You are on page 1of 8

Proceedings of the Eleventh (2001) International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference Stavanger, Norway, June 17-22, 2001

Copyright 2001 by The International Society of Offshore and Polar Engineers ISBN 1-880653-51-6 (Set); 1SBN 1-880653-53-2 (Vol. 11); ISSN 1098-6189(Set)

RBI Planning for Pipelines

M.J. Marley, C.H. Jahre-Nilsen and O.H. Bj~rn~y Det Norske Veritas Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT Pipeline systems are subject to several degradation modes / damage types for which monitoring or inspection is required. Inspection and maintenance are a significant part of pipeline operations costs. This paper discusses the philosophy and benefits of a risk based approach for planning these activities, describes which damage types can be addressed using a RBI approach, and how these are incorporated in available software tools. The principles and benefits of a risk-based program are presented, and a tier approach to the inspection planning process is described, including different applications of qualitative and quantitative methods. Critical pipelines can be carried forward to a quantitative detailed assessment where the level of complexity and accuracy may vary based on availability of information and owner needs. Detailed assessment requires significant effort in data gathering, and the benefit of this should be compared against the extra effort. RBI planning is a "living process". In order to optimize future inspections, it is essential that the analyses utilize the most recent information regarding the condition of each pipeline. KEY WORDS: Pipeline, reliability, corrosion, freespan, RBI INTRODUCTION Inspection and maintenance activities should aim to ensure that all requirements to safety are maintained whilst the overall costs of inspections, repairs and production shutdowns are minimized. Only then, will the inspection efforts be focused consistently towards those components and deterioration processes that contribute to the safety and economical risks for the facility. RBI planning is a method for establishing inspection strategy based on the risk principles, where the inspection effort is focused on those elements with a potential to reduce the risk. Inspection planning based on the RBI approach uses safety, economic and environmental risk of failure as a rational and cost efficient decision framework for determining: when, what, where, and how to inspect.

The risk based inspection planning process outlined in this paper is generic, and may be adapted to each project either as a whole or in part. The approach described is that adopted in ORBIT Pipeline, a DNV developed RBI software tool, and addresses the working process of RBI planning with respect to corrosion and freespanning pipelines and with due account of the potential damage due to these. The tiered RBI approach comprises the following levels; Screening assessment Initial assessment Detailed assessment The screening process is used to exclude damage mechanisms that are obviously not of interest, and can also be used as a client/project set-up of the RBI study. The initial assessment is a qualitative risk ranking of the pipelines and damage causes, and identifies an inspection plan based on limited input information. In many cases this is sufficient for planning, and particularly for the first inspections where there are no inspection data available for more detailed analyses. The detailed assessment is a quantitative assessment and includes evaluations of loads and capacity of various defects and can include probabilistic assessments, detailed consequence assessment and cost optimized inspection plans.

DETERIORATION AND EFFECT OF INSPECTION Although design strategies attempt to mitigate or minimize the effect of deterioration processes by choice of structural material or dimensions, deterioration processes still occur. Processes such as corrosion and coating deterioration will act on the pipeline systems from the very moment they are taken into use. Different deterioration processes will follow dissimilar patterns with respect to time and location depending on the materials, design and production characteristics, loading and environmental exposure. The deterioration processes are only partly understood and their evolution in time is associated with significant uncertainty. The progress of deterioration is therefore best predicted using statistical or probabilistic models based on a mixture of physical understanding, observations, and experience. Observations of the


actual deterioration, e.g. by inspection, can be introduced into the models and greatly enhance the precision of their predictions. RBI assessments should address all relevant damage mechanisms, both those that can be predicted and those that can only be directly observed. Inspection is a tool to identify whether degradation is occurring, and to measure its progress. The information obtained is used to reduce the uncertainty in the predicted deterioration such that action can be taken before failure occurs. Inspectionalone does not affect actual safety, but reduces uncertainty in the assessment of the safety and can initiate actions to achieve an acceptable safety level. Inspections and maintenance actions are also subject to substantial uncertainties. Assuming that detected serious deterioration will be result in remedial action, there is clearly a strong relationship between inspection intervals, quality, and coverage and the safety achieved as a result of the inspection.


The RBI concept is based on the principles that:

risk of failure can be assessed in relation to a level that is acceptable; and inspection and repair used to ensure that the level of risk is, and remains, below that acceptance limit. The risk of failure is calculated as the product of Probability of Failure and Consequence of Failure as discussed below.

