David A. Rosenberg Chief Economist & Strategist drosenberg@gluskinsheff.

com + 1 416 681 8919

September 18, 2009 Economic Commentary

MARKET MUSINGS & DATA DECIPHERING

Breakfast with Dave
WHO IS DOING THE BUYING? Is it the private client? Not really — stock funds actually had net outflows of $1.33 billion last week, while bond funds enjoyed an $8.2 billion net inflow. Is it corporate insiders? Well, heck no — Robert Toll (CEO of Toll Brothers) just disclosed that he sold a total 1.6 million shares of his company’s stock yesterday. Is it buybacks? Not at all — in fact, S&P 500 companies bought back a mere $24.4 billion on stock repurchases in 2Q, down 72% from a year ago and the lowest in recorded history, according to Howard Silverblatt of Standard & Poor’s. So who’s doing the buying? Very likely it is still a combination of program trading, short coverings and portfolio managers desperately trying to make up for last year’s epic losses. WAY TOO MUCH RISK IN THE EQUITY MARKET Never before has the S&P 500 rallied 60% from a low in such a short time frame as six months. And never before have we seen the S&P 500 rally 60% over an interval in which there were 2.5 million job losses. What is normal is that we see more than two million jobs being created during a rally as large as this. In fact, what is normal is for the market to rally 20% from the trough to the time the recession ends. By the time we are up 60%, the economy is typically well into the third year of recovery; we are not usually engaged in a debate as to what month the recession ended. In other words, we are witnessing a market event that is outside the distribution curve. While some pundits will boil it down to abundant liquidity, a term they can seldom adequately defined. If it’s a case of an endless stream of cheap money, we are reminded of Japan where rates were microscopic for years and the Nikkei certainly did enjoy no fewer than four 50% rallies and over 420,000 rally points in a market that is still more than 70% lower today than it was two decades ago. Liquidity and technicals can certainly touch off whippy tradable rallies, but they don’t take you all the way to a sustainable bull market. Only positive economic and balance sheet fundamentals can do that. Another way to look at the situation is that when you hear and read about “liquidity” driving the market, it is usually a catch-all phrase for “we have no clue” but it sounds good. When we don’t have a reasonable explanation for what is driving prices our strategy is to watch from the sidelines and express whatever positive views we have in the credit market and our other income and hedge fund strategies. IN THIS ISSUE • Who’s doing the buying in the equity markets? • In our view, there is way too much risk in the U.S. equity market • We remain long-term commodity bulls, but the near-term outlook is clouded • The Philly Fed manufacturing index now stands at its best level since June 2007 … • … But don’t uncork the champagne just yet, the components were mixed to slightly negative • U.S. initial jobless claims decline, but we are not out of the woods yet • U.S. housing market; carving out a bottom but still quite soft • Consumers still not out of the woods • U.S. household net worth rebounds, but the deleveraging process still has a ways to go

Please see important disclosures at the end of this document.

Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. is one of Canada’s pre-eminent wealth management firms. Founded in 1984 and focused primarily on high net worth private clients, we are dedicated to meeting the needs of our clients by delivering strong, risk-adjusted returns together with the highest level of personalized client service. For more information or to subscribe to Gluskin Sheff economic reports, visit www.gluskinsheff.com

September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

As for valuation, well let’s consider that from our lens, the S&P 500 is now priced for $83 in operating EPS (we come to that conclusion by backing out the earnings yield that would match the current inflation-adjusted Baa corporate bond yield). That would be nearly double from the most recent four-quarter trend. Not only that, but the top-down estimates on operating EPS, for 2009 are $48.00 for 2009; $52.60 for 2010; $62.50 for 2011; and $81.00 for 2012. The bottom-up consensus forecasts only go to 2010 and even for this usually bullish bunch, operating EPS is seen at $73.00 for 2010, which means that $83.00 is likely a 2011 story. Either way, the market is basically discounting an earnings stream that even the consensus does not see for another two to three years. In other words, this is more than just a fully priced market at this point. It is, in fact, deeply overvalued at this juncture. Imagine that six months after the depressed lows we have a situation where:
• The trailing price-earnings ratio on operating EPS is 26.5x. At the October

In just six months, we have managed to take the P/E multiple on the S&P 500 above the peak of the last cycle when the economic expansion was five years old, not five weeks old

2007 highs, it was 18.8x. In addition, when the S&P 500 is trading north of a 26x P/E multiple on trailing operating earnings, history shows that at these high valuation levels, the market declines in the coming year 60% of the time.
• The trailing price-earnings ratio on reported EPS is 184.2x. At the October

