for these restrictions include medical reasons and combat effectiveness. This singularity can also be found in the relationships of women and the military: women have been accepted into military academies since 1955. however. in the light of democratisation on the one side. and only in 1992 were women cadets allowed again into academies. Turkey is positioned in the South-Western quadrant. This means that women are accepted in officers’ roles only. but here only data for the first three ‘new entries’. women soldiers ‘were allowed to serve at sea in surface ships. restrictions to the soldier’s role were strongly present before entry into NATO. and all aircrew roles were opened’. and reduction and rationalisation on the other side. in order to assure better opportunities. Royal Armored Corps and in the RAF regiment. where countries scoring high on Traditional Authority and Survival Values are located. and. career and the general integration of women. Downsizing usually has unfavourable consequences for female employment in the services (and also elsewhere!). At a structural level. even though this was not totally realised in practice. will be considered. Restructuring and rationalisation. and are now slowly being abandoned. Since the early 1990s.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 255 The case of the United Kingdom is rather similar. The East-European cluster should include all the new NATO member countries. Czech Republic and Poland. where they numbered 9. Turkey does not match with any of the above clusters. however. Legal requirements for admittance into the European Union (the so-called aquis communautaire) has necessitated many changes and restructuring in the armed forces. Generally speaking. while equal opportunities policies are part of the spirit of the European Union and of the mainstream of communitarian policy. while this position is borderline with the upper part of the map.

Individualism/Collectivism Index measures the relative prevalence of collectivity over the individual (high ICI) in a somewhat Durkheimian definition of the subjection of the individual to the group. Masculinity/Femininity Index (MFI). administrative and logistics services. Secular–Rational authority and Survival values vs. In wishing to better explore the cultural dimension. Well-being values) helps to understand differences in the situations of female soldiers. and measured by means of corresponding indices: Power Distance Index (PDI). on the opposite side. The position of each country on the GES in Figure 12. and to his/her in-group in particular.16 If training for women cadets is similar to their male counterparts. the consideration of the position of countries in the Cultural Map derived from Inglehart’s work according to the two main cultural dimensions (Traditional authority vs. their number within the total force is very limited. and Long–Short Time Orientation (LTO). the ranking of countries on the two scales is strikingly similar! This is further evidence of the strict relationship between each military and its society or. a low ICI means that culture is mainly individualistic and that the individual is free to define his/her own life with little or no relevance given to in-groups. In this theory. where a low score means a more egalitarian culture. presented by Geert Hofstede and based on wide and replicated empirical surveys all around the world. As a consequence. Individualism/Collectivism Index (ICI). especially if we compare the GES made by means of World Values Surveys with the Index of Women Integration made by Carreiras: if we remove from the first scale the countries that are not present in the second. between each military and the culture of its society. Countries surveyed by Hofstedean programmes have given rise to specific scores on each dimensional index. UAI is the measure for the capacity of culture to accept uncertainty and to accept what the future will take with low or no . and it does not exceed 4 per cent of the total number of cadets. five cultural dimensions are considered. and according to relative scores. better. gives more insights into the women–military relationships in the various countries under investigation and in each cluster.256 Marina Nuciari mainly in technical. deployment (in peacekeeping operations) is limited to medical units. How culture matters: an Hofstedean explanation We have said that culture has a crucial impact on the relationships between women and the armed forces. we can rely on another well-known theory of cultural diversity. To a certain extent. and this situation seems likely to remain stable in the near future. The reasons given for this limitation to officers’ roles relates to the fact that the recruitment of female soldiers in the rank and file is unnecessary because of the abundance of young males willing to serve in the forces.3. Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). groups of countries can be distinguished according to relative similarities. PDI measures the extent to which social hierarchies and different power distributions are legitimated and accepted within a culture: a high score on PDI means a highly hierarchical culture.

are not equally adequate to an all-male or a diverse military society. Looking with the lenses of these three dimensions. In the North-Centre Europe cluster. it is open to innovation and change. where a long-term orientation prevails and is consistent with Confucian ethics. a certain degree of cultural similarity can be asserted among countries manifesting similar positions in women–military relationships. are rated highly against uncertainty and relatively more masculine. and finally Uncertainty Avoidance. to a new and modern image when Power Distance is low and there is a tendency to flat organisational patterns. In the South-Europe cluster. Turkey scores high on Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. which measures aggressive/assertive values against caring and expressive orientations. and it is in a mid-position on the Masculinity–Femininity Index. the consequence is a strong need for norms and rules in the high UAI cultures. . a low score indicates a culture where uncertainty is taken as normal. and it does not assert masculine orientations more than femininity ones. Among the many consequences. and rather open to change and innovation in the northern subcluster. rather. medium Power Distance and a relatively more Masculine than Feminine orientation. Dimensions considered relevant in this respect are Power Distance. In the Englishspeaking cluster. patience. countries considered here in relation to female military personnel integration can also be grouped according to their respective position on some of the culture dimensions – results are rather similar to the clusters already formed using other factors. since hierarchy is related to the military. By using three out of the five dimensions. LTO index measures a particular consideration of time which seems to be typical of Chinese and Oriental cultures. culture is not so hierarchical.2. promoting solidarity and reciprocity in a so-called ‘feminine’ type of behaviour. these are the definition given by Hofstede of ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ cultures. a masculine culture sees a larger role differentiation among genders. Eastern countries show a generally strong Uncertainty Avoidance. while the central subcluster (France and Belgium) shows higher Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. to a ‘conventional’ and traditional image of military institution when hierarchical authority is stressed and vertical lines prevail. Masculinity/Femininity. as can be shown in Table 12. a set of traits very similar to the South-European cluster. where extended rule systems and certainty are positively or neutrally evaluated. thus supporting a ‘masculine’ way of behaviour. thus sustaining parsimony. values are generally more inclined to recognise social hierarchies. or emphasising care and attention to others. and a low need and impatience for too-rigid and detailed rules in low UAI cultures. endurance and the capacity to follow long-term projects. A culture can promote self-assertion and aggressiveness in interpersonal relationships. and change is considered as a danger or as chance. linked to more masculine value orientations. while feminine cultures do not stress differences in gender roles. the situation differs: cultures are far less hierarchical. mainly oriented to feminine values.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 257 anxiety: a high value means a high inability to cope with uncertainty.

H ϭ high score. the Western culture in a broader sense. since a certain degree of consistency can be found with the more or less positive and proactive orientations towards female integration into military institutions and the general characteristics of national cultures. are all highly industrialised countries (whilst at different stages of advancement). showing that social policies implemented by countries to improve female participation in the military are also . p. L/M ϭ low-medium score. Notes L ϭ low score on dimension. our main hypothesis (formulated earlier. and are part of a unique cultural area. Hofstede. 250) finds an appreciable degree of confirmation. Given these differences in the general culture of the various countries. we have found a strong coherence between the two. UAI and MAS dimensions Country Canada USA United Kingdom Norway Netherlands Denmark Belgium Germany Luxembourg France Spain Portugal Italy Greece Turkey Czech Republic Hungary Poland PDI L M L L L L M/H L – H M H M H H M M/L M/H UAI M M L M M L H M/H – H H H H H H H H H MAS M M/H M/H L L L M M/H – L/M L/M L H M M M H M Cluster English-speaking cluster North-Centre European cluster South-European cluster East-European countries Source: author’s adjustment from G. Conclusion The assertion posed at the beginning of this chapter is that there should be some general reasons that can explain the large variety of situational traits characterising the relationship between women and armed forces in contemporary societies which – it must be underlined – belong to the same alliance (NATO).258 Marina Nuciari Table 12. M ϭ medium score. 1997.2 Position of NATO countries according to PDI. Comparing these clusters with those found by Ronald Inglehart as a result of his worldwide research on socio-cultural change and political development. But we have seen that the situations of female personnel can be grouped in clusters of countries where policies can be seen to differ enough from one to another. M/H ϭ medium/high score.

A. www. political and cultural elements play a synergic and complex role in helping or hindering the status of women in military roles. Special Edition. 13 www. Hofstede. Carreiras. university education is more important for a boy. H.htm. most cross-national analyses deal. (1998) ‘Development and democratic culture’. CWINF.int/ims/2001/win/uk. it is necessary for women to have children to be fulfilled. Dahl. G. 15 www. Brussels (May). New York. Bell. 11 See on this: www. (2002) Gender Integration in the Armed Forces: a Cross National Comparison of Policies and Practices in NATO Countries. Harrison. 334–9. References Bell. 8 This topic has been developed in Nuciari. structural. M. according to Carreiras’ research. New York: McGraw-Hill.htm. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Journal of Democracy.int/ims/2001/win/greece.Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective 259 ruled by similar discriminative dimensions. 10 See CWINF. New York. can be compared by means of a small number of complex dimensions (thus considering many different traits): the specific position of each national society on each dimensional index describing the general culture shows acceptable coherence with the related women–military relationships as far as integration and proactive dispositions are concerned. In order to find a causal factor for female integration within the military. 5 Carreiras (2002: 5–6).int/ims/2001/win/turkey. is only available for NATO countries. Basic Books. . Notes 1 This choice is obligatory because a database on female soldiers. while. Annual Conference.nato.int/ims/2001/win/us. 9 Nielsen (2001: 26). 2 These observations are developed in M. and.htm. New York. (1997) Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind. Year-in-Review. (forthcoming). woman wants to have children as single parents. D.nato. 14 www. according to Hofstede’s research. mainly or totally. 6 Carreiras (2002: 5–6). Nuciari (forthcoming). where data can be easily compared.nato.P. (1976) The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. 2001 (Updated Web Edition. men should have more right to a job than women.E. for the same reasons. social. 7 The five items are as follows: men make better political leaders than women. Basic Books. in Segal’s theory. 2002). R. S. 12 Data from CWINF.int/ims/2001/win/canada. and Huntington. time is not a good predictor of growing integration. with NATO data. 4 See Carreiras (2002: 5). (2000) Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. Basic Books. The final assertion debated in this chapter is that different societies contain different cultures that. D. L.htm.nato.nato.htm. 16 See for data. 3 For a wide-ranging discussion of social change and development all around the world see Harrison and Huntington (2000).

Richard D.-D. Dunlop. 9. 72. (1961) The Stages of Economic Growth. Inc. R. Kluwer/Plenum Publishers. Iskra. Cambridge.. in G. A. Nuciari. W. Cambridge. Inglehart. Irvin. Stiglitz.. Kerr. Web Edition. (2000) Development as Freedom. R. H.. Inglehart. Diez-Medrano.E. and Myers. Inglehart. (1994) The Clash of Civilization?. Inglehart. present and future’. Trainor. Nielsen.. Harvard University Press. and Luiskx. Lewis. 2nd edn. Anchor. de C. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Caforio (ed. (2004) Modernization. (1960) Industrialism and Industrial Man. Princeton. U. (2003) Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. 2: 26. 6: 757–75.. R. New York. L. New York. Mady W. Rostow. Foreign Affairs. New York. American Sociological Review. 49.W. (2000) ‘Modernization. F.. Halman.P. Gender and Society. Mexico. C. Inglehart. S. . R. European Journal of Political Research.) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. Cambridge University Press. Homewood. K. Harper. M. S. Princeton University Press. 42 (April). and Welzel. C. Siglo XXI Editores.W. W. Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. and Klingemann.P. M.T. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. (2001) ‘Women in Uniform’. (1993) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. New York.W. C. Sen. (1955) The Theory of Economic Growth.260 Marina Nuciari Huntington. Brisbane (7–13 July). (1995) ‘Women’s military roles cross-nationally: past. and Baker. R.A. New York and Cambridge. J. W. S. New York. Inglehart. J. and Norris. S.. 65 (February): 19–51.A. MA. J. and Segal. Simon & Schuster. D. P. Leithauser. R. Norton & Company. Cambridge University Press. Ch. Cambridge University Press. Segal. Welzel. W. Harbison. (2002) ‘Women in the military: sociological arguments for integration’.E. (2004) Human Values and Beliefs: a Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys. Omahe.V.A. Paper presented at ISA World Congress. New York. NATO Review. Huntington. (2002) Women’s Participation in Armed Forces Cross-nationally: Expanding Segal’s Model. 3: 22–49. Basanez.. (2003) ‘The theory of human development: a cross-cultural analysis’. M. cultural change and the persistence of traditional values’. R. M.