Probability of Failure

Probability of Failure (PoF) is estimated on the basis of the types

of degradation mechanisms operating on the component. Failure probabilities can be estimated by qualitative assessment, from experience data or by quantitative calculations using more or less refined physical/probabilistic models. For a qualitative evaluation, the failure probability is expressed as a ranking categou'. For a quantitative evaluation, the scale for PoF is probability of an event per unit time (e.g. annual probability) or probability of an event after a given time (accumulated probability). Most acceptance criteria are set as annual probability, and therefore the estimated PoF should be expressed in a similar unit. The qualitative categories and quantitative scale are shown in Table 1. The change in failure probability is calculated using degradation models based upon the damage mode and the damage incurred by the pipeline system. The models may be classified as: Rate: Damage accumulates over time. This model is usually amenable to inspection as the damage rate often allows for a number of inspections before failure. Susceptibility: Damage occurs spontaneously, after a delay of unknown duration (incubation period), as a result of external influence. This is not amenable to inspection, as inspection does not measure the triggering event. Some degradation mechanisms for certain materials do not progress at a steady rate, but instead initiate and progress to failure quickly once unfavorable conditions become established. Furthermore, some mechanisms can lead to damage not readily detected using conventional inspection. Consequently, the PoF estimation process can be used to indicate whether process monitoring or maintenance activity is a more cost-effective alternative to inspection.
C o n s e q u e n c e of Failure

The objective of RBI planning is to establish a cost effective inspection strategy that can be used to document and maintain the desired level of safety and operability of the installation. Many existing inspection planning approaches are based on prescriptive rules that do not adapt inspection effort to the actual condition of the components or to the importance of the component. Prescriptive inspection planning can be either over-conservative, resulting in inspection more often than required, or underconservative, potentially resulting in failure and repair and with an unacceptable (and often unknown) risk exposure. RBI is a condition based approach and provides a rational basis Ibr adapting inspection effort to the importance and condition of the individual components and the different deterioration mechanisms. In comparison to traditional inspection planning methods, RBI: targets inspection efforts to high risk components quantifies the results of inspections documents the condition of the installation RBI planning is a part of pipeline risk management and must be interfaced with appropriate design, maintenance and operating procedures and methods. RBI planning for pipelines provides an input to the overall inspection program, and aids the development of optimized inspection, monitoring and testing plans. To obtain the full benefit from RBI, the process of inspection planning, execution and evaluation should not be a one-time activity, but a continuous process where information and data from the process and the inspection / maintenance / operation activities are fed back to the planning, as indicated in Figure 1.
Inspection data evaluation Ol~ller Ioal~ Acceptance Criteria

AnillySLsof results
Inspection and testing

ConsequenCety, Em'ironmencf Fa ure

ASSet Loss

E~,,,io.~ R~oniog

Inspection Management
~ . p robability of Failure Materials/Environment and Streng~

Inspection delails, pl;inning, logistics

Rir,k Evaluation PoF x CoF Inspection Programme

Method. Tinting. Coverage, Location, Cost

Figure 1 RBI Management Process


Consequence of Failure (CoF) is defined for all consequences that are of importance to the company, such as safety, economy and environment. Estimation of CoF is a vital part of the screening process and important for prioritization for the detailed assessment. Safety Consequence Safety consequence considers the effect of failure in terms of personnel injury or loss of life. Safety consequence can be obtained from QRA studies and, for the purposes of RBI, is normally presented in terms of Potential Loss of Life (PLL). Safety consequences are usually estimated for failures that lead to ignition, explosion, pollution or toxic release, but failure of pipeline components containing high pressure non-hazardous fluids should also be considered. Economic Consequence Economic consequence is calculated as the sum business loss from interruption in production and the cost of repairs due to the