2007 highs, it was 23.4x. In fact, just prior to the October 1987 crash, the P/E ratio was 20.3x (not intended to scare anyone).
• The price-to-dividend ratio is 53x, where it was at the 2007 highs. Again, the

market is trading as it if were at a peak for the cycle, not any longer near a trough. Once again, and we don’t intend to sound alarmist, the price-todividend ratio just prior to the 1987 crash was 12x, and at the time, the S&P 500 was viewed in many circles to be at an extended extreme. Bullish analysts like to dismiss the actual earnings because they are “depressed” and include too many writeoffs, which of course will never occur again. Fine, on one-year forward (operating) earning estimates, the P/E ratio is now 15.7x, the highest it has been in nearly five years. At the peak of the S&P 500 in the last cycle — October 2007 — the forward P/E was 14.3x, and the highest it ever got in the last cycle was 15.4x. So hello? In just six short months, we have managed to take the multiple above the peak of the last cycle when the economic expansion was five years old, not five weeks old (and we may be a tad charitable on that assessment). As an aside, the forward multiple on the eve of the 1987 stock market collapse was 14x and one of the explanations for the steep correction was that equities were so overvalued and overbought that it was vulnerable to any shock (in that case, it came out of the U.S. dollar market). It certainly was not the economy because that sharp 30% slide took place even with an economy that was humming along at a 4.5% clip.

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

In other words, valuation may not be the best timing device, but it still matters. If the S&P 500 was in a 700-750 range, de facto pricing in zero to 1% real GDP growth, we would certainly be interested in boosting our allocations towards equities. But at 1,060 and over 4.0% GDP growth effectively being discounted, we will be spectators as opposed to participants, understanding that the key to success is to NOT buy at the peaks. So the strategy is to sit on the sidelines, be selective in our equity choices, and wait for the correction to come or for the fundamentals to catch up with this overvalued, overbought, overextended market. Remember, the reason why the tortoise won the race was because the hare got tired. One more thing, when people look back at this period, they are very likely going to ask themselves why it was that they never paid attention to the volume data, which, like the bond and money market, never confirmed the veracity of this very flashy bear market rally. We reiterate, Japan enjoyed four of these 50% power surges in the context of a market that is still down over 70% from its highs of two decades ago. So remember, rallies in a bear market are to be rented; never owned. For those that never took the opportunity to get out at the lows today have this glorious chance to do so at much better prices, but the question is whether greed has overtaken their long-term resolve, especially now that Gordon Gekko is making a return to the big screen. LONG-TERM COMMODITY BULLS BUT NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK IS CLOUDED By what? The evil “I”. As in … Inventories. Copper prices succumbed yesterday to the latest LME stockpile data, which rose for the fifteenth day in a row, to 324,375 metric tons — the highest since May 26. As for energy, much of the same story — supplies of distillate fuel rose 2.24 million barrels to 167.8 million, 24% above average and the most since January 1983. The commodity complex is down so far today but we remain secular bulls; however, let’s face it, if China has completed its buying program for the year, then it would not surprise us if resource prices press the pause button over the nearterm. (Though the long-term constructive view on the resource sector critically hinges on the outlook for the Asian economies and on this score, the front page article in today’s NYT was highly encouraging — China’s Economy is Roaring Back. We are also fans of the Canadian dollar on a trend basis, but again, it overshot the fundamentals on a near-term basis when it broke above 94 cents level very recently. We do not like the U.S. dollar at all, but at the same time, from a purely tactical standpoint, we have to recognize that there are no U.S. dollar bulls out there right now, the bearish dollar trade is the crowded consensus trade, and that the greenback is massively oversold. It could snap back near-term — be aware of that, please.

We believe that the U.S. equity market remains an overvalued, overbought and overextended market

We are long-term commodity bulls, but the near-term outlook is clouded

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

Be that as it may, long-term investors should stick with the currency of the country that is not going to be raising top marginal tax rates, whose government is not going to re-regulating or infiltrating wide swaths of its economy and who understands the importance of reducing barriers to international trade. As the Obama administration cow-tows to the unions and raises tariffs, the Harper government just announced that it is going to eliminate all import duties on machinery and equipment. As today’s Globe and Mail aptly put it, the move by the Canadian government is “reinforcing its commitment to freer trade even as other members of the Group of 20 nations slip on their pledge to maintain open markets.” PHILLY CHEESESTEAK The Philly Fed index was the latest in a string of indicators suggesting that industrial activity is remaining solid as the third quarter draws to a close. The diffusion index rose to 14.1 in September from 4.2 in August and now stands at its best level since June 2007 — six months before the recession started. However, before anyone uncorks the champagne, it is worth noting that the components were mixed to slightly negative. So like a Philly Cheesesteak, the first bite was great, but then the fried onions start to dominate. To wit:
• Prices paid, a measure of input costs, rose to 14.9 in September from 10.0 in