1 Second. there is not always sufficient time to debate publicly and in depth the actions needed to avert the dangers. claims to legitimate rule were based on. Therefore democracy and efficiency are not two opposite concepts. a contradiction can arise between the need for quick decision-making and the citizen’s right to transparent decisionmaking as well as parliamentary oversight. In other words. natural disasters. Every state and its society needs to have a competent political leadership and government agencies which are able to act efficiently. In modern political systems. by agreement. religious or hereditary grounds. conflict and war. or by imposition’. state institutions have to act quickly and decisively in order to divert dangers. Efficiency means that the political system is working in a quick and effective way. A political system that is efficient but not legitimate can hardly be called a democracy. Especially in times of emergencies. Democratic political systems that are ineffective have the danger of becoming illegitimate in the long term as people will have difficulty in accepting and supporting continuous inefficient political leadership. Legitimacy means that the members of a polity recognise the right of their rulers to govern. Democracy is a type of political system whereas efficiency is criterion which can be applied to any sort of political systems. The relationship between efficiency and legitimacy in democratic societies is complex. In times of crises. a democratic political system has to be both efficient and legitimate.2 Democratic legitimacy. In spite of this contradiction. as Max Weber has shown. For most of human history. it is equally important that the decisionmaking process and its outcomes are accepted and valued by the people. according to political scientist Robert Dahl. traditional. ‘the legitimacy of the power-holder to command rests upon rules that are rationally established by enactment. however. the relationship between efficiency and legitimacy can be problematic in democracies. From the point of view of democratic governance.13 Between legitimacy and efficiency A comparative view on democratic accountability of defence activities in democracies Hans Born and Ingrid Beutler Introduction During situations of national emergencies. in a democracy it is essential that the processes and outcomes of the state institutions are legitimate. emphasises . to exercise state power and to demand obedience.

It has been evidenced that the birth and rise of early representative assemblies in Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries was linked to defence policy. France. Parliamentary involvement with defence policy goes back many centuries. the obligation to be called ‘to account’. Beutler that government should be ‘responsive and accountable to the demos. a sovereign authority that decides important political matters either directly in popular assemblies or indirectly through its representatives’. Belgium. in a democratic polity. the Netherlands. there is hardly any comparative research data available about the exact role of parliaments in various democracies.6 The relevance of democratic and parliamentary accountability has undergone a renaissance in post-Cold War Europe and has been placed on the public and academic agenda in many European states for a variety of reasons. Indeed. assistance. Although it is taken for granted that parliaments play a role in the system of checks and balances.4 Not all monarchs liked the idea of representation. in some sense.g. parliament is the central locus of accountability for any governmental decision-making.5 The accountability of the measures taken by a democracy in such situations depends to a large extent on the parliamentary oversight mechanisms provided for within the state. preventing any person or group from gaining too much power.7 First. Their sometimes defensive but often aggressive and expansionist policies led the monarchs ‘to seek advice. Born and I. represented the wider community’. notably the USA. This idea of the Trias Politica and similar ideas have influenced the constitutions of many democratic states. in controlling defence policy. parliament is the natural forum to enable democratically accountable decisions to be made. Italy. from ornamental to substantial. have reserved an important role for parliament in the system of checks and balances. with the abolition of military conscription in several European countries (e. but also of corporate bodies which. ‘accountability’ is regarded as a general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their particular publics. providing oversight and control of a states’ defence activities. The separation of powers is the idea that the power of government should be split among two or three branches of the state. such as Montesquieu.3 For this reason. Hungary. Spain. ‘Accountability’. great thinkers of the Enlightenment. Of course. legislature and the judiciary. but their aggressive foreign policies necessitated the emergence of proto-parliaments from the twelfth century onwards. referring to a separation of powers between the executive. in current democratic polities the role of parliament may differ. support and consent not only of important individuals. a critical debate has been raised on the democratic control of the armed forces as many express .262 H. In this chapter. is a method of keeping the public informed and the powerful in check. Portugal). Most monarchs of the later Middle Ages had urgent military needs. In this chapter. ‘Accountability’ is now recognised prominently as one of the core values of democratic governance across a variety of disciplines. focus is made on accountability mechanisms adopted in various democracies throughout the world as they strive for legitimate and efficient policy decisions. including defence policy. Starting in the eighteenth century.

yet there has been an expansion in the tasks expected of them. it is imperative that the democratic control exercised over defence activities in each state is clearly defined and undertaken. transition societies adopted new constitutions. identification has been made of the importance of ‘democratising security to prevent conflict and build peace’ (UNDP Human Development Report. This is particularly applicable to post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe who have had to restyle political–military relations according to democratic principles. Before reforming the security sector. With these objectives in mind.8 Furthermore. and then addresses mechanisms and principles of parliamentary control at the national level. the main aim must be to create a climate of stability in which economic development and cooperation can prosper. and where peace and stability can reign. but also for bigger states such as France and the United Kingdom. police and . on the budget and personnel. the democratic (and civilian) control of defence activities is conceived as necessary for institutionbuilding. the EU and NATO. Second. calls for the reforming of political–military and civilian–military relations in accordance with democratic principles as a requirement of membership. This is not only true for smaller member states of. for example. Referring to the democratic peace thesis. 2002).9 Within the UN system specifically. which caused controversy in British society and parliament. Hence. For example. Democratic control of defence policy as an established international norm With the changing security environment throughout the world. with increasing international military activity. a number of norms and standards have been defined by international bodies that establish parameters as to how defence policy should be conducted within the growing family of democratic states. in the wake of the Iraq War. good governance and security at both the international and national levels. This chapter first dwells on those principles of democratic control as enunciated at the international level. strain political–military relations. Such demands. gave powers to legislatures and installed civilian ministerial control over the military. over the last decade there has been a general downsizing of the armed forces. At the international level. as defined by international organisations such as NATO and the OSCE. Although such definitions apply to public governance in general. a few specifically mention the security sector. which posits that democracies do not go to war against each other. the UN stresses the crucial role of democratic control of the military. ‘democratic and civilian control’. the British parliament is now investigating whether the power of government to deploy troops abroad and to declare war has to be limited. the democratic and parliamentary control of international military cooperation and institutions is also becoming increasingly relevant.Between legitimacy and efficiency 263 fear that an all-volunteer force is more difficult to control democratically than a conscript army. Third.

Together with PACE Recommendation 1713 (2005).12 the Council of Europe13 and the Inter-American Summit process. A civilian minister of defence. which contains the most innovative provisions on ‘the democratic political control of military. In its sections VII and VIII. between the three branches of state. Maximum transparency and openness of the military.11 EU. Beutler other security forces for human development and human security. Parliamentary oversight. avoiding the executive acquiring unchecked power over the military and other important security services. allowing media.15 Although no clear-cut definition or single model of democratic control of defence activities can be exemplified. NATO. Born and I. 2 3 4 5 6 . A military that is at ease with itself. as the elected representatives are able to offer or withhold democratic legitimacy to the government’s security policy and the military.10 The democratic control of defence activities has also been articulated as a political standard by a number of regional organisations and fora such as OSCE. furthermore. defining the primacy of the political leadership over the military.264 H. as well as the responsibilities of the government and parliament in times of war and peace. as defined by the constitution.16 A system of checks and balances. The subjection of armed forces to the norms and prescriptions of international humanitarian law. the OSCE has gone the furthest so far with the adoption in 1994 of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services and the police’. it lays out a set of principles for democratic governance in the security sector. which include: • • • • The primacy at all times of democratic constitutional civilian power over military power. a set of general principles and ‘best practices’ can be identified: 1 A constitution and laws. The commensurability of the domestic use of force with the needs of enforcement and prohibition of the use of force aimed at restricting peaceful and lawful exercise of human rights or at depriving people of their individual or collective identity.14 This ‘politically binding’ instrument is the only document which elaborates on the substance of democratic governance of the security sector. The respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the armed forces personnel. research institutes and other NGOs to do their work. it establishes the basic components of democratic control of defence activities.17 in terms of tasks assigned and its image in society. who has both top military and civilian advisors at his or her disposal. such as the intelligence services and paramilitary units.

and the control of activities of the state. to summon members of civil society. While parliaments may range from the ornamental to significant governing partners. making (or shaping) laws and exercising oversight. In most countries these powers include: the right to initiate or to amend laws. are determined. 2 . but by no means the only one. the powers necessary for. the president is elected by the people directly and not by parliament.Between legitimacy and efficiency 265 These points show that democratic accountability is a broad issue. legal procedures and parliamentary structures in one established democracy may be unthinkable in another. there is a general agreement that democracies adhere to principles of democratic civil–military relations. parliament is the workshop of democracy. to summon members of the executive and their staff to testify. they have some common characteristics. projects and separate line items.18 Generally speaking. to block budgets or stop or delay the legislation of new laws. including defence activities. with regards to the defence sector. in most cases. From these powers (and the credibility to use this power) derives all other powers vis-à-vis the government. Although we take it for granted that modern government must be democratic. the right to approve or disapprove any supplementary defence budget proposals (during the fiscal year) and having access to all relevant defence budget documents. applicable to all fields of government. there are no universal standards or best practices for parliamentary oversight given that accepted practices. the right to carry out parliamentary inquiries and the right to hold hearings. In short: the parliament is the mediator between government and the people. The role of parliamentary accountability mechanisms As Winston Churchill noted. and that parliament is an important issue in democratic accountability. in presidential systems. the no-confidence vote is characteristically for parliamentary political systems only. access to classified information. and it is within that workshop that the limits to. in principle. which include three basic functions to perform: representing the people. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is a sine qua non condition for democracy. In more specific terms. Budget control: the right to allocate and amend defence budget funds – on the level of programmes. involving societal. political and legal issues. in the sense of deriving its authority directly or indirectly from the people. to raise questions. Parliaments articulate the wishes of the people by drafting new laws and overseeing the proper execution of those policies by the government. we can identify the following parliamentary defence oversight powers: 1 General powers: these include powers that are. Although there is no single set of norms for civil–military relations. Furthermore. states differ in shaping legislative–executive relations. The ultimate power of parliament is to send the government home (no-confidence mechanism).