failure of the component. These costs may be subdivided into consequence for leak and consequence for rupture. The repair consequence is dependent on the location of the failure. Economic consequences due to business interruption or deferred production relate to the costs due to the shutdown. An important factor is the redundancy in the system, whereby production is maintained by using by-pass lines. Environmental Consequence The evaluation of environmental consequences is a complex issue as it includes short term (clean-up) and long-term effects on the environment. The consequences due to leaks from flowlines and pipelines are significant as the enclosed volumes are often large. The loss of toxic chemicals into the environment must be considered separately, as in some cases a small volume of chemical can have a widespread effect on the environment. Direct costs for oil releases are mainly related to the clean-up costs if the spill drifts towards shore. The actual effect will then depend on the location of the field in relation to the shore, oil drift conditions, temperature and evaporation, etc. For the purpose of inspection planning, a consequence expressed as volume oil spill or an equivalent clean-up cost is used. The environmental effects of gas releases is generally considered to be low consequence. Pollution is a sensitive public issue that can affect a company's reputation even if the actual damage is low. As such, the approach taken to these issues should be communicated to and accepted by management.

Inspection reliability
The coverage, accuracy and reliability of the inspection methods are crucial to the inspection planning. The more accurate the inspection, the more information it reveals about the state of deterioration. However, greater accuracy and coverage usually also implies more expensive inspection, and it is important to consider these aspects in the inspection planning. For example, MFL pigs cover virtually the entire pipeline surface, but with a modest accuracy, while local UT automated scanning cover only a fraction of the surface, but usually with a very high reliability and accuracy. These two methods are both important and complement each others. In general the result of inspections must be considered as uncertain in the sense that the inspection can: fail to detect a defect; find a defect, but indicate an incorrect defect size; or indicate a defect even though no defect is actually present. To account for the uncertainties, the reliability of an inspection method is used in terms of statistical characteristics, i.e. the probability of finding an existing defect, and the sizing (measurement) accuracy given that a defect is found.


The RBI process should begin with a clear objective of the scope of work and definition of the acceptance criteria. An overview of the RBI process can be seen from the flowchart in Figure 2. RBI planning is a multidisciplinary activity, and the tbllowing types of qualified personnel should be involved: Inspection engineers; Material and corrosion specialists; Operation / Maintenance engineers; and Process engineers. Experience with RBI assessment and the actual pipeline operations and conditions is vital for ensuring an effective inspection plan. The RBI assessment excludes or prioritizes actions as necessary to meet the acceptance criteria. These criteria should be established prior to the screening and assessment process. Documentation of design and operation of the pipeline forms the basis the for RBI screening and assessments. The amount of information required is dependent upon the level of detail of the RBI assessment. Some basic information is required for screening, with an increasing level of documentation required tbr initial and detailed assessment respectively.

Risk Presentation
Risk PoF and CoF is commonly presented as a matrix of PoF and CoF factors. To achieve adequate resolution of detail, a 5 x 5 matrix is used, as shown in Table 2. Measures of probability and consequence of failure may be qualitative or quantitative. Risk is normally presented as individual matrices representing safety, economic and environmental risk. The matrix has PoF on the vertical axis and CoF on the horizontal. The divisions between the categories of each should be chosen taking into consideration the absolute magnitude of the values, their ranges, and the need for consistent reporting when comparing different pipeline installations.
Table 1. Example Risk Ranking Matrix

Probability of Failure
>10 a
10~-10 .2


Risk Categories
!~!!:-o i}.i~i

Very High High Medium Low Very Low



10-~.10-3 10"5-104 <I0 "~

Consequence category







Acceptance criteria
The acceptance criteria are defined for each of the different consequence categories. Acceptance criteria may be based on previous experience, design code requirements, national legislation or risk analysis. The acceptance criteria for a function may be subdivided into acceptance criteria for the performance for the individual items comprising the function. 112

Screening is performed to focus the RBI assessment on the relevant damage causes and components. In the screening, an extensive list of possible damage causes are reviewed and identified as either "potential" or "insignificant" with respect to probability of occurrence and consequence in case of failure. If either PoF or CoF is assessed as "insignificant", the damage cause is omitted from the study for the pipeline(s) in question, and some general advice tbr further actions are given as in Table 2. Otherwise the pipeline(s) are brought forward to the initial assessment. The screening process should be carried out in workshop environment incorporating a multi-disciplined team, preferably with hands-on experience of the pipeline system under consideration.

Initial A s s e s s m e n t



I*z~,~inl/ Imlgnifica.t
Cl*~lh~ Mnln(enn~e ] j~

/ ~





Detailed Assessment



_ _ q

phm bLsetl~pon t;lrg~'t Risk level

asu~nl ~


[ ......