We are also fans of the CAD on a trend basis, but has overshot the fundamentals on a nearterm basis when it broke above 94 cents level very recently

August — the highest in 13 months. At the same time, prices received, which measures pricing power, tanked in September, to -10.5 from -1.5 (so much for the reflation/inflation chatter).
• New orders edged down to 3.3 from 4.2 in August. • Inventories actually swung to -18.1 (worst level since May) from +0.3 in

August.
• Employment declined to -14.3 from -12.9 (though the workweek did improve

to -3.9 from -6.4).
• The six-month outlook index fell to 47.8 from 56.8 and the nearby June high

of 60.1 — now at its lowest level since April.
• Pricing intentions rolled back to a three-month low of 9.7 from 13.6 in August.

Based on the research that has come our way, the ISM-adjusted figure actually broke a five-month string of gains with a modest drop, to 47.5 in September from 48.9 in August. The bottom in ISM led the bottom in equities by three months so keep an eye on any peaking out. JOBLESS CLAIMS DECLINE Initial jobless claims in the U.S. managed to climb over some pretty aggressive seasonal factors for the week of September 12 — down 12,000 to 545,000. But the raw non-seasonally adjusted data showed a plunge, from 466,000 to 408,000 — the lowest in a year. The four-week moving average is at 563,000 and frankly, this is still consistent with a near 200,000 nonfarm payrolls decline.

The latest Philly Fed manufacturing survey is like a Philly Cheesesteak — the first bite is great, but then the fried onions start to dominate

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

Continuing claims rose 129k to 6.23 million so there really is no sign of any new hirings taking place — consistent with the latest Manpower intentions survey. The insured unemployment rate edged up to 4.7% from 4.6%, and extended benefits rose a further 32k too for the August 29th week. It truly is difficult to say anything inspiring here about the labour market in the U.S. but then again, who needs to hire when Corporate America can shed 63k factory jobs in the same month that it boosts manufacturing output at a 7.8% annual rate? While it is now considered to be in very bad taste to say anything negative about an equity market that is seemingly on a one-way ticket north, by the time the S&P 500 was up 60% in the last cycle, claims had already fallen to 300k. And, in the cycle prior to that, claims had drifted down to 350k by the time the market had rallied 60%. The market is so overextended that it is now 20% above its 200-day moving average, which is a technical condition that has not occurred in 27 years. HOUSING … CARVING OUT A BOTTOM BUT STILL QUITE SOFT What was key in the August housing starts data in the U.S. was that single-family starts were actually down 3.0% to a 479k annual rate, fully offsetting the July gain. Single-family permits have clearly carved out a bottom but they did pause (-0.2% MoM) last month as well. Housing completions sank 5.5% and units under construction fell 2.8% and these will weigh on construction activity over the nearterm in terms of the expenditure data. Multi-family starts surged 25% to a three-month high of 119k units at an annual rate. That’s all we need, more “multis” with a nationwide apartment vacancy rate at a record of 10.6%. For the first time on record, this 30% chunk of the CPI, otherwise known as residential rents, has dipped now for two months in a row — and something tells us that more is to come. CONSUMER STILL NOT OUT OF THE WOODS If you mine the data, you will see that there was less to the blowout retail sales data for August than met the eye. Once the aggressive seasonals are factored, you can actually build the case that there was very little or no growth in the core number. Let’s go to the real world and away from the Commerce Department data for a second. Wal-Mart’s CEO said yesterday that “our customers have been under a real strain” and that the paycheck cycle has “been more exaggerated and pronounced in recent months.” He added (near and dear to our Ozzie & Harriet hearts) … “This new focus on frugality, and especially on the deferral of purchases for things that aren’t needed right now, are the new normal … I don’t believe this will change as the economy gets better. The deferral of purchases will be with us for a long, long time.”