1). these control instruments cover the most important aspects of any military. money. until recently. peace support operations. rules of engagement. crisis management concept. ‘Old’ democracies refer to Western democracies that have enjoyed a democratic governance system for longer than 15 years. Parliamentary oversight powers in 16 democracies in Europe and northern America Focusing on the five parliamentary defence oversight powers identified in the previous section.19 of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels.21 Table 13.1 shows that the sample of countries includes both ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies. operations. Although the ‘degree’ of democratisation within any state is a contested concept. representative. the ability and power of parliamentary structures to influence and control defence activities will depend to a large extent on the type and ‘degree’ of democratisation within the state. Born and I. Security policy and planning documents: the right to amend or to approve (or not) the security policy concept. transparent and responsive to citizens’ aspirations and expectations. force structure/planning and the military strategy. we here define a ‘democratic’ political system as inclusive. the mandate. equipment and policy. defence concept. This research data is the product of a joint activity. to facilitate a comparative analysis of parliamentary oversight powers. In a democracy there should be no area of . Beutler Peace support operations: the right to approve (or not) to send troops abroad. Therefore. conducted in 2002 and updated in 2005. specifying needs for new equipment. Defence procurement: involvement of the parliament in the government’s decision concerning contracts. people. control exercised generally over the budget. including former-communist countries and Turkey. duration of the mission and the right to visit troops on missions abroad. the budget. selection of manufacturer and assessing offers for compensation and off-set.266 3 H. command/control. authoritarian regime. namely. and security policy and planning documents.20 The data reflects how parliamentarians perceive their powers of oversight as provided in their responses to questionnaires completed either by members of parliament or the staff of the parliamentary defence committee (or the equivalent). 4 5 Together. defence procurement. Therefore. a true democracy must have the capacity to conduct parliamentary oversight over its defence activities. which is planning. from both West and Eastern Europe as well as Canada and the United States (see Table 13. The data is derived from comprehensive research on parliamentary oversight in NATO members and associated states. risks of military personnel involved. participatory. ‘New’ democracies are countries that had. accountable. 16 democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area have been selected that are examples of both presidential and parliamentary democratic structures.

8 Const. . represented by Governor-General President (Art.) Parliament (Art. 116 Const.) Sovereign President (Art. 79 Const. 29 Const.org/research/freeworld/2003/democracies.) Parliament (Art.) Elected by parliament in times of war President (Art.) Parliament (Art. 63 Const. 104 Const. 98 Const. 7.pdf.) President (Art. Federal Chancellor during wartime President (Art.) Parliament Parliament (Art. 35 Const. 19 Const. 65a Const. 62 Const.) Parliament (Art.) Parliament (Art.) Confederation (Art. 134 Const.) Monarch (Art. 2 (2) Constitution) Note 1 As classified by Freedom House.) Government (Ch.Table 13.) Parliament (Art. 80a Const. 96 Const.) Parliament (Art.) President (Art. 3 Const. 8 Constitution) Commander-in-Chief Declaration of war Political system1 Canada Westminster Parliamentary Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Parliamentary Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Plebiscite Parliamentary Presidential Westminster Parliamentary Presidential Monarch.) Monarch (Art. 92 Const. 19 Const.) Government (Art. 65 Const. 19 Const.) Minister of Defence (Art.) Parliament (Ch. Art. 10.) President (Art.) Parliament (Art.1 Characteristics of political systems and oversight bodies in selected states Transition democracy (‘New’) versus established democracy (‘Old’) Old New Old Old Old New New Old New New Old Old Old New New New Parliament Parliament (Art. 63 Const.) Parliament (Art. available at: www. 68 Const.freedomhouse. Art.) Parliament (Art. 15 Const. 87 Const. 9 Const.) during peace time. Online.) President (Art. 39 Const.

not necessarily all presidential systems have weak parliaments when it comes to defence policy. or a system in which one house is elected and the other appointed. US). such as in the Czech Republic. This power is generally provided in the constitutions of the countries. Presidential political systems are generally of the nature whereby the president will have a degree of direct executive control as head of state and head of government. where the president has traditionally farreaching authority in defence and security issues.1 illustrates that. Switzerland is described as having a ‘plebiscite parliamentary system’ given that executive power and parliamentary control is checked by popular referendums. the parliament can limit the powers of the president. with a largely ceremonial role. Due to the separation of powers. it is the parliamentary body who has the final say in most. the presence of opposition parties. Beutler state activity that is a ‘no-go’ zone for parliament. Germany falls into a unique category whereby it has a parliamentary government with the head of state completely excluded from the executive and holding . of the 16 states selected for the purposes of this analysis. the president is only powerful when his or her party is also the ruling party. Additionally. In parliamentary systems. their head of state is also retained as the commander-in-chief. Born and I. However. Table 13. the Netherlands). Romania. This is especially so when the opposition has a majority in one or in both Houses where it can obstruct presidential policy substantially. or the government (Sweden. if not all. Poland. Turkey. all other states have a commander-in-chief. including defence activities. the Governor-General. the US Congress has a strong position vis-à-vis the executive. This individual is generally provided for in the constitution as a ‘political’ commander-in-chief. in spite of the power vested in the president. The United Kingdom and Canada are representative of a Westminster parliamentary system22 whose particular features include an executive branch made up of members of the legislature. it is parliament who is granted the power to declare war. Hungary. the British monarch grants this right to the governor-general). the Minister of Defence (Germany during peace time or Federal Chancellor during war time). both during peace time and war time. and an elected legislature. except in Canada and the UK. in France. with parliamentary involvement providing legitimacy and direct democratic accountability. that is. Apart from Switzerland. However. the UK). In case of co-habitation.268 H. Political system characteristics of the 16 selected democracies The degree of parliamentary oversight possible today depends on the institutional and democratic measures implemented in each state. 11 are parliamentary democracies and five are presidential democracies. Spain. the sovereign (Denmark. matters of state. which do not have written constitutions. who is granted the right to perform this role by the sovereign power (in Canada. In some countries with parliamentary systems. being either the president (France. in all states included in the study. Macedonia and Spain.

Parliamentary involvement will ensure that defence activities and decisions are made to serve the state as a whole and to protect the constitution. With the Prime Minister supported by an overwhelming Labour majority in the British House of Commons. The results of Table 13. to summon military and other civil servants to committee meetings and to testify.25 This is a consequence of the federal decentralisation of the military and the lack of standing forces in Switzerland.24 This matter is the subject of a current inquiry by the House of Lords Constitution Committee.2 show that the parliaments in all selected states possess all these general powers of . arguably the norm has been established that this power should lie with parliament. rather than narrower political or sectional interests. it is unlikely that Parliament would debate the sending of troops abroad on peacekeeping operations as they generally involve much less overall danger for the forces than would an armed conflict. that decision should lie with those representatives elected by the people. to question the minister of defence. Compared with other countries. prior to British involvement in Iraq in 2003. and with the support of the opposition Conservative Party. However. Switzerland does not have a military supreme commander-in-chief during peace time. when a country is contemplating involvement in war. there was little likelihood that Parliament would vote down the motion recommending participation in the war. Considering the immense consequences for any state should it go to war. and the right to mobilise the militia. Prime Minister Tony Blair departed from precedent by seeking parliamentary approval for British participation in the war. It remains to be seen whether a future government with a small majority or in a minority in the House of Commons would seek parliamentary approval prior to the exercise of the Royal Prerogative.2 as belonging either to parliament itself or to the committee dealing with defence issues. These ‘general powers’ of parliament are evident in the majority of states analysed. General powers of parliamentary oversight The classification of the ‘general powers’ of parliament to oversee defence includes the power to initiate legislation on defence issues. decisions prior to the ultimate decision to go to war must be overseen and controlled by the very institution that makes that final decision. Whether it be a parliamentary or presidential political system. Such powers are identified in Table 13. if interpreted narrowly. and to hold hearings on defence issues.4. especially the right to declare war or make peace.23 In the UK. lies in the hands of the federal parliament. the Prime Minister indicated he would not formally advise the monarch to exercise the Royal Prerogative and declare war. With the majority of states now embracing the ideals and institutions of a full democracy. the powers given to Parliament in ‘peace support operations’ are stated as limited in the case of the UK due to the fact that. Should Parliament not have approved.Between legitimacy and efficiency 269 a rather ceremonial role. As represented in Table 13. the power to declare war was traditionally considered a Royal Prerogative possessed by the sovereign which now rests with the executive. The command and control over the armed forces.

Table 13. Notes X the parliament possesses the power. .2 General powers of parliament To question the minister of defence X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X X 15 (94%) 16 (100%) 16 (100%) 15 (94%) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X X To summon military and other civil servants to committee meetings and to testify To obtain documents from the ministry of defence and military To hold hearings and inquiries on defence issues Total general powers of parliament (per country) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 3 (60%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 78 (98%) To initiate legislation on defence issues Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Total general powers of parliament (per specific power) 16 (100%) Source: DCAF/NATO PA research 2005. O the parliament does not possess the power.

parliament has the power to initiate new legislation. Many parliamentarians do not have the expertise or the time to go into the details of developing new legislation. a Planning. Therefore. in practice. the parliamentarian has the power to oversee. without exception. legislation on defence issues can be amended or rewritten by parliament. Parliament and budget control The power of the purse is at the heart of parliamentary control. Though all parliaments have this right. .Between legitimacy and efficiency 271 parliament. Legislation is nowadays a very complex. whether through the cabinet or by the president introducing bills. if the government refuses to come up with a proposal. This is an important power that leads to greater transparency and accountability of governmental and military decisions and actions. specialist and time-consuming issue. are some of the greatest powers that a parliament can possess to determine the defence policy of the country. Only in exceptional cases do individual members of parliaments come up with their own legislative initiatives. With only the exception of Turkey. Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). whose parliament seems to be weaker. or existing legislation is amended. as explained below. most parliaments exercise this right only in exceptional situations. the direction of defence policy. By being able to influence where and when new legislation is required. In the majority of states. Programming. In all selected states. to a degree. Transparent defence budgeting: parliament has access to all necessary documentation to enable transparent decision-making. Power of amendment and allocation: parliament has the right to amend and allocate the defence budget fund. Generally. Most countries have developed or are developing a systematic approach for the evaluation and approval of budget proposals. all parliaments can question the minister of defence. most parliaments have delegated the legislative function to the government and only approve. to design and initiate defence legislation. this power is not granted to the Select Committee. In most states. the summoning of members of the military and civil servants to parliamentary committee/plenary meetings and to testify is a common legislative power in the selected states (except in Poland). Turkey is the only country where parliament is denied the power to question the ministry of defence and to hold hearings about defence issues. for example. These powers. In all states examined. the parliament is granted the power to obtain documents from the ministry of defence and/or the military. for example. parliament is granted the power to conduct inquiries into defence issues and hold hearings on those issues. Similarly. Basic characteristics of modern government defence budgeting systems in relationship to the role of parliament include:26 • • • Legality: all expenditure and activities should be in keeping with the law as enacted by parliament. reject or amend legislation. except for Turkey.