In the initial assessment, a risk ranking value is calculated for each respective damage cause carried forward from screening. The objective is to derive an efficient initial qualitative assessment not requiring a detailed description of the pipeline system. Often, this level may be the most appropriate approach for the inspection planning if detailed information or models are not available, or the benefit of a more costly assessment is marginal. The initial assessment is mainly based on sound engineering judgement. The initial assessment will determine prioritization in the following steps in the RBI study and hence must be carried out in a sound way and documented. To avoid unnecessary effort and focus on non-critical items, it is as important to determine noncritical items as to identify the critical ones. For the initial assessment, the whole pipeline system is considered as one item. The pipeline data specified for the initial assessment is then the most conservative "critical" data for the pipeline system. In the initial assessment, each pipeline system is ranked from 1 to 5 in terms of failure probability and ranked from A to E for different categories of consequence of failure. The consequences of failure considered are safety, economic, and environmental. The RBI Initial Assessment conducted automatically in ORBIT Pipeline isbased on only a few key data for some damages causes, such as corrosion and freespans. The outcome of the initial assessment in ORBIT Pipeline is an initial result that is based on some fairly basic, but representative, rules for ranking of the pipelines in terms of PoF and CoF, and hence risk. CoF, PoF and Risk A typical ranking for safety consequence is given in Table 3, and similar tables are made for economic and environmental consequences. In the Initial Assessment, likelihood is ranked from 1 to 5. The categorization of levels is defined in terms of typical annual failure probability along with the corresponding description. The PoF ranking in Table 4 is from the rule set in ORBIT Pipeline. For time dependent degradation mechanisms, PoF increases with time. Time since last inspection and the inspection outcome will be the starting point for the determination of the PoF. For each damage type, e.g. corrosion, the time increments for development of the PoF are determined depending on the corrosivity of the fluid, level of monitoring, operation temperature, protection system etc. The system is assigned a PoF based on the inspection, and this PoF increases by l-unit by the determined time increments. The PoF for some damage causes can remain constant over time, e.g. for trawling impact, anchor hooking and stationary freespans. An inspection will not reduce the likelihood of an incident, but if there are indications that a possible incident could have occurred then the pipeline system should be inspected. For each pipeline system, the obtained PoF factors and CoF factors for the damage causes considered are combined to estimate the risk factor for each of the defined consequence categories, see Table 5. The description of the different risk factors is given below the table. Note that numbers are selected for PoF ranking and letters are used for CoF ranking, which restricts the possibility to multiply the two into a Risk number, but guides the user to consider the combination of CoF and PoF.

Figure 2 Overview of the RBI Process Flowchart

Table 2. Screening assessment PoF Potential PoF Insignificant CoF Insignificant Corrective maintenance Minimum surveillance CoF Potential Brought forward to RBI initial assessment Preventive maintenance or monitoring

Table 3. Safety CoF categories - initial assessment CoF A B C D E Description Personnel injury not likely Minor injury, no lost time injury or loss of life Lost time injury to no more than one/a few persons. Multiple loss time injury. Potential for one fatality. Potential for multiple fatalities. Table 4. PoF categories - initial assessment PoF 1 2 3 4 5 Description Very low PoF, event considered insignificant Event rarely expected to occur Not expected for individual components; but expected to occur when summed over a large number of camp. An event, which individually, may be expected to occur once during the lifetime of the component. Expected to happen more than once over the service life


Table 5. Risk categories, function of PoF and CoF PoF 5 4



Risk Categories (example) M H VH M M H



2 1 CoF:






In contrast to the initial assessment, which considers the pipeline system as one item, the detailed assessment is performed on a component level. Further, the detailed assessment considers individual degradation mechanisms, as opposed to the overall damage cause considered in the initial assessment. For instance, there are several degradation mechanisms that can result in the damage cause "corrosion internal", as for instance CO2 corrosion, H20 corrosion, bacteria etc. Detailed assessment therefore requires more detailed information regarding the internal corrosion, Acceptance criteria Various acceptance criteria may be applied in the detailed assessment, for example: 1. Code requirements The acceptance criterion can be industry accepted risk levels inherent in the design codes. For example, DNV-OS-FI01 "Offshore Standard for Pipeline Systems" defines target annual failure probabilities combinations of location and product. 2. Maximum risk level The maximum tolerable risk level can be considered in different ways, such as risk cost (consequence cost times annual failure probability), safety risk, or risk of large hydrocarbon release. 3. Inspection cost versus risk reduction The perceived risk reduction (in monetary units) based on inspection results can be estimated and compared to the inspection cost. If the inspection cost is less the perceived risk reduction, then an inspection could be proposed. 4. Optimized inspection plan The inspections and other alternative actions can be optimized to give the minimum total cost. In the ORBIT Pipeline RBI methodology, the first option, code requirements with a target annual failure probability, are selected as the default acceptance criterion. This option is selected due io its general acceptability and limited required input data. The default target safety level is a total annual failure probability of 10-5 Ibr failure modes that pose a threat to personnel. For non-hazardous fluids, a failure probability of 10-4 is defined as acceptable. Figure 3 illustrates the approach to minimizing the total costs, where the inspection costs are balanced against the repair and operational costs as a function of the reliability level. In the illustration, a PoF of somewhat less than 10-3 is the optimum reliability level.
Total cost 35

Very Low (VL): insignificant risk; no further action; Low (L): evaluate possible further action; Medium (M): implement action at next planned inspection; High (H): review inspection reports and implement action for risk reduction within a reasonable period; Very High (VH): immediate review of inspection reports, and immediate initiation of action for risk reduction. The ranking in terms of CoF and PoF is based on a set of general rules in ORBIT Pipeline. It is important that the rule based results from the initial assessment are evaluated, preferably in a workshop environment, by experienced personnel. If required, the ranking should be altered and reasons documented by the RBI team. Inspection planning - initial assessment The outcome of the RBI initial assessment is primarily a risk ranking and an inspection plan for the pipelines and damage causes. The initial assessment also lists combinations of damage causes and pipelines associated with low risk where preventive maintenance or corrective maintenance could be an applicable approach. The estimated failure probability accounts for uncertainty in the actual condition of the system, and this uncertainty may contribute significantly to the estimated PoF. This uncertainty increases over time, and hence the estimated PoF also increases. An inspection, depending on its reliability, accuracy and outcome, can reduce this uncertainty, and should be initiated if the PoF is dominated by uncertainties related to the actual condition of the system. However, if a high PoF is based on recent inspection information, a repeated inspection is only applicable if the magnitude of the PoF is due to uncertainty in the inspection results, in which case a more accurate/advanced inspection and evaluation method may be considered. In other cases of a high PoF, actions such as repair or modifications, reduced operating pressure, more detailed assessment etc. should be considered. The latter includes the option to conduct the Detailed Assessment.
Detailed A s s e s s m e n t


The detailed assessment entails a more thorough assessment which may be carried out with different degrees of detail in the predictive models, and incorporates both deterministic and probabilistic assessment of the PoF. The different levels of detail relate to both the data required and the computational models. The detailed assessment is optional for each individual pipeline damage cause, and the decision to proceed with the refined assessment is based upon the overall criticality of the individual pipeline within the respective pipeline network. The detailed assessment provides an optimized inspection plan. Probabilistic models are applied to determine the safety level of the pipeline over the service life. The understanding of structural reliability methods is therefore a necessary part of the assessment.

20 o 15 10

Repair + o p e r a t ~ 0.0001
reliability level

i 0.01

0 0.00001


Figure 3 Optimized RBI assessment 114

PoF and CoF models The detailed assessment utilizes various models for the PoF calculation and CoF calculation, depending on the degradation mechanisms. For some mechanisms, simplified conservative assessments are applied as a first pass to reduce the user effort required for the data gathering. Other mechanisms require the same information for a simplified assessment as for a full probabilistic assessment, and the same model can be used but with various degree of confidence in the input data. An example of the first case is fi'eespan assessment where the wave and current require detailed input. An example of the second case is corrosion defects, where all parameters have to be input, but the accuracy and confidence in the inspection results, and levels of effort in the prediction of the future corrosion rates will result in different confidence levels.

For time dependent degradation mechanisms, the time to next inspection is based on the date of last inspection and the inspection quality and results and estimated degradation rate. The failure probability is calculated for succeeding years and when the acceptance risk limit is exceeded an inspection is required. For event based degradation mechanisms where models are not available the inspection plans must be more pragmatic, largely based upon engineering judgement. The time to next inspection will then be based on an estimation of risk levels (for the particular degradation mechanism) over the succeeding years and when the acceptable risk limit is exceeded an inspection will be required.