Yes, U.S. housing starts rose 1.5% MoM in August, but what was key was the 3.0% decline in singlefamily starts

Yes, U.S. retail sales were a blowout, but remember the new focus on frugality by the U.S. consumer will persist for a long time

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

A just-released Bloomberg poll shows that only 8% of households intend to lift spending; one-third say they intend to spend less. The only way it would seem to prop up the consumer is by recurring rounds of government stimulus. Indeed, don’t look now but there is a bill in Congress, introduced by Senator Johnny Isakson from Georgia (a Republican no less!), proposing that the $8,000 first-time homebuyer tax credit (supposed to expire at the end of November) be expanded to $15,000 and made available to everyone (besides being limited to “newbies” right now, there are income caps at $75k per individual and $150k for couples). Not only that, but the Obama administration is now engaged in talks with the Treasury department — the discussions centre around providing aid to jobless homeowners who are having trouble meeting their mortgage payments (that there is a private insurance sector that provides this to people who buy a home is somehow immaterial — the government south of the border is concentrating less on the taxpayer and more on nurturing a welfare state). Note as well (you can see this on page C12 of the WSJ — Uncle Sam Bets the House on Mortgages) how the long arm of the law has been extended to the residential real estate sector. Fully 85% of new mortgages being issued are receiving government support in the form of guarantees (the three banks dominating the market must be making out like bandits)! What is amazing is that we are really seeing only nascent improvements in housing demand and mortgage growth. In fact, as a sign of how the government is pushing on a string, consumer attitudes towards this ball and chain called real estate and the leverage that goes with it, mortgage applications for new purchases are down 30% from the already deeply depressed levels of a year ago. What’s that saying again about bringing the mule to water? U.S. HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH REBOUNDS The dramatic rally in the equity market (which has effectively taken valuations to late-cycle, not mid-cycle levels by the way), along with the stability in home prices (at least for now), helped boost U.S. household net worth by $2 trillion in the second quarter. But the reality is that this rebound recouped very little of the $14 trillion that was lost in the prior two years, and still leaves a gaping $12 trillion hole in the household balance sheet. The problem is that with 12 months of total unsold housing inventory, when the shadow supply from the banking sector is added in, will limit any potential for further home price gains and in fact leaves real estate valuation vulnerable to a further downleg, especially at the high-end market where excess supply is particularly acute. Moreover, valuations in the equity market are now far less compelling and are likely to cap the stock market or perhaps even leave the market vulnerable to negative returns in the coming year, if history is any indication. What really caught our eye, and one of the principal reasons why net worth improved, was the huge $48 billion decline in total household debt, bringing the cumulative runoff from the fourth quarter of 2008 to an unprecedented $200 billion. The post-bubble deleveraging continues, and absent recurring bouts of generosity from Uncle Sam, the consumer will remain in the doldrums as far as the eye can see.

The post-bubble deleveraging continues, and absent recurring bouts of generosity from Uncle Sam, the U.S. consumer will remain in the doldrums as far as the eye can see

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

Remember Bob Farrell’s rule number 2: “Excesses in one direction will lead to an opposite excess in the other direction.” The household sector is in the early stages of unwinding a secular excessive credit cycle that began a quarter-century ago, which turned parabolic in 2001 with the onset of the Bush ‘ownership society’, and all the leverage that came with it from low-doc loans, to no-doc loans, to liar loans, to stated-income loans, to piggyback loans, to subprime loans, and finally to option ARMS and “neg-ams”. Dialing back to the “mean” would mean slicing the household debt ratio by half and this in turn entails $7 trillion of debt repayment. So, consider the $200 billion of credit reduction to date a very small downpayment on what promises to be a deleveraging phase that can easily last a decade. Sushi anyone? CHART 1: CONSUMER DELEVERAGING HAS A LONG WAY TO GO
United States: Household Credit Market Debt to GDP (ratio)
1.1

Remember Farrell’s rule #2: “Excess in one direction will lead to an opposite excess in the other direction.”

0.9

0.7

0.5

0.3

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

00

05

Shaded region represent periods of U.S. recession Source: Haver Analytics, Gluskin Sheff

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

Gluskin Sheff at a Glance
Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. is one of Canada’s pre-eminent wealth management firms. Founded in 1984 and focused primarily on high net worth private clients, we are dedicated to the prudent stewardship of our clients’ wealth through the delivery of strong, risk-adjusted investment returns together with the highest level of personalized client service.
OVERVIEW
As of June 30, 2009, the Firm managed assets of $4.4 billion.