28 where the president is the commander-in-chief and has special prerogatives concerning foreign and security policy. Our research shows that wide variation exists between countries regarding the constitutional and legal powers of parliament to oversee PSOs (see Table 13. the Netherlands. Hungary. e. enabling parliament to control the budget at three levels. Canada. Beutler Specificity: the number and descriptions of every budget item should result in a clear overview of government’s expenditure. amend or to allocate defence budget funds (see Table 13. Although most countries grant parliament access to all defence budget documents. Germany.4). Denmark. and the Congress of the United States do not have the power of prior authorisation. Sweden. in giving budget approval and in controlling spending – using ‘the power of the purse’ in defence matters. All these states (except Romania) are parliamentary democracies. Poland.29 The data presented in Table 13. and weak parliaments.4 show that there is a great variety of ways in which parliaments control the deployment of troops abroad in PSOs. Germany and the Netherlands. The parliaments of the Czech Republic. The majority of these countries are Westminster Parliamentary Systems (UK and Canada) or presidential– parliamentary democracies such as France. the UK and Poland. Spain. including the right to discuss and influence the details of the PSO (e.g. the level of control over the budget varies. defence programmes. parliament is granted the important power and ability to approve. Denmark.27 The parliaments of Canada. e. . i. Prior authorisation is an especially valuable right because once the troops are sent abroad it is difficult for a parliament to undo the government’s decision – withdrawal could endanger the ongoing mission and damage the international reputation and credibility of the country.g. on what specific items the budget will be spent. Switzerland and Turkey have the power to approve or reject PSOs in advance. The power to amend and allocate defence budget powers is limited in a few states by the inability to control the budget by line items. projects and line items. It turns out that there are parliaments that have strong oversight powers.e. Germany and the Netherlands). Born and I. Our analysis shows that in almost all of the countries selected. Parliament and peace support operations One of the greatest tools of parliamentary oversight is the constitutional or legal right to approve or reject the use of force. Poland and the USA.. France.272 • H.g. that is. Romania. Macedonia.3). Further analysis of this data shows that four models can be distinguished with regard to parliament’s involvement in the authorisation of PSOs: 1 Parliament has the right of prior authorisation of PSOs. The legislature’s role in budget control helps to provide transparency in decisions concerning defence and security policy. as in Denmark.

O the parliament does not possess the power. approve and to allocate defence budget funds X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 (94%) 9 (56%) O – X X X – X – X X X O O X X X 2 (67%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 41 (85.42%) Control the defence budget by line items Total budgetary powers of parliament (per country) Has access to all defence budget documents Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X Total budgetary powers of parliament (per specific power) 15 (94%) Notes X the parliament possesses the power.Table 13.3 Budgetary powers of parliament Has the right to amend. – not available or not applicable. .

67%) 5 (83.33%) 5 (83.67%) 6 (100%) 2 (33. 1 Operational issues include rules of engagement.33%) 4 (66.4 Powers concerning peace support operations Approval of the Duration of Operational budget of the mission the mission issues1 Parliament has Total power of the right to visit parliament over the troops on PSOs (per country) missions abroad X X X X X – X X X X X X X O X X 4 (25%) 14 (88%) 1 (16.17%) Approval of Mandate of sending troops the mission abroad a priori O X X O X – X X O O – X O O O O 6 (38%) 10 (63%) 8 (50%) O X X O. O the parliament does not possess the power.33%) 6 (100%) 1 (16.33%) 2 (33.33%) 6 (100%) 1 (16. only a posteriori X X X X O O X X X O O X O X X O X – X X O O O X X O O X O O X O X – O X O O O O O O O X Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States O X X O X X X X O X O X X X O O Total power of parliament over PSOs (per specific power) 10 (63%) Notes X the parliament possesses the power. .33%) 5 (83.67%) 1 (16.67%) 2 (33.Table 13.67%) 4 (66.67%) 52 (54. command and control.67%) 1 (16. – not available or not applicable. and risk assessment.

Poland. giving government full authority once parliament has authorised the mission (e. a number of essential principles have been identified that apply directly to procurement and. in Canada. The third group of parliaments does not have prior authorisation power. Parliament plays an essential role in ensuring that procurement decisions focus on the right issues. parliament is informed about the deployments. 3 4 Aside from the extent to which parliaments have the power to authorise PSOs. generally speaking. Spain. Parliament and defence procurement Defence procurement is an important step in the sequence of actions needed to set up and to implement any given security policy. are important in all countries:31 • • • Foresight: with the exception of extreme urgency. however it is often served by personnel who. and to remedy the situation should there emerge a wrong trend or wrongdoing. Simplicity: defence equipment is intended to be used under extreme conditions. ammunition and services is a matter of much variation in the countries studied.30 However. duration of the mission and mandate). hence. but in coalition. For example. Whether parliament is granted any powers in determining the procurement of equipment. during the lifecycle of the programmes. although well-trained and educated. non-national sources of funds to continue the deployment. have not the education and the technical skills of engineers. the US Congress stopped funding for the US troops committed to the UN PSOs in Somalia in 1992–3 after the first casualties were incurred in 1993. A fourth type of parliament has no authorisation power or right to information about future or current PSOs. Nevertheless. Interoperability: nobody works or fights alone.g. Parliaments can use this power during debates on the annual defence budget and debates on any additional budget requests for ongoing PSOs. the UK and the USA. This would entail parliament’s involvement in the entire procurement process. Government can decide to send troops abroad on peace missions without the legal obligation to consult parliament. during the procurement itself and after. goods. This is the case. as in Romania and Turkey). • . from the preparation phase. However. France. the power of the purse does not compensate for the lack of a constitutional power of prior authorisation. This type of parliament was not represented in those studied. all decisions must be made in the light of future requirements. It is also not impossible (although less common for rich Western countries) for the government to have access to alternative. for example. the parliaments of all three groups often possess the power of the purse over funding for PSOs.Between legitimacy and efficiency 275 2 Parliament has the right of prior authorisation but not the power to influence the detailed aspects of PSOs (including rules of engagement. given the difficulty of pulling back troops in mid-mission. Efficiency: the decision-maker is accountable to ensure such to the nation.

along with Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Parliament and security and defence policy Generally. Switzerland and the USA. although politicians may not be routinely occupied in matters of national defence. but it seems to be an executive prerogative in the rest of the countries under analysis.276 • H. Transparency: in all decision-making. While Congress may not have the specific power to ‘disapprove’ contracts. With the differing powers of all parliaments. In the case of the USA. The comparison between different offers and the final selection of a manufacturer and product is decided by the parliament only in the Czech Republic. Yet. it is largely the power of the purse that enables (or otherwise) the parliament to influence the government’s procurement policy. Sustainability: there should be no major or additional unscheduled costs. Furthermore. generally. This is especially evident in Denmark. the power of the US Congress is derived from the US Constitution which grants Congress ‘the power to raise armies’. A few parliaments are involved in the process of specifying the need for new equipment. The lack of this right deprives parliament of the ability to approve or disapprove specific defence procurement projects. In those same states. the Netherlands. Sweden. politicians have limited interest in defence policy and have little active engagement in the formulation and supervision of national security and defence policy and the armed forces. Beutler Affordability: the country should be able to pay for it without jeopardising other segments of the national economic and social life. Czech Republic. it may prevent a contract from going into force by not appropriating money for that contract. Macedonia. It is at this point that it may be discovered that the defence policy is not as expected. the minister of defence is obliged to provide the parliament with detailed information on procurement decisions. This is the case in Canada. the Netherlands. where parliament has no say. parliament has limited control over the government’s procurement decisions. the lives of citizens and the welfare of the country. France. In only four of the selected states does parliament have the right to disapprove the contracts made by government (Germany. Only in those same three countries is the parliament involved in assessing offers for compensation and off-set. of the national budget and of defence programmes. Germany. Born and I. Romania and Spain. to ignore the importance of parliamentary involvement and debate is to ignore the fact that the defence decisions made by the ministry of defence and the armed forces in any country concern vast resources. they may become interested or involved during a crisis or emergency. or that the armed forces are not as compliant and effective as they thought they were.32 The civilian control of defence policy is a national responsibility and therefore any policy change and . Netherlands and the USA. Poland and the United States). • • Our results show that.

5 Parliamentary powers to influence government’s procurement decisions Minister of defence obliged to provide parliament with information on procurement decisions O O O O X (above C25mill. .) O O X X O O O – O O X Total parliamentary power over procurement (per country) 4 (25%) Notes X the parliament possesses the power.Table 13. O the parliament does not possess the power.) X O X (above C80.000) X O O O X O X X 7 (44%) 8 (50%) 4 (25%) 4 (25%) X X O X X O O X O O O X X O O X O X O O X O O X O O O O O O O X O X O O X O O X O O O O O O O X 1 (20%) 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 22 (35%) Parliament involved in specifying needs for new equipment Parliament involved in selecting producer Parliament involved in assessing offers for compensation and off-set Total parliamentary power over procurement (per country) Parliament right to disapprove contracts Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States O O O O X (above C25mill. – not available or not applicable.

Table 13.6 Parliamentary powers to influence government’s defence policy decisions Defence concept Force structure and planning Military strategy Total parliamentary power to influence defence policy (per country) 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 4 (100%) 2 (50%) 3 (75%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 8 (50%) 5 (31%) 23 (50%) Security policy concept Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States 9 (56%) O X O X X X X X O X O X X O O X O X O X X X X X O O O X X O O X O X O O X – X X O X O X X O O X O X O O X – O X O O O O X O O X Total parliamentary power to influence defence policy (per specific power) 10 (63%) Notes X the parliament possesses the power. . – not available or not applicable. O the parliament does not possess the power.

Between legitimacy and efficiency 279 decisions should focus on the processes of deliberation and justification in the national public sphere. With regard to security and defence policy formulation, we see some interesting differences between the parliaments studied. Only a small majority of parliaments are granted the power to define the security policy and defence concept, with this majority being diminished as regards the military–technical policy, a power which is generally left to the military. In those countries whose parliaments are lacking the power to oversee policy formulation (Canada, Denmark, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the UK), this power is often compensated by the power of the purse. Therefore, new defence policy initiatives can be blocked by rejecting the budget. In Westminster parliaments, such as Canada and United Kingdom, the lack of power by parliament to approve security and defence policy is only limited in so far as it does not possess the power to determine the policy, yet executive policy statements engender discussion and debate in parliament, who hence plays an essential role in reviewing, testing and improving national policy decisions. In general, the greater the degree of parliamentary power over security and defence policy, the more transparent and accountable defence policy decisions. This power is especially important as increasing multilateral agreements are being entered into by national governments. Such agreements effectively give the government extra executive power over their own national parliaments. On a number of occasions, national governments have used both NATO and the EU to negotiate and conclude agreements and take policy decisions without the input of their national legislatures.33 With increasing participation by states in military operations abroad, such as peace support operations, the associated policy changes that may be required in each national defence policy framework should ensure that policy decisions are legitimised by those elected by the people.