Output of RBI Planning

The result of the RBI analysis are the inspection strategies with specification of components and locations to inspect, inspection methods to use, time intervals between the inspections as well as the coverage assumed at the different inspections. The results of the inspections are used to update the models for the deterioration and thus modify the future inspection plans in accordance with the performance of the inspected components. RBI planning may result in decreased or increased inspection compared to the previous plan. Decreased inspection indicates that the previous inspection plan was over conservative with respect to the progress of degradation mechanisms and their importance with respect to acceptance criteria. Decreased inspection will result in cost savings due to reduced scope of inspection, fewer damages types to inspect for, and longer intervals between inspection. Increased inspection can appear to be a more costly approach in the short term, but increased inspection indicates that the original inspection plan was not suitable to meet the specified acceptance criteria. Failure to meet the criteria can in the long term result in failure of the pipeline and associated compensation, lost production, clean-up, repair etc. costs. Follow-up/revision of inspection program Different elements in the inspection management should be seen as a working process where information is fed from one element to the next for continuous improvement of the program. This does not mean that the full RBI analysis must be performed each time an inspection is performed, but rather should be initiated based on one of the following criteria: time (e.g. every 4th year); a major revision of company policies, cost structure, or inspection philosophies; following design or operational changes; based on inspection results; or based on failure events.

In-service inspection is carried out mainly for the purpose of detecting critical damage. In-service inspection can also assist in detecting degradation and enabling corrective measures before the degradation becomes critical. With this as a basis, the inspection program may be adjusted to focus upon areas with high probability of failure rather than those of only high consequence. The inspection data, both historical and current, should be reviewed in relation to the appropriate degradation mechanism and failure mode under consideration. Both the actual physical a r e a o f component inspected, and the inherent accuracy of the inspection method, should be assessed. Once the relevant degradation mechanisms have been identified the most appropriate inspection method and accuracy should be selected. The current inspection program should be reviewed with respect to the degradation mechanism under consideration including all practical aspects of the process. The existing program might be suitable, particularly if rationalized or extended, or if the level of accuracy within the inspection method. The inspection program is formulated based on: The underlying damage mechanisms, the type of degradation and the rate of degradation. The actual risk ranking - higher risk damages needs more attention. The risk ranking should include past historical experience with the pipeline. If any national legislation/code or company code should apply to the pipeline system, these should be followed, unless otherwise documented and accepted.

Time and Event Based Degradation Mechanisms

When considering degradation and appropriate inspection intervals, components with active damage mechanisms typically falls within one of the following inspection categories: Insignificant time dependent degradation. No inspection is required to maintain an acceptable risk level. Significant time dependent degradation. The predicted risk will eventually exceed the acceptable risk limit. It is recommended that a component be inspected before it reaches this limit. Non-time dependent degradation. Failure develops quickly after an unknown incubation period and inspection is ineffective. If the risk exceeds the risk limit, immediate mitigation action is required. If, however, the risk is below the acceptance limit, corrective maintenance or monitoring may be recommended. 115

RBI planning is a systematic approach to derive an installation specific, cost effective and targeted inspection strategy for operation within acceptable safety, economic and environmental criteria. The RBI assessment may result in changes to an existing inspection plan. Any changes will be based on balancing risk, i.e. balancing inspections to meet the acceptance criteria. Many consultants claim large savings, mainly by postponing costly inspections and indeed, in the case of over-inspection, there is a potential for inspection cost savings. However, the DNV approach considers pipeline network and operations as a whole where total cost, including risk cost, is of concern.