INVESTMENT STRATEGY & TEAM

We have strong and stable portfolio management, research and client service teams. Aside from recent additions, our Gluskin Sheff became a publicly traded Portfolio Managers have been with the corporation on the Toronto Stock Firm for a minimum of ten years and we Exchange (symbol: GS) in May 2006 and have attracted “best in class” talent at all remains 65% owned by its senior levels. Our performance results are those management and employees. We have of the team in place. public company accountability and We have a strong history of insightful governance with a private company bottom-up security selection based on commitment to innovation and service. fundamental analysis. For long equities, we Our investment interests are directly look for companies with a history of longaligned with those of our clients, as term growth and stability, a proven track Gluskin Sheff’s management and record, shareholder-minded management employees are collectively the largest and a share price below our estimate of client of the Firm’s investment portfolios. intrinsic value. We look for the opposite in We offer a diverse platform of investment equities that we sell short. For corporate strategies (Canadian and U.S. equities, bonds, we look for issuers with a margin of Alternative and Fixed Income) and safety for the payment of interest and investment styles (Value, Growth and principal, and yields which are attractive 1 Income). relative to the assessed credit risks involved. The minimum investment required to establish a client relationship with the Firm is $3 million for Canadian investors and $5 million for U.S. & International investors. We assemble concentrated portfolios – our top ten holdings typically represent between 30% to 40% of a portfolio. In this way, clients benefit from the ideas in which we have the highest conviction.

Our investment interests are directly aligned with those of our clients, as Gluskin Sheff’s management and employees are collectively the largest client of the Firm’s investment portfolios.

$1 million invested in our Canadian Value Portfolio in 1991 (its inception date) would have grown to $9.0 million2 on July 31, 2009 versus $5.0 million for the S&P/TSX Total Return Index over the same period.

Our success has often been linked to our $1 million invested in our Canadian Value long history of investing in underfollowed and under-appreciated small Portfolio in 1991 (its inception date) 2 would have grown to $9.0 million on July and mid cap companies both in Canada and the U.S. 31, 2009 versus $5.0 million for the S&P/TSX Total Return Index over the PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION same period. In terms of asset mix and portfolio $1 million usd invested in our U.S. construction, we offer a unique marriage Equity Portfolio in 1986 (its inception between our bottom-up security-specific date) would have grown to $10.7 million fundamental analysis and our top-down 2 usd on July 31, 2009 versus $8.1 million macroeconomic view, with the noted usd for the S&P 500 Total Return Index addition of David Rosenberg as Chief over the same period. Economist & Strategist.
Notes:

PERFORMANCE

For further information, please contact questions@gluskinsheff.com

Unless otherwise noted, all values are in Canadian dollars. 1. Not all investment strategies are available to non-Canadian investors. Please contact Gluskin Sheff for information specific to your situation. 2. Returns are based on the composite of segregated Value and U.S. Equity portfolios, as applicable, and are presented net of fees and expenses.

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September 18, 2009 – BREAKFAST WITH DAVE

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES
Copyright 2009 Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. (“Gluskin Sheff”). All rights reserved. This report is prepared for the use of Gluskin Sheff clients and subscribers to this report and may not be redistributed, retransmitted or disclosed, in whole or in part, or in any form or manner, without the express written consent of Gluskin Sheff. Gluskin Sheff reports are distributed simultaneously to internal and client websites and other portals by Gluskin Sheff and are not publicly available materials. Any unauthorized use or disclosure is prohibited. Gluskin Sheff may own, buy, or sell, on behalf of its clients, securities of issuers that may be discussed in or impacted by this report. As a result, readers should be aware that Gluskin Sheff may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. This report should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment and readers are encouraged to seek independent, third-party research on any companies covered in or impacted by this report. Individuals identified as economists do not function as research analysts under U.S. law and reports prepared by them are not research reports under applicable U.S. rules and regulations. Macroeconomic analysis is considered investment research for purposes of distribution in the U.K. under the rules of the Financial Services Authority. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or other financial instrument or any derivative related to such securities or instruments (e.g., options, futures, warrants, and contracts for differences). This report is not intended to provide personal investment advice and it does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in financial instruments and implementing investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. Any decision to purchase or subscribe for securities in any offering must be based solely on existing public information on such security or the information in the prospectus or other offering document issued in connection with such offering, and not on this report. Securities and other financial instruments discussed in this report, or recommended by Gluskin Sheff, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are not deposits or other obligations of any insured depository institution. Investments in general and, derivatives, in particular, involve numerous risks, including, among others, market risk, counterparty default risk and liquidity risk. No security, financial instrument or derivative is suitable for all investors. In some cases, securities and other financial instruments may be difficult to value or sell and reliable information about the value or risks related to the security or financial instrument may be difficult to obtain. Investors should note that income from such securities and other financial instruments, if any, may fluctuate and that price or value of such securities and instruments may rise or fall and, in some cases, investors may lose their entire principal investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Levels and basis for taxation may change. Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or financial instrument mentioned in this report. 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