Conclusion
Democratic accountability through parliamentary power In the strive for democratic accountability, citizens must be provided with the ability to hold decision-makers to account for the power that has been delegated to them. This democratic accountability gives legitimacy to the rulers of a polity and, arguably, in a democratic polity, is only wholly possible through the granting of sufficient powers to parliament through procedures that are regarded as sufficiently fair and participatory. The ultimate democratic legitimacy of the parliament rests substantially on the extent to which they are trusted instruments of the democratic state which created them. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, little comparative data is available about the actual role of parliaments in defence affairs in democracies, including general legislative powers, budget control, control over peace support operations (PSOs), control over defence procurement as well as parliament’s

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role in the decision-making of security policy. Table 13.7 shows to what extent parliaments possess these powers in the 16 selected democracies. On analysis of which broad powers parliament is granted over defence activities (represented in Table 13.7), it is apparent that most, if not all, parliaments are granted what is termed ‘general’ powers, such as the power to initiate legislation on defence activities and to question the minister of defence. Some 98 per cent of parliaments are granted these ‘general’ powers. Most parliaments are also granted a range of powers to control the defence budget (81 per cent) and to influence decisions concerning peace support operations (56 per cent). Only 50 per cent of parliaments analysed grant their parliament the power to influence security and defence policy. The least powers granted to parliament are those to influence governments’ defence procurement decisions (35 per cent). One might conclude that general/legislative powers and budget control belong to the minimum standards of democratic and parliamentary control of defence activities because these powers are possessed by nearly all parliaments. On the other hand, the power to control PSOs, defence procurement and defence policy is possessed by far fewer parliaments in the EuroAtlantic area. Looking to what extent parliaments of specific countries possess these powers, Table 13.8 provides us with a very mixed picture. Table 13.8 shows that the strongest parliaments can be found in the United States and in the Netherlands, and the weakest parliament in Turkey. In the former two cases, the USA and the Netherlands possess political systems with a substantial role for parliament in defence activities, leading to the conclusion that, in these countries, an effective system of checks and balances exist. In Turkey, the parliament possesses only 35 per cent of possible powers of parliament to oversee defence policy, leading to the conclusion that its parliament plays a rather ornamental role in defence activities. This signifies that Turkey’s system of checks and balances is heavily impeded by an imbalance in favour of executive power to the detriment of parliament. The other 13 parliaments can be positioned somewhere between a strong parliamentary oversight system in the US and the Netherlands vis-à-vis the weak parliamentary oversight system in Turkey.

Table 13.7 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: category ranking Ranking in order of defence activities over which parliaments is granted power 1 2 3 4 5 General powers of parliament Budgetary powers of parliament Powers concerning Peace Support Operations Parliamentary powers to influence security and defence policy Parliamentary powers to influence governments’ defence procurement decisions Average (%) 98 81 56 50 35

Between legitimacy and efficiency 281
Table 13.8 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: country ranking Parliament granted extensive powers over defence activities Ranking Netherlands, United States Germany Czech Republic Switzerland Macedonia Sweden Denmark United Kingdom, France Romania Hungary Poland Spain Canada Turkey Percentage average of powers possessed by parliament (%) 93 87 82 75 72 69 60 57 57 54 51 47 41 35

Parliament granted limited powers over defence activities

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Towards explaining parliamentary powers over defence activities How can this mixed picture of parliamentary oversight powers in the selected democratic states be explained? In trying to find explanations, we have divided the total sample of 16 democratic states into two groups of parliaments: 1 Parliaments granted extensive powers over defence activities, being the eight strongest parliaments as presented in Table 13.8; these are the parliaments of the Netherlands, USA, Germany, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Macedonia, Sweden and Denmark. Parliaments granted fewer powers over defence activities, being the eight weakest parliaments as presented in Table 13.8, being the United Kingdom, France, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Canada and Turkey.

2

To explain the variety of parliamentary powers, we have linked parliamentary power to the type of political system and the level of democratisation. With regard to political system, as explained before, we distinguish presidential– parliamentary, parliamentary and Westminster parliamentary political systems (see Table 13.9). Table 13.9 shows that parliaments with strong oversight powers are likely to be found in parliamentary political systems and that relatively weaker parliaments are likely to be found both in presidential and Westminster-type political systems. This might be explained by the fact that, in parliamentary political systems, the position of parliament and its powers is backed by the ultimate power to sack the government. This is a power lacked by presidential political systems as, in these systems, the president is elected by the people directly. Admittedly, also in Westminster-type parliamentary systems, parliament has the

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Table 13.9 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in different democratic systems Presidential democracies Parliament granted extensive power over defence activities United States Parliamentary democracies Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Switzerland Czech Republic Macedonia Spain Westminster system democracies –

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

France Poland Romania Turkey Hungary

UK Canada

power to sack the government. Nevertheless, parliaments in Canada and the UK have relatively weak oversight powers regarding defence activities because of the so-called ‘Royal Prerogative’ which shields the government from parliamentary involvement in defence activities. Prerogative powers are nonstatutory powers, handed down direct from monarchs to ministers over many years, allowing government, among other things, to go to war, to deploy troops in military operations overseas, to sign treaties and to regulate the Civil Service without parliamentary involvement. The prerogative power to go to war was criticised by various members of both Houses of the British Parliament in the wake of the Iraq War. Currently (Autumn 2005), the House of Lords is investigating whether to deny the executive its power to go to war and to deploy troops abroad. Spain and the United States are important exceptions to these classifications of strong parliaments in parliamentary systems and weak parliaments in presidential or Westminster-type political systems. In the case of the United States, this can be explained by the strong position of Congress in defence activities due to its constitutional power to raise and to maintain armies and the navy. This power gives Congress extensive budget control powers up to the level of line items (in theory, no pencil can be bought by the Pentagon without Congressional approval). It is not clear why the Spanish parliament (Cortès) is weak while being embedded in a parliamentary political system. It remains to be seen whether its recent dictatorial past or its colonial heritage might provide an explanation. In addition to the differences in political systems, a second explanatory factor for the variances in the role of parliament in defence activities might be found in the level of democratisation. Our analysis shows, however, that there is only a weak relation between parliamentary defence oversight powers and the level of democratisation (Table 13.10). According to our categorisation, ‘new’ democracies are those postcommunist countries in Central and Eastern Europe who have had to restyle

Between legitimacy and efficiency 283
Table 13.10 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies ‘Old’ democracies Parliament granted extensive power over defence activities United States Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Switzerland France UK Canada Spain ‘New’ democracies Czech Republic Macedonia

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

Poland Romania Turkey Hungary

political–military relations according to democratic principles. Before reforming the security sector, transition societies adopt new constitutions, give powers to legislatures and install civilian ministerial control over defence activities. However, the specific powers granted to parliament to increase the democratic accountability of decision-making over defence activities is a product of democratic evolution. Those states that are more mature democracies have gradually granted their parliaments these powers in response to changing security threats and evolving democratic values. Often, emerging democracies face difficulties in developing strong institutions and decision-making processes to deal with defence activities. Difficulties emerge from the security sector itself as well as the often inactive and complicit stance or active encouragement of nondemocratic behaviour by civilian actors in government or parliament.34 Often the security sector in emerging democracies still retain high levels of autonomy and prerogatives,35 as well as practices that contradict democratic norms. Developing institutions that rein in these tendencies and assert control is one of the primary tasks of these new democracies. In mature democracies, on the other hand, democratic control and accountability of defence activities is often problematised by the sheer size of defence establishments36 where opportunities for shirking increase.37 Numerous studies have also warned about a growing gap between military and civilian sectors regarding attitudes and beliefs.38 In new democracies, this gap is compounded by a continuous divide over views on human rights and their systematic violations by security forces under previous regimes. This calls attention to the importance of social, cultural and educational aspects in military and society relations across all democracies, old and new.

Notes
1 Coicaud, J.-M. (2002) Legitimacy and Politics: a Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 10–11. 2 Gerth, H. and Wright Mills, C. (1991 [1948]) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge, London, p. 294.

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3 Dahl, R.A. (1999) ‘Can international organizations be democratic?’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds) Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 19–36. 4 Graves, M. (2001) The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe, Longman, London, pp. 13–14. 5 Mulgan, R. (2003) Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, p. 8. 6 Mulgan, R. (2003) Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, p. 1. 7 See Born, H., Haltiner, K. and Malesic, M. (eds) (2004) Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, Nomos Vergasgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 8 House of Lords Constitutional Committee, Call for Evidence: War Making Powers, 11 August 2005. United Kingdom Parliament, London. 9 For example, UNCHR, ‘Ensuring that the military remains accountable to the democratically elected civilian government’, Resolution 2000/47 (2000); OSCE, ‘The democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police’, (specified by a detailed set of provisions) Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994); Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), ‘Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states’, Recommendation 1713 (2005); see also Hänggi, H. (2003) ‘Making sense of security sector governance’, in H. Hänggi and T. Winkler (eds) Challenges of Security Sector Governance, LIT Verlag, Münster, p. 14. 10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, pp. 85–100. Online, available at: hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/. 11 Partnership For Peace Framework Document (10 January 1994). Online, available at: www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm; Council of Europe’s Report (12 June 2002), AS/POL (2002) 07REV.2, point 34 (concerning Serbia and Montenegro’s membership application). 12 See also ‘EU backs Turkish curbs on power of military’, Financial Times, 30 July 2003. 13 This Motion explicitly refers to the work of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. See PACE (2005) Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States, Recommendation 1713. Online, available at: assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA05/EREC1713.htm. 14 Quoted from Ghébali, Y.-V. (2003) The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (3 December 1994): A Paragraph-by-Paragraph Commentary on Sections VII and VIII (Democratic Control and Use of Armed Forces), DCAF Document no. 3, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, March, p. 17. 15 Ghébali, 2003. 16 Unclear or overlapping responsibilities of the head of state, cabinet and the minister of defence can lead to numerous frictions and a tense political atmosphere, as happened in many post-socialist countries, which constitutions equivocally defined the responsibilities of the main political actors involved 17 Lunn, S. (2002) The Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Principle and Practice, DCAF Working Paper, Geneva. Online, available at: www.dcaf.ch/publications/ Working_Papers/81.pdf. 18 Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. (1999) ‘Government accountability in parliamentary democracy’, in A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, and B. Manin (eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 281. 19 Many thanks to R. Büscher, German Bundestag; T. Fuior, Advisor to the Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security, Deputies Chamber, Romania; I. Rogers, UK House of Commons Select Committee; J. Reed, Secretary of the US

German Embassy. the first two Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) military operations (Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in Congo) did not require consent from most of the national parliaments of participating states. pp.ca/sps/defence/publications/claxton1/claxton1. Cooperation and Acquisition. the Chief of Staff assumes the position of supreme leader as primus inter pares. Aldershot. Switzerland does not have a head of state or prime minister. MD. A. M. H. Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces. The research was carried out in cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat and the parliamentary defence committees of the 16 selected countries. Democracy Overview. A. in Born. Rowman and Littlefield. Secretary. (2003) ‘Parliamentary accountability of multinational peace support operations: a comparative perspective’. in C. The Westminster parliamentary system is used in most Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth nations such as Australia. Member of the Netherlands’ Senate and Vice-President of NATO PA and the support of NATO PA staff as well as Members of Parliament and staff of the parliamentary committees.pdf. Canada. Special thanks to Dr Wim F. 2001–2002. 131–2.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4500295. Born. Chancellery of the Sejm. 49. pp. Online. available at: www. D.ch/publications/epublications/Dem Oversight_Turkey/Faupin%20English.html. Bureau of Research. Ashgate Publishers. Demyanets. See. Breuleux. P. India. Defence Committee. the Republic of Ireland.bbc.freedomhouse. Mechanisms and Practices. Washington. Razumkov Centre. Production. BBC News. H. Damrosch. Cambridge University Press. Ku and H. See Bland.htm.pdf. School of Policy Studies. for their 2005 updates. van Eekelen. Van Eekelen.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/armedforces. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper no. and Urscheler. Ukraine. available at: www. Poland. ‘Brown calls for MPs to decide war’. Faupin. L. Karlowski. Turkey. Malaysia. Ocer. pp. New Zealand and Singapore. Online. M.germany-info. but a ceremonial position of an annually rotating president. For example.Y. Fluri. ‘Defence procurement decision-making and lobbying: a West European view’. and Johnsson. (DCAF). and Piano. 53–72. (1999) Parliament. available at: news. A. A good example is Russia. Kingston.isn. Online. Karatnycky. Online. Handbook for Parliamentarians. Jacobsen (eds) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law.co. H. ch/_docs/occasional_5. H. Freedom House. p. W.L. Online. org/ratings/index. Parliamentary Services. Geneva/Belgrade. Karatnycky and Piano (2002). DC.F. A. 30 April 2005. See Germany Armed Forces: Background Papers. for example.dcaf. A. (2005) The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement: Requirements. (eds) (2003) Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles. stm. (2003) ‘The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers’. P. Lanham. available at: www. Switzerland. 736–7. available at: www. Additionally. and Hänggi. (eds) The ‘Double Democratic Deficit’: Accountability of the Use of Force Under International Auspices. Defence Committee.pdf. Ontario. (eds) (2002) Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. queensu. Cambridge. Jamaica.. During peacetime.Between legitimacy and efficiency 285 Senate. available at: dcafnew. IPU/DCAF. where Vladimir Putin’s recent proposals for institutional reform to strengthen the state’s response to terrorism sharply accelerate an already 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 . Online. Born. A. 5.F.