In RBI detailed assessment, it is important to determine which corrosion mechanisms are taking place and the corrosion rates. A coarse conservative estimate can be made first, and later refined in more detail, if necessary. In addition, the uncertainty in the predicted rate is important and should be defined. If the coarse method implies a very high risk then a more detailed evaluation that accounts for more parameters may reduce the rate estimate and prediction uncertainty, and thereby reduce the perceived risk. If no inspection data is available, the corrosion rate must be estimated based on corrosion rate prediction models and specialist engineering judgement. When applicable and reliable past inspection data are available, then the inspection results should form the basis for the corrosion rate estimate, but this has to be combined with an understanding of the underlying degradation mechanisms and expected operational conditions. For calculation of the failure probability, as function of time, the following information is required: Diameter, wall thickness, and material strength (SMTS) Internal pressure, MAOP Commissioning year, and date of inspection Measured depth and length of defect Inspection method, and its accuracy Corrosion rate estimate, and uncertainty in rate A corrosion specialist, in cooperation with operational engineers of the pipeline system and the RBI team, should estimate the corrosion rates. There are a number of factors affecting the corrosion rate, such as material, product, presence of water in the system, temperature, CO 2 partial pressure, inhibition efficiency (if any), flow regime, H2S , etc. Corrosion defects can result in a pinhole leak or rupture, and both situations must be considered. A pinhole leak occurs when the corrosion defect is through the wall thickness, and the variations in the wall thickness and inspection accuracy should be included in the assessment. The rupture case requires a burst capacity model for the probabilistic calculation, and knowledge of the variations of the parameters, the model uncertainty and the inspection accuracy. The capacity model for rupture is given below and is similar to the capacity equation implemented in DNV-RP-F10t. _ 2t.a u (Is(d/t)____ ~)

Table 6. Parameters in the modelling of the burst limit state Variable PrNT D t clu Distribution Gumbel Deterministic Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Mean 1.05 MAOP Actual Nominal 1.09 SMTS Measured value Measured value 1.05 CoV 3.0 % 3.0 % 3.0 % - 6.0 % Specified Specified 9.5 %

Imeas d/t

The parameters in the limit state are modeled with their distributions, and taking account of the inspection sizing accuracy. The set of distributions shown in Table 6 is considered to be representative; more details are given in Sigurdsson et al. 1999. The detailed assessment full probabilistic PoF and risk calculation are shown in Figure 4 for the corroded section of the example pipeline. The CoF is set to 10-4 for safety and 10 -3 tbr economic consequences. The safety criterion is exceeded in 2007 and the economic criterion is exceeded in year 2009, resulting in initiating an inspection no later then year 2007. This is slightly later compared to the initial assessment. The outcome from the inspection in year 2007 will again form the basis tbr npdating tile corrosion rate and associated uncertainties and the time to the next inspection can be calculated.

Figure 4 Corrosion detailed assessment calculation where


Q= 1+0.31 Assessment of freespans can be performed to various degrees of complexity, usually requiring a significant amount of input. To minimize effort and cost, stationary freespans are subject to some simplified first pass checks. If the fi'eespan is acceptable according to these, further evaluation is not necessary. If the checks indicate that a stationary freespan is not acceptable, then more detailed integrity assessment using DNV Guideline No 14, or similar, is required. Inspection planning can be performed using estimated fatigue life from such models. Stationary spans are assessed for fatigue and buckling capacity, and checked for acceptability by a maximum allowable free span criterion. For fatigue check an on-set criterion is used. The 116

The X M accounts for the bias and the model uncertainty. Probabilistic assessments of pipes with corrosion defects can be based on the following limit state function: g = Pcap - PINT (Eq. 2)

where PINT is the annual maximum differential pressure and Pcap is the burst pressure capacity as defined in equation 1.

maximum allowable freespan lengths for stationary spans are categorised into 3 levels: First, freespans less than a specified acceptable length are accepted, and no further evaluations are required. Second, freespans exceeding a specified critical length are determined potentially critical based on this conservative first pass check, and should be assessed by detailed fatigue analyses. Third, advanced approaches using finite element analyses can be adopted. Non-stationary freespans are in general assessed in the same way as the stationary freespans. The developments of the freespans are random and usually very difficult to predict from only a few surveys. A non-stationary freespan can develop due to erosion of the span shoulder and the span length gradually increases. As the length increases the pipe will deflect more and more and finally the mid-span will touch the bottom of the scour hole, and the span is split into two spans or more. The spans can also completely vanish in a sort of self-burial process due to movements of the soil. The first pass assessment to distinguish between acceptable freespans and potentially unacceptable (i.e. critical) freespans is perlbrmed in ORBIT Pipeline. The following parameters are input for the check for both nonstationary and stationary freespans: length of freespan 100 year return period for the flow velocity at pipe level trench depth and gap between the pipe bottom and sea-floor concrete coating thickness and density corrosion coating thickness and density effective lay tension temperature at laying internal pressure at laying pipe diameter and wall thickness The criteria herein apply to fatigue caused by Vortex Induced Vibrations (VIV) on-set in "pure current" loading conditions. The onset criteria have been thoroughly calibrated against full fatigue analyses to provide a fatigue life in excess of 50 years. The criteria are used to determine if a freespan is acceptable or potentially critical. If the freespan does not fulfil the criteria, i.e. it is potentially critical, then more detailed fatigue analyses should be pertbrmed. Freespans in the vicinity of installations are of special concern, both in regards of potential consequences in case of a failure, but also likelihood of occurrence since the installation itself can initiate and escalate the development. For guidance in evaluating the criticality of the freespans and for inspection planning, the fatigue life for various span lengths can be pre-calculated for each pipeline as function of the KP-position. The fatigue life is sensitive to the water depth mainly due to the reduced wave and current loads. In Figure 5, span length corresponding to a 1 year, 5, 10 and 100 year fatigue life, and the ULS (buckling) are plotted versus the observed spans. Short spans are of no concern, whereas spans with a fatigue life of 50 years or less may become a concern and need to be inspected in about 3-5. years to determine the development. Spans with a fatigue life of 5 or less years may need to be inspected frequently to monitor the development to see if there has been sufficient time to accumulate any significant damage to the pipeline.



,~ . 1 year

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
600_ _ 58.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~- 5s.O "i . . . . . . . . . .

" ~ ' ~





~ """

:,[ . . . . . . .

~':~ " ' a


:~a~" " " " 5 0 y e a r U L S ( I 0 0 year)



,. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . .

: :-?': : --,~ x
. . . . . . . . .



52.0 -~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ~ . o ~ .............
40 ; .......

"--'?- ;.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... :-.. : _-_-.~. : -'.7:_'. ~ .....

: _--.- . . . . . _ ~ . . . . . . . . . . .


44.0= . . . . . . . . .


: .............

._"_. : ..............
o* : - e.... _e ......


- : : _ - : ? : : :-,~-_.,:-:_,: .~,. . . .
: . . . . . . . . . ~." . . . . . .

~8.o 36.0


~.o.: ..............
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .~. ............

i ......


- ;- .........................
m -? ~ ..... .......
: . . . . . . . .

~----~*----o--: ....... -

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... : ......
. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

. . . . . t. . . . . . . . . . e.~_

34,O " .

.. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .

-~---g---. . . . . . . . . . .

* - . . . . ~

. .
. . . . . . " "



. * . . ?






Figure 5 Freespan fatigue evaluation


RBI is a means of optimizing inspection activities for offshore pipelines. Inspection planning based on the RBI approach is a rational and cost efficient decision framework for developing an inspection strategy, and can document that applied acceptance criteria for the safety of personnel and environment are fulfilled. The paper presents principles and benefits of an RBI based program, and presents a tiered approach to pipeline RBI comprising of a number of main steps. The paper further demonstrates the application of quantitative methods and qualitative methods. An example for risk based inspection of a corrosion defect is shown for initial assessment and detailed assessment, and the principles for inspection planning for freespans are presented.


Bjomoy O.H., Jahre-Nilsen C., Marley M., and Williamson R., RBI Planning of Pipelines - Principles and Benefits, OMAE 2001, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Bjornoy O.H., Sigurdsson G., and Marley M., Background and development of DNV-RP-FI 01 "Corroded Pipelines" ISOPE 2001, Stavanger, Norway DNV Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-F101, Submarine Pipeline Systems, Det Norske Veritas, 2000. DNV Recommended Practice, RP-F 10 I, Corroded Pipelines, 1999. DNV Guidelines No. 14, Free Spanning Pipelines, June 1998. Fyrileiv, O., Mork, K.J., and Rongved, K., Togi Pipeline Assessment Of Non-Stationary Free Spans OMAE 2000, February 14-17, 2000, New Orleans, USA Ritchie, D., Voermans, C.W.M., Larsen, M.H., and Vranckx, W.R.,

Probabilistic Tools for Planning of Inspection and Repair of Corroded Pipelines, OMAE98-0901, Lisbon, 1998.
Sigurdsson G., Cramer E.H., Bjornoy O.H, Fu B., Ritchie D., 1999

Background to DNV RP-FI 01 "Corroded Pipelines", OMAE 1999,

Newfoundland, Canada