Cawthra and R. Expert scholars will even affirm. (2003) Armed Servants: Agency.. R. MIT Press. France or the United Kingdom’ (G. for instance. and Civil–Military Relations.H. F. A1. See Agüero. Feaver. . Tuesday. Luckham (eds) (2003) Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies. 14 September 2004. citing terrorism: overhaul of political system opponents call it step back’. Cambridge. New York Times. Zed Books. and Kohn. Police and Intelligence. London. MA. Cambridge.pdf. P. The New ‘Double Challenge’: Simultaneously Crafting Democratic Control and Efficacy Concerning Military. See ‘Putin issues plan to tighten grasp. 18). Online. Princeton.org/cmadrid/fileadmin/ 1-Ag_ero. that ‘There is arguably greater democratic accountability within the security sector in new democracies like South Africa than obtains in many established democracies like India. available at: www. Born and I.D. (1988) Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. p. A. Princeton University Press.286 H. Feaver P. Stepan. (eds) (2001) Soldiers and Civilians: the Civil–Military Gap and American National Security. Beutler 35 36 37 38 ongoing trend. That trend and the recent proposals for reforming the political system overshadow and subsume any specific threats to democracy coming from the armed forces or other state security agencies. Harvard University Press.clubmadrid. Oversight.

M.E. Roger 78. Ingrid 261–83 Birkinshaw. overview 67–8 Army Personnel Research Office. 201 army organization and culture: culture change perspectives 80–3. 191. 166 Australia 250–6 autonomy 193–4 Avant. André 169 Beaumont. Robert 6 Basanez. E. 146. 7–8. H. 52 Arnold. US 47 Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 133. 156 Baumgarten. 53 architecture 188 Armed Forces & Society 52–3. Fabrizio 54. L. 182. Anton 60. M. 2. S. 153 Barley.Y. 48 Andreski. 81. 48 Anderson. Iraq 126 Adams. 58 Baker. 189 Barilli. 72. Roger L. 172. 82–3. 145. 176 Betz. 81 Barry. 156 . 169 aptitude testing 47 aptitude–treatment–interaction (ATI) research 135 Arango. 131 Belgian Military Academy 135–6 Belgium 129.O. 145. 247–8 basic training 232 Bass. 81. differentiation perspective 73–6. James K. Bernard 57 Bastani. 202 behavioural sciences approach 123–4. 241–3. Paul 57 Barylski. 247 Balashov. S. 95–7. 155 Bartone. J. 202 Baard. Jerald D. C. 258 Bell. R. David 144. 123 Babin. 35. 79. 137 Battistelli. 111 ambidexterity 182. 111 anti-colonial wars 166. 190–2 American Psychological Association (APA) 133–4. S. 192 Bishop. David 94 Ben-Ari. 184.E. 188–9 agency theory 96 Al Qaeda 35 Alberts. method 68–9. 137 Abbate. US 49. Alexander Gottlieb 152 Beaufre. 9. 148 Berkowitz. 70 Ashkenas. W. Andrew 57 Abu Ghraib prison. 135 Afghanistan 28. US 110–11 asymmetric warfare 4.Index 11 September 2001 31. 116–17 Baldwin. 147. 186 Alvesson. R. fragmentation perspective 76–80. A. D. 131–4 Bekkering. R. D. 78 Berg. Deborah D. 184 Asia 250–6 Associated Universities. R. B. Daniel 245 Ben Gurion. 203 Beutler. Janet 121 Abbott.S. 55 Bachman. Eyal 53. Nehama E. 58. The (1949) 1. P. 166 beauty in the military 149–53 Bebler. 188.M.I. 82–3 Amadae. integration perspective 69–73. 138 American Soldier. T.

98 Chinese People’s Liberation Army 49 . 93. 78. 207. social research 60 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).288 Index Churchill. 250–6. 33. Carl 71 Bunce. new military 174–6.J. J. William 52 Boys in the Barracks. 35. 58 Blair. 248. 75 Bryant. 137 Bodei. Chris 54 Bowman. Giuseppe 1–16. 53. 201–2 Bush administration. F. 163–4. 129 career choice reasons 228–9 Carlton-Carew. T. revolutions in security affairs 169–71. 217–33 Cairns. 97–9 civil–military relations: examples from political science 91–100. 241–3. 266–83 Cannon-Bowers. path-dependency 206–9 civilian control of military 89–101. political framework 164–6. 210 Bustamante. Fred B. J. John A. 201. 34. 99–100. R. 210 budgetary control 271–2. A. 169. Leo 49 Bolman. France 53 Chechnya 27. Helena 241–3. 99 Cold War 25–6. military sociology/political science/interdisciplinary studies 200–6. John D. Bradford 55. US 31. 207–8 Colvin. 258. 98. overview 163–4. Winston 94 Cimbala. 119 China 33. Fernando 224–5 Butler. 221–2. US 112–13 Centre of Social Sciences Study of Defence. 60. war against see Cold War competences. 89. Tony 269 Blow. 145 Callaghan. Miranda A. V.A. 93 conscription 51–2. 206. 57. 193 cognitive psychology 125 Cohen. social research 49–51. The (1984) 75 Britain see UK British Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 173–4 Bruni. Hans L. Jnr. L. 155 Bryant. 32. 208–9 bureaucratization 169 Burk. 58 Born. 201. 189 classical theory of war 26 Clausen.G. Georges 94 Clifford. 93–5. 99. John Sibley 54 Caforio. Jean 60. 198. 34 coalitions 185–6. 262–3 Blair. political science approach 89–90. Eliot A. K. Robert E. 222–3 Boer War 97 Bogart. new missions 173–4. overview 197–9. Bernard 47. David 111 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 70 Central and Eastern Europe. C. G. and Russia 111–13. 90. 53. 48 Clemenceau. security sector and military transformation 172–3 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1944) 198 Connor. US 31–4. 188. 212 Canada 74. 204. Stephen J. new wars 166–8. 149 Boene. 280 Builder. 82 Bondy. 31. 170. 261–83 Bourg. need for 8 comprehensive security approach 172–3 Computer Generated Forces Conferences. 36. US 132 conceptual insecurity: European threat perception 171. 77. Eastern Europe: geopolitics/political geography/international relations 209–11. 259 Caute. logic of the research 199–200. 223–5 civilian personnel 55–6 Clark. 199.B. A. 200. Harry 2 Booth. 94 Carreiras. 135 combat stress reactions see post-traumatic stress reactions communication technologies 59 communism. C. 83 Brzezinski. 256. Z. 101. political science as core of interdisciplinary studies 100–1 Civil–Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy conference (1995) 197 civil–military relations. 35. and the US 105–11 colonial wars 166. James 70. 57. 226–7. 169 Colton.D. 80 Clinton administration. 93 Bryman.

Index 289
Consolini, P.M. 193 contextual ambidexterity 191, 192 conventional warfare 4, 6, 7–8 Cottey, Andrew 99, 204–5, 206, 212 crisis response operations (CRO) 173–4, 176 Cronbach, L. 135 cross-national studies, need for 1–16 culture change: differentiation approach 81–2; fragmentation approach 82–3; integration approach 80–1 culture gap, civil–military 96 culture linkages, gender integration 252–6 culture studies 58 culture, role in gender integration: cultural map/clusters 247–50; gender equality scale 250–2; Hofstedean explanation 256–8; overview 246–7 Curry, C. David 51 Czech Republic 241–3, 258, 267–83 Da Costa, J.M. 125 Dahl, R.A. 246, 261–2 Dandeker, Christopher 54, 58 Däniker, Gustav 175–6 Danopoulos, Constantine 202, 206 David S. 79 Davis, K. 74 Davis, T.R.V. 145 Davis-Blake, A. 184 De Kloet, C. 137 De Man, A.P. 185, 186, 187 Deagle, Edwin 218 Deaglio, Mario 4 Deal, T.E. 82 Debacker, M. 125 defence activities, parliamentary powers 281–3 defence policy, parliamentary control 263–5, 276–9, 280 defence procurement, parliamentary control 275–6, 277–8, 280 defence spending: dynamics of 27; parliamentary control 271–2, 273, 274–5, 280 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), US 129 Degot, V. 144 democratic accountability: defence policy 263–5; Europe/North America 266–79; overview 261–3; parliament 265–6, 279–83 democratic consolidation 206–9 democratization 28, 165; see also Eastern Europe demographics trends 29 Denmark 241–3, 258, 267–83 Desch, Michael C. 97–9, 202 development theories and gender integration 243–6 Dewar, R. 184 DiBella, A.J. 81 Diez-Medrano, J. 247–8 differentiation approach to culture 67–9, 73–6, 81–2 Dingsdale, A. 210 diversity issues 54 Dixon, N. 79 Dobratz, Betty 218 Donders, F.C. 125 Donnelly, Chris 203, 206 Downes, Cathy 218 downsizing 55–6, 183, 263 Doz, Y.L. 187 Drucker, Arthur J. 52 Druckman, D. 80 Dunivin, K.O. 81 Dunlop, J.T. 245 Durkheim, Emil 46, 238 Dussauge, P. 185 Duyker, H.J.C. 124 early twentieth century, social research 47 East European Politics and Society 208 East River Project 110–11 Eastern Europe, civil–military relations geopolitics/political geography/international relations 209–11; gender integration 250–6; logic of the research 199–200; military sociology/political science/interdisciplinary studies 200–6; overview 197–9; path-dependency 206–9; political–military relations 263 ecological trends 28 Edmunds, Timothy 99, 172, 204–5, 206, 212 education 127, 131–2, 134–5; see also training efficiency 261–3 Eisenhower, Dwight 79, 105–6, 107 Elkin, F. 72 Ellsberg, Daniel 105 Ender, Morten G. 59 Essens, P. 127, 133 Estonia 113–14, 115, 116 ethical code 223–4 Etzioni, Amital 219

290

Index
culture 246–52; theories of societal change 238–46; typology of women, armed forces and culture linkages 252–6 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 100, 266 geopolitics 209–11 George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies 197, 208 Georgev, W.A. 115 Georgeva, N.G. 115 German Armed Forces Institute of Social Research (SOWI) 53 German–Soviet non-aggression pact see Ribbentrop–Molotov pact Germany 33, 53, 169; gender integration 241–3, 258; parliamentary control 267–83; World War II 113–17 Gerschenkron, Alexander 67 Ghebali, V.Y. 198 Gherardi, S. 145 Giampietro, M. 145 Gibson, C. 182, 191, 192 Gilardi, R. 146 Ginger, C. 77 Ginzberg, Eli 48 Ginzberg, Sol W. 48 global challenges 25–30 Goldhar, J.D. 184 Gooch, John 220 Gottfredson, M. 194 Gould, R. 137 Greece 241–3, 258 Greenwood, Ernest 217 Guillet, de Montoux, Pierre, 144, 150 Gulf War 56, 59, 97, 168 Haeckel, S.H. 184 Hage, J. 184 Hagström, P. 184 Halman, L. 247–8 Haltiner, Karl 53 Hamel, G. 187 Hamilton, V. Lee 55, 59 Hammarskjöld, Dag 230 Hancock, P. 155 Handbook of the Sociology of the Military 200 Hänggi, H. 100 Harbison, F. 245 Harrell, Margaret 58 Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn 169, 219, 230 Hart–Reed Commission 31 Hatch, M.J. 145 Hauser, M. 82

Europe: as ally of US 33; civil–military relations 99–100; civilian contractors 56; defence industry 186, 187; downsizing 183; gender integration 250–6; parliamentary oversight powers 266–81; social research 53, 58; threat perception 171; see also Central and Eastern Europe; Eastern Europe European Conference of Traumatic Stress (2005) 130 European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) 9, 50, 96, 139, 201 European Security 205 European Security Strategy (ESS) 171 European Union 279 Everts, P. 79 external threats: Russia 35; US 33–4 Falk, William W. 55 Farr, Beatrice J. 56 Feaver, Peter D. 58, 90, 95–7, 199, 202 Feldman, M.S. 77 Ferguson, Charles D. 40 Fineman, S. 83 Finley, S. 144 flexibility 181–2, 183–5, 193 foreign policy concept 25, 34–5 Forester, A. 205 Forster, Anthony 99–100, 199, 204–5, 206, 212 Foucault, M. 156 Fraccaroli, F. 145, 156 fragmentation approach to culture 67–9, 76–80, 82–3 France 33, 53, 169, 241–3, 258, 267–83 Franke, V.C. 176 Frese, Pamela R. 58 Freud, S. 125 Friedman, Milton 51 Frost, P. 67, 72, 76, 83 Fukuyama, Francis 208, 233 Fuller, Steve 111 Gabriel, Richard A. 51 Gaddis, John Lewis 33 Gagliardi, P. 144, 145, 153, 155 Garrette, B. 185 garrison state 91–3, 98 Garstka, J.J. 186 Geertz, Clifford 79 Gelpi, Christopher 96 gender integration 52, 54, 58–9; importance of culture 256–8; role of

Index 291
He, Zi-Lin 190 healthcare: cutting edge developments 130; integrated approach to 133–4 hegemony, US 32–4, 35, 36 Heijnen, C. 142 Helmer, John 51 Hennes and Moritz 190–1 Herberg Rothe, A. 167 Herma, John L. 48 Herspring, D. 208 Heslegrave, R. 135 Hicks, Louis 55 Hill, Reuben 48 Hillen, J. 170 Hitt, M.A. 184 Hjorth, D. 155 Hockey, John 74–5, 82 Hofstede, Geert 69, 133, 246, 256–8, 259 Holsti, Kalevi J. 166, 167 Homans, George C. 48 Höpfl, Heather 154 Hughes, T. 136 human behaviour representation (HBR) 134–5 Human Beliefs and Values (2004) 247–8 Human in Command: Peace Support Operations 132–3 human resources activities 127–8 human security 29–30 Hungary 241–3, 258, 267–83 Huntington, Samuel P. 4, 50, 57, 91–3, 96, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206–7, 208, 211, 213, 218, 224, 225, 248 Hutchins, E. 145 Ikenberry, G. John 32–3 illegal immigration 28 independent national armies 224–5 Inglehart, Ronald 245, 246, 247–8, 250–2, 255 Ingraham, L. 75 institutional model of military 53, 54, 57, 75, 78, 225 institutionalized war 166 integration approach to culture 67–73, 80–1 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) 9, 50, 93–4, 201 interdisciplinary studies: armed forces 8–15; civil–military relations 200–6; military research 134–7; need for 1–8; political science as core 100–1 interfaces 188–9 internal threats, Russia 35 International Applied Military Symposium 138–9 International Military Mental Health Conferences (IMMH) 139 International Military Testing Association (IMTA) 9, 50, 128, 138 International Political Science Association (IPSA) 9, 50, 200 international relations 209–11 International Sociological Association (ISA) 9, 50, 96, 201 international terrorism 6, 27–8, 137; Russian response 35–6 Iran 28 Iraq 28, 33, 56–7, 95, 126, 191, 269, 282 Isenberg, D.J. 181 Israel 28 Italy 241–3, 258 Jager, Thomas 56 Janowitz, Morris 2, 12, 49, 50, 57, 75, 93, 100, 199, 206, 213, 218, 224, 225 Jarvik, L. 137 Jermier, J.M. 70 Jick, T. 184 Johnson, Chalmers 107 Johnson, L. 100 Johnson, Lyndon B. 95 Jones C. 203, 206 Jones, Joseph C. 55 Jordan, A.T. 69 Jordan, Amos A. 218 Justen, J. 135 Kaldor, Mary 4–5, 167 Kallan, M. 137 Kaplan, R.D. 165 Katy´ n massacre, Poland 114–15, 116–17 Katzenbach, J.R. 181 Kavelaars, A. 137 Kelty, Ryan D. 54, 56 Kennedy administration, US 106 Kernic, Franz 60, 201 Kerr, C. 245 Kerr, S. 184 Kersten, A. 145 Kestnbaum, Meyer 57, 58, 60 Klein, Paul 54 Klingemann, H.-D. 246, 247 Knoke, D. 190 Knorr Cetina, K. 156 Knowles, J.G. 144 Kohn, Richard H. 58, 96 Kolkowitz, R. 207

292

Index
Macedonia 267–83 Mackinder, H. 210 Maes, Michael 130 Magala, Slawomir, 12–13, 105–21 Mahoney, J.R. 187 Mailer, Norman 112 Malesic, Marjan 57 Maman, Daniel 53 management science, lessons from; ambidexterity 190–2; flexibility 183–5; future research 192–4; modularity 187–90; networking 185–7; overview 181–2 Mangelsdorff, D. 126 Manigart, P. 133 Manos, Angela M. 55 Martin, J. 67, 69, 73–4, 76, 77, 82, 83 Martin, Michael Louis 53 Martin, Michel 169 Martin, Patricia Yancey 154 Marx, Karl 46 Masks of War (1989) 71 Maxwell, A. 137 McCann, C. 132 McCormick, D. 71, 76 McCroskey, C. 135 McNally, Jeffrey 55 McPherson, K. 78 McSwain, H.W.J. 149 Mearsheimer, John J. 97–9 mental health issues 130 Mershon, S. 74 Meulman, E. 137 Meyerson, D. 67, 77 Microsoft 184–5, 186 Middle East 250–6 Milani, R. 149 Mileham, Patrick 222 Militant Liberty program, US 107 militarized empires 113–17 military: postmodern 174–6; transformation of 172–3 military academies/schools 220–1 military bases 55 military doctrine 25, 34–5 military operations other than war (MOOTW) 174, 231 military profession: future trends 230–3; process of change 225–30 military professional 217–25 Military Testing Association, US 48, 50 military victory, definitions of 26 military–industrial establishment, US 105–7, 108–9

Kopstein, J.S. 211 Korean War 49, 59, 106 Kosovo 28, 34 Kostera, M. 150 Kourvetaris, George 218 Kramer, E.H. 188 Kramer, Mark 207–8 Kretchik, W.E. 175 Krushchev, Nikita 106 Kuhlmann, Jurgen 204, 206, 207, 212 Kummel, Gerhard 54, 56 Kurashina, Yuko 60 Kursk submarine incident 120 Kwong, Y.Y. 59 Lamme, V.A.F. 125 Langer, Susanne 150 LaPorte, T.R. 193 Lasswell, Harold D. 50, 90, 91–3, 98, 100 Latin America 225, 250–6 Latour, B. 145 Latvia 115, 116 Laub, John H. 59 Laughton, Charlotte Jeane 54 Lavoy, Peter 40 Lawrence, P.R. 189 leadership 57, 132–3, 221 Lebovic, James 97 legitimacy 261–3 Lei, D. 184 Leigh, I. 100 Lenin Political–Military Academy 53 Lepgold, J. 211 Lewin, Kurt 125 Liddell Hart, B.H. 97 Lifton, Robert J. 49 Lincoln, Abraham 94 Linstead, S. 150, 154 Lithuania 115, 116 Little, Roger 49, 52 local wars: containment 169–71; spillover effects 163–4, 167 Lockwood, Robert S. 53 Lorsch, J.W. 189 Louis, M.R. 67, 76 Lowenhardt, J. 203 Luiskx, R. 247–8 Lumsdaine, Arthur A. 48 Lundberg, C.C. 67, 76 Luxembourg 241–3, 258 Lynch, Allen C. 118 Lynne, K. 208 Lytaev, S. 139

Index 293
Mintzberg, H. 190 missions: new types of 173–4; rehearsals for 127, 131–2, 134–5 modularity 182, 187–90 Moldova 119 Moore, Brenda 59 Moore, J. 79 Moore, L.F. 67, 76 Morgan, G. 72 Morgenthau, Hans 211 Moskos, Charles C. 51, 53, 54, 58, 75–6, 89, 99–100, 169, 170, 174, 175, 218, 225, 230 multi-national peacekeeping operations 60 Münkler, Herfried 167, 168 Munson, E.L. 47 Mychajlyszyn, N. 203, 206 Myers, A. 125 Myers, C.A. 245 Mylle, Jacques 13–14, 123–40 narcotics trafficking 28 National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, US 31 National Endowment for Democracy 197 national security concept 25, 29–30, 34–5 National Security Strategy of the United States 31–2, 172 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): action in Yugoslavia 31; definition of standardization 189–90; definitions of missions 174; member–ship 34, 36, 198; military research 128; negotiation of multilateral agreements 279; Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels 266; Research and Technology Organization 124, 131, 137; Response Force 186; role in Cold War 169; Strategic Concept 183 Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, US 52 Netherlands 132, 137–8, 188–9, 191, 192, 241–3, 258, 267–83 Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 183, 186, 193–4 networking 182, 185–7 new democracies 266–8, 282–3 new military 174–6 new missions 173–4 new tasks 191 new wars 4–8, 166–8 New Zealand 250–6 Newman, Edward 176 Nielsen, Vicki 253 Nincic, M. 211 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 219, 222 non-military targets 168 Norris, P. 250–2 Norway 241–3, 258 Nuciari, Marina 221, 235, 238–59 nuclear weapons 25–7, 28, 32, 110–11, 169 Nuremburg tribunal 32, 113 Nye, J. 197 O’Reilly, C. 190 Oakes, Guy 110, 111, 121 Obraztsov, Igor 50 occupational model of military 53, 54, 58, 75, 78 Odom, William 207–8 officers: evolution/education of 219–25; as professionals 217–19 old democracies 266–8, 282–3 Omahe, K. 245 operational settings 126 operations/operations support 128–30, 133, 136–7 organization and culture: culture change perspectives 80–3; differentiation perspective 73–6; fragmentation perspective 76–80; integration perspective 69–73; method 68–9; overview 67–8 organization science, lessons from: ambidexterity 190–2; flexibility 183–5; future research 192–4; modularity 187–90; networking 185–7; overview 181–2 organizational aesthetics: beauty in the military 149–53; method in aesthetic research 155–6; organizational aesthetics 153–5; organizational artefacts 145–9; overview 144–5 organizational skills 221 organizational structure 193 Orlikowski, W.J. 145 Orlov, A.S. 115 Oslin, D. 137 Ouchi, W.G. 80 outsourcing 55–6, 97, 194, 244 Palestine 28 Palland, B.G. 124 parliamentary accountability mechanisms 265–6; Europe/North America 266–81

294

Index
professional image 230 professional preparation 231–2 Professional Soldier, The 93, 201 professionalism 78, 92, 93–4, 299–300 psychological approach to military research: history of psychology 124–6; military psychology 126–30; overview 123–4; psychological forums 138–9 Puryear, R. 194 Putin, Vladimir 34–6, 115, 118, 120 racial issues 52, 58–9 Ramirez, R. 144, 150 Rani, Curi 55 Reagan administration, US 118 Recht, R. 69–70 recruitment 53–4, 226–7 Reed, Brian J. 55 Reilly, D.A. 211 reserve forces 56–7 Reuven, G. 126 Ribbentrop–Molotov pact 113–16 Rinaldo, R.J. 176 Roberts, K.H. 193 Rochlin, G.I. 193 Rohall, David E. 55, 59 Romania 267–83 Rommel, Field Marshall Erwin 78–9 Rosansky, J. 137 Rosen, M. 145 Rosen, S.P. 83 Rosenhek, Zeev 53 Rossant, M.J. 108 Rostow, W.W. 245 Royal Military Academy, Belgium 133 Royal Prerogative 269, 282 Rudakov, G.P. 116–17 Rukavishnikov, Vladimir 10, 23–39 Russett, B. 165 Russia: security strategies 25–30, 31, 34–9; social history 118–21; social research 50, 53; under communism 111–13; and World War II 113–17 Sabrosky, A. 78 Sagan, Scott D. 40, 193 Salas, E. 129 Sampson, Robert J. 59 Sanchez, R. 187 Santamaria, J.A. 181 Sarkesian, Sam C. 93–5, 98 Sarvas, Stefan 60 Savage, Paul L. 51 Schein, E. 12, 70, 81

parliamentary oversight, general powers 269–71 parliamentary powers 279–83 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 198, 202 path-dependency 206–9 Pattyn, Nathalie 136 peace support operations (PSOs) 4–6, 60, 126, 132–3, 164, 170–1, 173–4, 227, 229, 280; parliamentary control 272–5 Pearson, Raymond 113 Pelzer, L. 144, 150 people’s wars 166–7 Perrow, C. 193 Pfanner, T. 168 Pfeffer, J. 194 Phelps, Ruth H. 56 Philips, S. 194 Phillips, J. 156 Pickren, W. 131 Pigeau, R. 132 Pinch, F. 79 Piras, Enrico Maria 12, 14, 144–57 Poland 114–15, 241–3, 258, 267–83 political control of military 89–101, 108, 223–5 political framework 164–6, 167 political geography 209–11 political science perspectives on civil–military relations: in Eastern Europe 200–6; examples 91–100; political science approach 89–90; political science as core of interdisciplinary studies 100–1 political system characteristics 268–9 politicization of the military 94–5 politics, separation of military from 224 Polyani, M. 149, 151 Pondy, L.R. 72 Popevitch, V. 139 Popov, Gavril 107, 119–21 Portugal 241–3, 258 post-traumatic stress disorder/reactions (PTSD/PTSR) 130, 134, 137 postmodern military 174–6 postmodern model 58–9, 77 Potter, William C. 40 Powley, E. 146 Prandstraller, Giampaolo 219 pre-emptive action 32, 33, 36 presidential political systems 265, 266, 267–83 principal–agent relations 96–7 prisoners of war (POWs), interrogation 49 professional developments 233

200. 189.C. 48 Strategic Bombing Surveys 49 strategic concepts/doctrines. David 130 Shapiro. 57.Index 295 Schiff. 74 Schmahmann. impact on security thinking 25–30 Scott. 146 science. 182 Stein. 191 Soldier and the State. similarity and diversity within countries 243–6 Society for Military Psychology 133–4. Jay 54. 8. Joseph 2. 213 soldier–scholars 93–5 Sony 186 Sorensen. learning from 113–17. K. 72 Sivohina. 59 social trends. H. Ph. Andrew Samuel 1.S. 258. D. 187 Schlossman. 238–9. S. impact of science 25–30 Segal. 193 Snow. 137 Sloan. military professionals 230 social prestige 228–9 social research developments/trends: Cold War 49–51. Russia/USA 25–39 security thinking.A. E. Russia 111–13 social image 231 social origins. World War II 47–9. 55. 149.K. Thomas 52 Siefert. R. 208 Schneider. 280 security revolutions 169–71 security sector reform 172–3 security strategies. Wilbur 51. current state of knowledge 55–60. overview 238–9. 199. 69–70. 192 specificity of military profession 222–5 Spector. David R. 10–11. 54.M. Henning 53 Soviet Union see Russia Soviotology 206–9 Spain 241–3. 133. J. 108–9 Snider. 186 Stekete. S. C. 167 Smith. Jnr. José 6 Servan-Schreiber. Rear Admiral D.P. 125 Stouffer. 120 standardization 185–7. overview 46–7. 144. 40 Spencer. 54 Scroggs. 59. G. Ruth 54 Simons. 243. Leonard S. 156 stressful occupations 135–6 strong parliaments 280–3 structural ambidexterity 191–2 Studies in social Psychology in World War II (1949) 48 study centres 8–9 Study on NATO Enlargement (1995) 198 Sub-Saharan Africa 250–6 subcultures 73–6.E. 138 sociology 200–6 Soeters. Mady W. 136 Steensma. C. changes in 30–7 Strati. K. 60. Anna 74 Singer. R. overview 105–7. R. Herbert 46 Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture (1986) 74–5 Stalin. 155 Stiglitz. 2. 145 Schmidseder. 71 secular–rational authority 248–52 security policies. S. 189–90 Stanley. 201 Schilling. 150.F. 148. 245 Stogdill. A. Joseph 114–15. Sandra Carson 54 Staren. civil defence 107–11. 259 self-expression values 248–52 Sen. 240. 145. Brewster 48 Smith. J. 154. 186 Shibutani. M. M. 187 Steyaert. F. Vietnam War 51–4. index of female soldiers’ integration 241–3. John Hopkins University 49 specialization 3–4.K. 247 Serano.A. 93–5 Snook. A. The (1957) 93. 115 Slack. 182. 81–2 Sun-Zsu 181 . parliamentary control 276–9. Edward 49 Sicilia. 99–100. 91 Stanley. M.E. 74. T.A. Don M. 78. 70. 135 social history: and the armed forces 118–21. M. 267–83 Special Operations Research Office. early twentieth century 47. 173–4 Schmitter. 174 Segal. 46–60. Tamotsu 48 Shils. 80 Sion. S. 155. L. impact on US military 52 societal change theories: first general model of the women–military relationship 239–41.

L. 53. 97. Jacques 218 Van Maanen.A. 163–4. H. 193 Supreme Command: Soldiers. 57. social research 47–54. Marie 60 Vogelaar. 134–5. 193–4 Teitler. 131–2. 97.296 Index integration 241–3. new forms of 4–8. H. 258. 99. B. 155 Taylor. 59 Vlachova. J. 267–83 Ukraine 112 Ulrich. Strom 108–9 Tonelson. 80 Van Creveld. Gerke 220 TenHave. 184 UN (United Nations): Human Development Report 263–4. 226–7. 74 Van Doorn. K. 137 terrorism. Gayle L. and the Cold War 105–11. 155 Van Stone. 137 US Army Personnel Research Office 49 US Department of Defense 55 US Military Academy. Alan 233 total wars 166 traditional authority 248–52 traditional functions 163–4 Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 193 Velzen. 164.I. 75. F. Stephen C.E. 137 Varian. Piotr 3 TADMUS (tactical decision-making under stress) 129 Tanercan. van T. 137 veterans 59 Vico. 263 Von Bredow. 250–6. West Point (USMA) 135 US National Guard 56 US Naval Warfare Center 129 US Strategy of National Security for the 21st Century 31 Uzzi. 152 UK 74–5. M.R. 106. 127. gender . Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (2002) 94 survival values 248–52 Sutton. 97. D. 55–60. 192. 220–1. M. 124 Waard. security sector reform 172–3. M. Wilfried 163–77 Vuyk. 186 Vattimo. 241–3. social research 51–4. 187 Verbunck. C. J. 127. de 181–94 Waldrop. E. 135 warfare. 74 Thompson. 218 technology 22. 261 Weick. William J. 79 weak parliaments 280–3 weak states 167–8 weapons of mass destruction see nuclear weapons Weber. T. Gianni 149 Vaughan. parliamentary oversight powers 266–83. 133 Taylor. H. 166. 137 threat perceptions: Europe 171. 53. 78. 194 Sweden 267–83 Switzerland 267–83 symbolic studies 72 Sztompka. 163 Van der Meulen. G. R. 166–8 warlords 168 Watkins. 258. 54 transdisciplinarity 3 transitology 206–9 Turkey 241–3. 181 Van Cott. 170 United Psychogeriatric Biopsychosocial Evaluation and Treatment (UPBEAT) programme 137 US: civil–military relations 92–3. 222. Max 46. technology 186 US Air Force 52. security strategy 25–39. 94 Watson. S. E. armies in 224–5 Thomas. D. B. 152. W. military professionals 226–7 Thurmond. 258. E. V. 144. military culture 71–2. 81. international see international terrorism Third World countries. 186–7. 267–83 Tushman. 231–3 Trainor. R. peacekeeping operations 5. 183–4 voluntarism 51–2. 133 Volberda. The (2003) 98 training 127. J.J. leadership role 36. 153 Vietnam War 95. 59. A. 133 Vermetten. 181. 190 twenty-first century challenges 23–39 Tyler. 78 Thompson. R. 184 values-based model of military 53 Van Clausewitz. P.

118 Yeltsin administration. 70. 174 Williams. 197–213 . organizational aesthetics 153–5.C. method in aesthetic research 155–6. 40 Wolters. L. 113–17. 108–9. Leonard 55 Wong. Ch. 133 Wirtz. organizational artefacts 145–9. James J. 59 Wright Mills. 246. 125 women soldiers see gender integration Women’s Corps 244–5 Wong. Quincy 47 Yarmolinsky. Robin M.C. A. 81 Wilkins. G. 145 workgroup study: beauty in the military 149–53. A. S. Col.M. social research 47–9. Pol-Kam 190 Wood. Joseph 52 Zirker. Frank R. G.A. 210–11 Widen. 11–12. overview 144–5 World War II: Russian involvement in 112. 206 Zulean. Lt. D. 54 Woolgar.L. 150 Whitehead. 48 Wilson. D. 144. 67–84. 50 Wright. 247 Westminster parliamentary system 267–81 Westphalian system 165 White. John Allen 10–11. 119–20. Marian 60. C. 58. R. 47 Yugoslavia 31 Zeidner. Russia 34 Yerkes. 53 Woodruff. Todd D. 89–101. S. 176 Winslow. 80 Williams.Index 297 Welzel. Daniel 202. 12.

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